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CHAPTER 3
MULTICULTURALISM AND SOCIAL TRANSFORMATION: THE ISRAELI CASE

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Basic Aspects of Multiculturalism

Contemporary societies experience cultural diversity through the simultaneous presence of a variety of sociocultural groups (Garmadi 1981; Sankoff 1980). By sociocultural group, one means individuals marked by cultural features that, in one respect or another, contrast with the rest of society (Ben-Rafael 1994). This reality is multifarious. Taking inspiration from the sociolinguistic concepts of subtractive and additive bilingualism (see Beebe and Giles 1984; Lambert 1977 and 1981; Romaine 1989), one may speak, for instance, of subtractive multiculturalism as opposed to additive multiculturalism. Subtractive multiculturalism should refer to a social and cultural situation where individuals forget their original culture and language at the measure that they acquire the society's mainstream culture. Additive multiculturalism means that the acquisition of the mainstream culture does not prevent remaining individuals of a given entity to remain faithful to their own. Though, even then, the very exposure to the mainstream culture of a particular culture should lead to the crystallization of what might be called, again under the influence of the sociolinguistic concept of interlanguage, an *interculture*. By interculture, one then designates cultural patterns and modes of behavior that represent a transformation by new influences of elements of an original culture. An example is the language of a given group that is altered by its contact with the legitimate language of the group's new environment. These alterations consist in the absorption of words, expressions and patterns of speech pertaining to the legitimate language, the use of which by members of the group may vary in intensity and systematization, according to situations and locutors (Adjamian 1976). Interlanguages and intercultures (Myers Scotton 1983) mark collective boundaries and measure the extent that groups remain, vis-a-vis the rest of society, *culturally contrastive* or, when viewed from the other side of the coin, resistant to *acculturation* and to their becoming increasingly less *different*. At the limit, one will speak of *assimilation* when acculturation comes to include social identity (Orans 1971; Olzak 1983; Ben-Rafael 1994).

It is from this perspective that, following the literature of the field, one may discuss the impact of three basic forces that sociological models of

multiculturalism deal with, namely, stratification, the dominant culture, and the group's orientations.

The Class Aspect

Many (Barth 1969; Patterson 1975; Tajfel 1978 a; 1978b; 1978c) emphasize the influence of class and power relations on collective consciousness. Scholars focus especially on social deprivation, discrimination (Simpson and Yinger 1958), the blunt domination of stronger categories (Kuper 1965), or intergroup competition on split labor markets (Bonacich 1980) to account for a good part of groups' determination to hold to their cultural autonomy and refuse self-negation through acculturation and assimilation. Moreover, social inferiority correlates with social isolation as contacts with its membership are of little profitability for non-members, which also has the effect of maintaining a distance from the dominant culture (see Milroy 1989).

Social inferiority in a modern society rarely means, however, a total absence of social mobility. The multiplicity of markets always provides for at least a few to reach channels of advancement--in business, education, the military, sport, etc. Mobility means for these individuals greater respectability and thus greater exposure to the mainstream culture and the legitimate language, and a multiplication of out-group relations. Whether or not these individuals will still retain their attachment to their community of origin--both if most of them remain widely marked by social inferiority, or if mobility is the lot of the many--is a question that one may answer only in light of additional factors, that is, the dominant culture and the group's self-perception.

Models of Dominant Cultures

Up to now, we used the perspective of the mainstream culture to designate the prevalent models of behavior and styles. As the basis of legitimization of the center, the dominant culture is primarily identified with the stronger segments of the setting (Foucault 1972; 1984). It symbolizes the assumed systemic integration of the setting, as seen *from above* (Douglas 1978) and thus outlines the rights and duties of membership in reference to ideologies and/or legacies (Lipset 1967; Eisenstadt 1982). It is thereby that the dominant culture includes as one of its dimensions what Abercrombie and Turner (1983) call the dominant ideology.

In this context, diverse modern dominant cultures may obviously differ from each other in their attitudes toward sociocultural groups, which may explain, at least partially, why, in similar stratificational conditions, a same group encounters different experiences in different societies. Hence, Italians in France have been completely assimilated by the French society within one generation (Milza 1988) while Italians in the USA have remained, for much

longer, culturally distinct (Gans 1979). This very different kind of collective fate relates to the fact that the American pluralistic *melting pot* is more tolerant of pluralism (Glazer and Moynihan 1975) than France's *republicanism* which insists on the secular (*laïc*) uniformity of all French (Grillo 1989).

In brief, a *unifying* dominant culture (see Grillo 1989; Wardhaugh 1987) aspires to the erasure of particularisms and the predominance of uniformity. The acquisition of the legitimate language and the dominant culture is expected to supplant the allegiance of individuals to their own original codes and models. This is a subtractive-acculturation orientation. This orientation is the opposite of what is exhibited by a *pluralistic* dominant culture which is tolerant of diversity, and thus, allows for the development of additive acculturation. Furthermore, nothing excludes the possibility that a same dominant culture is more tolerant of the pluralism exhibited by some groups than by others, and is unifying and pluralistic at the same time, with respect to different groups.

The main issue at stake here is that different types of dominant culture are subject to different directions of the pressure which the center exerts--through language policies, educational programs, official media or budgets of institutions. This influence, to be sure, is limited by the social position of the group: if a group concentrates in lower strata, a unifying dominant culture will hardly be able to eliminate the segregationist effect of that condition. The contemporary Turkish immigrants in Sweden (Lange 1989) exemplify a case where an assimilationist center is unable to guarantee the cultural integration of low-class immigrants. The nature of the dominant culture is more powerful regarding the fate of mobile ethnics. In the USA, for instance, mobile ethnics among the Afro-Americans only rarely completely assimilate within the privileged layers of the leading group (the WASPs), in spite of their acculturation and out-group relations. The elitism of the Protestant ethos which is at the core of the dominant culture in the USA (Van den Berghe 1978; Orans 1971) shows, indeed, little intolerance for popular prejudices against Blacks, even when well-educated and socially successful.

The Perspectives of the Groups

Yet, even when experiencing similar conditions and confronting the same dominant culture, groups may still differ from each other regarding the contours and evolution of their social boundaries. Hence, Norwegians who have undergone impressive mobility, have completely disappeared among the WASPs while, at the same time, American Jews, who have not been less mobile, have retained their particularism with determination. Protestant Scandinavians, it is true, have been more warmly welcome than Jews by the WASPs, but, the Jews' stronger attachment to their parochialism has also been a factor (Haugen, 1953; Halpern, 1956). Hence, a group may, by itself,

aspire more or less to retain some symbolic particularism or, on the contrary, to assimilate. This velleity is also a factor of influence in the shaping of collective boundaries. It relates to the original cultures of groups (Geertz, 1965) which do not all ask for a same kind of commitment from members. This aspect plays an especially salient role when it comes to the mobile elements who are competent both in their own group's original legacy and the dominant culture, and who thus enjoy the opportunity of engaging in alternate paths of social and cultural insertion. The influence of the group's culture can then be exerted through kins and community as well as by means of the outlooks and values which individuals identify with since childhood. The more a group's culture emphasizes its intrinsic worth and requires the commitment of individuals, and thus the more the group conveys retentionist aspirations and individual members feel committed to their legacy, the more it is painful and stigmatizing to distance oneself from the community. This pressure should be a powerful factor of symbolic retentionism--even though some might overcome its influence and focus only on their practical interests.

Conclusion

In brief, stratification, the dominant culture and group orientations are major factors in the shaping of social boundaries. As seen above, everyone of these factors *says something* concerning the retentionism-versus-assimilation of the group. Hence, one may expect that each particular case will occupy a different place in a partially ordered spatial typology of profiles. At one end of this space there is the enclave model marked by the social inferiority of the group, a pluralistic dominant culture and a self-segregationist group. At the other end of the space, there is the case where ethnicity is getting deleted as the majority of the group is socially mobile and both the dominant culture and the group culturally and ideologically favor assimilation.

We may add that, according to the foregoing, it would be possible to correlate the various models of social boundaries with their linguistic activity. This especially refers to the extent that individuals--the mobile as well as the non-mobile--retain their original language, forge an interlanguage or subtractively adopt the legitimate language of their environment. This linguistic activity should reveal the extent that members of the group continue to use linguistic markers in their home, with friends or more widely, and whether or not they *forget* their original code and fail to transmit any of it (Hamers and Blanc 1989).

Multiculturalism and Politics

What is of primary importance, however, in the present context, concerns the extent that multiculturalism also constitutes a focus of social change, or even

transformation in modern society. This question is especially pertinent in democracies where groups of many kinds are authorized to exert political pressure on behalf of their claims. Even where the dominant culture is less than inviting, determined (that is, non-assimilationist) religious communities, ethnic minorities or regional populations are allowed and able to become political actors by creating parties of their own or acting as interest groups.

Success, however, is never warranted and always depends on the political conjuncture, that is, the configuration of power relations in the polity. This constellation does not necessarily relate to issues rising up from the reality of social cleavages but on it depends the extent to which the political scene is a profitable scene of action for sociocultural groups in general, or for some of them in particular. The potential weight of actors such as dispersed religious communities, regional populations or organizations of immigrants also depend on the nature of this interaction. Political profitability is, in itself, a major factor that may motivate potential political leaders, parties and associations.

This aspect is crucial for the evolution of multiculturalism as modern societies experience simultaneously a variety of cleavages. Hence, the strife of several sociocultural groups, if such individual confrontations over particular claims overlap, may add up to a power able to transform society. Yet, even if such coherence does not obtain and, instead, each group leads its fight in its own particular perspective, groups may still be able to exploit the conditions created by each other's achievements. Even then, one should still be able to speak of cumulative alterations in the social order that may well sum up to drastic changes of general significance. These issues, which concern the *how* and *to which extent* multiculturalism transforms society, raise the study of sociocultural groups to the level of the political analysis of multicultural settings. This latter kind of perspective asks how groups interact with each other, collaborate or exploit each other's achievements and, in common or individually, confront, alter, and even transform the dominant culture. It thereby asks nothing less than the extent that multiculturalism transforms the basis on which stands the legitimacy of the social order. It is from this twofold perspective that the following considers the major sociocultural groups of the Israeli society.

The Israeli Example

The order of the presentation of Israel's major sociocultural groups does not relate to a gradation of their difference vis-a-vis the dominant culture, but rather to two criteria. First, the first three considered represent Jewish cases and the fourth, which is the most extreme, a non-Jewish case; second, among the Jewish cases, the order corresponds to a historical perspective, which relates to the manner each case influenced and still influences the others. It must be stated right away, that these groups have succeeded in imposing their

very different particularisms on an antagonistic dominant culture. These cases taken together represent also a majority of the Israeli population--the ultra-Orthodox are about 6% of the population; the Middle-Easterners who are clearly marked by their ethnicity about 25-30% of the population; the Soviet Jews, 14%; the Arabs, 18%; that is, in total, between 63% and 68%.

This means that the dominant culture represents but one-third of the population. It must be emphasized that the foremost characteristic of the dominant culture is Zionism. Influenced by nineteenth-century European nationalisms, the Zionists drew much of their impetus from their proposal of a new secular solution to the fundamental identity problem of Jews, that is, the definition of their diaspora condition ("dispersion" in Greek) in cultural-religious terms as an exile (*gola* or *galut* in Hebrew) (Laqueur 1972; Avineri 1981, pp,3-13). The Zionist solution consisted of the resettlement of the Jews in the Land of Israel, the culturally-defined home of the Jewish People, and the creation of a secular nation-state. The Zionists thus attached themselves to a cultural revolution intended to transform the Jewish legacy, but maintaining Jewish solidarity as a basic tenet (see Ben-Rafael 1982, pp.13-20). It is against this background that their enterprise started with a linguistic revolution, the revival of Hebrew.

A secondary tenet of this dominant culture has been socialism (Horowitz and Lissak 1978). This ideology has been realized in welfare services, strong unions and an egalitarian orientation of the political culture. In parallel, the tumultuous history of the Israeli setting, the fact that this society was formed by immigration to an impoverished area, and the permanent state of belligerency with the neighboring states and the Palestinians, engendered attitudes that emphasized problem-solving and permanent reference to collective challenges. Moreover, as in any society of immigrants, being a veteran was a basis of prestige and authority associated with one's contribution to the formation of the setting. A special aura also surrounded the generation of continuers. In the late 1940s and during the 1950s, this leading stratum consisting of the founders and the second generation set up patronizing institutions with the purpose of guiding the new immigrants into the absorptive setting--in exchange, of course, for political allegiance. This elite, which was widely sustained by later secular Eastern and Western European immigration, increased its power by co-opting individuals of outstanding achievement or leaders of particular groups.

Over time, the Western version of modernity has become another tenet of the dominant culture. This focus supports private enterprise and the principle of market economy, high expectations regarding consumption, technology, science, and education (see Horowitz and Lissak 1989). Cultural bearings now insist on individual achievement and career and, the original socialist ideology notwithstanding, on meritocratic differentiation of social status (Lissak 1967). The elite that originally led the Zionist enterprise underwent a genuine cultural

changeover. Now populating the increasingly numerous universities, the offspring of this stratum and the socially mobile coming from the outside were to form the cohorts of achievement- and merit-oriented professionals. Furthermore, in the context of a general disenchantment with a bureaucratized socialism, these new layers found it increasingly difficult to retain their loyalty to old social-democracy, gradually identifying with centrist or New Left forces. These strata are also the ones who principally endorse the dominant culture's exigency of unified identity and culture; however, through this acceptance, they also express their desire for distinction (Ben-Rafael 1994). Remarkably enough, their principal status symbol is the mastery of English as a second language. While, however, these strata continue to head social and socioeconomic hierarchies, ever since the late 1970s, they have gradually developed a conflictual consciousness, as the parties which they mostly sustain (the left-of-the-center parties) are not, anymore, the principal and unmovable incumbents of the political center. Though the elite who have controlled the hierarchy of power for most of the time since the late 1970s also derives from the affluent, secular middle-class, they draw their principal support from major sociocultural groups which, as a whole, constitute a majority of the Israeli society. What this means for society and the study of multiculturalism will be illuminated by the analysis of those sociocultural groups.

1. The Ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazics

The ultra-Orthodox Ashkenazics (about 8% of the Israeli total population) represent a quite salient cleavage. Regarding the class dimension, most of them are lower class by their income, but this is of little cultural consequence in light of the power of religious codes and of the rabbinical elite among them. While the dominant culture, in a nation-building perspective, expects from any Jewish collective to be integrated into the society, this perspective hardly applies to the ultra-Orthodox. The latter, have always seen Zionism as a form of mass assimilation to the world of the non-Jew and, on behalf of their dedication to the ancestral faith, have never been ready to give up their distinct symbols--the long beard and fur hat for men and the long-sleeved blouses and the wig for women. In brief, besides the fact that the ultra-Orthodox are concentrated in the lower class; the main aspects of this case concern the mutual incongruence that the group and the dominant culture perceive in each other.

It must be emphasized, however, that this mutual incongruence is not symmetrical. While it is quite clear to the non-religious middle-class that the ultra-Orthodox represent *another world*, things stand differently among the latter. On the one hand, there is, for instance, the use of Yiddish as a major vernacular in the ultra-Orthodox community and the cult of Biblical Hebrew as

the language of study in the religious academy. On the other hand, while modern Hebrew (Ivrit) is perceived as *vulgar,* it has, in practice, definitely conquered the status of the first language in the ultra-Orthodox's daily life. This additive multiculturalism can be explained only by referring to the fact that, in spite of their controversies with the Zionists, the ultra-Orthodox cannot remain indifferent to the society around them. This society is Jewish and, for this reason, the ultra-Orthodox cannot but feel *responsible* for them, as the self-appointed holders of the banner of Judaism. Hence, they cannot not involve themselves in any Israeli matter of public interest.

It is in this, that the Ultra-Orthodox can not be reckoned as a regular sect despite the sharp contrast which their Judaism stands for vis-à-vis the dominant culture. Because of their constant preoccupation for anything Jewish, they might be depicted as a nearly-sect or *quasi-sect.* This also explains the ultra-Orthodox participation in elections (where they generally win four to six parliamentary seats out of 120). Despite their restricted size, the strength of their political representation is not negligible because of their influence on the other religious parties (in total 20-25 seats), and especially the strong Middle-Eastern ultra-Orthodox Shas. Moreover, their bargaining power also draws from their position as a floating element between the right and left, needed by any coalition formed by the two principal parties, the left-of-center Avoda and right-of-center Likud. Whether or not ultra-Orthodox participate in governments, they are always able to obtain substantial financial support for their institutions and communities--schools, academies, building rights and the like. Moreover, because they see themselves as the elite of the People of Israel in charge of carrying its religious mission, they are also, and principally, mobilized on behalf of the implementation of religion-inspired national legislation. Because of their success, they have institutionalized their presence in Israeli society as both *different* from and an *integral part* of it. The ultra-Orthodox have, thereby, deeply antagonized large parts of the secular civil society, but at the same time, they have been an example of successful particularism for others who came from very different horizons, and above of all, the Middle-Easterners.

2. The Middle-Eastern Communities

The Middle-Easterners represent a cleavage whose contrast with the dominant culture is less acute than the ultra-Orthodox. They are concentrated disproportionately in the lower class, which opposes acculturation and assimilation, but, on the other hand, the dominant culture has for long been vigorously assimilationist; and the Middle-Easterners themselves tended to both sustain assimilationism in a perspective that insisted on common Jewishness, and to be moved by a traditionalism that justified some retentionism.

Up to 1948, Eastern Europeans (Ashkenazics) constituted a large majority of Israeli Jews (85%). Middle-Easterners' share increased in the 1950s and 1960s (Ben-Rafael and Sharot, 1991) and reached 43% in the 1990s (see ICBS, 1988; 1989). Many joined the lower strata in the context of both their weak human capital --low education and traditionalism--and their cultural aloofness from an establishment which was prejudiced and often discriminated against them. In the 1990s, Ashkenazics are still four times more in the highest tenth of income distribution, and the proportion is reversed in the lowest tenth (IC.B.S.,1988). By now, nearly half of the Middle-Easterners belong to the middle class. In other words, Middle-Easterners are unevenly exposed to the assimilationist dominant culture.

Middle-Easterners whose position remain in the lower class actually continue to form ethnic communities (Ben-Rafael and Sharot 1991; Weingrod 1990). These communities find a justification to their retentionism on the ground that they are unable to disregard in the Land of the Jew what had always been understood by them as symbols of Judaism when they lived among Gentiles. In their traditional spirit, they had seen the creation of Israel as the promised Redemption rewarding their longstanding dedication to the Jewish faith. They accepted to turn to Hebrew as the national language--it has been, after all, extracted from the Bible--but, even in the second or third generation, they still speak the language with accents which mark their origins, the socializing influence of the Israeli school, army and media notwithstanding. Many Middle-Easterners, moreover, resent that the secular culture which dominates Israeli society means moral degradation in comparison to the traditional Diaspora. Some of these individuals joined Ashkenazic ultra-Orthodox academies and, later, established their own academies for the *glory of Middle-Eastern Judaism.*

In contrast, Middle-Easterners who have experienced upward mobility in business or the professions have undergone secularization and have often assimilated into the predominantly Ashkenazic privileged strata. The latter who are the closest to the dominant culture are committed to a unifying ethos and do not exclude Middle-Easterners who, in terms of class, belong to them. Middle-Eastern communities are also oriented, in principle, toward the *fusion of exiles,* and do not condemn their socially successful sons and daughters who assimilate into predominantly Ashkenazic milieus. The result is, that the Middle-Eastern communities remain marked by deprivation while the predominantly Ashkenazic privileged class becomes more and more heterogeneous by origin.

It is, however, in the realm of politics that the most crucial struggle takes place. The balance between Right and Left has dramatically increased the bargaining power of the Middle-Eastern vote. Parties have been ready to raise numerous Middle-Easterners to prominence while ethnic parties, long condemned as *divisive,* have become powerful and are courted by all

governments. Shas, the Middle-Eastern ultra-Orthodox party, has, actually, become the third force after the Avoda and the Likud. All in all, from 12 seats in 1977, Middle-Easterners in Parliament number 45 in 1996. Welfare budgets have substantially increased and ethnic schools have been authorized. Even mobile assimilated Middle-Easterners now ask if *Middle-Eastern Jewishness* does not deserve enduring commitment. All this was soon to be exploited by a newly arrived group, the Soviet Jews.

3. The Soviet Jews

The Soviet Jews differ even less with the dominant culture than the Middle-Easterners. With respect to social stratification, they still widely concentrate in lower strata but this, it is already clear, is temporary. The dominant culture, it is also obvious, wants Soviet Jews to completely integrate. On the other hand, the group itself is moved by a pride in its cultural and linguistic resources that might well prove strong enough to create a new ethnic reality in the current political constellation.

The Soviet Jews who have been arriving since 1989 number about 800,000 in the late 1990s (which includes 25% of non-Jews assimilated to Jews). On arrival, Soviet Jews turned to any occupation available, and many found themselves in low-class jobs (50%) (Ben-Rafael, Olshtain et al., 1996). Yet, this group possesses human capital assets which warrant rapid mobility-- academics are about 50%. Moreover, the group is defined by both the dominant culture and itself as a Returning Diaspora and as such accedes to immediate citizenship. This is not to gainsay that these are immigrants often motivated by purely instrumental considerations who draw little satisfaction from joining the *Jewish homeland*. Most do not speak Yiddish, the traditional language of Eastern European Judaism and have no Judaic knowledge either. In contrast, Soviet Jews attach great importance to their culture and language of origin which they evaluate higher than the Israeli culture and Hebrew. On this basis they build community institutions where activities are held in Russian and support newspapers and magazines in this language. While they are remote from the nationalism of either the veteran Eastern Europeans or the Middle-Easterners, they are not less secular than the former and like the latter, are bound to their original culture, which, however, in their case, is a non-Jewish culture. In the future, many Soviet Jews might be tempted by assimilation into the non-ethnic part of the middle-class, in the context of their social closeness to them; they would then probably lose their control of Russian. On the other hand, not a few Soviet Jews might prefer to remain identified with their ethnic community and to invest efforts in the retention of their bilingualism and bi-culturalism. They might eventually create, as well, a Russian-Hebrew interlanguage as a marker of the Israeli-Russian Jew and add English to their linguistic repertoire as the marker of their middle-class status.

Seeing their potential social mobility, Soviet Jews may soon become the first instance of a secular middle-class ethnic group in Israel. These are also the people who will build the political power of the Jewish Russian community and establish its distinctiveness. The success of an ethnic-Russian party at the 1996 elections (7 seats, only 7 years after their immigration began) concurs with this expectation and shows how Soviet Jews are able to exploit favorable political circumstances as well as the pluralistic climate created by the Middle-Easterners, themselves in the footsteps of the ultra-Orthodox.

4. The Israeli Arabs

One more sociocultural group consists, again, of a very different group, that is, Israel's Arabs. This group contrasts the most with the dominant culture. One finds here, like with the Middle-Easterners, a wide concentration in the lower class, but distinguished from them, and possibly closer to the ultra-Orthodox-- though more acutely in a very different perspective-- both the dominant culture and the group's orientation insist on their mutually exclusionist attitudes toward each other.

Arabs constitute 18% of Israel's population. They reside mainly (90%) in their own villages or towns (Horowitz D. and Lissak M. 1989). A widely traditional and illiterate peasant society in the 1950s, now 62% of them, compared to 29% among Jews, are employed in industrial and agricultural blue-collar jobs; 13% in professional jobs, as opposed to 31% among Jews (Lewin-Epstein and Semyonov 1986; Layish 1981; Makhou 1982; Smooha 1976). In light of Israel's security situation, Israeli Arabs are rarely given a chance in the weapons industry, diplomatic services, or the military. Yet, mobility in small business, the civil service and the professions has, nonetheless, created an Arab middle class. As for the dominant culture, it draws clear boundaries between Jews and Arabs, confining the latter to the status of a national minority (Gorny 1986). This also means that Arabic is recognized as an official language and that the State supports a comprehensive Arabic-speaking educational system.

On the other hand, Arabs themselves take pluralism for granted because of their own identification with tokens--*Arabs, Muslims/Christians* or *Palestinians*--that exclude the Jew (Nakhleh 1975). In this context, the new Arab middle-class remains a part of the community where it is expected to take over leadership. This very fact reveals how far Arabs are affected by the dominant culture (Levy & Guttman 1976). Arabs, indeed, learn about modernity through the Israeli version of this concept, and through the use of Hebrew. They learn Hebrew at school as a second language after Arabic, and have opportunities to improve their knowledge through contacts with Jews at work or by living in metropolitan cities, or through the media. It is through Hebrew that they get then acquainted with the vocabulary of modern technology,

welfare services or democratic politics. Hence, Israeli Arabs' Arabic contains numerous borrowings from Hebrew indicating the emergence of an inter-culture. A kind of cultural *Israelization* which, however, by no means signifies a convergence of identities (Ben-Rafael and Brosh 1995).

It is in this context that Arab parties play an increasing role in Israel's national politics. These parties and leaders have gained political experience and thorough knowledge of the Israeli polity. They are then able to find ways of influence and to progress toward positions within the process of decision-making. Their struggle for influence has also been greatly eased by the multiplication of political communities which has diversified the range of particularistic claims in the Israeli polity.

A Twofold Perspective

The example of Israel confirms that *multiculturalization* is a process of transformation of society where national politics play a determinant role. It shows how a project of nation-building has been considerably transformed due to a recognition of interacting and intermingling sociocultural groups.

The question which might now be raised concerns the reality created by the void left by the retreat of the dominant culture and the nature of the relations that crystallize between these groups which have been the instigators of the fragmentation of the setting. An answer to this question is already implied in the foregoing. Hence, beyond the fact that each cleavage has confronted the dominant culture by asserting its contrastive particularism, it has, at the same time, also been significantly exposed, in a variety of patterns, to that culture. The analysis showed the importance of the acquisition of Hebrew in this process. The language carries different connotations within the different groups, and it has had to share the linguistic field with *partners*. It dwells with Yiddish and Biblical Hebrew among the ultra-Orthodox, Judeo-Arabic among the Middle-Easterners, Russian among the Soviet Jews, Arabic among Arabs. In each group, Hebrew is also granted a different status, as it is a vernacular for the ultra-Orthodox, the language of Jewishness for the Middle-Easterners, of a target society for the Soviet Jewish immigrant and a second language for Arabs. Yet, it remains that its generalized use still means a reference to a common set of symbols and, thus, the best instrument of significant communication.

These sociolinguistic aspects correlate with the fact that each of those sociocultural groups is marked by a convergence of perspectives with the dominant culture. Hence, while they are divided about their respective status in the social order, the ultra-Orthodox and the dominant culture still share a common reference to *Jewishness*--even though the meaning of Judaism is different on either side. In the same vein, the dominant culture and the Middle-Easterners similarly understand Zionism as referring to *Israeli Jewishness*

which is nothing else than Jewishness made a national identity--even though this notion refers to different ancestral legacies. Moreover, while the Soviet Jews' orientation is much more pluralistic and ethnic than the dominant culture would like, both sides share a definition of Israel's relation to non-Israeli Jewishness in terms of a center-diaspora system. Finally, the Jewish-Arab fundamental contention notwithstanding, Israeli Arabs also partake in a common cultural *Israeliness* with the Israeli Jews as participants in the Israeli version of modernity. These identity convergences account for the relative proximity to each other of the various sociocultural groups themselves. They unveil what binds together the constituents of this setting. Like threads of different colors which would keep together different pieces of material, those tokens seem to guarantee the cohesion of the setting by retaining common allegiances among segments, while excluding systemic homogeneity.

Multiculturalism was discussed here from both the comparative perspective of individual cases, and from the standpoint of the multicleavage setting. In the first perspective, a framework is proposed which focuses on theoretical profiles partially ordered between two ends of an assimilationism-retentionism space. This framework draws from a discussion of the roles in boundary formation of stratification, the dominant culture and groups' own perspectives. A concentration in the lower class, a segregative dominant culture and a strong attachment of the group to its legacies contribute to additive acculturation and the retention by the group of its contrastive particularism vis-à-vis the dominant culture. On the contrary, a group which is part of the privileged class, which faces an assimilationist dominant culture and itself wants to assimilate, is bound to subtractive acculturation indicating an evolution toward assimilation. The many possibilities that may be proposed between those two extremes exhibit intermediary forms mixing retention and desertion of cultural particularism and a variety of relations between mobile elements and their group as a whole. Special attention is thus paid, in the discussion of the various profiles, to the positioning of mobile elements vis-à-vis non-mobile elements as a key to the evolution of the sociocultural group's boundaries. And in this latter respect, the analysis emphasizes the importance of data pertaining to linguistic activity as appropriate indicators of the cultural contrastiveness and contours of the group.

Multiculturalism, however, is also, and especially in a democratic regime, a force of change within society at large. The Israeli example has illustrated how sociocultural groups may be able, in appropriate political circumstances, to force a society, dominated by a culture originally assertive of its unifying ambitions, to recognize the reality of contrastive particularisms. These groups have proven that they know how to profit from each other's achievements in their own interests. Their unrelated and incoherent demands have converged toward the center and sustained the creation of parties capable of exercising pressures in most diverse directions. A variety of these processes fueling each

other, although uncoordinated, have deeply altered the impact of the dominant culture.

While the discussion of the profiles of groups has been paradigmatic, this could not be the case when it came to the political dimension of multiculturalism and societal change. That part has had to refer to specific historical and political conjunctures which can hardly be encoded in a priori categories. This means that one is unable to outline definite models of evolution of multiculturalism. Nonetheless, this discussion highlights the importance itself of the political dimension in showing that multiculturalism may effectively be a major force of change and alteration of the social reality, in the sense of an identification of particularisms, their recognition and legitimization.

It is under this light that one also best perceives what keeps sociocultural groups *together*, as constituents of one society. Each group, it has been seen, retains its distinctiveness by selecting, altering and forging its symbols not only by reference to itself but also through contact and confrontation with the dominant culture, and by creating intercultures and interlanguages conveying the imprint of that dominant culture. Hence, whatever their essential differences, various sociocultural groups which belong in the same setting cannot but accept sharing common features. This kind of closeness recalls the notion used by Wittgenstein (1961) to depict linguistic systems as made of language games, in which he discerned an *air de famille*. This notion may apply to multiculturalism to characterize the *resemblance of particularisms pertaining to the same setting*. A resemblance that is the outcome of those particularisms' very confrontations with the dominant culture. By *air de famille* one may think of any cultural trait--whether more fundamental like identity principles or less so, like habits and tastes--that makes individuals who belong to different groups feel *familiarity* vis-à-vis each other. As in the case of kins, not all elements feel the same kind or degree of closeness vis-à-vis each of those who make up *their family*. Familiarity does not exclude either conflictual or antagonistic feelings, nor does it necessitate a supreme authority.

At the hour of multiculturalization it is more obvious that the dominant culture is quite unable to impose its definition and identification of the society as a whole, and tends to be identified with but one specific constituency among others. Though, even then, the dominant culture is still a major *ingredient* of the intercultures and interlanguages that groups elaborate at the pace of their social insertion, when efforts to retain an allegiance to legacies have been concurrent with those to acquire, and adapt to, new codes and symbols. This is the kind of *glue* that seemingly helps contain those who both share a setting and fragment it.

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CHAPTER 4
INTERNATIONAL MIGRATIONS IN SOUTHERN EUROPE (ITALY AND PORTUGAL): THEORETICAL APPROACHES AND METHODS OF INQUIRY

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The aim of this paper is to present and discuss the theoretical paradigms that have guided studies of migratory movements in southern Europe. I shall concentrate on international emigration since the second half of the last century until the present-day in two countries: Italy and Portugal. I shall not consider all the studies conducted on migratory movements (even the briefest survey of these would require an enormous bibliography), only those most relevant to the argument that I wish to develop.

My intention here is to outline the two most important traditions of research on migratory movements--historico-comparative quantitative study, and case studies--in order to discuss their validity and shortcomings and to examine their future prospects.

The central thesis of the survey that follows is that all too frequently studies of migratory movements, rather than constructing models of concrete behaviour, proceed by classifying data and documents which fail to capture the economic-social logics of migrations and at most propose typologies and purely descriptive images.

Quantitative Historical-Comparative Analyses

Research Agendas

These analyses of emigration--historical, statistical-demographic, economic and sociological--mostly reconstruct the phenomenon from the quantitative point of view and attempt to draw syntheses and comparisons. They analyze the evolution and trend of emigration: the size of migratory flows and their destinations, novelties and continuities with respect to previous historical periods, and so on. They reveal a number of waves and directions of emigration which, save for some understandable differences, are shared by both Italy and Portugal (1): (i) the long-period and long-distance emigration to the Americas from the mid-1800s until the Second World War which was interrupted by the conflict and then resumed until the 1950s; (ii) medium and short-range emigration to the countries of Western Europe during the 1960s