ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE
INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION

CONGRÈS DE LIÈGE
24 août - 1er septembre 1953

LIÈGE CONGRESS
24 August - 1 September 1953

Sect. II
Les Conflits entre Groupes
et leur Solution

Sect. II
Intergroup Conflicts and
their Mediation

WORKING PAPER:
CURRENT RESEARCH IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF CONFLICT

By
Professor Jessie BERNARD
Pennsylvania State College
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By
Professor Jessie BERNARD
Pennsylvania State College

Skriveneskinstue
Stortingst. 18,
Oslo
Dear Fellows-Members of the International Sociological Association:

The following working papers for the Section on Conflict of our Liège meetings constitute Chapters 1 - 5 of a manuscript which will appear as a trend-report in Current Sociology in the near future. An enlarged version of the concluding chapter may be available at the time of the Liège meetings, however, and in any event will be available in print in the trend-report. I am keenly aware of the shortcomings of these working papers; I only hope that they can serve the purpose of eliciting good discussion at the meetings.

Sincerely yours,

Jessie Bernard

Pennsylvania State College

State College, Pa., U.S.A.
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The chapter by Jessie Bernard, written originally at the request of the International Sociological Association to serve as a working paper for its meetings in Liège in 1953, attempts to review recent research in the field of conflict as a basis for conceptual clarification. Its limitations, both deliberate and unwitting, lead the author to make the following apologia:

First of all, this chapter is not a treatise on the sociology of conflict, although it presents a great deal of data which would doubtless be pertinent to such an enterprise. If it were such a treatise on the basis of that examination, the above Association would have required at least a brief historical introduction going back, let us say, to the Chinese opposition of Yung and Yang or to the Old Testament myth of Cain and Abel, and continuing in summary fashion to include, at a minimum, reference to Machiavelli and Hobbes, to the Social Darwinists, to Marx, and so on. The apparatus of scholarship had to be eschewed in the name of brevity.

Other limitations resulted from decisions that had to be made with regard to both scope and method. First of all, what should be included in a survey of "current research?" How far back should one go and still consider the work "current"? A more or less arbitrary, though I hope flexible, criterion was used. Work within the last five or six years was considered to be still current, and in some cases even earlier work was included.

Next, what constitutes "research"? Textbooks embody a great deal of research. Should they be included? In the United States

1. In order to tailor the report to specifications, research in the field of family conflict, of culture conflict, of crime, of conflict of individuals with groups, of ideological conflict, was not included. The general pattern was set by the International Sociological Association, whose chief interest in the assigniment lay in industrial, ethnic- and racial-groups, and international conflict and in methods of mediating them. These interests set the boundaries for the project.
PREFACE.

The 1953-1954 program of UNESCO contained a resolution - 3.211 - which authorized the Director-General "to make a general survey of research undertaken on tensions between groups, with a view to assessing results and defining methods which might be employed in a scientific study of international tensions and of their removal by peaceful means." Elaborating on this resolution, the program continued: "By the end of 1952, UNESCO will have been conducting studies of tensions for more than five years. The time now seems ripe to assess the value of the research carried out and of the results obtained by specialists throughout the world and, therefore, to request a conference of experts to make a general survey of all international studies of tensions. A contract will be concluded with the International Sociological Association, requesting it to place the matter on the agenda of its Congress of that year and to submit a report on the subject to UNESCO. On the basis of that examination, the above Association will be requested to prepare a manuscript of a publication containing a critical analysis of studies conducted at UNESCO's instance, a particularly detailed description of those not published by UNESCO, and an account of other important studies carried out in this field."

Mr. Stein Rokkan of the International Sociological Association asked me if I would undertake to prepare an analytical survey of current research in the field of the sociology of conflict, to provide a basis for the broader assessment to be undertaken by the Association, and to be issued as an installment in the international periodical, *Current Sociology*, published by UNESCO. Correspondence between Mr. Rokkan, Dr. E. Franklin Frazier, Head of the Division of Applied Social Science, Department of Social Sciences of UNESCO, and me clarified the assignment, making it clear that what was wanted was an assessment of methods used in the study of intergroup tensions and of their removal, and not an assessment of methods of removal of intergroup tensions themselves. It will be noted that I have interpreted "methods" broadly to include conceptualization as well as technique.

The limitations, both deliberate and unwitting, of this study are obvious, not to say glaring. Nevertheless, or perhaps therefore, some apologia would seem to be called for. It is not, first of all, a treatise on the sociology of conflict, although it presents a great deal of data which would doubtless be pertinent to such an enterprise. If it were such a treatise, the traditions of scholarship would have required at least a brief historical introduction going back, let us say, to the Chinese opposition of Ying and Yang or to the Old Testament myth of Cain and Abel, and continuing in summary fashion to include, at a minimum, reference to Machiavelli and Hobbes, to the Social Darwinists, to Marx, and so on. The apparatus of scholarship had to be eschewed.

Other limitations resulted from decisions that had to be made with regard to both scope and method. First of all, what should be included in a survey of "current" research? How far back should one go and still consider the work "current"? A more or less arbitrary, though I hope flexible, criterion was used. Work within the last four or five years was considered to be still current, and in some cases even earlier work was included.

Next, what constitutes "research"? Textbooks embody a great deal of research. Should they be included? In the United States,
especially, textbooks on race relations and minority groups deal with conflict implicitly or explicitly. For the most part textbooks have not been included here, with a few exceptions. Should only research which is specifically pointed toward conflict be included? That is, if the work has only incidental reference to conflict should it therefore be excluded? Should descriptive reports be included? Should deductive studies without empirical data be included? E. C. Hughes has pointed out that "social science appears to have a double burden laid upon it. The one is to analyze the processes of human behavior, and especially of persistence and change thereof, in terms relatively free of time and place. The other is to tell the news in such form and perspective—quantitatively and comparatively—as to give clues for the taking of those chances of which action consists." 1) Some research, that is, presents data which are intrinsically important; they are "news" in the sense in which Hughes uses the term. Other research uses data merely to test hypotheses; the data themselves are incidental. In the present project both kinds have been included. A report on, let us say, agrarian protest in Southeast Asia, for example, was considered to be research in conflict, especially if it were analyzed in terms of sociological concepts, but even if it were not.

What, in the next place, is to be considered research in the "sociology" of conflict? Should only work done by professional sociologists be so considered? Or should the contributions of workers in cognate disciplines be included also? Since the purpose of the study was to point up the contribution of sociology, the first alternative might seem preferable. But since so much work of the highest order has been done by men who are in political science, in economics, in history—even in biology and in mathematics—it seemed an unnecessary limitation to exclude their contributions on narrow classificatory grounds.

The difficulties inherent in delimiting the concept of "conflict," finally, are great. They are discussed in Chapter 1. In addition to these there were still others. It is almost impossible to separate out the inter-relations of sociological phenomena. Conflict is not something separate from organization; disintegration implies integration. Inherent in the whole problem of conflict are such phenomena as of power, of leadership, of the elite, of control. Where does one draw the line in a discussion of conflict per se? One looks in vain in classified summaries of research or in bibliographies for specialized studies on conflict as such. They are usually parts of other projects.

The test of the correctness of the answers I have given to the four questions here raised—that is, what is current? what is research? what is sociology? what is conflict?—will be found in the project itself. Not everyone will agree that the answers are correct. Some will object to the inclusion of certain projects on the basis that they are not current, that they are not research, that they are not sociology, that they are not about conflict. Others will object because certain projects which they consider to be current, to be research, to be sociology, and to be in the area of conflict are not included. For errors of commission in this respect I make no apologies; for errors of omission I take this means of expressing regret. They were the result of wrong judgment or of ignorance. In no case, I believe, has work been omitted from bias or prejudice.

Under the heading of "ignorance" must come the limitation characteristic of so much research in the United States. I refer to the intellectual parochialism which results from lack of freedom in foreign languages and from inaccessibility of so much foreign-language work. I would feel much more disturbed about this limitation if UNESCO itself did not make up for this deficiency in its own publications, *Current Sociology*, which includes an annual bibliography of sociological literature published in all parts of the world, *International Political Science Abstracts*, which abstracts articles from periodicals from a great number of countries, including those from behind the Iron Curtain. Indeed, these periodicals should be considered as companion-volumes to the present study.

The report was supposed to be critical. Rather than make a critique of every project included, I have made the critique one of background orientation and of assumptions and implications. At the present time research techniques and sophistication have reached a point where most of the fallacies and errors are no longer likely to be technical but theoretical, results of underlying assumptions rather than of method primarily. All kinds of methods have been accepted in the screening process here - "clinical," historical, natural-history, laboratory-experimental, observational, anthropological, action, mathematical, inductive, and deductive. I have preferred to be catholic rather than parochial in judging methods.

But I have been critical, perhaps overly so, of basic assumptions. I have been especially critical of the so-called "tension" approach to the study of conflict; I may have been too uncritical of the theory of games of strategy as a basis for the sociology of conflict. If I have, I trust that the mores of science will lead my colleagues everywhere to set the balance right.

A further limitation was consciously made, finally, in order to tailor the report to specifications. Research in the field of family conflict, of culture conflict, of crime, of conflict of individuals with groups, of ideological conflict, was not included. The general pattern was indicated by the programme of the 1953 meetings of the International Sociological Association whose chief interest lay in industrial, ethnic- and racial-group, and international conflict and in methods of mediating them. These interests have set the boundaries for the present project.

It is a genuine pleasure to acknowledge my appreciation for the cooperation of Mr. Stein Rokkan. His patience, no less than his suggestions, greatly reduced the difficulty of my task. My colleague at the Pennsylvania State College, Dr. Arnold Green, read the manuscript and made his usual incisive, penetrating, and insightful comments, most of which were incorporated in the present draft. The project was financed by UNESCO through the International Committee on Documentation in the Social Sciences, my contacts with M. J. Meyriat of that organization have been pleasant and encouraging. I hope, in all humility and with the keenest awareness of its defects, that this small effort will help clarify the thinking of sociologists in the field of conflict and contribute to the common effort to understand the behavior of this strange, incomparable, creative, destructive phenomenon - the human species.

Jessie Bernard

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June 2, 1955.
CHAPTER ONE. VARYING CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF CONFLICT.

Conflict has been variously conceived; and these varying conceptions have influenced the methodological approach to the problem which has been used, the nature of the problems studied, the theory invoked to interpret the data gathered, the implications for policy, that is, for programs suggested, and the general interpretation and evaluation of violence or force. It seems important, therefore, at the outset to sharpen up these differing conceptualizations before we enter into any detailed discussion of the topic. We may label the several conceptualizations here to be distinguished as: (1) the social-psychological, (2) the sociological, and (3) the semanticist.

The Social-Psychological Conceptualization of Conflict and Its Implications.

By far the most thoroughly exploited in the research literature is the social-psychological conceptualization of conflict, which is in terms primarily of individual mechanisms. Group conflict is conceived to be some simple or weighted additive function of individual behavior. Conflict thus conceptualized is seen as essentially non-rational, though not necessarily non-functional, in nature. Sometimes emphasis is on what Ragnar Rommetveit has called the "personality-centered" model; sometimes it is on the "society-centered" model (45, 1951, pp. 12-18). But in either case, the approach is through the individual, his attitudes, opinions, and behavior patterns.

The study of conflict so conceived is by way of the individual; the methods are statistical, clinical, experimental, or by use of projective techniques and depth analysis of individual cases. The kinds of problems which are dealt with are those of prejudice, hatred, hostility, stereotypes, scapegoating, aggression, fighting, quarreling, violence. Indeed, it has even been suggested that the term hate or hostility be used instead of prejudice (208, 1948).

The converse of conflict, so conceived, has also commanded a great deal of attention, namely problems of morale, consensus, altruistic love," and "cooperation," psychologically conceived. All these phenomena are viewed as personality traits.

The theoretical orientation on which the social-psychological conceptualization is based is currently referred to as "tension" theory. Tension theory has been traced back to the work of Joseph Breuer and Sigmund Freud, who, in the analysis of "Anna O.," introduced the "era of Tension or 'Plumbing': Theories in which a repressed memory or an unresolved emotional conflict was considered the basic core of neurotic behavior." 1) Since then, the concept of tension has been broadened. The phenomena studied are sometimes viewed as tensions within the individual which, from time to time, eventuate into "open" conflict. That is, resentments and frustrations, from whatever source, pile up within the individual until, in effect, they explode in overt aggression of some kind - in quarreling, in fighting, in rioting, or what-have-you, as a means of reducing the tension.

These tensions are not currently traced to inherited or instinctive mechanisms; they are usually conceived as resulting from experiences in the socialization process, from the conditions of modern life in industrialized societies, and from frustrations associated with work. Psychoanalytic concepts are often incorporated into the theoretical framework of this conceptualization of conflict.

So far as practical applications are concerned, the type of program recommended is likely to involve some change in human attitudes or motivation; the specific methods may vary from educational programs to propaganda, from methods of alleviating industrial dissatisfactions to cross-cultural contacts, but essentially they are attempts to change the way people think or feel. Violence or interpersonal aggression is viewed as a method for reducing inner tensions; it is seen as often fulfilling an important function in the psychological economy of the individual, however nonrational or irrational it may be. But it is not favored by adherents of this school of conflict; they would substitute other means of dealing with, that is, "reducing" tensions.

The attitude of the researcher or action-promoter is often that the prejudiced individual is in some way not well; the program recommended is one to promote mental health. There is, in effect, a doctor-patient relationship between the program administrator and the people the program is aimed at. The emotional atmosphere is one, ostensibly, of great good-will; the philosophic orientation is one which, for the most part, ignores or denies the existence of evil. If the proper methods could be found, conflict as conceived by this school of thought could be minimized or obviated and good, that is, harmonious, human relations would result.

In the form of the "tension" approach, this conceptualization of conflict has been basic to the work sponsored by UNESCO. We shall reserve detailed comment and criticism of this school of thought for the second chapter of this report, hastening at this point to present a contrasting approach, namely by way of a sociological conceptualization.

The Sociological Conceptualization of Conflict and Its Implications.

The sociological conceptualization of conflict is in terms of the relationship between or among systems. The term system is here used instead of "group" because it is more inclusive and general; it embraces any functional interaction pattern whether it be a pair of human beings or a complex empire. This approach utilizes historical or anthropological data, informants, statistical analysis, content analysis of documents, and, currently, mathematical deduction. Conflict is viewed as not necessarily nonrational; it is seen as sometimes quite rational. The problems which this type of orientation deals with are, for example, those of: schism, secession, civil war, sect formation, splinter parties, resistance movements, revolutions, reform movements, on the one hand and - because disintegration and integration are so closely related - imperialism, conquest, subjugation, colonialism, growth of political, economic, and social integrations, on the other.

Implicit in the sociological conceptualization of conflict is some theory of cost. Conflict arises when there are incompatible or mutually exclusive goals or aims or values espoused by human beings (22, 1949). Both may be desirable; but both cannot be pursued simultaneously. If one is selected, it is at the expense of the other. This sacrifice of one value for the sake of another is similar to what economists call "opportunity costs." It is embodied in the folk saying that we cannot have our cake and eat it too. As related to ingroup-outgroup conflict, George Lundberg has recently stated the situation as follows (145, 1952, p. 34).
The first step in a scientific approach to conflicts between in-group and outgroup is to recognize that it is hopelessly contradictory for any group (1) to desire to maintain an exclusive group identity of any kind, and at the same time (2) to expect no differential (discriminatory) behavior toward itself on the basis of precisely the exclusive identity sought. This basic consideration does not abolish either the fact of conflict or the desirability of doing what may be done about it, through education, agitation, legislation, etc. Recognition of the basic nature of the problem, however, affords the only sound basis for action .... 1)

The problem of minority groups, so viewed, is not one of "prejudice" but one of mutually exclusive values espoused by human groups; if one group wins its values, another loses those it espouses. One set of values "costs" another set. Cost theories of conflict involve incompatible values or goals.

The practical applications of research based on this approach are likely to be cast in terms of strategy. What kinds of coalitions or alliances should a group seek? Should it attack attitudes or behavior? Gradualism or revolution? Conciliation or aggression? Legislation or education? These are among the applicational problems which the sociological conceptualization of conflict deals with. Violence is viewed as only one kind of strategy for dealing with conflict. It may be advocated as a deliberate policy; it may even be fomented. But violence is not conceived in any sense as synonymous with conflict. Nor are hatred and hostility viewed as necessary concomitants of conflict. Subjective hatred and hostility can exist where there is no conflict, as here conceived; and, conversely, conflict can exist without hatred; it can exist, in fact, among those who love one another (22, 1949, Chapter 5).

It will be noted that violence and aggression may be associated with conflict whether it is conceived social-psychologically or sociologically. They may tend to occupy a larger proportion of attention of those who hold to the social-psychological conceptualization, although this conclusion would require some validation.

It will be seen from this essentially brief summary that the kinds of phenomena subsumed under the two conceptualizations may or may not be the same, or even associated. Both of these conceptualizations are important; both have a contribution to make to our thinking. The social-psychological conceptualization is likely to be useful in face-to-face situations, in the factory, in the club, in the school, in the church, in the family. It is important for those who seek to minimize the interpersonal bickerings, quarrelings, defiances, resistances, and other frictions which interfere with the smooth functioning of day-to-day living. But it is of less and perhaps even of negligible value in dealing with such phenomena as war, industrial conflict abstractly conceived, revolutions, sect formation, and schisms of all kinds. Modern warfare, for example, can scarcely be viewed as

1) Lundberg has somewhat oversimplified his statement. It is usually only the group on the receiving end of discriminatory behavior which cannot pursue both goals simultaneously. An exclusive high-status group often receives the "discrimination" of deference. There is, for them, no conflict between exclusiveness and favorable discriminatory behavior.
a sluice or vent for individual aggressions. Disciplined warfare long ago succeeded heroic combat. This transformation can be illustrated by the case of the American Indian, who learned too late the superiority of the former over the latter. By the time Crazy Horse had finally taught his followers to fight as a disciplined army rather than to "count coups" as individual warriors, their cause was already lost. A modern war is a highly organized, disciplined enterprise; it probably creates more tensions than it releases.

These limitations are by no means discounted by those who deal with the social-psychological conceptualization. Thus Otto Klineberg has pointed out that the problem remains "whether an understanding of the bases of hostility in the individual can help us in understanding group antagonisms" (116, 1950, p. 208). He criticizes the work of Clyde Kluckhohn and concludes that individual and group aggression are inter-related but that "the assumption that they are identical must be questioned," and that individual frustrations and insecurities as explanations of war or group hostility have only limited application.

In brief, if our interest lies mainly in personal violence and aggression as nonrational, even irrational, ends in themselves, as forms of venting hostilities, as tension-reducing mechanisms, then we are faced with one set of theoretical problems and the social-psychological conceptualization seems appropriate. But if we are interested primarily in the whole gamut of strategies for dealing with groups or systems in conflict, then violence and aggression constitute only one phase of a broader problem; they are viewed as often highly rational, purposive, deliberate, used coldly, even without hatred, a calculated choice based on policy or strategy. A modern war is not, then, a blind, emotional outburst, the result of subjective hatreds or hostilities; it is, rather, a matter of strategy which may even be provoked, timed.

Abel, on the basis of a study of 25 major wars found that "in no case is the decision (to use war) precipitated by emotional tensions, sentimentality, crowded behavior, or other irrational motivations" (2, 1941, p. 855). Hatred of the enemy may even have to be cultivated. The same may be said of most strikes, wildcat strikes excepted. Race rioting or pogroms or lynchings are perhaps more likely to be ends in themselves rather than parts of rational strategy, although it is conceivable that they may be both.

The Semanticist Conceptualization of Conflict and Its Implications.

Before proceeding with our discussion it is important to refer to one school of thinkers who hold that conflict in the sense of mutually incompatible values and goals does not exist. They do not deny that conflict in the social-psychological sense - of interpersonal hatreds, hostilities, aggressions, violence, for example - does exist. But they insist that when it does, it is the result of verbal or conceptual misunderstanding. The implication is, then, that if only we could get rid of misunderstandings, if we could communicate adequately, conflict itself would disappear, or at least be greatly minimized. The archetypal type of conflict resulting from misunderstanding

1) I am indebted to Mr. Stein Rokkan for the distinction between "semantic" and "semanticist" as applied to conceptualization of conflict. He distinguishes between "a semantic approach to the study of conflicts - aiming at a description of the ways in which communication changes its referents under conflict and stress - and a semanticist approach which ... starts out from the assumption that all conflicts are 'merely verbal'".
is that described in the Tower of Babel myth. A breakdown in commu-
nication which leads to misunderstanding results in the breakdown of
the subtle web of interaction which constitutes a social system, or
it prevents the integration of such a system. The basic philosophy
of this point of view is, essentially, that there is a fundamental
harmony in the universe; when quarreling or fighting or wars take place
they are the result of some subjective error. The theory in its simp-
lest and most popular form has been stated as follows (44, 1951, pp.
195, 196, 207):

Many conflicts are due not to natural cussedness but to fail-
ures in evaluation ... Whatever improves ... and clarifies communi-
cation is sure to help agreement ... Nearly every human quarrel is
soaked in verbal delusions. If they could be squeezed out, as one
squeezes a sponge, many quarrels would simply vanish."

This theory is an application to social life of a theory
which was developed primarily in the field of logic to correct what
was considered the Aristotelian fallacy. This was the work of the so-
called Vienna Circle which arose in the mid-twenties. It stemmed from
the work of Ernst Mach in the nineteenth century and Hume in the eight-
teenth. Logic and scientific method were its preoccupation. Its
proponents hoped, by removing all ambiguities from syntax and defini-
tion, to solve the major philosophical problems which had arisen from
the inaccurate use of language. The movement was known as logical
positivism and the work which resulted, as semantics. It attacked the
Aristotelian basis of our thinking in terms of polar categories. It
believed that we should not think in terms of either-or, or A and not-A,
but rather in terms of more-less, in terms, that is, of continua. As
applied to logic, to purely intellectual and scientific problems, there
is no doubt that the logical positivists made a profound contri-
bution, and the discussion which follows is meant in no way to reflect on
the work of such men as Moritz Schlick, Carnap, or Wittgenstein.

It is only when some of their disciples came to assume that
social problems as well as philosophical problems were verbal rather
than objectively real that difficulties arose. We shall, in the case
of the semanticist conceptualization, vary our procedure somewhat and
present our critique here rather than later, in order to dispose of it
once and for all before continuing with our discussion. Only two cri-
ticisms of the semanticist approach will be presented, namely: (1) that
mutually incompatible values do exist and (2) that there is no unequi-
vocal evidence that misunderstandings always lead to conflict, while
there is some evidence that misunderstanding sometimes obviates
quarrels and hostilities.

(1) We pointed out above that conflict, sociologically
conceived, involves some kind of cost. Cost is inherent in the
nature of conflict itself, for conflict exists when mutually incompa-
tible values are involved. One cannot travel and at the same time re-
main rooted in the community. One cannot visit South America and Asia
at the same time. One cannot espouse an authoritarian and a permissive
policy of child rearing at the same time. One cannot have equality
of opportunity for all and special privilege for some at the same time.
One cannot pay the same money out in wages and in dividends. The same
land cannot be used for the grazing of herds or flocks and for agri-
culture too. One cannot have legalized chattel slavery and not have
it at the same time. One cannot be married and not-married at the
same time. If one chooses alternative A, one must sacrifice alternative
B. A costs B. These are not semanticist problems. No amount of verbal
refinement can change the facts. It is quite true that the alternatives
may be viewed logically as end points on a continuum; there may be points between them. Thus, for example, one can stay 90 days in South America and 1 day in Asia, or 89 days in South America and 2 in Asia ... or 1 day in South America and 99 in Asia, a kind of binomial curve conception of the relationship. Or one can have \( N-1 \) units of protection and 1 unit of free trade, \( N-2 \) units of protection and 2 units of free trade ... or 1 unit of free trade and \( N-1 \) units of protection. None of this denies the fact, however, that every unit of A costs a unit of B.

The cost theory of conflict in no way passes judgment on the incompatible values. One may be just as good as the other. It is not necessarily a conflict of good and evil. It may be a conflict between two good things or between two bad ones (22, 1949, Chapter 5). The point merely is that there exist in the world values so different and so incompatible that if one is selected, the other must be foregone to that degree.

It so happens that different people espouse these differing values. They will doubtless consider the values they espouse as good and those they reject as bad. Their interests may be tied up intimately with the values they espouse or reject. If one set of values is chosen by the community or society or group or system rather than another, they will suffer, or they will profit. No amount of clarification of thinking will convince the agriculturist or the sheep or cattle grazer that there are not conflicting uses of land.

To summarize: there do exist values which are incompatible, mutually exclusive in the sense that they cannot both prevail at the same time in any given system. Several kinds of strategy are possible for groups with such differing and incompatible values: (1) one group may withdraw from the system or be ejected from it; (2) one group may impose its system on the other; (3) an equilibrium may be established in which concessions are made, the more "expendable" values of one group being exchanged for the more "expendable" values of the other; (4) values may be modified so that coalescence is possible; or (5) the groups may assimilate to one another, or one may absorb the other (22, 1949, Chapter 5).

It is useful to distinguish between the fact of the existence of conflicting values and the fact of people in conflict. People who hold to opposing values cannot live together so long as they espouse them. If they wish to live together, one group or the other or both must give up the conflicting values. They must find some other value on which there is no conflict. The cost of doing this may be greater to one group than to the other. But the original conflict of values remains; the difference is that no one now espouses them. So long as people do, however, the people will be in conflict, just as the values are. A great deal of social life consists in finding ways to reconcile people to modifying their values. Here is one of the areas for social psychological study. 1)

1) The parallel between the religious wars of the 17th century and the ideological conflicts of the present time is sometimes drawn in this connection. The values of Catholicism and of Protestantism as they relate to secular affairs remain in conflict. But the people who espouse them have changed their strategies; they have rearranged their relative stress on different values, so that war and bloodshed seem worse than concessions in political practice.
(2) The second criticism of the semanticist position refers to the relationship between misunderstandings and conflicts. Misunderstandings do, of course, exist, as well as conflicts. And misunderstandings may even lead to conflict. There is no denying this obvious fact. Klineberg has summarized some of the misunderstandings among members of different nationality and cultural groups which lead to friction (116, 1950, pp. 21 ff.). And perhaps everything should be done to clear up those misunderstandings which interfere with peaceful relations. But clearing up misunderstandings does not necessarily eliminate conflict. It may, indeed, accentuate the conflict by making the issues clearer than they were before.

Without denying the validity of the theory that misunderstandings and blocks in communication may lead to hostilities and aggressions, one can nevertheless point out that misunderstandings sometimes create cooperation rather than block it; clearing up the misunderstanding clears up the issues in the conflict also. An illustration of this fact occurred in the course of the negotiations of Americans with the Russians concerning the status of allied newspaper and radio correspondents in Germany. Here is what happened (59, 1951, pp. 293-295):

The Russian word "vlast" is usually rendered as "authority," but "vlast" connotes a complete power of disposal, not a limited "authority." This difficulty was illustrated in an abortive attempt, in April 1945, to negotiate an agreement concerning the future status of allied newspaper and radio correspondents in Germany. The key provision of a draft agreement, which had been drawn up in the War Department for negotiation in the European Advisory Commission was that the correspondent was to be subject "to the full authority" of the Commander-in-Chief who issued credentials to him in his own zone....

For more than fifteen months the Soviet delegation had, time and again, been extremely slow in responding to American and British proposals, and it was usually unable to give any indication of whether it would ever be able to negotiate. In this case, however, Moscow acted with great alacrity. Within less than a week the Soviet delegation indicated that it wished to begin negotiations on the following day on the American draft agreement....

A few hours later the European Advisory Commission began its first and only session on the draft agreement. The Soviet representative offered a few minor textual improvements in the American draft and then declared that he was prepared to conclude it at once. It was now my turn to explain that by "full authority" the draft meant only "full authority in matters of accrediting and disaccrediting" correspondents. After this the Soviet representative rapidly lost interest in the draft, and the subject was not discussed again.

In this case the misunderstanding was not deliberate or purposive. But it had the effect, so long as it remained, of encouraging a cooperative attack on the problem. When it was cleared up, cooperation ceased.

We know that misunderstanding may be used deliberately for the purpose of promoting harmonious relationships. Shakespeare has given us the amusing case of Benedict and Beatrice who were led into one another's arms by a little judicious use of deceit. A large part of etiquette consists of deception or tactful "white lies" for reducing social friction. It would, however, take us beyond the scope of the present critique to analyze all the uses of deceit, fraud, ignorance, censorship, propaganda, and other techniques for promoting misunder-
McEvedy (1976) points out in this connection that: "There has been such exaggerated nonsense to the effect that international understanding is a cure-all and a preventive of wars. Experience shows that understanding each other doesn't necessarily mean two nations will never fight each other .... The French and Germans understand each other pretty well and yet have been at each other's throats at frequent intervals. Again, the most determined fighters against Soviet Communism have been West Berliners, who know and understand Kremlin ways better than any other free Europeans. Professor Frederick Dunn of Princeton likes to tell the story of a minor European monarch who was engaged in a boundary dispute with a neighbouring monarch. When this monarch was urged by his neighbours to try to settle the differences and misunderstandings, he replied that there were really no differences or misunderstandings between them, that they both wanted exactly the same thing. They understood each other perfectly!" (p. 309)
standing which have kept people cooperating when a clearing up of the channels of communication would have led them to revolt or at least to cease cooperating.

Klineberg, who has summarized and evaluated the work on national stereotypes, faces up to the ethical connotations of misunderstandings which serve to obviate or mollify rather than to foster hostilities. What should we do if the stereotypes which one people have of another make for friendliness? Should we try to change them? Yes, says Klineberg. He is in favor of dispelling misunderstandings even when they are favorable stereotypes, on the grounds that they represent a basically dangerous kind of thinking (116, 1950, pp. 214-215).

It must be freely admitted, of course, that misunderstandings may lead to quarrels and aggressions and even render the accommodation of conflict more difficult. A study of negotiating problems between Soviet Russia and the western powers points up some of the difficulties introduced by misunderstanding (59, 1951, pp. 293, 295):

According to dictionaries and pre-Soviet usage, "predlagat" means "to propose"; in Soviet usage, carried over from Communist Party practice, it means "to direct," to give an instruction which cannot be disobeyed. On occasion I have seen a Soviet negotiator fall into a rage because an inoffensive "propose" was turned into "predlagat" in the translation. The word "soyuz" in Russian means both an "alliance" between two independent states and a complete "union" into a single state. "Elagorazmynyi" is as near as Russian comes to "reasonable," and the Russian word has none of the overtones or undertones of its English meaning.

... the word "compromise" is not of native origin (in Russia) and carries with it no favorable empathy. It is habitually used only in combination with the adjective "putrid." "Compromise for the sake of getting on with the job" is natural to American and British people, but it is alien to the Bolshevist way of thinking and to the discipline which the Communist Party has striven to inculcate in its members.

These semantic problems are real and of great proportions. But a substantial amount of conflict remains even when all misunderstandings are cleared up. Clearing up misunderstandings may serve a useful social function; it may eliminate some aggression. It is, however, no obviator of conflict and in some cases may even aggravate it.

One unanticipated, even undesired, effect of the semanticist denial of conflict has been to lead those who accept it to withdraw from actual conflicts, to refuse to "take sides." They cannot make choices. They are disarmed. Semanticism is, in effect, for them an escape.

So much, then, for the three conceptualizations of conflict and their implications. Our concern will be mainly with the social-psychological and the sociological conceptualizations. If we accepted the semanticist point of view there would be nothing to discuss. We have included it here for the sake of completeness; but further consideration does not seem called for.

Differing Emphases on the Several Aspects of the Sociology of Conflict.

Since no form of social interaction is discrete, cut off from other forms, it is impossible to break social behavior or processes down into separate and distinct entities except analytically. Conflict
as a form of social interaction is but one phase of what Albion W. Small once called the "on-going social process." Social forms coalesce; they break apart. Systems become integrated; they also disintegrate. 1) Conflict may or may not be involved in either aspect of the process. This integration-disintegration continuum has been variously conceived. E. E. Babcock spoke of elimination, subjugation, compromise, alliance, and integration; S. C. Dodd likewise speaks of these processes. Ogburn and Minkoff refer to victory, compromise or coordinate accommodation, toleration, conciliation, and conversion. Leopold von Wiese distinguished differentiation, integration, destruction, and construction; differentiation included graduation, stratification, domination, and submission, while integration included uniformization and super- and subordination. Jessie Bernard has elaborated a conflict continuum from elimination, through exploitation, equilibration, coalescence, to assimilation in a large number of fields of conflict. At one end, social forms or systems attempt to handle the incompatible differences in values or goals by withdrawing, isolation, getting out of the system, or by expelling, destroying, liquidating the differing groups. At the other end, the social forms have become so similar in values or goals that they no longer constitute separate systems; they have become assimilated. In between we may have relationships of exploitation if one party is more powerful than the other; equilibration if both have about equal power; and coalescence if they have more in common than in conflict.

An adequate sociology of conflict must take account of both the integrative and the disintegrative phases of the relationships among systems. Sometimes students of sociology seem to be more interested in one phase, sometimes in another. Robert A. Nisbet is of the opinion that conservatives tend to emphasize the integrative aspects of social processes; order rather than change seems important to them (179, 1952). To them the given social structure or integration with all the non-rational props it rests on is a thing to be preserved. The schismatic, the revolutionary, the agitator, the protester will therefore be condemned. Conflict will be viewed as bad because by challenging current values it destroys the social fabric. The conservative point of view is in effect a demand that those who pay for the status quo continue to pay for it, and like it.

By way of contrast there was the radical strain of thought which emphasized change, even change by way of revolution, if necessary. In the latter part of the eighteenth and early part of the nineteenth century, rational behavior was stressed. It was hoped that man would become emancipated from the bondage of the past. It was the time of the economic man of Bentham, of the social contract. Among those who hold to a radical ideology sympathy will be on the side of the underdog who "fights for his rights." The disintegrative aspects of conflict seem important to them; they are interested in breaking down the system in order to free the disadvantaged from the bondage of nonrational

1) It should be made clear that there is no value-judgment implied by the terms integrate and disintegrate. The breaking down of a system may merely release the subsystems or elements of the system for a new integration. The disintegration of a system does not imply that the sub-systems which break apart are destroyed; they are only torn from one context; they are in a position to reform in a different context.
controls. As soon as a radical movement succeeds in breaking down an old system and reorganizing a new one, however, its proponents may change their theoretical focus and come to emphasize the stabilizing, non-rational, integrative aspects of the social process. They become interested in order, not change.

Currently sociologists of the western countries seem to have been more preoccupied with questions of organization than with questions of conflict. Don J. Hager, reviewing German sociology under Hitler from 1933 to 1941, found that "much of the thematic structure of these articles is typical of nationalistic revivals and movements found in the history of western civilization. In all countries interest in national unity, racial history, national economy, population analysis, and the like, had awakened" (86, 1949). Non-rational aspects of behavior have been emphasized. The sociology of the disintegrative aspects of conflict, of challenging values, has received relatively little attention as such compared with, for example, the attention devoted to a non-rational, integrative phenomenon like culture (20, 1950).

There has, nevertheless, been accumulating a body of work which constitutes a genuine if not systematic contribution to the sociology of conflict, which it is the purpose of the present report to summarize. Before we turn to this discussion, however, we shall consider in greater detail the social-psychological approach to conflict in the currently popular form of "tension" theory.

CHAPTER TWO. THE SOCIAL-PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH: "TENSION" RESEARCH AND PROGRAMS BASED UPON IT.

Introduction.

The individual or social-psychological conceptualization of conflict in recent years has focussed its attention primarily on what has come to be known as "tension" phenomena. The "tension" approach differs from the older instinctive approach in that individual tensions are not assumed to be inherited or fixed in "human nature" as the old instincts of pugnacity or aggression were assumed to be but are viewed as acquired in the process of socialization and social interaction. The "tension" approach resembles the older approach in that it seeks to interpret and "explain" collective and group behavior in terms of individual motivations. In freeing itself from the old instinctive approach, it has freed itself from the criticisms which inhered in the biological interpretation of collective and group behavior. In remaining identified with the individualistic interpretation of collective and group behavior, it remains vulnerable to the criticisms which have long been levelled against this point of view. In our discussion here we shall begin with a brief statement of the tension concept as it has developed in individual psychology, proceed to a discussion of the pitfalls inherent in using the concept for group or collective phenomena, and then review in a summary way the programs which have been based on the tension approach.
The concept of tension in individual psychology, introduced by Freud, as we saw in Chapter 1, was popularized by the late Kurt Lewin. In individual psychology it is closely allied with motivation. Tensions are conceived of as created by needs, by restrictions of space of free movement, or by other barriers (136, 1948, p. 89). They are variously identified with drives (178, 1950, p. 600), with mood (123, 1948, p. 174), and with instabilities within the psychological field (136, 1948, p. 40). They are identified also with conflict (136, p. 156). The essential characteristic of a tension is conceived to be that of leading to behavior designed to reduce it (123, p. 40).

Implicit or explicit in most tension theories is the assumption that modern living conditions create so many tensions in individuals that they are ready to release them in acts of overt violence. A great fund of "free-floating aggression" is posited as the result of the normal processes of socialization. We must repress or mask our antisocial impulses. But much aggression remains. Neurotic symptoms may be one way to disguise our aggressions. Scapegoats may be used to channel off hostilities. Leaders may even stimulate anxiety in order to justify sacrifice of civil liberties. There comes, finally, "a time in most cultures when the quantity of repressed hostility toward all those who control (us) has increased until the supply of scapegoats will not suffice to handle it all, and the leaders sense an increasing need to make a reality of the external threat so as to take the pressure off. In such a situation war, or internal revolution, eventually is likely to come" (6, 1955, p. 62).

The concept of tensions doubtless has validity for the psychologist dealing with individual behavior. It is a vivid term which most people can appreciate intuitively and introspectively. For almost everyone has felt tense, has been "under tension," has felt frustrations mounting up until they led to explosive behavior — functional even when non-rational — which gave relief. The tension concept as related to motivation is on far safer ground than the instinct concept which dominated social-psychological thinking in the early years of this century. The difficulty arises only when the concept of tensions is transferred from the realm of individual psychology to that of intergroup relations. Then a host of problems are injected. Two social psychologists, Krech and Crutchfield tell us that "the tensions among nations take many forms — feelings of hatred and aggressiveness, attacks in the press and on the radio, diplomatic strife, persecution of other countries' citizens, economic conflict and sanctions, and, ultimately, war. War, it should be emphasized, is only the last step in tensions" (123, 1948, p. 575). The implication is that wars result from feelings of hatred and aggression.

It was on such a theoretical basis that the UNESCO tension project was built. The purpose of the 1947 UNESCO resolution authorizing a study of Tensions Affecting International Understanding was "to encourage social scientists to focus their attention and their research techniques on an understanding of the development and perpetuation of attitudes which make for national aggression and, on the basis of their findings, to recommend ways and means of promoting attitudes that would increase international understanding" (116, 1950, p. 7). In most of the studies made as part of this project, the approach was through individual attitudes. We do not wish to disparage this work — as we shall point out later it is probably indispensable for determining
what are the "rules of the game" in sociological conflict - but merely
to point out that it is based on the assumption that group and collective
behavior can be interpreted or "explained" in terms of individual
psychological mechanisms, an assumption for which no solid proof can
be adduced; an assumption, in fact, which the tension studies them-
selves throw doubt on.

Without challenging the value of the concept of tensions for
individual psychology, we turn now to a brief discussion of the con-
cept as applied to intergroup behavior.

The Concept of "Intergroup Tension".

In view of the remarkable vogue of the concept "intergroup
tensions" in the last decade, it is somewhat surprising to find so
little attempt to give it specific content. The term has crept into
conventional usage, but its precise meaning remains amorphous, equivocal,
and lacking in precision. It is variously identified with hostility,
with conflict, or with discrimination. Thus, for example, the Social
Science Research Council in 1945 set up a Committee on Techniques for
Reducing Group Hostility, with three objectives, namely (255, 1947,
p. 5):

1. To make a preliminary survey of those techniques and
   procedures being used by various action agencies concerned with reducing
tensions and conflicts among racial, cultural, and class groups in the
United States.
2. To propose research aimed at evaluating the effectiveness
   of these techniques and procedures.
3. To consider social psychological theory and research
   bearing on the problem of group conflict with a view to deriving from
any promising theory not now practically applied an action technique
which might be tested for its effectiveness in reducing hostility and
resolving conflict.

The implication here is that tensions, hostility, and conflict
are interchangeable concepts. The body of the resulting report likewise
leaves this impression. The expression "reducing tensions," "hostility
and conflict," "discrimination and hostility" seem to refer to "facets
of intergroup tensions". Another statement in this report leaves the
impression that group hostility and group tensions are identical con-
cepts (255, 1947, p. 5). Again, Donald Young in the same report
identifies tension with conflict and hostility (255, 1947, p. viii).

Only two serious efforts to give the term intergroup ten-
sions specific and precise formulation seem to have appeared, one by
S. C. Dodd and his student Kaare Svalastoga and one by Björn Christian-
sen. Dodd has developed what he calls a tension or equilibrium equa-
tion (61, 1942, p. 265). His conceptualization is in terms of desiring,
wishing, hungering, striving. "Desire, as all inner motivation to be-
behavior ... is the total inner states (including experience) of the or-
ganism determining the response upon stimulation" (61, p. 263). For a
total group or system, tension is an additive phenomenon. Dodd illustrates
tension from a number of fields. Thus, for example: "For a political
case of the theory, consider nationalism, the intense desire for the
desideratum 'national aggrandizement' ... The tension of the nation
towards this desideratum varies directly with the number of people in
the nation and with the average intensity of their internationalist
desires" (61, p. 266). He applies his theory to education, to biology,
to economics, and to religion, concluding that there are only three ways to reduce group tensions, namely: "increase the production of desiderata, decrease desires, or, for desiderata that are scarce, decrease the number of sharers" (61, p. 271).

In 1951, Dodd reported the results of a study on the spread of "interracial tensions" among 1044 families in Seattle in a housing project subsequent to the rape of a white woman by a Negro (62, 1951). His unit of measurement of tension was "one anti-Negro opinion offered by one white respondent in reply to a non-directive question. This is a primitive all-or-none tension, which is defined by our tension theory as an index of intensity of desire per unit of the desideratum lacked. The negative desideratum was the anti-Negro opinion which being an all-or-none unit had unit value if expressed. Similarly, the intensity of desire was in all-or-none terms since 'intensity sufficient to utter the opinion to the interviewer' was called 'unit intensity' and non-utterance was called zero-intensity. Hence every anti-Negro opinion uttered was a unit-intensity per unit-opinion making a unit of tension" (p. 283). He measured the rate of spread and subsidence of tension, so defined, and found that although tension did subside, it did not quite return to its endemic level and among those who were living in the project at the time of the rape, it remained considerably higher.

One of Dodd's students, Kaare Svalastoga, applied his theory to a study of internationalism in the state of Washington. On the basis of 522 replies to a questionnaire on internationalism, he constructed what he called an international tension index. "It is a measure of the perceived discrepancy between certain states of affairs in the international field as desired by a respondent and the states of affairs desired by the government as estimated by the respondent, weighted by the respondent's own thermometer rating of his strength of feeling on the issues covered" (233, 1950, p. 32). Using this tension index as an instrument for testing the hypothesis that a high degree of tension is associated with tension-relieving behavior, Svalastoga came up with inconclusive results and concluded that there were so many tensions within individuals that their behavior could be accounted for only by reference to combinations of tensions and not even the same set for different individuals (233, p. 36).

Christiansen wrestles with the problem of group tensions from a theoretical point of view. He recognizes the inadequacy of the concept of tension and urges that it be clarified. He questions the value of introducing such concepts as needs, motives, wishes, and group mind. He recognizes that group tensions are not simple additive phenomena, but he still feels that they can be gotten at by way of some kind of weighted polling of individuals. His most valuable contribution lies perhaps in his emphasis on the threat component in the concept of tension. "It is the threat-dimensions in the perceptions of international relations that justify the use of such words and expressions as international tensions" (45, 1951, p. 71). He introduces from the work of N.R.F. Maier and T.M. Newcomb on frustration the idea of frustration tolerance. "According to their point of view, tension might be characterized as the degree of threat vs. goal-orientation, that dominates (determines) the perceptual behavior of individuals .... By thinking about (international) tensions as tolerance of threat, or if you prefer - a frustrational - tolerance, operating on a national level, it should be measurable in terms of national (or public) opinion" (p. 75). He recognizes that nations are congeries or systems of sub-systems and that therefore the usual kinds of mass-polling will
not be adequate. He stresses the necessity for a conceptual clarifica-
tion of the concept of tension and suggests "that both the percep-
tual aspects of threat and the aspects of national subgroups ought to
be incorporated in such a concept, if it is to be useful in description
of conflicts between nations" (p. 77).

It will be noted from this brief résumé of the work on the
concept of tensions that where the concept of "intergroup" or "group
tension" seems relevant, it is vague and amorphous; where it is pre-
cise and clearly defined it leads to fairly sterile results. It seems
as yet to have little to offer to the sociologist's analytical tool
kit. Since this is such a severe structure, it seems to call for
more detailed consideration.

Critique of the "Group Tension" Concept.

The first point in criticizing the concept of tensions as
applied to groups or to intergroup behavior is the fuzziness of its
definition. We have already pointed this out and need not elaborate
on it further here.

A second criticism can also be dismissed briefly since there
is a voluminous literature on it going back at least a quarter of a
century. It is a questioning of the assumption, basic to the tension
concept, that group and collective behavior can be interpreted or
explained in terms of individual motivations. Much - not all - of the
literature attacking the concept of "instinct" would apply here. The
controversy goes back even farther in the literature. 3 It is pertinent
here, but to review it would go beyond the scope of our project.
We merely point out that sociologists and cultural anthropologists do
not accept this assumption.

A third criticism may be stated as follows. So far as appli-
cation to sociological phenomena is concerned, the concept of tensions
seems to be little more than a figure of speech. Tensions exist with-
in individuals. Do they exist actually, except figuratively, between
groups? Can the "sum", however weighted, of tensions in individuals
be said to constitute a "group" tension? The nearest approach to an
adequate theoretical answer to these questions would seem to be by
way of the work on suggestion. It is, to be sure, no longer fashion-
able to use the concepts of suggestion and suggestibility in analyzing
collective behavior. There may be good reasons why their use has
fallen into disrepute. They may have been over-exploited to name or
describe rather than to explain behavior. Yet they are probably still
useful when carefully delimited. The results of C.L. Hull's classic
researches on hypnosis and suggestibility seem to be fruitfully applic-
able to the conceptualization of group tensions. 3 Individuals may
be "set" toward certain specific goals by the people about them under
conditions similar to those of hypnosis. In like manner, many people
may synchronously be "set", or suggested toward certain goals by the
usual methods of suggestion. Once set toward these goals, they tend
to realize them, just as persons in post-hypnotic suggestion feel

1) The reader will recognize this as the old problem of the relation
between sociology and psychology.

3) C. L. Hull, Hypnosis and Suggestibility: An Experimental Approach.
   (New York: Century, 1933).
emphasized that no omnibus criticism of the psychological approach is intended. It would be a serious error to identify the tension approach with the psychological one. As a matter of fact, the concept of cost, which is basic to the sociological approach to conflict, has a psychological as well as a sociological aspect. Costs may be measurable with some degree of objectivity in terms of territory, trade or privileges. But costs may be subjective also, determinable only in terms of the values which people attach to aspects of their systems which have to be sacrificed in order to achieve accommodation. The incommensurable aspect of the system may seem trivial to the outsider, even dysfunctional (for example, a custom like suttee) but if great value if attached to it, the psychological costs of losing it may be great. Costs may involve such things as "sovereignty", "freedom", "national pride", "honor", "face". Cost, in brief, has a psychological as well as a strictly sociological aspect, as economists have long since recognized in their theoretical wrestling with "utility" and "disutility". Any approach to conflict which ignored its psychological aspects or denied them, would be incomplete and inadequate.
restless - "tense" or "under tension" - until they have realized the goals set for them under hypnosis. A tension is created in them which can normally be released only by achieving the goal or an acceptable substitute for it. Sometimes such synchronous tensions are created and released in a fairly short time and in a fairly direct manner, as in a pogrom, for example, or a riot, or a lynching. Sometimes the tension is released by a dousing in the cold water of a fire house or by the results of a tear bomb. Sometimes, however, the tension is created over a long period of time and acts much like post-hypnotic suggestion, in which the subject remains restless, strained, and tense until he carries out the suggestion made under hypnosis. Similarly there are occasions when great masses of people are "set" toward, let us say, a war or a strike or a riot. Tensions are created in thousands or even millions of people which can be released only by carrying out the suggestion, that is, by realizing the set. They can be made to clamor for a war or a riot or a lynching. Newcomb, following F. H. Allport, views intergroup tension in essentially this light; that is, as social facilitation or a mutual heightening of stimulation (178, 1950, pp. 600-601).

The concept of group tension might also be legitimately applied perhaps to the synchronous tension of those playing a game or of those watching the game. There is also tension in an audience watching a good play or moving picture; whether this is group tension or not might be mooted. There is group tension as people follow strategic plays in any kind of contest. In brief, we might legitimately speak of group tensions when large numbers of people are being subject to the same stimuli or suggestions at the same time under conditions conducive to suggestibility.

But the conditions which must be present in order to set up group tensions thus conceptualized do not seem to constitute the usual ones for intergroup relations. As Svalastoga pointed out, individuals are usually subject to numerous tensions at the same time, nor are the same tensions present in all persons. In a sense the individual tensions or sets of tensions may be said to tend to cancel one another out. Unless created, synchronous tensions with common goals probably do not exist in the ordinary course of group existence or intergroup relations. The synchronization of the individual tensions of large masses of separate persons to make them react as a unit against another similar unit is a feat of some magnitude. It can be done, as we well know. Mobs can be created and incited. Mass hysterias can be fomented. But it is not an easy task. Mass inertia and mass apathy are more often complained of than mass action. The third criticism, then, may be summed up by saying that the phenomena of "group tension" can probably be subsumed under the category of suggestion phenomena and that the research data available from that area render unnecessary the invoking of new concepts for which research data are lacking.

Closely related to the third criticism is the fourth, which helps to explain why group tensions in the sense of synchronized tensions of many individuals is not more common, namely that most people live in extremely restricted social and psychological worlds. Cotterrell and Eberart, for example, reporting on American public opinion on world affairs, found that less than three-fifths of the people asked could give the name of the then secretary of state, although his name was daily in the press (49, 1948). A third gave little thought to international problems. They allowed the government to do the worrying. Naive, complacent, uninformed inertia was the prevailing picture. We are told, further, that (123, 1948, p. 582)
Studies on international thinking of a cross section of the American public made during the war by the Program Surveys Division of the United States Department of Agriculture clearly demonstrated that for large segments of the population, the world outside the United States or even outside their own immediate community was virtually nonexistent. Not only was there a lack of emotional and motivational connection with anything beyond these narrow borders, there was for large numbers of people only the haziest conception of what lies beyond.

It is difficult to believe that the tensions of these individuals have anything to do with the major conflicts among systems of our day.

A similar finding is reported by one of the UNESCO tension studies in Belgium. "Of the whole body of citizens, only a small fraction is interested in international questions" (56, 1951, p. 552). International policy was found to depend more on the political views of a few people than on those of the mass of people.

It is sometimes argued in defense of the group tension approach that the leaders who decide policy must reflect the tensions of their constituents. This is a nice question. Do the policies reflect the tensions or do the tensions reflect the policies? Are the tensions created, manufactured, to support policies? At the present time policy decisions are made farther and farther away from the people themselves. When political and industrial units were small, local, and more or less autonomous, decisions with respect to policy were made by people who were fairly close to the lives of those intimately involved. As both industry and government have become larger and more bureaucratized, these decisions are increasingly made by people who act on information shared by very few. So far as the man-on-the-street is concerned, they are like the weather. Wars and strikes may be decided upon with as little consultation as that offered by a blizzard or a monsoon. To be sure, once the decision is made, he will be wowed, since he must implement the decision. As another UNESCO tension study on stereotypes reports (35, 1951, p. 528):

There is limited evidence that rational stereotypes are flexible over a period of years; and thus that they may follow and rationalize, rather than precede and determine, reaction to a certain nation. The tenor of the findings as a whole is in the direction of minimizing the causative effect of either favorable or unfavorable stereotypes in relations between nations, and suggesting that they may not exist until objective events demand their creation. Perhaps their important function is the wartime one of providing a rationale within which men are able to kill, deceive and perform other acts not sanctioned by the usual moral code.

It would seem that the history of the last decade would tend to invalidate the tension theory as related to intergroup conflict. The realignment of political powers has had little relationship to national stereotypes or prejudices or hostilities or individual attitudes of any kind. The national stereotypes and attitudes have followed rather than preceded the realignments. During World War II, the American citizen felt grateful toward the Russians; he felt the opposite toward the Germans and the Japanese. Today his hostility is directed toward the Russians; there is little animosity toward the German and the Japanese. Americans have, at least for a generation, been, if anything, sentimentally warm in their attitudes toward the Chinese. Today there is little of that. How have these subjective
tension phenomena affected international relations? The man-on-the-street does not know what to think of other nationality groups until he is told what the power structure is and which groups constitute threats and which do not. Our fourth criticism, then, is that individual tensions seem to follow rather than to precede changes in intergroup relations.

Our reference to threats just above, leads to our fifth criticism of the group tension concept. Implicit in the group tension concept is the assumption that the difficulty is "all in the mind." The implication is that one group feels threatened only because its perception of the other group is incorrect. The assumption is that hostilities are not based on actual threat but on false images or stereotypes of the outgroup. Thus eight social scientists in a UNESCO publication state (40, 1950, p. 18):

- economic inequalities, insecurities, and frustrations create group and national conflicts. All this is an important source of tensions which have often led one group to see another group as a menace through the acceptance of false images and oversimplified solutions and by making people susceptible to the scapegoating appeals of demagogues.

Such a statement makes little sense. If there are inequalities and insecurities and frustrations, one group may actually be a threat to another. The threat may be an objective fact, not merely the result of a false image (21, 1951). Groups do constitute threats to one another. They do often have incompatible and mutually exclusive values, goals, and aims. The feeling of threat which the members of groups have may be wholly justified; not to have such feelings might be wholly unrealistic. In a sense this criticism of the tension concept is the same as that made of the semanticist approach in Chapter 3. We are not here in the presence of a misunderstanding; we are in the presence of real conflict.

So much, then, for criticism of the tension concept as applied to group and intergroup relations. We repeat that these criticisms are in no sense directed against the concept as applied to individual behavior, since that is not our concern here. Our point is that the phenomena subsumed under the concept can be adequately interpreted in terms of solid and substantial research in the field of suggestion, that group tensions do not seem to be related in a causal way to intergroup conflict, that they may follow rather than precede it, and that the whole concept seems to imply that actual threats do not exist. If the concept of intergroup tension is of any value to the sociologist it probably has a negative significance. Where it is considered a bad thing, the conditions which foster it should be controlled. Since group tensions in the sense of the synchronized tensions of a large number of individuals is a created, even, perhaps, a manufactured phenomenon, it would seem that the best way to handle them would be, if possible, to prevent their creation in the first place, or to provide a sanctioned way for their release.

Research on Programs Based on the Social-Psychological or Tension Approach to Conflict.

If group tensions are conceived of as the result of such non-rational phenomena as prejudice, hostile stereotypes, and frustrations of one kind or another, then the policy for their removal must
be one of changing these attitudes. In general, then, the socialpsychological approach to conflict has designed its research to find out how to change people, directly or indirectly - how they feel, how they think, how they value. Programs stemming from research with this orientation have had to do with ways and means for achieving this change in human beings, by education, by propaganda, by group contacts, or even by psychotherapy. Proponents of this school of thought have been leaders in what is known as action-research. The moral atmosphere has been one of a patient, kindly teacher or doctor attempting to help a mistaken if not an ill, patient. The general plan is to come up with recommendations which one group can freely - albeit, of course, in a kindly manner - "impose" on another; it hopes to show how one group can change another willy-nilly. It is not usually contemplated that the group to be changed will resist or fight back. An effort is made to avoid so-called boomerang effects. The changing group conceives itself as doing something to another group. The changing group assumes - usually rightly - that its ethical goals and aims are superior to those of the people they are to change, whose prejudices they are to minimize, whose misunderstandings they are to clear up, whose stereotypes they are to break down.

In 1947 three summaries or critiques of the results of programs designed to reduce prejudice in the United States were published, by Goodwin Watson, by Robin Williams, Jr., and by Arnold Rose (250, 255, 204).

In general, most of the agencies working in intergroup relations aimed at attitude change rather than legal force or pressure. This is shown by the fact that in a study of 75 organizations in the field of race relations, 50 were found to deal with education and only 12 to work through the courts or through legislation.

Attitude Changing: Premises.

Williams has analyzed the premises basic to the socialpsychological attack on the problem of intergroup conflict:

One of the most obvious of these premises guiding strategy is, in its least sophisticated formulation, "Give people the facts and prejudice will disappear." In this crude form the assumption is rarely made explicit, yet much intercultural activity is carried on as if the proposition were accepted ......

Insofar as it is assumed that presentation of facts will reduce intergroup prejudice, a further premise is necessary: that prejudice is unrealistic, a function of ignorance or of "distorted stereotypes," or "false pictures in the mind," or "warped social perception." For unless prejudices represent erroneous information or ignorance, the presentation of correct facts can not be expected to change hostile attitudes ......

In one sense the opposite of the viewpoint just mentioned is the doctrine that group prejudices are subject to reduction or elimination only by changing "underlying interests" or "needs." ...

A second basic assumption underlying a great variety of specific techniques may be presented in two opposing formulations: that action should be directed toward (a) a direct change in values or attitudes, or (b) a change in those aspects of the situation which are regarded as productive of existing attitudes and behavior ......

(A third basic assumption or premise is that) "contact brings
friendliness." This is the extreme and unqualified phrasing of a general assumption manifest in a great many current activities. The related but not completely homologous proposition is that segregation increases the likelihood of intergroup tension and hostility .... There is evidence that some kinds of contact sometimes are followed by increased mutual understanding and friendliness, and that the reverse is also true. There is a growing awareness that future action and research must define the whole context of intergroup contacts more carefully in order to arrive at practically useful specifications.

There are in addition, finally, the assumptions that "(a) the experience of (intergroup association) changes behavior, and (b) there is a transfer of the changed behavior to other, more usual, types of situation" (p. 16). As Williams points out, none of these assumptions basic to programs with a social-psychological orientation has been unequivocally tested by research. In as much as the design of programs depends on the premises, one would have expected more concern with this problem.

Changing Attitudes: Techniques.

Williams points out that there are basically only two techniques for controlling intergroup relations, namely: one which operates on the situation within which people must act, approaching attitude changes by providing greater economic security, increasing job opportunities for the underprivileged, or, in the most extreme case, altering the whole social structure in a thorough-going, even communistic, way (as, for example, in 95, 1945; 91, 1948); or one which works directly on the values or attitudes of individuals. Of the two, the second is commoner as a result of simple expediency; acting on the first is usually impossible since the factors involved are so inaccessible.

Among the direct appeals are attempts to show that differences in the characteristics of various groups are not inevitable or biologically fixed; the minimization of differences in values and behavior and emphasis on elements common to both parties; demonstration of the wide range of intragroup variation to attack categorical or stereotyped thinking; appeals to larger social, religious, or legal values; emphasis on achievements and qualities of the disliked group which are universally esteemed; linking tolerance with persons who are prestige-symbols (pp. 18-19).

Williams summarizes the results of over fifty studies in the field of attitude change, reporting that (pp. 27-32):

The weight of the evidence from published studies is that the stimuli tested (school and college courses, specific propaganda, personal contacts, information, and general education) do result in or are accompanied by attitude changes in a "positive" direction. On the other hand, nearly half of the studies have found inconclusive results or no change in attitudes. No important attitude changes in a negative (more prejudiced) direction have been reported, although some boomerang effects were noted in a few studies ....

In the few experimental studies the following findings have been reported:
1. Auditory stimuli are more effective than visual stimuli ....
2. Speakers are more effective than printed matter ....
3. "Emotional" appeals tend to be more effective than "logical" appeals, but there are exceptions ....
4. Oral propaganda is more effective in small groups than in large audiences.

5. The effectiveness of propaganda tends to be greater when the material is linked with prestige symbols.

William finds the results inadequate for decisions with respect to policy. He criticizes the research so far available on the grounds that it is based on small samples, that it is based so largely on school or college populations, and that there has not been adequate provision for controls. Furthermore, the stimuli studies have been of relatively brief duration. Outmoded measuring techniques have been used, and they refer too preponderantly to verbalizations in isolation from other behavior (pp. 33-34).

Since Williams' monograph was published, the results of the work on mass communication done for the American army have appeared (97, 1950). These do not bear directly on the matter of intergroup relations, but they are pertinent with respect to what can be expected from the mass media so far as acquisition of information (good), change of attitude (not so good), and motivation (not good) are concerned.

Although the quality of research dealing with intergroup relations may have improved since Williams made his study, many of the same errors continue to be made. A study published as recently as 1951 shows the same confusion of basic concepts and methods as those pointed out by Williams in 1947 (48).

The use of public housing policy as a technique for changing attitudes has been reported on recently, with equivocal results, so far as policy is concerned. For example, there have been interesting experiments aimed at the reduction of prejudice through housing projects. William Form, reviewing studies on stratification in low- and middle-income housing areas, questions the general possibility of bringing about neighborhood interaction and cooperative experience in a heterogeneous population and concludes that "the hope of reducing tensions by planning a community of 'balanced' or 'mixed' social composition is based on false reasoning" (68, 1951, p. 123). Other researchers, on the other hand, come to directly opposite conclusions. Marie Jahoda and Patricia West give the results they secured in a study of the comparative effects on Negro-white interpersonal relations of integrated and segregated public housing projects. They found a net reduction of "tensions" in the community resulting from "balanced" or "mixed" social composition in the population (103', 1951). And Morton Deutsch and Mary Evans Collins came to similar conclusions, namely: that "from the point of view of reducing prejudice and of creating harmonious democratic intergroup relations, the net gain resulting from the integrated projects is considerable; from the same point of view, the gain created by the segregated bi-racial projects is slight" (60, 1951). They found that individuals in integrated projects were less prejudiced and showed greater improvement in their attitudes than those in segregated projects. This difference they attribute to the social-psychological effects of the two patterns of occupancy.

Henry Enoch Kagan has recently reported his experiences in changing the attitudes of Christians toward Jews. He found that the informational approach in and of itself was not very effective, but that the group method which "stimulates Christians in a group under authorized Christian religious influence to discuss directly pro and con their attitude toward the Jew" was effective and that the changes produced in attitude tended to greater permanency (108, 1952).
Action Research and Group Dynamics.

Williams referred in his summary of types of action in current intergroup programs to action research and community self surveys, in which members of the community attempt to locate their own prejudices and change them. These techniques developed under the particular influence of Kurt Lewin who had been impressed by the inadequacy of the usual survey-type study which was inert, sterile, and for practical purposes usually futile. He advocated what he called "action-research, a comparative research on the conditions and effects of various forms of social action, and research leading to social action" (136, 1948, pp. 202-203).

Action-research requires well trained personnel. An experimental workshop conducted to train community leaders in intergroup relations has been described by Ronald Lippitt (137, 1949). As a result of the training received in this workshop, most of the subjects reported more time spent on intergroup relations when they returned to their communities (p. 178). If one had more confidence in the efficacy of all this increased intergroup work, the results here reported would be more impressive. We have no unequivocal proof that the work itself was effective; much of it may have been more busy-work.

In industrial relations it has been found that the psychological and social costs to workers of changes in machinery or procedure can be considerably reduced if the workers are allowed to participate in planning for them (42; 1953). "Participation" has become almost a fetish in industrial relations today, as an antidote for hostilities among workers (151, 1952).

Action-research has come to be identified with the work of the Research Center for Group Dynamics at the University of Michigan - the Center was founded in 1945 at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology by Lewin - which has made the reduction of conflict, psychologically conceived, its main interest:

Society's skills in reducing intergroup conflicts are pitifully inadequate ... Much more specific information is needed about forces producing intergroup conflict or harmony and about the ways in which they may be controlled ... Until we can know concretely and finally the consequences flowing from efforts to reduce intergroup conflict there is only slight hope that we shall hit upon effective courses of social action. To this end the Center together with a variety of agencies have conducted research projects in close collaboration with action programs. 1)

A collection of the most important work done by the Center has just been published (42, 1953). There is at the present time a danger that the group-dynamics approach may take on the characteristics of a cult and that uncritical enthusiasts may discredit it. There has developed, indeed, a strong current of resentment toward it among many people who feel that it is manipulative, cynical in effect if not in intent, patronizing, and that it might even become dangerous. As yet most of this criticism is expressed only orally; it has not invaded the literature to any great extent, but it may perhaps be expected to in the near future.

On the quite reasonable assumption that research has focussed too much on the evil person, the criminal, the prejudiced, the hating, and the destructive, P.A. Sorokin has turned his attention to studies

of altruistic love and programs for the "altruization" of mankind (222 and 223, 1950). He has also established at Harvard University an organization to prosecute research in this area. Reports on results are not yet forthcoming.

Problems of Application.

Williams, whose work evaluating the research in reduction of intergroup "tensions" we referred to above, has recently re-viewed the problems of application of research to intergroup relations (256, 1953). Although he reports on the situation in the United States there is no reason to doubt that similar problems exist elsewhere.

He finds that the application of intergroup research in social action involves barriers at four points, namely: (1) awareness or lack of it by the research sociologist of the problems and needs of those who apply his findings; (2) communication, or lack of it, between researcher and user; (3) translation of research findings into implications for strategy and tactics; and (4) the scientific evaluation of the results of the application.

He makes the point that practitioners or policy makers are often ahead of the researcher. Research is likely to be too atomistic, static, and sterile. He refers also to the administrative anxiety which the evaluation of a program is likely to generate in the administrator who may view evaluation as implicit criticism. He makes clear that the relationship between researcher and action-man is a two-way one; the researcher can learn from the action-man as well as the other way round.

In actual life, research has sometimes been used to delay, forestall, or even avoid change. It has been used to justify decisions already reached. It can perform a function simply by explicating or clarifying a conflict. Williams suggests that we know little about the direct effect of research itself on people; in some cases it may increase the sense of threat to a group to have a race-relations survey undertaken in the community; in others it is known to have a mobilizing and catalytic effect in the desired direction. He suggests that we need research on the effects of research.

The reader who applies these comments to the international field will find them very suggestive.

Violence.

Most of the research dealing with programs for improving intergroup relations aims at the individual's behavior before it reaches the stage of violence. The hope is that the release or reduction of individual tensions can take place without violence.

There has been some study of the conditions which make for violence and which therefore should be avoided if violence is to be obviated. Lee and Humphrey made a careful study of the Detroit race riots of 1943, comparing their findings with riots in Harlem and Los Angeles. On the basis of their research they suggest programs for preventing riots and also tell what should be done once a riot is underway (129, 1943).

H. Otto Dahlke has also recently published a study of race and minority riots (50, 1952). He compares the Kishinev Riot of 1903
with the Detroit Riot of 1943 with respect to historical conditions, events leading to the riot, duration of the riot, personnel of the riot, that is, the rioters, organization of the riot, methods of control, and results. Although he recognizes the tension or stress aspect of such outbursts, he sees also their strategic nature, that is, the use of violence by middle class persons as a method of removing competitors. This study is extremely suggestive; but it presents no control or negative case. Do the conditions which Dahlke analyses as likely to result in violence even exist without producing violence? Do they always produce violence? Are they all necessary? Does violence occur where they are not present? A more rigorously designed sequel to this study would be illuminating.

Lynching have declined so drastically in the United States that they have become almost of only historical interest. No recent research has appeared. Davie devotes a chapter to Lynchings and race riots in his study of the Negro (53: 1949) and Newcomb presents a vivid psychological description of a lynching (178: 1950, pp. 596 ff.). Outbreaks of violence against Jews, especially among teen-agers, are reported from time to time in the urban press, but no systematic research has as yet focussed this problem in either a psychological or a sociological frame of reference. A great deal of light could be cast on tensions by a careful study of "incidents" and minor disturbances known to the police. As yet carefully documented data are not available, although the materials could be found on the police blotters of all cities.

Evaluation.

Perhaps the first impression one gets from a survey of the program of research based on the social-psychological approach to conflict in the United States is the tremendous amount of idealism and goodwill it seems to represent. Here are men apparently urgently serious about hatreds, hostilities, prejudices, violence, and equally serious about applying science to the problem of eliminating them. They are hopeful that science may in time find a way to render peace and love or altruism within the reach of men. They are men of faith, liberals in the old tradition.

Actually, so far as the results of their work are concerned, it may not be important that careful scientific procedure has found them equivocal or difficult to apply. We do not know what conditions would be like if no one were interested or cared about intergroup relations. It is, of course, important that research should not render community relations worse. But even if we cannot demonstrate that it improves them, this fact would not itself condemn it.

Perhaps after all the best way to view the great mass of work on intergroup relations in the community is primarily as itself a sociological phenomenon of great significance. What is important is that in the United States there is not complete complacency about intergroup relations; there are people who want to improve them. Societies have functioned on an exploitative basis where certain groups were required to bear an undue cost of the system in relation of slave to master or inferior to superior, and there was little or no protest. It may be that such inequitable distribution of the costs of any social system is inevitable in a heterogeneous society. What is important is that large numbers of individuals and groups in the United States protest them and
attempt to change them and invoke science, along with other techniques, to help them. Viewed in this light, the evaluation of any single program is not especially significant. What needs evaluation is the total phenomenon of "scientific" protest. What would intergroup relations be like if no one were concerned with them? What would they be like if science were being as seriously invoked — as in Nazi Germany — in behalf of racial hatreds? It has been argued that the most important effect of propaganda is on the people who use it rather than on those toward whom it is aimed. The same might conceivably be said with respect to all techniques aimed at changing attitudes.

Since most of the programs for improving intergroup relations are carried on in the United States, our discussion of research related to them has been limited to the United States. With suitable modifications, however, the discussion could probably also be applied to other countries and to international relations. Could it not be said, for example, that the actual effectiveness of any specific UNESCO research project is of minor significance compared to the fact that a body of idealistic men are engaged in the great, humane effort to apply science to the betterment of the human lot?

CHAPTER THREE. RESEARCH BASED ON A SYSTEMIC ORIENTATION TOWARD CONFLICT.

Research on conflict which is based on a systemic orientation assumes that all social life consists of interaction within and between social systems. The system may be a small group, even a pair, or it may be a nation or an empire, or anything in between. It may be a political party; it may be a denomination. It may be a work group; it may be a factory. The sociology of conflict attempts to describe, analyze, and explain how such systems fall apart or how they are built up, but only when there is some cost involved in the process.

The following logic is used in presenting our data. The most theoretical work, that is, the work which is most general in its application, is presented first. The data here are merely illustrative of principles rather than significant in and of themselves. Much of this work is deductive; some of it is mathematical. This mathematical work is followed by reference to three experimental studies in which, again, the data themselves are less significant than the hypotheses tested. Reference will then be made to work dealing with the building up of systems, that is, with the integration of systems, as related to the emergence of areas of peace. Finally the substantive contributions to a sociology of conflict will be referred to. Here the data themselves are important — "news" in the sense Hughes used the term — whether or not they are presented by the researcher in terms of sociological that is, theoretical concepts.

Mathematical Studies in the Sociology of Conflict.

The first work to be reported is among the most general. It is offered by its author, Walter Firey, as a theory of schism, a theoretical model for measuring the conditions under which a system of
accommodated groups may fall apart and the conditions necessary for its reintegration. He carries through his analysis in terms of fairly small, informal groups, especially in industry, but this is only incidental; for his conceptual framework is general enough to include all kinds of systems, even a world system (67, 1948).

On the basis of a set of premises and the deductions he makes from them, Firey evolves the formula \( U = -k(u-x)^2m + c \), where \( U \) stands for utility, \( u \) the attainment of a given end, \( k \) and \( m \) constants for any particular system, and \( C \) the point of maximized utility. By setting up differing conditions, he arrives at models in which separate curves tend to emerge out of the original single curve. If the distance between the two curves remains within certain limits, the sub-system will remain within the super-system. But if the curves diverge too greatly, the subsystem will tend to break off; the disadvantages or costs of remaining within the system will be greater than the costs of schism. Sometimes the cost of alliance, or remaining within the system, is borne by one system, sometimes by the other. Firey is not interested in the methods used in schism. That is, violence or war is not essential. Either may or may not be involved. Nor need hate or hostility be involved. Firey's statement is independent of the content of the behavior.

Firey applies his model to several kinds of real-life situations in industrial plants in order to test its applicability, with encouraging and stimulating results. The model could, as he says, be equally well applied to the relationship of a colony to an army of a state, or to a political and economic system. This principal is also in terms of costs, but can also be applied to the concept of work. In the course of development, he notes that his "minimum equation"

\[
\frac{1}{P} + \frac{1}{2P} + \frac{1}{3P} + \ldots + \frac{1}{nP}
\]

adequately describes rank-population distributions, "where \( P \cdot S_n \) equals the total \( C \) population of the terrain, and where \( P \) is the population of the largest community ..., and where the exponent \( p \), equals \( 1/q \)" (p. 366). The equation says that in an integrated and stable social system, the second largest community will be half as large as the largest, the third largest will be one third as large, and so on. When the equation does not hold, as in the United States from 1820 to 1860, according to Zipf, this is an indication that the social system is splitting into two separate systems. After the Civil War, the reintegration of the South into the Union shows up in Zipf's equation "as an ever greater approximation to rectilinearity" (p. 422). Wars and revolutions, according to Zipf, are incidental to the process of achieving the rectilinearity in population distribution called for by the principles of least effort and as embodied in his equation.
Zipf applies his theoretical system to an analysis of class conflicts also. He believes that the tendency for men to exploit one another when they can is inevitable. The strength of a given class and hence its potential for rebellion is determined by its income. The incentive to remain in any given system is proportional to the income of the individual. The two magnitudes must be in an appropriate relationship in order to have equilibrium. If classes are ranked from the bottom up, the income of the individuals in each class should be proportional to the rank of his class; the number of individuals in a class should be inversely related to the square of its rank. Equilibrium, concludes Zipf, is reached under these conditions and rebellion is averted (Chapter 11).

Applying the same principle to international relations, Zipf finds the "least work center" now to be in Germany rather than in England, where it formerly was. In effect, Zipf's theory of conflict is that it represents an effort to align production forces and factors in such a way as to minimize human effort. "We shall view wars and revolutions as potential equilibrating devices for effecting a more stable equilibrium" (p. 436).

So far as application is concerned, the implication of Zipf's work is that the rational policy maker will work with his equations, rather than against them; if he works against them, he will lose out.

Aside from the substantive criticisms which might be leveled against Zipf's work - his theory of class conflict being far too simple, for example, in the light of recent research in this area - the following methodological criticism has been made by Kenneth J. Arrow (11, 1951, pp. 149-150):

"Dr. Zipf's work does not constitute a properly developed mathematical model. The fundamental postulates are nowhere stated explicitly; though mathematical symbols and formulas are sprinkled rather freely through a long work, the derivations involved are chiefly figures of speech and analogies, rather than true mathematical deductions; in some cases, they are simply wrong. Thus, as an attempt at a systematic social theory, Zipf's work can only be regarded as a failure..."

However, two empirical regularities do emerge which are highly suggestive and may prove promising for further research. (The two regularities referred to are those discussed above) ... The theory of games of strategy, to which we shall refer later, seems to offer a more rigorously mathematical tool for the study of sociological conflict and one which seems to conform better to the known facts of social existence.

Still another deductive approach to the sociology of conflict has been made by Herbert A. Simon (218, 1952). The system he is dealing with is a social group whose behavior can be characterized by four variables, all functions of time, namely: (1) intensity of interaction as among members; (2) level of friendliness among the members; (3) amount of activity carried on by members within the group; and (4) the amount of activity imposed by the external environment, that is, the external system. In addition, three sets of dynamic relationships among these variables are postulated: (1) the intensity of interaction depends upon, and increases with, the level of friendliness and the amount of activity carried on within the group; (2) the level of group friendliness will increase if the actual level of interaction is higher than that "appropriate" to the existing level of friendliness; and (3) the amount of activity carried on by the group will tend to
increase if the actual level of friendliness is higher than that "appropriate" to the existing amount of activity, and if the amount of activity imposed externally is higher than the existing amount of activity. Simon presents equations for all of these postulates. He then derives the conditions of equilibrium, of stability, and then the method of what he calls comparative statics. From his equations he finds conditions which indicate positive and negative morale; the latter not unrelated to Durkheim's anomie. Under certain conditions, his equations indicate that groups will dissolve. He finds, further, that if a group has been dissolved by reducing one of the parameters of his equation, it cannot necessarily be restored by increasing the parameter once again.

Simon validates his work by reference to George Homan's study of The Human Group (1950), but in addition he applies his models to clique formation, to "conflict of loyalties," and to competition of groups. He feels that his model "offers an explanation for some of the commonly observed phenomena relating to the stability and dissolution of groups" (p. 211).

An empirical researcher might wish to question some of Simon's postulates. It may be true, for example, that intensity of interaction increases with the level of friendliness in a group; might it not also increase with the level of hostility in the group? Hostility is often if not necessarily a concomitant of competition; competition has been found greatly to accelerate the amount of activity, if not its quality.

A mathematical biologist, Nicolas Rashevsky, has been attempting in two books to build up a mathematical sociology, including a sociology of conflict and of war. His aim is to interpret neurobiological mechanisms of the central nervous system as revealed in group behavior. In one sense his theory may be viewed as a theory of an 'élite.' His theory is wholly general; it does not apply to any specific system. He posits two populations or systems, both made up of "actives" - élites, perhaps - and "passives." The two sets of actives, or the two élites, are in conflict, and each attempts to influence the other individuals in their respective populations or systems to engage in the conflict also. Or there may be in each population two active groups in conflict with one another, one wishing to carry on the conflict, the other not wishing to. For simplicity's sake Rashevsky assumes only one active set of individuals in each population. He derives the inequalities which must be satisfied if both populations are to engage in conflict. The length of the conflict is computed from the rate of destruction of the members of the populations, or of their removal from combat. If the rate of destruction of the active members of a population is more rapid than that of the passive members, a point is reached where "the active group can no more influence the passive individuals and make them continue to fight. The populations stop fighting, become demoralized.... We thus have a quantitative interpretation for the 'breakdown of morale', which is usually a rather elusive notion" (197, 1947, pp. 185-186). The population whose morale breaks down first loses the conflict. As related to war, Rashevsky applies his formulas to describe the rate of retreat, including in his variables and constants such factors as amount of land involved, technical equipment and productivity, natural resources, and changes in the ration of actives to passives. Differences in defensive capacity and in striking power are also involved. The offensive is taken by the population which is favored in the mathematical inequality.
As an illustration of the kinds of situations which Rashevsky attempts to reduce to mathematical formulas we cite the following (198, 1951, pp. 218-219):

What looms ahead as a result of such studies is the possibility of describing in mathematical terms the following situation: Let \( n \) social groups with initial populations \( N_1, N_2, \ldots, N_n \) settle at a given moment in \( n \) adjacent areas of sizes \( S_1, S_2, \ldots, S_n \), characterized by coefficients \( k_1, k_2, \ldots, k_n \), which measures the fertility of soil and the mineral resources. Groups with initially small values of \( N_i/S_i \) will develop technical abilities more slowly. Since those factors act to decrease \( a \), the value of \( a \) will be less in such groups after a time. If we consider warlike interactions between the various groups, we will find that the incidence of wars favors a special class of military rulers, who survive wars better than other individuals do. The ratio \( p = N_{im}/N_{i} \) of the military people will vary with time ... Groups with small initial \( N_{i}/S_{i} \) will develop a higher \( a \) and \( b_{r} \). If a change in behavior pattern occurs, the new regime in such groups would be more intolerant, according to equation 26. We may have here the clue to understanding the different results of revolutions in different countries. A smaller \( a \) at the moment of a revolution results in greater tolerance and more freedom.

In principle, all these relations can be described mathematically by developing further the theory outlined here. The different parameters may be estimated by comparison with historical data.

Basically Rashevsky's system rests on a cost theory of conflict; although it is not identical to those already referred to. In pleading for objectivity in analyzing the conflict of systems - in this particular instance capitalism versus socialism, but equally relevant for any other system conflict - he points out that although the group which profits from any particular social form tends to evaluate it as superior and any other as inferior, actually such subjective evaluations do not hold. It is always a question of superior for whom, inferior for whom. "Fundamentally ... any advantage to a group of individuals results in some disadvantage to others" (198, p. 235).

Since Rashevsky's models are perfectly general, wholly independent of empirical data, it is impossible to make any substantive critique. So far as method is concerned, he is, apparently, rigorously correct. His "standards of mathematical rigor are high. The methods used are drawn from the calculus and the theory of ordinary linear differential equations, with a few tentative steps toward the use of integral equations" (11, 1951, p. 149). The test of this work will come in the stimulus it offers to others and in whatever application can be made of it.

Another mathematically oriented approach is that of Anatol Rappaport who, in a series of articles dealing mathematically with what he calls "satisfaction functions" has explored the rewards of cooperation between two individuals under given conditions of sharing, of need, of output, and of initiative. In the course of his analyses he derives an equation which he interprets as follows (196, 1947, pp. 118-119):

The logarithmic terms of \( S_1 \) and \( S_2 \) represent the satisfaction of two "states" arising from "security" which each believes results from armaments. Hence the satisfaction depends not only on the absolute amount of armaments possessed but also on the excess of armaments over those of the neighbor. Here, of course, the increased efforts of \( Y \) detract from the satisfaction of \( X \). The linear terms represent the detraction from satisfaction due to the burden of taxation, etc.,
that is, the "effort" in producing the armaments. The amount of arma-
ments produced under these circumstances can be given by equation 16,
and the resulting satisfaction is higher than they would be if the
"competitive term" were not present, in spite of the fact that this
term vanishes at \( x = y \). where "balance of power" is achieved. It is

Karl W. Deutsch (59B) has contributed an interesting theory of
national assimilation and conflict based on the currently popular
cybernetic concepts of information and communication. He suggests
that on the basis of numbers in nine population groups and six rates
of change, "the probable developments towards either national assimi-
lation or national conflict in a given area" can be calculated (p.102).
The nine population groups are as follows. The total population (P);
the public, or socially mobilized population (M); the unmobilized or
underlying population (U); the assimilated population (A); the
differentiated population (B); the mobilized and assimilated population
or the mobilized but differentiated population (W); the underlying
assimilated population (Q, for quiescent); and the underlying differen-
tiated population (R). The six rates of change needed are: the
natural rate of growth of the total population; the rate of natural in-
crease of the mobilized part of the population; the rate of entry
of outsiders into M; the rate of natural population increase for the
assimilated population; the rate at which outsiders are entering the
assimilated group; and the rate of natural increase of the
differentiated population. He documents his conclusions with data
dealing with Finland, Bohemia-Moravia-Silesia, India-Pakistan, and
Scotland.

... Stability is not the same as equilibrium; for on the contrary
stable and unstable are adjectives qualifying equilibrium. Thus an
equilibrium is said to be stable, or to have stability, if a small
disturbance tends to die away; whereas an equilibrium is said to be
unstable, or to have instability, if a small disturbance tends to
increase.

Richardson develops his statements to include a formula for
disarmament by a victor - a formula used by physicists to describe
"fading away" phenomena, or by accountants to describe depreciation.

1) S.C. Dodd reports a similar fading away phenomenon in connection
with "tension" in a housing project (62, 1951).
To take account of these phenomena, Richardson amends his equations to include another constant which gives a "fatigue and expense coefficient" or a "restraint coefficient." These restraining influences may be sufficient to render the equilibrium stable, or they may not. Richardson concludes that there is a theoretical possibility of permanent peace by universal total disarmament, but to meet the argument that "grievances and ambitions would cause various groups to acquire arms in order to assert their rights, or to dominate over their unarmed neighbors," he again amends his formulas by adding another set of constants so that the formulas no longer indicate a permanent condition. He now has two straight lines in two planes; if they intersect, a condition of equilibrium — stable or unstable — is indicated at the point of intersection. This set of equations, the author points out, does not take into account other than retaliatory reactions to threats, that is: contempt, submission, negotiation, or avoidance, since his theory "is restricted to the interaction of groups which style themselves powers, which are proud of their so-called sovereignty and independence, are proud of their armed might, and are not exhausted by combat. This theory is not about victory and defeat. In different circumstances k or l might be negative." (p. 233). Richardson proposes the concept "varfinpersonal" (war-finance-per-salary) as the best measure of a nation's war-like preparations. On its subjective side — moods, friendly or unfriendly, before a war — he finds that the best equation to describe the way such moods behave is one used in the theory of epidemics of disease, so that, he argues, "eagerness for war can be regarded analogously as a mental disease infected into those in a susceptible mood by those who already have the disease in the opposing country" (200, p. 235),

Richardson's work differs from that of some of the other mathematical work here reported in that it is based on empirical data; it is intended to be descriptive of the behavior of nations in relation to one another. There is little attempt to ferret out new relationships; nor is the mathematical basis in any way new.

The mathematical models of social conflict so far presented are based on conventional, if difficult, mathematics, mainly on systems of linear equations enlisted for ad hoc analyses. There is in process of developing at the present time a radically different kind of mathematical model, dependent more on combinatorics and matrix algebra, but evolving its own mathematics as it proceeds. It may be viewed as a method for measuring the costs of differing policies or plans or strategies and thereby helping in selecting the best one. It is called the theory of games of strategy (248; 1947; 469, 1949). Since we shall discuss it at some length in a later chapter, we mention it here merely for the sake of completeness.

It will be noted that most of the mathematical models for the study of conflict derive directly or indirectly from physics. In this sense they are somewhat flexible and mechanical, even when they do fit life situations. Thus, for example, when Simon went over his equations with Homann, on whose work he was basing his model, Homann concluded "that the mathematical treatment does not do violence to the meanings of his verbal statements, but that the equations do not capture all of the inter-relations he postulates — that they tell the truth, but not the whole truth" (218, 1952, p. 204 fn.). This will probably

always be true of any equation; it omits some of the aura which is associated with sociological data.

Nevertheless, equations and especially formulas of inequalities seem to constitute an appropriate language for conflict situations. Inequalities may, by varying parameters, pass through equalities and then reverse themselves. This oscillation of position seems to constitute a reasonable model for many conflict situations, especially in those where bargaining is involved.

To some students, especially to those who come to research by way of empirical work, the currently increasingly popular postulational approach seems vaguely unsatisfying. It seems to begin without sufficient empirical basis; it seems, in effect, to beg the question. The postulates assume given conditions; the empirical researcher would seek proof that such conditions actually exist generally. The deductive approach, however, aims at finding conditions which the empirical approach cannot locate with its method. And ultimately the deductive approach tests itself by its ability to "explain" real-life situations. Still it must be granted that the deductive approach seems to assume that we know more on the simple descriptive level than perhaps we really do know. The relationships assumed among given variables, again, strike some students as unrealistic, or at any rate, as requiring more validation.

Perhaps most troubling is the assumption in mathematical models that all the variables involved can be precisely measured and that in the case of those referring to subjective phenomena - e.g., utility, satisfaction, "effort"; etc. - they are additive in nature. This last-named difficulty haunts researchers in all the social sciences. Perhaps the chief contribution of mathematical models may turn out to be the stimulus they offer for the invention of techniques for measuring the parameters involved. The measures needed may far transcend those now available. Perhaps a totally new attack on the problems of measurement is needed. It may be that we are in a rut in our thinking, that present approaches - in terms of attitude scales, "utils", and the like - are inhibiting the emergence of better ones. It has become so easy for good technicians to whip up new instruments based on current assumptions that the invention of better instruments may be prevented. Here as in so many other fields, the good may be the enemy of the better. The problem is especially acute in the sociology of conflict because here "cost" is so often in terms of phenomena as yet unmeasurable. In this area the work of the social-psychological school of conflict and that of the sociological school can find a common problem to attack, requiring all the skills and insights both can muster.

Some Experimental Studies in the Sociology of Conflict.

Experiment in the field of conflict is a dangerous procedure. It is one thing to observe and report on the fomenting of conflict by others; it is quite another thing to create the conflict itself. In real-life situations conflicts are always being produced - "experimentally" in a non-scientific sense - but they are not scientifically set up or controlled. Agents provocateurs make a profession of inducing aggression. There is, no doubt, quite a "science" of conflict in this sense available in the heads and reports of conspiratorial and resistance leaders. But the professional scientific literature offers little.

Only one controlled experiment in this field has, in fact,
been reported. Muzafer Sherif has presented some preliminary results of an experiment on boys at a summer camp which showed that bitter conflict among boys could be produced and strong loyalty to new groups be developed, by separating them into rival groups (203, 1951). The significance of this experiment lies in part in the fact that goals and values may be rendered incompatible artificially, that costs may be introduced into a situation where none would necessarily exist without outside intervention. Strategists have long known this principle and used it. The agitator and the "trouble-maker" are past masters in the art of applying it. But this is the first attempt to observe it under controlled conditions.

In another study of boys at a summer camp, the development of factionalism in small face-to-face groups or systems was studied. Two of the seven hypotheses tested were: "The large group will tend to break into smaller factions" and "As factions develop in the large group, one or two persons will become spokesmen for these factions and the discussion will be carried on between them" (87, 1952, pp. 266-267). This second hypothesis suggests Rashevsky's "actives" and "passives," or, in fact, any élite. Neither of these hypotheses was unequivocally confirmed. It might be pointed out that this experiment, although dealing with factionalism, was not truly a study of conflict since costs were not involved. Or, perhaps, we should say that in the experimental conditions here set up, the costs of remaining within the system were so insignificant that conflict could hardly be said to exist.

Of tangential interest for a sociology of conflict and primarily observational in method rather than strictly speaking experimental, is a study of the size determinant in small group interaction by John James (106, 1951). As a face-to-face group increases in size, the potential number of interrelationships among members increases at an exponential rate. 1) Individuals therefore tend to split themselves into smaller units in which interrelationships are more manageable in number. The implication of this study is that there may be characteristics inherent in group structure itself which facilitate the break-down of systems when costs and therefore conflicts are involved. It would not do, of course, to stretch this thin bit of evidence too far.

The work of students in the field of sociometry and of group dynamics should be referred to in this connection also. Little of it is directly related to the sociology of conflict since there is usually little if any cost involved. It is relevant mainly in the sense that it shows how easily, even without cost elements present, natural groupings tend to break down as a result of factors seemingly inherent in interpersonal relations. The preconditions for conflict, in brief, may be present in all groupings; it may take only the interjection of cost elements to transform them into conflict groups.

Studies in the Integration of Systems.

In general the studies so far referred to have dealt primarily with the breakdown of systems, although the integration of systems might be inherent in their assumptions. In some of the work, provision is made for shifting coalitions or alliances in the process of interaction,

1) The formula, given by Kephart based on work by Bossard, for potential relationships is:

$$\frac{3^n - 2n - 1}{2}$$
that is, for the disintegration of one system and the reintegration of the constituent sub-systems into new systems. And the whole concept of equilibrium, basic especially to many of the mathematical models, implies that systems may coalesce or integrate as well as break apart or disintegrate. Indeed, it is one of the "beauties" of mathematical models that they may make provision for such twoway processes. On the whole, however, we have emphasized the break-down or schismatic rather than the integrative aspects of the work so far presented.

There has been, nevertheless, a great interest in integration as such in recent years. We have already referred, in Chapter 4, to Nisbet's thesis that current sociology has followed essentially the conservative tradition of emphasis on organization - a phase of integration - rather than the radical tradition of emphasis on social change, which is essentially a phase of disintegration, if not always of conflict. The costs of any integrated system may be variously allocated. The totalitarian system tends to throw the entire cost of its own integration on opposing sub-systems, either by liquidating them or by exploiting them. Democratic systems find it impossible to use such methods to any great extent; they depend on an assessment of the costs of their integration fairly widely, if not uniformly, throughout all the sub-systems involved.

Not all processes of integration and of disintegration of systems come within the purview of the sociology of conflict; sometimes they occur with little if any cost, and sometimes, with a mutual gain. In the theory of games, for example, it is demonstrated that some coalitions benefit both or all members, at the expense, of course, of their mutual opponent. Even without a common enemy, however, it is demonstrable that large consolidated units may be more profitable to constituent numbers than many small, unimegrated units. The division of labor is, in fact, based upon this fact. Conversely, systems may fall apart not because the cost of remaining intact is great, but merely because there is no gain either way, so that slight or even chance factors may lead to break-down.

The classical formulation of integration perhaps was that of Oppenheimer who expounded the conflict or conquest theory of the origin of the state. And many people have defended imperialism on the grounds that empires broaden the area of peace. The Pax Romana and the Pax Britannica, they argue, came as a result of imperial integration. The same process of "empire" building, it has been argued, is continuing so that eventually one world will emerge. The question is, in their minds, must integration come by means of force and violence and conquest, or can it come by some other means?

No-Yong Park, for example, has pointed out that although white men have succeeded in establishing peace among aborigines by substituting - with the use of brutal force - a reign of law and order, they have failed with Asiatics and with themselves. The reason, according to him, is that they have confused cause and effect. Nationalism, militarism, economic rivalries, and other alleged causes of war are the result of fears and uncertainties, rather than the reverse (184, 1948). G.S. Ghurye testifies to the importance of the problem by his reference to the integration of the backward peoples into the larger society and economy with a minimum of disorganization and exploitation. He reviews the administrative and anthropological literature dealing with aborigines and the processes, past and present, of incorporating them into larger systems, and concludes that in the case of India, at any rate, the very heart of the problem of building a unified nation
lies in how to integrate the tribal peoples (74, 1943). An anthropological study which throws some light on the process of spreading, let us say "the King's peace" is that on the Kalingas by R. F. Barton (15, 1949). In this study the transition from kinship to territorial organization - which Maine once characterized as constituting a true revolution - can be viewed in detail. The book shows how feuds and local warfare have been eliminated, how areas of peace have been established, how the rule of law has been substituted for the feud and other forms of violence. Processes which in Western civilization have taken centuries to work themselves out have been telescoped into a comparatively short time, so that they can be studied as under a microscope.

Without distinguishing as between growth involving costs and growth not involving costs, Hornell Hart has applied logistic curves to data on the size of political areas and concludes that such curves do indeed fit the data. He accepts as given such phenomena as conquests, rebellions, and other reshufflings of governmental control. But he pays no especial attention to the fact that some empires or territorial expansions have been without conflict, as when the American government purchased the Louisiana Territory. He does, however, recognize the disturbances which wars and crises introduce into growth curves. Hart is primarily interested in determining the fact of political integration and in describing it mathematically; he is not interested in the processes by which this integration - with or without conflict - takes place (89, 1948).

The processes of political integration themselves have been analyzed by a historian, Crane Brinton, who finds only two such processes, namely: imperialism and federalism. In the history of Western society he finds only a small number of the latter - the Achaean and the Aeolian Leagues, Holland, Switzerland, the British Commonwealth, and the U.S.S.R. Most political integration, he concludes, has been achieved by some kind of imperialistic technique, whether by violence or force of some other kind (33, 1948). The classic example of national integration, Switzerland, has been analyzed by Kurt Mayer, who concludes that it is the demographic equilibrium among the several language groups which helps to account for the way Switzerland has managed to maintain its peaceful integration (154, 1951).

One of the difficulties in studying the processes of integration lies in the lack of indexes on the basis of which to measure them. Here a number of American sociologists have been making noteworthy contributions. Rudolf Heberle, for example, has demonstrated how political behavior as reflected in election returns can be used as indexes of "social solidarity or disintegration." It is interesting to note that Heberle hopes the kind of work he describes will lend itself not only to the theory but also to the practice of integration, and he reminds us that such giants as Saint Simon, Comte, and Lorenz Stein "conceived the new science of society as an antidote against the poison of social disintegration which, in their opinion, had taken effect since the turn of the eighteenth century" (93, 1952). This point of view, it need scarcely be remarked, on the part of the giants reflected a conservative orientation. It decried the efforts of those who were paying the costs of the new system to re-allocate them in a manner less onerous to themselves.

Integration on a community-wide level has also engaged the attention of sociologists. Werner S. Landecker has proposed four indexes - cultural, normative, communicative, and functional - to be
used for measuring integration, and has discussed the structural setting in which integration occurs (124, 1951; 125, 1952). But perhaps the most careful empirical study in this area is that of R. C. Angell on the moral integration of cities (7, 1951). He conceives moral integration as "the degree to which the areas of possible friction or conflict within the group are covered by a set of moral norms that are accepted and implemented by all." He experimented with a variety of statistical indexes as measures of moral integration as thus conceived and emerged with one based on crime and welfare effort. He then applied this index to 43 large American cities and found moral integration as measured by his index to be related to the (1) compatibility and (2) adequacy of moral norms and also to the (3) efficiency of the processes which made for such compatibility and adequacy. Among the factors which he found made for (3), that is, for efficiency of processes leading to compatibility and adequacy of norms were: (a) the rate of population mobility, (b) the community-mindedness of churches and schools, and (c) the quality of the community's leadership. Angell hopes that the leads he has offered might be usefully applied to other than local community areas. "We might expect that significant inferences could be made to other large, heterogeneous groups, such as giant factories and national states. It is even possible that our theory might prove suggestive for research on problems of world order."

Before we leave the topic of integration as a phase of the sociology of conflict it may be pertinent to say a word about the associated concept of cooperation, which seems to have gotten in the way of clear thinking about intergroup relations. Jessie Bernard has pointed out that:

... surely there is no concept in sociology more poorly conceived than this one. I once asked Dr. Park ... why his system of sociology had no separate concept of cooperation in it. He replied that all social life was cooperative, all social organization was a cooperative system, biotic and commensalistic behavior was cooperative, the division of labor was cooperative, accommodation was cooperative ("antagonistic cooperation," Sumner had labeled it, but cooperative nonetheless), assimilation, communication, conformity to mores, custom, etc., were all cooperative, as was also the highly complex system known as Rochdale Cooperation, etc. ... An adequate concept of cooperation would have to include all behavior that contributed to common goals. It would include a large proportion of all sociological phenomena. For some, cooperation is the alternative to conflict; for others, to competition. The problem of conceptualization has become further complicated with the arrival of anthropologists and psychologists in the field of group and intergroup behavior. The tendency of the latter is to view such behavior subjectively, so that cooperation becomes a personality trait - helpfulness, or a cooperative attitude. 1) 

Ashley-Montagu, who has tried to systematize the concept, has succeeded only in confusing it even further (12, 1950). He identifies it variously as simply living together in aggregates rather than in isolation, as a personality trait associated with loving dependence, and as conformity, sacrifice, frustration. The implication in a good deal of the discussion of cooperation is that it is inherently good. Yet there is no particular virtue in cooperation as such. We must always ask such questions as: who cooperates with whom? for what? Even, 1) American Journal of Sociology, 56(3), Nov. 1950: 283.
against whom? There can be the cooperation of the slave and master. There can be the cooperation of thieves and crooks and politicians. Conspiracy is cooperation; so is cheating. We do not consider it good when people cooperate with our enemies. We are not pleased when nations impose "cooperation" on satellites. During a military occupation, cooperation with the conquering occupation forces is considered by patriots to be treasonable; resistance, not cooperation, is honored. As a sociological concept, certainly with any value connotations, cooperation is probably worse than useless; it may be misleading.

In evaluating cooperation there must always be an assessment of the allocation of the costs involved. Are all parties sharing the costs equally; that is, have all yielded the same amount in terms of values and goals? Are some parties paying a disproportionate share of the costs; have they had to give up more in terms of values and goals than others? Are all parties gaining at the expense of a common opponent? Or are there no costs involved at all? In the latter case, the situation does not fall within the province of the sociology of conflict.

Ashley-Montagu’s work has tended to revive the nineteenth controversy with regard to Darwinian "struggle for existence" and Kropotkin’s "Mutual aid." It is a fruitless controversy.

The opposite of cooperation is not conflict but anomie.

Substantive Contributions to the Sociology of Conflict.

In the studies so far discussed, the actual data used were relatively unimportant. The emphasis for the most part was on fundamental and general processes, the data being primarily illustrative. In addition, there have been analytical, descriptive, and explanatory studies based on anthropological and historical data, as well as on contemporary observation. In them the data are themselves intrinsically important. They are "news" in Hughes’ sense, as well as illustrations of important sociological processes. We can only give the barest reference to most of these studies; the reader who wishes more details may refer to the sources in the bibliography.

White Settlers and Native Peoples.

A. Grenfell Price, studying the impact of white settlers on native peoples in the United States, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, finds three stages, so far as the impact on the native peoples is concerned, namely: (1) crude impact, resulting in a decline of the native population; (2) reforms to help the natives, often, however, ill-conceived and producing as a result more harm than good; and (3) a scientific attempt to bring natives into the culture stream (194,1952). He pleads for a humane policy. It is, of course, only when one people has succeeded in eliminating another as a threat that a generous policy is considered feasible; it is only when the vanquished group has borne almost the entire cost of an empire that imperial policy can afford to indulge in humane policies.

The Far East.

Perhaps the greatest single conflict occurring at the present time is the breakdown of colonial empires. The stage is primarily in the
Orient. Sociologists, both of the East and of the West, are watching with a kind of fascinated interest the many forms which conflict is now taking in the Orient. Maurice Zinkin, for example, gives us a general picture of the revolutionary processes there taking place (261, 1951). J. H. Boeke deals, among other topics, with the village community in collision with capitalism (30, 1948). Bruno Lasker has given a careful picture of slavery, serfdom, peonage, debt bondage, and compulsory public service in Southeast Asia (126, 1950). Agrarian unrest in Southeast Asia has been analyzed by Erich H. Jacoby (102, 1949). Justus M. Van Der Kroef has analyzed for Indonesia the breakdown of the indigenous social system and the restitutive processes now taking place in reorganizing Indonesia on a nationalistic basis (245, 1952). Ralph Pieris and Bryce Ryan have given American sociologists an analysis of a caste system not often presented in the literature, namely that of Ceylon (192, 1952; 211, 1953).

China has become the center of focus for many students of conflict today. Even before the rise of the Communist Party to leadership, the conflicts revealed by the Chinese revolution, by Chinese rebellions, by agrarian unrest, and by the impact of Western civilization on Chinese society had elicited a great deal of interest in both Chinese and Western sociologists. The Chinese Student Movement has been analyzed for Western sociologists by Wen-Han Kiang (114, 1948), who distinguishes four phases: the Chinese Renaissance, the revolt against religion, the nationalist revolution, and the united front. Marion J. Levy, Jr., has described what he calls the family revolution in Modern China, pointing out that industrialization is incompatible with the traditional kinship system which has served as the basis of solidarity; and other bases for stability have not yet emerged (135, 1949). Levy's thesis has been challenged by Morton H. Fried (72, 1949).

Shu-Yu Teng concludes that all revolutions in China have resulted from political corruption (251, 1950). Shu-Ching Lee considers this generalization too sweeping. His own interpretation of the current scene in China is that it is a form of rural-urban conflict; the communists are trying to foment and combine a red or urban, and a green, or peasant, movement in order to increase industrialization and the rise of a proletariat (130, 1951).

An analysis of the backgrounds of the men who have led China during the last generation has shown that although the West has been responsible for furnishing the ideological background for the modern revolutions in China, it has not been able to furnish techniques for implementing the ideology it has offered; communism has been more successful in this respect (181, 1952).

The conflicts - Hindu-Muslim, Pakistan-India, aborigines-civilized, India-Great Britain, ideological, industrial, caste - in which India is engaged are among the most dramatic of the present time. For this reason India has become the center for a series of UNESCO studies. For the most part, the analyses of conflict in India have therefore been in terms of "tensions" (170, 1951; 172, 1953; 195, 1952). The problem of incorporating the aborigines has also received some attention (74, 1943). And Gandhi continues to elicit the interest of students of conflict because of the perennial challenge of his theory of non-violence (173, 1952).

Europe and the Near East.

Dinko Tomasic in a recent study in the field of political sociology has presented an analysis of leadership in Eastern Europe
in terms of the cultural conditioning of personality (240, 1948). He has also made a sociological analysis of Bolshevik ideology as related to Bolshevik policy, tracing the relationship in an international context (241, 1951). Hans Bernd Gisevius (77, 1947) has contributed a study of the opposition to Hitler. One would have expected many sociological analyses of resistance movements to have issued from the pens of European scholars. But so far they have not appeared. Chester L. Hunt has tested J. O. Hertzler's thesis that dictatorships tend to pass through certain stages by examining the German Protestant Church under Hitler and feels that he has verified it successfully (100, 1949). Theodore Abel has introduced and analyzed the concept of democide, that is, extermination on the basis of any kind of social attribute, such as age, culture, education, political affiliation, as well as on the basis of race and religion (3, 1951).

A study of the emerging cleavages - racial, class, occupational, and religious in Israel has recently been published by Samuel Koenig (120, 1952).

Africa.

A recent study by Simon Davis, based on historical data, presents evidence against the current view that race problems are relatively new and modern phenomena. He shows that contrary to the opinion often expressed, ethnocentrism, miscegenation, discrimination, anti-Semitism, riots, pogroms, and similar problems of intergroup relations existed in ancient Egypt (55, 1952).

South Africa is considered by most informed students to be one of the most serious "tension" spots in the world today, and the Mau-Mau riots of 1952-53, the resistance movement, and the policy of Malan with respect to Apartheid have tended to corroborate this opinion. Eugene P. Dvorin has analyzed the theory of Apartheid, which states that the peaceful co-existence of whites, blacks, and Asians in South Africa depends on their being kept strictly and effectively isolated from one another.

Most of the literature on colonial problems has been by members of the imperial state. A recent study of the Sudan question is an exception, being by an Egyptian, Mekki Abbas (1, 1952).

America.

Lucio Mendieta y Nunez has recently summarized racial, cultural, and class "tensions" in Latin America, with special attention to Mexico, Guatemala, Ecuador, and Peru. The aboriginal groups have been exploited and, lacking leaders and conscious political sense, they have been unable to protect themselves. As a result the Indian hates the Spanish-speaking group, foreigners, and others responsible for his life with a suppressed hatred, waiting for the time when he can give it full play (161, 1952). The social anthropologist, Melvin M. Tumin reports on the tensions and strains in the social structure of Guatemala based on changing land tenure (245, 1950).

A great deal of raw data for an analysis of the sociology of conflict in Latin America is available in the publications of the several agencies of the United Nations, such, for example, as the ad hoc Committee on Slavery, the Commission on Human Rights' Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The International Labour Organization publishes its Yearbook, which includes materials on labor conflicts. The Secretary-General of the Commission
on Human Rights has reported on the activities of the United Nations and of specialized agencies in the area of economic, social, and cultural rights. Still in process is the UNESCO pilot investigation of contacts between races and ethnic groups to determine the factors which are favorable or unfavorable to harmonious relations in Brazil (by Rene Rivelino in Recife; by Thales da Azevedo in Bahia; by Harry W. Hutchinsen, Ben Zimmerman, Marvin Harris, and Charles Wagley in rural communities in the hinterland of Bahia). Dr. Oracy Nogueira is including a study of race in his survey of the town of Itapetininga.

A study of the Indonesian minority in Surinam, Dutch Guiana, shows that although there is no legal discrimination, the Indonesians have low status. By their own exclusiveness, however, they seem to encourage non-legal discrimination (245, 1951).

United States and Canada: Race and Ethnic Group Conflict.

There is probably no country in the world where there is more research on conflict than in the United States. Race conflict, ethnic group conflict, political conflict, economic conflict, and religious conflict engage a large share of the attention of sociologists in the United States.

John B. Edlefsen has recently described a case of "enclavement," that is, of cultural and biological identity and continuation in a situation of social interaction, referring to a Basque immigrant community in Idaho (65, 1950). Acculturation has taken place without prejudice or conflict; a sub-system and a super-system have, apparently, managed to co-exist without cost to either one. Paul C. F. Siu has suggested the concept of "the soujourner," a type of stranger, somewhat different from the marginal man. He clings to his cultural heritage and tends to live in isolation. His significance for a sociology of conflict lies in the fact that he is more likely than others to be available as a fifth column recruit (219, 1952).

Two masterly studies of the Negro in the United States, one by E. Franklin Frazier (69, 1949) and one by Maurice Davis (53, 1949) include both a historical and contemporary account of Negro-white conflict. A bibliography on the Negro in the United States up to 1947 was published by Hill and Foreman (95, 1947) and a critique of the periodical literature, by Hill (94, 1947). Community studies in the United States continue to document discrimination against the Negro with monotonous regularity (110, 1948). A "revolutionary" change in the pronouncements of the Protestant Church with respect to the Negro since World War II is reported by Frank S. Loescher (133, 1947); and T. J. Harte has described the work of Catholic organizations designed to promote Negro-white race relations in the United States (90, 1947).

On the basis of a comparison of Brazilian and United States systems of race relations, T. W. Sprague concludes that exploitation on a racial basis is a substitute, in effect, for exploitation on the basis of other criteria (22, 1949). Frank E. W. Stettie reports that the attitude of whites toward Negroes varies according to class, there being less distance between whites and upper occupational groups of Negroes, but the status of the white person was important also, high status whites showing less distance than lower status whites (253, 1952). People who are secure in their own status do not have to lean on artificial status symbols for props. It may also be a matter of competitive relationships. The upper class white person has less competition from Negroes than the lower class white person.
Some doubt is cast upon the validity of the usual analyses of race conflict in the United States by a report on race relations in Canada by Ruth Danenhower Wilson (257, 1949). She points out that there is the same pattern of discrimination in Canada as in the United States without the conditions usually assigned to explain it.

The uprooting of thousands of American citizens of Japanese descent during World War II on the grounds of military safety was interpreted by some students as a strategic move in a domestic, rather than international, conflict situation. Three studies of this move may be mentioned here: Morton Grodzins' analysis of the political aspects (83, 1949), Dorothy Thomas' study of the social-psychological aspects (238, 1946; 239, 1953); and Leonard Bloom and Ruth Riemer's study of some of the costs involved (28, 1949). It is interesting to note that although attacks on Jews have been in terms of systems—the Jews being viewed as essentially subversive because of their religious and/or cultural ties which constituted them a powerful system—the defense against these attacks has been primarily in terms of "prejudice". The B'nai B'rith periodically publishes cases of discrimination and attack, but the tremendous amount of research on the subject has been for the most part based on a theory of prejudice. One study, by a journalist, however, rather than by a social scientist, has viewed it primarily in terms of systems, namely the study of anti-Semitism by Carey McWilliams, who views it as a "mask for privilege" (157, 1948).

Sectarianism and Religious Conflict.

Because of the unique freedom from political control of religious institutions, sectarianism has played a prominent role in the history of religious organization in the United States and has engaged the interests of American sociologists. One recent study deals with the schisms or conflicts between church and sect forms of religious organization in Canada from 1760 to 1900 (46, 1948).

The author follows Troeltsch in viewing the conflict between "forces of order" and "forces of separation" as basic in religious development. The non-conflict, folk aspect of the sect is emphasized in a recent study by E. D. C. Brewer (32, 1952). Walter B. Rutland sees church-state relations in the United States as "first a problem of deeply conflicting religious viewpoints; and, second ... one of balancing relationships in a changing social order" (210, 1949). And John J. Kane, on the basis of a content analysis of one Protestant and one Catholic periodical for 1939, 1944, and 1949, reports evidence of increasing tension between the two groups (109, 1951).

Although it is not by a sociologist nor even in terms of sociological concepts, the work of a skilled journalist, Paul Blanshard, should perhaps be at least referred to here. In two volumes which constitute what may be called political pamphlets in the grand tradition he documents the bid of the Catholic Church for political power and dissects the strategy and tactics it uses. He makes it clear that he is speaking of the church as a secular rather than as a religious institution (26, 1949; 27, 1951).

Political Conflict.

Although American sociologists have given lip-service to political sociology in the sense of an analysis of political institutions or of the state or of government as social institutions, unlike
European sociologists they have not, until quite recently, devoted their research efforts to political sociology as a study of conflicts of power groups. It was, in large measure, the influence of sociology which transformed political science from a study of formal documents into a study of political behavior and public opinion around the beginning of the twentieth century. Thus many political scientists for over half a century have been, in effect, political sociologists studying sectional, class, racial, and ethnic-group cleavages as revealed in voting behavior; or studying pressure groups as they shaped legislation and policy; or political parties as evidence of protest and conflict. It is only recently that American sociologists have become actively interested in research in this area. Outstanding among them is Rudolf Heberle, whose recent volume on social movements has organized a great deal of pertinent data on political protest (1951). Heberle finds that voting behavior can be used as an index of profound sociological processes. On the basis of a study of written documents, Sarah McCulloh Lemmon has analyzed the strategy and tactics of the so-called Dixiecrat Movement (1951). Thomas H. Grier has studied social reform movements in the United States since 1865, concluding that people tend to bear the costs of inequalities in a social system a long time before they attempt to re-allocate them (1949). Two case studies of agrarian revolt in Canada, including, in one, similar movements in the United States, have contributed data for a sociology of political conflict. One is a study of protest movements in the wheat belts of Canada, especially of the Non-Partisan League (1948); and the other is a study of agrarian socialism in Saskatchewan, pointing out that the farmer's antagonism against "business" was a class conflict rather than an expression of political sectionalism (1950).

When the conflicting political systems are national states themselves, rather than sub-systems within the nation, we enter the field of international relations, where many disciplines have for many years been working. UNRSCQ publishes an annual bibliography of articles in political science, International Political Science Abstracts, a large proportion of which deal with conflict. War, imperialism, colonialism, economic warfare, international migration, international arbitration, have all piled up impressive bibliographies. We shall refer to only one analysis, to one of the conflict between the Soviet Union and the United States (1951). The author, A. K. Davis, finds the historical setting for this conflict in the industrializing process itself. He points out that similarities as well as differences may produce rivalry and mutual anxiety; and he finds a great many areas of similarity between Russia and the United States. He then invokes the currently fashionable tension theory to explain the inter-system conflict, in terms, that is, of internal hostility generated by the socialization process in all systems. He sees both the United States and Russia as performing a scapegoat function, each for the other.

Class Conflict and Industrial Conflict

Brief mention should be made here of one of the most interesting developments in American sociology in the last generation, a development

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1) For a survey of Sociology and the Study of International Relations up to 1934, see the monograph of that title by L. L. Bernard and Jessie Bernard published by Washington University Press, St. Louis, Mo.
in itself a sociological phenomenon of some significance perhaps. The concept of "class" which was originally bound up with the struggle for power has been almost completely emasculated and sterilized of its conflict implications. "Class consciousness" which used to be a term denoting consciousness of the incidence of the costs of modern industrial society has come to mean simply a recognition of status differentials. This change in conceptualization of class from one involving power to one involving primarily prestige was inaugurated by a social anthropologist, W. Lloyd Warner, and his associates. Coming to the study of modern industrial society with a research background in pre-literate cultures in Africa, Warner viewed the structure of a modern community in essentially static terms. The research methods and techniques which were adequate enough to lay bare the structure of a pre-literate community were not, however, adequate to reveal the dynamic conflict aspects of a highly industrialized community. As a result of the reorientation of the concept of class, American sociologists have been, figuratively, jumping around in confusion trying to find out just what has happened. A large literature has arisen attempting to clarify exactly what the problem is (190,1953). All the emotions which went with the conflict-for-power conceptualization of class have had to be re-channeled. The Warner class-as-prestige conceptualization - in terms of who invites whom to dinner, who belongs to what clubs, who lives where - is essentially trivial. Except for social climbers and social snobs it has little emotional impact. But class in the struggle-for-power sense is explosive. Much of the impact of the Warner school on American sociology may be ascribed perhaps in part to a semantic confusion. When Warner talks about social stratification in class terms he is talking about one kind of thing; but to those who interpret it in terms of the struggle-for-power concept of class, it has profoundly disturbing implications, as though power relationships were becoming fixed and frozen. We bring this point in here to explain why the great literature on class in the United States in recent years is not discussed in this report; it is not a contribution to a sociology of class conflict. It is, rather, a contribution to organization in the conservative sense described by Nisbet as referred to in Chapter 4.

Equally revolutionary has been the transformation of the study of industrial relations from one of a conflict-for-power to a study of status relationships. Under the tutelage of Elton Mayo, there has developed what has come to be known as the Harvard School of industrial sociology. It is indicative of the point of view of this school that it calls its research method a clinical approach. It views the hostilities, resistances, sabotages, and other evidences of conflict as essentially abnormal, if not pathological. If the normal principles of organization are recognized in the operation of the factory these manifestations disappear. For basically there is a harmony of interests between management and labor. Technical efficiency has been sought without regard to the natural groupings; the results have been frustration, resentments, and resistant hostilities, the raw materials for re-


2) Two other "schools" are also active and productive in this field: the Yale school, under E. Wight Bakke, which tends to emphasize community factors, and the Chicago school, under E. C. Hughes, which tends to think in terms of a sociology of work as such, regardless of its industrial setting.
vocations (155,1945, pp. 116-117). This is essentially the "tension" theory of conflict; it is noted here because it must be contrasted with the sociological conceptualization in terms of a struggle for power among systems.

One word with respect to the practical implications of the Mayo school. The costs of modern industrialization are in terms of interpersonal human relationships and are borne most heavily by the worker. If good human relations can be established by means of applying proper principles of organization, then conflict - in the "tension" sense - will be done away with. It is not a matter of one class profiting at the expense of another; it is rather a matter of one class paying an exorbitant price in terms of frustration for ignorance on the part of the other. One of the principles of organization involved is that of participation. When workers are allowed to have some say in the way their work is done, the result is better cooperation and increased productivity. When channels of communication are clear both up and down the line, misunderstandings which lead to conflict can be avoided.

The theoretical orientation of the Mayo or human-relations-in-industry school has been traced back to the influence of Durkheim, whose basic preoccupation was with the nature and conditions of solidarity (230,1952). It has a great many of the earmarks of conservative social thought which Nisbet has delineated (179). A good deal of criticism has for many years been leveled against this whole social-psychological conceptualization of conflict in industry (146, 216, 29, 212). The critics accept all of the factual findings based on its research - Marx, himself, as a matter of fact, had pointed them out long ago - but they interpret these findings differently (230, p. 119):

The particular phenomena of impersonality, rationalization, fixed status, industrial discipline, etc., are factory conditions which cause conflict. But where do these particular factory conditions come from and what causes them? The Conflict-of-Interest school argues that these conditions come from power distribution determined by the institutions of capitalism. Hence it follows that no change in a chronic state of conflict can be alleviated without a basic change in power relationships .... We may state the Marxian problem in this fashion: how do economic power arrangements affect sociative and dissociative processes in industrial life?

These differing interpretations of the phenomena of conflict - which both the human-relations-in-industry and the conflict-of-interest schools accept - have had important reverberations in strategy. According to the conflict-of-interest school, espoused by unions, the amelioration of the costs of modern industrialism lies not so much in concessions on the part of management in the form of factory organization and kindly human relations and status protection, as in the acquisition of power to force concessions by workers through their own organization. Contrariwise, the strategy of the human-relations-in-industry school, espoused by management, has served to prevent unionization in some plants. By making concessions to human needs in the work situation, hostilities and resentments which might have led to the formation of unions have been dissipated. Unions have argued that if management recognizes the union, the conflict-of-interest between worker and management is mitigated and harmony of interests is stimulated (163,1945,p. 356).

That the acceptance of a union does not automatically eliminate conflict in the plant has been demonstrated in work reported by
Melville Dalton, who has shown that unofficial bargaining goes on constantly in a plant between the grievance officer of the union and the foreman (52, 1950) and that conflicts take place within the several phases of management itself (51, 1950).

Mention should also be made of the series of case studies sponsored by the National Planning Association on "causes of industrial peace." By April, 1955, eleven such studies had been published in such diverse industries as pulp and paper, glass, chemicals, clothing, steel, aircraft, and textiles (176). The purpose was to find out what conditions made for peaceful relations between management and workers. In general, mutual recognition and respect on the part of both union and management, confidence in the integrity of the other party, "problem-centered" rather than doctrinaire or legalistic approach to bargaining were found to characterize good industrial relations.

It will be noted from this brief resume that the substantive studies of current conflicts vary greatly in point of view, objective, method, and theoretical assumptions. Some aim simply to state the facts as nearly as they can be determined—to give the "news"; some attempt to organize the facts into a systematic framework, psychological or historical; and some seek to reduce the data to objective indexes which can then be analyzed and interpreted. There is little tie-up between the substantive studies and the deductive models presented in the first part of this chapter. Nor has yet any sociological formulation like the psychological formulation of "tension" been applied to see whether or not all manifestations of conflict may be subsumed under a unitary set of principles. Perhaps the theory of games of strategy may be suggestive for future studies. In the meanwhile most substantive studies may perhaps best be viewed, along with the "tension" studies, as sources of raw data on "the rules of the game", a basic concept in the theory of games of strategy.

CHAPTER FOUR: STRATEGY BASED ON THE SOCIOLOGICAL APPROACH TO CONFLICT, AND THE THEORY OF GAMES.

The sociological conceptualization of conflict takes for granted that incompatible values or goals exist among different systems. It takes for granted that costs are involved in conflict. Sometimes the costs of any given social system seem to be borne disproportionately by one sub-system or set of sub-systems. Attempts to reallocate costs may involve resistance from the system to whom the costs are shifted. Strategy from the sociological point of view involves the minimization of the costs of achieving a goal against opposition. The basic questions, then, which the parties in any conflict must ask are these: what is the optimal strategy to follow to achieve certain ends under certain given conditions? How much should we aim for? How much opposition would we expect? How much should we settle for? What are the opposition's weak points? What are its strong points? What alliances or coalitions should we seek? What strategies is the opposition likely to use? What is likely to be the effect of our strategy on the opposition? Of the opposition's on us? ... Wherever strategy is being discussed, answers to these questions are being sought.
The research basic to answering such questions is no more satisfactory than that involved in mapping strategies for changing "human nature" reviewed in Chapter 2. Perhaps the best general statement of the research problems involved is that presented in a recent volume called *The Policy Sciences* (133, 1951), which might just as well have been called *The Sciences of Strategy*, since that, essentially, is what it is. For basically strategy is a policy or plan of action, a rule of behavior, such, for example, as a policy of appeasement, a policy of militancy, a policy of legal force, a policy of revolution, etc. Strategy based on the sociological approach to conflict does not aim at changing "human nature" in the subjective sense; it may, and often does, aim at changing behavior. It may attempt to outwit or to bypass "human nature." But it begins with people as they are.

In the United States strategic problems have engaged the attention of some distinguished social scientists, but in the absence of adequate research on which to base conclusions, the replies have sometimes been equivocal. In spite of all the research summarized by Williams, as referred to in Chapter 2, for example, there is as yet no clear-cut reply to such questions as: Should the Negroes use a strategy of appeasement or of militancy? Should they fight for changes in laws first or for changes in the mores first? Similar uncertainties exist in other conflict areas also.

In the first part of this chapter we shall discuss strategy as related to race relations, religious group relations, industrial relations, international relations, and also the strategic use of violence. In the second part we shall return to a brief consideration of the evaluation of strategy in terms of the theory of games of strategy, since this theory seems to offer a promising basis for a modern sociology of conflict.

**Strategy in Race Relations.**

Gunnar Myrdal's study of Negroes in the United States (174, 1944) has received wider recognition for its diagnosis of the racial situation in the United States than for its principles of strategy. Yet it is permeated throughout with strategic considerations. Especially in Appendix 3 does he elaborate his strategic "principles of cumulation," based on a theory of dynamic causation. All the factors involved in the Negro's status, he points out, are inextricably interrelated and interdependent; none is basic to the others. Thus "any change in any one of these factors, independent of the way in which it is brought about, will, by the aggregate weight of the cumulative effects running back and forth between them all, start the whole system moving in one direction or the other as the case may be, with a speed depending upon the original push and the functions of causal interrelation within the system" (p. 1067). Anything one can do to improve the Negro's status will, by this principle of cumulation, tend to work toward the improvement of other factors. Myrdal is of the opinion that "a rational strategy in the Negro problem ... assumes a theory of dynamic causation" (p. 1070).

Foremost among American sociologists who have devoted attention to problems of strategy is R. M. MacIver (148, 1946), who accepts Myrdal's basic principle of cumulation, and concludes on the basis of it that the concern of the policy-maker is that of securing changes in one variable or another in a way that has most likelihood of relative
persistence and one which can be maintained against a downward drag. He recommends that emphasis should be placed on the economic, political, and educational fronts rather than on the social. He presents a two-fold strategic principle, namely, that points of least resistance must be found and broken through and that the longer a gain is held, the easier it becomes to hold it. His discussion of strategy has been summarized by F.D. Freeman as follows (71, 1951):

His suggestion is that a particular merit attaches to gains made in some tangible fashion or that are of an institutional character. Advances most likely to be sustained for a considerable time, and thus most likely to secure the protection of usage and of the binding institutional forms in which they are themselves embodied, are those of an economic or political character. Institutional reforms are necessary to consolidate victory on any front.... The policy-maker must ask...: 
(1) What are the factors most susceptible to change? 
(2) What are the weakest points of resistance by the opposing forces? 
(3) What is the ratio of probable results from immediate and direct action on the one hand and indirect and delayed action on the other? 
(4) What are the agencies most likely to assure that gains made will be retained sufficiently long for the establishment of new habituations and reconditionings of response? In his conclusion that a proper strategy will seek out the weak points toward which policy-makers may direct their attack, MacIver points to (1) the relatively little opposition to increasing economic opportunity for Negroes, and (2) ideological weakness - a contradiction of valuations in the "moral dilemma" sense.

The strategic questions raised by MacIver cannot yet be unequivocally answered by present research techniques. We must still rely very largely on insights and intuitions, hunches and unaided observations for replies.

As a result we have widely differing strategic proposals, ranging from those at one extreme based on psychoanalytic analyses to those at the other based on objective evaluation of legislative action. As an example of the first we cite that of Cornelius L. Golightly, who, on the basis of an extensive review of psychoanalytically oriented literature, proposes the abolition of caste on the grounds that it is a second-rate mechanism for ego satisfaction rather than a first-rate one (78, 1949). As an example of the other extreme we refer to two recent studies of the results of antidiscriminatory legislation, by Burma and by Berger.

John H. Burma (38, 1951) points out that the strategy of legislation is aimed at the elimination of overt discrimination, not of prejudice. He counters the argument that antidiscriminatory legislation will increase interpersonal conflict rather than diminish it by referring to experience under state fair-employment practices laws and civil rights laws: "Ill feeling and misunderstanding have decreased, not increased; and while there have sometimes been repercussions of a semiviolent nature, they have been of negligible importance in the beginning and then declined. Strife, conflict, and ill feeling are more closely related to tension and feelings of injustice and resentment than to efforts to equality, fairness, and justice." A more detailed and documented study of the same problem by Monroe Berger (18, 1952) comes up with essentially the same results. Legislation may not forbid attitudes, but it may and should forbid behavior of a public interest which violates the civil rights of others. Finally law itself becomes an educational force which changes attitudes. Equality by statute has proved an effective strategy.
Joseph D. Lohman and Dietrich C. Reitzes also present evidence that the strategy of aiming at objective behavior rather than at attitudes is effective (140, 1952). They point out that an individual's attitudes toward Negroes is not a unitary, consistent phenomenon. It is specific to certain roles. A man might accept Negroes in his union because in that situation his role is defined for him by his occupational interests; in another situation he might reject the Negro, that is, as a property holder. They cite evidence, both in Washington and in Chicago, to show that proper indoctrination of the police force in their duties as public officials rendered them effective bulwarks against racial violence. In neither case were their own subjective attitudes involved; they could have remained prejudiced. The important thing was that they successfully projected on potential perpetrators of violence the community's insistence on a policy of non-discrimination and in this role they succeeded in preventing violence. Lohman is the author of a manual used by the Chicago Police Department in training personnel (141).

Another type of study tending to validate the strategy of aiming at behavior rather than at attitude refers to the introduction of Negro workers into a plant or factory. It has been found that if workers are asked whether they will accept Negro workers they may say no. But if Negro workers are introduced casually, as a matter of course, there may be little opposition. In one study a slightly different situation obtained. Negroes were already working in the plant when Southern workers—so-called "hillbillies"—were introduced. The question was, would they bring their prejudices with them and thus change the plant atmosphere to conform to their prejudices, or would they fall into line with the antidiscriminatory policy? The answer was, they conformed. "When confronted with a firm policy of non-discrimination... they tended to accept the situation as defined by management. Yet this did not indicate a radical change in the racial attitudes of the southern whites, but rather an accommodation to the existences of a specific situation" (115, 1952).

Herman H. Long also criticizes the point of view which looks upon prejudice as the "cause" of discrimination. Such a point of view involves a strategy of re-education of human beings before changes can be effected. In contrast is the point of view which emphasizes the adventitious source of antipathetic group behavior. From the point of view of strategy, this second point of view seeks to change the institutional framework rather than the inner mechanisms of the individual (142, 1951). We have already referred in Chapter 3 to Rommetveit's contrast between "personality-centered" models and "society-centered" models (45, 1951), which is also pertinent at this point.

One of the most critical tests of strategy in race relations began in the United States in 1954. In that year the Supreme Court declared that segregation in schools violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution in that it denied Negroes the equal protection of the law. This was the boldest application yet of the strategy of legal force in race relations in the United States. At least two Southern states had earlier threatened to abolish their public school systems if the Court decided against segregation. Students of conflict will watch the results of this strategy with great interest, not only because of its humanitarian implications but also because of the lessons in human relations which it can teach.
Anti-Semitism as Strategy; Strategy and Anti-Semitism.

Tension theorists, especially within the last decade, have evolved elaborate theories to explain hostility toward Jews in terms of subjective mechanisms (96, 1945). But anti-Semitism as a deliberate strategy on the part of nationalistic politicians, has also been noted. Florian Znaniecki, for example, points out the strategic considerations which led to a policy of discrimination in Poland, but reminds us that deliberate genocide as a policy came later. 1)

Why did anti-Semitism emerge in many countries from the middle of the nineteenth century on, culminating finally in the Nazi manifestations? For modern anti-Semitism is distinct from medieval anti-Judaism, which was rooted in religion. It is everywhere connected with the growth of modern national solidarity and international struggle. A minority of Jews living within a territory inhabited by another nationality came to be regarded by the latter as unreliable or even dangerous. For their solidarity with other Jews inhabiting foreign territories was considered stronger than their loyalty to the nation in which they lived; and it always seemed possible that they might ally themselves with foreign enemies if it was to their own advantage.

This was a common argument against the Jews which was used by nationalistic groups in most countries, from Russia to the United States.... The most widely promulgated method was to weaken the Jews economically and to exclude them from any politically or intellectually influential positions. Nationalists considered expulsion even more desirable whenever possible .... But, outside of a few small, non-educated and ruthless gangs, no nationalistic group advocated the method of genocide until the Nazis came to power.

The recent change of policy toward Jews in Russia has also been interpreted as a strategic move: "The outcome of Soviet policy toward minorities is something like this: stress and encourage the autonomy of minorities whenever it will embarrass the enemies of the USSR; destroy minorities whenever they hinder the development of the classless society." 2) Within the last year reports have been emanating from Russia that the "cosmopolitan Jew" is being attacked, a strategic move variously interpreted as a bid for support in the Near East or as a reaction against Zionist nationalism.

In 1950 the National Community Relations Advisory Council, representing a large number of Jewish community agencies, retained MacIver to make a study of Jewish community relations work. In May, 1951, he presented the results of his study, including among his recommendations a re-assessment of strategy. He felt that "the need for a continuous process of thinking through the problems of strategy prior to the making of programs" was of fundamental importance and that meeting it should have first priority in the work of the research personnel of Jewish agencies (150, 1951). Throughout the whole report he emphasized strategic problems, such as alliances with other agencies and points of attack.

Strategic Problems of Organized Religion.

An analysis of strategy in the field of religious institutions has been made by J. Milton Yinger, as follows (250, 1951). The church as an institution is in conflict with secular institutions for control of human behavior, that is, for power. If it demands too much, it may lose out; if it makes too many concessions, it loses also. It must devise a strategy which steers between these two losing policies. Following Troeltsch, Yinger points out the two characteristic policies which result: "on the one hand, there is development and compromise, on the other, literal obedience and radicalism" (p. 19). The first is the church approach, the second, the sect approach. Compromise or withdrawal is the strategic choice. That this strategic problem is not unique to religious institutions is pointed out by Howard E. Jensen, in his Editorial Note to Yinger's study:

The significance of the study ... is not limited to the field of the sociology of religion, inasmuch as the same types of response are disclosed by nonreligious groups engaged in the struggle for power ... Similar intragroup tensions have been developed within, and a similar strategy has been employed by, the American Negro minority in its organized efforts to secure greater opportunities and improve status within the framework of our contemporary culture. The struggle for power as represented by feminism, the labor movement, racial and cultural revivals, and other subordinate or minority groups constitutes complexes of social phenomena the future study of which could well profit by the further application of the methods of sociological analysis, to the development of which Dr. Yinger has here made a significant contribution.

Appeasement or isolation. Gradualism, ameliorism, Fabianism, reform; or revolution. Conciliation or aggression. These are words which recur throughout all studies of conflict. Religious institutions are no more immune to the problems of strategy which they represent than are economic or political institutions.

Strategy in Industrial Relations.

In the field of industrial relations one of the main strategic problems of management has been whether to forestall unionization by meeting every promised benefit by paternalism, by counseling programs, or to accept unions and protect its interests in the processes of collective bargaining. We have already referred to some of the work in this area in Chapter 3.

The strategy of violence in fighting unionization which the LaFollette Senate Committee exposed in the 1930's has practically been abandoned in the North. But the "researches" or investigations of another Senatorial Committee, published in April, 1951, show that it is still used in the South (244, 1951). Kidnapping, threats, espionage, beatings, "back-to-work" movements, "Citizens' Committees," and injunctions were all reported.

On the side of the union organizer strategy is also important. One leader, John Steuben, with no pretensions to social-science objectivity, has scanned the history of strikes and the strategies that have been used by management and shown how strike leaders should deal with them by applying the principles of military strategy (228, 1950). The first part of this book examines the relationship of strikes...
to politics and "an effort to apply lessons drawn from military strategy to counteract the methods of actual warfare which have been used by employers." The second part is a manual on the conduct of strikes; the third part analyzes strike-breaking techniques; and the fourth part discusses the qualifications necessary for effective strike leadership.

In the field of class conflict, so-called, as in the field of race relations, there has long been a split in thinking about strategy as between gradualism, that is, piecemeal reform or "Fabianism," on the one hand, and revolution on the other. Two recent studies have tended to corroborate the Marxian notion of classes as interest-groups (as contrasted with the notion of classes as status groups) but actual events have not shown that the Marxist strategy of class struggle is a necessary concomitant. Herman M. Case corroborated Richard Centers' conclusion that "a person's status and role with respect to the economic processes of society imposes upon him certain attitudes, values, and interests relating to his role and status in the political and economic sphere;" that, in brief, social classes were indeed interest groups, "but interest groups which appear to be behaving non-militantly and non-violently within a framework of capitalism" (43, 1952). The strategy of legislation and social reform rather than of revolution was being used.

Another analysis of strategy as related to class is that by Gerard DeGré, who points out that "the main role of the middle class ... would appear to be that of providing, because of its voting strength and indeterminate political orientation, a battleground to be fought over by the major contending parties. It exists as a potential ally which both parties are anxious to win over to their respective sides. This ... means that whether it consciously wishes to or not, and possibly even in spite of itself, the middle class plays a mediating role between the demands of the dominant class and those of the working class" (58, 1950).

The literature of Marxism remains the great library of strategic writings in the field of class conflict even today. To enter into a discussion of this tremendous repository would, however, involve us in too long a digression.

Strategy in Social and Political Movements.

In an important recent volume, Rudolf Heberle has brought together the fruits of his experience in both Europe and the United States in the field of what he calls political sociology (92, 1951). He devotes two chapters to tactics and strategy, one dealing with the general principles and one with the strategy and tactics of communism and fascism. He deals with such tactical problems as political and direct action (the latter including such activities as boycotts, sabotage, strikes, violence) and democratic procedure. He analyzes the conditions under which each of these is likely to be used. He discusses the nature and results of revolutions. He presents an illuminating analysis of communist strategy and tactics in the United States, such as raising demands among urban tenants, appealing to the American Negro as an "oppressed nation," boring from within or infiltration, and duplication of government units. He analyzes the conditions necessary for a successful coup d'état and the three problems that must be met once power is seized, namely threat of attack from abroad, opposition within the
country, and dissent within the political order itself. He deals, fi- 
nally, with the issue of "exceptionalism" or "titoism." Although this 
book is published as a textbook it is really more than this. One of 
the important contributions it makes is the clear-cut presentation of 
the actual processes of political conflict. This is the first time, 
it seems, that the theory and practice of strategy have appeared in 
a textbook.

A more specialized study is an analysis of Russian strategy 
and tactics by Philip Selznick (214, 1952). It is based on historical 
records and on the self-analyses of various members of the bolshevik 
elite. The author stresses action and feels that his work may be used 
as a training manual for anticommmunist forces. He considers organiza-
tions and organizational practices to be weapons "when they are used 
by a power-seeking elite in a manner unrestrained by the constitutional 
order of the arena within which the contest takes place. In this usage, 
'weapon' is not meant to denote any political tool, but one torn from 
its normal context and unacceptable to the community as a legitimate 
mode of action" (p. 2). It is characteristic of communism to concentrate 
total social power in the hands of the ruling group. Selznick analyzes 
not only offensive, but also defensive strategies and tactics of com-
munism; and then discusses the problems of counteroffense, including 
the role of intervening elites, the denial of legitimacy, and the denial 
of access (Chapter 8). This is a neat sociological dissection of the 
actual processes of conflict.

A political scientist, Bertram M. Gross, has recently published 
a study of the process of legislation in which it is viewed as a power 
struggle. Strategy and tactics of the process as it occurs in the 
United States are analyzed in detail (84, 1955). The study in politi-
cal conflict by V. O. Key, Jr., referred to in Chapter 3, also deals 
historically with such tactics as restrictions on voting (113, Part 5). 
Indeed, the political scientists have paid a great deal more attention 
to matters of strategy than have sociologists in the last generation.

**Strategy in International Relations.**

It is, of course, in the area of international relations 
that problems of strategy become most self-conscious, dramatic, and 
tense. Here the problem is not merely one of determining what stra-
tegy is best for one's own side, but also of determining what is the 
strategy of one's opponent. Just what does his behavior mean? What 
strategy is he using? Is this particular move a feint or is it genuine? 
Is he trying to mislead us here in order to gain an advantage there? 
Is this a genuine offer or is it phony? A great deal of secret re-
search goes on in the foreign service departments of all major powers 
attempting to answer these questions.

Two observers at first hand have recently reported on commun-
ist strategy and tactics in Korea. They describe the policy of pro-
moting aggression toward the United States, of dividing the people of 
South Korea from their government, of promoting identification with the 
USSR, and shaping expectations toward rewards under a communist regime. 
They report on the many techniques or tactics used in implementing 
this strategy, such as monopoly use of mass media, constant repetition 
of simple themes like Americans are Imperialists, the use of schools, 
indoctrination in face-to-face groups, spectacle and display, special 
devices like self-criticism, public confession, "brain washing," and 
surveillance information (201 and 202, 1951).
Former Assistant Secretary of State, Edward W. Barrett (1953) has described and illustrated the strategic and tactical problems involved in the war of ideas today. His book contains little theory, but is filled with concrete, specific facts which could be drawn upon in any sociological analysis of conflict.
There have been some attempts to suggest strategies to use against communism in order to obviate war. Selznick's suggestions refer primarily to defense against communism within the United States. But David Mitrany, on the basis of a careful analysis of the policy of Marxism toward the peasant, proposes that one way to combat communism would be to make it perfectly clear to peasants everywhere that "the peasants of the world who turn towards Communism in the hope that the land would be distributed are being obviously misled. It is clear from the writings of Lenin and Stalin that the successful outcome of a Communist classless society would be the elimination of the peasants and their amalgamation into the proletariat or members of the classless society" (164, 1951).

Hans Speier, after reviewing war and militarism and political warfare, suggests that we should tempt communist leaders to change their expectations by the use of proper inducements, that we should sow suspicion, distrust, and dissension, and thus split control at the top, thereby avoiding a clash of arms (224, 1952). He also feels that propaganda should be substituted for warfare to accomplish political ends. He feels that the concept "psychological warfare" is ambiguous. After analyzing the will to fight, he finds that hostile action against foreign political and military elites can be taken by interfering with intelligence or information with respect to both foreign and domestic strengths, intention, and/or obedience, by interfering with estimates of consequences of alternative policies, by interfering with the control by the political elite of working and fighting populations, and by interfering with communication with these groups. He lays down three rules for minimizing the risks involved in deviant (reasonable?) behavior in the enemy, so as to induce it more readily, including a careful analysis of how to exploit self-interest. The time perspective of any policy of an elite will depend on its history: an elite recruited from the aristocracy, for example, is likely to be governed by medium- and long-range objectives; an elite which has risen to power from a state of persecution, are not likely to plan far ahead. Policy objectives of some kind are a prerequisite of political warfare. The distrust among elites in a hostile power may be exploited advantageously where it exists, in effect playing one off against the other. He ends his discussion with an analysis of deception, its forms and functions.

An interesting aspect of the study of strategy as related to policy is suggested by the problem, what if the culture of a people forbids the use of precisely the strategies and tactics necessary to use against an enemy? We are told, for example, that the use of communist methods — subversion and sabotage, for example — by the United States has been hushed up because "Official Washington fears the United States public would be shocked by disclosure that this country resorted to such 'dirty' methods." 1)

Strategy is the essence of non-violent conflict, or the so-called cold war. It has many aspects, psychological as well as economic. Perhaps the best research in these areas in the United States is "classified," that is, unavailable because of security reasons. We refer, therefore, to only two works, one on psychological (133, 1951 ch. XIV) and one on economic, warfare (79, 1947).

The Strategic Use of Violence.

Those who hold to a tension theory of conflict look upon violence as essentially a tension-reducing activity, functional perhaps but non-rational. People engage in riots, lynchings, pogroms, street brawls as a means of venting long pent-up hostilities and aggressions. Few theorists come right out and say that a modern war can be explained so simply, although in general tensions are felt to be involved somehow or other. At this point, however, we are concerned with the use of violence not as a non-rational tension-reducing form of behavior but as an element in strategy. For violence is one kind of strategy even for rational people.

In referring to Dahlke's analysis of pogroms in Chapter 3 we noted that some people encouraged, even when they did not themselves actually instigate, such aggressions in order to eliminate competitors. And there is considerable evidence that the deliberate provoking of violence during a strike is common strategy on the part of management (228, 1950). The agent provocateur is a well recognized, if not highly respected, functionary. Nor are the uses of war for strategic purposes unknown in history (47, 1941, p. vii):

Whether or not international war may ultimately go the way of armed personal and corporate combat, it is still potent to bring results useful to the rulers of peoples. War demands unity for an objective that takes precedence over all peace-time problems. On the one hand, in the name of this unity, objections to radical alterations in the social structure may be overcome. On the other hand, in the name of the same unity, harassed politicians may find respite from embarrassing demands for social betterment. In either case, war may bring enhanced prestige and power to those who guide the destinies of the rank and file.

The fomenting of external wars as a means of diverting hostile elements at home has been reported - always, of course, for the enemy - in history. This theory is basic to the concept of the garrison state, to which we referred in Chapter 2 (6, 1953).

Wars can be produced at any time when they are really wanted or needed for strategic purposes. For the conditions leading to war are endemic. Border incidents can be created; the agent provocateur is almost a professional, for international incidents as well as on the picket line. Perhaps refraining from the use of war is as much in need of "explanation" as the actual use of war itself.

The calculated, planned, wholly rational - in the sense of means well adapted to ends - nature of the strategy of war has been freshly documented in the case of Hitler. In a secret briefing of his commanders-in-chief in 1939 he said:

One might accuse me of wanting to fight and fight again. In struggle I see the fate of all beings. I did not organize the armed forces in order not to strike. The decision to strike was always in me. Time is working for our adversary. I shall strike and not capitulate!

Again, in 1937:

The history of all times - Roman Empire, British Empire - has proved that every space expansion can be effected only by breaking resistance and taking risks. Even setbacks are unavoidable. Neither in former times nor today has space been found without an owner. The attacker always comes up against the proprietor. The question for Germany is where the greatest possible conquest can be made at lowest cost.
There may have been a time when the strategic use of war was more acceptable than it is now. When international relations were carried on by secret diplomacy; when the man-in-the-street did not know what was going on; then the strategy of war may have been more lightly resorted to. It may still be used when it can be gotten away with. In the United States, for example, it is alleged that Roosevelt and his advisers had concluded fairly early during the last world war that war with the Axis powers was inevitable; it was bound to come sooner or later - as the captured Nazi documents show, indeed, that it was - the question was, when? The strategic problem was, then, not how can it be avoided, but how can it be most advantageously timed? (168,1947; 235,1952).

So little applicable is the tension theory as related to war that leaders must cajole their followers into it. And even when it is resorted to, popular disapproval must be carefully avoided. Thus in Directive No. 1, March 11, 1948, for the occupation of Austria, Hitler makes it very clear that "the behaviour of the troops must give the impression that we do not wish to wage war against our brother nation. It is in our interest that the whole operation shall be carried out without any violence but in the form of a peaceful entry welcomed by the population. Therefore, any provocation is to be avoided. If, however, resistance is offered it must be broken ruthlessly by force of arms". The use of mass extermination, or genocide, as a technique by the Nazis has been reported on (121,1950; 3,1951). The remarkable thing in this connection seems to be the error in strategic judgment which led the Nazis so flagrantly to disregard world opinion. For whatever the practice may be, as we pointed out above, the moral atmosphere of the present time decrees the use of the strategy of violence. Clausewitz is often quoted as saying that war was simply a continuation on the field of battle of conflicts which diplomacy or non-violent strategies had failed to resolve. But there is less popular stomach for the use of violence today; it is now looked upon as a failure in strategy rather than as proper use of strategy. Proper strategy, it is sometimes argued, would obviate recourse to violence.

We now approach near to the heart of the question raised in the UNESCO resolution referred to in the Preface of this report, namely, what is the best way to study international "tensions," that is, conflicts, with a view to resolving them by peaceful means. On the basis of the review of current research here summarized, the answer seems to lie in the work being done by mathematicians and economists in the so-called theory of games of strategy. Because this report has been critical of the current tension approach, that is, the approach by way of individual subjective mechanisms aggregated into group mechanisms, it seems advisable that a brief statement about a substitute approach should be introduced here.

The Theory of Games of Strategy as the Basis for a Modern Sociology of Conflict.

The theory of games of strategy is both a theoretical system throwing light on the nature of social organization and social conflict and a technique for solving concrete and specific problems of a technical nature. It is based on a theorem first worked out by John von Neumann in 1928 and since then elaborated by other mathematicians.
As a theoretical system, it has been applied most thoroughly to economic behavior, especially by Oskar Morgenstern. As a technical tool it has been applied to a great many kinds of specific problems, especially military ones, such, for example, as the optimal behavior in an air duel. What is now needed is some solid work by sociologists to render their data amenable to game theory analysis. The present statement is about the theory rather than a statement of the theory itself. 1)

The theory of games of strategy is a theory of rational behavior; in this respect it differentiates itself markedly from social-psychological theories which view conflict as non-rational behavior. It deals with people in interaction, that is, with people who must plan their behavior with reference to the behavior of other people. Every strategy, or rule of behavior, must be evaluated in terms of the expected behavior of others. The theory of games does not assume that one's opponents are necessarily attempting to injure one— that would be a theory of paranoia— but only that they are attempting to do the best they can, even at your expense.

A fundamental concept in the theory of games of strategy is that of the payoff function. If player A does this and player B does that, what will be the consequences for each one? The theory of games of strategy is worked out best for two-person zero-sum games, which means that what player A wins, player B loses, and vice versa. The payoff function in parlor games is specified by the rules of the game or by the players themselves; they decide what it will be. But for sociological "games" the payoff function is determined by the "laws" of nature, including "human nature." The "rules of the game" are not human creations, but natural phenomena. If Nation A does this and Nation B does that, what will be the consequences? What will be the payoff? Which combination of strategies or rules of behavior will favor Nation A? which, Nation B? It will be noted that the determination of the payoff function for sociological "games" is a monumental research task. Until we know what the payoff function for every combination of strategies of the players is, we cannot apply the theory of games.

But once the payoff function is known, it is tabulated in a payoff matrix, as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Player A</th>
<th>Strategy B-1</th>
<th>Strategy B-2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategy A-1</td>
<td>-8</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategy A-2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>-10</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Such a matrix is to be read as follows: If player A uses strategy A-1 and player B uses strategy B-1, player A will lose 3 points; if player A uses strategy A-1 and player B uses strategy B-2, player A gains 4 points; if player uses strategy A-2 and player B uses strategy B-1, player A gains nothing; if player A uses strategy A-2 and player B uses strategy B-2, player A loses 10 points. By convention

1) For a fuller statement about the theory see a forthcoming article by the present writer on "The Theory of Games of Strategy As a Modern Sociology of Conflict," American Journal of Sociology, 59 (March 1954) pp 411-424.
the matrix is read in terms of player A; player B’s gains and losses are the same as player A’s, but with the signs reversed. The number of strategies — here limited to two — may be infinite. For non-zero-sum games — in which gains and losses do not cancel one another — dummy players are introduced to absorb gains and losses.

The problem for each player now is to select the strategy which over the long run will net him the most, regardless of what his opponent does. This is done by the so-called minimax and maximin procedure. Player A finds the minimum gain he can make with any strategy; he then selects the strategy which nets him the largest of these minimum gains. Player B finds the minimum gains he can hold Player A down to, and then selects the strategy which will result in the largest of these minimums.

When a third player is introduced new theoretical problems emerge. Now coalitions or alliances tend to be formed. And the distribution of gains among the members of the coalitions — imputations, so-called — looms up as a problem. Presumably players will coalesce in a manner to make their gains optimal, since they are rational. The distribution of gains — the imputation — must conform to accepted standards of behavior. Attempts to pay any one member of a coalition less than he could get in another coalition will mean that he will desert the coalition, producing loss to the other player in the coalition.

The application of game theory will probably come first in combination with statistics in problems of statistical inference. It may take some time before it can be applied to sociological data. But it is probably important for sociologists to work with the mathematicians who are developing the theory, since the direction of mathematical research will doubtless be determined by the nature of the models presented for its consideration.

In the meanwhile, all the dependable research that sociologists and social psychologists can do may have to be harnessed. Just what are the “laws” of social life? of “human nature”? Just what is the payoff function of certain combinations of strategy or behavior or policy? A great deal more will have to be known about the way groups function before we can supply the data necessary for application of the theory. The tension studies which UNESCO has sponsored may be part of the indispensable foundation for computing payoff functions.

It is suggested here that a group of sociologists meet in seminar fashion with a group of mathematicians interested in game theory in order to explore the conceptual and theoretical problems which will have to be mastered before game theory can be applied to sociological data. The Social Science Research Council sponsors what it calls inter-university seminars each summer at different university campuses in the United States. Perhaps it could be invited to join with UNESCO in sponsoring such a seminar on an international basis, so that sociologists from different countries could meet with game theorists to tackle the problem jointly. The fruits of such a combined effort might be slow in maturing, but they would almost certainly be very much worth waiting for.
The chief criticisms of the theory of games of strategy as a basis for a sociology of conflict, aside from those invoked in connection with our presentation of other mathematical models above, may be summarized under three headings: (1) conceptual-technical difficulties, (2) practical difficulties, and (3) ethical difficulties.

1. The conceptual-technical difficulties center about the problems of determining and assessing costs, or payoffs. This, as we saw earlier, is a psychological as well as a sociological problem. The practical difficulties inherent in the overwhelming volume of computations necessary to apply the theory even in relatively simple practical situations -- running into the millions and even billions and trillions. The ethical difficulties lie in the apparently Socratic conception of human nature implicit in the theory. The theory does, however, leave room for ethical considerations. For it assumes that when several solutions in a strategic game are possible and equally good, the one will be selected which conforms most closely to accepted standards of conduct.

It seems important to emphasize the fact that two entirely different kinds of face-to-face situations are being dealt with in the two kinds of conflict we have referred to. There is little justification for the hope sometimes expressed that techniques which are effective in the first type will also work in the second. Arriving at agreement or consensus is not at all the same thing as negotiating a conflict.

1. For a more extended discussion of these points, Ibid., pp. 422-424.
The task of summarizing the current research in the United States in the field of achieving agreement, especially in face-to-face groups, has been undertaken by Stuart A. Chase in a recent volume in which he describes, analyzes, and evaluates a number of techniques used in reaching agreement, namely: the methods used by the Quakers in arriving at consensus, the work done by the followers of Kurt Lewin in group dynamics, other laboratory studies in small-group behavior, and the work of great mediators of industrial disputes (44, 1951).

Since he has organized this material in an easily understood fashion, we shall follow his presentation here. We remind ourselves here that for the most part the conceptualization of conflict basic to the work he reviews is of the social-psychological type, in terms of quarreling or belligerency (pp. 2-3).

... to expect people to abandon their right to quarrel with the neighbors, however high its price, is of course, Utopian. But the mounting cost of belligerency is causing thoughtful observers to look around for ways and means to reduce it. Perhaps it is none too soon to take an inventory of those techniques ... which could be used to reduce the area of conflict and make us less vulnerable to outbursts of our own belligerency. When we begin to look, a surprising number of methods come to light.

We are dealing, then, with belligerency, with personal animosity, with hostilities, and not with conflict in the sense of costs. Chase himself confuses the two kinds of conflict, but the reader should not.

First of all Chase describes and analyzes the principles on which Quakers conduct their meetings, including: unanimous decisions in order to avoid a defeated minority nourishing grievances; the use of silent periods; using the cooling-off technique when agreement cannot be reached unanimously or when opposing factions begin to form; participation by all members in order to pool experience; going to meetings to listen, with an open mind; absence of leaders; equality of status; dependence on facts rather than emotion; and limiting the size of meetings. Quakers have found these principles effected. They are limited, of course, in application. Quakers are like-minded people, with similar cultural backgrounds. They have been processed by religion to subdue their egos. They are sincere in seeking solutions to common problems. The motivation to reach agreement is present. Wherever these conditions exist, the Quaker pattern may be considered a suitable "model."

Chase also summarizes the results from the research in group dynamics, to which reference has already been made in Chapter 7. These researchers wish to know exactly how run-of-the-will groups function, even when the optimum conditions are not present. Groups of many kinds have been observed in both natural and laboratory circumstances. In the United States - and the results might be different in other cultures - it is reported that people seem to function more efficiently when they are involved in setting up the methods of achieving the goals they are aiming at. Rewards of "need satisfactions" seem to work better than punishments or "forced need reduction." Groups seem to work better when they select their own leaders, deliberately or unconsciously. The structure of a group may determine whether or not it can solve a common problem successfully.
One technique that has attracted a considerable amount of attention is the use of "role taking." This is a method for helping people understand one another and thus presumably obviating hostilities and aggressions. The foreman who takes the role of the worker and the worker who takes the role of the foreman come in time, it is reported, to see one another's point of view and thus find it easier to accommodate differences. It should be pointed out that the same ability to take another person's point of view, to take his role, also makes it possible to think up more ways of hurting him if one wants to. One can discover vulnerable areas and exploit them by this form of what Cooley used to call "sympathetic introspection."

Chase also summarizes the work which has been done over the past thirty years in the study of conference techniques. The importance of this area of research lies in the fact that a great deal of policy is formulated in conferences. Important decisions are arrived at; differences must be reconciled; agreements must be reached. If this policy and these decisions are to represent the best thinking of those entrusted with their formulation it is important that the conference be managed in the most effective manner possible. The number of members should be about ten to fifteen, not more than twenty. So-called "buzz groups" of four or five sometimes help, informality, within the bounds of good manners, helps, but there should be no forced good fellowship. Consistency with respect to the use of first or last names should be practiced; if there is not, cliques or the suspicion of cliques may arise. Some trivial pointers include a table where everyone can see all the others, with no special chair for the leader.

Two hours seems to be as long as a session should last. Ten-minute recesses may help in case of a deadlock. If emotions begin to mount, it may be useful to postpone further discussion. Consensus seems to be better than voting since a vote splits the group into winners and losers. In the United States a democratic or permissive type of leader seems to be most successful.

Chase points out that at the present time many if not most international conferences violate the principles of group dynamics in that delegates come instructed, so that free interaction is not possible. He suggests that if all participants in international policy formation were well grounded in the culture concept better success in arriving at agreement could be expected.

So far as industrial peace is concerned, he finds that the research adds up to: the improvement of morale, incentive, and cooperation on the part of workers by means of increasing their participation in decisions involving their work conditions. More flexible organization instead of the rigid chain of command up and down the line. Tears of workers set up their own procedures for achieving goals of their unit in the plant. This releases productive energy which is frustrated when workers are simply given orders and expected to execute them with no say-so on their own part.

Chase concludes his summary of the roads to agreement with the following statement (p. 235): In the course of our inquiry we found many useful methods, rules, and suggestions to reduce conflict. Some of them kept coming back, like recurring decimals, in situation after situation. I would like to underline five of them:
The principle of participation.
The principle of group energy.
The principle of clearing communication lines.
The principle of facts first.
The principle that agreement is much easier when people feel secure.
Critique of Work Summarized by Chase.

Chase has performed a valuable service. His book should be widely translated and read. Yet it cannot be accepted uncritically. We shall present only four criticisms here; others will doubtless occur to the reader.

First of all, the model to which this research refers is one of limited incidence. This fact in and of itself would not be damaging if the researchers held clearly in focus the limitations of their model. It does become dangerous when it is inferred that results for this model are applicable to different models.

The techniques which have been shown to be successful in small face-to-face groups of like-minded men in our culture, eager, indeed anxious, to solve their problems, are not necessarily transferable to the formal structure of collective bargaining or of negotiation. The research summarized by Chase is based on the above-described model. It assumes that the parties wish to find a solution but do not have techniques for doing so. Good will is assumed; know-how or technique is the problem. It rests on the theory that conflict is the result of lack of knowledge of ways of reaching agreement, that "our failure to perfect human relations results less from lack of trying than from not discovering how" (133, 1951, p. vii). This point of view looks upon human beings as grooping for some way to reach agreement and failing, when they do, because they do not know how. It presupposes that men wish to achieve agreement or consensus but do not know how to go about it. It assumes a willingness on the part of those involved to do what is required to bring about a resolution of conflict. It concentrates, therefore, on applying the methods of science to the envolving of ways of achieving this goal.

But none of this research is applicable to a model where the good-will is not present. The resolution of conflict is a problem of motivation as well as of technique or know-how. Science can tell us how men can achieve agreement or consensus. It cannot make man want to. Science can tell us the conditions under which agreement or consensus can be achieved. It cannot create these conditions. We are reminded of the psychiatrist - without doubt an apochryphal character - who complained that he could cure his schizophrenic patient if the patient would only cooperate. In a similar manner Chase tells us we could peaceably and even amiably settle our differences if only we would cooperate.

The illness of the schizophrenic is precisely his inability to cooperate in the cure of his malady.

A second point is that although the cultural difficulties involved in applying the findings of the research he presents do occur to Chase, not all the implications do. The very techniques for reaching agreement or consensus which he advocates with such pernicious conviction are precisely those which others in a different culture may vigorously reject. Stalin did, for example. The basic philosophy underlying the methods described by Chase is precisely the opposite to that which the Russian communists believe in. Stalin put himself on record as opposed to what he called the "family and neighbor" system for settling differences, the very system which Chase is describing. Said Stalin (252, 1940, p. 239):

If we Bolsheviks ... eschew self-criticism for the sake of the peace-of-mind of some of our comrades, is it not obvious that tremendous harm can result for our cause? ... If we, champions of the
proletarian revolution, close our eyes to our errors and settle matters in a familiar and convivial way by preserving silence as to our mutual mistakes and thus driving the festering ulcers into the interior of our Party organism, who will finally correct our shortcomings? Is it not obvious that we shall then cease to be proletarian revolutionaries, that we shall probably go under if we countenance a growth of this "family and neighbor" system in the settlement of important matters?

At the opposite extreme is the method of arriving at decisions in Japan, where the individual shrinks from assuming any responsibility and tends to shift it to the leader. It is interesting to note that whereas Chase tells us to avoid voting, which tends to split a group into winners and losers, the American Occupation in Japan felt that voting was a necessary aspect of democratic group functioning. It worked on the assumption that cleavages should be brought out into the open rather than submerged in unanimity (112, 1951).

... the actual fact is that any democracy must depend on majority decision. This is neither a Western nor an Eastern concept; it is a general prerequisite for any kind of democracy, organizational or political. Democracy is the essence of compromise with the edge going to the majority. Japanese unanimity of group decision is of course compromise in one sense, but too often concessions are made by the majority to the will of the minority.

In brief, the results of research on group dynamics in the United States may have only limited applicability, not only with respect to the model, but also with respect to the cultural setting.

A third criticism of some of the work especially by the researchers in group dynamics is that their whole approach is one of manipulating people. Many people resent the idea of having specialists trained in techniques for manipulating group behavior. They consider it not only humiliating to those who are thus manipulated but also as potentially dangerous. It strikes others as somewhat arrogant also.

And, finally, we should not overlook the negative aspect of this, as of all other, research. We are, indeed, learning a great deal about how men must act if they wish to solve problems together. But as in the case of all scientific research, the results are two-edged swords. To show what must be done to arrive at agreement is exactly the same as showing what must be done to block agreement. To prevent consensus you do just the reverse of what you do to achieve it. If you are interested in fomenting difficulties you know how to do it. If you wish to destroy solidarity, the weapons are available to your hand. The Communists have been cleverly applying obstructional and divisive techniques for years. Breaking down consensus and fomenting hostilities have been important weapons in their arsenal for a long time.

In spite of these limitations, however, the research in small-group behavior is valuable. It is performing a function quite unrelated to that of science building. In a highly competitive society like that of the United States where status must be achieved, a gathering of men is likely to become a contest in which each seeks to magnify his own importance by playing down that of his fellows. It is very much like the "counting coups" of the Indian brave. One man tells expansively of his achievements; unless others can match these achievements, they feel inferior. Or one man may deflate another by responding with raised eyebrows to the recital of his prowess. One man refers familiarly to the esoteric and specialized work of another, with the implied judgment that anyone not familiar with it is inferior. And so on. It is a battle of words for the most part; it may all be done in the most
convivial manner, politely. But the result is to make many people feel isolated, insecure, inferior. They are inhibited from taking part. It is one of the functions performed by the students of small group behavior to counteract the competitive "counting coups" atmosphere of such groups and to substitute an atmosphere in which people will not attempt to make their fellows feel insecure and inferior. It is, in a sense, an effort to recapture some of the emotional warmth and security of the primary group in groups which are ordinarily breeders of hostilities and insecurities.

Other Approaches.

One of the most important approaches to the study of how face-to-face groups operate is the work done by Robert F. Bales (14, 1950). By ingenious laboratory devices he has studied a large number of groups in action and has found that all face-to-face interaction can be analyzed in terms of twelve categories, including four which deal with conflict axes. The twelve categories are: (1) the showing of solidarity, raising others' status, giving help, rewarding; (2) the showing of tension-release, joking, laughing, showing satisfaction; (3) agreeing, showing passive acceptance, understanding, concuring, complying; (4) giving suggestion, direction, implying autonomy for others; (5) giving opinion, evaluation, analysis, expressing feeling, wish; (6) giving orientation, information, repeating, clarifying, confirming; (7) asking for orientation, information, repetition, confirmation; (8) asking for opinion, evaluation, analysis, expression of feeling; (9) asking for suggestion, direction, possible ways of action; (10) disagreeing, showing passive rejection, formality, withholding help; (11) showing tension, asking for help, withdrawing out of field; and (12) showing antagonism, deflating others' status, defending or asserting self. It will be noted that (1) and (12) constitute one kind of conflict axis and (3) and (10) another.

A quite different approach to the problem of technique, assuming desire to reach a satisfactory solution of conflicting claims, is that of the mathematical theorists, also applicable in the area of sociological choices. The method is not limited to face-to-face groups but applies wherever individuals are allowed to express a preference. Outstanding here is the work of Kenneth J. Arrow, whose work (10, 1951) applies methods of symbolic logic "to the question whether a social valuation of alternatives can be consistently derived from given, partly conflicting, individual valuations." He is interested in finding a rational group preference - for candidates, utilities, policies, or what-have-you - on the basis of the preferences of the individual members of the group. The method for obtaining such a group preference he calls a social welfare function. He imposes five conditions which he considers necessary for an acceptable social welfare function or method for ascertaining group preference and finds that none now exists which satisfies all the conditions.

1) "Condition 1 says, in effect, that as the environment varies and individual orderings remain fixed, the different choices made shall bear a certain type of consistent relation to each other. Conditions 2 and 3, on the other hand, suppose a fixed environment and say that, for certain particular types of variation in individual values, the various choices made have a certain type of consistence" (28).

(The note continues next page)
have, however, challenged the plausibility of Arrow's conditions; they lay down three conditions which must be satisfied and they do find social welfare functions which meet them.

The work of Arrow is phrased in the language of symbolic logic, but the implications for a sociology of conflict are clear. When Arrow quotes Rousseau to the effect that "if the opposition of individual interests has rendered the establishment of societies necessary, it is the accord of these same interests which has rendered it possible" (10, p. 82) or the economist F. W. Knight to the effect that "the principle of majority rule must be taken ethically as a means of ascertaining a real 'general will,' not as a mechanism by which one set of interests is made subservient to another; political discussion must be assumed to represent a quest for an objectively ideal or 'best' policy, not a contest between interests" (p. 85) we see the pertinence of the problems he is dealing with.

Arrow does not feel that he has found a satisfactory social welfare function on the bases he rests his logic on. If the semanticists were right, and there actually exist some objective value on which men only seemed to disagree about - such as a Kantian absolute or some cultural value - then the problem of the social welfare function would take on a wholly different aspect. Now it would be a matter of "discovering" the best policy, not of expressing individually preferred values (pp. 85-86):

From the point of view of seeking a consensus of the moral imperative of individuals, such consensus being assumed to exist, the problem of choosing an electoral or other choice mechanism, or, more broadly, of choosing a social structure, assumes an entirely different form from that discussed in ... this study. The essential problem becomes that of choosing our mechanisms so as best to bring the pragmatic imperative into coincidence with the moral ... .

In this aspect, the case for democracy rests on the argument that free discussion and expression of opinion are the most suitable techniques of arriving at the moral imperative implicitly common to all. Voting, from this point of view, is not a device whereby each individual expresses his personal interests, but rather where each individual gives his opinion of the general will.

This model has much in common with the statistical problem of pooling the opinions of a group of experts to arrive at a best judgment; here individuals are considered experts at detecting the moral imperative ... . The analogy to the problem of pooling experts' opinion is, of course, incomplete; for, in the social welfare problem,

(Notes continued)

Condition 4 demands that the individuals be free to choose among the alternatives available, that is, "the social welfare function is not to be imposed" (29). And Condition 5 states that "the social welfare function is not to be dictatorial" (30). Arrow concludes that "the method of majority decision is a social welfare function satisfying Conditions 1-5 when there are only two alternatives altogether, but that this method does not satisfy Condition 1 when there are more than two alternatives. The method of majority decision does, however, satisfy Conditions 2-5 for any number of alternatives" (10, p. 77).
the very method of pooling, i.e., of social decision, may affect the degree of expertness of individuals .... The very act of establishing a dictator or elite to decide on the social good may lead to a distortion of the pragmatic from the moral imperative.

For a true conflict, then, Arrow's approach is inadequate. It should be noted in passing that the implication of some social and even more economic theory in the nineteenth century was that the best interests of the total group could best be served by the efforts of each individual to maximize his own interests. In such a model, Arrow's approach might be more successful.

It might be safe to conclude from this brief résumé that when people who share a cultural background genuinely wish to reach agreement, techniques are little by little becoming available for them to use in achieving their goal. Although we have criticized the limitations of the research here presented, it would be unfair not to credit it with some genuine contributions to the important art of working and living together harmoniously.

**Mediation.**

Mediation is a special kind of accommodation. It occurs only when (a) the issues are fairly clear, (b) the parties involved are self-conscious, (c) a decision is necessary for further functioning of the system, that is, a crisis of some kind is involved (as contrasted with more diffuse accommodation in reduction of prejudices, intercultural education, and similar processes). It may be between the parties involved or between their responsible representatives. It cannot take place unless the parties can interact; some part of the process must be face-to-face. It falls therefore into the category of small group research.

Mediation is probably most likely to occur between approximately equal parties so far as power relationships are concerned. If there is great inequality, the more powerful party will be in a position to impose its will. Mediation tends, therefore, to be characteristic of situations in which equals are in conflict.

Mediation, it should be pointed out, is a profoundly moral process. It cannot successfully take place unless both parties have faith in the integrity of the mediator. Both parties, furthermore, must inhabit the same moral universe. Otherwise there will be no understanding. For success, both parties must want a solution. Ideally there should be no further step on which the parties may depend in case of failure. In brief, the incentives to achieving a solution must be great.

If mediation is viewed as the guidance of the interaction of a problem-solving group, then all the research summarized at the beginning of this chapter would be pertinent. If it is viewed as dealing with a schismatic process, then one of the models referred to in Chapter 3 may be useful; the researcher might help the mediator if he could find the point on the curve where the intersection took place or he could work out the proper parameters for an appropriate equation. If the mediation situation is viewed in the light of the theory of games of strategy, the researcher might approach the problem in terms of finding the strategy which could be demonstrated to be optimal for both sides.

As a matter of fact, of course, the actual process of media-
tion is an art. Some people seem to know intuitively what to do; they may be helped by scientific research, but they seem to be able to sense the correct thing to do. Nor would all the research in the world make other persons successful as mediators. Part of the process of mediation consists in reactions to the mediator himself as a person. If he does not have the symbolic and intuitive significance required, technique will be of little avail.

Stuart Chase has described the work of some of the great conciliators in American labor disputes. Cyrus Ching, head of the Conciliation Service in the United States government, is of the opinion that successful conciliation, being an art, cannot be formulated into scientific rules. "You have to sense the situation, feel it out, then you act. Every case is different. There are no set rules" (44, p.150).

Some of the rule-of-thumb techniques Ching has used are such things as occasionally misconstruing or questioning the evidence, letting the parties blow off steam, sensing the strategic moment to suggest a compromise, probing for places where emotion can be made to give way. Another great conciliator, Charles T. Estes, sometimes makes the contestants angry with him, so that they must make common cause against him and be less angry with one another; he develops communication among the contestants so that at least they know what the issues are and what the facts are. Dwight Morrow, late ambassador from the United States to Mexico, served as conciliator between the Catholic Church and the Mexican government. He got representatives to concede that ideological conciliation was impossible, but on concrete, practical matters it was possible to come to agreement.

Bales' work has shown that in reaching a group decision certain stages - of orientation, evaluation, and control - must be gone through; none can be skipped. A group has its own natural history, its own tempo, and its own pace. If it is hurried no good is accomplished since the missed stage must be gone through anyway and time may even be lost in going back to pick up the lost beat. Bales has also allowed for "tension release" as one of his categories for studying small group interaction: as we saw above, A serious mediator could doubtless apply these findings.

An important theoretical basis for successful mediation or conciliation may lie in the concept of the looking-glass self. Successful interaction depends on an accurate gauge of the impact which our behavior makes on others. People who are skilled in foretelling how they will affect others can judge social situations well. They may show good or poor judgment in the course of behavior they decide upon; but at any rate they choose it with their eyes open. A good mediator may be one who successfully performs the function of interpreting to people how they look to others, interpreting their behavior from the point of view of the opponent.

From an administrative and practical rather than from a theoretical point of view, Elmore Jackson has attempted to find out what could be learned from mediation of industrial conflicts that could be applied to mediation of international conflicts (101, 1952). His purpose was "to see if the experience in the two fields is sufficiently similar for the United Nations to profit in some way from the more extensive labor mediation experience" (p. xlv). He distinguishes mediation from conciliation in that it is more active, even proposing suggestions for settlement. The book summarizes the way labor disputes are handled in the United States, in Sweden, in Great Britain, and in Russia. It discusses international disputes and areas of comparability between them and industrial disputes. He concludes that:
with the Russians and these reports constitute about the only important
source for a study of the processes of negotiation when cultural back-
grounds, orientation, interests, and philosophies are radically diffe-
rent. The editors conclude that "negotiations with the Soviet Union
are rarely useful or successful unless the international political
climate is favorable"; nevertheless, they continue, "the free world
should ... be prepared to expend the time, money and effort in addi-
tional negotiation" (p. xi).

The one outstanding successful case of negotiation was that
of the handling of war crimes; the Russians were charming, courteous,
and friendly; they were never rude; there were no invectives, no
polemics, no personal attacks and vituperations. This is explained,
says Sidney S. Aldeman who reports on it; by the fact that there
were no conflicts involved. It was a situation similar to the models
discussed in the first part of this chapter, where arriving at agree-
ment was the problem, not the accommodating of differences.

But in other instances, the American negotiators were baffled,
frustrated, worn out and exhausted by the processes involved and by
the tactics employed by the Russians. Especially difficult for the
Americans to take was the recourse to vituperation and personal attack;
they were not accustomed to that kind of behavior. Also wearing was
the inability of the Russian ever to make a decision. Whereas the
American was in a position to come to a decision, the Russian was
simply an intermediary who transmitted information to Moscow and waited
for instructions. One thoughtful, kindly American negotiator summarizes
the contrasting approaches of the Russians and the Americans as follows
(pp. 234-236):

The Soviet representative was quite evidently under specific
instructions both as to what he was to say and as to his conduct. He
was at all times to question the motives of the others; he was to try
to split the other nations apart from each other, but never to conciliate
the smaller nations, to whom he was always to be arrogant and truculent;
he was never, under any circumstances, to concede a point except on
specific instructions from the Kremlin, and then only in the exact
language given him; and, finally, he was to talk as much as all the
others put together, to delay, to confuse, and never to admit his true
intent or to tell the truth ... 

Gromyko, Malik, and Skobeltzyn could all be very charming
socially, and on all the many formal social occasions when they met
with the other delegates seemed to take a certain pride in showing
us this side of their characters. But their behavior in the meetings
of the Commission was entirely different. It was stylized to the ex-
treme. It showed careful training ....

At no time did any of these men give any honest clarifica-
tion of their proposals; at no time did they indicate any possibility
of compromising any issue, though there were plenty of times when they
made compromise proposals, patently fraudulent to the other delegates,
for purposes of propaganda. At no time did they discuss the proposals
of the other delegates on their merits.

In contrast to the behavior of the delegates of the Soviet
Union and its satellites, the other nine or ten delegates behaved as
one might expect any high-grade group of serious men to behave in simi-
lar circumstances. They were sincere, stuck to the issues, did not
attack anyone's motives, discussed the various proposals on their merits,
strongly upheld their own points of view, accepted compromise, and took
responsibility for decisions within the considerable latitude allowed
them by their governments. They were there to reach a solution to a problem ... The Soviet representatives were there to make certain proposals, and to make propaganda if the proposals were not accepted.

Was this a negotiation? Certainly it was not in any ordinary sense of the term. I believe that at the end of the three years all of us came to believe that we had not been negotiating, except among ourselves ...

If there is a lesson to be learned from these meetings with the Soviet Union over a period of three years, it is this: that the word negotiation should not be used to define meetings in which only one of the parties is actually attempting to negotiate. Such a "negotiation" must inevitably fail, and it is not always easy to make it clear to the public who was to blame for the failure.

We might perhaps visualize the above situation in terms of game theory as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>United States</th>
<th>Russia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Quit the Conference and Suffer Omus of Failure</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Continue to Try to Negotiate</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Obstruct (as described in text above)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is obvious from inspection that 4 constitutes the saddle-point of this payoff matrix. Russia was playing a pure strategy; so was the United States. So long as the Americans could hold out against the obstructing tactics of the Russians, they could hold the Russian gains down to 4; so long as the Russians could obstruct, they could keep American losses up to 4. For three years this "game" continued. Then apparently the Americans decided to quit the game and get out, even though this increased their loss to 6.

As a sort of handbook or manual for those who must deal with Russians, Philip E. Mosely attempts to summarize what was learned from the experiences of the men as reported. First of all, he says, one should determine whether the representatives have instructions or not. In the case of representatives of the Western Powers, a flexible process of continuous negotiation has been worked out which is fairly successful. But they cannot be applied with Russian representatives who cannot understand that their western colleagues have both the opportunity and the responsibility for presenting and even advocating policies within their own governmental operations and that, within a broadly agreed pattern of interests and purposes, they have considerable leeway in finding the most effective, and usually informal, methods of influencing their 'opposite numbers' in foreign ministries or embassies" (pp. 275-276). The informal net-work of communication among western representatives makes possible a speed of arriving at accommodations of differences which looks suspicious to the Russian; he looks upon it as a case of American dictation.

The Russian seems always to come with a pure strategy, which may take one of several forms. He may come with completely inflexible instructions; or he may come with instructions not to commit himself to anything or to sign anything; or he may come with no instructions except to report back. The first is the commonest situation; he is
bound by detailed instructions, rigidly pressed, so that "each point at issue, large or small ... becomes a test of will and nerve" (281). The contents of the pure strategy are as follows: grievances are played up; retorts and accusations of bad faith are common; constant imputation of evil intentions to exasperate those who are thus diverted from their main goals in order to deny them. One technique has been labeled "head-against-stone-wall"; it transforms any issue into a test of staying power. Another technique reports is that of agreeing in principle, then reversing the agreement in practice.

The Russians seemed to be in mortal terror lest they violate any part of their instruction or be accused of falling captive to imperialistic insinuations. They had to lean over backward to demonstrate conclusively how far they were from being won over by the West. This defense against seduction rendered such techniques as convivial association as a method of breaking down barriers impossible. Ralph Bunche once found that although he could not get two negotiators to shake hands during a business session, when he invited both of them to his apartment for a social gathering, the amenities forbade such rudeness. They were obliged to shake hands. Once having done this, it was easier to continue with the business of negotiation. The Russians are protected against such techniques by their resistance to even the appearance of fraternizing with the West.

In addition to terminological and semantic difficulties, there were real differences in interpretation of strategy and tactics (pp. 295-296):

The western negotiator is usually able to envisage a series of minor shifts in his own and other positions. He is "pluralistic" in his approach to a solution, in the adjustments of democratic decision-making at home and in seeking adjustments of interests and views among nations. The Soviet negotiator is worried, puzzled, scornful, and suspicious when the western negotiator tries out a series of minor variations to see if the opposing positions cannot be brought closer together. To him it means only that the western representative was "not serious" in the first place. If he is willing to shift so quickly from his original position it must mean that he did not hold it in earnest to begin with and that he can eventually be forced all the way over to the Soviet position, provided the Soviet negotiator will only display "principled steadfastness" long enough and vigorously enough.

The western representative tends to assume that a minor concession here or there will facilitate achieving the common aim of cooperative action. He does not necessarily look for an immediate quid pro quo for each minor concession. At a later stage in the negotiation his partner will remember the facilitating concession and will yield something in turn. To him "good-will" is both a lubricant of the negotiating process and a valuable intangible by-product. The Soviet negotiator takes a minor concession as a sign that his principles are stronger and his will is firmer than those of his opponent. He does not believe in "good-will." He is trained to assume the ill-will of the "capitalist environment." If an "imperialist" negotiator asserts his will for peace, it means, at the best, that he is consciously in favor of peace but is unconsciously a tool of uncontrollable forces which work for war and for the final clash between two worlds. At the worst, it means that he is trying to deceive and gain time while mouthing words of "peace." To a Bolshevik even a momentary "loss of vigilance" may have fatal consequences. The Soviet diplomat feels himself like a traveler by night in the forest who must be constantly on the watch for the smallest sound or sight of treachery. He must be
unceasingly on guard against his own human tendency to "fall into complacency" and thus to underestimate the dangers which surround both him and the regime which he serves.

Mosely thinks that in addition to understanding the Russian language, anyone who wishes to negotiate successfully with representatives of the Russian government must understand the role of the Soviet diplomat vis-a-vis his government. The Russian diplomat must be able to function without the informal channels of communication which are so useful among western diplomats. He has to adopt at the beginning a single clear position and hold to it logically, through indefinite repetitions. "The Soviet negotiator, of course, does not believe what he hears, but he listens for undertones of firmness or uncertainty which tell him whether or not he is shaking the determination of his adversary" (p. 298). Strong feeling, but not impatience or anger, is the way to answer that question. An established point should be put into writing. Pressure should be avoided during a negotiation. General or broadly stated principles should be avoided. One's position should be stated in terms of a definite material interest; the Soviet delegate can understand and adjust to that. Mosely feels that trying to negotiate with the Russians in a period of Soviet expansion could only confuse and divide the nations opposing that pressure; he adds that "since the war the Soviet purpose in negotiating has not been to reach agreements with strong opponents but to intimidate weaker and adjacent countries and to undermine the stamina of its principal potential adversaries" (pp. 301-302). (It was on the basis of this logic that the figures in the payoff matrix presented above were determined).

Perhaps some of the failure on the part of the West in its dealings with the Russians in a period of Soviet expansion could only confuse and divide the nations opposing that pressure; he adds that "since the war the Soviet purpose in negotiating has not been to reach agreements with strong opponents but to intimidate weaker and adjacent countries and to undermine the stamina of its principal potential adversaries" (pp. 301-302). (It was on the basis of this logic that the figures in the payoff matrix presented above were determined).

CHAPTER SIX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS.

This summary of current research in the sociology of conflict has shown that there exist two quite different conceptualizations of conflict, one social-psychological and one sociological. The social-psychological conceptualization is in terms of individual mechanisms, currently those of "tensions." This concept has been taken over from individual psychology and applied to groups, so that "group tensions" is commonly used almost synonymously with group conflict. There is little definitive evidence that "group tensions," as either simple or as weighted additive functions of individual tensions, can be adduced to explain intergroup relations.
Current research in the field of intergroup conflict reveals two quite different conceptualizations, one social-psychological and one sociological. The first is in terms of individual mechanisms, currently those of "tensions" rather than, as formerly, in terms of inherited behaviour patterns or instincts. This concept of tension has been taken over from individual psychology and applied to groups, so that "group tensions" is commonly used almost synonymously with group conflict. Little definitive evidence has, however, been adduced to show that "group tensions", as either simple or as weighted additive functions of individual tensions, can explain intergroup relations. The second, or sociological, conceptualization of conflict is in terms of systems with mutually incompatible goals or values, so that accommodation involves cost of some kind or other. Research in this area has been both formal, mathematical, and deductive on the one hand, and substantive and descriptive, on the other. In the area of research in face-to-face groups, as in the area of research on costs, both the social-psychological and the sociological approaches to conflict find application.
What, then does it all add up to? What can we conclude from this array of research? From a research point of view perhaps the first thing that strikes the student is the inadequacy of any single-pronged attack on the subject of conflict. Conflict is itself such a complex phenomenon -- even the problem of conceptualization is complex -- that neither a social-psychological nor a sociological approach -- nor an economic nor a political one, for that matter -- is adequate to cover the subject. It is a bias of the present writer to see the subject in a sociological framework, with psychology -- and economics and political science -- contributing specific data, on costs or payoffs, for example, on incompatibility or complementaries, on strategies, rule of the same. But any other approach which made it possible for all the social-science disciplines to contribute their insights and techniques might
equally well serve the basic purpose of showing us the mechanisms and
processes which, in their interwoven entirety, we call conflict.

From a more practical or applicational point of view, the
research here reviewed reminds us again that no matter how good re-
search is, it cannot in and of itself be expected to eliminate or
prevent conflict. It can clarify the rules of the game so that we
know to what degree it is inevitable or inherent in social living;
it can help to calculate costs and payoffs of strategies; it can
show trends and it can present data. But if some particular strate-
gy -- war, let us say, or violence seems to one party in a conflict
situation to be its best bet, even with all the research data
available with respect to the payoff, there is little likelihood
that such a strategy will not be used. Technology may make the
payoff of war so exorbitant that it may cease to be judged good
strategy in any situation; and social-science research may demonstrate
this fact. But research cannot determine policy. It can, however,
in spite of the difficulties Williams has clarified, enlighten poli-
cy-makers, so that decisions are made with the fullest possible
knowledge.¹

This chapter has emphasized the sociological approach to
conflict, with only minor consideration of the psychological, ex-
cept as it was embodied in the tensions approach, and with no
attention at all to politico-historical factors. We turn then, in
the following chapter to a discussion of the psychological approach
to the study of conflict, and then to a more focussed study of
war, within a political and historical setting.

¹ When the Supreme Court was thinking through its decision on
elementary school segregation in the United States, the research
data which the previous decades had made available was mobilized
and submitted for its consideration. These data undoubtedly
contributed to the Court's decision.
The sociological conceptualization of conflict is in terms of systems with mutually incompatible goals or values, so that accommodation involves costs of some kind or other. Research in this area has been both formal, mathematical, and deductive on the one hand, and substantive and descriptive on the other.

The scientific study of strategy in sociological conflict is not yet highly advanced. Of all the research work now being done, the kind which seems to hold greatest promise for a genuine sociology of conflict is that of the mathematicians and economists in the so-called theory of games of strategy. So far only the simplest models have been satisfactorily handled by this theory, but if sociologists can learn to state their problems in game-theory form, the mathematicians can probably work out ways of dealing with them. Indeed, one of the problems facing game theory at the present time is conceptual; mathematicians are asking in what direction they should push their researches. This seems to offer a genuine challenge to the sociologist.

In the area of research in face-to-face groups, both the social psychological and the sociological approaches to conflict find application.
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56. de BIE (Pierre). "Certain Psychological Aspects of Benelux". Int. Soc. Sci. B. 3(3), Autumn 1951: 540-552. International policy depends on leaders rather than on mass of people; view that increased contact or strong cultural affinity automatically leads to better understanding between groups not supported by this study.


60. DICKSON (Lenore) see. LUNDBERG (George) and DICKSON (Lenore) DE GRE (Gerard), DEUTSCH (Karl W.)


65. DUNN (Frederick S.). War and the Minds of Men. New York: Harper, 1950, xvi + 115 p. This is a study of "the efforts to minimize war by changing the attitudes of men" (xiv). A discussion of the strategy which lies in the "middle ground between the bargaining of diplomats and total war" (xii). UNESCO was based on a theory that wars begin in the minds of men; this is a study of how to change men's minds. Critique of UNESCO's philosophy and the dangers of its premises. Also a critique of the theory that mutual understanding can allay war (pp. 6-7).


94. FOREMAN (Paul) see HILL (Mozell) and FOREMAN (Paul)


76. GIBBS (Marion). Feudal Order. New York: Schuman, 1953.


96. HORKHEIMER (Max). "Sociological background of the Psychoanalytic Approach" in Ernst Simmel, ed. *Anti-Semitism as a Social Disease.* New York: International Universities Press, 1946, xxvii + 140 p. Contains a typology of anti-Semitism: (1) the born anti-Semite, (2) religious and philosophical anti-Semitism, (3) the backwoods or sectarian anti-Semite, (4) vanquished competitor, (5) Jew-baiter, and (6) fascist anti-Semite. Strategy must be varied according to the type.

97. HOVLAND (C. I.), LUMSDAINES (A. A.), and SHEFFIELD (F. D.). Experiments on Mass Communication. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1949, x + 345 p. This is Volume 3 of the "Studies in the Social Psychology in World War II." Is summarizes the results of studies by the American Army on effectiveness of mass media in transmitting information (good) changing attitudes (not so good), and creating motivation (not good).


45. HYMAN (Herbert), see CHRISTIANSEN (Björn), HYMAN (Herbert), and ROMMETVEIT (Ragnar).


103. JAHODA (Marie) and WEST (Patricia Salter). "Race Relations in Public Housing". *J.Soc.Issues*, 7(1 and 2), 1951: 132-139.


118. KNOWLES (K.G.J.C.). Strikes -- A Study in Industrial Conflict, with Special Reference to British Experience between 1911 and 1947. Oxford: Blackwell, 1952, xv + 330 p. An historical and analytical study of British strikes which concludes that the "causes" have changed from demands for union recognition to expressions of "social insecurity or frustration", which cannot wholly be met by management or union. "In so far as the root causes of strikes like outside the sphere of union and management control, detailed proposals or changes will have a limited effect" (p. xii). Strategy and tactics of strikes, pp. 6-13.


122. KOIVISTO (W.A.) "Value, Theory, and Fact in Industrial Sociology". Amer. J. Sociol. 58(6), May 1953: 564-572. Conflicting values are analyzed.


127. LASSWELL (Harold D.). The World Revolution of Our Time. A Framework for Basic Policy Research. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1951, vi + 66 p. This is the first of the Hoover Institute Studies and it lays down the pattern for future studies. It suggests two concepts or constructs, namely: (1) developmental constructs and (2) goal values. "A developmental construct characterizes a possible sequence of events running from a selected cross-section of the past to a cross-section of the future" (p.4). "The dignity of man is our concern", and eight values are pertinent: power, wealth, wellbeing, skill, enlightenment, affection, rectitude, and respect.


130. IEE (Shu Ching). "Agrarianism and Social Upheaval in China". Amer. J. Sociol., 56(6), May 1951: 511-518.


133. LERNER (Daniel) and LASSWELL (Harold D.). The Policy Sciences: Recent Developments in Scope and Method. Palo Alto: Stanford University Press, 1951. Pp. xiv + 344. This is one of the Hoover Institute Studies, whose purpose "is to shed light on the world revolution of our times and its consequences for world politics and national policy". The studies are made by "the Hoover Institute and Library on War, Revolution, and Peace as part of its research project on Revolution and the Development of International Relations (RADIR)". French translation. Les "Sciences de la Politique aux États Unis. Préface by R. ARON. Paris, Colin, 1951, xvi + 305 pp. The general pattern on which this research is based was laid out by Harold D. Lasswell, see item number 127, above.

134. LÉVY-STRAUSS (Claude). Race and History. Paris: UNESCO, 1952, 50 p. Cultural differences must be encouraged as a condition of human progress. Coalitions of differences are necessary also. They may be gotten by (1) increasing internal diversity, (2) admitting new partners, or (3) emergence of antagonistic political and social systems (p. 47). "... a state of disequilibrium ... is necessary for the biological and cultural survival of mankind" (p. 48).


143. LOVELL (Hugh G.). "The Pressure Lever in Mediation", Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 6(1), Oct. 1952: 20-30. On the basis of detailed analysis of two cases, author concludes that skill in human relationships was not an important factor in negotiation, probably because it is so widespread. He found "emotional factors relatively unimportant" (p. 29). Stylized interaction, as in poker, designed for effect was common (p. 29). Negotiators were
bound by organizational decisions, often contrary to their own attitudes (p. 29). The functions of the mediator seemed to be (1) direct efforts to persuade, (2) confidential mediator, and (3) control of the level of persuade used.


97. LUMSDAINE (A.A.), see HOVLAND (C.I.), LUMSDAINE (A.A.), and SHEFFIELD (F.D.).


148. MACIVER (R.M.). The More Perfect Union. New York: MacMillan, 1948, vi + 311 p. A specific discussion of strategy. Includes a typology of prejudiced people: (1) those for whom prejudice is the result of indoctrination, and (2) those for whom it is an outlet for tensions.


152. MARK (Max). "Nationalism versus Communism in Southeast Asia". Southw.Soc.Sci.Quart., 33(2), Sept. '52: 135-147. "Nationalism in Southeast Asia cannot be separated from social revolution. Social revolution is the creator and the raison d'être of nationalism. Communism is the form of social revolution in Southeast Asia. It is a particular type of communism, a type which will undergo 'nationalization' if not opposed by colonialism or its heirs and if not forcibly taken over by China, one which will become fully 'nationalized' if able to create the welfare state" (p. 146).

79. MARKOWITZ (Harry), see GOODMAN (Leo) and MARKOWITZ (Harry).


156. MCKEON (Richard), and RÖKKAH (Stein), editors. Democracy in a World of Tensions: A Symposium Prepared by UNESCO. Paris: United Nations, 1951, xviii + 540 p. Thirty-four social scientists discuss controversies over concepts of "democracy" and the results are analyzed by Arne Naess and Stein Rokkan. A contribution to the study of the nature of ideological conflict.


248. MORGENSTERN (Oskar), see VON NEUMANN (John) and MORGENSTERN (Oskar).


172. MURPHY (Gardner). In the Minds of Men, The Study of Human Behavior and Social Tensions in India. New York: Basic Books Inc., 1953, xiv, 306 p. A report on the UNESCO studies conducted by several teams of Indian social scientists under the guidance of Professor MURPHY at the request of Government of India. Team leaders: Professor Pears RAM, Gujboot University, Professor C.N. VAKIL, Bombay University, Professor R.K. MUKERJEE and Kali PRASAD, Lucknow University; Professor H. PUATI, Patna University; Dr. G.S. GUHA, Government Department of Anthropology, Calcutta; Dr. Komla CHOWDRY and Mr. Ishwar DAYAL, Ahmedabad Textile Industry Research Association.

175. MURPHY (Gardner), see RAM (Pars) and MURPHY (G.)


238. NISHIMOTO (Richard S.) see THOMAS (Dorothy S.); and NISHIMOTO (Richard S.).


182. NUMELIN (Ragnar). The Beginnings of Diplomacy: A Sociological Study of Intertribal and International Relations. New York: Philosophical Library, 1950, 372 p. Chapter 5, on "War Contact", attacks the theory of primitive man as always warlike. "Savages at a low stage of civilization rarely regard war as a means of looting, still less do they aim at permanent conquest. They wage war to settle their disputes, to take revenge for wrongs, real or imagined, inflicted on them" (p. 105).


188. PATerson (T.T.) and WILLETT (F.J.). "Unofficial Strike". Sociol. Rev. 43 (section 4), 1951: 57-94. A detailed description of a strike in a Scotch coal mine analyzed in terms of stresses and tensions.


195. RAM (Pars) and MURPHY (Gardner). "Recent Investigations of Hindu-Muslim Relations in India", Human Organization, 11(2), Summer 1952: 13-22.


28. RIEMER (Ruth), see BLOOM (Leonard) and RIEMER (Ruth).


156. ROKKAN (Stein), see McKENZIE (R.P.) and ROKKAN (Stein), editors.
45. ROMMETVEIT (Ragnar), see CHRISTIANSEN (Björn), HYMAN (Herbert), and ROMMETVEIT (Ragnar).


201-202. SCHRAMM (Wilbur), see RILEY (John W.) and SCHRAMM (Wilbur).


216. SHEFFIELD (F.D.) see HOVLAND (C.I.), LUMSDAINE (A.A.) and SHEFFIELD (F.D.).


218. SHEFFIELD (F.D.). see HOVLAND (C.I.), LUMSDAINE (A.A.) and SHEFFIELD (F.D.).


228. STEPHENSEN (R.M.). "Conflict and Control Functions of Humor". Amer. J. Sociol. 56(6), May 1951: 569-574.


234. STOUFFER (Samuel A.) and TOBY (Jackson). "Role Conflict and Personality". Amer.J.Sociol. 56(5), March 1951: 395-406.


236. TAWNEY (R.H.). Equality. London: Allen & Unwin, 1952, 285 p. Fourth edition, revised, of income and opportunities in Great Britain, concluding that the costs to one class have been more than compensated for by the benefits to another. Equality has not "cost" liberty.

104. TENEN (G.) see JAMES (H.E.O.) and TENEN (G.)


175. VAKIL (C.M.) see NAVAI (Manilal) and VAKIL (G.N.)


191. WEIL (M. Anne) see PLIGET (Jean) and WEIL (M. Anne)

| 101. | WEST (Patricia Salter), see JAHODA (Majore) and WEST. (Patricia Salter) |
| 242. | YARROW (Marian Radke) see TRANGER (Helen) and YARROW (Marian Radke). |
| 42. | Zander (Alvin), see CARTWRIGHT (Dorwin and ZANBER (Alvin)) |