

TRANSACTIONS OF THE FIFTH
WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

ACTES DU CINQUIÈME
CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

VOLUME I

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VOLUME I

THE SOCIOLOGISTS, THE POLICY-MAKERS AND THE PUBLIC
THE NATURE AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

LES SOCIOLOGUES, LES POLICY-MAKERS ET LE PUBLIC
NATURE ET PROBLÈMES DE LA THÉORIE SOCIOLOGIQUE

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EDITORIAL NOTE

Contained in this volume are original studies presented in the plenary sessions of the themes on The Sociologists, the Policy-makers and the Public and The Nature and Problems of Sociological Theory.

The Theme, *The Sociologists, the Policy-makers and the Public* is sub-divided into two parts:

I. Professor A. Sauvy's introductory essay concentrates on communications between the sociologists and the policy-makers. The national papers presented by Professor D. Ghosh (India), Professor R. Treves (Italy), Dr. A. Vratusa (Yugoslavia) and Dr. R. Weitz (Israel) illustrate concrete examples.

II. Professor E. Hughes' introductory essay deals with communications between the sociologists and the public and is followed by examples from Latin America (Professor F. Fernandes), The Netherlands (Professor S. Groenman), Poland (Professor J. Hochfeld) and Scandinavia (Professor T. Agersnap).

It is regretted that Professor D. Glass' paper on communications between sociologists and policy-makers in the United Kingdom was not available in time for inclusion in this volume.

The plenary session devoted to *The Nature and Problems of Sociological Theory* attempts to define the different types of sociological «explication» and to make an historical survey and estimation of their value. Mr. E. Gellner analyses concepts and society, Professor H. Lefebvre deals with Marx's thought in sociology, Professor A. K. Saran's paper criticises positivism in sociology, and certain theses on the role of historical method in the social sciences are explained by Professor P. Sorokin.

One working group for the first theme, and four for the second theme (Historical & Comparative Studies, Functionalism, Marxism and Models and Theory Formation) will use the papers of the plenary sessions as the starting point for their discussions. Some of the short papers of the working groups, together with a report on the proceedings, will be published after the Congress.

AVANT-PROPOS

Ce volume contient des études originales qui seront présentées au cours des séances plénières consacrées aux thèmes «les sociologues, les policy-makers et le public» et «la nature et les problèmes de la théorie sociologique».

Le premier thème fera l'objet de la séance plénière du dimanche 2 septembre. Le contact entre les sociologues et les politiques fait l'objet d'un rapport général présenté par le professeur A. Sauvy; les professeurs D. Ghosh, R. Treves, A. Vratusa et R. Weitz ont mis en relief divers aspects concrets de ce problème dans des rapports particuliers consacrés à l'expérience de l'Inde, l'Italie, la Yougoslavie et d'Israël. Le professeur E. Hughes est l'auteur d'un rapport général sur les relations des sociologues avec le public; des expériences concrètes empruntées aux pays scandinaves, à l'Amérique Latine, aux Pays-Bas et à la Pologne sont présentées par MM. les professeurs T. Agersnap, F. Fernandes, S. Groenman et J. Hochfeld.

Au cours de la matinée du mercredi 5 septembre aura lieu une séance plénière consacrée à différents types d'explication en sociologie et à leur considération historique et critique. Le rapport du professeur E. Gellner a pour objet l'analyse fonctionnelle de la réalité sociale, celui du professeur H. Lefebvre la pensée de Marx et la sociologie. Le professeur A. K. Saran présente un rapport relatif à quelques remarques critiques sur le positivisme en sociologie et le professeur P. Sorokin explique certaines thèses sur le rôle de la méthode historique en sciences sociales.

Les exposés qui se rattachent au premier thème majeur feront l'objet de discussions plus approfondies au cours de la journée du 3 septembre; ceux qui se rattachent au deuxième thème formeront le point de départ des discussions de quatre groupes de travail qui traiteront de l'explication historique de la sociologie, des hypothèses fondamentales et des méthodes d'investigation dans la sociologie marxiste contemporaine, des problèmes du fonctionnalisme et enfin du positivisme en sociologie.

N'ayant pu disposer en temps utile du texte du rapport du professeur D. Glass relatif aux contacts entre sociologues et «policy-makers» en Grande-Bretagne, il n'a malheureusement plus été possible de l'inclure dans un des deux premiers volumes de ces Actes du Cinquième Congrès Mondial de Sociologie.

Contents

EDITORIAL NOTE	V
AVANT-PROPOS	VII
THE SOCIOLOGISTS, THE POLICY-MAKERS AND THE PUBLIC	
LES SOCIOLOGUES, LES POLICY-MAKERS ET LE PUBLIC	
A. Sauvy, <i>Sociologues et politiques</i> <i>Exposé introductif</i>	3
D. Ghosh, <i>The Sociologist and the Policy-maker in India</i>	23
R. Treves, <i>Sociologists and Policy-makers in Italy</i>	33
A. Vratusa, <i>The Sociologists and the Policy-makers in Yugoslavia</i>	45
R. Weitz, <i>Sociologists and Policy-makers</i> <i>A Case Study of Agricultural Settlement in Israel</i>	59
E. C. Hughes, <i>Sociologists and the Public</i> <i>Introductory Essay</i>	77
T. Agersnap, <i>Sociology and the Public in the Scandinavian Countries</i>	87
F. Fernandes, <i>Sociologues et grand public au Brésil</i>	97
S. Groenman, <i>The Sociologists and the Public</i> <i>Observations concerning the Dutch Situation</i>	123
J. Hochfeld, <i>Sociology and the Public in Present-day Poland</i>	131

THE NATURE AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY
LA NATURE ET LES PROBLÈMES DE LA THÉORIE SOCIOLOGIQUE

R. König,	<i>The Nature and Problems of Sociological Theories</i> <i>Introductory Note</i>	147
E. Gellner,	<i>Concepts and Society</i>	153
H. Lefebvre,	<i>Marx et la sociologie</i> <i>La pensée de Marx en 1844</i>	185
A. K. Saran,	<i>Some Aspects of Positivism in Sociology</i> .	199
P. A. Sorokin,	<i>Theses on the Role of Historical Method in the Social Sciences</i>	235

THE SOCIOLOGISTS, THE POLICY-MAKERS
AND THE PUBLIC

LES SOCIOLOGUES, LES POLICY-MAKERS ET LE PUBLIC

SOCIOLOGUES ET POLITIQUES

Exposé introductif

A. SAUVY

Directeur de l'Institut national d'études démographiques, Paris

Avant d'entamer le sujet, je dois faire une remarque préliminaire:

Je me suis efforcé de raisonner de façon aussi générale que possible, en donnant des vues inspirées par ce que j'ai pu observer en divers pays. Cependant, je dois reconnaître que j'ai fatalement été inspiré surtout par le milieu qui m'environne et, notamment, par mon propre pays. L'exposé qui suit peut donc avoir besoin d'une certaine transposition, qui peut même être assez large pour les pays peu développés.

D'ailleurs, ces vues ne concernent pas, en principe, les pays de régime socialiste; et quand elles les concernent, le texte l'indique explicitement. Je n'ai pas approché de suffisamment près le comportement des hommes d'État de ces pays pour porter sur eux un jugement étendu et sans appel. Mais je suis heureux que des personnes de ces pays veuillent bien exposer quels rapports peuvent exister dans leur pays entre les sociologues et les politiques.

I. GÉNÉRALITÉS ET DÉFINITIONS

Le praticien responsable du pouvoir qu'est le politique a-t-il intérêt à faire appel au théoricien compétent qu'est le sociologue? Le fait-il et comment s'établissent leurs relations? Tel est le problème.

Appel à l'histoire

Il serait intéressant de procéder systématiquement à une étude historique sur le sujet, à condition, bien entendu, de donner au terme «sociologue», de formation récente, une signification assez large, qui serait plutôt orientée du côté de la «sagesse» et de la philosophie, avant les temps modernes.

En régime absolutiste, les rapports du politique et du sociologue sont ceux du souverain et de ses conseillers, lorsque ceux-ci ont quel-

que hauteur de vue. L'Histoire nous parle abondamment de tels conseillers, de «sages», plus ou moins heureux et plus ou moins suivis:

Si Egérie représente peut-être le sociologue «parfait» selon la légende, n'oublions pas son caractère surnaturel. Un peu plus tard, nous voyons Sénèque et Burrhus réussir assez mal auprès de Néron et nous n'en concevons pas trop d'amertume, parce que le corps des sociologues modernes se refusera énergiquement à considérer Narcisse comme un collègue.

Dans l'ère chrétienne, les conseillers sont le plus souvent inspirés de religion, ce qui donne à leur action sur le pouvoir une tournure très particulière, parfois opposée à la sociologie, telle que nous l'entendons.

Si le bon saint Eloi n'est guère connu que pour son intervention, du reste fort opportune, dans une question de détail vestimentaire, sans doute symbolique, on voit souvent les souverains regretter d'avoir fait appel à l'influence du pouvoir spirituel, même si leur déception est moins étendue que celle de Henri II, vis-à-vis de Thomas Becket.

En des temps laïques, on peut citer les relations de Voltaire avec Frédéric II, l'influence de Turgot sur Louis XVI, d'abord heureuse, puis efficacement combattue par les privilégiés, etc., etc.

Lorsque la monarchie cessa d'être absolue, le pouvoir appartenant à des ministres ou des chefs d'État, issus plus ou moins directement d'une consultation, dite populaire, c'est surtout l'influence de sociologues sur ces ministres qui fournit le champ d'étude qui nous intéresse. C'est seulement dans ce cas que je vais dorénavant me placer.

Il me faut d'abord définir le mieux possible les sociologues et les politiques et placer les uns et les autres dans leur milieu respectif.

En schématisant quelque peu, je décrirai ensuite les relations qu'ils ont entre eux et celles qu'ils pourraient avoir.

Définition du «politique»

Les «politiques» sont les hommes chargés des affaires de leur pays. Il faut donc entendre sous ce nom, avant tout, le chef de l'État, les membres du gouvernement (ministres, secrétaires d'État), et les parlementaires. Leur ensemble constitue ce qu'on appelle les Pouvoirs publics.

Dans une acception un peu plus large du terme «homme politique», on peut viser aussi les hommes à qui les membres du gouvernement délèguent une partie de leur pouvoir, membres des cabinets ministé-

riels, hauts commissaires, gouverneurs, hauts fonctionnaires bien que ceux-ci puissent, au contraire, jouer le rôle de conseillers. Par contre, les magistrats paraissent devoir être exclus, bien qu'ils aient le pouvoir judiciaire, car ils sont chargés d'interpréter les lois, non de diriger.

Dans une acception plus large encore, on pourrait comprendre aussi ceux qui, par leur pression sur le pouvoir directe ou par l'intermédiaire de l'opinion, commandent en partie la politique: groupes de pression, grands industriels, directeurs de journaux, agences de publicité de presse, etc.

Nous ne pensons cependant pas qu'il faille aller jusque là. Ces hommes ne sont pas chargés de la politique, telle n'est pas leur fonction. Le problème de leur action politique étant bien différent de celui qui nous préoccupe, nous les laisserons donc de côté, comme nous laisserons de côté les favorites ou autres familiers des hommes d'État, bien qu'ils aient souvent marqué la politique de leur empreinte.

Définition du sociologue

La définition du sociologue est plus difficile à donner que celle du politique, car le terme est ambigu. Dans une acception très restreinte, il faudrait ne voir que les professeurs de sociologie ou les chercheurs appointés à ce titre. Dans une conception large, on engloberait tous les hommes, car il est impossible de vivre en société, sans faire de sociologie.

Il ne nous paraît pas que le terme de sociologue doit, avant tout, s'appliquer à l'homme qui étudie scientifiquement la société. A ce titre, il doit être capable de juger mieux qu'un autre l'état d'esprit des citoyens et de prévoir les conséquences d'un acte du pouvoir (loi, décret, etc.), en particulier du point de vue des réactions humaines. Le sociologue «parfait» ne se tromperait jamais dans ces jugements. Faut-il en déduire que le sociologue «parfait» serait, en même temps, le politique parfait, si on le plaçait à la tête de l'État? Assurément non, car il y a des choix purement politiques. Expliquons-nous:

Le sociologue «parfait», s'il existait, n'aurait pas à annoncer si une mesure est politiquement bonne ou non, dans le sens le plus général du terme politique. Sa tâche consisterait essentiellement à juger si les conséquences qui découleront des mesures projetées seront bien conformes à ce qui en est attendu.

Supposons, par exemple, que, dans un pays, un gouvernement entende supprimer la peine de mort, en escomptant que cette mesure

humanitaire n'aura pas pour conséquence l'augmentation de la criminalité. Le sociologue «parfait» n'aura pas à prendre parti pour ou contre la peine de mort, mesure politique, mais il pourra juger si effectivement, la suppression projetée ne doit pas avoir d'effet défavorable sur la criminalité. La réponse peut naturellement varier, selon les pays et les circonstances.

En d'autres termes, le sociologue «parfait» jugerait si les actes du gouvernement répondront à l'attente de ceux qui les décident. Ainsi conçu, le rôle de sociologue apparaît clairement: s'il existait un sociologue «parfait», l'homme politique aurait tout intérêt à lui demander non ce qu'il convient de faire, mais quelle mesure est susceptible d'atteindre l'objectif qu'il se propose, de permettre un résultat déterminé. Ce sociologue «parfait» et quelque peu abstrait, pourrait donc conseiller utilement un gouvernement conservateur ou un gouvernement socialiste ou tout autre encore.

Certes, si ce sociologue «parfait» existait, on pourrait le juger capable non seulement de préciser les actes qui correspondent à telle ou telle politique (conservatrice, socialiste, etc.), mais même d'aller au delà et de juger quelle politique peut conduire à des objectifs qu'aucun politique ne conteste (richesse nationale, santé publique, etc.). Si ce sociologue, quasi divin, prenait le pouvoir, il ne pourrait l'exercer que de façon autoritaire.

Cette technocratie à l'état pur nous paraît d'autant plus à exclure que le sociologue «parfait» n'existe pas. On peut concevoir sans doute, un homme capable de prévoir assez bien les réactions d'une société, mieux en tous cas qu'un homme agissant de façon empirique (sans quoi il n'y aurait pas de problème), mais il serait dangereux ou plutôt utopique d'aller au delà.

Le sociologue non certes parfait, mais avisé et expérimenté que je vise, n'a pas étudié que la sociologie, dans le sens étroit du terme; il est nécessairement aussi économiste et même financier et naturellement politologue. Ne limitons pas, de ce côté, sa compétence, du moins pour le moment et admettons qu'elle embrasse l'ensemble des sciences humaines. L'essentiel est que ces divers domaines ou plutôt les divers aspects de ce vaste domaine qu'est la société soient étudiés de façon scientifique. C'est seulement au cours de l'exposé que j'aurai à établir quelques distinctions de compétences selon l'opportunité.

Le sociologue, ainsi défini, est un homme de pensée plus que d'action. On dira de lui, non sans quelque méfiance, que c'est un intellectuel ou un théoricien, même s'il a une grande expérience des hommes et des choses. Il exerce souvent une profession libérale, du domaine de sa science, professeur par exemple, mais il peut aussi

avoir une profession différente, qui lui laisse suffisamment de loisir pour l'étude et la réflexion.

Voici donc, à peu près définis, les deux hommes dont nous entendons étudier les rapports.

- L'homme politique est parvenu au pouvoir et cherche à l'exercer de la meilleure façon possible, combinant, et confondant souvent, le désir de faire progresser son pays et celui de conserver le pouvoir.

- Le sociologue a étudié sans passion, ni préjugé, le corps social et ses réactions et n'a pas de fonction propre, tout au moins de pouvoir.

Ces deux hommes sont pour le moment bien séparés et pourraient continuer à vivre chacun leur existence propre. Mais leurs deux existences peuvent aussi s'interférer. De quelle façon ?

Nous pouvons distinguer l'action du sociologue sur le politique et celle du politique sur le sociologue.

II. ACTION DU SOCIOLOGUE SUR LE POLITIQUE

De façon générale, lorsque quelqu'un fait appel à un expert, c'est que les choses vont mal dans un domaine particulier: on recourt aux services du plombier, quand il y a une fuite d'eau, de l'otorhinolaryngologue, quand on souffre de la gorge, du nez ou des oreilles, etc. Il ne faut donc pas nous étonner que les politiques aient un comportement analogue.

Mais il peut se faire aussi que les politiques fassent appel à un «sociologue» non pour recevoir ses avis, mais pour pouvoir placer le leur à l'abri d'une autorité reconnue.

Il s'agit donc pour le politique soit d'accroître son savoir, soit d'accroître son pouvoir. De toute façon, le politique ne fera appel à ce conseiller que lorsqu'il sera en difficulté ou craindra de l'être.

Quelles sortes de soucis peut éprouver un gouvernement ou un homme de gouvernement, quels sont les dangers qui le menacent ? Ils peuvent se rattacher, semble-t-il, à deux catégories:

a. *Difficultés techniques.* Le politique se trouve devant des problèmes embarrassants. S'il s'agit du domaine économique, les diverses erreurs ou insuffisances de politique se matérialisent souvent et se comptabilisent en termes financiers. Mais le politique peut voir plus loin et entendre prévenir de telles conséquences.

b. *Difficultés politiques.* Le risque essentiel, pour un gouvernement, est de perdre le pouvoir, soit par vote du Parlement ou par suffrage populaire, en régime démocratique, soit par émeute, conjuration,

coup d'État. Pour un ministre, le risque est aussi de se voir désavouer par celui qui l'a nommé ou d'être obligé de démissionner pour prévenir ce désaveu.

Quant au parlementaire, il redoute moins les difficultés techniques que les politiques. S'il est peu expert en une question, il peut toujours s'abstenir d'en parler et se référer, pour le vote, aux spécialistes de son groupe. Par contre, il est presque toujours hanté par la crainte de perdre son siège et peut s'entourer de conseils à cet effet.

Comme le ministre est, le plus souvent, parlementaire lui-même, nous pouvons, avec plus de fruit, nous limiter à son cas.

L'appel au technicien

Placé devant de telles difficultés, il est très peu probable que le politique fasse appel au concours du sociologue proprement dit, portant ce titre, c'est à dire du sociologue au sens étroit du mot. Ce n'est pas d'un «sage» qu'il pense avoir besoin, mais d'un technicien.

Il fera donc appel plutôt à l'économiste ou au juriste et aura même soin d'attirer leur attention sur un point précis. Parfois encore, le ministre fera appel à un homme réputé pour bien connaître, par exemple, les milieux ouvriers, les milieux agricoles ou médicaux, etc., ou encore, ce qui est loin d'être la même chose, pour avoir des relations et de l'influence dans ces milieux. Il s'agit donc toujours d'un «spécialiste».

A ma connaissance, il n'y a pas d'exemple qu'un membre d'un cabinet de ministre en France ait fait, dans l'arrêté de nomination, suivre son nom du terme de «sociologue». Ceci ne signifie naturellement pas qu'il n'y ait eu, souvent, dans l'entourage d'un ministre, des hommes ayant étudié la société, sous l'angle que nous avons décrit.

En dehors de ses collaborateurs permanents, le politique peut prendre des conseils ou des avis occasionnels: Il fera appel à un atomiste s'il se trouve devant une question d'énergie nucléaire, ou à un actuaire pour un calcul de retraites.

Les gouvernants actuels font parfois appel aux juristes, par exemple pour les aider à rédiger une constitution. Nous sommes encore bien loin de la sociologie.

Cette branche de la connaissance est, pour le moment, trop générale, trop diffuse pour apparaître aux yeux des hommes d'État comme une science, à plus forte raison comme une technique.

Le mal financier

Les souverains sûrs de leur pouvoir ont, dans le passé, souvent été aux prises avec cette sorte de difficulté. Elle se présente comme un mal vif, une menace immédiate. Placé devant celle-ci, le politique ne peut avoir l'idée de recourir à un sociologue, alors même que la cause du mal est d'ordre sociologique. Il lui faut, en effet, une solution immédiate, parfois un simple expédient. Certes le psychologue spécialisé pourra donner une idée de la façon la plus opportune pour trouver, par exemple, des prêteurs, mais il s'agit encore là d'une spécialisation vraiment poussée.

Il n'est pas étonnant par contre, que les hommes d'État aient si souvent eu recours, comme Louis XVI, à des banquiers. Necker avait certes suffisamment de connaissances pour mériter aujourd'hui le nom de sociologue («imparfait» assurément), mais ce n'est pas à ce titre qu'il fut nommé. La tâche qui lui était confiée consistait beaucoup moins à réformer la société qu'à conjurer le mal financier. Il était appelé, en somme, à agir sur le symptôme, et non sur les causes. Vu sous cet angle, l'expert est considéré quelque peu comme un magicien et c'est une sorte de sortilège qu'on attend de lui.

Il y a peu de temps encore, dans les états démocratiques évolués, une bonne partie de l'opinion était persuadée que, pour remettre les affaires financières du pays en ordre, il fallait nommer un banquier ministre des finances.

Avec le temps et de dures expériences aussi, l'opinion croit un peu moins au thaumaturge et se rappelle un peu plus la fameuse parole: «Faites-moi de bonne politique et je vous ferai de bonnes finances».

Du reste, dans les pays modernes, le mal financier aigu a changé d'aspect. Il ne concerne plus les finances intérieures, grâce au procédé appelé par pudeur «moyens de Trésorerie». Ceux-ci permettent de faire appel à la banque imprimeuse, de façon si indirecte qu'aucune objection de purisme monétaire ne peut s'élever. Mais, du même coup, le mal aigu se présente sous une autre forme; le plus souvent, il se transporte dans les finances extérieures, ce qui oblige à élargir l'horizon.

Cet élargissement est cependant loin d'être suffisant pour que les politiques aient recours, en cette circonstance, à un sociologue. Les conseils de celui-ci ressembleraient trop à ceux de l'oncle riche, sollicité par un neveu placé devant une dette criarde: Au lieu d'indiquer l'adresse d'un bon usurier, l'oncle conseille, en pareil cas, à son neveu d'adopter une vie moins dissipée et plus laborieuse.

Cet éloignement entre la finance et la sociologie a cependant besoin d'être quelque peu explicité.

Du libéralisme à la planification

Le libéralisme économique, dans sa doctrine idéale tout au moins, était le régime de la liquidité absolue. Le socialisme, au contraire, recherche les avantages et subit les inconvénients de la «solidité». Dans l'ordre libéral naturel, les équilibres doivent se réaliser automatiquement et, comme tout doit se traduire en monnaie, il n'y a finalement que des problèmes financiers. Pour bien écarter toute préoccupation psychologique sur le comportement de l'homme, les économistes classiques avaient créé un «homo oeconomicus», qui agissait, en quelque sorte, automatiquement lui aussi, sous la pression de ses intérêts économiques et financiers. L'économie se trouvait ainsi totalement détachée de la sociologie.

Bien que l'expérience ait montré l'étendue des déconvenues auxquelles conduit une telle conception et bien qu'il soit devenu une mode de la condamner, dans les manuels et ouvrages modernes, elle continue à inspirer assez largement la pensée économique, en raison de sa commodité.

D'importants efforts ont cependant été faits, depuis une génération, pour pousser la politique économique au dessus ou au delà de la comptabilité purement financière. Pendant la période de dépression, puis d'inflation, la politique économique s'est efforcée d'agir sur les prix. Poussant plus loin, elle s'est attachée, de plus en plus, au concept de production, utilisant, pour augmenter celle-ci, des moyens qui auraient été réprouvés par le libéral. Le chemin qui reste à franchir est important, puisque l'homme n'est encore qu'à peine en question.

L'homme est à vrai dire, un gêneur pour l'économiste. Il n'entre pas aussi bien que les choses dans les statistiques, ni dans les modèles:

a. N'étant pas une valeur marchande, puisque nous ne sommes pas en esclavage, il n'apparaît pas dans les comptes, même élargis sous forme de Comptes de la Nation. D'où prédominance apparente des questions financières.

b. Ses réactions sont aléatoires, parce qu'il est souvent poussé par des sentiments plus encore que par l'intérêt; d'ailleurs, devant un cas déterminé, il peut avoir de ses intérêts une conception différente de celle que lui attribuent les économistes.

Le sociologue et l'économiste

Ces considérations m'amènent, un peu à mon corps défendant, à établir, entre le sociologue et l'économiste, une distinction qui peut paraître malheureuse à certains. Mais il faut bien dire qu'elle existe, dans la pratique, et en tirer les enseignements qu'elle comporte.

Aux yeux du public, des parlementaires, des hommes d'État, l'économiste, même non financier, apparaît assez facilement comme un technicien. Comme ce technicien n'est pas toujours bien vu, comme il est même redouté, on accole souvent à son nom (en français) l'épithète de «distingué». Par ce moyen, le citoyen peut, tout en reconnaissant en partie la compétence de l'économiste, porter sur lui un jugement ironique et se décharger du sentiment de culpabilité qu'il sent monter en lui.

L'homme d'État avouera volontiers, surtout s'il s'adresse à un public populaire, qu'il n'est pas économiste et qu'il se méfie des hommes de cette sorte. Mais une fois cette libération accomplie, il embauchera volontiers, dans son cabinet, un homme réputé pour ses connaissances économiques, surtout si une étiquette spécialisée peut lui être attribuée.

Les conclusions qui lui seront présentées en langage économique, par ce conseiller ou par ses hauts fonctionnaires, le politique va-t-il les accepter telles quelles ? Non certainement ; «Je ne conteste pas la rigueur de vos chiffres, va-t-il dire à l'économiste, et sans doute aussi avez-vous raison dans les principes. Mais vos conclusions sont trop rigides, et quelque peu inhumaines ; je vais les adoucir, les rendre moins rugueuses et plus acceptables. La difficulté n'est pas de trouver la meilleure solution technique sur les choses, mais la solution qui s'en rapprochera le plus, tout en étant acceptée par les hommes». Cette attitude si fréquente, recueille l'adhésion de la majeure partie du public.

Dès lors, nous attendons l'entrée en action du sociologue. Il n'en est rien, parce qu'après avoir parlé ainsi, le politique ajoute, de façon cette fois plus discrète : «Or, les hommes, je les connais, ce n'est pas votre métier, monsieur le technicien économiste, mais c'est le mien, celui de l'homme politique». Ainsi, l'homme politique peut avouer quelque infériorité en économie, mais dès que la question se transporte sur le plan sociologique, il pense n'avoir plus besoin de personne.

Il n'est d'ailleurs pas le seul : Politiques ou non, les hommes ne croient pas avoir besoin de la science, dans ce domaine. Ceux même qui, dans leur idéologie ou leur programme politique, mettent la Science et la recherche scientifique au premier plan, poussant parfois

l'admiration jusqu'au culte, n'éprouvent aucun scrupule à attaquer des questions relevant des sciences humaines, avec les préjugés sentimentaux les plus dogmatiques.

A vrai dire, à l'exception peut-être de l'ermite dans sa solitude, tout homme fait dans la journée, et en toutes circonstances, de la sociologie; aucun ne reconnaît avoir besoin de leçons sur ce point et nombreux sont d'ailleurs ceux qui ne connaissent pas le mot.

Le mode de sélection des hommes politiques

Le politique va plus loin encore et affirme ou pense que s'il n'a aucunement besoin du sociologue, c'est que c'est précisément son métier, ou, du moins, sa compétence. S'il est parvenu au pouvoir, c'est justement grâce à sa connaissance des hommes; non seulement il a été reçu aux «examens» que sont les élections et les choix, mais il a une si longue pratique qu'il n'a pas besoin de maître.

La série de sélections successives qui porte un homme au pouvoir, en tous régimes, semble bien se faire, en effet, selon le critère de la connaissance des hommes. S'il s'agit d'un régime de démocratie occidentale, une série de sélections s'opère dans le même sens:

a. N'envisagent leur candidature que ceux qui pensent connaître les hommes et savoir ne pas leur déplaire.

b. L'élection elle-même est une épreuve, un examen, où il s'agit peut-être moins de connaître les matières traitées que de les présenter convenablement au collège électoral. Gagner la confiance populaire, en sachant éluder tant de questions embarrassantes exige de fortes aptitudes; le plus souvent, ce métier ne s'apprend pas dans une école, mais «sur le tas».

c. Il s'agit ensuite de s'élever au sein même du parlement et dans son propre parti. La connaissance technique de certains problèmes n'est jamais inutile, mais elle passe après l'art de séduire les hommes, de leur inspirer confiance et, tout au moins, de ne pas les heurter. De sorte que cette série de sélections peut, toujours dans la même optique, être considérée comme plus efficace que celle d'examens de sociologie.

Et, dans tout système politique différent, à moins qu'il ne soit basé sur la pure succession héréditaire, un phénomène analogue peut être constaté: Si un homme parvient, au sein d'une aristocratie, d'une oligarchie marchande ou d'un parti unique, à se hisser au poste suprême, c'est qu'il connaît les hommes et sait trouver leurs plus secrets ressorts.

Telle est, du moins, une opinion fort accréditée. Est-elle vérifiée par l'expérience ?

Le politique et le corps social

La sélection des hommes politiques ne se fait qu'en partie d'après leur aptitude à savoir s'adresser aux hommes. Le don de parole, voire de séduction, doit se distinguer de l'aptitude à agir. Plus d'un tribun, d'un orateur, s'est révélé un médiocre politique, une fois au gouvernement.

D'ailleurs la politique n'est pas seulement intérieure: Avoir des relations avec des diplomates et des hommes d'État étrangers est un problème assez différent de celui qui consiste à parler le mieux possible devant une foule, en mécontentant le moins possible ses électeurs.

Allons plus loin: la connaissance du corps électoral lui-même par l'homme politique, a subi de nombreux démentis. Toute révolution, toute vague de fond populaire surprend le pouvoir. Or, par sa sélection même et par les moyens dont il dispose, il devrait être convenablement informé.

L'homme politique au pouvoir encourt, quoi qu'il en pense et quoi qu'il en dise, un reproche essentiel: Il est séparé du peuple.

Le conditionnement du politique

Tout d'abord, une fois au gouvernement, il mène une vie de reclus: Comment en serait-il autrement pour qu'il accomplisse sa fonction ? Le bureau où il travaille avec des fonctionnaires le protège, la voiture où il se déplace l'isole au point qu'il ne lit même pas les affiches et n'entend pas de conversations spontanées. Tout le milieu environnant est conditionné. Cet homme ne lit pas les journaux, mais une revue de presse, préparée à son intention, selon des règles déterminées.

Il reçoit certes des personnes dans son bureau et s'entretient avec elles; mais ce sont des personnes sélectionnées, qui lui prodiguent à la fois des éloges globaux et des revendications bien localisées, parfois purement personnelles.

Les groupes de pression qui agissent sur lui sont, eux aussi, revendicatifs; en outre, ils font planer des menaces, directes ou nuancées. Si satisfaction ne leur est pas donnée, ils craignent, affirment-ils pudiquement, d'être débordés par leurs troupes ou par de plus violents

qu'eux. Leur patience et leur dévouement au pouvoir peuvent n'être plus d'aucune utilité. Parfois la menace est plus franche, plus directe. Elle porte sur une insurrection, des sabotages, sur une grève, une évasion de capitaux, etc. Il fait certes juger à leur valeur ces menaces et peser leurs chances de réalisation. Et, sur ce point aussi, d'importantes erreurs sont journalièrement commises.

Assurément, le politique ne reste pas enfermé dans son bureau; il est également animé du louable désir de se rendre compte sur place. Ministre, il va visiter des usines, des chantiers, des bateaux, des fermes. Parlementaire, il se rend dans sa circonscription. Mais, au cours de toutes ces visites, il trouve un milieu conditionné à son intention. Autour de lui, les hommes sont les uns dévoués, trop dévoués, les autres intéressés, trop intéressés.

Dès son arrivée dans sa région, à la gare, à l'aéroport, à l'entrée de la ville sur la route, l'homme politique est accueilli par des personnes dont il est bien permis de dire qu'elles ne constituent pas un échantillon représentatif de la population. Selon le thème général des conversations et suggestions, le politique est très aimé, très estimé dans sa circonscription. Toutefois, cette estime, lui dit-on, a besoin d'être consolidée; il lui faudrait absolument obtenir telle ou telle faveur, tel ou tel avantage pour tel ou tel secteur local, faute de quoi sa popularité pourrait être sérieusement compromise.

Au banquet du soir, se poursuivent les congratulations et les espoirs choisis, dans l'euphorie de ce genre de manifestation.

Nombreux ont été, en tous pays, les échecs ou erreurs d'hommes politiques, cependant de grande valeur, et qui se croyaient bien informés. Qu'on nous permette seulement de citer deux exemples et d'en tirer la leçon:

Après le traité de Munich, le gouvernement français a pris des mesures pour accroître la protection et relever l'économie fort défaillante jusque là. Effectivement, les résultats obtenus dépassèrent les prévisions les plus optimistes: en huit mois, fut enregistré un accroissement de 20 % pour la production industrielle, de 49 % pour les textiles, 36 % pour le bâtiment, etc. Or, pendant toute cette période, les rapports des directeurs locaux de la Banque de France soulignaient le marasme persistant des affaires.

Que s'était-il passé ?

Ces hommes ne voyaient que des quémandeurs, politiquement intéressés à faire valoir leurs difficultés. Soucieux d'attirer sur eux des crédits plutôt que des impôts, tous les groupes professionnels manifestaient bien entendu, un franc pessimisme sur la marche de leur secteur. Ces informations données par des directeurs locaux, en principe

bien informés, auraient pu suggérer des mesures politiques totalement à contretemps. En ce cas, heureusement, les choses renseignèrent mieux que les hommes.

L'autre exemple est plus direct encore; il s'agit cette fois d'accueil du politique par le corps social: Un homme d'État français de grande valeur et de grande réputation se rendit, il y a quelques années, dans une commune rurale, en période électorale. Accueil assez froid, au début de la réunion, puis clameurs et violences. Rentré chez lui à l'hôtel, il fut assailli avec son collaborateur, par une sorte de commando et jeté par la fenêtre, heureusement située au rez de chaussée. Il quitta la commune, au petit jour, presque clandestinement, pensant qu'il n'avait rien à escompter de bon de cette population. Or, quelques jours après, il obtint une forte majorité, dans cette même commune.

Comment expliquer ce résultat? La minorité agissante avait fait illusion; elle n'était pas le nombre et ne le représentait pas. Ajoutons qu'il n'y avait pas de femmes, parmi elle, non plus qu'à la réunion publique.

Le vote des femmes donne d'ailleurs lieu à de curieuses constatations: Les parlementaires, du moins en France et, dans leur grande majorité, ne se sont pas encore faits une bonne représentation du corps électoral, depuis qu'il a été plus que doublé par des personnes qui ne participent que très modérément aux campagnes électorales et aux manifestations extérieures. A un moindre degré, ils sous-estiment également l'importance des personnes âgées, de plus en plus nombreuses, mais souvent silencieuses elles aussi.

Malgré toutes les précautions dont il s'entoure, il est toujours très difficile à un homme de résister à l'impression donnée par un milieu, ou même à un courrier (toujours très peu représentatif). Les hommes du plus fort caractère se laissent impressionner par quelques lettres, vivantes, sincères, émouvantes, allant dans le même sens.

Les sondages d'opinion

L'application de cette technique fournit une intéressante matérialisation des rapports entre la politique et la sociologie, disons aussi entre le politique et le sociologue. Il faut naturellement supposer ces enquêtes conduites selon des règles aussi strictes que possible. Elles ont le grand avantage de toucher l'ensemble du corps électoral. Certes la population représentée par l'échantillon ne s'identifie pas avec celle qui se présentera aux urnes. Si l'enquête est très bien conduite,

l'échantillon consulté peut d'ailleurs représenter l'ensemble de la population mieux que l'ensemble des électeurs, en raison des abstentions lors du vote. Mais c'est celui-ci qu'il convient de connaître.

En outre, la réponse donnée par une personne à un questionnaire n'est pas identique à celle qu'elle donnera, en public, mais en secret, quelques jours plus tard; néanmoins, à coup sûr, l'approximation est très supérieure à celle du milieu sélectionné qui entoure le politique. L'erreur faible en général, pourrait peut-être être encore réduite, si l'enquêté répondait à l'enquêteur sans se découvrir, en plaçant un bulletin dans une urne.

Ce rapprochement des conditions matérielles entre les conditions de vote et le sondage préliminaire pourrait avoir une importance favorable sur la politique même. En mettant en évidence la supériorité de ce système en matière d'information sur celui de l'homme politique, il pourrait attirer, de façon plus générale, l'attention de celui-ci sur les moyens d'investigation sociologiques. Allons même plus loin: une rénovation profonde de la démocratie pourrait se produire le jour où l'ensemble des hommes serait plus familiarisé avec les notions de probabilité et d'échantillon représentatif.

Attitude et champ de vision du sociologue

Imaginons maintenant le sociologue, même très imparfait, placé devant le même problème que l'homme politique: Connaître le corps social et ses réactions. Sans disposer des moyens matériels de l'homme politique, il est mieux placé que lui pour juger, peut-être même parce qu'il ne dispose pas de ces moyens. Il vaut même mieux qu'il n'occupe aucun poste officiel et qu'il ne passe pas, dans le public, pour être le conseiller attitré du politique.

Non seulement il échappe, assez largement, à ce redoutable conditionnement (en quelque sorte matériel, bien qu'il s'agisse de personnes), mais il peut détacher son esprit, le placer dans l'état de parfaite indifférence, sans lequel il est à peu près impossible de ne pas verser dans quelque position commode, de ne pas dévier insensiblement, loin de l'arête aiguë et douloureuse de l'impartialité.

Il est certes difficile à quiconque, même à un sociologue averti, de rester dans un tel état, qui permet d'assurer à toute nouvelle information sûre, une réceptibilité parfaite, quelle que soit son orientation. Pour parvenir à cet état, pour en approcher tout au moins, il faut se livrer à un véritable entraînement, s'astreindre à une discipline sévère qui, par moments, devient insupportable par la solitude paradoxale

qu'elle entraîne. Dès l'instant en effet que des conditions exceptionnelles doivent être réalisées, l'homme qui s'efforce d'être le plus au courant des opinions et réactions humaines finit en effet par se trouver étrangement seul. Assurément et du seul fait de l'effroi provoqué par cette solitude, le sociologue ne saurait être « parfait », mais il peut tout au moins éviter les lourdes erreurs qui guettent l'homme politique. Je reviendrai sur ce point.

Quelle peut être, dans ces conditions, l'influence de tels hommes sur le politique ? Il est toujours fort difficile de l'apprécier. Il circule toujours, en de tels cas, des rumeurs d'autant plus difficiles à vérifier que les intéressés eux-mêmes peuvent éprouver des difficultés à bien connaître l'efficacité de la pensée de l'un sur l'action de l'autre.

Il arrive que des politiques s'assurent le concours, non officiel, d'un homme non spécialisé, chargé de les renseigner sur l'attitude des hommes à leur égard. Il y a, dans les circonscriptions électorales, par exemple, des hommes qui excellent à observer les courants d'opinion et à les mesurer. Mais ils ne portent pas le nom de sociologues. On peut aussi invoquer des exemples à un niveau beaucoup plus élevé ; citons le plus marquant de l'époque contemporaine :

Le cas de Jean Monnet

L'action en faveur de l'Europe des Six et du Marché commun a été décidée par des hommes politiques. Mais la marche à suivre a été indiquée aussi nettement que possible par un homme sans pouvoir : Jean Monnet. Je me garde ici, notez-le bien, de porter un jugement de valeur sur l'évolution qui en a résulté.

Jean Monnet ne portait pas le titre de sociologue, non plus d'ailleurs que celui d'économiste ou de politologue. C'est pourtant sur la société même qu'il a agi, non directement, tout au moins au début, mais par influence sur des hommes politiques et, notamment, sur M. R. Schuman auquel il a suggéré la Communauté du Charbon et de l'Acier. Bien d'autres suggestions ont été faites à cette époque et même à des dates très antérieures, en vue d'une unité de l'Europe ou de l'Europe occidentale. Seule celle-ci a réussi.

Si un tel exemple peut ne pas sembler adéquat à certains, c'est, une fois encore, par suite de l'ambiguïté qui s'attache au terme de sociologue. L'exemple est, en tous cas, le plus caractéristique que l'on puisse citer.

L'appel au sociologue «engagé»

Il peut arriver que le politique fasse appel au concours du sociologue et sollicite expressément son avis, non pour être informé et conseillé, mais pour renforcer sa propre autorité morale.

En ce cas, il choisit un homme (ou un groupe d'hommes) dont il connaisse à peu près à l'avance la réponse, en raison des préférences et sympathies qu'il éprouve. Il donnera alors à l'avis qu'il reçoit toute la publicité nécessaire.

Dans ce cas, on ne peut pas parler d'influence du sociologue sur le politique. La situation peut se comparer quelque peu à celle de Frédéric II qui, affirmait-il sans hypocrisie, décidait d'abord de conquérir les provinces qu'il convoitait et demandait ensuite à un juriste de trouver les justifications nécessaires.

Situation intermédiaire

La méthode peut être beaucoup plus nuancée qu'il n'est indiqué ci-dessus. Le sociologue auquel le politique fait appel peut être connu pour sa tendance générale, l'orientation de son esprit, sans que soit connue à l'avance la réponse au problème qui lui est soumis. Des études techniques sont parfois nécessaires, impliquant des collaborateurs, dont le choix est souvent laissé à la personne en question. Ce procédé, souvent utilisé, comporte une collaboration féconde entre le politique et un homme auquel il n'est pas interdit de donner le nom de sociologue.

Influence indirecte du sociologue sur le politique

Un autre cas mériterait une étude attentive; c'est l'influence que peut exercer le sociologue sur le politique par le canal d'autres personnes et, en particulier, de l'opinion.

Le cas le plus fréquent est celui de la presse. Il est peu de pays où l'on ne puisse citer l'influence exercée sur la politique et naturellement sur le politique par un homme disposant d'une tribune importante. Les exemples sont nombreux et divers. L'influence se fait alors de deux façons:

- ou bien le politique est plus ou moins séduit par la manière de voir et s'en inspire;
- ou bien le politique tient compte de l'influence du rédacteur sur l'opinion et s'en inspire.

Dans les deux cas, le débat se ramène une fois de plus à la délimitation du terme de «sociologue».

Conclusion

De l'exposé qui précède, et plus encore de l'examen des nombreux échecs subis par les politiques par manque d'information, de connaissances, on peut conclure que l'homme politique pourrait mieux exercer son métier non seulement en vue de l'intérêt du pays, mais dans la défense du sien propre. L'influence du sociologue sur le politique est, dans l'ensemble, insuffisante.

Il reste à voir maintenant quelle est l'influence du politique sur le sociologue.

III. ACTION DU POLITIQUE SUR LE SOCIOLOGUE

Cette influence peut exister, par réciprocité, lorsque s'établissent des rapports directs, dans les conditions exposées ci-dessus. Mais, le plus souvent, cette influence est indirecte, de sorte que nous pourrions plutôt parler de l'influence des doctrines politiques sur celui qui étudie la sociologie et particulièrement la sociologie politique.

Au cours de cet exposé, j'ai parlé de sociologue «parfait» et de sociologue totalement scientifique. Il faut maintenant pousser un peu la question.

Un homme inspiré par la seule expérience, par l'observation rationnelle et dégagé de tout dogme devrait être toujours prêt à modifier ses conceptions doctrinales, si les faits observés ne sont pas en accord avec ce que ces conceptions donnaient à prévoir. Il doit, par suite, être en perpétuel conflit intérieur, en révision continuelle de ses idées. Voilà une situation redoutable, non seulement parce qu'elle exige une discipline exceptionnelle, mais parce que nul n'est jamais certain d'avoir atteint cet état et que chacun se persuade facilement lui-même qu'il s'est soumis à toutes les rigueurs nécessaires à l'approche de la vérité.

Comme le corps et peut-être plus encore que lui, l'expert cherche le confort et, le plus souvent, ne peut s'en passer que très partiellement. Ce confort d'esprit s'accommode le plus souvent d'affectivité, de passion, c'est à dire d'une défense contre toute agression venue du dehors et susceptible d'apporter le trouble, le doute, la mobilité, c'est à dire en somme, l'inconfort.

D'autre part, du fait même qu'elle est très rare, une discipline trop rigoureuse conduit fatalement à un certain isolement, qui ne facilite pas les rapports sociaux et qui pourrait paradoxalement conduire à faire traiter d'asocial celui que s'est exercé scrupuleusement à étudier la société où il vit.

Les doctrines politiques, cristallisées le plus souvent par un parti, offrent au sociologue diverses positions de confort, en même temps que des possibilités d'amitié. Même si l'on tient pour négligeables les avantages matériels qui peuvent en résulter, l'agrément d'un conformisme relatif atteint une forte intensité. Je dis bien conformisme relatif; il est rare que le sociologue reste dans la primitivité d'un programme politique. Sur une infrastructure idéologique, acceptée une fois pour toutes, il édifie diverses constructions, parfois provisoires, dont le style peut lui être propre, mais dont les conclusions pratiques ne peuvent s'écarter d'une zone assez étroite et bien limitée. Souvent d'ailleurs, il s'abstient de pousser jusqu'à ces conclusions.

S'il y a des sociologues «engagés» ou, tout au moins apparentés à une idéologie politique, nombreux aussi semblent être — je parle toujours des pays de démocratie occidentale — ceux qui se veulent apolitiques ou dociles aux lois de l'impartialité. Un critère intéressant est alors de savoir s'ils acceptent, à certains moments, de défendre une position qui se heurte nettement à un courant d'opinion et risque de leur conférer une certaine impopularité et de leur fermer des portes. C'est le test décisif.

Bref, l'influence de la politique sur le sociologue est loin d'être négligeable, même lorsqu'aucun contact direct ne s'établit, même lorsque l'homme politique affecte une position d'indifférence, voire de mépris à l'égard de la sociologie et de ceux qui s'y adonnent.

IV. VUE D'ENSEMBLE ET CONCLUSION

La difficulté essentielle du sujet tient, nous l'avons vu, tout au long de l'exposé, au fait que la sociologie est une science qui attend encore, en quelque sorte, sa reconnaissance officielle. Si vaste est son domaine, si nombreuses les façons de l'aborder, si variées même sont, sur les points les plus simples, les réponses des hommes appelés sociologues, que cette reconnaissance officielle, générale, tarde à se manifester.

La médecine a mis, depuis la Renaissance, trois siècles au moins à acquérir l'esprit scientifique et l'autorité qui s'attache à une science reconnue. Nul ne pourrait prétendre qu'elle a achevé cette évolution. Et cependant, elle a toujours bénéficié plus ou moins de son appareil, et de son vocabulaire.

La sociologie n'a pas les mêmes recours et se trouve, il faut le dire nettement, attardée. Il ne faut donc pas s'étonner de voir que les rapports entre le sociologue et le politique soient loin d'être aussi bénéfiques pour la société qu'ils pourraient l'être dans un état idéal que nous n'avons pas de mal à imaginer.

Sans prétendre à quelque idéal utopique, on peut penser que de fortes améliorations pourraient se produire, au cours du siècle que nous parcourons. Mais gardons-nous, nous sociologues, de reprocher aux politiques les imperfections actuelles de la situation. C'est assurément une position commode, une attitude confortable, mais ce n'est pas une attitude de progrès. N'attendons pas que les politiques du monde entier ou même d'un seul pays se réunissent pour examiner avec sérénité comment ils pourraient améliorer leurs méthodes. C'est à nous qu'il appartient de rechercher ces moyens et, but plus précis encore, plus noble peut-être, de cultiver les voies qui peuvent, par notre influence éventuelle sur les politiques, contribuer au rapprochement des peuples.

THE SOCIOLOGIST AND THE POLICY-MAKER IN INDIA

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In this paper I shall deal almost wholly with the relations between the sociologist and the policy-maker, and make only incidental references to the relationship of the former to the public. My observations are based upon the contact I have had as a social scientist with policy-makers in my country, off and on, during the last thirty years.

I include in the category of policy-makers in India the ministers, the members of the Planning Commission and the higher echelon of civil servants. Beyond the ministers are the party, the Parliament and the public. These are the ultimate sources of policy. But policy decisions, in their final form, are made by ministers, singly and collectively. The Planning Commission in India is, in theory, an advisory body with no executive functions. In practice, however, its members influence policy decisions directly through their role as planners and indirectly through the supervision they exercise over planned expenditure. Moreover, the recommendations of a body of which the Prime Minister is the Chairman, and the Finance, Planning and Defence Ministers are members, must carry the weight of cabinet decisions. Lastly, though in theory the role of the civil service is to execute policies which have been decided upon by ministers, in practice, its senior members contribute significantly to policy-making. In any case, policies cannot be framed without elaborate preparation. This is the job of the administrator who may, consciously or unconsciously, select and arrange facts to support his own point of view. Besides, there must be few ministers who would not want to draw upon his long experience, and his understanding of the strength and weakness of administration to improve current policy or gather hints for a new policy. In fact, the bureaucrat in India has enjoyed, in recent years, more than the normal opportunity to influence policy-making. The responsibilities and functions of the state have expanded rapidly, and there has been considerable growth of large semi-autonomous public corporations usually under the management

of the civil servant. Legislation cannot fully deal with the diverse complex and dynamic issues that come up everyday, and large areas have to be left to administrative discretion. As the draft outline of the First Year Plan of India says, «At the highest level, the enunciation of policies and their execution shade into each other».

The opportunity which the Sociologist has to contribute to public policy in any country depends on a variety of factors of which probably the most important is the view taken of the role of the state in the life of the public. Even in the early days of authoritarian rule, the British administration limited its interference with the social life of the people to a few fields; it abolished, by law, obnoxious social customs like the *Suttee*; it suppressed criminal communities like the *Thugs*, and it made special provisions for the protection of tribal peoples. But latterly it lost courage and self-confidence and steadily developed an attitude of non-interference towards social problems, not only those which had their roots in the indigenous social structure, but others which were the product of its own policies. To give one example; its trade and transport policies ruined village industries, undermined the inter-dependence of rural classes, struck at the root of rural community life, led to large exodus of village population to cities, and the growth of slums and unplanned industrial centres. But the state owned no responsibility for these phenomena and showed no concern over them. Indeed, there was a general lack of interest in social issues except when they raised administrative problems.

Towards the end of foreign rule, the people's representatives acquired some political power, and laws like the one fixing the minimum age at marriage of boys and girls, were passed to deal with social problems. But these were sporadic attempts to deal with particular issues. There was little awareness of the inter-connexity of social institutions and no attempt to study the wider repercussions of specific measures of reform or to provide against their unwanted consequences.

The achievement of independence was followed by the inauguration of planning and the adoption of the ideal of the welfare state. The Indian Constitution includes a number of Directive Principles of state policy aimed at social objectives. In particular, it directs that the state shall strive to promote the welfare of the people by securing and protecting, as effectively as possible, a social order in which justice, social, economic, and political, shall inform all institutions of national life. The national Plans refer to social justice and social security, which again figure in the platforms of different political

parties. A separate Ministry of Community Development has been established to promote integrated rural development and a Central Social Welfare Board set up to assist voluntary agencies to organise welfare programmes for women and children and handicapped persons. The Home Ministry has administrative divisions to look after the welfare of backward peoples and tribes.

From this enumeration one would expect the sociologist in India to have, to-day, a good chance to contribute to public policy on social affairs. In fact, however, he has, as yet, played a small part in the planning effort. The proximate reason for this is to be found in the approach to planning in India. Planning is regarded very much a matter of economic development; the emphasis is, largely, on raising the income per capita of the people through increasingly larger investment. Indeed, planning is almost equated to an issue of saving and investment. According to the Draft Report on the First Five Year Plan «The scope of our planning is limited, in the first instance, to the public sector and to such developments in the private sector as follow directly from the investments in the public sector». (p. 3. op.cit.) Only the political and administrative conditions of planning are discussed at some length, and its technique is conceived in economic and administrative terms. There is nowhere a comprehensive view of the Indian social structure and its functioning; there is no analysis of the processes of social change, and of the problems they are creating, there are only *ad hoc* attempts to meet some of these through unco-ordinated social work.

To my mind the most important explanation of this state of affairs is the absence of scientific outlook on social affairs in India. That the structure of the Indian society, its values and institutions can be the subject of disinterested, objective and scientific study is an idea which is foreign to the majority of even educated Indians. There is, it is true, an increasing drift away from old ways and habits, a steady erosion of some of the older values under the pressure of changing circumstances. There are, here and there, open revolts too. But these are mere pockets, and by and large, the social changes that are taking place are unplanned and unguided.

Back of this, again, are two important factors. There is, first, the uncritical faith of many Indian leaders in the power of goodness to solve social problems, a faith which has its roots in Indian tradition. Social reforms have been the work of religious leaders from Buddha to Bhave. We have had as yet no Age Reason in our history. No man can, even to-day, lead a movement for reform in India on a purely intellectual thesis, he has to have the aura of moral leader-

ship if his ideas are to spread beyond small groups. Secondly, the large conservative element among the leaders have an unarticulated fear that a critical examination of Indian society may yield conclusions which will strengthen revolutionary forces. They have accepted political democracy, but they fight shy of social democracy. They have agreed to share the suffrage with the common man; but they find it difficult to readjust their social relations with the result that «political equality» and social distance exist side by side.

I would not, however, like the reader to gather from the statements I have made that there is no awareness to social problems in India. There is such awareness and on an expanding scale. There are innumerable organizations in the country interested in various aspects of social welfare work for the benefit of the weaker and the more vulnerable sections of the population. And there is a Central Social Welfare Board, set up by the Government to co-ordinate and supplement the work of these bodies. Besides, the government provides social services like education, health, housing etc. for the benefit of the population. But social welfare work, singly or in conjunction with social service, does not constitute social planning. The main concern of social planning is with the social structure and its functioning, and its chief objective is to modify, control and guide these in the desired direction. By contrast, the purpose of general social services is too broad and that of social Welfare work too narrow. A general raising of the quality of the people through education, health services etc. is basic to social planning, and there would always be sectors of society which will require special care. But, as I have said, the efforts on these two planes do not add up to social planning.

The second important factor bearing upon the work of the sociologist in relation to the policy-maker is the quality and character of the latter. A minister is not expected to be a specialist, but he should have enough general intelligence to size up the issues he has to handle and to use intelligently the advice that the specialist or the administrator may give him. Otherwise, either he will be taken in by charlatans, or he will defend his own ignorance by pooh-poohing the expert. I cannot recall without a smile my first meeting, a few years back, with a minister who was in a charge of an important programme. For nearly half an hour he held forth against men with university degrees. When he had finished, I asked him what suggestions he had to make on this score. As I had anticipated, he had none. I could quote other instances within my experience. The politicians from among whom policy-makers have been recruited in

India are, with some brilliant exceptions, not men of high intellectual calibre.

The chief responsibility for this is of recent Indian history. The vast majority of the men and the women who joined the freedom movement were marked by their passion for national freedom rather than by high intellectual capacity. This is, probably, inevitable in a revolutionary movement; the emphasis is on the participants' willingness to make sacrifices for the cause rather than on their capacity for intellectual analysis. Moreover, during the long years that they spent in the struggle, their education suffered seriously. Finally, the top-ranking leaders in Indian politics have failed to work harmoniously with persons who are nearly equal, if not equal, to them in capacity with the result that these have either stayed away from or left the government. Not only the Prime Minister at the centre, but, in quite a few states, the chief Ministers are not firsts among equals but firsts without seconds.

The result is that the specialist has a hard job putting his advice across to the policy-maker. If the former uses an over-simplified analysis, he offends the *amour propre* of the latter. On the other hand, if his analysis is elaborate, the latter feels baffled or bored. Again, if the specialist is bright and quick, he raises suspicion about the reliability of his recommendations. Some specialists, indeed, find the job of advising the policy-maker so tricky, that they prefer to make their recommendations through writing, public addresses and work in committees; and it is not unoften that the less able men become advisers. One even comes across social scientists who belittle their own sciences and boost «common sense» to the delight of the policy-makers and the discomfort of his colleagues.

The remarks that I have made about ministers apply to some members, at least, of the Planning Commission. In theory, the commission is an advisory body of the Cabinet. It should, therefore, consist of specialists in different aspects of planning. This was largely so when the Planning Commission was created. But in recent years the proportion of political appointees has been on the increase and the Planning Commission has to have Planning and Economic Advisers.

The next important group of policy-makers are the bureaucrats.

The Indian bureaucrat has a deservedly high reputation as administrator. He is honest, intelligent, and efficient. He enters service through competitive examination, goes through a well-defined course of training, shoulders responsibility from the beginning of his career and early learns to rely on his own judgement. He is well-paid; he has a secure job and with the passage of years he moves up, almost

automatically, to senior positions. He enjoys power over others in his official relations and prestige as a member of the upper social class. In course of time he comes to look upon his job as a vocation, the pursuit of which becomes for him the *summum bonum*. His functions are well-defined and, in good part, involve routine operations which he does efficiently. He is protected by the Government against public criticism, except when he commits an act of indefensible folly or misbehaviour, when he is quietly removed from the cadre. All this makes for bureaucratic efficiency, but it also tends to make the civil servant aloof, complacent and, in some measure, insensitive to the world outside his coterie.

Independence, the exit of the foreign members of the civil service, popular government, the increase of governmental activities, in particular, those in which the civil servant has to co-operate with the public have affected him. He is changing, he is less rigid and self-sufficient than before and more social in his public relations. Probably his mental horizon has expanded, or rather it is less firmly defined than formerly. He is less sure of himself, and more willing to listen to others, especially on technical problems.

But old traditions die hard. At least on social problems, the average civil servant's attitude and approach have not changed significantly. In the first place, he does not normally have a clear perception of these problems; and he does not want to attach much importance to them. I remember the visit of a senior civil servant to me some years back. He had dropped in to discuss. «The Social Implications of Technological Change», a subject on which he had been invited by some organisation to give an address. He knew rather vaguely that technological changes affected the life of a people in many ways. But he could not understand why one should worry about them. Social change and some measure of suffering and unrest were unavoidable prices for technological progress. But, in the long run, the social discord tended to lessen while the benefits of technological advance continued to mount up.

Secondly, as a person who handles problems on the spot, the civil servant feels that he is competent to work out their solution by himself. Some years back I met an officer concerned with the welfare of the rural people. I asked him the innocent question, viz, how far he got the people involved in his planning and work. He almost snapped at me and said: «I have studied and thought about their good. I know how it can be achieved. I do not see the need for consulting the people». This is an extreme case; but it reflects, though in rather strong colours, the working of the bureaucratic mind.

Finally, even if the bureaucrat admits that there is a social problem worth discussing, he tends to discuss it entirely in administrative terms. His sole concern is to discover the appropriate administrative set up and work it efficiently. All this is partly the result of the constant pressure on him to find short-term solutions to a variety of problems. He has no time for time-consuming analysis; in the course of his career he develops a positive dislike for it. But, in the nature of things, most short-term solutions can be, at best, administrative improvisations. But the civil servant is also handicapped by his training and the tradition of his service; the practice of dealing impersonally with human beings weakens his social perception and dries up his social sympathy.

It would, however, be absurd to say that a large body of intelligent men dealing, day in and day out, with concrete problems which touch upon human welfare are completely insensitive to their social significance. The civil servant in charge of, say, public health, education, or rural development in an under-developed country must be alive to the social situation responsible for high infant mortality, extensive illiteracy, the prevalence of factions and litigation in the village. He is also anxious to contribute what little he can to the solution of these problems. But lacking the training, the attitude and the time required to see these problems in the proper perspective, he tends to deal with them piecemeal, as isolated issues unrelated to the basic social structure. This is one of the reasons why the approach to social work in India is, in most instances, administrative, why there is so much social work and so little social planning. We have an eminent example of this in the Government of India publication *Social Welfare in India*. In a study of more than 350 pages, and 37 chapters, dealing with social work in various fields, not a single chapter has been devoted to the analysis of the Indian society, the strains to which it has been subjected in recent times and the changes it is undergoing. The result is that a good part of social work is to-day public charity. The same exclusive attention to administrative issues is, again, largely responsible for the failure of the Community Development Programme in India. The Programme was conceived as a comprehensive approach to an integrated development of the Indian village community. Obviously it required a careful analysis of rural society, the selection of a few areas for experiment and a cautious development on the basis of accumulating experience. The actual course of things was, however, very different; there were no preliminary sociological studies and in spite of admonitions by Indian and foreign social scientists, the government of India committed itself to cover

the vast sub-continent with development blocks by 1963. In the eyes of the administrators who have played the largest single role in the programme, the obstacles to the spread of the programme are administrative and financial only and its rate of progress is limited only by the amount of money that the Government can spend and the speed with which workers and development officers can be trained. There is no recognition of the fact that social change has its own time-table and its pace cannot be forced beyond narrow limits.

The final factor governing the relationship of the sociologist to the policy-maker is the sociologist himself, his competence as a scientist and his personal qualities. It is a delicate task for one who is a sociologist only in the broadest sense of the term to sit in judgment on professional sociologists. However, as Member Secretary of the Research Programme Committee of the Planning Commission I had some opportunity to see them in action. The main function of the Committee is to assist universities and research institutions to take up research on economic, social and political problems concerned with planning. The response of the sociologist to this opportunity during the period I served the committee was, by and large, poor. They submitted few projects and these were only remotely connected with social planning. There was no attempt by them to enlighten the public on its significance or press its importance on the government.

In my view a number of factors is responsible for this state of things. There is, in the first place, the character of Indian planning to which I have drawn attention; it is almost wholly economic and this may have made the sociologist feel that he is not wanted. But, secondly, the Indian sociologist himself is, in part, to blame. He seems to suffer from a kind of aversion to purposive social research. He is at home in descriptive studies, he has carried out elaborate enquiries into particular social institutions, e.g. kinship and caste. In recent years he has conducted extensive surveys of rural communities. And he has been, for quite some time, engaged in detailed anthropological studies of primitive societies in the country. These researches and investigations have helped a clearer understanding of social institutions and tribal peoples, and they should assist the policy-maker in framing the social policy of the government more intelligently. But something more than this is necessary, if the sociologist is to have impact on Indian social policy. Someone has to attempt a comprehensive view of the Indian social structure, interpret intelligently the changes it is undergoing and suggest ways and means by which further development can take place in the desired direction.

The task is an immensely difficult one but it has to be done if the claims of social planning are to get a hearing. Secondly, the sectional studies have to be carried out in such a manner as to yield conclusions of direct significance for the policy-maker. I have already given my assessment of the interest of the Indian policy-maker in social problems, his education and his frame of mind. These being given, the Indian sociologist will have to go more than half the way to meet him, he may have even to knock on his door. And finally the Indian sociologist has to assert his claims confidently. This is something which he has not been able to do, not at least as much as the Indian economist. The former has certainly a more difficult task to perform than the latter, but probably he is less sure of his conclusions, and has fewer short-cut remedies to offer. Perhaps his solutions are more fundamental and therefore less easy to present as concise and concrete formulae, which could appeal to the policy-maker. But whatever the reasons may be, the Indian sociologist normally takes a back seat in discussions on planning. The Planning Commission has a panel of economists to advise it on economic issues, but it has selected no body of sociologists to advise it on social problems.

SOCIOLOGISTS AND POLICY-MAKERS IN ITALY

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I

Studies and research work in the field of sociology in Italy were for a long time neglected and almost abandoned. Although in the last few years the number of projects has increased, generally speaking they are still in a position of relative set-back. Sociological research has not yet reached the high level of development that we can find in the other branches of Italian science and culture.

When we resolve to study the relations between sociologists and policy-makers in Italy, we cannot forget this situation and must consider two points as we inquire into the subject. First of all, I believe it necessary to point out that in Italy the extent of these relations is rather limited. There are important centres both in the political and economic spheres in which sociological studies and researches should be carried out. But as far as these centres are concerned, we cannot speak of relations between sociologists and policy-makers because sociological research is not undertaken and therefore the relations do not exist. Secondly, we must remember that in Italy sociologists cannot be classified in a true and real professional category because there are no schools of sociology, and no degrees or certificates in sociology are being given. When we speak of relations between sociologists and policy-makers in Italy, we cannot deal only with the few «free lecturers» teaching sociology in the universities. We must also take into consideration those who either carry out studies and sociological research or practise a sociological function, be they individuals or groups of research workers, or institutions or research work organizations.

After clarifying the above-mentioned points, I shall try to explain what the relations between sociologists and policy-makers appear to be in Italy. For this purpose I will use the results of an inquiry which has been carried out by the Associazione Italiana di Scienze Sociali along with the Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale. Such an inquiry has been made under my direction by a group of

scholars who have examined some of the main sectors in which the political power of our country is subdivided. In each sector they have considered a remarkable number of cases¹.

To give a certain order to my statements I will distinguish between these relations according to three different groups: 1. Relations in which the sociologist is in a position of autonomy and tries to influence the decisions of the policy-makers by means at his disposal; 2. Relations in which the sociologist is in a subordinate position and, being an instrument of the policy-maker, cannot influence the decisions of the policy-maker; 3. Relations in which the sociologist, although he is in a subordinate position, enjoys a certain autonomy and can exert his influence on the policy-maker with whom he is united by an institutionalized relationship.

This distinction of the three different groups of relationships is not at all absolute. The descriptions are simply indicative, as are the following examples.

II

We will consider first the relations between policy-makers and those sociologists of the new generation who enjoy a certain indepen-

¹ The results of this inquiry were presented and discussed in a meeting which took place at Ancona, November 4th and 5th, 1961. To the meeting were sent the contributions of the following scholars: S. Acquaviva, E. Albertoni, M. Allione, A. Anfossi, C. Antiochia, F. Barbano, G. M. Bertin, G. Bonazzi, G. Braga, D. A. Buzzi, A. Carbonaro, R. Catelani, F. Compagna, F. Demarchi, G. De Rita, L. Diena, A. Dumontel, F. Ferrarotti, G. Galasso, L. Gallino, O. Gavioli, G. Gozzer, P. Grasso, D. Greco, C. Mannucci, C. Marletti, G. A. Marselli, L. Mazzillo, A. Pagani, E. Pennati, F. Pitigliani, R. Rieser, M. Talamo, T. Tentori, V. Tomeo, N. Tranfaglia, C. Trevisan, F. Zaccone De Rossi.

For this report, I have made particular use of the following contributions: G. A. Marselli (Social Researches and Agricultural Reform), V. Tomeo (Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale), L. Diena (Società Umanitaria), F. Barbano, S. Dumontel, A. Carbonaro, R. Rieser (Parties and Trade Unions), F. Compagna, G. Galasso (Centres for the Formation of Public Opinion), F. Ferrarotti (Parliament), G. Gallino (Industry), A. Pagani (Local Administration), G. De Rita (Central Administration), T. Tentori (Organisms for the Development of Social and Cultural Activities), L. Cavalli (a Case of Indirect Utilization of the Results of Research Work in Genoa), A. Ardigò, G. Gozzer, F. Pitigliani (The School). A large number of the above mentioned contributions, along with my enlarged report, will be put together to form one or two volumes, to be published shortly.

dence. The theoretical sociologist, detached from practical life, was a person rather popular in Italian culture of the last century. Nowadays he has completely disappeared and the new sociologist, engaged in his research work (as an individual or as an organized group), feels the need to exert his influence upon the decisions of the policy-makers. Only in this way can the results of his inquiries be utilized so that social knowledge may become social action.

Two types of influence brought to bear by sociologists may be identified: social reform can result directly from their research, or statements of sociologists can influence the programs of organizations. An example made by the first case can be offered by sociologist who work with universities which, as such, devote themselves to scientific research. These institutions have great prestige and so can effectively influence the decisions of policy-makers. I refer, among others, to the Institute of Agricultural Politics and Economics of Portici which, as a university institution, devotes itself substantially to scientific research and keeps, at the same time, some relations with the Reformation Unions, Chambers of Commerce and city and provincial administrations in order to operate practically in Southern Italy. Professor Manlio Rossi Doria, Director of the Institute has emphatically stated his policy: «Agricultural Reformation and Action in Southern Italy».

An example of the second case may be offered to us by the program of the Study Centre of the Review, *Nord e Sud*, edited by Francesco Compagna. This Centre is particularly interested in the social problems of Southern Italy. The programme states: «We have the ambition to offer to the public and politicians an explanation of the data which helps to determine the situation in which we live. At the same time we have in mind to discuss the political implication of these kinds of problems and intend to suggest the political strategy which seems the most reasonable and profitable.»

The means by which the sociologists, who are in an autonomous position, try to influence the policy-makers can differ according to the cases. Some sociologists are successful in using personal pressure during informal contacts with policy-makers to obtain their cooperation. I remember, as an example, the group of Italian research workers which was formed and directed by the American sociologist, F. Friedmann. Around 1951, these men carried out some research work in the area of the town of Matera. Afterwards, they were asked to contribute their findings to two action programs. One was concerned with building a rural hamlet at La Martella, sponsored by UNRRA-CASAS. The other program was responsible for the parliamentary

bill «Colombo», which called for the complete elimination of Matera «stones», the grottos in which part of the population lived in a state of poverty.

In other cases the sociologists exert their influence upon the policy-makers with the help of pressure groups founded for this purpose. An example of such an organisation is the Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale. This Centre was opened in Milan in 1947, with a sociology section of its own. The Centre can be considered a real research organization. Since 1954, after the International Congress for Underdeveloped Areas, it has been exerting its influence on the central powers and the local boards. As a matter of fact, the Centre not only organizes meetings and congresses which help in weighing public opinion, but it has also established new organizations. Examples are: the Parliamentary Group for Social Defence which is composed of members of various parties from Parliament and the Senate, and the Lombard Centre of Health Education which is helped by branches of the Centre. As an influential research organization, the Centre has succeeded in pressuring Parliament to accept some of its principles for the reformation of penal procedure and in having the Government and local boards accept some of their suggestions for the reformation of psychiatric hospitals.

In other cases the sociologists exert their influence upon the policy-makers by their own example and action. These sociologists are active in organizations which are interested in social and cultural reform. I will limit myself to mention one which is perhaps the oldest, the Società Umanitaria, which arose in Milan in 1893 to fight against distress and unemployment. This Società is well known not only for its important inquiries about workers' housing, child mortality, strikes, lockouts and so on, but also for its activity in fields such as emigration, professional orientation, and adult education. Since the Società Umanitaria is both a research institute and an institute for Social work it has been able to exert its influence effectively on local and central powers.

Because I want to limit my discussion to recent years, I will mention only two examples. The research undertaken by the Società Umanitaria in 1953 about the working conditions in industry led, in 1955, to the constitution of the parliamentary commission for the study of these problems. Furthermore, I will mention that the inquiries made in 1957 about female labor conditions led to an act of Parliament which sanctioned the equality of wages for equal work for both men and women.

The ability to exert an influence on public powers by example

and action is not only easily perceived in the Società Umanitaria and similar organisations, but such influence is also perceived in individual sociologists who are engaged in research, as well as in practical work. I would like to mention, for example, a very well known man, Adriano Olivetti, the clever founder of the *Comunità* movement. In order that tighter relations could be maintained between researchworkers and centres of social and political decision, he not only publicized the services of each group and their need for cooperation through his review, but also tried to operate directly with the political parties, the trade unions, and the central power. During the last few years his movement has become politically important during national elections, and he himself has accepted a parliamentary seat.

I will also mention a less popular case, but one as meaningful as the preceding one. A group of students of Turin University, in July, 1960, began their inquiries in the Fiat car factories and foundries. Their aim was to find out the most important problems concerning the integration or non-integration of workmen in the factory social system of a productive business organization. After about six months, however, they felt the need for a practical utilization of the results of their inquiries. They turned to action by taking part in the political fight of the trade unions by drawing up leaflets about factory problems and the workers' claims. They also organized groups of workers to analyze the workshop situation so that they could plan the strategy necessary to accomplish their aims.

III

The second group of relationships (that in which the sociologist is in a subordinate position and is the instrument of the policy-makers) is substantially opposed to those of the previous group. Here we are dealing with a policy-maker who, although he has some interest in research work, is very jealous of his own power to make decisions and admits no limit and no interference in the power itself.

The examples of this second group of relations may be found in the fields in which the research is not carried out by sociologists but by policy-makers themselves. For the documentation and collection of data they make use of statistical offices or offices of other natures which work on contract. Some centres for the formation of public opinion, such as the newspapers, do some research themselves. The

policy-makers, who are editors and administrators, are responsible for the investigations. Radio and television use an office called «Opinion Service», which enjoys no autonomy since its research can only support the ideological and cultural ends fixed by the leaders.

Other examples of subordination and instrumentalization of research may be found in the political parties. The leaders are most interested in research which they can take advantage of, and fear at the same time, the information which will aid their adversaries. I will mention that, from some inquiries into the Italian Socialist Party, it appears that the several cultural and study committees formed by the leaders of this party do not work to suggest choices, but to validate the choices already made. In fact, a research institute which was formed in Milan by some leaders of the same party in 1960 did not play, during its short life, a sociological role so much as a political one. However, what I said does not necessarily mean that in the Italian Socialist Party we cannot find men who are fully aware of the usefulness and importance of autonomy in research work and inquiries. It is interesting to mention here an inquiry which was carried out in 1957 by a group of members and supporters of this party concerning the formal and functional structure of the party in the Milan section. The following words are contained in a letter that these researchers addressed to the secretary of the Milan section: «The group, through their action, should contribute to affirm and spread a habit of autonomous scientific participation in the general political life. To be clear, the group thinks that, in order to make their own contribution to the life of the party, they need not give up the scientific method of objective observation of reality».

What has been noticed about the Italian Socialist Party can also be noticed about other political parties and trade unions. In the trade unions and in their leaders, however, one can see generally a much better attitude toward research. Among other things, this is due to a greater decentralization of the trade unions' structure and to the trade unions' decisions which are mostly concerned with special situations. These ones need, from time to time, a precise knowledge and evaluation.

As for the Parliament, the situation is similar to that of the parties. From examining the parliamentary acts and from the answers that 140 Parliament members gave to a questionnaire which was prepared for this purpose, it appears that only a minority of them (15 %) has a clear conception of scientific sociological inquiry, or believes that such inquiries must be the basis for every choice and decision. On the contrary, the majority thinks that inquiries, especially parlia-

mentary inquiries, are ideological weapons for the forwarding of selfish ideas and convictions, or tactical means to gain time, or instruments to justify decisions which were previously taken. Of course this does not exclude the possibility that the parliamentary investigations are interpreted differently by those who order them to be carried out than by the investigators themselves.

A knowledge of parliamentary inquiries is very important in the history of social research in Italy. Errors in method and other deficiencies may be revealed, but nobody can deny the importance of the contribution they have made to the knowledge of the social reality in our country since the beginning. It will be enough to mention the Jacini agricultural inquiry which dates back to 1876.

Although the field of politics particularly has been considered in my discussion, we must not think that the phenomenon of the research worker being subordinated and his research being treated instrumentally is an exclusive feature of this field. We cannot forget that this phenomenon appeared very clearly in the field of industry between 1950-55, when the human relations doctrine had great popularity and prestige. According to the opinion of many people, this doctrine was a mere instrument in the hands of industrialists, not so much for the increase of incomes, as they said, as to strengthen them in the anti-trade unions fight. Industry was attracted to this doctrine because it lent itself admirably to manipulation. It can be summed up in this formula: "Give the Worker the feeling that he is a human being and he will stop causing you difficulties." We must admit that in these last few years the interest of the industrialists has moved from the human relations doctrine to the more actual problems of staff direction, relations with the trade unions, collective negotiations and so on. In fact, Italian industry is concerned with all things that go traditionally under the name of industrial relations in the Anglo-Saxon countries. We can say that this change has secured a greater autonomy for the researchers, even if the position of the sociologist in industry is rather precarious and his connection with the industrial structure reveals a fundamental weakness.

IV

The third and last group of relationships is the one in which the sociologist is in a subordinate position to the policy-maker, but in spite of which, he enjoys a certain autonomy. He can, in some cases, exert great influence upon his superior. For this reason we shall consider the local and central administration separately.

In the local administration we shall distinguish between the study offices and the research organizations. The former, even when they enjoy some autonomy, can hardly exert their influence upon the municipal and provincial administration on which they depend. Usually sociologists who work in these offices are forced to fight against the bureaucrats who are suspicious of any external interference. The sociologist cannot even find valid support in the administrators who are generally jealous of their own freedom of choice and decision. So it often happens that these sociologists perform a work of mere documentation about problems of little interest and do not aim at any operative work. Therefore, we can see that in these cases the research and the administrative activity proceed independently of each other, the former not being able to exert a noticeable influence upon the latter. The sociologist of the study office is satisfied with the performance of a mere descriptive activity, and the administration considers it sufficient for its own prestige that people are interested in the inquiries made by the studies' office and that the press writes about them.

The inquiry organizations, differently from the study offices, have a greater possibility of exerting an influence upon the public powers because they act in an almost autonomous way. This means that, once they have been constituted, they prepare the program and the instruments of their action without a further check from the promoting and financing corporations such as the municipality, province, savings banks, chambers of commerce and so on, whose direct or indirect influence is limited to a verification of the degree of their efficiency and utility. It is difficult to express an opinion on the amount of influence that these inquiry organizations can exert on the political centres, because almost all of them were formed recently and have not had time to prove their effectiveness. We might, however, consider the activity of one organization which was established some time ago, the Istituto di Ricerche Economiche e Sociali, founded in 1958 in Turin. We can observe that the Provincial Administration of this city has always followed the opinions provided by this Institute about single problems. The administration has also acted so that the Institute itself could intervene and make an effective contribution to the preliminary work for intermunicipal and regional plans of development.

As for the central administration, we can notice that recently it has intensified and extended remarkably its interventions in the social field. These interventions can be divided into three different groups: the ordinary interventions which are part of the normal

activity of the Ministries acting in this field, such as the Ministry of Works, Health, Education and so on; extraordinary interventions, which took place in recent years regarding workers' homes, Southern Italy development, and various new types of assistance; and finally, interventions engaged in the programming of future Italian development, such as school plans, agricultural plans, *piano verde*, and plans for the development of Sardinia.

To perform all these interventions, it is clear that the central administration and its subsidiary organizations must try to acquire an exact knowledge about the problems they face. Such knowledge is generally acquired in two different ways: either internally, through offices formed for this purpose, or by an external method. For the latter, those seeking information apply to independent experts and ask them not only for data which might verify their policy, but also for the clarification of difficult situations. The experts may be asked for the very formulation of hypotheses of intervention. It can be said that this is usually the method that ministerial offices follow when they feel the need of renewing their activity, leaving the bureaucratic routine for more complicated interventions. This latter method is of particular interest since it leads to a type of «expert» relationship between the scholar and the politician; it also leads to the formation of the intermediary figure, the «technico-politico», whose duty is that of synthesizing the study of the research workers in order to define the lines of action of the public administration. The «technico-politico» is outside the administration and generally has personal, direct contact with the Minister, rather than institutionalized relations. For these reasons, relationships are not easy to define because they vary from case to case.

The sociologists acting in the study offices of the central administration are, with regard to their managers, in a situation similar to that of the sociologists acting in the study offices of local administration, or of other similar public or private organizations. Since their position is generally subordinate and sometimes precarious, they have few chances to markedly influence the decisions of the policy-makers.

V

The discussion of the three different types of relationships between the sociologist and those he works with emphasizes the diversity of his roles and the difficulty of utilizing the social research done in Italy. There can be no rules made for its use, so that each case must

be considered separately. Again I would like to mention some examples given on previous pages: the Colombo parliament act about Matera, promulgated after the inquiries performed by the Italian sociologists who were directed by Friedmann; the acceptance of some suggestions made by the Centro Nazionale di Prevenzione e Difesa Sociale for the reformation of the psychiatric hospitals; the bill for the equality of wages for both men and women, promulgated after an action performed by the Società Umanitaria.

In other cases, the utilization of the results of the inquiries may happen indirectly, that is, through the influence exerted upon public opinion which, in turn, urges the policy-makers to action. An example of this form of utilization of research can be offered by the events which followed an inquiry made in Genoa by a Centre of Social Inquiries about the slums in that town. Many Southern Italian immigrants used to live there in the utmost misery. The publication of the results of this inquiry, which aimed only to gather information, focused attention on the problems. Immediately great interest was aroused. The newspapers wrote about it, public opinion was moved. The parties and their representatives discussed the matter in the city council. Finally the competent local boards intervened with radical measures. Consequently, today the slums have almost disappeared from the town. But we must realize that nobody is willing to admit that the merit goes to those who organized and made the inquiry, who were the first to point out the problems and thus stimulate the slum-clearance. The party leaders and the public boardmanagers usually state that they have acted independently and maintain that the research work had no part in their actions. It exerted no influence because, among other things, results of the inquiry were not «conclusive», as is true for most modern inquiries.

In addition to the above-mentioned cases, there are many in which the results of the inquiries are not utilized, either directly or indirectly. I will explain what happened to an inquiry about the post-elementary school and the school for professional education in Calabria. This inquiry was promoted by the Ufficio Centri Didattici dependent of on the Ministry of Education and was made in cooperation with UNRRA CASAS which was particularly interested in the problems relating to the building of schools. The study took place in 1960, lasting several months and obtaining results of remarkable interest. These results, however, were in no way utilized by the sponsoring organizations, but were quite ignored. It is true that inquiries made in Calabria for the Ministry of Education were also never used to validate the changes proposed.

VI

What I have said so far, I think, has given a rough idea of the relations between the sociologists and policy-makers in Italy. I believe it advisable to add some indication of the view-points of the sociologists concerning these relationships, their fears, wishes and aspirations.

When we consider the whole problem of relations between sociologists and policy-makers, it is easy to realize that it is connected with a wider problem: that is the problem of relations between theory and practice, science and politics, men of culture and men of action. In the face of this wider problem we must recognize that the Italian intellectuals have in the last few years and after the sad experience of Fascism, agreed substantially that there is a danger that science and culture could be subdued to politics and have been searching for the best way to avoid such a danger. In this searching, various solutions have been proposed. I will mention the following: the intellectual who, not to betray the eternal values to which he is committed, takes no interest in the problems of practical life, retires into an ivory tower and affirms that the secret of his intellectuality lies in his disinterestedness and retirement; the intellectual who, not to betray the above-mentioned values, joins a party that he has chosen freely and commits himself to the political fight, trying to obtain success for his ideals; the intellectual who, for the same reasons, devotes himself exclusively to the performance of his academic duties, searches for the truth and proclaims it with sincerity and courage, knowing that by so doing he performs a useful work for society, and therefore a political work in a wider sense, not in the sense of «ordinary politics», but in that of «politics of culture».

My opinion on this point is that the optimum attitude of Italian sociologists should be to denounce the danger of sociology to becoming the slave of politicians, and also to declare their explicit opposition to the tendencies which aim at the isolation of the sociologist and at having him detached from the problems of practical life. As a matter of fact, most Italian sociologists favor participation and political commitment. It is easy to find in their writings some such statements. It is not as easy to understand if the participation and commitment to which they refer are to be understood in the sense of ordinary politics or in the wider sense of «politics of culture.» In my opinion, this difficulty is due to many reasons, not the least of which is the fact that in the field of sociology, as against what happens in other fields of knowledge, the distinction between «ordinary

politics» and the «politics of culture» is not yet precisely outlined. In fact, such a preoccupation, the concern for the politics of culture, could be the basis for autonomous scientific subject matter which has not yet emerged in Italy.

I hope that the imminent competition for full professorships in sociology, a new event in the history of the Italian Universities, will contribute efficaciously to strengthen this autonomous scientific trend and will lead, even in this field, to a better distinction between the politics of culture and ordinary politics.

THE SOCIOLOGISTS AND THE POLICY-MAKERS IN YUGOSLAVIA

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The task set in the new Yugoslavia, born in the course of the National Liberation War of 1941-1945, was not merely to lay the foundations of modern economic expansion and free the country from a position of semi-colonial dependence, but also to build up the machinery of democratic government on the foundations which had grown out of the socialist revolution. This, often enough meant the application of new methods, as yet untried. The task was because Socialism was to be developed in a country which was relatively backward, and also by the fact that after the war Yugoslavia had to endure additional economic and political difficulties caused mainly by the intervention of a variety of outside factors.

In this period of radical revolutionary changes, sociology did not develop as a separate scientific discipline in Yugoslavia. There were two reasons for this. First, there was the lack both of funds and personnel for organized research. Secondly, there were certain prejudices regarding sociology as such. The opinion also prevailed in some circles that the general marxian method adopted in the country might cover the needs of sociology as well. It is impossible to speak of any particular relationship between the sociologist and the policy-maker in this period. The two approaches were often enough combined in individuals who were simultaneously one and the other. What is more, the bulk of scientific analyzes and studies of this period were theoretical, or *ad hoc* generalizations based on actual studies by a core of responsible state and political personalities. They had, between the two wars, both in theory and in practice — in the main working under cover and sorely harassed by political oppression — strived to work out socialist ideas.

It was, without question, not before the last decade, with the increasingly profound re-fashioning of the Yugoslav community on the principles of workers' self-government, that a significant revival of sociology took place. It has, however, been only in the past five years that this discipline has been felt to be a branch of science as well as an important factor in the life of the community. It is only

as recently as this that one can, with any right, speak of a relationship between the sociologist as an independent scientist with his own independent institutions, methods and financial resources, and the policy-maker. For this reason the present communication refers mainly to this period.

I

A basic feature of the shaping of modern Yugoslavia is *scientific forecasting* and a planned development founded on the immediate economic and moral activity of the producer on the socially-owned means of production. A policy of this kind cannot be based *merely* or *exclusively* on one's wishes, still less on elemental forces, but must primarily be based on an objective, scientific assessment of social movements and relationships, as well as on a conscious shaping of social development. This means, therefore that the very system of society implies the absolute necessity of the scientific study of any changes in the social structure, of the development of the very framework of society, and certainly also of the development of the machinery of direct socialist democracy. This system is necessary in Yugoslavia since both the basic units of production, the enterprises and the basic social-economic territorial units of the community (the communes), and also all larger political-territorial communities, organizations and institutions develop their own policies independently. This must be done within a framework of rights and obligations laid down in the Constitution, in legislation and by their own statutes. A system so thoroughly decentralized can only function satisfactorily if every individual and every self-governing body is guided by both its own rights and obligations, and if the society as a whole has at hand sanctions to be applied against any who fails to respect the rights of others or any trend towards the establishment of privileges at the expense of those rights. From day to day the working of such machinery produces ever-new forms of relationship both between individuals and between one self-governing body and another. Under such conditions, all progressive factors in the society are interested in the elucidation of the truth concerning the social structure and the processes which are taking shape in the highly-proliferated mechanism of self-government. There is, hence, no room for that antagonism which results when a given political system restricts the work of a science in its efforts to search for truth. Indeed, one can go further. In this situation there is practically no limit to mutual con-

facts, cooperation and activity of the sociologist and the policy-maker at all levels, from the working collective of an enterprise or institution, all the way up to the federation as a whole. There are decisions to be taken, and a variety of mutual relationships also develop at all these levels. All these processes call for scientific research. Under such conditions it is no easy matter to separate the sociologist and the policy-maker as they both are very frequently in the situation to deal with problems from both aspects. Furthermore, in a country in which the trend — and that trend is one which has already given significant results — is for the broadest strata of the people to take an active part in decision-making, it would be unnatural were both sociologists and other scientists not active as members of various self-governing bodies. The reason is that in Yugoslavia, practice politics becomes a constituted part of the general creative efforts being made to build up a society by scientific methods.

In Yugoslavia, there is no antagonism between the sociologist and the policy-maker. There are none of those restrictions set up in a class society between those who research into the truths of society and the representatives of class relationships, whose very existence depends on the maintenance of inequalities and exploitation. Such a situation of course, does not mean that there are no problems, no contradictions, no disagreements concerning, first of all, practical matters. These are indeed inevitable in the process of building up a dynamic society as is found in Yugoslavia to-day. The ever-new changes in the economic and social system inevitable in such a development call for continuing scientific investigation. They require an ability of the highest degree to assess the views of the masses; they require political sensitivity, foreseeing the consequences of this or that measure; they demand elasticity in the application of any new measures, a power of adaptation and a readiness to accept criticism. This relationship takes the form of an unbroken process of criticism and discussion which is most dynamic, a process of agreement and disagreement, of dialectical resolution of contradictions in all fields, not merely in the science-politics relationship. Since the social developments of present-day Yugoslavia have resulted among others from the free, mutual and comparative action of both these factors, there has been none of those excesses or forms in the system which we today know generally as «Stalinism». With science and politics both influencing affairs in mutual interaction, thanks to lasting progressive economic and social developments, the Yugoslav system tends to insure the solution of contradictions in society in a progressive way. Science and politics are coupled with the simultaneous democratic

evolution of the decision-making bodies themselves from the workers' council of a factory up to the Federal People's Assembly, bringing science into all the problems and processes of society.

It is relationships of this sort that have determined the position and the development of sociology in Yugoslavia. The prime factor is that the society itself organized on the principles of social self-government, definitely creates the right «social climate» for free scientific research. Further, the unity of opposites of the interests of the individual and of the community, the public nature of governing, and the mutual activity which exists in the democratic supervision of the use made of socially-owned resources by individual collectives, are of significant importance. All go to create the conditions requisite for the development, presentation and dissemination of scientific truth, regardless of whether or not it impinges on the interests of any precise social grouping or stratum. Thirdly, the interest of the community as a whole, as well as of the individual working collectives in the development of science, is a guarantee of sufficient funds — within the framework of possibilities, of course — being set aside for the training of the scientific personnel required, and for expenditures necessary, to extend the network of scientific institutions. Consequently, in Yugoslavia, the relationship between the sociologist and the policy-maker is not determined solely by the practical requirements of day-by-day development of the country, but rather by the actual position which science enjoys as an independent activity in a country which has taken the road of conscious socialist development.

In regard to science, the 1958 *Programme* of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia declares: «Science is its own judge and the only decisive criterium of objective truth in the sphere of the findings of social science can be whether those findings do or do not factually correspond to reality, which in the last resort is checked by both social and scientific realities... Yugoslav communists claim no monopoly in that sphere, but stand for the further uninterrupted development of Marxism and its enrichment by ever more profound elucidation of objective reality.» But, if the rule ever held that true science cannot shut itself away in any sort of ivory tower, as a self-sufficient discipline, it certainly should do so in a country whose policies by their very nature should be based on scientific findings, on knowledge of those material factors which are the basis of men's mutual relations. Science must prescribe its own framework and directions. It should not merely describe and interpret phenomena and events, but also contribute to their modification, and to foresee further develop-

ment. Science should be free from the various pressures exerted on it, in some places, in the name of ideological or political interests, free from various prejudices and anything else which hampers its development. It should not, however, be neutral or unengaged regarding progress or research itself, or opinions which would be damaging in effect. This means concretely, that science cannot live apart from the realities within which it develops. In its own way it is a reflection of its period and the realities, the circumstances, in which it develops. This is particularly true of the social sciences, first and foremost of sociology, whose subject of investigation is the whole range of social relationships and the social set-up, as well as the institutions which men found and the processes which unfold in human society. This means that under these realistic conditions the position of the social sciences is precisely defined: it should lay bare those new trends which make for an increasing liberation of man, make for the creation and elaboration of such social relationships and institutions as may best enable man to reveal all his creative powers, both as producer and as manager. In all this the basic criterion is the validity of the discoveries and analyses of science, experience and truth checked by experience.

It is only in this sense, under Yugoslav conditions, that one can speak of science as being «engaged». It is only in this sense that we should understand any indication by Yugoslav political thought that it would be contrary to progress and in contradiction to science as such were we to put forward as a principle the idea that science should be neutral.

For this reason every true scientist, particularly the sociologist, cannot, under Yugoslav conditions, be but an opponent of anything that hinders concrete socialist developments, regardless of whether such hindrance comes from the forces of the past or from some practice or bureaucratic tendency in the social practice itself. In this sense, the sociologist cannot but be engaged in the further development of a socialist community. In this sense institutes and other scientific centres are not merely scientific research centres, but also most active rallying points of men fighting for the development of a socialist conscience and a new ethic.

In Yugoslavia, of course, nobody is any longer concerned about how to attain a socialist society, because this has already been development of that society, to find the inner prime movers of its achieved. The question is merely how, by what roads, to continue the further advance, to discover the basic economic, political and ethical factors of man's participation in that development. We must know

which trends in this process make for the true liberation of the human personality and which hold us back and make for stagnation and the preservation of existing relationships. All this requires a still more profound study of phenomena and relationship by the social sciences, both in the very foundations of society, and also in the superstructure. And since that foundation has undergone qualitative changes from those which existed in the old Yugoslav society, this calls further for the application of adequate scientific instruments and methods of analysis of the processes which are now unfolding on this new foundation.

II

These are the premises on which, particularly of late, the cooperation of sociologist and the policy-making bodies of social self-management and other decision-making bodies at various levels has been developing in Yugoslavia. Those who lacked faith in the efficiency of the workers' councils, once maintained that the workers would ruin the factories because, allegedly, they would not be able to master the handling of such complicated machinery as that used in industrial production. In fact, the opposite proved to be the case. The workers — as soon as they began managing their enterprises independently — very rapidly grasped the truth that their own future, the prosperity of their respective collectives and also the advancement of their communes, were all primarily dependent on themselves, on their making the best possible use of the socially-owned means of production of which they had the management. Very little time passed before they found a way to link up with scientific institutions, just as these institutions found themselves increasingly prompted to seek the cooperation of the organs of workers' management. In the initial period, while all these matters were being decided somewhere at the centre, outside the reach of the people directly interested, the working collectives were not very interested in such cooperation, nor did it prove possible to excite the interest of the sociologists in such matters. Now, gradually, as it became evident that every individual worker and every working collective were the masters of their own fortunes in the Yugoslav community, their thirst grew for advancement in the technological processes of production. Simultaneously, they became interested in research into the relationship between men — research to be accomplished in partnership with sociologists, psychologists, economists, legal and

other expert advisers. There began to be a steady infiltration into the working collectives, an awareness that without scientific analyzes they could not even hope to make adequate decisions about matters of importance to them. This led to an increasingly frequent resort to institutes of sociology (and of course to other scientific institutes) for aid in the solution of day-to-day problems which confronted the enterprise, such as problems of planning, of information, of inner-enterprise communication, of labour relations, of the principles governing the definition of labour units, problems of how to allocate revenues, and so forth. At the same time the field of inquiry and initiative on the part of institutions regarding research work inside working collectives in industry, in the communes, in a variety of self-governing bodies, in town and country-side, in the family and in all manner of social groupings began to be constantly extended.

Examples could be evinced of sociological research which was at the same time direct engagement in public affairs. One instance is the research conducted by the Belgrade Institute of Social Sciences into the handling of revenue by the Natron Works of Doboï in the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, a task undertaken jointly with the Association of Yugoslav Trade Unions. The Association was investigating the same complex problems primarily from the standpoint of what line to take in the application of such principles in practice.

Leading political factors support and indeed prompt such activities and such cooperation. Indeed, they go further, and definitively call on sociologists to engage in such work.

Sociologists and other social scientists have the opportunity of exerting a direct influence on political decisions, especially those regarding the organization of society that is, the setting-up of social and other such public institutions in Yugoslavia, not merely sociologists.

Anybody interested in these questions enjoys every opportunity not merely of having his say on such matters, but also of playing an active part in the drafting of any measures and in the application of such measures. There has not been a single law of any importance, either at the federal or at republic level, which has not benefited from the views of scientific and professional organizations and also of individuals. While legislation and other such matters are in preparation, particularly if the measures are of decisive importance for the further development of the country, the views of the most competent scientists and of representatives of occupational and social organizations are regularly sought. What is more, wherever possible in such cases, preliminary tests are carried out in individual collec-

tives, or services which scientifically record the phenomena which result from the application of the proposed measures.

Thus, for instance, before workers' management in industry was introduced in 1950, in a few dozen enterprises, selected as being at various stages of development, the relationships and trends which arose under the proposed new management conditions were assayed. The same procedure was adopted in 1955 when the system of municipal self-government was to be reorganized and again in 1960 when there was to be a transfer from the system of fixing wages in industry administratively to the system of income distribution by the working collectives themselves on the basis of work results. The same method of experimental approach was adopted when preparations began for a new constitution in 1960. On all these occasions numerous institutes and dozens of legal experts, economists, sociologists, psychologists and mathematicians were engaged in analyzes, in the working out and classification of data, in drafting the necessary texts and so forth. They also made practical observations at the social level, in order to elucidate any financial, sociological, or psychological material of consequence which at any particular stage was likely to give rise to difficulty. This method of working is not invariably the most speedy, but it is always much more efficacious, natural and healthy than any method which the most highly qualified of administrative machines could achieve from a single centre. The examples reported here reply eloquently to the question of what the policy-maker asks from the sociologist in Yugoslavia, and what are the «most useful» activities of the sociologist from the point of view of the everyday political practice in the country.

This engagement of sociologists in political science is, of course, only one part of their work—and not the most important—in Yugoslavia. Every branch of science has its own programme of work and research. For instance, the sociologists have drawn up a plan to develop sociology, sociological research and institutions teaching sociology, with their own scientific and teaching programmes. Within this framework sociologists and sociological research institutes make their contracts with any interested bodies (The Federal Scientific Research Pool, representative bodies, trade unions, communes, enterprises and the Socialist Alliance) in the research field of applied sociology and in the sphere of scientific theory as well as formation of new scientific cadres. Having all that in mind, sociologists in Yugoslavia develop their research work above all in the following directions and fields of enquiry:

1. Self-government as the basis principle of the political and so-

cial set-up of Yugoslavia; relationships inside working collectives in industry, public health, the humanities, the sciences and even the units of the state administration; and the functioning and prospects of development of selfgoverning organization, primarily from the standpoint of the position of the individual as a free personality in them.

2. The commune as a system of social and human relationships and as the basic economic-social unit of the society, where the individual's interests and those of the community as a whole are harmonized at the very foundations of society.

3. The basic premises of the social system which determine the social and economic position of the individual in society and the basic premises of the development of society as a whole. Here, for instance, one has to deal with problems of property, planning, of self-government in economic organizations, questions of income distribution according to work done in each enterprise and of income distribution between the working collectives and the whole community, problems of building up the community's capital basis, legality in the system of self-government, the speed and paths of development of the under-developed areas, relationships in a multi-national federal community, and so forth.

4. Social-economic developments and the social changes connected therewith, in particular the problems of urbanization, industrialization, problems of the family, of youth, of migration from country to town, contradictions between country and town between manual and intellectual work, and such matters.

5. The part played by political and other social organizations in the community in the system of social self-government as a whole.

6. Political and social systems in the world of today and their trends, characteristic phenomena and processes in the various social set-ups, the way in which social, economic and other changes are conditioned by the degree of development of the forces of production, the mutual conditioning of social economic development and the political consciousness of the citizen, the general problems and forms of democracy, and the social political role and organization and structure of the working-class of today.

The problem is to discover a suitable relation between the development of theory and research in the field of applied sociology. There are sociologists who are of the opinion that theoretical work is to some degree neglected, but the policy-makers feel that sociologists have to pay still more attention to concrete research work in existing problem areas.

The most important sociological institution in Yugoslavia, the Department of Sociology of the Institute of Social Sciences of Belgrade (founded in 1957) works first of all on the following general subjects: the social structure and mobility of the working class in Yugoslavia; trends in self-governing bodies and in discussions at their meetings; the position of the younger industrial workers in Bosnia; changes and trends in the life of the re-settled family; the working-class family in which the wife goes out to work; the social position and functions of the intellectual engaged in the arts in Yugoslavia; the development of the suburban rural family in the Belgrade district. Most of these subjects were placed on the agenda in 1959 or 1960 and results should be ready by the end of 1961 or by 1962. There also many research subjects handled on a smaller scale. Some results have already been published in the sociologists' journal *Sociology*. The Sociological Institute of Ljubljana University (founded in 1959) is also working on a number of subjects. It has played a part in research on the commune Skofija Loka (near Ljubljana) has been responsible for a number of other studies in the field of sociology of public opinion (radio-television, newspapers) or into research on leisure.

III

In the sphere of sociological research there are matters in Yugoslavia which defy overnight solution and go beyond the powers of scientific institutions and scientists alone. They are problems which call for the concern of the whole community.

The principal of these are:

1. *The problem of qualified cadres.* The hostility of the ruling circles of the old Yugoslavia to any research into social realities meant that the social sciences were unable to develop, least of all sociology. True, there were a certain number of sociologists, particularly among the progressive younger men, and there was some research concerned with the social aspect of some questions, but sociology as an organized, independent scientific discipline was non-existent. The fact that lectures on some subjects of sociology were given in some universities and that there existed some sociological associations does not essentially change this picture. Besides, many men then working in this field were killed in the People's Liberation War of 1941-1945, and the remainder were later absorbed mainly in practical work on building up the new Yugoslavia, particularly in the early post-war period. The few who did remain at their former work were hardly

sufficient to cope even with the basic organizational and teaching work involved. It was not until younger men came on from the universities and other institutions that, thanks to the efforts made by the community as a whole, a decisive advance was at last accomplished.

Institutes obtain new personnel primarily through public competition, or by arranging post-graduate studies for them. Most institutes organize part-time work for students, who may be men and women coming from industry or political life: Yugoslavia has two universities with departments of Sociology. In addition, lectures on sociology are offered by other faculties handling social sciences (law and economics) at various colleges and high schools. Two independent Institutes of Sociology are established and a journal of sociology regularly appears. There is also a sociologists' society, with a branch in each of the six Republics.

2. *Funds.* It would be a mistake to say that scientific research was neglected in the early period, yet it is true that while the foundations of industrialization were being laid, insufficient funds were set aside for the development of this science. This was in part because there simply was not the money available, but also partly because here and there the opinion prevailed that the building of factories came first. The situation, however, changed completely once factories and other institutions became directly interested in the development of scientific institutions and when these began to work as independent institutions whose revenues were dependent on the effectiveness of their work. In all these efforts an important part is played by the scientific research councils as institutions for coordinating and prompting scientific work. There are today beside a Federal Council of Scientific Research, such councils in each of the six Republics. There are also special funds for the advancement of scientific work which finance, totally or in part, the more important programmes of scientific research.

3. *Organization and Methodology.* The Institute of International Politics and Economy, the senior Institute in the field of social sciences, was founded in 1948, but most scientific institutes date from after 1955. Many of them are still coping with teething troubles, both on the side of staff and that of organization and work programmes. The predominant form of working is still individual, not teamwork, which alone would make it feasible to make use of all the technical and other tools available to modern science. Likewise, the organized teaming up of a number of institutes on one scientific project is only in its early stages. However, the Institute of Social Management

of Zagreb and the Department of Sociology of the Social Sciences Institute of Belgrade are now working together on a special programme: the Social Development of the village of Jalzabet. Steps are now being taken to ensure that other institutes and universities work together to a greater extent on subjects of this kind.

Despite these and other allied shortcomings, Yugoslav sociologists have nevertheless begun cooperation with institutes of sociological research abroad. Thus we have the Beograd and Ljubljana institutes which are planning to work together with Polish sociologists on the question of the processes of social structure which the municipality as a social complex manifests under the influence of socialist industrialization. The Institute of Social Sciences of Belgrade is working together with the Ecole Pratique des Hautes Etudes, de Paris (Section de Sociologie Coopérative) on a sociographical survey of the Smederevo Commune (near Belgrade).

There are shortcomings too in methods, actually felt more since new problems and new phenomena call for new corresponding improvement concerning both methodological and research techniques. This we see in research into workers' management, which puts the producer in a substantially new position *vis-à-vis* the means of production, in effect gradually ending the wage-labour nexus, establishing the integral personality of the worker through his right to a distribution of earnings on the basis of work performed. Here we have the gradual disappearance of the relationships produced by a system in which the owner of the means of production who regularly stands outside the production process (whether as private owner, a share capital company or the state) decides on the worker's lot, his remuneration, and so forth. Under the conditions of workers' self management, it is the producer himself who — once the needs of the larger community are satisfied — decides on the share-out of the enterprise's revenue into funds for development of the enterprise and the general standard of living on the one hand, and funds for personal remuneration on the other. We see completely new motives and aims of work coming to the fore. Under such conditions work becomes less and less a mere means to produce labour power and more a matter of management of the means of production by the free producer himself.

The same situation applies to research into the structure of communal self-government, which beside workers' management is the other basic feature of the Yugoslav system. The commune is the basic cell of the community, economically and socially, in which the machinery of social self-government resolves contradictions between

the individual and the general interest. Here members of the working collectives come face to face with problems of the general development of the productive forces in their area by creating revenue and by allocating that revenue to the financing of all the functions of the commune and also to raising the personal and general standards of living. It is from the commune that the whole superstructure of society springs, representing on the one hand the unity of the socialist community all the way to its overmost framework, the federation, and on the other hand making it possible for the working collectives to exercise an influence on the policy of the supreme organs, and, primarily through the councils of producers in the communes, the republics and the federation.

The socialist development of Yugoslavia has brought Yugoslav policy-makers as well as scientists, particularly those in the sphere of the social sciences, up against a number of very important questions in theory and ideas. These questions do not merely touch Yugoslav realities and experience, but are ever more insistently coming to the fore on a world scale. They represent an integrating part of phenomena owing, first of all, to the dynamic economic and structural changes of today's society on both national and international scales. The research in these fields of social science in Yugoslavia contributes to similar efforts of the scientists of other countries. It is also true that the existing political practice in Yugoslavia represents a contribution to the experiences in other countries and offers a very fruitful field for international scientific exchange and cooperation. Among areas of special interest are, for example, the question of the state in the transitional period and the role it plays in the building up of a socialist society; the problem of decentralization, that is, of the democratization of the management of production and the public services and the question of the concentration of material means to secure the most speedy and harmonious development of the forces of production and production itself; the problems of planning and directing production under conditions of self-government; the ways of liberating man and his work and the true humanization of the relationships between one man and another; the question of legality, i.e., of respect of the rights and duties of every person under conditions of social self-government; the problems of a socialist ethic, etc.

Fifteen years of experience of socialist development in Yugoslavia have furnished a wealth of material for concrete studies in all directions. Yet organized work of this sort is only in its beginnings. In this respect the initiative of the International Labour Organization has been extremely helpful, one of its publications, in 1961, providing

the most voluminous sifted information on workers' management in Yugoslavia so far available. There is indeed also a wealth of material in the Workers' Management Records Centre of the Yugoslav Association of Trade Unions. There are also similar centres in Zagreb and Ljubljana. Nevertheless, these treasuries of experience are still, in the main, inaccessible to policy-makers, as the material still awaits the hand of the scientist to sort, classify and analyse it.

The new way of handling these materials has brought with it much new terminology, new concepts, new categories and new institutions. These are steadily increasing in numbers, which is understandable enough in the absence of a suitable new terminology, and there has been much borrowing of terms for new institutions from the old systems. This makes it still more difficult to understand the true nature of many institutions, phenomena and relationships now being brought into being in Yugoslavia. A number of attempts have been made to systematize and classify the terminology, but so far without satisfactory results. What is the reason for this? Some suggest that Yugoslavia's social and economic expansion is so dynamic that there is no time to pause and give a moment's thought to it, to the road it has covered. Legal and other institutions in the Yugoslav social order change so rapidly that what is reality today becomes a matter of mere history by tomorrow. It is thought that, for these reasons, it is very difficult to make a proper analysis either of institutions or of trends. This, however, is only partially true. The real reason for the failure of such attempts hitherto has been the tendency, rather, to neglect analytical work to study the factors which were decisive in determining why the processes of social development took precisely this, and not some other, direction. But, is it not, after all, precisely the society which lives intensively and is developing dynamically that presents a fruitful subject for research? Having before him with equal clarity not only the present but also the past, the researcher surely has a favourable opportunity of clearly recognizing the basic factors and components of the social developments in question, their inter-relationship and their prospects.

SOCIOLOGISTS AND POLICY-MAKERS
A Case Study of Agricultural Settlement in Israel

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The incentive for the connection established by the Jewish Agency's Agricultural Settlement Department — which is the agricultural settlement institution in Israel — with sociological research, is the search for solutions to complicated social and communal problems with which we have been faced after the establishment of the State, mainly as a result of one basic fact: the mass absorption of new immigrants in the newly established and veteran agricultural settlements in the country. Already at the outset it became clear that the great experience acquired in the course of a long period of pioneering settlement activities before the establishment of the State would be able to fulfil its mission successfully only if we were able to balance the accumulation of agricultural-professional know-how with a parallel accumulation in the social and public sphere. Which road, however, leads to the practical effectuation of this conclusion?

The practical significance of this question was clear. And so it happened that after the Agricultural Settlement Department joined the circle of «customers» of the Israeli Sociologists who were all trainees of the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University, under the Chairmanship of Professor S. N. Eisenstadt, a reply to that question was sought from the two directions. At a meeting with the sociologists, both teachers and research workers, for the purpose of clarifying the problem, the key-question was posed: What actually do the policy makers expect when they propose to a sociologist to undertake a work of research in the sphere of agricultural settlement? Is it their purpose to arouse the curiosity of the Sociological research workers in regard to their own field of endeavour, so that the result will be «research for its own sake» alone, from which conclusions will be drawn separately, or is it their purpose to obtain conclusions and recommendations from the outset, while the research is in progress, in order that they may be assisted in laying down the overall and the day-to-day policy of effectuation? In connection with this question, and its various subsidiaries, a very

lively discussion arose¹. The group was divided in its opinions. One section tried to prove that sociology still hasn't sufficiently developed media at its disposal and that the research worker cannot give an undertaking to the party inviting research to supply conclusions and well-based practical recommendations. The other section argued that the well-developed and sufficiently tested means of sociological research are capable not only of carrying through research aiming mainly at the collection of facts and their analysis, from which one can draw conclusions and make recommendations for the party inviting research, but the research worker has it within his power to arrive at results enabling him to make well-founded prediction of future trends and developments. Such media and systems are being constantly improved while the work is in progress, just like other methods of research in the various fields of science.

To begin with, the policy makers did not take part in the discussions. However, with the amassing of experience and the closer cementing of ties, their attitude too was formulated in the light of Israeli experience. In their opinion the reply serves as a sort of bridge between the two apparently opposing attitudes, while clarifying the focal point as it is grasped by an outside observer.

But since the solution is unobtainable a priori and since it is possible to attain to it by the empirical way, it was decided to link the sociologists — with their agreement, understanding and willingness — to the staff of workers engaged in planning and in effectuating agricultural settlement in Israel. The short experience that has been gained since then proves that this method has borne fruit. A description of the general background conditions will be helpful to an understanding of the collaboration between the policy makers and the sociologists and later on also of the results and conclusions that were derived from such collaboration.

PERIOD OF GROPINGS AND DISAPPOINTMENTS

The absorption of new immigrants in agricultural settlement has right from the beginning been a very complicated and complex problem, both owing to the nature of the various forms of cooperative settlement that became crystallized over a long period of years before

¹ From a symposium arranged by the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University with the participation of the Author, on: «The Relations between the Sociologist and the Party Inviting the Work of Research».

the establishment of the State, as well as owing to the new and different character of the immigrants who arrived in this country after the establishment of the State. This difference is particularly outstanding in comparison with the generations of pioneers who had laid the foundations and who had crystallized the original forms of agricultural settlement in the country.

The three principal types of cooperative settlement in this country were crystallized during the pioneering period when at the centre of things there stood the aspirations of the settlers and their thirst for a new type of society, based on principles of equality, and essentially different from the type of Jewish society that existed in the townlets of Europe before World War I. Such yearning and longing lies at the foundation of the prohibition set on hired labour to which, in actual fact, the members of the various veteran settlements have not seen fit to renounce to this very day; it also lies at the basis of the equal division of the basic means of production and the nurturing of the ideal of manual labour and the worship as it were of the hoe.

The three existing forms in the veteran settlements differ in accordance with the grade of cooperation introduced in them. In the kibbutz form of settlement the collective foundation is the most dominant, and reaches over to almost every sphere of life and activity of the individual — in the sphere of production, consumption, education and recreation and, in a certain section of the kibbutz movement, it governs even the principle of ideological collectivism. From the kibbutz through the smallholder's cooperative settlement — the moshav shitufi — where the productive section is collective and the consumption-family section is separate, we pass over to a relatively smaller grade of cooperativeness, but which is nonetheless more pronounced when compared to the moshav. In the latter, cooperation is involved in certain sections of production and marketing whereas production and private consumption are relegated to the sphere of the family unit alone. With all this, however, these are cooperative settlements in which the understanding of the individual for the nature and effectiveness of the principles of collaboration and his readiness to make certain sacrifices for the benefit of the cooperative framework are criteria for his ability to integrate and to consolidate in this form.

Very soon, however, the agricultural policy makers in Israel realized that not one of the three forms of agricultural settlement are suitable to the *Weltanschauung*, form of life, traditions and aspirations of the new immigrants. At the same time, however, the moshav based on the defined cooperative lines served as a very comfortable framework for the implementation of planned settlement which is

effected by central institutions when the pre-requisite, as far as the individual is concerned, when he joins this voluntary framework is to harmonise the rights and duties of the members of the moshav. It is this seemingly obvious condition that caused the policy makers very serious difficulties, and gave rise to serious crises which, owing to insufficient information as to their causes and a proper understanding of their nature and significance, the settlement institutions which had from the outset trodden a well-defined path, were not in a position to solve. This became the principal incentive for a search of new ways and created the need for a scientific analysis of the process of settlement and laid special stress on a study of the forms of human conduct within it.

Not always is the overwhelming importance of the human factor in the advancement of agriculture, which, in my opinion, exceeds even the importance of the professional-agricultural factor duly recognised².

From this point of view special and unique conditions obtain in Israel.

The number of inhabitants in this country on the establishment of the State in 1948 was less than three-quarters of a million. Since the emergence of the State more than one-million people have immigrated to this country, a very appreciable proportion of them from under-developed countries in Africa and Asia. The social and ethnic composition of this country has changed drastically. On the establishment of the State the natives of Asia and Africa constituted only 9.8 % of the population; the natives of Europe and America — 54.8 %, while the remaining 35.4 % were born in this country their ethnical origin being mainly Western. At present, the Asian and African-born members of the population constitute about 30 % of the total residents of the country, those hailing from Europe and America — about 36 % and the locally born about 34 %. An appreciable part of the latter are of Afro-Asian ethnical origins. A certain proportion of the immigrants turned to agricultural settlement and so a very steep change resulted also in the composition and nature of the agricultural population. On the establishment of the State the Jewish agricultural population was for the most composed of settlers of Western origin (mainly European) whereas today the settlers from Oriental countries (Asia and Africa) constitute upwards of 50 % of the overall agricultural population in Israel. In the agricultural

² R. WEITZ, *La Scienza nel progresso economico dell'Agricoltura*. A lecture delivered in Rome on December 1, 1961.

settlements founded during the last 12 years the settlers from North Africa constitute 32.4 %, the immigrants from the Yemen 11.3 %, immigrants from Iraq and Persia 14 % and those from India, 4 %.

The social structure of the community in the countries of Asia and Africa is patriarchal and is based on the «Hamula» or on the extended family. The mode of life of the Western community, its organisation and its use of technological innovations is entirely foreign to these settlers who at times evince a sort of internal opposition to the Western mode of life. Research into this form of life and study of the social problems entailed in it have made it possible also in Israel to introduce changes and improvements into the organisation and structure of the agricultural settlements.

We must stress in particular that the solution that has been found does not lie within the scope of social research alone. Various systems of new settlement planning have been created, as well as new systems of organisation and implementation. In this article however, we are concerned with purely sociological problems so that we would deal with these alone.

We shall first give some concrete examples of case studies of social research which shed light on problems of agricultural settlement and then proceed to describe the organisation framework of the collaboration between policy makers and sociologists in this sphere.

Concrete Cases of Sociological Research bearing on Problems of Agricultural Settlement. There are in existence in Israel numerous agricultural settlements where the conditions of the soil, the climate and the means of production are similar, nonetheless some of them have reached a stage of prosperity and of appreciable attainments in production whereas others have failed to develop and their settlers can maintain themselves with only the utmost difficulty, having to eke out a living through emergency employment schemes. For a long time this phenomenon has been a source of surprise which one has failed to fathom. Let us quote one example. The two villages which we shall call A and B are situated side by side in the Negev region. Both of them were founded in 1953 by immigrants from North Africa who had come here from one and the same district. Both these settlements were described as settlements based on field crops. That is to say, the principle branch of production is industrial crops under irrigation. Both of them received the same means of production: an equal area under irrigation, an equal quantity of water, implements, poultry, etc. The two settlements have a similar number of farm

units — about 60. Yet, despite the great similarity in conditions of these two settlements their development has taken an entirely different trend.

Village A developed speedily. In the course of a relatively short period the settlers were able to adapt themselves to a life of agriculture; they were able to pick up the methods of production in vogue in this country and so their crops and their income rose from year to year.

Village B lags behind in its development to this very day. Only a few individuals from among the settlers have become producers. A section of the initial settlers have deserted the village and have gone over to other localities, while those who have remained behind, while still living in the village, earn a living mainly by doing outside work in the vicinity so that their holdings are neglected. At the end of 1960 only 48 families were living in the village and of these only 18 subsisted on work on their holdings alone. Eleven families cultivated their farms only partially and about half of their livelihood was derived from various works in the vicinity. About 19 families entirely neglected their farms and subsisted on various kinds of outside work.

The social research that was instituted into these two agricultural settlements set itself the goal of establishing the reason for this different development in each of the two villages and by what means it is possible to bring progress to the backward settlement. In the course of the examination it transpired that village A which is the progressive settlement, consists of a large percentage of linked families who have family ties with one another. Of the 60 families resident in the village in 1960, only eight families have no family connections and no relatives in the village. The remaining families have at least one related family there and for the most part had more than one related family in the same village.

On the other hand, in village B more than half of the individual families had no family connections with one another. The social examination proved that in village A the relationship between the families gives rise to a feeling of sociability, to a desire for mutual assistance and collaboration and that for the overwhelming part they are led by a stable and crystallised leadership which maintains close collaboration with the settlement institutions. For that reason the agricultural guidance proved very effective while the modern methods of cultivation received full understanding and appreciation. The village institutions were properly organized and conducted, the produce was marketed jointly and the families assisted one another. The traditional «Hamula» and patriarchal leadership leads the village

towards adaptation to the modern methods of agriculture. On the other hand in village B, in which the number of linked families is small, the settlers are not prepared to accept any central authority, the leaders of the small groups are at strife with one another and there is not one group among them that is capable of rallying around it an overwhelming number of settlers. For that reason there is here no possibility of effectively operating the village institutions and the lack of such organisation gives rise in the heart of the settlers to a feeling of dissatisfaction and to a non desire to cultivate their fields. Thus, every one of them looks for employment outside the farm and evinces no interest in agricultural guidance and instruction.

Such social examination brought the greatest benefit because it enables one to point to a certain solution in the case under examination and to assist in laying down the most desirable line of policy in regard to the composition of the settlers in other villages. In the case in question it was found that it is desirable to remove from the village a number of families and primarily those who have no ties of relationship in the village and in their stead to bring other families who have relatives in the village. In the event of this being impossible it is necessary to transfer to the village a central and crystallised «Hamula». Another interesting example³ may be quoted from a Moshav which has been defined by the staff of instructors as «good» from the social-economic point of view. Its settlers constituted a closely-knit rural community while still in their country of origin⁴. It may be assumed that this fact in no small measure determined the success of this settlement in its new surroundings but the sociological research revealed also other factors. The nature of employment of the settlers in the village has changed drastically. In their country of origin the principal economic branch in which they engaged was hand-weaving, petty trade and, in part, also agriculture.

The most important economic branches in the settlement today are fruit plantations, poultry raising and cultivation under irrigation. Such characteristic change has set in also in the distribution of the tasks within the family framework. In their village of origin the women mainly engaged in agriculture (in their own homesteads of course) whereas in the Israeli village the men who were formally weavers and traders have become farmers, leaving their wives to look after their homestead and their chicken runs. The sociological

³ Ovadia SHAPIRA, *Gadish, Sociological Report on a new immigrant village in the Jerusalem Mountains*. Internal Publication.

⁴ One of the countries in the Middle East.

analysis has accentuated the great importance that is to be attached to the internal change of forms and the continued development of the village. In their country of origin the lay leadership in the village had no institutional forms outside the custom of electing the head of the community by the heads of families, and that again by non-formal elections. It should be noted that even today after the introduction of a drastic change in the functional content and in the forms of the rise of the leadership, the struggle is still conducted over leadership positions between those two extended families (*hamulus*) which in the past used to supply the leaders of the community in their country of origin. At the same time, however, the most outstanding change lies in the fact that the representatives sent up by the communities are no longer the elders of the community but particularly young people who define themselves as standard-bearers of the process of modernization.

A successful solution of the problems connected with the functions of leadership has also insured the success of the settlement as a whole, and so we have been able to draw a very important conclusion through the material provided by the sociological research. It transpires that the properly conducted social life in the village does not always necessitate a full social homogeneity and is not connected particularly with the lack of crystallisation of a defined nature and with internal struggles. One can quote numerous examples to show that a relative stability of the social structure is in large measure connected with mutual integration of functional groups having need for one another in their daily activities. In the case of the village in question the segment between the young people and the older elements is cut by the criterion of extended families which necessitates identification between those belonging to different age groups. The dissemination of the focuses of struggle which is received by mutual dove-tailing and integration of various functional groups which, in addition, are divided according to various criteria, is the characteristic feature of the social structure in the *moshav*. It is that that makes possible in overwhelming measure its development and continuity.

The lack of a suitable understanding of this internal social structure may give rise to serious failures in every work of development. One must not bring any large measure of pressure from the outside to bear on social framework of this kind which will deprive the internal leadership of the possibility of leading the «*hamulas*» gradually to accept the modern methods of production and organisation. Badly considered pressure is likely to thwart all the efforts

exerted by the policy makers as is borne out by the following example: A certain village — village A —⁵ in the Galilee was settled by a community originating in a mountainous region in a certain Middle East country. The leader of this village was the same leader who had been acceptable by the community before its immigration to Israel. By chance, conditions of mutual respect and understanding were created between the settlement authority and the leader. It is the leader that stood at the head of the village and thanks to him the village prospered and began developing along proper lines, although the leadership was not conducted along the lines of democracy and cooperation usual in the veteran agricultural settlement in Israel. After a certain period a new group of agricultural instructors sent by the settlement institution came to the village. These instructors belonged to the second generation of veteran settlements in the country and were suitable for their jobs from the point of view of professional training and understanding of the methods and rules of rural development. However, they evinced no understanding for the peculiar mode of life that they found in the village and so began explaining to the settlers the principles of cooperative organisation according to which the moshav from which they hailed were being conducted and under which they had been brought up. They stressed the need of setting up a new village committee to be conducted in accordance with the accepted systems of cooperation. The attempt forcefully to introduce into this village and to enforce upon the settlers who had been used to an age-long tradition and form of life of their own, methods which were strange to them, led to a very serious upheaval. Within a short period this gave rise to strife among the settlers, to the failure of the whole of the internal leadership and to a general disintegration. The final result was that this village which had served as an example for a closely-knit and developing community and on which the settlement institution had pinned numerous and great hopes, became entirely undermined and deserted by its settlers.

Additional conclusions relating to the adaptation of various branches of agriculture and improvements in agricultural methods were also obtained from these sociological researches. Thus, for example, it transpired in certain cases that the settlers are not always inclined to act in accordance with the rational instructions on which the planning of settlements is based from its agricultural-economic points of view. Such planning may have been suitable for a

⁵ Internal Report by a team of sociologists.

certain human material possessed of ability and preparedness to come up to the demands of a modern agricultural economy. Reality, however, has shown that in supposition of this nature there is a great measure of simplification, at least so far as the special conditions of agricultural settlement in Israel are concerned. A simple and instructive example of same is the reaction of certain new settlers who were not prepared to thin out the fruit on the trees immediately after bloom, and shirked this work despite the fact that the plantation instructors had told them what great importance attaches to the thinning out of the fruit both as regards the future welfare of the trees and as regards the quality of the fruit. It was fully explained to them that serious damage is likely to accrue from a non-fulfilment of this agro-technical requirement, but in vain. An examination of the reasons for this opposition proved that the work of thinning out the fruit is thought of by the settlers as being opposed to their accepted traditions, and for that reason they were not prepared for reasons of economic-effectiveness to forego these principles. An additional example bears mention. In a certain village⁶ there arose during the first two years of its foundation, certain social problems that stem in many ways from the policy of the agricultural settlement department. During these years an attempt was made to entrust the fixing of budgets and credits into the hands of the local council. This attempt undermined the authority of the council in all other spheres so that the force of its leadership was weakened. When the experiment was finally shelved and the fixing of budgets was again relegated to the representative of the agricultural settlement department, the internal relations in the village again improved and its institutions began to function properly. Thus we learn from experience that the factor determining the internal leadership has certain limitations which require study and strict delineation. On the other hand there are numerous instances in which the system of handing over the internal distribution of the budget to the local council led to very positive results, in fact increasing the authority and the power of leadership of the local council.

The examples quoted here were merely intended to point to a very small section of a complicated and intricate problem: How is it possible to direct the activities of every agricultural nucleus, in other words, every farmer's family, towards an economic and civic end which is bound up with a change of systems, customs and organisation. Experience has shown that the social factor is the key to every

⁶ Sociological report on the Mountain Region.

economic development plan in agriculture, and that this factor cannot be deciphered without full and close collaboration between the sociologists, the policy makers and the implementors.

ORGANISING RESEARCH AND SOCIAL DIRECTION

Since it was recognised that the social factor has such decisive influence on the development of the rural economy, the ties between the sociologists, the policy makers, and the implementors were recognized and an organisational framework to deal with the problem was set up. There was established in Israel a Council for Social Affairs on which the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University and the Department for Agricultural Settlement of the Jewish Agency are represented. This council fixes the policy regarding social activity, the works of research that are to be carried out, discusses the conclusions stemming from the works of research carried out. The Agricultural Settlement Department acts in the agricultural settlements under its supervision in accordance with the recommendations of this council. The council has two chairmen — one a Professor of Sociology who heads the Department of Sociology of the Hebrew University and the other is the Director General of the Agricultural Settlement Department of the Jewish Agency, who serve jointly in this capacity. The council has two branches a theoretical-research arm composed of a team of research workers of the Hebrew University and a directive branch which is composed of regional sociologists of the Agricultural Settlement Department.

The research team engages in research and in thrashing out general basic problems such as: the influence of the demographic composition of the settlers on their adaptability to a rural economy; the influence of the various cultures on the economic and social development of the agricultural settlements; the accumulation of the theoretical agricultural know-how and the power of reception that characterises settlers of various communities and of different standards of culture; the cultural background of the settlers and the motivation in regard to agricultural life; the connection between the ethnic origins of the settlers and their adaptability and proclivity to certain branches of agriculture, etc.

The guiding and directing teams are linked within the implementing organisation of the Agricultural Settlement Department. They are headed by a head sociologist who acts as advisor to the Department's administration. The regional sociologists belong organizationally to

each organisational region of the Department and take part in the consultations of the regional administration. They receive their professional directives from the Council for Social Affairs through the medium of the head sociologist and participate in its deliberations. Their task is to direct and to guide the activities of the implementing staff in the social sphere and to advise the director of the region in solving the social problems arising in the villages.

The linked work of the two branches has borne much fruit. We shall quote here only one example, the importance of which is self-evident.

The program of agricultural guidance in the new settlements was examined by the sociologists⁷. Following a comprehensive research it became clear that the social character of each village has a clear influence on the prospects of success of the agricultural guidance. The measure of success of a professional lecture or demonstration on any agricultural subject is dependent not only on the instructor's ability to organize such activity but mainly on his ability to plan and to coordinate it with the demands of the individual settlers. Thus, for example, it was established that when there is in any one agricultural village more than one «humula» it is necessary to set up an «observation chicken run» for the purpose of studying the various systems of poultry raising in the farms of settlers belonging to each of these «humulas». The erection of «an observation chicken run» in the holdings of settlers belonging to only one «humula» would seriously impair the prospects of success of the guidance in this branch in the whole of the village, so that the whole of this guidance activity would be a mere waste. The same holds good in regard to other subjects of guidance. It also transpired that in order to establish a feeling of trust on the part of the settlers in their instructors and in the systems that they suggest, one must begin instruction in subjects and branches in which the settlers evince particular interest. Only afterwards when the confidence of the settlers has been gained can the instructor pass on to guidance in other subjects which, for some reason or other, are not regarded to be of importance by the settlers. There is not always a uniformity of opinion between the various groups in the village in regard to the importance of subjects and the instructor must in such case «steer between the various trends». Likewise it transpired that one must introduce systems of instruction and programs of extension separately for settlers of various grades of professional know-how. In many instances instruction did not

⁷ The following is adapted from a work summarizing the activities of the sociological department, which is to be published shortly.

achieve full success because the program of guidance was uniform for all the settlers in the village, without taking into consideration their varying standards of knowledge. These are only several illustrations and conclusions from a large number of subjects that were examined and scrutinised and became an inseparable part of the daily instructions concerning conducting affairs in the sphere in question.

RESEARCHES FOR THE SOLVING OF GENERAL PROBLEMS

Scientific research and the deriving of practical conclusions from their results have a considerable share in improving the situation in new villages.

We have already realised this but researches of this type are of importance not only for the advancement of the settlers who have only recently settled on the land and begun to engage in agriculture, but also — and perhaps to an even greater extent — for the introduction of new systems and of various methods of cultivation, the introduction of improved strains and in particular the new methods of organisation have been received with a measure of unconcern, if not of natural opposition, by the experienced farmer or by the second generation of new farmers. The social research must delve deeply into the root of things and find rules for the direction of the practical policy in order to avert difficulties in the future. Such rules require researches of a general nature which are not limited to any one village or even to any sphere of activity. Such researches full to the duty of the theoretical research team in collaboration with the regional sociologists and the implementing staff. By their very nature it is impossible to define beforehand the framework of the direction of such researches but we have come to realise that their results are likely to be of the greatest importance in fixing projects for the future and in shaping the policy of the overall rural development.

We shall quote here only one example of an overall work of research which is still in its initial stage and is likely to turn out most interesting. It is a research into the problem of continuity of the second generation in the settlements.

A sample of settlers representative of the principal settlement regions in the country was taken. In an initial report in which the findings of the research are given, a number of intermediate conclusions were summarised and recommendations of decisive importance were given in regard to the shaping of policy and the planning of the

development of the settlements for a medium and a long term period. The first examinations tried to delve into a number of fundamental problems such as: the percentage of those remaining behind and the percentage of those leaving, the connections between those who leave and their communal origins; the connection between the agricultural success of the farmer and the desertion of the son, and likewise the connection between the education of the young person and his desertion of the village. The conclusion from the latter point shows, for example, that final desertion of the village is to be connected with lengthy educational experience outside the village. Desertion is to be connected with the gaining of knowledge and with military service in a non-agricultural surrounding. To the extent that such factors are signs of cultural changes it would appear that the young people in whom a considerable cultural change has taken place are more inclined to leave the village, whereas the more «traditional» among them tend to remain behind. It should be pointed out here that military service in Israel must be regarded as a means of imparting a certain amount of knowledge and education to the settler since such military service is accompanied by study and the imparting of knowledge by means of lessons in various subjects to those lacking education.

Such manifestation is common among members of the Eastern communities despite the family and humula ties that generally act in the direction of the sons remaining behind in the village. Thus, for example, we have come to realise that the percentage of desertion of the village among the second generation of Western origin amounts to 35 %, while that among Eastern immigrants amounts to only 12 %. On the other hand, as for the gaining of knowledge or know-how, it has a much more decisive influence on the desertion of the village among the second generation of Oriental immigrants when compared with Western immigrants.

The conclusions to be drawn from this phenomenon of the desertion of villages by those who have gained an education are that the halting of this process can be brought about only by the creation of suitable conditions for the residence of people of education and of professional know-how in the agricultural region. Hence, for the direction given to the planning of the settled areas and the direction of the process of urbanisation, education, amusements, etc. Indeed, the Department of Sociology is called upon to continue its research in this field.

Preliminary surveys carried out in this respect in new immigrants smallholders' cooperative settlements point to the fact that although

the great majority of the second generation tend to remain in the village, this group is composed primarily of the less educated, less cultured and less dynamic elements. Moreover, even then the decision to remain behind may be largely based upon family ties and lack of economic opportunities rather than upon the attraction to agricultural life itself. This, of course, only confirms similar phenomena already observed in other developing countries. In Israel, however, the situation is rendered more complex by its being a country of immigration so that the selective process may deepen not only urban-rural cleavage but also that between the veteran and the new strata of the population. To study this basic problem, a large scale longitudinal project has recently been inaugurated and it will attempt to find out if, and under what economic, social and cultural conditions, this trend may and should be reversed. In other words, whether and how it is possible not only to attract youth to agriculture in general but to enable it to function in the group of origin without on the one hand, becoming frustrated and on the other, precipitating the dissolution of this group.

Such and similar problems arise after deliberating on a work of research on subjects of general significance. They create the need of comprehensive and deep going and complementary research to examine and clarify the significance of the general problem and to enable by so doing the planning and the guidance set-up a more effective and well-founded form of activity. The action of the feedback becomes clear here in the relations of the sociologists and their work with the policy-makers when the conclusions of the research become a source of incentive to the policy makers so that that influence returns to close the circle.

CONCLUSIONS FROM THE POINT OF VIEW OF THE POLICY-MAKERS

One cannot of course undertake in advance to accept all the conclusions and recommendations of the sociologist, and not because doubts arise in regard to the objective possibilities of this profession. The limitations stem from the fact that the policy maker must take into account the whole complex of facts and conclusions supplied to him by a complete set-up of research workers and advisors each in his own special field. The decision can only be taken after a suitable weighting of the relative importance of the conclusions and recommendations so as to find the most effective means of reaching a certain goal. The sociologist is only one of number of advisors sur-

rounding the policy maker, and although the scientific possibilities of the research sociologist and his recommendations have proved themselves and are greatly valued, the policy maker who is responsible for coordination and for decision in the whole network of activities in his field must nonetheless act in such a way as to be able to bridge over between the recommendations of the sociologist and those of his other advisors.

As for the immediate relations between the research workers and the policy maker, one must always preserve a direct and constant contact as far as possible in order to enable the policy maker to be in the picture throughout the period of the research and not only to be there when the final results are to be presented to him. The benefit of the social research requires the participation of the policy maker even throughout the development of the research so as to be as near as possible to the findings whenever they appear and to enable him to see the direction that the research worker decides to take. For the most part, of course, a decision of this nature requires a certain measure of professional know-how and discernment. Hence for conclusions in regard to the educational background required of the policy maker. He must be at home in the whole range of problems and assist the research worker in the choice of the proper direction, illuminating the situation from his own point of view. In addition, the fact is well-known to sociologists and to social psychologists that active participation in the work of research transforms the policy maker into a more «amenable» person, and binds him to a certain extent also in regard to the final results and recommendations.

And another point, a research worker who seeks the collaboration of the policy maker in the intermediate and determining stages of the research, makes possible a use of the intermediate findings already during the «doing stage». This is of importance even if the implementation of his final recommendations is not assured to him. In this way, the research influences the process of accepting the conclusions and contributes its share to the improvements in the processes of planning and the return planning which are closely interlinked.

On the other hand, the policy maker expects a constructive contribution on the part of the sociologist. This expectation however, should not serve as a prerequisite in his attitude towards the work of research. One must accept the risk wherein all researches in the various branches of science, but not every research will bear fruit even as regards the immediate end of the policy maker and he must always bear in mind that it should be assumed that he makes a con-

tribution to pure science or at least to the attempt of the research workers and so to the results expected of him in the future.

Furthermore, the purpose of every sociological research is to analyze and to explain social problems. Even if this goal is not attained, the objective presentation of important aspects of social life when it is done properly and carefully, by means of collecting facts and data, is of great importance in itself.

From Israel's experience one may arrive at the conclusion that sociology has become an essential instrument for every organisation engaged in the problems of planning and implementing the various processes connected with human society both at the present time and in the ancient world. One must pay special attention in fixing the organisation and its framework and one must maintain direct and constant contacts between the sociologist and the policy maker in all the stages of the organisational hierarchy.

SOCIOLOGISTS AND THE PUBLIC

Introductory Essay

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The sessions of the American Sociological Association which will have preceded the World Congress are to be devoted to discussion of *The Uses of Sociology*. President Lazarsfeld has invited American sociologists to tell the use of sociology in government, business, medicine, and many other institutions. The emphasis is on how sociology is or may be used by policy-makers and professional people, rather than on the relation of the sociologists to the public. Professor Sauvy, in his introductory note to participants in the present session, indicates that when he speaks of policy-makers he refers primarily to members of government. Professor Lazarsfeld has included policy-makers of other kinds as well. I mention this only because many who will attend this session will have read or heard the papers presented at the American meetings. That fact will no doubt influence our discussions. Those papers are not, however, available to me or to others at the time of writing. In any case, the American program will deal primarily with American experience. Our session should deal with experience and problems in a variety of countries. My discussion, as distinguished from that of Professor Sauvy, will deal with the public at large, with the unorganized as well as with the organized publics who may be the objects of sociological study, and who may be also the consumers of sociological analysis, the people to whom sociology is presented in one way or another and who may be affected by it directly or indirectly.

Sociologists are but one of the many kinds of specialists who study some aspect of nature, including human life, for the love of it, for the common good, in order to facilitate effective action on the part of others, or so that they themselves may act with reference to the matter in question on their own account, or for the benefit of clients who seek their services. If the specialists in question pursue their study only in order that they may act, they are professionals in the usual English sense of that term. The learning is a means to the end of effective action. A profession is *practised*; that is. the professional's

main business is to provide a service for some body of clients. The clients may be individuals who come of their own accord or who are referred to the professional. They may be institutions or public bodies. The individuals who make up the public are, in varying degree, potential clients of the professional; all of us have been or will be patients of the medical profession. Not all of us will call upon the service of chartered accountants, patent lawyers, or electronic engineers. But we may all be affected by the way in which the members of those professions perform and distribute their services. In any case, the public is considered to be properly concerned about the manner in which professional services are performed; the concern expresses itself in laws which limit the practice of the profession to people licensed by the state, although generally in fact chosen by the members of the profession itself.

Other specialists, although they may be moved by concern over practical matters, follow learning whither it leads without much thought for its immediate usefulness.

Note that I say immediate usefulness. I suppose nearly all who pursue studies of society believe it is better to know than not to know. But some want their knowledge to be applied soon, and are likely to choose their fields of observation accordingly even though they leave application itself to others. Some pursue knowledge in a longer perspective, making their choices of field and problems on grounds other than social urgency. Other sociologists, however, believe that they should be professional in the sense of giving advice or other services to clients who pay for it. I am not among them, but I am not against their following their bent. Others are of the other extreme, divorcing their work completely from all influence by thought of application. Neither am I among them, nor against this. Many of us are ambivalent on this point; perhaps the majority of sociologists refrain from professional application of their knowledge for benefit of clients, but are inclined to choose their problems for study somewhat on the basis of what they consider the problems of the contemporary world, the world we live in and which is here to be seen and observed. Were we to confine our attention to societies distant in time, we might save ourselves most of the problems of our relations to the public; we might pay for it by a competence which would depend upon that built-in ignorance with which the modern historian, E. H. Carr, twits his brethren who study ancient history.¹

¹ E. H. CARR, *What is History*, Macmillan, 1961, p.9. He refers to the fact that the historian of ancient Greece has no way of correcting the bias of the Athenian sources, the only ones available.

Our problems are those of any group of people devoted to gaining and disseminating knowledge of any aspect of the natural or human world, compounded and made acute by the fact that we generally study our own societies. One of the problems of any such group is that of the relation of its specialists' or professional culture to one or more lay cultures (or sub-cultures). For whenever an aspect of reality becomes an object of study or action by specialists, the latter develop and maintain a specialists' culture with respect to it.

The specialists' culture will consist, in part, of a view of the nature of the phenomena which the specialists study, and of their place among other orders of reality. It will include ideas concerning the nature of evidence, its own line of reasoning and analysis, its concepts, in short, its universe of discourse. Those of us who were initiated into sociology by Professor Robert E. Park, Ellsworth Faris, et al., were made to dwell long and thoughtfully upon Durkheim's discussion of *collective representations*, and especially of those *concepts* which both form our ways of perceiving and conceiving and enable us to communicate more fully with those with whom we have a great body of shared experience. As Park and Burgess put it:

The significance of the fact that 'every group has its own language' is being recognized in its bearings upon research. Studies of dialects of isolated groups, of the argot of social classes, of the technical terms of isolated groups, of the precise terminology of scientific groups suggest the wide range of concrete materials. The expression 'different universes of discourse' indicates how communication separates as well as unites persons and groups².

The interaction of sociologists with the public, or more exactly, with the several publics of a given society, is the interaction of universes of discourse, of whole systems of concepts which express, respectively, the sociologists' culture, and various lay cultures.

Any specialists' or professional culture — that of the physicist, the pathologist, the biologist, the sociologist — may be so different from the corresponding lay culture as to allow of no understanding between professional and layman. On the other hand, they may be very much alike in basic concepts. In many countries nowadays physician and patient share the same basic notions of the nature of disease. A physician can, with some of his patients, tell the truth in the

² R. E. PARK and E. W. BURGESS, *Introduction to the Science of Sociology*, Chicago, 1921, p. 423. Cf. also pp. 195-198, where they reproduce a selection from Durkheim's *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, entitled «Collective representations and intellectual life.»

same terms he would use with colleagues. But the specialist's culture and the lay culture can never be exactly the same; for although specialist and layman may share the same general concepts and body of knowledge, their situation with regard to the aspect of the world in question cannot be quite the same.³ A theory of the causes of divorce can give but little comfort to those unfortunate people who are sorely in need of one. The snake that has bitten me is something other than a beautiful specimen of a certain order of reptiles. Whether different or similar to each other, the specialists' and the lay cultures will interact in some degree. That interaction, as it concerns sociology, is our problem.

That interaction begins in the very definition of whatever problem is to be studied by the sociologist. For the public will have its own definition, or definitions, of any problem of social life, definitions couched in moral, political, religious, economic or other terms. It is hard to conceive of anything more shocking than to have one's favorite troubles defined in objective, comparative terms. In our society, at any rate, not many people mind it if a physicist redefines some problem, say that of what holds a piece of metal together, in terms other than those used by a mechanic or a foundryman. In general, scientific and professional redefinition of diseases is accepted although with some reservation. But as one moves toward political, economic and social matters, the lay publics are less willing to accept the specialists' definitions of situations. For one thing, most people think they know what ails the state, the economy and society. At least in democratic countries, everyone is expected to be informed on these matters and, indeed, to participate in action regarding them. For another, everyone has vested interests in these matters; they are life itself to him. And, finally, people have deep sentiments concerning these matters. Sentiments do not merely define problems, but contain also the proper answers to them. It is characteristic of the sociological as of any other scientific definition of a problem that it assumes that there can be a variety of answers. It seeks relatively better, but always tentative and limited answers. Sentiments do not seek answers; they *are* the answer.

One may illustrate some of these points by referring to the matter of race in my country. Many people of the race called white define the race problem as biological, insisting that the traditional position

³ For a classic statement of the problem of communication of professional with client see L. J. HENDERSON, «Physician and Patient as a Social System», *The New England Journal of Medicine*, Vol. 212, Nov. 1937, pp. 404-413.

of the races in relation to each other is simply a natural consequence of biological differences. Some people define the matter in religious terms. To define the problem in historical and sociological terms, to see it is another case of economic, political and social relations among peoples, to compare it with other such cases is not suitable to those who have defined the problem in pseudo-biological or in religious terms.⁴

Even to consider a question open is often considered sacrilege. For where there is question, there lies the implication that the answer is not yet known; that there may be another answer than that generally accepted. One has only to think of going about the United States asking people, «Which system, ours or that of the Soviet Union, will bring greater benefits to mankind?» — or going about the Soviet Union asking it in reverse. One might also speculate on the fate of someone who would go from house to house in white districts of South Africa asking, «Who has the right to rule here? Whites, Natives, Coloured or Indians?» Or, to be even more provoking, consider asking white people, «Who should rule here: Africans, Asiatics or Europeans?»⁵

Involved in this is, of course, the problem of neutrality. In his capacity as a student of reality, the sociologist is presumed to be neutral. In any society there are areas with respect to which intellectual neutrality is accepted; with respect to others, it is not permitted even to play at being the devil's advocate. Within a society, people vary as to the matters on which they will put up with the neutrality implied in philosophical speculation or scientific discourse and inquiry. Even on such an issue as that of free trade as against protective tariffs, a matter of fiscal policy, one may have difficulty concerning neutrality, as Lewis A. Dexter has shown. Some of his respondents took his very putting of questions on the subject as evidence that he was an enemy of the truth.⁶

The areas concerning which sentiments are such as to make ob-

⁴ Of course, it is scientifically legitimate to ask questions concerning the biological aspects of race. Those, however, who have attributed the system of race relations to biological difference, are not scientists seeking answers. They are laymen expressing sentiments by dogmatic assertions.

⁵ The categories used in the second putting of the question are those used by the people whom the whites call Native, Bantu, Kaffirs, etc., but who call themselves African.

⁶ Lewis A. DEXTER, «Role Relationships and Conceptions of Neutrality in Interviewing», *American Journal of Sociology*, LXII, Sept. 1956, pp. 153-157.

jective inquiry difficult will vary from society to society, from country to country, religion to religion, political party to political party. The sociologist, if he is indeed one, will be aware of such sensitive areas in any society he undertakes to study. It is part of the sociological task to be students of this matter, and to be able to interpret our own work and that of others in the light of it.

It is one of our weakness that we do not always make ourselves fully aware of the blind spots of inquiry in our own societies (we are quick to smell them out in other societies). The case is fairly simple when some aspect of society is completely closed off from inquiry. More insidious is an apparently detached and objective inquiry which stops short of being completely so. One common manifestation of such a case is the asking of questions about only one end of a full range of possibilities. If I may again speak of race in my own country, I have known of inquiries as to whether Negroes should have rights equal in all respects to those of whites; I have never known any sociologist to ask whether Negroes ought not to be given superior rights for a while to make up for their past disadvantages. Once the parents of the school my children attended were called together to consider the admission of Negro children. One parent moved that we send a ballot to all parents asking whether they favored it or not, and whether they would withdraw their children if Negroes were admitted. Another parent then moved that another question be asked: Will you withdraw your children if Negroes are not admitted? The whole matter was dropped. We consider, very often, but one half of a possible scale, or one quadrant of the possible relations between two variables. This may be quite sensible in some cases. But my point is that sociology, at its best, raises the full range of questions. It is a radical thing to do with respect to matters of sentiment, as most sociological matters are.

Sometimes the very constitution of the state is based on a sociological theory. Indeed, I suppose all legal and political systems rest on theories concerning the nature of society. If those theories are very explicit, the sociologist may at least know where he stands. If they are implicit, he may have more difficulty in discovering the limits of toleration of the inquiring attitude. Of course, there may be in the same society and country competing definitions of any social matter or problem; they are espoused by people of varying wealth, power and sophistication. A recurring problem and a common accusation flow from this fact. The sociologists may be tempted to define a problem in a way that fits more closely one of the competing definitions than another. They may be accused of being the

servants of some vested interest. In a recent book⁷ American industrial sociologists are accused of accepting management's definition of the problem of industrial morale and production. The case is pertinent, although the author has oversimplified the case. It is true that many sociologists and psychologists have studied «restriction of production.» Max Weber did so fifty years ago in his *Zur Psychophysik der industriellen Arbeit*,⁸ and came to the conclusion that «putting on the brakes» is part of the eternal struggle of the worker with his employer over the price of his labor. But both phrases, although useful enough, contain a certain bias. To restrict production is to do less than the employer wants, or less than is physically possible. The phrase assumes that there is a proper standard of production set by someone other than the worker. It asks only half a question. The true question in this: How are levels of productive effort determined in working organizations of any and all kinds — industry, hospitals, universities, government bureaux, etc., — and among all kinds of workers in those organizations — management itself, professionals, students and apprentices, white-collar workers, skilled and unskilled manual workers? This is a truly open question, relating to a problem to be found in all societies no matter what the form of ownership and control of industries and other institutions. It does not cut its inquiry to those aspects acceptable to any segment of the public.

Sociologists take as their object of study the very public to which their findings may eventually be communicated. The members of the public thus studied become subjects, who collaborate, knowingly or not, in study of themselves. From this relationship flow questions of the extent of the sociologists' access to facts concerning people's behavior and thoughts, of the ethic governing the gathering of their data, and of the terms on which data are gathered and communicated. And one may ask, of course, why people allow themselves to be studied at all and on what terms.

In addition to the point already made, that the sociologist treats in an objective and detached manner the beliefs and institutions which are precious to members of the society studied, there is the additional question whether the sociologist can be trusted with infor-

⁷ Loren BARITZ, *The Servants of Power. A History of the Social Sciences in American Industry*. Middletown, Connecticut, Wesleyan University Press, 1960.

⁸ Cf. *Gesammelte Aufsätze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik*. pp. 61-255. The essay was first published in 1908-1909.

mation about one's behavior, that of his family, colleagues, friends and neighbors. For eventually the data of the sociologist come from people; generally, the facts that are of most use are those that are given willingly. True, the sociologist will often have to seek out hidden facts, and will sometimes consider himself justified in revealing them without the consent of persons deeply involved. Most information concerning social life is, however, given willingly. Every human being is the repository of much secret knowledge. Without access to secret knowledge there could be no systematic and penetrating study of human society. The psychoanalysts' greatest invention was probably the interview, in which the subject revealed not merely to the analyst, but also to himself, facts what, in other contexts, would appear shameful and would occasion deep guilt and fear. Sociologists, when they study certain orders of human relationships, must have facts that could cause shame and harm to the person who reveals them. In order to do his work well, he must have the confidence of his subjects (informants, respondents, people observed). They must believe that he will not use his privileged information to do them harm.

In order to have that confidence, the sociologist must deserve it. All of us who have been given access to delicate situations know how difficult it is to get the confidence of people, how great are the pressure and temptations to reveal confidential matter in such a way that sanctions might be visited upon the subject, or his peers. All successful investigation of existing social relationships depends upon some sort of explicit or implicit bargain with the people concerned. That bargain has to do with the terms under which the findings will be made public or otherwise used.

Societies undoubtedly differ greatly in the willingness of people to let themselves be observed for scientific purposes. If internal tension and anxiety are great, we may expect that while many might wish to give information, most people will fear to do it. Where freedom is limited, suspicion of the investigator will be great. In any society we may expect that people of various classes will have their own patterns of consent or resistance to inquiry, based on their experience, or what they have heard of the experience of others. Part of the skill of the sociologist in relation to his public, is to understand their suspicions and the grounds on which they rest, and to know how to reduce that suspicion by correct conduct on his own part. Part of that correct conduct, indeed the heart of it, is a strict ethic of responsibility toward those who give him the data with which he works.

If people are sometimes reluctant to give information or to allow themselves to be observed, they are also as often quite eager to have a part in social investigation involving themselves. With us, in North America, people are generally willing to believe that a study will, in some distant future, be used for the common good; they are quite patient about it. It is believed that the people of some countries, of some classes or occupations, can not be observed or interviewed. That may be so. Nevertheless, it is amazing how successful social research has been in all countries where it has been undertaken. We need to learn more about the differences of access to various people and various segments of society. One of the aims of our session should be to compare notes on this matter, and especially to become aware of the biases that may creep into comparisons of one society with another through differences in the responsiveness of people to investigation.

The sociologist must, in order to study societies, become familiar with the language of the people whom he studies; not merely the words and what they mean in the dictionary, but the language as expression of society and the culture. He must, of course, also have a second language, that in which he communicates with his colleagues. This second language is, in part, quite technical. It may include statistical or other systems of symbols which are necessary to economic and accurate statement among specialists. But there is eventually a third language which we must learn, that of the public to which the sociologist wants to communicate his findings. Some sociologists consider that they have done their duty when they have reported some findings to a client — the government, a business, or some private or public agency. Not many are content with that alone. They will want to add something to general sociological knowledge and to theories of society; they want to communicate to their colleagues. Many will also want to contribute knowledge and ideas to the public mind. This requires an art at which many of us are not adept. Some, indeed, think we should not try to speak to the public at large. At least one colleague who read my initial statement thought we should not try to communicate with the public lest we yield to the temptation to pontificate. Since we deal with important problems, people expect us to say important things. We sometimes pretend to know more than we do; the temptation is great. Yet, in most countries, it will be expected that something of common interest and value will eventually come out of the great amount of effort spent on social science, including sociology. One of our problems is to become skilful in putting our findings and theories into wider circulation. As

a matter of fact, the young colleague who counselled against speaking to the public writes with clarity and wit in language that any one of moderate learning can understand.

It may well be objected that what I have had to say is addressed almost entirely to sociologists who engage in empirical research. I mean by empirical research not mere scurrying about to gather facts, real or presumed, but well considered attempts to join hypothesis and theory with actual observation of human behavior. Those observations may have been made and recorded centuries ago; they may be made now. There are sociologists with great knowledge of historical currents, of various societies of the past and present, but who do not themselves go into the field to gather new social data. They use records made by others. Some of the problems of the relation of the sociologist to the public will apply less to them than to those who do actively study current societies. But the basic problems apply to them as well, for all sociologists analyze the customs, beliefs, and institutions of societies in a systematic and detached way. This analytical view is bound at times to conflict with the view of the lay public (indeed, with our own views in our capacity of members of society). The resulting dilemmas are solved in many ways. They are the matter for our discussions.

SOCIOLOGY AND THE PUBLIC IN THE SCANDINAVIAN COUNTRIES

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Sociology is a relatively young science in the Scandinavian countries. Only during the years after the Second World War has a number of large sociological investigations been published and the number of qualified sociologists and sociology students at an advanced level is still very modest.

In this connection it should be noted, however, that the science of *sociology is defined more narrowly* in Scandinavia than elsewhere in the Western world. Thus, according to university tradition in the Scandinavian countries, demography is not considered one of the sociological subjects, but it is counted among the subjects of economics. Therefore, the very early development of the population statistics and demography was of greater consequence to the development of economics and political science than to the development of general sociology. Nor has ethnography, which too was early developed in the Scandinavian countries, been very interested in sociological points of view, and has therefore not been of much support to sociology.

To-day there exist a dozen full-time professorships and about fifty positions for scientifically trained research-workers distributed over about twenty universities and independent research institutes in the four Scandinavian countries, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. Seen in relation to the countries' total population of 18 million with a relatively good schooling, it is not an impressive position for the sociological science.

The fact that it is only during late years that sociology has met with sympathy and support from the public and from political circles, may also be explained by social conditions having been so relatively homogeneous and easy to survey in the various parts of the country, that in many cases it has been possible to establish a satisfactory foundation for determining e.g. the welfare policy of the State or the personnel or marketing policy of the companies by placing ten experienced and skilled people round a table with the purpose of

working out a statement of the conditions within some area of social life. As long as politicians and business managers can get on with *ad hoc* models and the estimate of experienced people, there is no decisive incentive to support and make use of sociological research. Of course this does not prevent sociological research being carried out through the work of one man. But the rapid development of advanced research presupposes access to a larger material and further economic resources than one man can procure.

As suggested by Hughes, there is hardly any doubt that it will be possible to study the extension and the acceptance of the systematic empirical science, including sociology, as a «akkulturationsfænomen» along the same lines as the diffusion of other culture elements or culture complexes. Such an analysis, however, is not to be made in this paper in the case of the Scandinavian countries. Instead it is the purpose to give a short account of the sociological research activities in Scandinavia and of some of the circumstances which have been of influence to the development of research and to the acceptance of the results of the investigations outside the sociologists' circles.

The fields of research which have so far been taken up by the sociologists in the Scandinavian countries, have been decided by a number of different factors, among which the following are to be dealt with here:

1. Research initiative and financing possibilities,
2. Possibilities of collecting material,
3. Possibilities of publication,
4. Education of sociological research-workers.

RESEARCH INITIATIVE AND FINANCING POSSIBILITIES

Action research

The research, which is aiming at investigating a concrete practical problem supported by sociological theory has during the years after the Second World War obtained considerable economic support in the Scandinavian countries. The two groups in society which have given the largest support have been the public administration and industry. The military administration has not been of the same importance as in several other places of the Western world.

The initiative for these projects in applied research has often, but not always, come from the financing institution. There are several examples of a formulation of a research problem being made by a

single research-worker or an institute of research, which has also taken the initiative to make investigation, and then economic support has been obtained because the study had a practical aim.

Consequently the sociological research has to a great extent been in the nature of *action research*. From a theoretical point of view this need not be alarming, provided that this research is supplemented by a study of basic theoretical problems, cf. Kurt Lewin's comment: Action should always be tested by research and research be validated by action set upon it.

This research collaboration with the State and industry has not been without problems. First may be mentioned that in a number of cases it has demanded considerable diplomatic skill on the part of the research-worker to force through *an approach to the problem* which, besides giving the wanted information of the concrete problems, has also been worked out on a sound theoretical basis.

Along with the question may be mentioned the difficulty which has often arisen in the cases where the financing institution has demanded the results procured so quickly that it has been almost impossible for the research-worker to carry through a presentation of the *results of the investigation*, which satisfies professional requirements to criticism of the collected material.

A third problem has consisted in securing the research-worker's right to publish the results of the investigation, also in cases where the results are of no support to the practical policy which the financing institution may have wanted to pursue.

Finally the problem may be mentioned which has sometimes arisen where several firms have been included in an investigation, and where in return for its participation in the investigation the single concern has wanted a more detailed presentation of the collected material than the research-worker thought defensible with regard to the safeguarding of the anonymity of the persons who have provided the information.

In all the cases about which information is available the research-worker has succeeded in maintaining his points of view, but no doubt there are times when it has cost him his popularity with the institution that has financed the investigation.

Basic research

Until very recently it has been relatively difficult to obtain support for the purely basic research without any definite practical aim. The

financing authorities and the committees of scientific foundations have in many cases had no understanding at all of the development of the sociological theory and method. To a large extent this is due to the sociologists themselves. They have not had the ability nor have they taken an interest in expressing themselves in a way which was comprehensible and acceptable to the appropriation group.

However, this has changed during recent years, and now the economic difficulties of the various research institutes do not so much consist in obtaining support for definite research projects as in obtaining support for the daily running of the institutes. The sociological research-workers who have not yet been able to get a permanent position at one of the institutes are thereby obliged to make their living by applying for support for the carrying through of new projects, or to the finishing of old projects (if any). Sometimes it has been very difficult to procure the necessary means for the finishing of an investigation, the expenses of which have been estimated too optimistically.

THE POSSIBILITIES OF COLLECTING MATERIAL

The possibilities for the research-workers to collect sociologically relevant data must on the whole be said to be highly favourable in the Scandinavian countries. Several circumstances are contributory to this.

First it must be mentioned that the public administration keeps a detailed and extensive recording of all inhabitants. In Sweden this registration is even rationalized in such a way that each inhabitant has a so-called citizen number, which is entered in all registers. This registration of the citizens on the part of the public administration gives special possibilities of collecting a great amount of information on each chosen person without having to contact him (or her) and this holds true no matter whether the cross sectional or the longitudinal method is used. But when using this information, one must of course be aware of the inaccuracies in the material which arise from the fact that often the information has been collected for a special purpose (e.g. control of taxation).

Another facilitation of the sociologists' work of collecting data is due to the fact that the inhabitants of the Scandinavian countries are relatively enlightened and relatively responsive to a well motivated collection of material. The number of persons who cannot read or cannot write is almost negligible. This means that the greater part of

the information may be collected by using mail questionnaires combined with a small number of more extensive personal interviews with persons, who are selected representatively among the persons who have been sent a mail questionnaire, so that the percentage of non-response may be controlled and the information of the questionnaires be studied in detail. Besides «non-response» which usually is not very big, can often be controlled through the registrations of the public administration.

There are several commercial institutions for collection of material in each of the Scandinavian countries, and in most cases it is possible to cooperate with the institutions carrying through of the investigation, so, that the research-worker can control the institution's selection of respondents as well as the interviewers' work in the field. A few commercial institutes, however, consider their investigation technique a business secret, and subsequently these institutes cannot collaborate in scientific projects.

The condition of succeeding in collecting a material which fulfils professional requirements such as the representativity, reliability and validity of the material, is in general that the interviewed persons have confidence in the neutrality and professional secrecy of the collecting institution, and also that the investigation appears meaningful. Generally these conditions are not difficult to fulfil, but still two problems are to be mentioned in this connection.

Firstly it has been a problem that a few of the sociological scientists are eager participants in the political debate. There is no doubt that these scientists exactly define when they are speaking as scientists and when they are speaking as politicians. Nor is there any doubt that their clear political standpoint makes it easier for other scientists to control if their investigation results should be politically biased in some direction or other. But it is not difficult to see that this dividing line between science and politics is not at all as clear to the various political groups and the general public, and naturally this may influence the possibilities of collecting material.

Secondly at an investigation in the Scandinavian countries within the labour market it will be a condition for the acceptance of the investigation among workers and employers of whom the greater part are organized, that the carrying through of the investigation has been approved by the trade unions as well as by the employers' federation. In a few cases this has had the effect that an investigation could not be carried through, because its subject matter was thought too dangerous.

The possibilities of working up the material does not give rise to

any special comments. There exists a rather large number of data processing machines, which may be used on a service basis and besides some of the institutes have their own machines. It may be regretted that several of the Scandinavian research-workers seem to be hampered by their limited knowledge of the technical possibilities of these machines in their further analysis of the collected material.

POSSIBILITIES OF PUBLICATION

The possibilities for publishing sociological studies are on the whole good in Scandinavia. For large reports grants from scientific foundations may be obtained for printing and translation into an international language. The number of readers of these works is often very small, and many research-workers will, therefore, try to cover several groups of readers in the same publication, which may cause some difficulties in production.

Small studies and summaries of large studies may be published in the periodical *Acta Sociologica* which is published with support from scientific foundations in each of the Scandinavian countries, and which has a relatively large circulation in international circles.

Most of the research institutes have also a series of mimeographed papers. These works are usually written by staff-members at the institutes sometimes by advanced students in connection with their final examination.

In some of the Scandinavian countries there are also periodicals in the national languages, intended for an interested public.

In this connection we may distinguish between three groups, which hold the interest of sociologists: a) colleagues, b) politicians and c) the public.

The contact between sociologists within the Scandinavian countries is good. There exist the well-known theoretical controversies between the different sociological schools, but only few sociologists are so one-sidedly marked by one school that they have difficulty in making contact with others for that reason. Apart from Finnish, which is not understood in the other Scandinavian countries, the various Scandinavian languages give no problems of understanding. Moreover, a large part of the professional production is written in English, partly because of the frequent visits of English speaking research-workers, partly in order to avoid increasing the professional terminological difficulties by having to find appropriate Scandinavian *termini*.

Only in the case of duplicated works has it been difficult to maintain an effective exchange, and as many preliminary results and more imaginative theoretical hypotheses only appear in this form, there have been several attempts to improve this possibility of contact during recent years.

Every third year a Scandinavian sociology conference is held with a limited number of participants, and a corresponding number of meetings is held for the industrial sociologists in the Scandinavian countries.

The contact between the sociologists and other scientists at the institutes of higher education leaves much to be desired. In a number of fields the sociologists have common research interests with e.g. the psychologists, the economists, the geographers, the ethnographers and the historians. But instead of supporting this cross scientific research cooperation the scientists' work has often been characterized by a certain distrust (suspicion) and rivalry (competition). This is no doubt connected with the fact that only recently has the labour market for scientific labour changed from a buyer's market to a seller's market, which surprisingly enough has not been fully realized by the scientists themselves.

However, recent years have seen several examples of organized cooperation between sociologists and other branches of science. In Denmark may be mentioned the Committee of Social Research in Greenland, in Finland the Alcohol Political Research Institution, and at the Scandinavian level there is the Nordic Summer University.

The contact between the sociologists and the politicians in public and private institutions and organizations has been of a very changing character during the post-war period. In many cases the politicians have not been able to understand the sociologists' professional language, and often the sociologists have not been able to express themselves in the language of the politicians, and there has been a marked lack of popularizers. Some of the foreign works of an accessible character have been translated into the Scandinavian languages, but generally they have not had a wide circulation.

The politicians' lack of understanding has sometimes manifested itself in an amusing way. There have been instances when published results of a Gallup poll have influenced the politicians' attitude decisively, at the same time as investigation results with a small but published uncertainty have been refused as unreliable. At this point, however, there is reason to believe that in the long run the growing number of undergraduates with a sociological training will act as intermediaries between the two groups.

Another difficulty in the contact between the research-workers and the politicians is that the politicians expect concrete practical suggestions in the investigation reports of the «målrettede» research and not only an impartial statement of the results of the investigation. In some cases this problem has been managed by prefacing (beginning) the report with a summary of the investigation results and ending the report with a number of comments, in which the research-worker gives a cautious expert opinion of what effects may be expected from the various action alternatives set up. This seems to be a better solution than entering direct into the political decision, as it preserves the independent and neutral position of the research-worker.

The contact between the sociologists and the public must on the whole be said to be better at the time when the information is being collected than at the time when the investigation results are being published. This may be illustrated by the attitude of the press. It is not difficult to obtain press support for the collection of material, and it is seldom that the collection gives rise to unjustified criticism. On the other hand the investigation results have often been received with a very critical attitude. The results are characterized as commonplace if they correspond with the preconceived ideas of the editor, and as erroneous if they are at variance with them. «Human behaviour cannot be studied by scientific measuring techniques» etc.

The knowledge of sociology is very small among the general public. This may be connected with the fact that sociology is not included among the subjects of the primary schools, and also (perhaps with the exception of Sweden) because of there being a lack of elementary books on sociology, as mentioned before.

THE EDUCATION OF SOCIOLOGICAL RESEARCH-WORKERS

The education of sociologists at the first stages of the academic career takes place only at the universities and the institutes of higher education, which are all owned by the State.

During recent years a relatively large number of students at an elementary level have been educated in Sweden and Finland. But this is partly due to the fact that an examination in sociology gives an extra qualification to the admission to the schools of medicine, where entry is restricted. In Denmark and Norway the number of students at this level has been very modest, and for all the Scan-

dinavian countries it holds true that only few sociologists with an advanced scientific knowledge of sociology are being educated.

Highly simplified, two characteristics of the education of Scandinavian sociologists may be emphasized: the epistemological outlook and the participation in cross scientific research work. The interdisciplinary outlook of the Scandinavian sociologists has also been advanced by many of the present research-workers having completed another academic education before they specialized as sociologists.

SOCIOLOGUES ET GRAND PUBLIC AU BRÉSIL

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Il n'est ni possible ni souhaitable de discuter des rapports entre sociologues et grand public en considérant le continent latino-américain comme un tout. D'une part, il y a des différences notoires et essentielles en matière de situation économique, d'organisation sociale et de tradition culturelle des communautés latino-américaines. D'autre part, la signification de ces différences est mal connue, spécialement quant au développement de la science et aux rapports des hommes de science avec le grand public.

Dans un débat objectif, susceptible de mettre en lumière le rôle des sociologues dans les communautés de l'Amérique latine, il est à conseiller de partir d'exemples les plus concrets, qui présenteraient le caractère de *faits simples et clairs*. Même si ces faits sociaux se rapportaient seulement à une des alternatives possibles du scénario historico-social latino-américain, les sociologues auraient avantage à situer la question de façon rigoureuse et facilement intelligible.

Ayant en vue la situation brésilienne, la seule que nous puissions étudier avec quelque certitude, il nous semble intéressant et efficace de rassembler les données principales et les conclusions pertinentes qui concernent un mouvement social sur lequel plusieurs sociologues ont une influence marquante et continue. Le présent exposé tentera de décrire ce mouvement et ses principales conséquences sous trois aspects distincts: d'abord, comment la contribution intellectuelle des sociologues a-t-elle été acceptée, utilisée et appréciée comme valable? Ensuite, comment peut-on juger objectivement l'importance de cette contribution pour la collectivité et la sociologie? Enfin, quel enseignement peut-on en tirer quant aux facteurs et aux processus sociaux qui règlent, orientent et organisent l'interaction des sociologues et des profanes?

I. LE SOCIOLOGUE COMME «INTELLECTUEL PARTICIPANT»

Le cas choisi pour la description et l'analyse permet de considérer les rapports du sociologue avec le public sur le seul plan des rapports

présentant un minimum de stabilité et de réciprocité dans l'actuelle société brésilienne. Il s'agit du plan qui place les profanes en face des problèmes nommés «les grands problèmes nationaux»; ceux qui désirent et réussissent à comprendre les contributions des spécialistes, et qui considèrent celles-ci comme des preuves de leur disposition à agir en tant qu'«intellectuels responsables» ou «participants».

Il est certain qu'il existe des degrés en cette réaction. Le degré de tolérance, de compréhension et d'identification des profanes face aux interprétations sociologiques de la réalité brésilienne varie, grosso modo, en fonction inverse de leur attachement aux estimations conformistes et impératives. Toutefois ces attitudes diverses contiennent invariablement une partie d'estimation formelle et une bonne dose d'intérêt pratique envers les contributions du «spécialiste participant».

Un autre aspect que nous devons souligner dès maintenant concerne la nature du problème national impliqué. Celui-ci offre un champ assez étendu et neutre pour la discussion des relations entre les fins et moyens inhérents aux perspectives de contrôle de la société pour les graves dilemmes qui lui sont posés. Il est indéniable que l'interférence des intérêts sociaux et des options idéologiques a été nettement alourdie par le climat de conflit sous-jacent aux prises de position inéluctables. Toutefois le sens commun malgré son incapacité à diriger avec efficacité les réactions sociales¹, a favorisé la communication des sociologues avec le grand public à trois niveaux différents: celui de la perception, celui de l'explication et celui de la manipulation de la réalité. Tout d'abord en facilitant la compréhension et l'assimilation par le public des interprétations sociologiques complexes de certaines exigences de la situation historico-sociale brésilienne; ensuite en donnant son accord aux critiques de structure, de fonctionnement et de rendement des institutions émanant des sociologues et fondées sur les exigences structurelles et fonctionnelles de l'intégration normale de ces institutions, plus ou moins réalisée dans la pratique; finalement, en incitant le public à accepter et à reconnaître la légitimité de l'intervention des sociologues comme telle dans le débat du problème national en question.

Le problème national dont il est question ici, est celui de l'instruction. Les déficiences et les carences de l'enseignement au Brésil sont tellement graves que personne ne refuse de le considérer comme un des principaux problèmes sociaux du pays. Le recensement de

¹ Sur la manière d'envisager les problèmes éducatifs brésiliens par les différents groupes et couches sociales cf. Florestan FERNANDES, «A Educação como Problema Social», *Comentário*, Ano I, n° 4, 1960, pp. 7-13.

1950 a mis en évidence l'existence de 50 % d'analphabètes dans la population brésilienne. La répartition entre les niveaux d'enseignement, pour la population urbaine est la suivante ²:

	Immatriculés %	Diplômés %
Enseignement primaire	305	202
Enseignement moyen	7	37
Enseignement supérieur	1	6

L'instruction est un privilège de groupes sociaux et économiques, sous deux aspects: celui de la classe sociale des familles des élèves ou étudiants et celui du degré de prospérité de la région. En outre, le rendement des écoles est affecté, à tous les niveaux d'instruction, par des systèmes périmés et déficients d'organisation de l'enseignement qui ne permettent qu'une mobilisation limitée des facteurs éducatifs et provoquent un gaspillage systématique des ressources ³.

Ceci a eu pour résultat que l'État républicain a pris progressivement la responsabilité de lourdes charges dans le domaine de l'instruction. Il est intervenu directement par l'instauration et l'extension de l'enseignement gratuit à tous les niveaux. Il a également fixé des conditions légales de fonctionnement et de rendement minimum des écoles en convertissant la législation scolaire existante en législation de contrôle ainsi qu'en réformant parfois considérablement le système d'éducation.

L'Etat et des organismes privés prodiguent l'enseignement. Les données citées ci-dessous révèlent le rapport entre l'enseignement public et privé en 1957 ⁴.

Il est évident que l'école particulière ayant tendance à recruter ses élèves parmi les familles capables de payer la scolarité de leurs enfants sélectionne ceux-ci sur une base économique, et ne s'adresse qu'à certaines classes sociales. Une tentative quelconque d'augmenter par des subventions publiques les opportunités d'éducation des couches

² Données extraites de A. BARBOSA DE OLIVEIRA (org.), *O Ensino, o Trabalho a População e a Renda*, publication n° 2 de la Campagne Nationale de Perfectionnement du Personnel de Niveau Supérieur, Rio de Janeiro, 1953, tableau 4 A.

³ Sur les structures de l'organisation des écoles, ses déficiences et sur l'éducation au Brésil cf. Florestan FERNANDES, «Dados sobre e Situação do Ensino», *Brasiliense*, n° 30, 1960, pp. 67-119 et 23 tableaux hors textes.

⁴ *Ibid.*, données exposées au tableau IV.

pauvres de la population ou celles des régions moins prospères du pays va normalement porter sur le réseau de l'enseignement public existant.

	Immatriculés		Diplômés	
	Enseignement Public	Privé	Enseignement Public	Privé
Enseignement primaire	5.664.892	800.687	397.582	89.546
	88 %	12 %	82 %	18 %
Enseignement extra- primaire élémentaire	8.994	17.885	1.721	2.116
	33 %	67 %	45 %	55 %
Enseignement moyen	321.854	651.130	45.494	99.030
	33 %	67 %	31 %	69 %
Enseignement supérieur	45.579	38.174	7.886	7.863
	55 %	45 %	50 %	50 %

Les éducateurs engagés dans la promotion du Brésil ont concentré leurs efforts dans ce sens et ont toujours cherché à augmenter l'efficacité de l'action directe ou indirecte de l'Etat républicain en matière d'instruction⁵. Comme but principal, ils se sont assigné la définition plus précise et plus positive des responsabilités éducatives de l'Etat. Ils ont provoqué ainsi des changements rapides et profonds dans la structure de l'enseignement brésilien. En 1934, ils ont obtenu un amendement du texte constitutionnel qui attribuait à l'Union (Etat) la compétence de légiférer dans le domaine des bases et lignes directrices de l'éducation nationale. Ces dispositions ont été maintenues dans la Constitution de 1946. On cherchait ainsi à accélérer l'adaptation du système d'enseignement aux exigences actuelles de l'éducation et à favoriser l'essor constructif des plans nationaux d'éducation surtout en ce qui concerne l'enseignement public.

En novembre 1948, à la Chambre des députés, il a été présenté un avant-projet de loi sur les Directives et Bases de l'Education Nationale qui constituait une sorte de systématisation des innovations suggé-

⁵ Sur l'idéal des « pionniers d'une éducation nouvelle » et son influence pratique, cf. Fernando DE AZEVEDO, *A Cultura Brasileira*, Companhia Editora Nacional, S. Paulo, 1944, 2^e éd., pp. 382-388, et chap. IV. En ce qui concerne les buts de ces éducateurs à travers le projet de Directives et Bases de l'Education Nationale, cf. A. ALMEIDA Junior, « Directrizes e Bases da Educação Nacional (O Hibridismo que a Camara aprovou) » *Anhembi*, Ano X. N^o 112, vol. XXXVIII, 1960, pp. 18-35.

rées par les éducateurs de tendance libérale. Il sembla que les mesures préconisées étaient accueillies favorablement par les membres du Parlement. Cependant les défenseurs de l'école privée sous l'ordre et avec l'appui du clergé catholique ont réussi à modifier le projet de loi jusqu'à changer complètement son orientation et son contenu. Déjà en janvier 1959, les défenseurs de l'enseignement privé escomptaient un amendement qui tiendrait expressément compte de leurs intérêts et revendications. Finalement, un an après, la Chambre des députés a approuvé un projet de loi donnant satisfaction aux revendications principales des courants d'opinion particuliers, contrairement aux traditions fortement consacrées par l'expérience républicaine, notamment en matière d'autonomie de l'Etat dans l'administration et la politique de l'enseignement, pour l'attribution des subventions du pouvoir central aux établissements d'instruction et encore en ce qui concerne la façon d'interpréter l'intervention des pouvoirs publics dans la démocratisation des possibilités d'enseignement⁶.

L'approbation d'un tel projet de loi a déchaîné plusieurs manifestations de mécontentement dans tout le pays. Les plus violentes et les plus radicales se sont produites évidemment dans les milieux estudiantins, le corps professoral et les organismes syndicaux des ouvriers. A ce moment-là, s'est créé un climat favorable à l'organisation formelle des groupes d'opinion prêts à défendre les traditions républicaines brésiliennes et le système d'enseignement public. Les étudiants ont propagé un slogan qui est devenu la définition d'un état d'esprit: *L'argent public pour l'École Publique*. En outre, ils ont posé les jalons de la Campagne de Défense de l'École Publique⁷. Cette campagne a rassemblé des étudiants, des professeurs, des leaders syndicaux, des intellectuels et des représentants de plusieurs minorités religieuses, de centres culturels et d'associations ouvrières. En un mot, le mouvement est devenu un mouvement civique qui se proposait de défendre l'héritage républicain et la philosophie démocratique de l'éducation.

Les sociologues qui ont pris part à ce mouvement social, s'engageaient, dès le début, en tant que citoyens. A côté d'autres intellectuels,

⁶ A ce propos voir Roque Spencer MACIEL DE BARROS (org.), *Directrizes e Bases da Educação*. Livraria Pioneira Editora, S. Paulo, 1960, annexe dans laquelle est transcrit l'avant-projet gouvernemental, l'amendement de l'enseignement privé et le projet de loi approuvé par la Chambre des députés, pp. 479-547.

⁷ La Campagne s'est structurée à l'occasion de la «I^{ère} Convenção Estadual de Defesa da Escola Pública» réalisée à S. Paulo le 5 mai 1960: voir *O Estado de S. Paulo*, le 6 mai 1960, dernière page et pp. 14-15.

des éducateurs surtout, ils ont accepté la part de responsabilité civile que les circonstances imposaient. Leur rôle d'intellectuels les a conduits à se poser en défenseurs des intérêts, des valeurs et des aspirations sociales de certaines strates de la société brésilienne. Il faut noter que: 1° La participation des sociologues au mouvement a son origine dans des initiatives spontanées, provoquées par des convictions intimes et profondes partagées avec plus ou moins d'intensité par tous les citoyens brésiliens sensibles à la conception démocratique du monde. C'est à dire que ces convictions n'ont pas été le produit d'une pression sur leur volonté ou de leur soumission à des influences extérieures. 2° La collaboration donnée au mouvement a eu un caractère doctrinal au sens large, elle était fondée sur la divulgation des résultats d'analyses sociologiques de la situation brésilienne montrant les facteurs qui l'expliquent et les effets sociopathiques que pourraient corriger des réformes appropriées. La Campagne de Défense de l'École Publique n'a jamais disposé de moyens humains ou financiers suffisants, ni bénéficié d'une organisation formelle au sens strict du mot. Elle a toujours été dépendante de l'altruisme des collaborateurs militants. Ceux-ci ont cependant réussi à récolter les fonds nécessaires pour la réalisation de plusieurs Conventions⁸. Des commissions chargées d'apporter aux législateurs et aux politiciens les revendications du mouvement ont pu être constituées⁹.

Grâce à la collaboration de certains journaux, de postes émetteurs de télévision et de radio, il a été possible d'organiser des tables rondes qui ont permis d'atteindre une grande partie de la population¹⁰.

⁸ I^{ère} «Convention» Estadual de Defesa da Escola Publica, réalisée dans l'auditoire de la Bibliothèque Municipale de S. Paulo le 5 mai 1960; «Convention» Espirita em Defesa da Escola Publica réalisée dans l'auditoire de la Federação Espirita do Estado de S. Paulo du 11 au 16 juillet 1960; «Convention» Operaria de Defesa da Escola Publica réalisée en collaboration par les groupes syndicaux de l'Etat de S. Paulo dans la salle du Syndicat des Ouvriers de la Métallurgie le 26 février 1961; II^e «Convention» Estadual de Defesa da Escola Publica réalisée dans la salle du Syndicat des Ouvriers de la Métallurgie le 4 juin 1961.

⁹ Dès le mois d'août 1960 plusieurs missions ont été constituées en vue d'entrer en contact avec des sénateurs, députés et autres politiciens dans la capitale de la République; ces missions étaient composées d'éducateurs, de leaders estudiantins et ouvriers et de sociologues qui participaient à la Campagne de Défense de l'École Publique.

¹⁰ En plus de quatre tables rondes télévisées, deux autres ont été organisées pour des publics choisis: pour les élèves de la Faculté de Droit de l'Université de S. Paulo, sous le patronage de l'Académie de Lettres de la Faculté de Droit, le 13 septembre 1960; pour des méthodistes, sous le patronage

Par ailleurs, les associations qui ont patronné des réunions ou des conférences ont couvert leurs frais d'organisation, en finançant le déplacement, le logement de nombreuses personnes, en assurant la propagande et la transmission simultanée, etc. En même temps des études sur la question se sont accumulées: des articles destinés aux revues et aux journaux, des interviews, des communications de contenu plus complexe étant destinées à un public choisi (conventions ou tables rondes de groupes culturels) ont paru dans des revues et des journaux soit entièrement, soit sous forme de résumé¹¹. Quand la Campagne de Défense de l'École Publique s'imposa comme un mouvement constructif reconnu, un éditeur s'est proposé pour publier dans un ouvrage les principaux textes de cette contribution intellectuelle. Un des éducateurs les plus actifs et les plus influents du mouvement fut choisi pour diriger cette entreprise¹².

En général, la production intellectuelle des sociologues et des éducateurs doit correspondre simultanément à deux objectifs précis: l'un, d'information et de propagande, l'autre de caractère formatif et doctrinal. Le premier imposait une attention systématique au relevé et à la divulgation des lacunes, inconsistances et omissions du projet de loi sur les Directives et les Bases de l'Éducation Nationale. Le deuxième exigeait que l'on formule et diffuse en langage courant les idées qui se rapportaient à l'état de l'enseignement au Brésil, à la philosophie démocratique de l'éducation et aux exigences de l'enseignement d'ordre économique, social et politique. Ces deux objectifs convergeaient de façon explicite vers la formation et vers la mise en train de mécanismes réactionnaires de contrôle par le groupe compétent en matière d'éducation, dont l'absence ou la carence provoque

de la Fédération des Sociétés Méthodistes de Jeunesse, dans la salle de l'Église Méthodiste Centrale, le 8 juillet 1961.

¹¹ Plusieurs journaux ont prêté une grande attention à la Campagne de Défense de l'École Publique. Toutefois, grâce à sa position face aux problèmes de l'éducation au Brésil et à son orientation libérale éclairée *O Estado de S. Paulo* a été le pionnier de la campagne lors du projet de loi déposé à la Chambre; une fois la campagne constituée, ce journal lui a donné un appui généreux, constant et stimulant. Il restera dans les annales de l'histoire de l'éducation du pays comme un exemple de l'influence constructive de la presse sur la politique républicaine en matière d'enseignement. Parmi les revues, méritent une citation spéciale: *Anhembi*, qui a publié systématiquement les principaux travaux présentés aux différentes conventions et des études élaborées par des éducateurs ou sociologues qui ont participé à la campagne et *Brasiliense* qui a accueilli et provoqué une collaboration assez variée de militants et sympathisants du mouvement.

¹² Roque Spencer MACIEL DE BARROS, (org.), *Directrizes e Bases da Educação*, Livraria Pioneira Editora, S. Paulo, 1960.

le divorce entre le fonctionnement des écoles à tous les niveaux de l'enseignement et les besoins d'éducation différents selon les couches de la population et les régions.

Il est évident que les sociologues engagés dans le mouvement y participaient comme agents de rééducation de l'homme¹³. Ils ne visaient pas à obtenir une adhésion pure et simple au mouvement, mais à la transformation d'une façon de percevoir les aspects vitaux de la vie sociale organisée; ils exposaient directement les bases perceptives et cognitives du comportement social des Brésiliens en ce qui concerne la forme, le contenu et l'intégration des institutions scolaires. En conséquence, ils devaient obtenir des profanes de niveaux intellectuels très variés qu'ils écoutent et qu'ils acceptent les connaissances et les convictions résultant de l'analyse sociologique des problèmes brésiliens de l'éducation. En transmettant de telles connaissances et convictions par le dialogue et par la discussion, les sociologues s'engageaient dans des contacts répétés et personnels avec le public, contacts qui avaient à leur tour un caractère formatif. Les sociologues se voyaient obligés de modifier des conceptions académiques, des préjugés anciens de certaines classes sociales dominantes, telles que: «le peuple ne s'intéresse pas à l'éducation des enfants»; ou des affirmations gratuites telles que: «le peuple ne possède pas de discernement sur les questions d'enseignement»; «les étudiants ont très peu de responsabilités en ce domaine qui ne les concerne pas»; etc. Ils se voyaient également obligés de modifier l'horizon des intellectuels rigidement exclusivistes qui n'avaient jamais considéré la population non cultivée ou semi-cultivée comme «égale» à respecter dans une relation de réciprocité avec le spécialiste. Cette circonstance a vraiment facilité la propagation des connaissances et des convictions que l'on voulait diffuser, en stimulant des transformations d'attitude et d'expression qui ont eu une importance énorme pour la compréhension des objectifs de la campagne entreprise. L'homme de la rue a révélé, plus que l'on pouvait l'espérer, que celui qui a la

¹³ L'ouvrage mentionné comprend des travaux des sociologues suivants: Fernando de Azevedo, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Florestan Fernandes et Wilson Cantoni. Il ne contient aucune étude de Michel Levy, Octavio Ianni, Luiz Pereira, Marialice Mencarini Forachi, Renato Jardim Moreira, Douglas Teixeira Monteiro et Maria Sylvia Carvalho Franco Moreira, qui cependant ont participé au mouvement à Sao Paulo. Bien que d'autres travaux aient été publiés ultérieurement, le contenu des articles inclus dans cet ouvrage donne une idée fidèle de la qualité de la collaboration intellectuelle offerte à la Campagne de Défense de l'École Publique par les sociologues de São Paulo.

«soif d'instruction» est aussi bien avisé que le spécialiste. Ce qui manque aux gens d'ordinaire ce sont des catégories de pensée qui éclairent l'expérience concrète et leur permettent de procéder à la transformation des perspectives suivant lesquelles ils envisagent les problèmes de l'éducation.

Pour juger de l'ampleur et de la répercussion des activités des sociologues dans la Campagne pour la Défense de l'École Publique, j'ai choisi à titre d'exemple celles d'un membre des plus dévoués du groupe. En excluant les tâches d'ordre impersonnel (liées aux réunions de la direction du mouvement ou à la participation à des groupes de travail formellement organisés) ce sociologue s'est chargé de 39 conférences consacrées à l'analyse et à la critique du projet de Directives et Bases, données à des auditoires de composition et de niveaux intellectuels variés; 4 communications sur des thèmes d'éducation, faites en conventions formelles; 3 participations à des tables rondes transmises par la télévision; 2 participations à des tables rondes organisées pour des cercles restreints de non-spécialistes; 1 exposé dans un meeting préparé par des groupes syndicaux ouvriers; 5 conférences dans lesquelles la question a été débattue sous l'angle d'un problème de base de l'éducation, données à des auditeurs représentatifs du public. Si l'on considère seulement les 44 conférences, on constate que 19 conférences ont été données dans la capitale de l'État de São Paulo; 16 dans des communautés à l'intérieur de cet État; 8 dans de grandes capitales urbaines d'autres États brésiliens; 1 dans une communauté de l'intérieur de l'État de Minas Gerais¹⁴. Le patronage de ces conférences est le suivant: 18 associations estudiantines de l'enseignement supérieur; 3 associations estudiantines de l'enseignement moyen; 2 associations de professeurs de l'enseignement supérieur; 3 associations de professeurs de l'enseignement moyen; 2 organisations religieuses spirites; 2 loges maçonniques; 6 associations culturelles; 1 association récréative; 1 groupes divers; 1 association de professeurs de l'enseignement moyen et associations culturelles; 2 associations estudiantines d'étudiants de l'enseignement supérieur et associations d'élèves de l'enseignement moyen. Il est impossible de

¹⁴ Voici la liste des communes où ont eu lieu des conférences:

- a) à l'intérieur de l'État de S. Paulo: Garça, Araraquara, Marília, Tupã, S. José do Rio Preto, Rio Claro, Mogi das Cruzes, Ribeirão Preto, Lins, Taubaté, Atibaia, Campinas, Sorocaba, Assis, S. José dos Campos e Santos;
- b) capitales d'État outre S. Paulo: Rio de Janeiro, Porto Alegre, Fortaleza Recife e Belo Horizonte;
- c) intérieur de Minas Gerais: Uberlândia;

Chaque conférence était suivie de débats d'une durée d'une heure ou plus.

juger objectivement de la répercussion de telles activités. Deux exemples caractéristiques suggèrent toutefois la nature du contexte émotionnel et moral des réactions qu'elles ont suscité dans la communauté. Dans une ville de l'intérieur de l'Etat de São Paulo, les défenseurs des écoles catholiques de l'enseignement moyen et supérieur ont publié dans un organe de la presse locale une proclamation dans laquelle ils regrettaient: «la présence de ce sociologue», le déclaraient: «ennemi notoire de l'école privée» et soulignaient que: «l'éducation appartient (...) à titre surnaturel à l'Église, d'après l'Encyclique de Pie XI». Par contre, les conseillers communaux de la ville de São Paulo ont jugé ce sociologue: «digne de l'admiration et de la sympathie de tous ceux qui luttent pour la cause de l'éducation nationale» et lui ont conféré solennellement, comme «hommage d'admiration» la décoration la plus haute que l'on puisse accorder à un citoyen de São Paulo.

En ce qui concerne les effets constructifs de telles activités, il faudrait tenir compte de facteurs que l'on ne pouvait et que l'on n'a pas mentionné ici. Par ailleurs, participant à des activités précises, les sociologues engagés dans la Campagne de Défense de l'École Publique ont contribué à deux conquêtes remarquables. La première concerne l'amélioration partielle du texte législatif. Malgré la faiblesse des institutions politiques démocratiques et le pouvoir immense des forces d'opposition, ils ont obtenu des amendements remarquables portant sur quelques dispositions essentielles¹⁵. La deuxième concerne la propagation et l'affermissement d'un nouveau modèle de réaction communautaire aux dilemmes de l'éducation brésilienne. Dans les communautés et les associations où le thème a été débattu, on a vu apparaître de nouvelles dispositions d'aspirations de l'homme de la rue face aux pratiques impératives de l'éducation et à l'organisation du système national d'enseignement. Dans une société, où les problèmes de l'éducation du peuple présentent une telle gravité, ce résultat indirect pourrait mener à un mode nouveau d'utilisation des ressources de l'éducation.

II. LA COMMUNICATION AVEC LE GRAND PUBLIC COMME MODÈLE SOCIAL

L'exposé présenté est fort sommaire. Il se borne à énumérer les données empiriques dont nous avons besoin. Les estimations du

¹⁵ A ce propos voir Roque Spencer MACIEL DE BARROS, «Directrizes e Bases da Educação», *Agora só o Veto* in «O Estado de S. Paulo» du 13 août 1961. Il y avait encore des possibilités de modifier le projet de loi à la Chambre des députés et lors de la sanction gouvernementale.

grand public face à la contribution des sociologues sont liées à des motivations et des attitudes réglées par les situations sociales. La somme des connaissances sociologiques constitue une condition de communication; une autre condition est l'action de facteurs psycho-sociaux et socio-culturels favorables à l'intégration de ces connaissances dans l'horizon culturel de l'homme moyen. Le cas exposé permet d'envisager ce processus sous plusieurs angles intéressants: le rapport entre le changement social, la transformation des conceptions du monde et la valorisation des sociologues par le public; l'émergence et le prestige social du rôle intellectuel des sociologues dans la communauté; l'apparition d'un modèle social de communication entre les sociologues et le grand public.

En ce qui concerne la première question, il nous paraît clair que la crise qui ébranle tout l'héritage traditionnel conditionne le processus de l'acceptation, de l'estimation et de l'assimilation de nouvelles formes de connaissance et d'explication des choses. D'une telle crise dépendent d'un côté l'abandon progressif d'attitudes conformistes qui excluent la science de l'horizon culturel de l'homme et de l'autre côté la recherche progressive d'attitudes et de comportements qui permettent de faire face aux exigences de situations historico-sociales émergentes. De ceci résulte un fait essentiel. La rupture avec le conformisme constitue une simple condition pour l'apparition de nouvelles polarisations du comportement humain. Les facteurs psycho-sociaux et socio-culturels qui orientent, collectivement, les options positives, révèlent leur importance dynamique décisive. L'exemple décrit cerne très bien ce fait. L'appui à la Campagne de Défense de l'École Publique procède de cercles sociaux anti-conformistes: ce fait l'a rendue possible, lui a donné un sens en tant que mouvement social et a hâté la valorisation des techniques culturelles modernes. Quel est le point central de cette valorisation? La réponse est évidente. Les intérêts sociaux de ces milieux ont déterminé les attitudes de pression sur la tradition en faveur de l'éducation scolarisée. Ces milieux demandent non seulement «l'universalisation de l'instruction», mais veulent aussi qu'elle se fasse de manière à augmenter la capacité d'ajustement et d'emprise rationnelle de l'homme sur la portion d'ambiant socialement organisée. Ces aspirations, en pleine phase de transition, développent des nécessités complexes, mal perçues ou partiellement entrevues. L'appel à la collaboration des sociologues et d'autres spécialistes est lié ouvertement dans ce contexte à de nouvelles formules qui correspondent au désir de changement social, alimenté par la modernisation de la technologie, de l'économie et du style de vie.

Cependant, sous cet aspect, il est possible de comprendre comment se forme socialement le grand public des sociologues. Il faut que les tendances de transformation des systèmes de conception du monde englobent la science, les hommes de science et la technologie scientifique dans le processus de reconstruction sociale. Pour y arriver il ne suffit pas que les hommes désirent, collectivement, un quelconque progrès social. Mais, il est indispensable qu'ils disposent de conditions psycho-sociales et institutionnelles pour orienter dans ce sens le comportement collectif. Quelques-unes de ces conditions sont facilement perceptibles. Parmi celles-ci figurent le degré de conscience, d'autonomie et de persévérance des personnes et des groupes qui défendent ces intérêts et valeurs sociales: la tolérance, la valorisation elle-même du changement comme facteur social constructif et facteur de continuité du système socio-culturel, etc. D'autres conditions sont plus complexes et profondes et restent plus ou moins ignorées des agents humains. Parmi celles-ci, figurent la capacité de penser et d'agir raisonnablement, en fonction de fins et de valeurs, des différentes couches sociales en présence; le degré de congruité dans la perception et dans les manifestations de loyalisme de ces couches face aux valeurs et intérêts sociaux définis comme «universels» et «communs» par ordre légal; la capacité purement intellectuelle de l'homme moyen de reconnaître et de distinguer selon une échelle sociale, les inconsistances basiques de structure, de fonctionnement et d'intégration des institutions prises isolément ou en groupe, etc. Les résultats de nos interprétations démontrent que, dans la situation brésilienne, seuls les grands centres urbains, comme la ville de São Paulo, combinent avec harmonie les deux types de conditions. Dans ces centres, le traditionnel fait place à d'autres vues grâce à l'expansion progressive de la nouvelle conception du monde, fondée sur la science et sur la technologie scientifique. Dans les autres centres urbains, spécialement dans les villes moyennes et petites, plusieurs de ces conditions n'existent pas ou sont si faibles que la tradition étouffe, anéantit ou déforme les ambitions significatives orientées vers la transformation de la conception dominante du monde.

Notre analyse porte spécifiquement sur ce qui se produit actuellement dans les centres urbains. Comment expliquer sociologiquement le recours aux sociologues, et à d'autres spécialistes, comme source de prise de conscience de la réalité sociale? Ici, fuir la tentation d'extrapoler les explications s'impose. Les raisons par lesquelles les sciences sociales sont devenues «techniques de conscience sociale» valables pour l'Europe, ne se retrouvent pas en Amérique latine. On ne peut oublier que les Européens ont fait appel depuis longtemps

aux sciences sociales et ce après avoir eu une modalité de connaissance de «sens commun» qui combinait, complètement, la connaissance vulgaire, née de l'expérience, avec des catégories de pensée élaborées à travers le droit naturel, le bilan public et privé de la philosophie de la «question sociale». Quand les sciences sociales se sont transformées en technique de conscience sociale, ce type de connaissance commune avait déjà épuisé ses possibilités et le fait que la connaissance scientifique-positive s'y soit substituée, s'explique par ses limitations, insurmontables en ce qui concerne une réalité sociale devenue plus complexe. Or, en Amérique latine, les choses se passent autrement. Les bases perceptives et cognitives du comportement humain ne sont pas arrivées à constituer un modèle aussi complexe, qui provoquerait une connaissance de sens commun hautement systématisée, rationnelle et critique des conditions ambiantes de l'existence sociale. Les études d'Adam Smith, Marx, Tönnies, Max Weber, Sombart, Durkheim, Scheler et Manheim suggèrent comment et pourquoi la connaissance de sens commun a acquis un contenu aussi abstrait et aussi critique en conférant à l'homme le pouvoir d'ajuster, sans interruption, son comportement et ses niveaux d'aspirations aux exigences de la situation historico-sociale. Plusieurs processus ont contribué, par convergence, à produire cet effet, en faisant que la sécularisation des attitudes et des comportements ainsi que la rationalisation des moyens de concevoir ou d'organiser le monde se reflètent constamment et profondément dans les catégories de pensée utilisées par les hommes dans la perception, l'interprétation et la solution de leurs problèmes pratiques quotidiens. Dans les communautés humaines d'Amérique latine, un style de vie rustique qui empêchait largement une connaissance aussi élaborée a prévalu. A ce propos, en raison de la transplantation de formes archaïques et dérivées de la domination seigneuriale et de la prédominance de l'héritage traditionnel, il existe plus de similitudes entre l'Europe précapitaliste et l'Amérique latine coloniale et préindustrielle qu'entre celle-ci et l'Europe de la révolution industrielle et de l'avènement des sciences sociales. C'est seulement, par la combinaison très récente de l'urbanisation, de la modernisation technologique et de l'industrialisation, que l'horizon culturel de l'homme a été révolu dans ses formes et dans son contenu par des processus sociaux analogues à ceux qui ont engendré le type de connaissance précité, celui du sens commun, dans la société européenne.

De ceci découle qu'il faut tenir compte de deux éléments. Primo, il ne faut pas oublier que, sous certains aspects l'intérêt pour la sociologie en Amérique latine est lié à son utilisation comme suc-

cédané de cette connaissance de sens commun, exigée par les circonstances émergentes, qui cependant n'a pas encore trouvé des conditions psycho-sociales et morales lui permettant de se développer pleinement dans les milieux ruraux ou traditionalistes. Secundo, il faut tenir compte de ce que les rôles intellectuels des sociologues, reconnus et estimés socialement, les transforment en une sorte d'«avant-garde» de la conscience sociale.

Ce n'est pas la sociologie comme telle qui est l'objet d'une valorisation spécifique, mais sa contribution à la compréhension du monde qui entoure les hommes; ce qui est péniblement étriqué pour les spécialistes. Sans doute, le sociologue finit-il par être considéré comme «homme de science» et sa science finit-elle par être super-valorisée comme «facteur de conscience» de la situation et comme «facteur de changement de la situation». Par ailleurs, il est incontestable que ces estimations se reflètent dans l'importance et même dans la préférence accordée à la sociologie et aux sociologues. Ce qu'il y a derrière ces estimations grandiloquentes, mais ingénues et honnêtes, est sans doute choquant et incompréhensible pour le sociologue européen ou nord-américain, de tendance purement académique. On peut résumer la situation en disant que pour le public les sociologues devraient produire des connaissances:

1. immédiatement compréhensibles par le public à partir d'éléments perceptibles et cognoscitifs dont ils disposent en tant qu'agents sociaux;

2. essentiellement concordantes avec les intérêts et les valeurs sociales correspondantes, face à des manipulations qui englobent ou la préservation ou la modification de l'ordre légal;

3. fondamentalement convergeantes avec le désir d'accélérer le progrès social mais sans sacrifice coûteux. Evitons les subterfuges: il s'agit d'une connaissance qui pourrait être élaborée par le non-spécialiste cultivé dès qu'il peut disposer de recours intellectuels pour envisager les problèmes nationaux à la lumière de modèles historico-sociographico-pragmatiques de l'interprétation des choses. La préférence pour le sociologue provient de la carence en intellectuels possédant de telles possibilités et de quelques motifs assez évidents en apparence: la confiance dans le technicien, dans l'homme «capable»; l'attente d'une attitude de neutralité du spécialiste devant les conflits d'intérêts; le discrédit du savant de cabinet, prisonnier d'idées sans contenu et sans sens pratique; ajoutons encore que la formation scientifique favorise singulièrement les sociologues. Des observations superficielles et parfois la simple expérience de l'observateur participant

sont suffisantes pour garantir leur succès dans cette sorte de *connaissance sociologique*.

Nous pourrions maintenant passer à la troisième et dernière question. Quand serait-il possible de parler de l'existence d'un modèle social de communication de l'homme de science avec le grand public ? Et quelles seraient ses conditions et conséquences ? Par ce que nous avons vu, tout dépend de la qualité de la réaction du groupe. Le mode par lequel les hommes ont défini socialement le rôle intellectuel des savants et profitent intentionnellement de ses contributions décide du reste. Des exemples montrent que ceci ne peut être source de limitation du développement de la science ; mais, on peut y trouver la raison d'être de l'inertie ou de la non-utilisation des découvertes de la science par la société. Pour cause, il serait utile de donner une plus grande amplitude à la discussion des évidences et des conclusions obtenues jusqu'à maintenant.

De l'analyse effectuée, il découle qu'on peut admettre un modèle social de la communication des sociologues avec le grand public quand ses contributions concourent, dynamiquement, au modelage de l'horizon culturel de l'homme moyen. Alors, s'établissent des conditions subjectives qui garantissent la rencontre des productions intellectuelles des sociologues et des attitudes du public. Un des graves problèmes de la sociologie contemporaine, dans tous les pays où elle a réussi à atteindre un certain développement scientifique, réside dans les niveaux et proportions en lesquelles ce fait est possible. Malgré que le public se soit familiarisé avec les thèmes traités par les sociologues, celui-ci tend dans une plus ou moins grande mesure à réagir négativement ou improductivement à la connaissance sociologique. Sans même tenir compte des difficultés nées d'un vocabulaire technique, qui cependant ne sont pas insurmontables, la compréhension du public est fréquemment oblitérée par des évaluations ethnocentristes souvent essentielles à la préservation de convictions profondes et par la sous-estimation de la connaissance scientifique elle-même d'une réalité qui semble intelligible à la connaissance de sens commun. La suppression de ces difficultés dépend, exactement, du développement de la civilisation moderne et de l'importance que l'éducation basée sur la science, les sciences sociales incluses, aura un jour sur la formation de l'homme. A présent, la situation est pénible dans les pays où le niveau intellectuel moyen offre de bonnes perspectives de valorisation positive de la contribution des hommes de science et même des sociologues. Prenons la France comme exemple. On connaît bien le nombre de critiques inconsistantes, de type ethnocentriste, et de faux problèmes soulevés autour de l'explication sociologique du

suicide, découverte par Durkheim. Ce climat défavorable au profit productif des contributions intellectuelles du sociologue garde encore aujourd'hui la même intensité. On y trouverait l'explication de la résistance opposée à la sociologie dans les milieux universitaires eux-mêmes¹⁶.

En tenant compte des données exposées et des conclusions qui en découlent, la définition sociale du rôle intellectuel des sociologues comporte deux sortes de réflexion. Le niveau de communication développé dans les rapports intellectuels des sociologues avec le grand public, dans la situation brésilienne, possède des inconsistances indéniables. En particulier, en dehors du cercle des spécialistes, il ne favorise pas la compréhension fructueuse du caractère légitime et de la nécessité de la spécialisation, amoindrissant la recherche sociologique de base et les développements de la théorie sociologique systématique. Le public est prédisposé à accepter, à valoriser positivement et à profiter des explications constructives correspondant à son besoin de comprendre la réalité et de la modifier conformément à ses intérêts ou ses valeurs sociales. Au-dessus de ce plan, ni la sociologie ni les sociologues ne parviennent à avoir aucune importance pour sa conception du monde et des choses. De cette attitude, résultent les évaluations et les pressions qui amènent les sociologues eux-mêmes à certaines options qui mettent en relief l'exploration de modèles historico-sociographiques d'analyse, portant parfois l'accent sur des suppositions pragmatiques extra-scientifiques. En conséquence, les possibilités les plus complexes et scientifiquement importantes de la recherche de base et de l'élaboration théorique sont négligées ou sous-estimées. Cependant, le même type de communication présente des éléments positifs prometteurs. Il réduit l'isolement intellectuel du sociologue et offre un point de départ riche en perspectives de rendement. L'isolement intellectuel du sociologue, aussi bien en Europe qu'aux États-Unis, tient à la convergence de deux séries de circonstances qui maintiennent les hommes de science culturellement séparés de la collectivité. D'une part il y a les exigences du travail intellectuel du spécialiste nécessitant un minimum d'isolement physique et mental, d'autre part il y a son exclusion systématique des rôles sociaux actifs qui impliquent l'application des données et des découvertes de la science à la solution de problèmes matériels, moraux et éducatifs de l'homme. Cette convergence a suscité une situation de travail intellectuel franchement non satisfaisante, qui engendre chez

¹⁶ Armand CUVILLIER, *Où va La Sociologie Française ?*, Marcel Rivière et Cie, Paris 1953.

les hommes de science des frustrations dangereuses et qui remet en des mains très peu ou mal qualifiées l'avenir d'une civilisation basée sur la science et la technologie scientifique. Or, ce n'est pas ce seul isolement que brise le modèle social de communication que nous considérons à présent. C'est tout un ensemble de possibilités nouvelles qui surgit, dont le profit dépend de la plasticité, de la malléabilité et de la responsabilité des sociologues eux-mêmes dans leurs échanges avec le grand public. S'ils ne rejettent pas les centres d'intérêts mentionnés, petit à petit, ils pourront acheminer la curiosité et l'esprit critique du public vers des objectifs plus compensateurs pour le progrès de la recherche et de la théorie, en préservant une position stratégique d'une importance énorme pour les influences dynamiques de la science sur la civilisation moderne.

III. ISOLEMENT OU RESPONSABILITÉ SCIENTIFIQUE ?

Le cas choisi et son analyse à travers la discussion précédente permettent de placer le thème au niveau où il est le moins attrayant pour les sociologues conscients de leurs responsabilités devant le développement de la sociologie comme science, c'est à dire, au niveau le plus élémentaire de représentation des rôles intellectuels des sociologues, dans lequel il serait difficile de séparer la sociologie des types de connaissance extra-scientifiques qui l'ont précédée et qui ont conditionné son apparition dans les sociétés européennes modernes. L'intérêt scientifique éventuel de la présente contribution réside dans ce fait. Celle-ci traduit, de façon extrême, une modalité de réaction de groupe à la production intellectuelle des sociologues, qui demeure latente dans les évaluations du public, là même où ils ont pu faire abstraction de l'usage que l'on prétend donner à la connaissance sociologique en Amérique latine. Les expectatives pourront être plus raffinées et complexes, en y incluant aussi la reconnaissance explicite des autres rôles intellectuels des sociologues, directement intéressés à la recherche de base et à l'élaboration théorique. Chaque fois qu'on parle, cependant, du «sens pratique» que la contribution des sociologues devrait posséder, des évaluations, qui tendent vers le modèle social de communication considéré, entrent en jeu. D'où l'extrême importance d'étendre la discussion, de façon à débattre les implications positives d'une stratégie de travail qui donne la possibilité de considérer de façon consciente et intégrale les expectatives de ce genre.

Le côté positif de la question présuppose des intérêts théoriques et pratiques d'ordre assez divers. Quelques-uns de ces intérêts affectent la condition humaine du sociologue et l'équilibre qui doit exister entre ses obligations envers la science et ses obligations civiques ou humanitaires. D'autres concernent les fonctions de la science dans le monde moderne et les particularités qui élargissent encore davantage ces fonctions quand il s'agit de sciences sociales. En ne nous tenant qu'au fondamental, nous avons choisi six sujets qui semblent être les plus significatifs pour le contexte général de la discussion.

La question centrale, pour ainsi dire, est celle de la technique d'exposition à employer par les sociologues. Le cas choisi prend la communication entre le sociologue et le grand public au plan où elle demande le minimum de sophistication et d'ésotérisme. En examinant les apports oraux et écrits des sociologues à la Campagne de Défense de l'École Publique, on constate cependant que certains d'entre eux présentent une indéniable rigueur scientifique et même une certaine précision dans la terminologie. Que pourrait-on en conclure ? Deux choses semblent patentées. Primo, la technique d'exposition formellement considérée peut être adaptée aux auditoires auxquels se destinent les contributions sociologiques sans que cela impose quelque dégradation substantielle de la connaissance sociologique. Secundo, le problème de la rigueur et de la précision se présente quant à l'observation, à la construction et à l'interprétation de la réalité; il est parfaitement possible de profiter des conclusions obtenues en accord avec les canons d'investigation scientifique au moyen de techniques d'exposition et d'artifices du langage accessibles au public en général. C'est donc sous cet aspect qu'une suggestion de haute valeur découle de la question étudiée. Le langage technique, fermé et inaccessible au non-spécialiste, peut et doit être utilisé convenablement dans les travaux destinés au public spécialisé et qui, de par sa nature, s'orientent directement vers le progrès de la théorie sociologique. La rigueur descriptive et l'uniformité conceptuelle apparaissent, dans ces instances, comme condition essentielle à la communication entre les spécialistes. Cependant, étant donné l'importance des sciences sociales pour la vie pratique de l'homme moderne et pour l'avenir de la civilisation sur laquelle elle se base, il est indispensable que les spécialistes sociaux cherchent à s'adapter positivement aux exigences symboliques de communication avec d'autres auditeurs: non-spécialistes en connaissances sociologiques ou public totalement étranger aux valeurs et aux normes de pensée scientifique qu'ils doivent satisfaire, et ceci pour chaque type d'auditoire, à des fins qui sont variables mais d'importance capi-

tale pour la science. En observant strictement les besoins de communication avec son public organique restreint, le sociologue tient compte des fins immanentes au processus de croissance de la théorie de base de la science. Il ignore cependant que l'interaction de la science dans le système civilisateur en gestation possède une importance équivalente pour le développement du savoir scientifique. C'est pourquoi, nous croyons que le cas discuté nous met devant des défis réels de la communication avec le grand public, nous forçant à penser aux auditoires systématiquement ignorés par les sociologues jusqu'aujourd'hui et aux fins de signification définie par la diffusion des connaissances sociologiques dans le monde où nous vivons.

L'autre question importante qui se pose est celle de la nature même de l'éthique suivie par les sociologues en tant qu'hommes de science et comme tels. Nous sommes à une époque où les savants prennent un intérêt croissant au destin dépendant des découvertes scientifiques et cherchent à s'adapter aux exigences de la situation historico-sociale, en acceptant des responsabilités spécifiques. Toutefois, pour paradoxal que cela puisse paraître, les pionniers de la sociologie ont adhéré à une éthique de responsabilité scientifique bien avant les physiciens, les chimistes et les biologistes actuels. Leurs continuateurs ne les ont pas suivis, sous prétexte que leurs préoccupations entraînaient des attitudes et des options extra-scientifiques (ou plutôt, liées à la philosophie sociale). Au lieu de se conformer aux préoccupations pragmatiques inhérentes à l'horizon intellectuel des savants, ils s'en sont dégagés, en échange de l'assimilation du mode de travail en vigueur dans le domaine de la physique, de la chimie ou de la biologie. En d'autres termes, ils ont opté pour l'isolement et l'abstention devant les dilemmes moraux créés par la civilisation basée sur la science et sur la technologie scientifique. L'aspect paradoxal de la situation réside dans le fait que les sociologues se sont trouvés repoussés vers les anciennes positions, sous l'influx direct de la rébellion des physiciens, des chimistes et des biologistes modernes contre «l'irresponsabilité éthique» inhérente à la conception libérale des rôles intellectuels des hommes de science. Le cas étudié nous amène à considérer cette question objectivement, sous l'angle où elle s'impose au sociologue comme un dilemme inévitable. Notre situation est bien plus difficile que celle des physiciens, celle des chimistes et celle des biologistes. Nous devons, tout comme eux, penser à l'usage constructif des découvertes de la science: mais à cause de la nature même de notre science, nous sommes aussi appelés à collaborer activement aux processus par lesquels un tel usage constructif devient réalité. Que nous le veuillons ou non, cela entraîne

des contacts avec différentes couches de la population, et une interaction sur le plan symbolique. Même sans la chercher, ceux qui s'occupent de science sociale se trouvent toujours davantage devant une participation responsable dans les mécanismes de réactions de groupe aux problèmes sociaux. La question consiste à savoir quelle attitude prendre: défendre l'ancienne orientation passive ou stimuler la formation de nouveaux rôles intellectuels qui amèneront les sociologues à partager de nouvelles responsabilités dans la vie pratique? Objectivement parlant, les tendances de développement historico-social nous enlèvent l'initiative du choix, nous imposant dans le domaine de la vie pratique des tâches complexes, auxquelles nous devons répondre en tant qu'hommes de science. Le pôle le plus simple de ces pressions morales est présent dans le cas que nous examinons. Le plus compliqué se révèle dans les tentatives de convertir la planification en technique rationnelle pour la reconstruction sociale. Les deux obligent à un changement de stratégie intellectuelle. Bien des constructions sociologiques ne se dirigent plus spécifiquement et fondamentalement vers le progrès de la théorie sociologique proprement dite. Le technicien profane et du grand public s'insinue dans la sphère des relations professionnelles des sociologues, avec des exigences qui ne peuvent désormais être ignorées ou *olympiquement* méprisées comme étant «dangereuses pour la science». Ou bien, nous envisageons ces exigences, en assumant les rôles intellectuels et les responsabilités sociales qui en découlent; ou bien, nous abandonnons la sociologie à un avenir ingrat. A nouveau, ces résultats nous mettent en face d'un autre dilemme. De quelle façon le sociologue doit-il envisager les nouvelles exigences de la situation? Le cas choisi pour illustrer les tendances de notre époque nous révèle comment des rôles intellectuels imprévus surgissent, entraînant les sociologues dans des mouvements sociaux spontanés. Si notre expérience historique était autre, il serait bien possible d'analyser le même processus dans le champ de planification sociale et de formation de rôles intellectuels qui entraîneraient les sociologues dans la vie sociale organisée. Dans les deux extrêmes, le dilemme est identique. Le sociologue doit-il ignorer la transformation du monde qu'il habite et ses répercussions dans son univers de travail? Indépendamment de toute option de caractère idéologique, il semble clair que le sociologue ne peut pas et ne doit pas négliger de participer aux processus qui tendent à redéfinir la position de la science dans l'organisation de la vie humaine. A lui de soutenir toute tendance constructive d'inclusion des sociologues dans les secteurs d'activités pratiques où les découvertes des sciences sociales peuvent être exploitées productivement par

l'homme. S'ils n'ont pas d'autres raisons, les sociologues auront cependant besoin d'accepter cette option pour des motifs égoïstes: pour sauvegarder les possibilités de recherche de base et la continuité du développement théorique de la sociologie comme science. Mais, en adoptant cette option, ils ne pourront jamais se dispenser ni d'exercer des influences spécifiques dans la modification de l'horizon culturel du public, ni d'intervenir directement et intensément dans les formes d'institutionnalisation de leurs nouveaux rôles professionnels. Ce qui signifie qu'ils doivent se préoccuper, dans un style différent, des problèmes de l'intégration de la science et de la sociologie elle-même dans la routine de la vie sociale. Les collègues éventuels dans une entreprise scientifique ne sont plus les seuls partenaires intellectuels dont il faut tenir compte. D'autres techniciens et spécialistes, aussi bien de «l'homme de la multitude», surgissent comme des pôles actifs de l'organisation du monde professionnel et moral.

A côté de ces éléments de signification générale, le cas étudié comporte des pondérations se référant de manière spécifique à la situation socio-culturelle brésilienne. Les influences externes qui entraînent les sociologues dans les mouvements sociaux spontanés ne pourraient manquer de se refléter sur d'autres plans de l'interaction des sociologues avec le milieu social ambiant. A ce propos, il conviendrait de mettre en relief trois points fondamentaux. Primo, l'importance relative de cet entraînement pour le sociologue comme savant et pour la sociologie comme science. Secundo, l'importance du point de vue de la communauté de la participation des sociologues à des mouvements sociaux. Tertio, le sens dans lequel l'éthique de la responsabilité scientifique peut contribuer positivement à l'élargissement du champ de la connaissance positive des grands dilemmes d'une société et à l'amélioration de la qualité du type de réaction de groupe à de tels dilemmes.

En ce qui concerne le premier point, il est actuellement possible d'affirmer que la principale victime du type de travail académique dominant auquel se lie l'isolement physique, intellectuel et moral du sociologue, a été la sociologie elle-même. En restreignant les limites de l'expérience humaine du sociologue, en l'excluant de l'analyse et de la solution des questions pratiques, on a provoqué une grave et périlleuse réduction de sa capacité de connaissance des processus sociaux en tant qu'observateur par participation. Il paraît normal que le recours éventuel à la participation suppléante et active et notamment les techniques d'observation systématique ont permis de compenser et de vaincre les limitations résultant d'une telle situation. Il est hors de doute que la formation de nouveaux rôles intellectuels en

rapport avec la participation des sociologues aux problèmes concrets de la collectivité augmente les possibilités de connaître, de manière active, mais intime et pénétrante, les bases dynamiques des relations humaines et des polarisations du comportement collectif. Sur ce plan, la communication des sociologues avec le grand public acquiert une signification constructive pour l'homme de science et pour la science elle-même. Limitons-nous à des expériences personnelles: la vision et la compréhension que nous avons de plusieurs aspects de la société brésilienne se sont élargies et approfondies grâce à la participation à la Campagne pour la Défense de l'École Publique. Méritent une mention spéciale deux types de résultats d'observation «endopathique» que ce mouvement social a suscité. A l'arrière-plan des débats et des discussions était en jeu la question de savoir quelles forces sociales contrôlèrent l'enseignement brésilien: les milieux catholiques conservateurs, qui aspirent ouvertement au monopole de la politique en matière d'éducation ou les courants libéraux et démocratiques qui cherchent à affermir l'État républicain et à assurer son intervention dans la solution des problèmes d'éducation populaire. Dans chaque situation, le sociologue pourrait observer comment des personnes et des groupes liés aux différentes polarisations de ces tendances s'affrontent sur la scène sociale, comment ils s'engagent dans la lutte pour la défense de leurs intérêts et de leurs valeurs sociales. Ce qui est important toutefois, c'est que les observations faites trouvent des modèles dans l'expérience réelle, qui permettent d'établir le caractère et la qualité des différentes connexions structurelles et fonctionnelles ainsi que le sens du comportement des agents, considérés individuellement ou comme parties des groupes en conflit. Par ceci nous avons non seulement acquis une perspective permettant de réinterpréter les tendances conservatrices et innovatrices en lutte dans les circonstances actuelles, mais aussi nous avons eu l'opportunité de découvrir quelque chose de surprenant: les lacunes de l'horizon culturel dominant sont d'un ordre tel que cet horizon est incapable de promouvoir l'ajustement des actions humaines aux exigences inéluctables du présent. Par ailleurs nous sommes arrivés à former certaines convictions intimes qui mettent en évidence l'importance de la malléabilité des sociologues en présence de rôles extra ou ultra-scientifiques qui leur sont assignés par la communauté. Il paraît évident, dans le cas du Brésil, que la rigidité des milieux conservateurs et du système organisateur de la société globale tend à aggraver le danger potentiel des solutions tardives, mais violentes, des problèmes sociaux. De ceci résulte qu'une situation stratégique dans des occurrences historico-sociales représente une condition favorable donnant des éclair-

cissements aux sociologues sur la nature et la portée des options pratiques, en leur fournissant les éléments nécessaires pour décider à la lumière de leurs obligations morales de sociologues¹⁷. Ces deux résultats montrent qu'une participation plus ample et plus active des sociologues comme tels à des événements importants pour la communauté, raffine leur capacité d'observation de la réalité, en leur fournissant, en même temps, des critères objectifs pour mesurer la nécessité ou la portée de leurs apports pratiques.

Cependant, la rupture de l'ancien modèle académique n'est pas moins importante pour la collectivité. Même au niveau où nous pourrions envisager les choses, à travers le cas choisi, il semble évident que les apports des sociologues peuvent devenir la source de changements d'attitudes et d'habitudes enracinées, stimulant des innovations constructives dans le mode d'envisager et de traiter les problèmes nationaux. Malgré la réaction ethnocentriste de chaque groupe à ces apports, ceux-ci acquièrent une double signification dynamique. Tout d'abord, ils élargissent directement ou indirectement les bases de perception et de conscience objective des problèmes sociaux; en même temps, ils répandent et consolident les probabilités de contrôle rationnel des faits. Ensuite, ils fortifient, dans le contexte social, les tendances de réaction de groupe qui cherchent à résoudre les problèmes sociaux moyennant le contrôle des conditions et des facteurs psycho-sociaux ou socio-culturels qui les déterminent. Ceci veut dire que les apports pratiques des sociologues peuvent assumer une signification importante pour la modification des contenus et même du modèle d'organisation de l'horizon culturel des hommes. Ceci indique aussi un sens constructif spécifique. Dans une civilisation fondée sur la science et la technologie, cette collaboration constitue la vie normale des communautés humaines qui remplacent graduellement des conceptions et des techniques de contrôle plus ou moins arriérées ou improductives par des conceptions et des techniques rationnelles de contrôle social. Dans ce sens, la collaboration des sociologues à des rôles intellectuels d'intérêt prépondérant pour la communauté répondrait à des impératifs créés par le changement social et surtout par les tendances les plus profondes d'amendement du modèle civilisateur lui-même.

¹⁷ Des options dans ce contexte présentent une signification équivalente à celle des options que les physiciens, chimistes et biologistes ont dû prendre face à l'emploi destructif de l'énergie nucléaire. Ce qui est en jeu, naturellement, c'est la portée de la prévision scientifique concernant les occurrences de la vie pratique et l'obligation morale qui en résulte de la divulgation de telles connaissances.

Finalement, toutes les sociétés possèdent et envisagent deux sortes de dilemmes: ceux qui sont universels et qui proviennent des modèles matériels et moraux de l'organisation de la vie dans le cadre d'une civilisation divisée, et ceux qui sont particuliers et résultent des conditions spécifiques où chaque société peut réaliser les modèles matériels et moraux de l'organisation de la vie du cercle civilisateur auquel elle appartient. Les sociologues peuvent analyser et divulguer les deux sortes de dilemmes. Dans la situation actuelle de l'Amérique latine, cependant, le grand public s'intéresse surtout aux dilemmes de la deuxième catégorie, parce qu'ils permettent d'expliquer sociologiquement les causes et les effets du sous-développement économique, culturel et social. En acceptant de nouveaux rôles intellectuels et le modèle de communication avec le grand public, les sociologues introduisent aussi des modifications dans leur propre horizon culturel et dans les critères d'évaluation de ce qui serait d'importance scientifique primordiale. Les dilemmes qui aveuglent la collectivité deviennent ainsi désormais les thèmes centraux de la réflexion scientifique. Or, le dilemme premier de la société brésilienne d'aujourd'hui est le retard culturel, non pas dans le sens de la modification trop rapide de certaines sphères de la société et de la culture ou de l'urgence d'une réintégration des progrès réalisés, mais dans ce sens bien plus pénible et dramatique: il existe une résistance résiduelle intense au changement, laquelle devient sociopathique dans les cercles conservateurs du pays, concentrés dans les villes ou dispersés dans le vaste monde rural et traditionaliste brésilien. En participant à des mouvements sociaux, les sociologues non seulement peuvent mieux connaître la nature, les fondements et les perspectives d'un tel dilemme, mais ils savent désormais pourquoi il n'a pas été combattu avec succès et comment modifier le style d'intervention du profane, enfin principalement, quelles sont les techniques sociales à suggérer en vue du changement et de la mentalité des hommes et de la structure de la situation.

Le cas sélectionné est une évidence positive de l'ensemble de ces éléments. Pourrait-on objecter que l'alternative implique les risques de placer les sociologues (et avec eux, la science et l'attitude scientifique) au centre des conflits humains? Il est cependant faux de présumer qu'un tel phénomène produise, de lui-même, la perversion de la connaissance scientifique. Ce qui garantit la teneur positive de la connaissance scientifique, ce ne sont pas les rapports de l'homme de recherche avec les problèmes sociaux de la collectivité, ce sont plutôt les techniques d'observation, d'analyse et d'interprétation des faits. Si l'investigateur a subi un entraînement scientifique assez étendu, sa

condition de participant ainsi qu'un modèle actif d'interaction réciproque avec le grand public pourront être extrêmement avantageux. S'il ne possède pas cet entraînement, même en se maintenant neutre et indifférent aux problèmes humains ambiants, sa production intellectuelle pourra révéler des distorsions plus ou moins graves dans l'explication des faits. Par ailleurs, il serait risqué de préjuger que le contexte du conflit serait nuisible à l'estimation positive de l'homme de science et de la science par le public. Rien n'empêche, cependant, que les différents groupes en présence finissent par invoquer les mêmes ressources intellectuelles. Notre expérience suggère que c'est au bénéfice de la valorisation de la sociologie et dans le souci de dominer les explications sociologiques, données au public, dans le domaine des problèmes sociaux. Par là, non seulement des attitudes et des estimations plus objectives de l'éducation brésilienne ont été diffusées, mais aussi la qualité de sa perception et la disposition de l'envisager constructivement se sont modifiées, chez tous les groupes. Ce que l'on pourrait en conclure atteste que l'interférence d'appréciations discordantes et même conflictuelles ne doit pas paralyser les sociologues, ni les empêcher d'écouter les appels du grand public. Nous vivons dans une société divisée par des tensions et des conflits, et disposant de ressources pour organiser les processus de reconstruction sociale dans un tel climat. En répondant à des demandes définies de collaboration intellectuelle, les sociologues risquent d'affronter les conséquences de ces conflits; mais ils se mettent au service de forces qui travaillent à réduire leurs effets nuisibles ou à les éliminer de la scène sociale; ainsi donc, il existe de sérieux antagonismes entre les divers cercles sociaux, dans l'appréciation et dans l'acceptation du changement social comme facteur de développement de la société brésilienne. Pour certains d'entre eux, considérer la résistance résiduelle au changement comme trait sociopathique est source potentielle de graves conflits sociaux et représente un défi intolérable. Cependant, une fois le débat entamé, la vérité surgit lentement et chacun doit s'adapter à un état de consensus minimum respectant sa réalité et ses conséquences. Au moment où ceci se produit, le dilemme cesse d'être dénaturé et les pressions morales qui le maintenaient hors du champ de la conscience des hommes cessent d'opérer efficacement; l'inertie devant les effets fait place à différentes manifestations du comportement collectif, pour les surmonter. Même si les sociologues furent seulement appelés à collaborer à la phase initiale du processus, des perspectives de ce genre semblent suffisantes pour justifier des engagements plus ou moins proches de la carrière scientifique comme telle.

THE SOCIOLOGISTS AND THE PUBLIC

Observations concerning the Dutch Situation

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I. INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

The subject at hand has so far, never been studied in the Netherlands. This implies that the following remarks necessarily are impressionistic. The present author feels that he is only able to point out where as he sees it, some more or less important problems may be indicated. No doubt the very fact that the subject is interesting to the Dutch sociologist means that Dutch sociology has come to the forefront in the Netherlands. Sociology, at least quantitatively, has rapidly developed. Sociologists penetrated into all spheres of government and at all levels, into industry and commerce, into mass-communication, employers' organizations and trade-unions, into education, social work and the forces. They are active in the spread of knowledge; they act as counsellors, advisors and even as «social advocates» and policy-makers. In such a situation sociology is confronted with the problem of its position in society, especially vis-à-vis the policy-makers and the public as a whole or different parts of it¹.

II. SOCIOLOGISTS AND THE PUBLIC

By «public» we mean firstly the people living in this country. As a homogeneous concept this meaning of public does not seem to make sense. As a subject of study the public as a whole practically only has importance for public opinion polls, executed in the Netherlands by two or three agencies. As a «consumer» of sociology the public is almost always restricted to parts of it, although it is surprising how the interest for sociology is aroused in all sorts of social circles.

Nevertheless it is possible to make a series of remarks concerning

¹ See this author's contribution to the meeting of the German Sociological Association in October 1961 at Tübingen: *Die Berufsmöglichkeiten des Soziologen*, to be published in 1962.

the public as a whole although it goes without saying that these remarks are applicable in varying degree from category to category. We may discern as we did already between the public as a consumer of sociology and as a subject of sociological studies.

The attitude of the public as consumer of sociology

a. The association of sociology with socialism is still alive in some quarters. Historically it is of course true that sociology by studying society did not accept its structure as a fixed datum and no wonder that socialists, with some conspicuous exceptions in Netherlands, however, were interested in the social sciences. Socialism in the Netherlands has for a long time been very un-orthodox. The Dutch brand of socialism and the feelings of the socialist vote (ca. 30 %) are more in favour of the establishment of the welfare state, of social security and of social planning, than of any old Marxist dogma. On the other hand, the parties that call themselves non-socialist, including the liberal party (People's Party for Freedom and Democracy, V.V.D.), are sharing to a high extent the social views of the Dutch Labour Party (P.v.d.A.). In this situation it is no surprise that sociology is accepted by practically all political quarters and by the religious denominations who have in the Netherlands in some cases a close affiliation with political parties. These circles accepting sociology very clearly cannot be earmarked as socialistic. On the other hand the circles that are against sociology are fervently anti-socialistic. For them sociology is a disguise of the red danger. For these circles the word «planning» is like a red rag to a bull. The planners, «planners», to them are a species of worthless people disturbing the free development of personal initiative. Planners and sociologists are all alike.

b. The press in the Netherlands in general favours sociology. Reviews of sociological books, reports of sociological lectures, announcements of sociological research projects continually are in its columns. Sociologists act as contributors to the newspapers. The exceptions to this general statement are connected to the ones mentioned before in the sphere of politics. The newspapers that are fiercely anti-socialistic are not on good terms with sociology. They criticize research projects, warn against «enquetitis» and enjoy any sign that a forecast in the social and economic sphere made by social scientists seems to be false. A census is considered as an illicit interference in personal life.

If we try to localize the resistance against social science and against sociology in particular we might suggest that it is present mostly in middle-class circles (shop-keepers, small industrialists, and business men) where the antagonistic feelings against Government intervention are strongest. This is no more than an hypothesis with some evidence. Sociology as such is not noticeably touched by this resistance.

c. Notwithstanding the strong position of sociology in the Netherlands the sociologists experience a striking ambivalence. The public is highly interested in sociology without knowing exactly what it is, but on the other hand it is suspicious vis-à-vis this science (is it a science, or simply a body of learned formulations of what everyone knew already?). Trust and mistrust adjoin very near to each other. Trust may turn to mistrust and just the other way around. Sociology seems to have a sort of mysterious flavour not unlike psychical research (parapsychology).

d. The interest for sociology is not always directed at sociology *strictu sensu*. It is a conspicuous fact that the public, the intellectual elite included, shows a lasting interest for writers on macro-societal subjects without a professional training as a sociologist. These writers may boast on large printings. Their success is lying in the ease of handling difficult problems not being hindered by too much critical sense in matters of society. The success of what I might call pseudo-sociological authors in the Netherlands is rather great. The effect is partly to be cheered because at least the interest for the problems of society is aroused, partly however to be deplored because sociology afterwards has to clear away all sorts of unscientific notions about rural life, the horrors of the city, «an outline of hell», and mass culture.

e. The public as a consumer of sociology is rather self-conceited. It is a well-known fact that the public on the basis of its participation in social life is convinced that it knows quite a lot about society. Of course sociologists know interesting details and they are able to find better formulations but people with no sociological training are ready to disagree with sociologists every moment and to deliver quasi-sociological pronouncements without the slightest idea that what they are saying is nonsense. The disagreement with sociologists manifests itself particularly, when the findings of sociology differ from the interest-defined views of specific categories. A striking example in these years is the subject of emigration. In the Netherlands after World War II emigration was fostered by a rather effective policy. Given the population pressure of this country emigration seemed a blessing. Moreover valuable relations were established between the Nether-

lands and overseas countries. In the last few years however the economic situation is such that there is full employment. The problem now is what to do with emigration. To continue the emigration policy, subsidizing emigrants, making a sort of propaganda seems unjustified. On the other hand it is to be realized that the Dutch population is still rapidly growing. There may come a moment when everyone will be happy that at least some more hundred thousands disappear to Canada or Australia. It would be short-sighted to interrupt abruptly a carefully built up emigration policy, to break off relations, to spoil goodwill. In such a situation, the Dutch Government is inclined to follow the advice of sociologists and economists to slow down a bit this active emigration policy but to maintain the apparatus and anyhow not to stop completely the stream of emigrants, that will for the rest naturally decrease.

The arguments to break off the emigration apparatus and not to suspend the emigration regulations are scientifically strong enough. Nevertheless in industrial circles they are rejected and these circles are acting as a pressure group against emigration. This is their right of course, but it is worse that they do not take seriously the value of scientific arguments. Moreover their own arguments are apparently weak and their reasoning is based on uncritically accepted notions of the sort that the best people emigrate or that the Italians or Spaniards now coming to the Netherlands are performing the same functions as the emigrants. We here meet the curious fact that people (this time employers) who are really interested in social science are falling back to a prescientific stage at the very moment that their interests are on trial.

f. The language problem no doubt plays a role in the relationships between sociology and the public. The fact that many people without hesitation speak about social problems, i.e. the population problem or the spatial difficulties in the Western part of the country, and do not fear the discussion with social scientists in committee meetings or in «letters to the editor» of a newspaper, implies that they feel a bit frustrated the moment the sociologist makes use of *termini technici* or of some jargon. There is a common feeling among the consumers of sociology, that the sociologist should write his reports in a language comprehensible to all. This desire of course is only to a certain extent reasonable and it is moreover not without danger. The public asks of the sociologist something it would not ask of biologists, natural scientists or medical doctors. It is accustomed to be excluded from the discussions with other scientists, but it wants to have a say in sociological discussions. Sociology however needs to have just

like other sciences its own terminology. It must be able to speak say of acculturation, and disintegration, of social roles and frames of references. It must coin terms with a specific meaning unlike the language of the man in the street. Common language is not seldom too ambivalent or too vague. Sociology must not have to explain what is stratified sampling.

This is no plea for making sociological studies as sophisticated as possible. The present author being a former journalist always tries to write in a comprehensible manner. The statement on language only is meant to underline the right of sociology to use its own terminology. The more an exposé is really sociological, the more this specific terminology is used. There are some striking examples of irritation among laymen about how sociological views were presented although the way it was done was quite correct. As sociology develops the discrepancy between every day language and scientific language will surely increase.

g. The language tension may be projected against a somewhat different background if we realize that the public has an over-simplified idea of what is sociology. This is clear firstly by the use of the words «social» and «sociological» as interchangeable terms. It is *à la mode* among laymen to speak of «sociological problems» always and everywhere. Very often there is nothing sociological at all. It is in fact conspicuous how much the word «sociological» is popular in newspapers and in all sorts of speeches of people without a sociological training. For a sociologist however it is not quite clear why i.e. the professional composition of Parliament is «sociological». No wonder that the public feels a bit disappointed when confronted with what is really sociology.

The public as object of study

In general sociology in the Netherlands does not experience many difficulties when investigating social phenomena in the field. The public is not reluctant to be interviewed. The response in interviewing is high; with mail questionnaires it varies of course with the subject and the categories approached.

The public opinion polls are accepted as quite normal and other investigations using the interview technique are considered as a sort of public opinion research.

Of course there are subjects that are felt as delicate with the effect that the non-response is higher. In the last ten or fifteen years Dutch

sociology experienced two interesting cases of trouble that drew general attention. The first of them occurred about ten years ago as the Institute for the sociological study of the Dutch population «Isono-nevo» carried out a research project into the desired family size with women at the moment of officially giving notice of their marriage (to be announced at the Town Hall). The project was executed by means of a mail questionnaire and the response was not too high, somewhat over 20 %. In order to get a certain quantity of data the project took months and months. Some weeks before the data-gathering was finished, i.e. after more than a year, there came protests from one of the regional newspapers echoed by some smaller ones. The matter was handed over to a member of Parliament who put written questions to the Minister of Education. The Minister in fact answered that he judged the research as undesirable. At that moment however there was no need for further data gathering so that an overt conflict between the research-institute and the Minister could be avoided².

The second case happened a few years ago. It dealt with the interest of secondary school children in television. The research project this time was carried out by the (Government) Central Bureau of Statistics on the request of the Minister of Education. The study made use of the availability of the children at school and questionnaires were filled up during school hours. However a copy of the questionnaire found its way to the parents and aroused incidentally some anger. One question especially was rejected. The executors were anxious to correlate the hours spent at the T.V. set by children with the authority pattern within the family. To have an indication for this pattern they had added a question concerning the way children were punished. This point in some quarters was found too delicate for investigations. This time also questions were put at the instigation of the Minister but as an effect of his responsibility perhaps he did not agree with the member of Parliament.

The two cases have in common that in both the intimacy of the family was found to be endangered.

The sociology vis-à-vis the opinion of the public concerning society

Sociology of course gives some guidance on societal problems. Sociologists are asked to give lectures and to write articles. A special

² For the study see: A. E. DIELS, *Opvattingen van ondertrouwde vrouwen omtrent de grootte van haar toekomstig gezin*, Amsterdam, Isono-nevo, I, II,

problem rises as to the fact that the sociologists do not feel themselves able to give sufficient guidance on macro-sociological problems: it is clear that the public particularly wants to be informed on questions like the influence of mass-communication on family life, the effects of industrialization on youth or the pedagogical implications of the welfare state. People with no specific sociological training are less reluctant to deal with such problems. They are easy-speaking on «massification» and out-levelling of cultural patterns. The use of the word «massification» is a rather reliable indication that it is not a sociologist who has the floor. The task of the sociologist is to correct false notions, stereotypes and superficial opinions. This is a rather difficult task because the public is ready enough to believe slogan-like addresses of a pseudo-sociological nature.

III. SOCIOLOGISTS AND POLICY-MAKERS

The contribution to policy

It is quite normal that sociology contributes to making policy more scientifically justified. All sorts of government bureaux make use of the services of sociology.

Sociologists contra policy-makers

It happens that the policy-maker tries to influence the research-project and especially the results. There are other problems too. Sociological research in the Netherlands of course is free. Nevertheless it occurs that the policy-makers try to hamper the execution of research. To take a recent example: a sociological institute on its own initiative carried out an investigation into the public's interest in the local advisory council for the neighbourhood of one of the big cities. The institute simply to be correct gave notice to the city government of the project. The reaction of this government was that it told the project leader that at this very moment the research was undesirable because it might influence legal proposals to revise the relationships between central city government and neighbourhoods. The city government naturally could not forbid the execution of the

1951, 1953. S. J. GROENMAN, «Women's opinion about size of family in the Netherlands», *Eugenics Quarterly*, Vol. 2, n° 4, dec. 1955.

project; it suggested however to stop it. In such a situation the difficulty is that the sociological institute in the future may have to cooperate with the policy-makers. It is not interested in a conflict. The solution this time was to slow down the negotiations with the government and to speed up the research so that it was executed in a very short time. It was possible to tell the government quite honestly that it was stopped. In other cases however it will be difficult to avoid a conflict.

SOCIOLOGY AND THE PUBLIC IN PRESENT DAY POLAND

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Perhaps it is the very nature of the information on the vicissitudes of sociology and its position today in the various countries that calls for a quick sense of humour and a large dose of scepticism if it is to be received with proper understanding. A reader deprived of a sense of humour and harbouring no sceptical mistrust could hardly have learned as much as he should from some of the papers prepared for the Fourth World Congress of Sociology in 1959 which were devoted to sociology in its social context¹. Nor would the reader be at the best point of vantage, if he attempted to treat too seriously some statements published in the special May, 1960, issue of *The Twentieth Century* devoted to British sociology: In that publication is printed O. R. McGregor's opinion that: «British society today exhibits a greater unwillingness to discover, to collect and to face up to the social facts of life than at any time in the last hundred years»²; and the statement referred to by Donald G. MacRae, according to which «a sociologist is a man who spends fifty thousand dollars to find the way to a whorehouse», a gibe he considers «near enough true to hurt». A supplementary commentary adds: «What is worse is that the sociologist, with a team of collaborators, then produces a book telling one exactly how it was done»³.

All this is an exaggeration, an intentional exaggeration, most surely. And Mr. McGregor's reproof of the British public seems particularly overstated. Or is it really possible that sociology is far less popular in Britain today than it is in Poland? It is certainly popular in Poland. And I would think it naturally out of place if the view I have expressed were treated with humour and scepticism.

¹ *Transactions of the Fourth World Congress of Sociology*, Vol. I, London, 1959, pp. 139-146.

² *The Twentieth Century*, Vol. 167, No. 999, p. 389.

³ *Op.cit.*, p. 435.

THE POPULARITY OF SOCIOLOGY

The sociological periodicals appearing in Poland are not the only ones to treat sociological problems. Much space is devoted to them in the philosophical, economic, historical, legal and other learned journals. But since by the very nature of things the circulation of specialized periodicals is confined to a limited number of readers, it is not in learned journals that we should seek testimony to the popularity of this or another branch of science. It would therefore be apt to add at this point that in Poland the daily press, the socio-cultural weeklies, the non-specialized periodicals appearing less frequently, even the popular weekly illustrated magazines, discuss and inform their readers about sociology, sociologists and problems simply defined as pertaining to sociology. Sociology is now in vogue. People have confidence in its social usefulness; and the sociologist is not only a specialist, such as the historian, or philosopher, but a professional man as well, such as the economist or physician⁴. And sociology today has a mysterious modern flavour, with such words as cybernetics, automation, computers, transistors, or plastics. *Zycie Warszawy*, one of the two most popular dailies, has set up in its editorial office a special section of information on sociology, while *Polityka*, one of the most serious and relatively widely read socio-cultural weeklies, lists sociology on its title page together with other

⁴ To quote from *Trybuna Ludu*, the daily of the Polish United Workers' Party Central Committee, which carried on August 27th, 1961 a notice headlined «Waiting for the Sociologist the Amplifiers Ought to be Repaired». The notice says that the Warsaw Management of the Retail Distribution System «plans to employ a sociologist and to establish cooperation with a Chair of Sociology» because the Management «thinks that the time has now come to make the best possible advantage of all the achievements of science»; the sociologist it will employ «will inquire into the tastes, likings and habits of the customers», and his observations and remarks will be taken into consideration «when planning production» and «devising ... the advertising campaign»; in cooperation with other scientists, the sociologist will concern himself with finding out what is needed «to help raise sales, including such stimuli as lighting, music, etc.» The writer adds not without reason that before the sociologist appears on the scene, the Warsaw Distribution Management could by itself do much to improve the quality of goods, enhance the appearance of the shops and better services by teaching the sales personnel to show more politeness to the customers; and if shops do have amplifiers, the latter must be regulated so as not to expose the ears of the customers «to the frightfully hoarse sounds not infrequently coming from them» and that «it does not take a sociologist to know that such amplifiers instead of promoting sales annoy the customers inducing them to leave the shop».

regular subjects appearing in its columns. Sociology conceived along the lines of Nathan Glazer's definition, that it is an occupation of «a man who asks people questions and then statistically analyses the answers to them»⁵, has found its way even into satirical journals. *Szpilki*, the most popular satirical weekly in this country, ridiculing a certain mannerism in the selection of subjects for dissertations, mentions sociology in quite a natural way alongside Polish philology, medicine or history, and quotes the following fictitious example chosen by a candidate for a doctor's degree in sociology for his thesis: «On some aspects of the environmental structure of the 28 lady-typists working in the Praesidium of the People's Council in Poznan»⁶. It can be easily seen that this type of satirical treatment does not discriminate against sociology. On the contrary, such a comment reasserts its social status, and is a testimony to the opinion that the selection of trivial subjects for research in a discipline of such social importance and as useful as sociology deserves to be ridiculed, and the editors feel sure their readers will understand it. No self-respecting press organ will ignore the existing phenomenon of the popularity of sociology, perceived by satire as it does here, if the editors of the organ are mindful of the tastes of the more intelligent milieus of their readers, and if they are conscious of their social duties.

Indeed, the press keeps the public informed about sociological books and papers, about projects and findings in sociological research; it reports the polemics in sociological disputes, and prints the postulates which, in the opinion of the managers and the other people concerned with the practical aspects of social life, claim the attention of sociology and sociologists; it induces the sociologists to take part in discussions on topical problems connected with forthcoming reforms, when the need for reforms in the various fields becomes acute. Convinced of its social usefulness, the press demands that sociology be given a say in the planning and realization of measures the authorities plan to undertake; and finally, it shows interest in sociology as a teaching enterprise and in the training of future sociologists. University sociologists contribute only a part to all that is written on sociological subjects. The publications are of uneven quality, and sometimes reveal the rather inadequate level of its writers' competence. If we were, however, to analyze the content of the most important and most serious Polish dailies and weeklies and

⁵ Nathan GLAZER, «The Rise of Social Research in Europe», D. LERNER, ed., *The Human Meaning of Social Sciences*, New York, 1959, p. 44.

⁶ «From the World of Science», *Szpilki* No. 35, August 27, 1961.

to measure the space they devote to various types of interest in sociology and sociologists, we would see how much *Zycie Warszawy* — at least in proportion to its size — outdistances such papers as the Paris *Monde*, the London *Times* and the *New York Times*; and how much *Polityka* outdistances *France-Observateur* and the *Observer*; how much our popular weekly *Przekrój* outdistances *Time*⁷.

Although the press is the best touch-stone of the public's attitude to sociology in present-day Poland, it is not the only one. At this point, it is worth while to discuss in brief yet another problem. I have in mind the popularity of sociology as a subject of study. It is true we cannot yet boast of an impressive number of universities having the prerogative to train sociologists, or of the number of places reserved for studies designed to prepare students for the profession of sociologists. And yet, in the academic year 1961-1962, over 100 places were allocated for prospective freshmen in sociological studies. While the ratio of places to the number of candidates (whose selection is based on the entrance examination) in all Polish schools of higher learning was 1:1.8, and the respective figure for universities was 1:2, the ratio for sociological studies was nearly 1:4, this being the same as the ratio for ethnography, psychology, and biochemistry⁸. Moreover, sociology courses in one form or another, as a predominantly «technical» subject, or more often as one which will broaden the general educational standards of the student are listed in almost all the syllabi of nearly all courses of study. Sometimes this principle, outside the socio-humanistic studies, is not always fully implemented, simply because of a shortage of an adequately trained teaching staff. The fact remains that an impressive number of future high school graduates are either directly familiarized with the problems involved in sociological research, to some extent also with its technique, or get a general idea about the knowledge of society. All students are at least educated in an atmosphere permeated with understanding of

⁷ Because of the shortness of the interval between the date I received the letter inviting me to write this paper and the date due for it to be mailed back, I have not succeeded in doing the research myself or in inducing somebody else to do it. I am thus unable to corroborate my thesis, though, being more or less a regular reader of these periodicals, I am under the impression that the thesis is correct.

⁸ See *Trybuna Ludu*, June 30th, 1961. Computing the figures, the writers did not take into account the *ultimately* allocated number of places for the first year course of sociological study; they added the originally reserved number *before* the enlistment of candidates started; the number of places has been subsequently increased by over one third, among other things, because of the large number of applicants.

the need for such knowledge. Such attention cannot but be instrumental in both the advancement of the social position of sociology in society and in shaping public opinion towards it.

Let us add that both university and non-university sociological research centres are working on over 150 subjects of that part of the National Five-Year Plan of Scientific Research (1961-65) which deals with «scientific problems of particular importance for the national economy». Such research forms part of the National Economic Plan and, as such, is subject to endorsement by Parliament. The humanities and social sciences are not too strongly represented in this part of the Plan, although sociology, alongside with economics, law, and education is a noteworthy exception. This emphasis gives us a certain idea of what is considered in Poland of «particular importance for the national economy»⁹.

Two main sources account for the popularity of sociology in Poland. The first is the still unsatiated hunger for objective, *lege artis* acquired knowledge of social facts and the mechanism of social processes. The people are sceptical towards other forms of presentation and explanation of the vicissitudes of their fortunes, their situation and the situation of thousands of other similar human beings who have been disillusioned and misled a hundred times, and even exposed to painful experience through the fault of politicians and journalists. They try to believe that their natural curiosity to know what sort of life they are after all living, will be satisfied by science, or to put it more precisely, by *Science*; they have confidence that questions concerning their future will be answered by the specific language of collected facts, methodically culled and expressed in terms of figures. Such beliefs must unavoidably be accompanied by a large number of myths, widely held not only among the general public but also among sociologists themselves. This does not deprive sociology of its popularity; on the contrary, it may even enhance it. Behind this hunger for knowledge and the desire to know what the situation is and will be, and what it should and could have been, and behind the myths born by this very hunger when it was not satiated (or even deceived by a nourishment, which revealed only too soon its true, make-believe nature) is concealed a second, much more deeply rooted source of the popularity sociology enjoys in Poland. It is to be sought in the social needs of a country undergoing a

⁹ From the mimeographed materials of the Polish Academy of Sciences and the Ministry of Higher Education, concerning *the National Plan for Scientific Research in the years 1961-65*.

speedy process of industrialization, where the socialist form of ownership of the means of production is the predominant form, and where the basic socio-economic functions have been brought under centrally exercised control and subjected to planning. These needs cannot be ignored without running the risk of pulling back the whole system. How could these needs be ignored, particularly in the context of the ideology of peaceful competition between socialism and capitalism?

The popularity of sociology is an important social fact. It is paving the way to the conviction that the subject is worthy of study and should be undertaken by sociologists themselves. The attempts at analysis which are being made, though still modest in numbers and taking the form of general reflections, bear witness to this conviction. Zygmunt Bauman's contributions¹⁰ are the most valuable to have appeared thus far; but to the best of my knowledge I could not say that research has already been started into the public's opinion of sociology, and in particular into the source of the latter's popularity in this country.

SOCIOLOGICAL PUBLIC

On the basis even of a general orientation as to the scope, forms and sources accounting for the popularity of sociology in Poland, we may, however, venture a preliminary typology of that category of people whom we have called the sociological public. I have in mind the aggregate of the receivers of sociological journalism, of information about sociology, about sociological problems and methods, about plans, progress and findings of sociological research, of the news about sociologists, the plans and ways and means to use their skills, and also about the profession of a sociologist. From this aggregate we should in principle exclude professional sociologists. An aggregate thus defined is exactly what I mean by the «great» sociological public.

In dividing this category into several types, I am far from maintaining that each person which we will include into the sociological public must automatically be reckoned in one, and only one, of the

¹⁰ See: «Sociology and the People», *Argumenty*, 1960, Nos 32 and 33; and «About the Profession of a Sociologist», *Kultura i Społeczeństwo*, 1960, IV, No. 3. See also J. HOCHFELD, «Concerning Social Engineering», *Argumenty*, 1961, Nos 27 and 28.

several types. We are concerned exclusively with an apt instrument of sociological analysis which would be consistent with the present pattern of social relations in Poland. This or another type of interest may prevail among the aggregate's members who go to make up the sociological public; the type is however unlikely to appear in its «pure» form.

I would like to single out the following types:

a. *Those who are curious to seek a knowledge of society and a true image of the communities, whether large or small, to which they belong.* This is perhaps the most widely spread type. In July 1961, the candidates applying for the first year of sociological studies at the Warsaw University were requested by me to answer a few questions, the purpose of which was not the verification of the candidates knowledge, but of the type of interest they take in sociology. The printed form on which they were to write the replies bore the emphatic remark that answers do not make part of the examination material. In 72 % of the answers the type of interest which dominated, or was at least concomitant, can well be characterized by the following examples from the replies. «The society to which also I belong is something so vast and diverse ... To examine and find out the differences in the views people may have — that is what I am interested in. What do people make their living from? In which way do they get their means for a living? What is the aim of man's life? These are the questions preoccupying me». Or: «I would like to add to my knowledge of life. We need after all to have some theoretical knowledge on questions and problems confronting us in every day life». Or: «I have just started to work for the first time in my life, and have come into contact with people, with the relation of some groups of people to other ... I have found in sociological literature numerous answers to the questions weighing on my mind». Or: «I would like to know what is my own position in society, and sociological studies could be of great assistance to me». Or: «What fascinates me is that through sociology I could get to learn about people, their opinions, attitudes and judgements». Or: «I would like to mix with different human environments to investigate their attitudes to the various phenomena appearing in our life». Or: «Society as an organism composed of individuals is a subject of great interest to me ... I am curious to know what various people think of various problems».

It can be safely assumed that the type of interest in sociology and the motives behind it that we have disclosed among the aggregate of these student, who do not know much and are not supposed to know much about sociology, is simply a reflection of opinions widely

held among the adults in their surroundings whom we can properly include in the sociological public.

b. *Educationalists*. We have mentioned earlier that the syllabi of nearly all the courses of study in Polish schools of higher learning include sociology as a teaching subject. Let us now add that elements of general knowledge of society are being introduced in the propaedeutic course of philosophy in secondary school programmes. In this case sociology is not taught as a technical subject; that is, it is not treated as a component part of a professional education. The sense and purpose of teaching sociology vary distinctly where — to give a well contrasted example — economists and physicists are concerned. In the case of the physicists, the teaching of sociology is aimed entirely at enhancing his general level of knowledge. Those who have set themselves the life-task of organizing the educational process of a new man represent a specific type of sociological public. What, then, should a sociologist be from the point of view of this category of needs? This is how Zygmunt Bauman sees him: «He must help people to understand the world. He should look upon social processes from the height of polyhistoricism; he must grasp the tendencies and laws inherent in these processes, and decode the harmonious working of diverse and complex factors and trends. He should communicate his observations and impart the accumulated capital of his knowledge, helping to fit his observations into a colourful mosaic, giving a composite picture of the world and its development. But he should not only give a picture of the world, but also explain it. He should help to make it understandable so as to make it easier to change, so that changing and improving the world should become a social habit and a social need»¹¹.

c. *Ideologists*. Though akin to the previous type, this class of receivers is worthy of being singled out. In Poland a definite type of ideology is explicitly accepted as the basis for a longterm, dynamic and planned transformation of the entire social life, and ideology is closely linked up with the internal and foreign policy pursued by the State. This ideology and its representatives exert a strongly pronounced and specific influence on the structure of relations between sociology and the «great» public of its receivers. Sociology can, under the circumstances, hardly escape ideological problems. On the other hand, ideology is susceptible to being saturated with sociological reflections and being influenced by sociological findings and analyses,

¹¹ Z. BAUMAN, *The Profession of a Sociologist, op.cit.*, p. 167.

the subject of which is essential in construing arguments in politico-ideological controversies.

d. *Receivers of social engineering.* I have raised the question earlier that to persist in the use of the primitive methods of controlling social phenomena would be a dangerous paradox in a country which is the scene of a fast developing industrialization, where the socialist form of ownership of the means of production predominates, where basic socio-economic functions are subject to planning, in a country belonging moreover to the world where the prospects of controlling the phenomena of nature are determined by cosmic flights. The increasing popularity of social engineering demonstrates the need. Hence also the opinion is spreading among those organizing socio-economic life that the time has now come for the sociologists to cooperate with economists, town-planners, chemical workers, engineers and physicians in supplying instruments for controlling social phenomena manifest in social micro-structures, such as the factory, the school, or the family. Expert diagnosticians, expert advisers, up-keepers, project-makers, even builders, are members of the sociological public which expects of sociology some sociological engineering. It does not matter whether and to what extent these expectations are warranted¹²; it is a fact that they do exist. «I venture to say», writes a director of a cement factory, «that few of the managers of our industry have ever studied sociology, since this subject has not ... been taught in technical schools of higher learning ... The lack of knowledge of sociology often leads to misunderstandings between the management and the personnel, resulting sometimes in quite serious difficulties hampering the entire activity of our factory»¹³. The director and the chief of the Organizational Department of a big metallurgical combine both insist on the introduction of sociological research in industrial concerns; they believe that the various problems confronting them should be solved in close cooperation with sociological departments at the universities, and not without the support of other sociological institutions¹⁴. «Cooperation between psychologists and the factories should in practice result in a more skilful recruitment, selection and elimination of personnel, and subsequently in decreased labour fluctuation», writes the manager of a footwear

¹² I wrote about it in the aforementioned paper *Concerning Social Engineering*.

¹³ Discussion on the sociology of work in the weekly *Polityka*, 1961, No 32; see also Z. BAUMAN's article on this subject which appeared in *Polityka*, 1961, No. 26.

¹⁴ *Polityka*, 1961, No. 32.

factory. He adds that: «it would bring the management and the workers closer together, promote democratic relations, improve methods of management, instil a sense of co-responsibility for good management ... raise labour productivity»¹⁵. These statements are characteristic of what the receivers of social engineering are interested in and expect of sociology.

e. *Receivers of sociological concepts and methods*. Research workers who are not professional sociologists, and who at the same time do not demand that sociology render them engineering services, still need a certain amount of knowledge about sociological concepts and methods. In connection with this type of needs, interest in sociology is shown by philosophers and economists, historians and philologists, ethnographers and art theorists, psychologists and educationists, and also by representatives of other less related branches of learning. As a matter of fact, this is a realm of interests within which the borderline between a sociologist and scholars of other branches of learning is most easily blurred.

A detailed study of the problems involved in the distribution and the regularity in the concomitant emergence of these five types of interests in sociology among the sociological public is still open for research.

FUTURE SOCIOLOGISTS

The sociological public is an aggregate of people whose interests in sociology stems from a certain need or a combination of needs, and who expect to derive one thing or another from sociology and sociologists. In this aggregate, a specifically emanating category consists of the candidates for sociology degrees. It would be reasonable to assume that they intend, after completing their studies, to work in their professional capacity of sociologists and to satisfy and shape the tastes of the general public interested in sociology. Who are the candidates for sociological studies ?

I mentioned earlier that in July, 1961, I had made an attempt, however modest, to analyse the types of interests taken in sociology by 136 candidates who applied for the first-year course of sociology at the Warsaw University¹⁶. The structure of this population is characteristic enough to be worth a brief discussion.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁶ More than 136 persons applied and sat for their examinations; not all

To begin with, the female applicants accounted for as much as 62.5 % of the total, against 37.5 % male candidates. It should be added that the proportion of women has gone up since the last academic year. In 1959-60, female students constituted 38.4 % of the total number of students studying sociology¹⁷. The proportion will rise to 68 %, if from our population of 136 applicants we single out 97 persons who finished secondary school in the years 1960 and 1961, and to 71.3 % if we take into account 80 persons who left school in 1961. The upward trend is thus clearly apparent.

Only 22 % of the candidates are either of working class origin, or come from peasants and artisans' families; others come from white-collar and intellectuals' families, and only 4 % come from families engaged in private business. Even in comparison with the composition of students at universities, where students of white-collar or intellectual backgrounds are more numerous than in the other types of schools of higher learning, the degree of saturation of the aggregate of candidates for sociological studies with applicants coming from white-collar and intellectuals' families, is exceptionally high. Particularly striking is the very small number of applicants of peasant origin: out of the 136 applicants, only five, all men, are of peasant social background. In the academic year 1959-60, peasants' offspring accounted for 20.7 % of the total number of students in all the schools of higher learning; the percentage was 20.4 % for the universities, rising to 36.3 % in the agricultural colleges, and dropping to 10.2 % in the various art schools¹⁸.

Out of the 136 applicants, with whom we are still dealing, 28 persons (21 %), including 16 men and 12 women, had pursued other courses of studies before they applied for sociological studies. These other courses of studies included philology, education, economics, history, law, philosophy, journalism, mathematics and physics, fine

of them however returned the forms with filled out answers which, after all, did not pertain to the entrance examination programme. Outside of Warsaw, the Lodz University has also sociological studies; according to new plans, these studies will concentrate on sociology of work. Moreover, the Jagellonian University in Cracow has an ethnographic-sociological course of study. The Warsaw University, however, was the one which received 60 % of all the places allocated for the first year of sociological studies, i.e. more than Lodz and Cracow taken together. All the data pertaining to the group of 136 candidates, who applied for the first year of sociological studies at the Warsaw University, have been elaborated on the basis of the questionnaires, which are now filed at the Sociological Section of the University's Philosophic Department.

¹⁷ See *Statistical Year Book*, Warsaw, 1960, p. 346, table 44/479.

¹⁸ *Op.cit.*, p. 349, table 47/482.

arts, agriculture and architecture. This very long enumeration alone bears witness to the absence of a dominant chord in the earlier interest of the applicants.

A relatively large number of the applicants, namely 45 persons (33 %), including 23 men and 22 women, had worked professionally before they sought admission to the University. They worked as librarians, journalists, social and political workers, office clerks, teachers, and also as manual workers (four men). Office clerks (twenty-two persons) represented the largest wage-earning group.

In regard to age, the most numerous group, about 82 %, consisted of persons born in the years 1940-1941, the higher agegroups ranging in number from six to one persons; the oldest applicant was 31 years of age.

More than half of the candidates finished secondary school in Warsaw. As an administrative unit the capital of Poland has the status of an independent voivodship, irrespective of the Warsaw Voivodship comprising over 30 nearby districts. Applicants from other voivodships were rather modestly represented, except for a somewhat larger number of newcomers from the Voivodships of Warsaw, Bydgoszcz and Kielce. The assumption seems well justified, even if the problem calls for a closer inquiry, that the reason for the predominance of the Varsovians should not be sought only in their proximity to the place of study. Perhaps, above all, it is the high degree of urbanization and the socio-intellectual character of the milieu which has shaped the interests of the candidates¹⁹.

Asked whether they had any idea as to what a sociologist's profession really was, and what they planned to do after graduation, the 1961 candidates for sociological studies revealed they were quite an unusual group: over 26 % answered straightforwardly that they wanted to become journalists; about 15 % either did not reply to the question at all, or stated plainly that their imagination was much too poor to help them to formulate the answer; some 14 % answered in generalities, declaring that knowledge about human society is a fascinating subject; some 12 % mentioned literature, theatre, films, fine arts, as the domains in which they would become professional. A relatively small number of the applicants over 5 % could see them-

¹⁹ *Trybuna Ludu*, September 14, 1961, announced that out of more than 67,500 persons which in the year 1961-62 were admitted to Polish universities, technical schools of higher learning, agricultural colleges and high schools of economics, over 8,500 persons, i.e. more than 12.5 % came from Warsaw; from among the various voivodships, the first seven places went to the Katowice, Warsaw, Lublin, Cracow, Kielce, Rzeszów and Bydgoszcz Voivodships.

selves in the role of a sociologist working in some big establishment, in industry, building town-planning or economic planning. Others mentioned education, the combatting of crime, research work into youth and family problems, or research into habits and customs, assisting in moulding moral attitudes, etc. (8%). A few persons wrote about the interest taken by them in rural life, migratory movements, the native population of the Western Territories, the Gypsy population, etc. Some 7% pointed out the Public Opinion Research Centre — a very popular institution in Poland — as the establishment they thought it well worth their while to work in; over 5% said, without elaborating, that they wanted to become scholars, while the answers of over 4% were somehow unfit for any classification at all.

Nobody can expect that those who are just at the stage of seeking admission to a certain branch of learning, and are rather young at that, should have a clear idea of their future profession and work. But their opinions on this subject — particularly in the case of sociology — can be regarded as a specific reflection and «digest» of the press, the commentaries of the adult milieu (including teachers and older friends), «a digest» of authoritative utterances. In one word, they can be regarded as a sounding board of the views circulating among the sociological public.

We are brought, then, even without additional research, to the conclusion that there still is a marked discrepancy between the degree of popularity sociology enjoys in Poland and that of the orientation of the «great» sociological public as to what sociology really is and what it can be as an autonomous profession and occupation. The pessimists will undoubtedly say that this is a correct relationship between popularity and sound judgment of what is popular. The fact, however, remains that these are important aspects of a phenomenon which in sociological literature is known under the name of the «marginal status» of sociology²⁰.

²⁰ See Charles H. PAGE, «Sociology as a Teaching Enterprise»; R. K. Merton, L. Broom, L. S. Cottrell, Jr., eds., *Sociology Today*, New York, 1959, p. 587 and onward.

THE NATURE AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY

LA NATURE ET LES PROBLÈMES DE LA
THÉORIE SOCIOLOGIQUE

THE NATURE AND PROBLEMS OF SOCIOLOGICAL THEORIES Introductory Note

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Although the four main papers presented to the section on Sociological Theory derive from different backgrounds, both personal and philosophical, they seem to exhibit some convergent features which should be stressed in this introductory note. This fact in itself will help to highlight a general condition of sociological theory in our time, which seems far more directed towards systematic integration than towards controversy. Sociology has come of age and has more or less overcome the stage of being the wildgrowing «weed» which was alluded to by Professor Sorokin thirty-four years ago in his famous book *Contemporary Sociological Theories*¹. Indeed, when we glance over the papers which mean to systematize the different subsections of this part of the Congress, we easily become aware of the fact that the «sterile flowers» and «weeds» of the past have withered away and have been replaced by a sober evaluation of the range of sociological knowledge and its possible reference to action.

Whereas Professor Sorokin's endeavour, in the book quoted above, was to get away from cheap theorizing, to comb out what was substantial in sociological theory and to discriminate it from mere intellectual play, in order «to separate what is really valid from that which is false or unproved in these theories»², we are today in a far better position. It can even be stated that this is to a great extent due to the excellent book of Sorokin which has spread a sound judgment and a realistic evaluation of sociological theory, as well as its possible achievements and failures, among young students and mature scholars alike. Thanks to him we can face today, what could only be hoped for in these early days: «the nature of really existing sociology»³.

¹ P. SOROKIN, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, New York and London, Harper and Bros., 1928, p. 757 ff.

² *Op.cit.*, p. XIX.

³ *Ibid.*, p. 761.

As a matter of fact, nobody cares any longer for the subtleties of a general methodology of sociology and for the sophisticated question whether or not sociology «as a science» may be «possible». Suffice to say that sociology has become a fact. Sociology does exist notwithstanding many an open question in theory. It is research that has overflowed the «antechamber» of sociology and has brought us nearer to the core of the problem. Due to the fact that research data of many kinds has accumulated in most of the different fields of sociology, we have no longer to develop our theories in empty space but rather with the help of research results which have been carefully checked.

I think that the four papers I have to introduce to you are in full agreement with his general remark. They also agree on the danger of «generalizing a certain conclusion far beyond the factual basis on which it is built». Empty theorizing has definitely gone out of fashion, although there may still be some scholars around who keep to the old rule. Furthermore, a general agreement has been reached as to the principle that all the statements of sociological theory are in need of evidence and can be refuted under certain circumstances when this evidence cannot be produced or when counter-evidence comes forward. The latter point arises very clearly in the discussions of functionalism as presented both by Ernest Gellner and A. K. Saran. Their point is to find out whether functionalism is «scientifically sound» or if we have not to give up «strong functionalism» in face of new theoretical arguments and shortcomings in research, and to replace it by «moderate functionalism, or functionalism as a method rather than a theory» as Gellner puts it. There is no question of voluntary or speculative criticism, but rather of considering carefully theoretical arguments and/or postulates in the light of available empirical evidence.

Under these circumstances, the recent developments of functionalism become particularly interesting, insofar as a feeling of distrust seems to have developed against taking a whole society as a unit. Although it is generally accepted «that concepts and beliefs do not exist in isolation» (Gellner), and that the exploration of social structure cannot be developed without awareness of the «context» within which an institution finds itself, the further assumptions, namely that social systems could always be looked upon as «closed systems», as systematic «wholes» and «total» unities, have been discarded. This leads to the criticism of notions like «internal consistency of a system», «functional unity» etc. as developed by Saran, his main argument being that these concepts are «not scientifically sound», because they «can-

not be subjected to empirical control». In fact, we will have to discuss anew the notion of a «social system». Useful as it may have been in the past in sharpening our understanding of far-reaching social contexts, it may now be no longer conducive to a more realistic consideration of complex processes of social change. The concepts of «cultural inconsistencies» which develop e.g. out of a «defensive culture» may help to understand the intricacies of the concept of «maintenance of a system». Again, this new approach has been obtained by checking older concepts in the light of new or more refined empirical evidence. Therefore, we can take it for granted that also here an agreement as to the general role of sociological theory in the process of developing sociological knowledge has been reached. Even highly abstract terms have to be modified and may be discarded in case the necessary empirical evidence cannot be produced, especially when counter-evidence is met with repeatedly in research. It is in this sense that we think that the terms of «unity of a system», «maintenance of a system» and «cultural inconsistencies» are incompatible and will force sociological theory to a reconsideration of some of its fundamental assumptions.

This refers mainly to the most fundamental terms of sociological theory especially to those which could be termed as categories in the Kantian sense. But besides these fundamental and highly abstract categories — e.g. that of a social system — we have still to face more concrete and specific theories as the theories of the middle range. With regard to these I would like to stress the importance of some of the remarks made by Professor Sorokin in his paper *The Role of Historical Method in the Social Sciences*. I think that it is evident that we have to broaden our approach to the social problems of contemporary society by a more historical perspective. In principle, we can of course limit ourselves to a strictly «contemporary» analysis of contemporary problems. Yet, on the other hand, the question arises whether or not such an analysis can ever be called an adequate one. I myself have considered this question within the frame of community research. In studying social problems of a given community, one will have to look for the historical development of the community in order to gain a proper idea of its structure. Structures appearing very much alike when looked upon from a purely contemporary outlook, may prove to be entirely different when studied under a more historical aspect.

I would therefore stress the point that historical analysis is a necessary implement of any inquiry in contemporary social problems. Perhaps we could even declare that the historical method in the social

sciences is a necessary counterpart to the exploration of contemporary social problems. Without a historical framework it would, in the long run, be impossible to «locate» given problems in time and therefore also to assess the meaning of the specific circumstances of their appearance in a given community at a given time — *le moment*, as Hippolyte Taine would have put it.

In recent research, problems of this kind have come up with some regularity so that they cannot be ignored any longer. In his book on *The Eclipse of Community*⁴, Maurice R. Stein has shown very clearly the historical changes as far as the problems of urban sociology and family sociology are concerned. Whereas «cultural conflict» was a major topic in the early 'twenties, the contemporary problems of the metropolitan areas and the migrating «exurbanite» in the suburbs are quite different both in kind and in extension. Another example is to be found in the field of family sociology: whereas family disorganization was a central topic of sociology in the 'twenties — given that many families were indeed endangered due to the rapid changes in industrial society — the family of the early 'sixties has more or less adjusted itself to the new conditions of urban life and suffers much more from overorganization in general, and more specifically from maternal overprotection with the corresponding set of psychic troubles and emotional fixations. It would be impossible even to identify these problems without making any historical comparisons. This, by the way, was the reason why Emile Durkheim stressed so much the importance of the comparative method in research. In his time this meant of course a general survey of the different evolutionary stages of human society. Today the concept of contemporary society has gained a gradation in time so that we can compare different stages of industrial society, the older type of «capitalist» industrial society properly speaking, characterized by mass-production of problems of (individual and collective) adjustment, and the newer type of the more advanced industrial societies wherein some of the older problems have been successfully settled, at least partly. Developments of this kind could never be grasped without a more historical approach to the problems of contemporary society.

Problems of the same kind are raised by the Marxist approach to sociology as well. Professor Lefebvre spends considerable thinking to the relation between the concept of «actual» social action in Marx, and his concept of the historicity of social processes. Given that so-

⁴ Maurice R. STEIN, *The Eclipse of Community*, Princeton, N. J., 1960.

ciological knowledge is part of the total social process, we can even face the necessity of major changes in our customary set of categories and not only in specific sociological theories. This is perhaps the most important challenge sociological theory will have to face in the future. In fact, it is not only the changing structural background of social life that creates the necessity of opening historical perspectives in our analysis of contemporary society, we will also have to face the dilemma that most of the categories we have used so far may be at stake. To the cultural inconsistencies and the inconsistencies in maintenance of a social system, we may have to add inconsistencies in the logic of social thought and sociological theory.

Although broad perspectives are opened by these considerations, I would again like to stress the point that we are by no means back to the old kind of sociological speculation. It must be clearly stated, that this kind of new development in sociological theory would never have been possible without the enormous growth of empirical research. Mere abstract speculation in the void of philosophical over-generalization has become obsolete thanks to the developments we have sketched at the beginning of this introductory note. But this by no means implies that sociological theory is limited to the narrow range of the data of research. In fact, it overflows these limits at the same time in several directions. We have mentioned at the beginning the tendency toward integration into larger systems of interconnected theories. But we have also to take into consideration the somewhat opposite tendency toward a partial disintegration of premature theory formation and fundamental changes in the logical structure of social thought, perhaps corresponding to the structural changes occurring in developing social systems.

CONCEPTS AND SOCIETY

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1. This paper is concerned with the application of Functionalism to the interpretation of concepts and beliefs.

Concepts and beliefs are themselves, in a sense, institutions amongst others: for they provide a kind of fairly permanent frame, as do other institutions, independent of any one individual, within which individual conduct takes place. In another sense, they are correlates of *all* the institutions of a society: and to understand the *working* of the concepts of a society is to understand its institutions¹. Hence, a discussion of the application of Functionalism to interpretation (of concepts and beliefs), rather than Functionalism as such, is not really much of a restriction of the subject-matter.

Concepts and beliefs are, of course, of particular concern to social anthropology. Sociology can sometimes be a matter of ascertaining facts within an institutional framework which is taken for granted. The anthropologist can virtually never take anything for granted in this way. But anthropology is also the discipline most associated with Functionalism. The connection is not fortuitous.

2. Nevertheless the problem of the *interpretation* of concepts is almost as important within sociology — in the narrower sense in which it excludes Social Anthropology. For instance, the problem which is one of the mainsprings of sociological theory and which remains at the very centre of sociology — the question concerning the impact of theological doctrines on the emergence of economic ration-

¹ It is however very important not to misunderstand this point. For it is *not* true to say that to understand the concepts of a society (in the way its members do) is to understand the society. Concepts are as liable to mask reality as to reveal it, and masking some of it may be a part of their function. The profoundly mistaken doctrine that to understand a society is to understand its concepts has a certain vogue and has recently been revived and argued, for instance, in Mr. P. Winch's *The Idea of a Social Science*, London, 1958. Some of the reasons why this view is false are discussed below.

ality — hinges in large part on how one *interprets* the relevant theological concepts and arguments. Is one merely to take what the recorded theological text says and explicitly recommends? In that case, the connection seems very tenuous. Or is one to take what the text says *and* interpret its meaning, for the people influenced by it, in the light of what they actually *did*? In that case, the explanation of behaviour in terms of doctrine risks becoming vacuous and circular. There must, one hopes, be some middle way, which allows interpretation, which allows some but not all of the context to be incorporated into the meaning of the concept, thus avoiding both an unrealistic literal-minded scholasticism, and yet also escaping circularity of explanation. The problem concerns the rules and limits of the invocation of social *context* in interpreting the participants' concepts.

Consider as an example one of the most recent contributions to this debate, Professor Kurt Samuelsson's *Religion and Economic Action* (London, 1961; Swedish edition, *Ekonomi och Religion*, Stockholm, 1957). This work is an onslaught on the Weberian thesis. «...our scrutiny of Puritan doctrine and capitalist ideology ... has rendered untenable the hypothesis of a connection between Puritanism and capitalism ...» (p. 153). Samuelsson employs a battery of arguments to support his conclusion, and some of these are highly relevant to the present theme. For one, he refers (p. 153) to «... the impossibility, in the last resort, of correlating concepts as broad and vague as those in question.» Here he seems to mean primarily the sociologist's own concepts (Puritanism, capitalism), but indirectly the alleged breadth and vagueness of these reflects the vagueness of Puritan or capitalist notions themselves. But it would be an absurd requirement to restrict sociological interpretation to clear and distinct concepts: these are historically a rarity, and there is nothing to make one suppose that vague and broad notions, whose logical implications for conduct are ill-determined, do not in fact have a powerful and specific impact on actual behaviour. We are faced here with the unfortunate need to *interpret* just what the concepts in question meant to the participants — and the problems connected with such interpretation are the theme of the present paper.

Samuelsson is not content with a declaration of the impossibility «in the last resort» of establishing such correlations at all, but also specifically tries to refute the correlation by adducing contrary evidence. This counter-evidence largely consists, reasonably enough, of examining just what the Puritans actually said, and the kind of conduct they actually commended. Considering this, Samuelsson concludes (p. 41) that «unquestionably, this ought to have impeded rather

than promoted a capitalist trend.» He then considers counter-objections to this, such as Tawney's: these consist of arguing that the 'Christian casuistry of economic conduct', which *logically* should have impeded capitalism (i.e. if one considers what the statements in the text actually entail), in fact, in virtue of what they *meant* to the people concerned, «braced the energies» and «fortified the temper» of the capitalist spirit. In other words, he convicts Tawney of claiming to know better than the texts what Puritanism really meant to its devotees. Samuelsson appears to have a great contempt for such implicit claims to access to hidden meanings: it is (p. 41) «a somersault in the best Weberian style». With irony he comments (p. 42, italics mine) that on the view he opposes, the capitalist spirit «was the *true and genuine* Puritan spirit» (as opposed to the spirit actually found in the texts), and that thus «Puritanism *in some other and more capitalist sense* ... becomes the capitalistic spirit's principal source of power ...»

I am not concerned, nor competent, to argue whether Samuelsson's employment, in this particular case, of his tacit principle that one must not re-interpret the assertions one actually finds, is valid. What is relevant here is that if such a principle is made explicit and generalised, it would make nonsense of most sociological studies of the relationship of belief and conduct. We shall find anthropologists driven to employ the very opposite principle, the insistence rather than refusal of contextual re-interpretation.

3. This is where Functionalism is relevant. The essence of Functionalism is perhaps the stress on context (rather than origin or overt motive) in the explanation of social behaviour. Formulated as an extreme doctrine, it asserts that each social institution is ideally suited to its context. The paradigm of explanation then becomes an account of just how a given institution does ideally fit its context, which means presumably just how it serves the survival and stability of the whole better than would any available alternative.

One of the charges made against this doctrine is that it is 'teleological', that it explains the present behaviour in terms of its consequences in the future, i.e. in terms of the manner in which those consequences *will* be desirable from the given society's viewpoint.

It seems to me that it is not difficult to answer this particular charge. All that is required is that each 'functional' explanation be as it were *read backwards*. The 'explanation' of institution X is not really the proper, causal explanation of *it*, but of the manner in which it contributes to the society as a whole. The 'real' explanation of X is provided when the functional accounts of the *other* institutions

is given — of all of them, or of a relevant subset of those of them which contribute towards the maintenance of X — which jointly make up a 'real', causal explanation of X itself (just as the 'functional' account of X figures in *their* causal explanation). This of course implies that good, proper explanations can only be had when a whole society is seen as a unity, and that partial studies of institutions in isolation are incomplete, and only a step towards proper understanding. But such a stress on societies seen as unities is indeed a part of the 'Functionalist' syndrome of ideas.

But there cannot be many people today who hold Functionalism in its extreme form.² What needs to be said about that has been most brilliantly and succinctly said by Professor Lévi-Strauss:

«Dire qu'une société fonctionne est un truisme; mais dire que tout, dans une société, fonctionne est absurdité.»

Anthropologie Structurale, (Paris, 1958, p. 17.)

The thesis of social adjustment is not really a theory: it is a promise of a theory, a promise that somewhere along the spectrum between an absurdity and a truism there is a point where truth without triviality is to be found. Until the precise point along that spectrum is located, it will not be a theory, and as far as I know no one has attempted to locate it, and it is difficult to see how one could. The corollary of the doctrine in its *extreme form*, the claim of perfect stability and self-maintenance of societies, is plainly false. The requirement that societies be seen as unities is unsatisfiable for most societies in the modern world, in view of their size, complexity and in view of the difficulties of delimiting «societies».

But whilst, for these reasons, 'strong' Functionalism is dead or moribund, moderate Functionalism, or Functionalism as a method rather than as a theory, is happily very much alive. Lévi-Strauss is perhaps right when he speaks of

«... cette forme primaire du structuralisme qu'on appelle fonctionnalisme».

op.cit. (p. 357).

The exploration of social structure is one of the main preoccupations

² But they do still exist. Consider Professor Ralph Piddington's essay, «Malinowski's Theory of Needs», in *Man and Culture*, edited by Professor Raymond Firth, London, 1957, esp. p. 47.

of sociology. It must require of the investigator of any one institution an awareness of its context, of the «structure» within which that institution finds itself.

But if moderate Functionalism is justifiably alive, its application to the interpretation of concepts and doctrines is particularly relevant. It consists of the insistence on the fact that concepts and beliefs do not exist in isolation, in texts or in individual minds, but in the life of men and societies. The activities and institutions, in the context of which a word or phrase or set of phrases is used, must be known before that word or those phrases can be understood, before we can really speak of a *concept* or a *belief*.

4. The particular application of the functional, context-stressing method to concepts is nothing new. It can be found above all in the work of Emile Durkheim which is one of the fountainheads of Functionalism in general, in *Les Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse*. I think that less than justice is done to Durkheim when he is remembered as the author of a doctrine to the effect that primitive societies or societies in general really «worship themselves». The real essence of his doctrine in that remarkable work seems to me to lie elsewhere, in the view that concepts, as opposed to sensations, are only possible in a social context³ (and a fortiori that they can only be understood when the social context is known), and that important, categorial concepts, on which all others depend, require ritual if they are to be sustained. It tends to be forgotten that Durkheim's main problem, as he saw it, was not to explain religion but to explain conceptual thought and above all the *necessity*, the compulsive nature of certain of our general concepts. This is a Kantian problem, and Durkheim claimed to have solved it in a way which resembled Kant's, but differed from it in various important ways.

Above all, it differed from it in two ways: the machinery, so to speak, which was responsible for the compulsive nature of our categorial concepts was collective and observable, rather than hidden in the backstage recesses of the individual mind; and secondly, it did not, like a Balliol man, function effortlessly, but needed for its effective working to keep in training, to be forever flexing its muscles and keeping them in trim — and just this was Durkheim's theory of ritual, which for him was the method by which the intelligibility and compulsiveness of crucial categories was maintained in the minds of members of a given society. Ritual and religion did publicly what the Kantian transcendental ego did only behind the impassable iron cur-

³ Much later, L. Wittgenstein was credited with just this discovery.

tain of the noumenal. It was thus the Durkheim who paved the way for modern anthropological fieldwork: it was his view that in observing (say) the rituals associated with a clan totem, we were privileged to observe the machinery which explains the conceptual, logical and moral compulsions of the members of *that* society, compulsions similar, for instance to our inability to think of the world outside time. Much later, a linguistic philosopher commenting somewhere on transcendental beliefs, hinted that their source lay in language by saying that men needed a god of time as little as they needed a god of tenses. Durkheim's much more plausible point was precisely this in reverse: in order to have and understand tenses, we need first of all to have or to have had (something like) a god and a ritual of time...

Our contemporary invocations of the functional, social-context approach to the study and interpretation of concepts is in various ways very different from Durkheim's. Durkheim was not so much concerned to defend the concepts of primitive societies: in their setting, they did not need a defence, and in the setting of modern and changing societies he was not anxious to defend what was archaic, nor loth to suggest that some intellectual luggage might well be archaic. He was really concerned to explain the compulsiveness of what in practice did not seem to need any defence (and in so doing, he claimed he was solving the problem of knowledge whose solution had in his view evaded Kant and others, and to be solving it without falling into either empiricism or apriorism.) Whether he was successful I do not propose to discuss: for a variety of reasons it seems to me that he was not ⁴.

⁴ Somewhat to my surprise, Mr. D. G. MacRae appears to think that he was: "...Durkheim *showed* ... how time, space, causality and other fundamental categories ... are in great measure social products ..." *Ideology and Society*, London, 1961, p. 83. (Italics mine.)

Much depends of course on how great a measure "great measure" is. Durkheim was concerned to explain the compulsiveness of categories. He succeeded in showing, I think, how our power of *apprehending* them depended on society. He did not explain why, once they are in our possession, we cannot escape them.

The distinction is important. Precisely the same is also true of Durkheim's (quite unwitting) follower and successor, Wittgenstein, who also supposed categories were validated by being parts of a "form of life" and who, incidentally, like Durkheim also vacillated between supposing all concepts could be validated in this manner, and restricting this confirmation to categories.

I am quite prepared to believe that at the root of our ability to count, to relate things along a time series or spatially, is a social order which exem-

By contrast, the modern user of the Functionalist approach to concepts is concerned to defend, rather than to explain a compulsion. In anthropology, he may be concerned to defend the objects of his particular study from the charge of absurdity or pre-logical thought; in philosophy he may be concerned with applying the crypto-Functionalist theory of language which is the basis of so much contemporary philosophy. And behind either of these motives, there is, more potent than either, the consideration springing from our general intellectual climate — the desire to assist or reinforce the tacit *concordat* which seems to have been reached between intellectual criticism and established concepts in the middle of the Twentieth century.

5. The situation, facing a social anthropologist who wishes to interpret a concept, assertion or doctrine in an alien culture, is basically simple. He is, say, faced with an assertion S in the local language. He has at his disposal the large or infinite set of possible sentences in his own language. His task is to locate the nearest equivalent or equivalents of S in his own language.

He may not be wholly happy about this situation, but he cannot avoid it. There is no third language which could mediate between the native language and his own, in which equivalences could be stated and which would avoid the pitfalls arising from the fact that his own language has its own way of handling the world, which may not be those of the native language studied, and which consequently are liable to distort that which is being translated.

Naively, people sometimes think that *reality* itself could be this kind of mediator and 'third language': that equivalences between expressions in different languages could be established by locating just which objects in the world they referred to. (If the objects were identical, then so were the expressions ...) For a variety of powerful reasons, this is of course no good. Language functions in a variety of ways other than «referring to objects». Many objects are simply not there, in any obvious physical sense, to be located: how could one, by this method, establish the equivalences, if they exist, between abstract or negative or hypothetical or religious expressions? Again, many 'objects' are in a sense created by the language, by the man-

plifies and 'ritually' brings home to us the concepts involved. But I do not think this accounts either for their compulsiveness or for occasional lapses from it. There is something comic about this idea. Are we to say that Riemann and Lobachevsky were inadequately exposed to those rituals of Western society which make the Euclidean picture of space compulsive to its members?

ner in which its terms carve up the world or experience. Thus the mediating third party is simply not to be found: either it turns out to be an elusive ghost ('reality'), or it is just one further language, with idiosyncrasies of its own which are as liable to distort in translation as did the original language of the investigator. Using it only multiplies the probability of distortion by adding to the number of conceptual middlemen, and in any case the procedure involves a vicious regress.

This situation is described, for instance, in a recent important study of primitive religion: «(The) unity and multiplicity of Divinity causes no difficulty in the context of Dinka language and life, but it is impossible entirely to avoid the logical and semantic problems which arise when Dinka statements bearing upon it are translated, together, into English.» in Godfrey Lienhardt, *Divinity and Experience: The Religion of the Dinka*, (Oxford 1961, p. 56.)

Or, as the same author puts it in the context of a general discussion of anthropology, in *The Institutions of Primitive Society*, by various authors (Oxford, 1954, chapter VIII).

«The problem of describing to others how members of a remote tribe think then begins to appear *largely as one of translation*, of making the coherence primitive thought has... as clear as possible in our own.» (p. 97, italics mine.)

The situation facing the historical sociologist is not very different. Samuelsson says (*Op.cit.*, p. 36): «Neither in St. Paul nor in Baxter do the texts... form coherent chains of reasoning... The source material, in both cases, consists of a few sentences, statements made on isolated occasions... often clearly contradictory and not infrequently framed with such oracular sophistry that it is impossible for the reader of a later age to determine with certainty the 'intrinsic meaning'...»

The problem is analogous, though there are differences. One is that if the historical sociologist's material is disjointed and fragmentary, there is less he can do about it than the anthropologist confronting a still continuing culture. Another difference is that this particular sociologist is not over-charitable in attributing coherence to the authors of his texts, whilst the anthropologist cited appears to make it a condition of a good translation that it conveys the coherence which he assumes is there to be found in primitive thought. Such charity, or lack of it, is a matter of fashion in various disciplines. Most anthropologists at present are, I think, charitable: in sociology the situation is not so clear, and there is no reason to

think that Samuelsson is similarly typical⁵.

One main stream of contemporary philosophy is inclined towards similar charity towards the concepts of the philosopher's own society. Mr. R. Wollheim, for instance, in *F. H. Bradley*, (Penguin Books 1959, p. 67) observes "... there are those (philosophers) who think that... what we think is far truer, far profounder than we ordinarily take it to be..." and goes on, correctly, to cite as the contemporary origin of this charitable view the later Wittgenstein. But Wittgenstein is also the author of the insistence on seeing the meaning of utterances as their use, and on seeing language as a «form of life»: in anthropological terms, on interpreting them in the light of their function in the culture of which they are a part. This influential movement is of course liable to confirm anthropologists in their attitude, and at least one of them, in a brilliant essay⁶, has drawn attention to the parallelism. Time was when neither philosophers nor anthropologists were so charitable.

6. Thus the basic situation is simple. I am schematising it below. Indigenous or textual sentence S faces a long or infinite column of all possible (say) English sentences. The investigator, with some misgivings, locates the nearest equivalent of S in the column. (See diag. I, p. 162)


7. Having done this, the anthropologist simply cannot, whether he likes it or not, and however much he may strive to be *wertfrei*, prevent himself from noticing whether the equivalents found in his own language for S are sensible or silly, as assertions. One's first reaction to assertions in one's own language, inseparable from appreciating their meaning, is to classify them in some way as Good or Bad. (I do not say 'true' or 'false', for this only arises with regard to some types of assertion. With regard to others, other dichotomies, such as 'meaningful' and 'absurd' or 'sensible' or 'silly' might apply. I deliberately use the 'Good' and 'Bad' so as to cover all such possible polar alternatives, whichever might best apply to the equivalent of S.)

So in terms of our diagram, we have two boxes, G(ood) and B(ad); and having located the equivalents of S in his own language, the anthropologist willy-nilly goes on to note whether these equivalents

⁵ For instance, Dr. W. STARK, in *The Sociology of Knowledge*, London, 1958, recommends almost universal charity in this respect, with the help of arguments which differ both from Durkheim's and from those of Functionalists. See also «Sociology of Faith», *Inquiry*, 1958, No. 4.


⁶ E. R. LEACH, in «The Epistemological Background to Malinowski's Empiricism», in *Man and Culture*, ed. R. Firth, London, 1957, p. 119.

DIAGRAM 1



go into G or B. (He may of course think that he is doing this purely in his own private capacity, and not professionally as an anthropologist. No matter, he does do it.) So the schema becomes slightly more complex. Let us assume in this case that the anthropologist judges the equivalents of S to be silly, B(ad). The schema now is:

DIAGRAM 2



8. But what the preceding diagram 2 describes is, as an account of contemporary interpretations, unrealistic. On the contrary, it describes a state of affairs much more characteristic of an earlier period, of what may almost be called the pre-history of anthropology. To come out with an interpretation of the indigenous sentence which classifies it as B(ad), as false or irrational or absurd, or at any rate to do it often, is a sign of *ethnocentricity*. Ethnocentricity is a grave defect from the viewpoint of the standards of the anthropological community.


Like members of other tribes, anthropologists are socialised by means of legends. These legends of course need not be false: indeed the one I am about to describe has much truth in it. Nevertheless, it is their socialising, indoctrinating function rather than their historical accuracy which is relevant. The legend by means of which a new anthropologist is moulded runs something as follows: Once upon a time, the anthropological world was inhabited by a proto-population who were *ethnocentric*. They collected information about primitives mainly in order to poke fun at them, to illustrate the primitive's inferiority to themselves. The information collected, even if accurate (which it often wasn't) was worthless because it was torn out of context.

The pre-enlightenment anthropologist, struck by the frequency with which the interpretations resulted in assertions which were B(ad), and crediting this to the backwardness of the societies whose beliefs were being described, tended to explain this in terms of one of two theories: a) Primitive Mentality theories, or b) Jacob's Ladder (Evolutionist) theories of moral and intellectual growth. The former theory amounts to saying that savages get things wrong and confused so systematically, rather than being just occasionally in error, that one can characterise their thought as 'pre-logical'. The latter theory is somewhat more charitable and supposes that the savages are on the same ladder as we are, but so far behind that most of what he believes, whilst resulting from the application of the same logical principles as our own, is also an example of so unskilled an application of them that it is all too frequently wrong. Neither of these theories is much favoured at present.

For, one day the Age of Darkness came to an end. Modern anthropology begins with good, genuine, real modern fieldwork. The essence of such fieldwork is that it does see institutions, practices, beliefs etc. *in context*. At the same time, ethnocentrism is overcome. It is no longer the aim of studies to titillate a feeling of superiority by retailing piquant oddities. The two things, the seeing of institu-

tions etc. in context, and the overcoming of ethnocentrism, are of course intimately connected. The schema which now applies is somewhat different:

DIAGRAM 3



The circle C around the original indigenous assertion S stands for its social context. The context so to speak refracts the line of interpretation: with the aid of context, one arrives at a different equivalent in English of the original sentence S. And, lo and behold, if one *then* asks oneself about the merit of the newly interpreted S, one finds oneself giving it a high mark for sensibleness, truth or whatnot. One ends at G(ood) rather than B(ad). The earlier, bad old practice is indicated on this diagram by a dotted line.

9. There are various motives and/or justifications for the new, contextual approach. One of them is simply that it contains a good deal of validity: one does indeed get incomparably better appreciation of a doctrine by seeing its setting and use. But there are other

motives. One of them is the laudable desire to be tolerant, understanding and liberal, to refrain from an uncomprehending and presumptuous superiority in one's attitude to other (notably 'primitive') societies.

In the modern world, this can be an urgent concern and connected with the need to combat racialism. A notable example of this use of anthropological sophistication is Professor Lévi-Strauss' *Race and History*, (UNESCO, Paris, 1952). In a chapter entitled «The Ethnocentric Attitude» he describes the widespread tendency to discount and despise members of other cultures as savages or barbarians, and speaks of it (p. 11) as «this naive attitude... deeply rooted in most men» and adds that «this [i.e. his] booklet... in fact refutes it». The main method he employs here to dissuade us from ethnocentricity is to point out that ethnocentrism characterises above all just those whom one would describe as savages. «This attitude of mind, which excludes as 'savages' (or any people one may choose to regard as savages) from human kind, is precisely the attitude most strikingly characteristic of those same savages». One may be worried by the fact that the second occurrence of the word *savages* in the preceding sentence does not occur in inverted commas: in other words, that Lévi-Strauss is attempting to dissuade us from speaking of «savages» by warning us that *savages* do so. Does he not here presuppose their existence and a condemnation of them? The liberal is in great danger of falling into paradox: either he condemns the ethnocentrism of savages and thus his tolerance has an important limit, or he does not, and then he at least condones *their* intolerance...

The paradox emerges even more clearly in an aphoristic definition he offers a little later (p. 12) of the «barbarian». «The barbarian is, first and foremost, the man who believes in barbarism». What makes one a savage, in other words, is the belief that some others *are* such.

Let us follow out this definition, taking it literally. A barbarian is he who believes that some others are barbarians. Notoriously, there are such people. They, therefore, are barbarians. *We* know they believe it. Hence, we believe they are barbarians. Ergo, we too are barbarians (by reapplication of the initial definition). And so is anyone who has noticed this fact and knows that *we* are, and so on. Lévi-Strauss' definition has the curious property that, by a kind of regression or contagion, it spreads barbarism like wildfire through the mere awareness of it...

This paradox follows logically from Lévi-Strauss' innocuous-seeming definition. But this is not merely a logical oddity, arising from some

quirk or careless formulation. It reflects something far more fundamental. It springs from a dilemma deep in the very foundations of the tolerant, understanding liberalism, of which sophisticated anthropology is a part, and it goes back at least to the thought of the Enlightenment which is the ancestor of such liberalism. The (unresolved) dilemma, which the thought of the Enlightenment faced, was between a relativistic-functionalist view of thought, and the absolutist claims of enlightened Reason. Viewing man as part of nature, as enlightened Reason requires, it wished to see his cognitive and evaluative activities as parts of nature too, and hence as varying, legitimately, from organism to organism and context to context. (This is the relativist-functional view). But at the same time in recommending life according to Reason and Nature, it wished at the very least to exempt this view itself (and, in practice, some others) from such a relativism.

This dilemma was never really resolved in as far as a naturalistic or third-person view of beliefs (individual or collective) leads us to relativism, whilst our thought at the same time make an exception in its own favour. We are here only concerned with the working out of this dilemma in anthropology. What characteristically happened in anthropology is rather like that pattern of alliances, in which one's neighbours are one's enemies, but one's neighbours-but-one are one's allies. Anthropologists were relativistic, tolerant, contextually-comprehending vis-à-vis the savages who are after all some distance away, but absolutistic, intolerant vis-à-vis their immediate neighbours or predecessors, the members of our own society who do not share their comprehending outlook and are themselves 'ethnocentric'...


The anthropologists were roughly liberals in their own society and Tories on behalf of the society they were investigating: they 'understood' the tribesman but condemned the District Officer or the Missionary. A bitter and misinformed attack on this attitude occurs in A. J. Hanna's *European Rule in Africa*, (London, 1961, p. 22): «The rise of social anthropology did much to foster (the) attitude (of trying to perpetuate tribalism)... exploring with fascinated interest the subtle and complex ramifications of tribal structure, and disdaining to mention... murder, mutilation, torture, witch-hunting (sic), cattle-raiding, wife-raiding... A... psychological tendency led the anthropologist to become the champion not only of the tribe whose customs he studied, but of its customs themselves.»

It is interesting to note, however, that the pattern of alliances, as it were, has changed since the days of the liberals who were, in

relativist spirit, tolerantly understanding of the intolerant absolutism of the distant tribesman, but less so of the absolutist beliefs in their own society. Nowadays, more sociological students of religion are themselves believers: in other words, contextual charity ends at home.

10. My main point about the tolerance-engendering contextual interpretation is that it calls for caution: that as a method it can be rather more wobbly than at first appears. Let us return to the diagram. What the last diagram expressed — the diagram schematising context-respecting, enlightened investigation — can involve some self-deception. What really happens, at any rate sometimes, is this:

DIAGRAM 4



This diagram differs from the preceding one partly in the direction of the arrows. What I mean is this: it is the *prior* determination that S, the indigenous affirmation, be interpreted favourably, which determines just how much context will be taken into consideration. The diagram shows how different ranges of context — C_1 or C_2 — are brought in according to whether the starting point is charitable or not... The context 'refracts' the line of interpretation: take a little more, or a little less, (as in the dotted lines), and a different interpretation of S in English will result. Or rather, the prior disposition

concerning what kind of interpretation one wishes to find, determines the range of context brought in. (Apart from varying the range, there will also be different views of what the context is, either empirically, or in the way it is described and seen. A believing and an agnostic anthropologist may have differing views about what contexts there are to be seen). The dotted circle represents a different — in this case, smaller — range of context taken into consideration.

It may be that the sympathetic, positive interpretations of indigenous assertions are not the result of a sophisticated appreciation of context, but *the other way round*: that the manner in which the context is invoked, the amount and kind of context and the way the context itself is interpreted, depends on prior tacit determination concerning the kind of interpretation one wishes to find... After all, there is nothing in the nature of things or societies to dictate visibly just how much context is relevant to any given utterance, or how that context should be described.

Professor Raymond Firth has remarked in «*Problem and Assumption in an Anthropological Study of Religion*» (Huxley Memorial Lecture, 1959, p. 139) «From my own experience, I am impressed by the ease with which it is possible to add one's own personal dimension to the interpretation of an alien religious ideology, to raise the generalisations to a higher power than the empirical content of the material warrants». My point is, really, that it is more than a matter of *ease* — it is a matter of necessity: for interpretation cannot be determinate without assumptions concerning the success or failure of the interpreted communication, and the criteria of such success are not manifest in the «content of the material» itself. One has to work them out as best one can, and it will *not* do to take the short cut of reading them off the material by assuming that the material is always successful, i.e. that the statements investigated do satisfy and exemplify criteria of coherence, and hence that interpretation is not successful until this coherence has been made manifest in the translation. The logical *assessment* of an assertion, and the identification of its nearest equivalent in our language, are intimately linked and inseparable.

11. But this formal argument may carry more conviction if illustrated by concrete examples. The first I shall take is Professor Evans-Pritchard's treatment of Nuer religion, notably in Chapter V, «The Problem of Symbols», of *Nuer Religion*, (Oxford 1956). Evans-Pritchard's main theoretical concern in this book is to refute Lévy-Bruhl's thesis concerning «pre-logical mentality». Evans-Pritchard's method in the pursuit of this aim is to take Nuer assertions and

doctrines which, on the face of it, would indeed provide excellent evidence for a doctrine of the «pre-logical mentality» of primitives, and then to proceed with the help of contextual interpretation to show that in fact they do not.

Evans-Pritchard begins his discussion as follows (p. 123): «Our problem... can be simply stated by the question: What meaning are we to attach to Nuer statements that such-and-such a thing is *kwoth*, spirit? The answer is not so simple». For point is that the Nuer do make assertions which, *prima facie*, support a Lévy-Bruhl-type theory of «primitive mentality», as Evans-Pritchard himself admits and stresses:

«It seems odd, if not absurd, to a European when he is told that a twin is a bird as though it were an obvious fact, for Nuer are not saying that a twin is like a bird but that he is a bird. There seems to be a complete contradiction in the statement: and it was precisely on statements of this kind recorded by observers of primitive peoples that Lévy-Bruhl based his theory of the prelogical mentality of these peoples, its chief characteristic being, in his view, that it permits such evident contradictions — that a thing can be what it is and at the same time something altogether different.» (p. 131) Or again, «When a cucumber is used as a sacrificial victim Nuer speak of it as an ox. In doing so they are asserting something rather more than that it takes the place of an ox». (p. 128).

But this is not the only kind of apparently odd assertion in which the Nuer indulge. This kind of statement appears to be in conflict with the principle of identity or non-contradiction, or with common sense, or with manifest observable fact: human twins are *not* birds, and vice versa. But they *also* make assertions which are in conflict with good theology, or at any rate with the theology which, according to Evans-Pritchard, they really hold. «... Nuer religious thought... is pre-eminently dualistic». «...there is... a duality between *kwoth*, Spirit, which is immaterial... and *cak*, creation, the material world known to the senses. Rain and lightning and pestilences and murrains belong to this created world...» (p. 124).

Nevertheless, Nuer do make assertions which appear to be in conflict with this theology as well. «... certain things are said, or may be said, 'to be' God — rain, lightning, and various other natural ...things...» (p. 123). «They may say of rain or lightning or pestilence '*e kwoth*', 'it is God'...» (p. 124).

What is the solution? How are the Nuer saved for both common-sense *and* for dualistic theology, when their assertions appear to

convict them of self-contradiction *and* of a doctrine of the immanence of the Deity in the world?

I shall present the solution in Professor Evans-Pritchard's own words. Concerning the apparent contradiction in Nuer thought, arising from the identification of twins, and birds, it appears (p. 131) that «no contradiction is involved in the statement, which, on the contrary, appears quite sensible and even true, to one who presents the idea to himself in the Nuer language and within their system of religious thought. ...*They are not saying that a twin has a beak, feathers, and so forth. Nor in their everyday relations as twins do Nuers speak of them as birds or act towards them as though they were birds.*» (Italics mine).

One may ask here — but what, then, *would* count as pre-logical thought? Only, presumably, the behaviour of a totally demented person, suffering from permanent hallucinations, who *would* treat something which is perceptibly a human being as though it had all the physical attributes of a bird. But could Lévy-Bruhl conceivably have meant this when he was putting forward the doctrine of pre-logical mentality? He knew, and could hardly have helped knowing, that savages like everyone else are capable of distinguishing objects which are so unlike physically as a human being who happens to be a twin, and a bird. (In as far as there is nothing about the physical appearance of a human being who happens to be a twin — unless perhaps some socially significant markings, but Evans-Pritchard does not say that Nuer twins have something of this kind — to distinguish him from other human beings, the Nuer capacity to distinguish him from a bird follows from their very capacity to distinguish humans in general from birds, a capacity which can hardly be in doubt...) This being so, Lévy-Bruhl's thesis can hardly with fairness be interpreted as entailing that errors such as the confusion of human and bird bodies is genuinely committed by primitives. He could not have meant this: or rather, we may not attribute this doctrine to him if we extend to *him* too the courtesy or charity of contextual interpretation, which requires that we do not credit people with beliefs — whatever they *say* — which are plainly in conflict with what they can be assumed to know in the light of what they actually do. (E.g. — Nuer cannot believe twins to be birds as their conduct distinguishes between the two).

If it be adopted as a principle that people cannot mean what at some level (e.g. implicitly, through their conduct) they also know to be false or absurd, then this principle must be applicable to Lévy-Bruhl too... The trouble with the principle is, of course, that it is *too*

charitable: it absolves too many people of the charge of systematically illogical or false or self-deceptive thought.

It is worth considering just why the principle is so indiscriminately charitable. It insists, as Evans-Pritchard does when applying it, on interpreting assertions in the light of actual *conduct*. But no ongoing viable system of conduct — and any society, and also any sane surviving man, exemplifies such a system — *can* be self-contradictory. Assertions, doctrines, can easily be illogical: conduct, and in particular the conduct of a *society* which is, by definition, a human group persisting over time, cannot easily be illogical. The object of anthropological inquiries are precisely human groups persisting over time. Their very persistence entails that they are reasonably viable: and this viability in turns ensures that a «context» is available for the sympathetic interpretation which will make sense of the local doctrines and assertions, however odd they may seem on the surface. This hermeneutic principle, tacitly employed by Evans-Pritchard, is too strong, for it ensures that no reasonably viable society can be said to be based on or to uphold absurd or «pre-logical» doctrines. The trouble with such all-embracing logical charity is, for one thing, that it is unwittingly quite *a priori*: it may delude anthropologists into thinking that they have *found* that no society upholds absurd or self-contradictory beliefs, whilst in fact the principle employed has ensured in advance of any inquiry that nothing may count as pre-logical, inconsistent or categorially absurd thought it may be. And this, apart from anything else, would blind one to at least on socially significant phenomenon: the social role of absurdity.

12. But before proceeding with this general consideration, one should also look at Evans-Pritchard's second re-interpretation of Nuer assertions. The first one was to save them for common sense or consistency from the charge of self-contradiction. The second was to save them for a dualist theology and from an immanentist one. Again, it is best to present the case in Evans-Pritchard's own words. Referring to the fact that Nuer appear to speak of certain things — rain, lightning etc. — as being God (as quoted above), in contradiction of the dualist theology with which he credits them, Evans-Pritchard comments (pages 123 and 124):

«There is here an ambiguity, or an obscurity, to be elucidated, for Nuer are not now saying that God or Spirit is like this or that, but that this or that 'is' God or Spirit».

In interpreting this crucial sentence, a good deal depends on just what Evans-Pritchard meant by putting the final occurrence of the word *is* in inverted commas. He might simply have wished to accent-

uate it, by contrast to the expression *is like* in the preceding clause. But there are two good objections to this interpretation: had this been his intention, he might simply have italicised it, as is more customary, and secondly, he should have given the same treatment, whether inverted commas or italicisation, to the contrasted expression *is like*. In fact, I interpret him as saying that the Nuer do not really say that these things are God, but merely that they 'are' God. They mean something other than what they say.

And indeed, we are told (p. 125), «When Nuer say of rain or lightning that it is God they are making an elliptical statement. What is understood is not that the thing in itself is Spirit but that it is what we could call a medium or manifestation or sign of divine activity in relation to men and of significance for them». And no doubt, elliptical statements are common in all languages. What is at issue are the procedures for filling in the gaps left by ellipsis.

It is important of course that the Nuer themselves being illiterate do not put any kind of inverted commas around their word for *is*, nor do they adopt any kind of phonetic equivalent of such a device. (Evans-Pritchard at no point suggests that they do). Hence the attribution of the inverted commas, of the non-literal meaning, is a matter of interpretation, not of direct observation of the utterance itself.

And what is the logic of this interpretation? How are the gaps filled? In part, the argument is based on the assumption that the Nuer *cannot* mean the assertion literally because (their notion of) Deity is such that this would make no sense. «Indeed it is because Spirit is conceived of in itself, as the creator and the one, and quite apart from any of its material manifestations, that phenomena can be said to be sent by it or to be its instruments» (p. 125). But to argue thus is of course to assume precisely that they do have such a self-sufficient, substantial-Creator notion of Spirit as they are credited with, *and* that they follow out the implications consistently. Indeed one may doubt whether and in what sense the Nuer can be said to possess a notion of the One, self-sufficient substance and Creator, independent of this material manifestations, etc., difficult notions which, explicitly formulated in this way, seem to presuppose the context of scholastic philosophy. It is something like this that Schoolmen have done for God: can the same be meaningfully said of the Nuer God, the Nuer having no Schoolmen?

But the position is supported not only by this argument, but also by some good independent evidence. One argument is that «...Nuer readily expand such statements by adding that thunder, rain, and

pestilence are all instruments...of God or that they are sent by... God...» (p. 125). This is indeed a good and independent piece of evidence. Another argument is from the irreversibility of the judgments which claim that those certain mundane manifestations 'are' God: God or Spirit cannot in Nuer be said to 'be' them. This does not seem to me to be so valid a point. It is of course difficult for one who speaks no Nuer to judge, but in English it is possible, in some contexts, to say that A is B without the statement being reversible, but at the same time implying that A is a part of B and in that sense identical with it (or rather with a part of it). To someone who inquires about my suburb, I may in some contexts say that Putney is London, (it is not Surrey): and I cannot say that London is Putney. It could be that for Nuer, rain etc. is in this sense (part of) the deity, and this would then indicate that the Nuer view of God is at least in part an immanent one, and not as severely transcendent as Evans-Pritchard seems to be arguing. («...God not being an observable object, [the situation could scarcely arise] in which Nuer would require or desire to say about him that he is anything». p. 125). Again one may also wonder whether Nuer can be credited with so firm a theological position on a question which they can hardly have explicitly posed in such terms.

I do not wish to be misunderstood: I am *not* arguing that Evans-Pritchard's account of Nuer concepts is a bad one. (Nor am I anxious to revive a doctrine of pre-logical mentality *à la* Lévy-Bruhl). On the contrary, I have the greatest admiration for it. What I am anxious to argue is that contextual interpretation, which offers an account of what assertions 'really mean' in opposition to what they seem to mean in isolation, does not by itself clinch matters. It cannot arrive at determinate answers (concerning 'what they mean') without doing a number of things which may in fact prejudge the question: without delimiting just which context is to be taken into consideration, without crediting the people concerned with consistency (which is precisely what is sub judice when we discuss, as Evans-Pritchard does, Lévy-Bruhl's thesis), or without assumptions concerning what they can mean (which, again, is precisely what we do not know but are trying to find out). In fairness, one should add that Evans-Pritchard is aware of this, as just before he severely rebukes Lévy-Bruhl and others for their errors, he also remarks (p. 140): «I can take the analysis no further: but if it is inconclusive it at least shows, if it is correct, how wide of the mark have been... (Lévy-Bruhl and some others)».

13. To say all this is not to argue for a scepticism or agnosticism

concerning what members of alien cultures and speakers of alien languages mean, still less to argue for an abstention from the contextual method of interpretation. (On the contrary, I shall argue for a fuller use of it, fuller in the sense of allowing for the possibility that what people mean is sometimes absurd).

In a sense, Evans-Pritchard's saving of the Nuer for a dualistic theology is a more difficult exercise than is his saving of them from a charge of pre-logical mentality. We know anyway, without field-work, that they could in conduct distinguish birds from men and bulls from cucumbers, and to argue from these premisses to the absence of pre-logical thought does not perhaps really advance the question of whether pre-logical thought occurs. On the other hand nothing prior to field-work evidence could give us any reason for having views about whether Nuer theology was or was not dualistic.

14. It is interesting at this stage to contrast Evans-Pritchard's use of the method with that of another distinguished practitioner of it, Mr. Edmund Leach.

We have seen how Evans-Pritchard takes Nuer statements which, on the face of it, violate common-sense and also others which go counter to a dualistic theology which separates a transcendent deity from the immanent world, and how, by holding these statements to be metaphorical or elliptical, he squares them with commonsense and an acceptable theology. Mr. Leach, in *Political Systems of Highland Burma*, London 1954, copes with other odd statements, made by Burmese Kachins.

Again, these statements are odd. It appears (p. 14) that a Kachin found killing a pig and asked what he is doing may reply that he is 'giving to the nats'. The oddity arises simply from the non-existence of nats. On the face of it, we might accuse the Kachins, if not of 'pre-logical mentality', at any rate of populating the world with imaginary creatures in their own image. Indeed, this seems to be so, for Leach tells us (p. 173) that nats are 'magnified non-natural men', and that «in the *nat* world, as in the human world, there are chiefs, aristocrats, commoners and slaves».

Nevertheless, Leach does not, like Evans-Pritchard intend to give us a picture of what that supernatural world is like. (Evans-Pritchard gave us a picture of the Nuer vision of the supernatural which was sufficiently determinate to exclude some superficially plausible interpretations of some Nuer assertions). On the contrary, he tells us (p. 172) «it is nonsensical to discuss the actions or qualities of supernatural beings except in terms of human action». «Myth... is not so much a justification for ritual as a description of it». Or, (p. 13) «Myth

(and) ... ritual ... are one and the same». «...myth regarded as a statement in words 'says' the same thing as ritual regarded as a statement in action. To ask questions about the content of belief which are not contained in the content of ritual is nonsense.»⁷ «... a very large part of anthropological literature on religion (is) a discussion of the content of belief and of the rationality or otherwise of that content. Most such arguments seem to me scholastic nonsense».

Or again, (p. 14), when a Kachin is killing a pig and says he is giving to it the nats, «it is nonsense to ask such questions as: 'Do nats have legs? Do they eat flesh? Do they live in the sky?'" (Given the fact that they are 'magnified non-natural men' and that they are 'chiefs, aristocrats, commoners and slaves', it seems odd that it should be nonsense to credit them with legs, a diet, and a habitat...)

Concerning his own procedure, Leach tells us (p. 14): «... I make frequent reference to Kachin mythology but I ... make no attempt to find any logical coherence in the myths to which I refer. Myths for me are simply one way of describing certain types of human behaviour...» And, later, not only are myth and ritual one so that it makes no sense to ask non-contextual questions about the former, but also (p. 182) «...it becomes clear that the various nats of Kachin religious ideology are, in the last analysis, nothing more than ways of describing the formal relationships that exist between real persons and real groups in ordinary Kachin society».

It is possible to discern what has happened. Leach's exegetic procedures have also saved the Kachins from being credited with meaning what they *appear* to be saying. Their assertions are reinterpreted in the light of the author's disregard for the supernatural, in the light of the doctrine that myths simply mean the ritual which they accompany and nothing else, and that the ritual in turn 'means', symbolises, the society in which it occurs. The «Social» theory of religion appears to have, in our society, the following function (amongst other, possible): to enable us to attribute meaning to assertions which might otherwise be found to lack it.

Again, I am not concerned, nor indeed inclined, to challenge Leach's specific interpretations of the Kachins; though one wishes that some enterprising teacher of anthropology would set his students the task of writing an essay on *kwoth* as it would be written by Leach, and another on *nats* as it would be written by Evans-Pritchard. The point with which I am concerned is to show how the range of context,

⁷ If Mr. Leach meant this quite literally, he should of course give us only the Kachin expressions itself plus a description of the ritual and of the society — and *not*, as in fact he does, *translations* of the ritual statements.

and the manner in which the context is seen, necessarily affect the interpretation. Both Evans-Pritchard and Leach are charitable to their subjects, and neither allows them to be credited with nonsense: but in the case of Leach, the 'sense' with which they are credited is identified by means of an essentially *social* doctrine of religion, a doctrine which is also precisely that which Evans-Pritchard strives to refute with the help of *his* interpretations

15. The crux of the matter is that when, in a sense rightly, the interpretation of people's assertions must be made in the light of what they do and the social setting they do it in, this requirement is profoundly ambiguous. Two quite different things may be intended (though those who postulate the requirement may have failed to be clear in their own minds about this). The distinction between these two things can best be brought out, at any rate to begin with, by means of a simplified imaginary social situation.

Assume that in the language of a given society, there is a word *boble* which is applied to characterise people. Research reveals that *bobleness* or *bobility* is attributed to people under *either* of the following conditions: a) a person who antecedently displays certain characteristics in his conduct, say uprightness, courage and generosity, is called *boble*. b) any person holding a certain office, or a certain social position, is also ipso facto described as *boble*. One is tempted to say that bobility (a) is a descriptive term whose operational definition consists of tests for the possession of certain attributes (and might consist of seeing how large a portion of his income he distributed as largesse, how he behaved in danger, etc.), whereas (b) is simply an ascription, depending on the will or whim of those in authority, or on the social situation, but not in any reasonably direct or identifiable way dependent on the characteristics of the person in question. But the point is: the society in question does not distinguish *two concepts*, *boble* (a) and *boble* (b). It only uses one word, *boble tout court*; and again its theories about bobility, expressed in proverbs, legends or even disquisitions of wise elders, only know bobility, one and indivisible. As a first and simplified approximation, the logic of bobility is not an unrecognisable model, perhaps, of some familiar concepts in our own languages.

But what is the observer to say about bobility-like, so to speak semi-operational concepts? Bobility is a conceptual device by which the privileged class of the society in question acquires some of the prestige of certain virtues respected in that society, without the inconvenience of needing to practice it, thanks to the fact that the same word is applied either to practitioners of those virtues or to oc-

cupiers of favoured positions. It is, at the same time, a manner of reinforcing the appeal of those virtues, by associating them, through the use of the same appellation, with prestige and power. But all this needs to be said, and to say it is to bring out the internal logical incoherence of the concept — an incoherence which, indeed, is socially functional.

What this shows, however, is that the over-charitable interpreter, determined to defend the concepts he is investigating from the charge of logical incoherence, is bound to misdescribe the social situation. To make sense of the concept is to make nonsense of the society. Thus the *uncharitable* may be 'contextualist' in the second, deeper and better sense.

It seems to me that anthropologists are curiously charitable to concepts. They are not unduly charitable to individuals. On the contrary, they are all too willing to describe how individuals 'manipulate' each other and the rules of the local game: indeed the word 'manipulation' has a certain vogue and is encountered with very great frequency. But why should concepts not be similarly open to manipulation? Why should it not be a part of their use that the ambiguity of words, the logically illicit transformation of one concept into another (like a spirit appearing in diverse forms) is exploited to the full by the users of what seems to be 'one' concept?

Excessive indulgence in contextual charity blinds us to what is best and what is worst in the life of societies. It blinds us to the possibility that social change may occur through the replacement of an inconsistent doctrine or ethic by a better one, or through a more consistent application of either. It equally blinds us to the possibility of, for instance, social control through the employment of absurd, ambiguous, inconsistent or unintelligible doctrines. I should not accept for one moment the contention that neither of these things ever occurs: but even if they never occurred it would be wrong to employ a method which excludes their possibility a priori.

16. It may be worth illustrating the point further with a real rather than schematised example, amongst central Moroccan Berbers, and I shall draw on my own field work for this. Two concepts are relevant: *baraka* and *agurram* (pl. *igurramen*). *Baraka* is a word which can mean simply 'enough', but it also means plenitude, and above all blessedness manifested amongst other things in prosperity and the power to cause prosperity in others by supernatural means. An *agurram* is a possessor of *baraka*⁸. The concept *baraka* has been

⁸ The term *baraka* is in use throughout North Africa by Arabs and Ber-

explored before, notably by Westermarck's *Ritual and Belief in Morocco*, (London 1926, Chapters II & III). The concept of *agurram* has not to my knowledge previously been properly explored.

Igurramen are a minority in the wider tribal society of which they are a part. They are a fairly privileged and influential one, and they perform essential and important functions as mediators, arbitrators etc. amongst the feuding tribal population around them. They are selected from a range of potential *igurramen*, who are defined by descent — roughly speaking, to be one it is necessary that one's ancestors or at least some of them should have been *igurramen* too. The crucial question is — *how* are they selected?

The local belief is that they are selected by God. Moreover, God makes his choice manifest by endowing those whom he has selected with certain characteristics, including magical powers, and great generosity, prosperity, a consider-the-lilies attitude, pacifism, and so forth.

The reality of the situation is, however, that the *igurramen* are in fact selected by the surrounding ordinary tribesmen who use their services, by being called to perform those services and being preferred to the rival candidates for their performance. What appears to be *vox Dei* is in reality *vox populi*. Moreover, the matter of the blessed characteristics, the stigmata of *agurram*-hood is more complicated. It is essential that successful candidates to *agurram* status be *credited* with these characteristics, but it is equally essential, at any rate with regard to some of them, that they should not really possess them. For instance, an *agurram* who was extremely generous in a consider-the-lilies spirit would soon be impoverished and, as such, fail by another crucial test, that of prosperity.

There is here a crucial divergence between concept and reality, a divergence which moreover is quite essential for the working of the social system. It is no use saying, as has been suggested to me by an advocate of the hermeneutic method which I am criticising, that the notion of divine selection of *igurramen* is simply the local way of conceptualising a popular election. This interpretation is excluded for a number of reasons. For one thing, the Berbers of central Morocco are perfectly familiar with *real* elections. In their traditional system, they also have, apart from the *igurramen*, lay tribal chiefs, (*amghar*, pl. *imgharen*) who are elected, annually, by tribal assembly.

bers, and also elsewhere. The term *agurram* is only known among Berbers, and not among all of these. It is used in central and southern Morocco, but not among the northern Berbers of the Rif mountains. It is also used by Algerian Berbers, but I do not know how extensively.

In these real elections the tribesmen do indeed hope for and request divine guidance, but they are quite clear that it is they themselves who do the electing. They distinguish clearly between this kind of genuine annual election, and the very long-drawn-out process (stretching over generations) by which *igurramen* are selected, in fact by the tribesmen, but ideally by God. But it would be presumptuous and blasphemous for tribesmen to claim to appoint an *agurram*. Secondly, it is of the essence of the function of an *agurram* that he is given from the outside: he has to be a neutral who arbitrates and mediates between tribes. If he were chosen, like a chief or an ally, by the tribesmen, or rather if he were seen to be chosen by tribesmen (as in fact he is), for a litigant to submit to his verdict would be in effect to submit to those other tribesmen who had chosen the *agurram*. This, of course, would involve a loss of face and constitute a confession of weakness. Tribesmen sometimes do choose lay arbitrators: but they then know that they are doing and the point of invoking *igurramen* is the invoking of *independent* authority. Submission to a divinely chosen *agurram*, is a sign not of weakness but of piety. Not to submit to him is, and is explicitly claimed to be, *shameful*. (This illustrates a point which seems to me enormously important, namely that concepts generally contain *justifications* of practices, and hence that one misinterprets them grossly if one treats them simply as these practices, and their context, in another dress. The justifications are independent of the thing justified.)

It might be objected that my unwillingness to accept the indigenous account at its face value merely reflects my theological prejudices, i.e. my unwillingness to believe that the deity interferes in the political life of the central High Atlas. But this kind of objection does not have even a *prima facie* plausibility with regard to the other social mechanism mentioned. There is nothing in my conceptual spectacles to make me unwilling to conceive that some people might be generous and uncalculating, nor should I be unwilling to describe them in these terms if I found them to be so. It is just that field-work observation of *igurramen* and the social context in which they operate has convinced me that, whilst indeed *igurramen* must entertain lavishly and with an air of insouciance, they *must* also at least balance their income from donations from pilgrims with the outgoings from entertaining them, for a poor *agurram* is a no-good *agurram*. Here again, we are faced with a socially essential discrepancy between concept and reality. What is required is not disregard for social context, but, on the contrary, a fuller appreciation of it which is not wedded a priori to find good sense in the concepts.

One might sum up all this by saying that nothing is more false than the claim that, for a given assertion, *its use is its meaning*. On the contrary, its use may depend on its lack of meaning, its ambiguity, its possession of wholly different and incompatible meanings in different contexts, *and* on the fact that, at the same time, it as it were emits the impression of possessing a consistent meaning throughout — on retaining, for instance, the aura of a justification valid only in one context when used in quite another.

17. It is worth exploring this in connection with the other concept mentioned, *baraka*. I shall not say much about it, as the literature concerning it is already extensive (E. Westermarck's *Ritual and Belief in Morocco*, London 1926, Chapters II & III). Suffice it to say that the concept is a source of great joy to me, for it violates, simultaneously, no fewer than three of the major and most advertised categorical distinctions favoured by recent philosophers. It is an evaluative term, but it is used as though it were a descriptive one: possessors of *baraka* are treated as though they were possessors of an objective characteristics rather than recipients of high moral grades from their fellow men. And in as far as it is claimed to be an objective characteristic of people, manifest in their conduct, it could only be a dispositional one — but it is treated as though it were the name of some *stuff*: apart from being transmitted genetically, it can also be transmitted by its possessor to another person by means of spitting into the mouth, etc. Thirdly, its attribution is really a case of the performative use of language, for people in fact become possessors of *baraka* by being treated as possessors of it — but, nevertheless, it is treated as though its possession were a matter wholly independent of the volition of those who attribute it. (This has already been explained in connection with the account of *agurram*, the possessor of *baraka*, and it has also been explained how this deception is essential for the working of the social system in question.)

In other words, the actual life of this concept goes dead against the celebrated work of recent philosophers. One may well speculate that the society in question could be undermined by acquainting its members with the works of Ryle, Ayer, Stevenson and J. L. Austin. The question is somewhat academic, for in its traditional form the society is virtually illiterate (that is, illiterate but for a small number of Muslim scribes whose range is severely circumscribed) and not amenable to the persuasion of external teachers, and by the time it has ceased to be illiterate and unreceptive, it shall have been disrupted anyway.

But this does illustrate a number of important points. I have al-

ready stressed that it is no use supposing that one can deal with this by claiming that the indigenous societies always live, as it were, in a conceptual dimensions of their own, in which our categorial boundaries do not apply. On the contrary, we can sometimes only make sense of the society in question by seeing how the manipulation of concepts and the violation of categorial boundaries helps it to work. It is precisely the logical *inconsistency* of baraka which enables it to be applied according to social need and to endow what is a social need with the appearance of external, given and indeed authoritative reality.

18. There are, both in philosophy and the wider intellectual climate of our time, considerable forces giving support to the kind of Functionalism which makes good sense of everything. In philosophy, it springs from the doctrine which identifies *meaning* with *use*, and there is already in existence at least one work by a philosopher about the social sciences in general — Mr. P. Winch's, cited above — which elaborates (and commends) the consequences of this doctrine. A proper discussion of the philosophic questions involved would of course take longer.

In the world at large, there is much incentive to paper over the incoherence, and inconveniences, of current ideologies by emulating this anthropological technique. How many ideologists treat their *own* beliefs with a technique similar to that employed by anthropologists for tribesmen! I for one do not feel that, in the realm of concepts and doctrines, we may say that *tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner*. On the contrary, in the social sciences at any rate, if we forgive too much we understand nothing. The attitude of *credo quia absurdum* is *also* a social phenomenon, and we miss its point and its social role if we water it down by interpretation to make it just one further form of non-absurdity, sensible simply in virtue of being viable.

19. One major charge against Functionalism in the past has been the allegation that it cannot deal with social change. With regard to Functionalism in general this charge has now little relevance, as it only applies to strong or extreme formulations of it, and these are held by few. But with regard to the Functionalist approach to interpretation of concepts, it applies very strongly. For it precludes us from making sense of those social changes which arise at least in part from the fact that people sometimes notice the incoherences of doctrines and concepts and proceed to reform the institutions justified by them. This may never happen *just* like that: it may be that it invariably is a discontented segment of society, a new rising class for instance, which exploits those incoherences. But even if this were

so, and the discovery of incoherences were never more than a contributory rather than a sufficient cause, it still would not be legitimate for us to employ a method which inherently prevents any possible appreciation of this fact. When anthropologists were concerned primarily with stable societies (or societies held to be such), the mistake was perhaps excusable: but nowadays it is not.

In the end, it is illuminating to return to one of the sources of the functionalist approach, Durkheim. Durkheim is sometimes accused of overrating the cohesion-engendering function of belief. In the *Elementary Forms of Religious Life*, which is the object of these charges, he did also put forward, albeit briefly, a theory of social change.⁹ This theory he sums up in one brief passage, and it is a theory plainly parallel to his theory of social cohesion.

«Car une société (est) constituée... avant tout, par l'idée qu'elle se fait d'elle-même. Et sans doute, il arrive qu'elle hésite sur la manière dont elle doit se concevoir: elle se sent tiraillée en des sens divergents... ces conflits, quand ils éclatent, ont lieu non entre l'idéal et la réalité, mais entre idéaux différents...».

Les Formes Élémentaires de la Vie Religieuse, (1925, édition, p. 604).

This theory, the germ of which is contained in Durkheim, has been elaborated by Mr. E. R. Leach's *Political Systems of Highland Burma*, (London 1959, esp. pp. 8-9.) My main point here is that there was no need for Durkheim to look even that far for a theory of social change. He apparently thought that if the one set of ritually reinforced and inculcated concepts explained social stability, then it took the presence of *two sets* to account for social change. But ironically, such a refinement is not necessary. Some social change may be accounted for precisely because *one* set of ideas has been inculcated too well, or has come to have too great a hold over the loyalties and imaginations of the members of the society in question, or because one of its subgroups has chosen to exploit the imperfect application of those ideas, and to iron out the inconsistencies and incoherencies. Over-charitable exegesis would blind us to this.

Contextual interpretation is in some respects like the invocation of ad hoc additional hypotheses in science: it is inevitable, proper, often very valuable, and at the same time dangerous and liable to disastrous abuse. It is probably impossible in either case to draw up general rules for delimiting the legitimate and illegitimate uses of it.

⁹ The work also contains some other suggestions on this subject, not so relevant to my argument here.

In science, the best safeguard may be a vivid sense of the possibility that the initial theory which is being saved may have been false after all; in sociological interpretation, an equally vivid sense of the possibility that the interpreted statement may contain absurdity.

20. There remains the issue in the wider society outside the social sciences, the question of the justifiability of 'Functionalist' white-washing of concepts and doctrines. Professor Evans-Pritchard sternly rebukes Durkheim at the end of his book *Nuer Religion*, p. 313: «It was Durkheim and not the savage who made society into a god.» Perhaps, but it is ironic that if the savage did not, modern man *does* seem to worship his own society through his religion.¹⁰

My plea against charity did not have as its aim the revival of a 'pre-logical primitive mentality' theory. On the contrary: I hope rather we shall be less charitable to ourselves. I agree entirely with Mr. Leach's point in his contribution to «Man and Culture», that when it comes to the general way in which concepts are embedded in use and context, there is no difference between 'primitives' and us. There is no need to be too charitable to *either*.

My own view of Durkheim is that at the core of his thought there lies not the doctrine of worshipping one's own society, but the doctrine that concepts are essentially social and that religion is the way in which society endows us with them and imposes their hold over us. But, consistently or not, he did not combine this with a static view of society and intellectual life. It would be ironic if neo-Functionalist interpretation now became the means by which our own concepts were ossified amongst us.

¹⁰ Cf. Will HERBERG: *Catholic-Protestant-Jew*, 1955.

MARX ET LA SOCIOLOGIE

La pensée de Marx en 1844

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I. On peut, en s'appuyant sur les textes, montrer que les œuvres de jeunesse de Marx contiennent le projet d'une sociologie concrète dominée par la notion de l'activité sociale pratique, ou *praxis*¹. Par la suite, ce projet se transforme, et Marx accordera la priorité dans les sciences sociales d'abord à l'histoire (en 1845, dans l'*Idéologie allemande*) et ensuite à l'économie politique (dans les travaux préliminaires du *Capital* et dans cette œuvre elle-même), encore qu'il n'ait jamais adopté un «*économisme*» sommaire que souvent on lui attribue. Pour lui, l'économie politique s'accompagne d'une critique de l'économie politique (sous-titre du *Capital*), laquelle fait appel à des notions sociologiques.

Notre étude n'ira pas jusque-là. Nous voulons reprendre un seul texte, un des *manuscrits philosophico-économiques de 1844*, pour montrer que Marx y conçoit la société en sociologue.

Ce texte, nous le prendrons dans la traduction Molitor en la rectifiant². Nous savons aujourd'hui que cette traduction n'est pas bonne, non seulement à cause de ses défauts en tant que traduction, mais parce que le texte allemand de la *Marx-Engels-Gesamtausgabe*, d'après lequel Molitor a traduit ces œuvres, n'est pas exact. D'après les exégètes récents qui ont repris les manuscrits avec des moyens modernes, de graves erreurs ont été commises. Les premiers lecteurs, notamment, auraient confondu *Geist* avec *Genuss*, de sorte que là où la traduction porte «esprit», il faudrait lire «jouissance» ! Une telle erreur, aussi grave que significative, montre assez bien comment on procède à une mauvaise lecture d'un texte manuscrit aussi difficile par son contenu que par son graphisme. En attendant l'édition scien-

¹ Thèse présentée dans *Critique de la vie quotidienne*, «Introduction», Paris, Grasset, 1946; 2^e éd. l'Arche, 1958. Georges Gurvitch défend avec force et ingéniosité la même thèse dans l'ensemble de son œuvre et surtout dans ses cours de Sorbonne, cf. le cours public 1958-1959 sur «Marx et la sociologie».

² K. MARX, *Œuvres philosophiques*, tome VI, traduction Molitor.

tifique, nous utiliserons les instruments imparfaits dont nous disposons.

II. Commençons par restituer les manuscrits de 1844 dans le mouvement de la pensée de Marx, mouvement à notre avis constitutif de cette pensée (qui précisément s'affirme et se dit pensée du mouvement et pensée en mouvement).

Dès sa thèse sur *La philosophie de la nature chez Démocrite et Épicure*, Marx montre comme Hegel des mouvements dialectiques à l'intérieur des systèmes philosophiques et dans leurs rapports réciproques. Mais il ajoute à la pensée hégélienne un élément décisif: l'essentiel de chaque système, à savoir une attitude pratique, ne se comprend que par rapport à des cadres sociaux et à une pratique sociale, ici la société grecque d'abord au temps de Démocrite, ensuite au temps d'Épicure.

Qu'est-ce que la philosophie pour Marx ?

Dans ses premières œuvres, il en dégage un concept qui prolonge et transforme en même temps le concept hégélien, à travers une critique radicale.

Nous allons nous permettre de traduire la pensée de Marx en termes contemporains, pour la rendre plus intelligible, en nous efforçant de ne pas la déformer.

Premièrement, la philosophie en tant que telle définit une attitude et se définit comme attitude. Cette attitude spéculative et systématique, réduit inévitablement l'homme social réel, issu de la praxis, à ce qui se laisse systématiser: la pure rationalité. Ne se concevant que par rapport à une société où la raison est agissante, n'existant que dans de tels cadres sociaux, la philosophie comme telle ne retient du réel social qu'un aspect.

Secondement, la philosophie comme telle contient un projet de l'homme. Toute philosophie enveloppe à la fois une interprétation du monde et un projet utopique concernant l'homme. Ce projet se veut total, aussi bien en totalisant le savoir qu'en totalisant la vie concrète; or il se révèle toujours unilatéral et incomplet.

Troisièmement, il s'agit de *réaliser* la philosophie, c'est-à-dire de réaliser le projet philosophique, ou si l'on veut l'homme projeté par la philosophie: libre, heureux, jouissant de la vie et du monde, dans une reconnaissance réciproque et mutuelle des libres consciences unies par la vérité, le bien et la liberté. Toutefois, cette réalisation

transforme le projet, parce qu'elle révèle ses lacunes et le confronte avec des éléments qu'il n'a pas prévus dans la pratique sociale.

La philosophie comme telle doit donc *se dépasser* c'est-à-dire à la fois s'abolir (comme système et comme attitude), et se réaliser (faire entrer dans la vie pratique les notions qu'elle a prises dans cette pratique et élaborées abstraitement). En Allemagne, où la grande pensée théorique appartient à la philosophie comme telle, deux «partis» résultent de l'éclatement du système hégélien. Les uns veulent «supprimer la philosophie sans la réaliser», parce qu'elle a formulé l'homme et l'humain de façon abstraite et théorique; ce sont des réalistes, des esprits positifs. D'autres croient au contraire pouvoir «réaliser la philosophie sans la supprimer» en tant que formulation abstraite et seulement abstraite de l'homme, de la liberté et de son accomplissement.

Lorsque Marx rédige les manuscrits de 1844, il a donc fait l'inventaire critique de la philosophie. Pour lui, «la philosophie», c'est le système hégélien, en tant qu'il contient et condense l'histoire entière de la pensée systématique et spéculative, de Platon à Hegel lui-même. En examinant l'hégélianisme et son influence, c'est donc bien «la philosophie» que Marx soumet à une critique radicale.

Il juge la philosophie tout autrement que ne le font le positivisme et l'empirisme. Pour Marx, la philosophie a une importance capitale et décisive. Il est impossible de la renvoyer à une époque révolue. Et cependant il faut aller plus loin que la philosophie. Elle a résumé les acquisitions de la praxis, dans l'ordre de la connaissance et dans celui de la vie éthique ou esthétique. Mais ce résumé ne sort pas de limites internes, qui lui sont infligées par l'essence même de la philosophie. Il y a eu un double devenir. Le monde devenait philosophie par l'élaboration théorique des concepts pratiques. En même temps, la philosophie comportait un vouloir et cherchait à pénétrer dans le monde, à s'y incarner ou plutôt à s'y réinvestir. «Le devenir philosophie du monde est en même temps le devenir monde de la philosophie», écrit Marx dans des fragments non insérés de sa thèse de doctorat³. Et il ajoute: «sa réalisation est en même temps sa perte».

La mission du prolétariat, en Allemagne d'abord mais pas seulement en Allemagne, c'est de réaliser la philosophie. «De même que la philosophie trouve dans le prolétariat ses armes matérielles, le prolétariat trouve dans la philosophie ses armes spirituelles. La philosophie est la tête de cette émancipation, son cœur le prolétariat. La philosophie ne peut se réaliser sans la suppression, *Aufhebung*, du

³ *Op.cit.*, I, p. 76.

prolétariat, le prolétariat ne peut se supprimer sans la réalisation de la philosophie»⁴.

Cependant, nous allons le voir, la philosophie qui éclate comme telle lègue aux sciences naissantes de la réalité humaine plusieurs concepts de première importance, comme celui de *totalité* et celui d'*aliénation*. Ces concepts, pris par la philosophie dans la praxis, lui retournent, mais à travers les sciences et non par un réinvestissement direct dans la vie sociale.

III. Marx aborde l'économie politique en critique, et il dispose pour cette critique des concepts mentionnés, d'origine philosophique mais dégagés de la systématisation philosophique (hégélienne).

Pour sa part, l'économie politique apporte un concept d'une importance décisive. Avec Adam Smith et Ricardo, elle a reconnu le *travail social* comme son principe et découvert sa propre condition: l'énergie de l'industrie moderne⁵. Les physiocrates, qui croyaient encore que la nature (la terre) est la seule source des richesses, n'avaient pu malgré leur génie s'élever jusqu'au concept de travail social. Or ce concept a une profonde originalité. Il est *abstrait*, par rapport à tous les travaux parcellaires et particuliers, ceux des différents métiers. Et en même temps il est *concret*, car il saisit une réalité à l'échelle de la société globale; à ce titre il est plus concret que les concepts qui restent au niveau de l'immédiat. Il représente une *moyenne* sociale, le travail social moyen ou plutôt la productivité moyenne de l'ensemble des travaux que répartit la société entre ses membres. De même, l'argent et la monnaie représentent une abstraction, et cette abstraction est plus réelle et plus concrètement agissante que ce dont elle s'abstrait, actes et rapports humains.

En même temps qu'ils élucident la maîtrise de l'homme sur la nature (par le travail, la division du travail et la technique), les économistes font l'apologie de la propriété privée. Ils l'acceptent comme présupposition de leur science. Si la philosophie est la fausse pudeur d'une telle société, l'économie politique en est le cynisme. Science de la production matérielle, l'économie politique est au même titre (mais sans le savoir) science de l'aliénation humaine, science de l'abstinence et de la rareté. Partant d'un point de vue exact, à savoir que l'homme doit *s'objectiver* pour exister réellement et par conséquent

⁴ K. MARX, *Critique de la Philosophie du droit de Hegel*, Mega, I, I, pp. 607-621, trad. Molitor, I, pp. 107-108.

⁵ Cf. *Œuvres philosophiques*, tome VI, trad. Molitor, p. 12.

transformer le monde extérieur, elle en tire un fétichisme de la richesse extérieure, prise dans la forme de la propriété privée⁶.

Présupposant ainsi la propriété privée, l'économie politique nous invite à partir avec Fourier de la présupposition inverse: la suppression de la propriété privée. Nous cesserons ainsi de confondre deux termes, la *propriété* des choses et l'*appropriation* par l'homme de la nature extérieure et de sa propre nature, appropriation qui crée une «nature humaine». Bien plus, nous allons constater une incompatibilité entre *propriété* et *appropriation*. Il suffira de développer cette hypothèse: la suppression de la propriété privée.

Toutefois, nous constatons aussitôt l'existence d'un communisme abstrait et grossier. Ce communisme vulgaire généralise la propriété privée, alors qu'il croit la supprimer; en effet, il ne conçoit pas la société dans sa complexité, encore moins dans son développement. Il revendique donc le partage des biens existants, l'égalité des salaires, l'abolition de l'Etat. Ce communisme interromprait donc brutalement l'histoire et le développement historique de la société, sans même supprimer la condition ouvrière (puisqu'il se borne à demander l'égalité des salaires). Une telle manière d'envisager la suppression de la propriété privée ne constituerait pas une véritable «appropriation». Et c'est ce que prouve la négation abstraite par ce communisme de la culture et de la civilisation, le retour qu'il prône «à la simplicité de l'homme pauvre et sans besoins, qui n'a pas encore dépassé la propriété privée, qui n'y est même pas encore parvenu»⁷.

De ce communisme grossier, Marx suggère une interprétation sexuelle: la communauté des femmes en est le «*secret avoué*»⁸.

Marx en effet retient ici une idée de Fourier: la situation de la femme dans la société représente exactement la situation de cette société, c'est-à-dire la situation humaine dans telle ou telle société. Avec le mariage traditionnel et la prostitution qui le complète, la femme devient propriété privée; elle tombe au rang des choses, selon la loi d'aliénation qui frappe la société considérée. Dans la vie sociale que rêvent certains communistes, les femmes deviendraient propriété commune, ce qui généraliserait la prostitution, c'est-à-dire la propriété privée de l'être féminin. La situation de la femme symbolise et rend présent le degré d'appropriation par l'homme en général de la nature et de sa propre nature. En effet, dans le rapport des sexes «il

⁶ *Op.cit.*, p. 12.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 21.

⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 20.

se montre à quel point le comportement naturel de l'homme est devenu humain, et jusqu'à quel point l'être humain est devenu naturel»⁹.

Pour comprendre la société, il ne faut ni mélanger l'humain avec la nature, ni séparer l'homme social de la nature, ni enfin poser l'individuel hors du générique (anthropologique) en fixant la société comme abstraction extérieure à l'individu¹⁰. (Cette phrase de Marx vise certainement la sociologie d'Auguste Comte). L'activité sociale, celle des individus insérés dans des groupes sociaux, n'existe pas directement et immédiatement de façon commune à tous. La société réelle se découvre d'une part dans des rapports sociaux, et d'autre part dans les créations (produits matériels et œuvres diverses, y compris la connaissance) de l'activité¹¹.

Nous avons devant nous en présence (donc en interaction) trois termes. Le premier, c'est la nature, transformée et «appropriée» par le travail. Le second terme, c'est la société, ensemble de rapports actifs entre des groupes humains et des individus membres de ces groupes. Le troisième, c'est l'homme total, le générique (l'espèce humaine, définie anthropologiquement) conçu comme unité du particulier et du général, incluant par conséquent l'individualité.

La société et l'homme total sont ainsi deux termes étroitement liés, ni séparables, ni identiques. L'un, le premier, c'est l'être de l'homme, essence et existence indissolubles. Le second, c'est sa conscience et son activité pensante. Or *être* et *pensée* sont «à la fois différents et unis»¹². Cette formule, que Marx reprend de Parménide, signifie qu'entre les deux termes considérés il y a non seulement réciprocity mais unité dialectique. Des rapports conflictuels peuvent donc intervenir entre l'humain et le social, entre l'individuel et le générique, sans pour autant que l'unité se rompe. La réalité humaine, une et concrète, vue comme multiplicité de rapports, c'est la société. Cette même réalité, vue comme unité active et créatrice, c'est l'homme total. Le terme «production» a donc beaucoup plus d'ampleur et de profondeur que ne le comprennent les économistes. Il désigne la production de l'homme par lui-même, celle de l'homme individuel et celle de «l'autre homme», dans la société. Comme l'avait compris Hegel, il y a une *auto-crédation* de l'homme, par le travail, par la connaissance, par la technique. Et cela à travers une multiplicité de déterminations impossibles à séparer les unes des autres. Hegel, lui, déduisait

⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 21-22.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 26-27.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 27.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 28.

le concept d'auto-crédation en attachant à l'Idée absolue, pré-existante, initiale et finale, le processus de formation de l'homme. Marx, partant de la nature considérée comme fondement, met en pleine clarté le processus d'auto-crédation. A tel point que, selon lui, la vieille idée idéologique et métaphysique de la création (par un dieu) perd désormais tout sens¹³. Le terme est ensuite repris et développé dans toute la partie du manuscrit consacrée à l'exégèse critique de Hegel.

La notion d'un communisme qui se baserait sur le développement virtuel de la société et qui remplacerait consciemment la propriété par l'appropriation, prend alors un sens nouveau. Ce communisme se conçoit comme « retour complet, conscient, accompli à l'intérieur de toute la richesse du développement passé, de l'homme à soi-même en tant qu'homme humain »¹⁴. Le communisme ainsi déterminé comme ré-appropriation, *Zurückführung*, est à la fois un concept, une idée. En tant que concept, il porte sur une *possibilité*; il joint le possible au réel, et dès lors permettra d'éclairer le réel social par le possible social; « le communisme, en tant que naturalisme achevé, est de l'humanisme, et en tant qu'humanisme achevé, du naturalisme. C'est la véritable solution de l'antagonisme entre l'homme et la nature, entre l'homme et l'homme, la vraie solution de la lutte entre l'existence et l'essence, entre l'objectivation et la subjectivation, entre la liberté et la nécessité, entre l'individu et l'espèce »¹⁵. En définitive, ce communisme, « énigme résolue de l'histoire » cesse d'être une hypothèse et prend dans une pensée, qui n'est plus philosophique mais active, la place de l'Idée philosophiquement conçue chez Hegel. « Ce n'est que dans l'état social que le subjectivisme et l'objectivisme, le spiritualisme et le matérialisme, l'activité et la passivité, perdent leurs contradictions et par suite leur existence en tant que contradictions. On voit que la solution des contradictions théoriques n'est possible que d'une manière pratique, par l'énergie pratique de l'homme; cette solution n'est pas du tout et pas seulement la tâche de la connaissance, mais une réelle tâche vitale, que la philosophie ne pouvait pas résoudre, précisément parce qu'elle n'y voit qu'une tâche purement théorique »¹⁶.

Revenons à l'analyse du monde humain que nous découvrons peu à peu (ce qui constitue déjà un dépassement de la philosophie comme telle). Dans ce monde humain, nous constatons de l'*immédiat*: des

¹³ *Ibid.*, pp. 38 et sv.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 23.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 34.

objets sensibles, des biens et des produits, et aussi les organes sensoriels qui nous permettent d'appréhender ces objets sensibles et de nous les approprier.

Ce caractère immédiat est à la fois réel et apparent. Il est réel; ces objets sensibles existent devant nous. Il est apparent, car nos rapports actifs avec les objets sensibles (biens, produits, œuvres) impliquent et supposent la médiation de tous les autres rapports, qui sont des rapports sociaux. «L'homme s'approprie son essence universelle d'une façon universelle, en tant qu'homme total»¹⁷, c'est-à-dire que l'universel et le total se découvrent au sein du particulier et du singulier sensibles. Par exemple l'œil n'est humain que pour autant que son objet est un objet social, façonné par l'homme, destiné à l'homme. Il y a interaction perpétuelle entre l'acte de produire, les objets produits, les sens et les organes de l'homme qui produit et qui crée. A travers le sensible transparaissent la raison, la connaissance, le langage, ces médiations entre les hommes. Ainsi, les sens deviennent «directement, dans la pratique, des théoriciens»¹⁸. L'objet de nos sens, ce n'est donc pas seulement d'après Marx l'objet sensible, c'est aussi et surtout la manifestation sensible d'une puissance de notre être commun (total), aspect subjectif des capacités objectives de créer et de s'approprier des objets comme tels. Le comportement vis-à-vis de l'objet, pris dans sa réalité profonde, actualise, *bestätigt*, la réalité humaine. Ainsi la musique n'a de *sens* que pour un *sens* (une oreille) cultivée et affinée. Ainsi pour chaque individu ses *sens*, et sa conscience elle-même, n'ont de *sens* que pour la communication active avec les autres individus. De cette façon se constituent des activités sociales, aspects de la *praxis*, qui sont à la fois des manifestations des puissances essentielles, *Wesenkräfte*, et des modes d'appropriation de la vie.

L'analyse dialectique de l'immédiat fait ainsi surgir la totalité des médiations. Dans les *sens* organiques, pour déceler leur *sens* (orientation), nous reconnaissons les *sens* (significations) spirituels: la connaissance, le langage et aussi la volonté, l'amour, etc.: «Il faut l'objectivation de l'être humain, aussi bien théorique que pratique, pour rendre humains les sens de l'homme et pour créer le sens humain correspondant à toute la richesse de l'être humain et naturel»¹⁹.

La société constituée produit l'homme et elle est produite par

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 29.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 33.

lui. L'activité «auto-créatrice» se dédouble dialectiquement. D'un côté, elle est société et de l'autre homme total. D'un côté, elle est monde humain des objets et de l'autre monde des puissances vitales et sociales. D'un côté, elle est aliénation, exprimée par la propriété privée; de l'autre elle est conquête, désaliénation, appropriation, richesse vraiment humaine.

IV. Arrêtons-nous un moment et considérons le chemin parcouru avec Marx. N'est-il pas remarquable que la pensée révolutionnaire se propose d'abord comme affranchissement et délivrance des sens? Marx nous demande d'abord une sorte de conversion au sensible, pour en ressaisir la richesse et aussi le caractère actif plutôt que passif. Dans la société dominée par la propriété privée, «tous les sens physiques et intellectuels ont été remplacés par l'aliénation de ces sens: le sens de l'*avoir*»²⁰. Il faut d'abord se débarrasser de ce fétichisme pour reconnaître dans sa richesse le *pratico-sensible*, à savoir les sens (organes), les *sens* (significations), les *sens* (orientations, tendances, mouvements).

Marx, imitant Hegel qui a si bien joué sur les «sens» d'un mot ambigu, *aufheben* (conserver, élever, supprimer), joue sur les sens du mot «sens», *Sinn*, *sinnlich*. Mais il y a ici, comme chez Hegel, beaucoup plus qu'un jeu de mots: il y a une pensée dialectique qui se fonde sur les ambiguïtés, les contradictions latentes et les unités implicites dans le discours verbal.

La tradition philosophique, malgré l'équivoque des débuts (Platon) avait dans l'ensemble défini l'homme par le connaître. Marx le définit doublement: d'un côté par le besoin et la jouissance, de l'autre côté par l'activité pratico-sociale²¹. Le fameux matérialisme marxiste s'introduit ici bien autrement que par une définition de la matière. Il se détermine comme restitution de la nature, plénitude sensible saisie et appropriée à l'homme par des moyens humains, donc sociaux. En ceci, la philosophie spéculative, à la fois théorique et purement rationnelle, se dépasse doublement: dans le sens du sensible et dans celui de l'énergie pratique. La nature comme source de jouissances multiples et la jouissance dans tous les sens du terme comme appropriation de la nature viennent donc bouleverser la spéculation traditionnelle. Cette notion de *jouissance* n'a ici rien de commun avec l'attitude qu'une tradition malveillante (et d'ailleurs rejetée par Marx dans sa thèse de doctorat) attribue à Epicure. La jouissance résulte aussi

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 30.

²¹ *Ibid.*, cf. p. 36.

bien de l'art que de l'amour humain, aussi bien de la connaissance que des rapports sensibles pénétrés de raison dans les communications humaines.

Un peu plus tard, Marx reprendra ces idées dans «La Sainte Famille». Il s'y rattache plus nettement à la philosophie matérialiste française du XVIII^e siècle. Seulement, il la considère comme liée à une *praxis* du bonheur et de la jouissance, celle d'une bourgeoisie éprise de luxe, d'art et de pensée. Il y critique fortement le matérialisme décharné qui élimine par des considérations abstraites (mécanistes) la joie du sensible. Avec le mécanisme, Marx écrira en 1845, le matérialisme se fait misanthrope. Il veut battre sur son propre terrain le pur esprit désincarné; il mortifie lui aussi la chair, se présente comme un être de raison. Et cependant le mouvement théorique du XVIII^e siècle ne peut ni s'expliquer ni s'exposer ainsi. La «robuste bourgeoisie française, en pleine lutte, en pleine montée sociale, opérait elle aussi sa conversion au pratico-sensible dans sa diversité et sa richesse; elle s'orientait vers la pleine jouissance du monde de façon anti-théologique et anti-métaphysique»²².

Chez Marx en 1844, les manifestations de l'essence sociale de l'homme sont données de façon sensible, dans des produits et des œuvres. Quant à cette essence sociale, elle n'est en elle-même ni sensible ni abstraite. Comment l'atteindre ? Par l'analyse des données *immédiates* (sensibles) en y découvrant par l'analyse les médiations, c'est-à-dire les formes sociales de l'activité créatrice. Marx part du mouvement «immédiat - médiations - immédiateté retrouvée», mouvement qui constitue et dévoile en même temps le réel social dans toute son étendue. Le retour à l'immédiat sensible s'opère à travers l'ensemble —la totalité — des médiations découvertes. L'analyse aboutit à un exposé, qui atteint une réalité globale, laquelle ne se situe pas au niveau du sensible et ne se perd pas dans l'abstraction parce qu'elle englobe les abstractions elles-mêmes en tant qu'agissantes, à savoir les représentations, les concepts, le langage, etc... C'est une grave erreur que de la fixer comme abstraction hors des individus et de leurs rapports. Dans ces rapports qui les constituent comme êtres humains, les individus sont à la fois actifs et passifs; ils font et ils sont faits. De même pour les groupes. Il s'agit donc d'un mode d'existence irréductible d'une part à la matérialité sensible (bien qu'il s'y révèle et qu'il faille en partir pour le déceler) et à l'abstrait (bien qu'il l'enveloppe puisqu'il l'utilise). La réalité sociale est donc supra-biologique autant qu'extra-

²² Cf. K. MARX, *Heilige Familie*, Berlin, Brütten und Loenig, 1953, pp. 195 et sv.

sensible. On ne touche pas les rapports humains comme des choses, et cependant ils détiennent une objectivité plus profonde que celle des choses, puisqu'ils produisent des choses (des biens, des produits, des œuvres).

Chez Marx comme chez Hegel, l'interaction et la réciprocité d'action dialectiquement conçues présupposent ou introduisent un troisième terme. Ici, le troisième terme impliqué dans les interactions entre les hommes (individus et groupes), c'est la société elle-même comme totalité. Elle est quelque chose de plus que ses composants, les individus et les groupes. Qu'est-elle ? Une activité créatrice commune, bien que cette communauté — brisée et aliénée par la propriété dans la société existante — n'apparaisse pas immédiatement. Marx nomme *praxis* cette activité complexe, contradictoire, prise dans toute sa généralité. La *praxis* crée, c'est-à-dire qu'elle produit. Quoi ? En tant qu'ayant affaire immédiatement avec la nature, elle crée les produits matériels et aussi les rapports de production (division du travail, rémunération du travail) qui permettent tels ou tels produits. Ce qu'étudie (avec ses limitations propres) l'économie politique. En tant qu'ayant affaire médiatement à la nature et immédiatement aux êtres humains qu'elle enveloppe, la *praxis* produit des *œuvres* (y compris les représentations et les idéologies, y compris la connaissance et la conscience elle-mêmes). Ainsi la société n'est pas sensible. Elle se compose de rapports. Et cependant la *praxis* se détermine bien comme pratico-sensible.

Il y a dans le mouvement constitutif de la pensée marxiste plus d'un aspect comparable avec le saint-simonisme. Lui aussi, Saint-Simon, a fortement critiqué l'économie politique de J.-B. Say et accusé l'économiste d'exalter la propriété privée. Lui aussi, comme l'a montré plusieurs fois Georges Gurvitch, parvient à une notion globale de la société en acte et de l'activité sociale. Pourtant, à notre avis, le mouvement de la pensée marxiste diffère du saint-simonisme. La problématique fondamentale n'est plus la même. Saint-Simon cherchait à créer une nouvelle élite, capable de gérer la société industrielle: ingénieurs, techniciens, administrateurs. Il cherche pour cette élite une philosophie et même une religion. Marx lui, va vers une anthropologie²³, laquelle se changera bientôt en un humanisme largement ouvert. Il commence par définir l'homme (total), puis il jugera que l'homme se définit lui-même et qu'il suffit de l'aider à créer les conditions de son accomplissement et de sa liberté.

Encore un mot de commentaire. Que la connaissance du social se-

²³ Cf., *Œuvres philosophiques*, tome VI, p. 36.

lon Marx parte de l'immédiat pour y revenir à travers l'ensemble des médiations, cela justifie une approche de la réalité sociale et humaine comme *analyse critique de la vie quotidienne*.

V. Revenons au texte. Les objets, les sens, les besoins, sont déjà des produits et des œuvres, manifestations de puissances humaines, objectivations de forces créatrices sociales.

Ces activités sociales créatrices sont d'après Marx à la fois révélées et multipliées dans *l'industrie*. Celle-ci ouvre devant nous le livre des forces créatrices de l'homme et en ce sens elle éclaire le passé lui-même²⁴. Ce livre est d'ailleurs également celui de l'aliénation, dont le chemin coïncide avec celui de la désaliénation. L'industrie nous montre enfin la *physiologie* sociale.

Marx emprunte, on le sait, ces termes et ces idées à Saint-Simon²⁵. Mais il en change le sens. Le problème qu'il pose à ce propos, c'est d'abord celui de la classification des sciences. Quel est le rapport de la science de la *praxis* (rendue évidente par l'industrie moderne) avec les autres sciences, déjà constituées ou en voie de constitution: l'histoire, la psychologie, l'économie politique ?

En premier lieu, il s'agit pour Marx de déterminer plus exactement la spécificité de la nouvelle science, la *physiologie sociale*. Jamais Marx n'emploiera le terme «sociologie» et toute son argumentation se dirige contre Auguste Comte, qu'il ne cite d'ailleurs pas mais dont il ne peut guère, en 1844, ignorer l'existence et l'influence.

En second lieu, il s'agit pour lui d'ajouter à la coupe histologique qu'il présente (et qui tranche pour ainsi dire verticalement à travers l'épaisseur de la réalité sociale) une autre dimension: la dimension historique. Comment unir l'historicité de l'humain avec la thèse de la société en action et celle de l'activité pratico-sensible comme fondamentale ?

Marx considère que toutes les sciences font partie des œuvres de la *praxis* sociale. Avec l'industrie, les sciences de la nature apparaissent ce qu'elles étaient déjà (mais la philosophie l'ignorait): la base technique de la pratique sociale. Elles doivent donc devenir aussi la base des sciences humaines, que tend à développer la nouvelle société industrielle. «L'industrie doit se comprendre comme révélation exotérique des forces de l'être humain, l'être humain de la nature ou l'être

²⁴ *Op.cit.*, p. 34.

²⁵ Cf. «L'industrie», 1819, vol. XIX de l'édition de 1869, in *Œuvres de Saint-Simon*.

naturel de l'homme étant également compris»²⁶. Les sciences de la nature doivent donc perdre leur autonomie et se fondre avec les sciences de la réalité humaine. D'ores et déjà, «c'est un mensonge que de dire qu'il y a une base pour les sciences et une autre pour la vie». L'acte générateur de la société humaine concerne aussi bien la nature formée et transformée par l'homme social que les modalités de cette transformation. Les transformations de la nature et les transformations de la société font partie d'une seule et même histoire, celle de la société. Réciproquement, l'histoire de l'homme est «une partie réelle de l'histoire naturelle, de la transformation de la nature en homme»²⁷.

Il n'y aura donc plus qu'une seule science²⁸.

Marx rejette les classifications qui supposent des coupures et des discontinuités entre les sciences. Toutes les sciences, celles de la nature et celles de la société, étudient des aspects de l'homme total, de son action et de sa création.

Toutefois, en 1844, Marx ne résout pas complètement le problème. De loin. Dans la science unitaire qu'il évoque, les spécificités s'estompent et même disparaissent. L'historicité qui s'introduit ici devient vite dominante. Il arrivera à Marx d'écrire que l'histoire est la seule et unique science de l'homme²⁹. Que devient alors la physiologie sociale, c'est-à-dire la sociologie ? Que devient l'économie politique ?

La pensée de Marx cherchera en tâtonnant. Après avoir privilégié l'histoire, il tentera de privilégier l'économie politique, non sans la critiquer et non sans l'unir à l'histoire dans *Le Capital*. Mais alors, la «physiologie sociale», sans disparaître, sera quelque peu laissée dans l'ombre.

²⁶ K. MARX, *op.cit.*, p. 35.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 36.

²⁹ K. MARX, *L'Idéologie allemande*, 1845.

SOME ASPECTS OF POSITIVISM IN SOCIOLOGY

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'Positivism' has no longer a standard use. One of the earliest systematic sociologists, Comte, launched Sociology as the culmination of his new system of positive philosophy. Though now associated chiefly with empirical researches and middlerange theorizing, historically sociological positivism has been intimately connected with a new philosophy and hence given to grand theorizing. In modern times, positivism in philosophy received one of its most vigorous formulations in the Viennese Circle and in the movement known as Logical Positivism or Logical Empiricism. After a brief flowering there, it began to disintegrate and is now dissipating itself into diverse types of linguistic philosophy. But this is true only of what may be called the codified form of Positivism. As a version of the doctrine of *Homo Mensura* and of the *Civitas Terrena* or as a set of variations on Comte's Religion of Humanity and the utopia of a self-directed humanity, and on Feuerbach's anthropological Christianity, positivism constitutes the intellectual foundation of our age. And in this lies the deepest dilemma of our age: positivism as a philosophy lies in ruins, but the positivist *Weltanschauung* remains.

It is understandable then that positivism in sociology cannot stand today for a set of neatly defined tenets or a well organised school. It is not surprising to find one positivist regarding another as non-positivist. For instance, methodological individualism is regarded as positive and scientific in contrast to methodological holism; but, by virtue of its emphasis on the physical and hence on the subjective (so marked in Hayek's version), it is rejected by others as unscientific. So is the case with Functionalism.

May Brodbeck (1954) has distinguished between four types of approaches in sociology: «First there are the self-conscious continuers of the Galilean-Newtonian tradition who insist upon essential identity in method between the social and the physical sciences.

«Second, from the early nineteenth century until our own time, the Romantics insist upon what later came to be called *Geisteswis-*

senschaften, the science of man. Organicist, holist, and emergentist, this school deploras the La Placean vision as radically mistaken, if not viciously demeaning to the dignity of man and his works.

«The third view represented by Marxists and pragmatists unites — or attempts to unite — the empiricist scientific tradition with anti-analytical holism and historicism. The study of society they claim can and must be objective and scientific. But its laws are held to be unique in kind unlike those of psychology and physics.

«The fourth conception of the social science is reductionist in one sense and anti-reductionist in another.

«The behaviour of groups must be explained in terms of the behaviour of individuals; but the psychology of individuals cannot be reduced to anything else.» (May Brodbeck: 1954; 140-41).

I have reproduced Miss Brodbeck's analysis of the present state of sociology to show how complex, even confusing, the situation is. In sociology an extreme form of reductionism may perhaps be seen in Lundberg's oft-pilloried comparison between a piece of paper flying in the wind and a man *fleeing* from fear. In substantive theory, however, Lundberg comes nowhere near the ideal. From the early «mechanist» sociologists to Parsons, there is an attempt to have sociological concepts and laws corresponding to certain laws of Physics (cf. Parsons' Laws of Action Space) but again the Parsonian theory, in spite of deep strains of psychologism, does not formally seek to reduce society to physical or even psychic reality.

Among the adherents to the second school there is a good deal of difference as to what the method of understanding is to be, Dilthey (who was not a positivist) and Weber (who called himself one) standing almost on two opposite poles. Nor is there any accord on holism. Weber is explicitly opposed to it, going so far as to insist on the ideographical construction of his ideal types even though it has to serve a nomothetic science. Again, though Weber was neither a Marxist nor a pragmatist he, however, always appealed to «success» as the ultimate validation of his methodological principles. On the other hand, Durkheim whom the Danish sociologist, Ranulf (1955) regards as one of the best representatives of positivistic sociologists, is clearly a holist.

On the other hand, though opposed to the mechanistic or physicalist school, Marx was the most consistent thinker in carrying out a materialistic reduction (for him man's surplus labour power is the only true foundation of his socio-economic order) and he certainly believed in the unity of science *via* a single set of laws.

In these circumstances, what I propose to do is to take one or two

basic issues in the philosophy and logic of the social sciences and examine the internal consistency of what may be called the positivist approach to them.

I

It will be agreed that underlying every methodology there is a view about the nature of reality that is being investigated. This does not necessarily mean that a method of study may not be common to diverse realms of reality: it means that the judgement about the validity — or success — of the method does presuppose a theory of reality. In any case, positivism has a certain view of reality: even though it may disavow any concern with the ultimate nature of reality as such: As was said at the outset, one branch of positivism holds all reality to be ultimately physical. The methodological maxim of positivism as formulated by Comte reads: «Every proposition which is not in the last resort reducible to the simple enunciation of a fact, either particular or general, is devoid of any real and intelligible sense.» A precise definition of fact is, however, never available. In the context of certain philosophical systems (for instance, those of Wittgenstein and the early Carnap), the demand is eliminated by the logic of their system; but even in the work of such sociologists as are not hampered by any logical tabu against it, we do not find any clear idea of what they mean by «fact» or «reality» to which they swear allegiance.

This is not just a formal and trivial omission. Indeed, the point of our criticism is not that a key-term is left undefined or is indefinable. Our contention is that the positivist conception of reality (which they equate with «facts») is beset with irresolvable difficulties. The Viennese Circle attempted to reduce all realms of reality and language to physics and the Physicalist language; for, «Scientific scripture, in its most canonical form, is embodied in physics (including physiology)» (Russell: 1940; 15). As is well-known this attempt to reduce or translate all facts to physical facts has not been successful, though for certain rather extraneous reasons, the impression persists that the physical reality is somehow ultimate and paramount. In the first place, a consistent application of the empiricist principle results in just the opposite, as happens in Neurath and others. The physical reality is reduced to a series of private sense-impressions and the everyday object is then a logical (or, better, sociological) construct out of these sense data. Indeed, in more extreme versions, the sense-

impressions are equated with «word-thought»; and then step by step one is led to the dictum that «sentences are compared with sentences and not with experience or the world,» all of which are relegated to a more or less refined metaphysics.

The culmination of empiricism in an extreme form of subjectivism may, however, be regarded as an external criticism. There is nothing logically wrong if positivism locates the ultimate reality in individual sense-impressions or experiences. However, this reduction suffers from certain internal inconsistencies. In the first place, as Russell (1940; ch. X) observes about Neurath's position and as was clearly seen by Wittgenstein in his *Tractatus* the reduction of all reality to protocol-sentences results, in the final analysis, to a selfless solipsism. Now this result is all right except for the consequence that it closes all sources from which the immediate protocol-sentences could be derived.

This points up to another serious difficulty: namely the construction of a public world from the private *protocol* of individuals. Neurath and some other leading positivists have been keenly aware of it, but the only solution is to assume intersubjectivity *ab initio*. And this as Russell says, «deprives empirical propositions of all meaning» (1940; 148). Even if the question of the truth of basic propositions is not raised, the logical result of the empiricist view of reality is to make it coincident with point-instants (Buddhist *Kshna*) of experience. It is here that the most serious difficulty arises; for, consistent with its basic tenets, positivism can find no principle of unity and continuity — unless it be memory, but memory itself being a psychic phenomenon will be subject to the same dissolving analysis. Ultimately, one has to take recourse to something like 'habit' or custom; and this oddly enough, introduces the social-human world as the end-point of the whole analysis — while it was this very phenomenon that positivism sought to reduce to the physical or the psychic.

Even if we were to waive all these considerations and believe that the human world could be reduced to the physicalist one — in the sense of atoms and electrons, the question of relating this system to the phenomenal system will remain. This is a problem for the physicist himself. Its importance was pointed out by Whitehead (1920) (*The Fallacy of Bifurcation of Nature*) and Eddington (1939)

Recently Professors Owen Barfield (1957) and Hayek (1952) have, each from a different angle, invited us again to consider the very serious implications of this gap. In any case, if human reality can be strictly reduced to atoms and electrons which are strictly governed by laws of Physics, then there will be no need for analogous laws

governing the human world. This will, however, not mean founding a strictly positive sociology but the abolition of any sort of human science. However, if it is a reduction which does not involve elimination, the problem is of explaining the lack of isomorphism between the physical and the phenomenal orders of reality; or, of explaining the natural residue if the two are supposed to be isomorphic. The only other alternative is a science of analogous correspondences — but all this is alien to positivism and scientific sociology or philosophy.

It is obvious, however, that there has never been any serious attempt strictly to reduce the human-social to the physical, of sociology to physics — notwithstanding the use of such terms as social physics, social energetics, etc. Even in logical empiricism, the reduction has, for all serious purposes, stopped short at psychology — often of the behaviourist kind; but even there the logical end-point of reduction, i.e., microphysiology, is never attained. There have been programmes to treat human actions as if they were tropisms; but nobody, I think, has seriously treated human behaviour as a tropism in terms of a physicist's constructs.

The only major thinker who was aware of this implication of positivism seems to be Karl Marx, who defined man as *animal laborans*, and made labour-power and surplus the basis of his whole socio-economic system. Marx's attempt did not succeed. It has not been successful because Marx, though he saw clearly that materialism in the human realm must mean the ultimacy of physiology, did not wish to follow it up consistently and tried to preserve a measure of specifically human dignity; it seems when he made labour the distinguishing mark of man and the foundation of his economic-social life, he was thinking of the natural man (i.e. the unredeemed); the redeemed man in Marx was certainly not the *animal laborans*, but the leisured man who had transcended the necessity of labouring. It may not be quite correct, therefore, to say that he tried to reduce human action to labour; his effort, on the other hand, was directed to surpass labour as the basic human necessity within a humanistic anthropology. If this could not be consistently done, perhaps the basic reason was that Marx's fundamental objection against exploitation — that human labour power cannot be made into a commodity, that is, it cannot be bought and sold, depends, in the last analysis, on the idea that labour-power surplus is a gift; and this in the context of the whole human species would but lead to its concept as a (Divine) gift from above. (All this is brilliantly analysed by Hannah Arendt, 1958).

II

If a refutation of Marx from the «positive» «scientific» point of view has scarcely been effective, one of the reasons certainly is that it has been mainly attacked as an historicist (or holist) and deterministic system, and this is hardly an adequate ground to declare it «unscientific». It is, however, a fact that one of the persistent forms of positivism in sociology has been individualism in various versions (a parallel development in philosophy is Logical Atomism) some of which involve a reduction of the social to the psychical, while others claim to be free from any kind of psychologism. For this version of positivism holism represents one of the worst types of non-positive outlooks in the social sciences.

The version of individualism currently in vogue goes under the name of methodological individualism. This has three main versions which I shall discuss in brief. They are those of Hayek, Watkins and Popper. All of course start from a destructive critique of what they take to be the holist (and, in Popper's terminology also, the historicist) view of society and sociology.

The substance of Hayek's attack on holism is as follows:

1. If society is a purposive and intelligible whole, this implies that there is conscious and rational direction. Now either we accept a group-mind or the whole has to be analysed into individuals who alone should be regarded as ultimately real, for individuals alone have mind.

2. To claim to understand the laws of the whole is destructive of the argument for holism in two ways: First, it will be an individual mind and hence actually it will amount to a theory of superman; and secondly, to claim to understand the working of the human mind and reason and thus arrive at sociological holism via a social determination of the individual mind and reason, is to establish again either a supermind or the superiority of unreason over reason.

The other part of Hayek's programme to which the above critique leads is, of course, to show that social sciences are by their very nature subjective and hence any method which is designed to investigate objective reality is obviously fundamentally unsuited for understanding society and history. The key argument is that mental events could not be translated into the language of physics, for the transition from a phenomenal to a physicist's world is still logically unexplained. Hence his conclusion is that while the positivist programme of reducing social action to physics and physiology cannot be carried out, a reduction can be and should be effected in terms of events in the

minds of individuals. Here one reaches the irreducible which must be taken as the ultimate reality by the student of society. Introspection thus remains the basic, though not the only, instrument for the knowledge of society.

Hayek seems to think that the disjunction between the individual and the collective mind is exhaustive. Since there is no coherent idea of collective mind the individual, obviously, is the locus of social reality for he alone has a mind. This argument is fallacious in as much as belief in a transhuman intellect has been historically a functioning alternative to both, individualism and collectivism (Group mind etc.). This alternative is, therefore, not affected by the demolition of the notion of a group or collective mind. The proposition that the individual mind constitutes the ultimate human social reality must therefore be directly and positively proved.

And similarly, the validity of the introspective method must be independently established, since the failure of current empirical methods does not automatically establish the soundness and reliability of introspective knowledge. Strictly speaking, if the disjunction of individual *vs.* collective mind is not exhaustive, the thesis of the subjective nature of social science becomes untenable, for then the fact that the sociologist studies the beliefs, opinions and attitudes of individuals or actions governed by these, will not, *ipso facto* mean that he studies subjective or mental phenomena.

It is important to note that the Hayekian argument about the impossibility of a complete explanation of human mind, if sound, refutes not only the holist methodology, but equally the individualist position and the introspectionist composite method. For, if the human effort to explain the determinants of human Reason itself leads to the supremacy of irrational forces, the positive form of man's knowledge of this inability to achieve a complete self-knowledge must be faith in transtemporal wisdom, unless Hayek wishes to rest in the negative form, which means despair. That is a *logical* alternative, but only so long as despair does not degenerate into a form of self-love.

III

In Watkins' version, the subjectivism is softened and the «antiscientific» animus is transferred to something called methodological holism. It is suggested that methodological individualism is the right 'scientific' position.

Mr. Watkins draws the following contrast between methodological

individualism and Holism: Methodological Individualism maintains that the system's overall behaviour could be deduced from (a) principles governing the behaviour of its components, and (b) descriptions of their situations. In contradistinction, according to methodological holism, the behaviour of the components of the system could be deduced from (a) Macroscopic laws which are *sui generis* and which apply to the system as an organic whole and (b) descriptions of the positions (or functions) of the components within the whole. (Watkins: 1952b.; 187).

Such a formulation of holism is misleading because it presupposes that the holist is concerned with the explanation or understanding of the individual's behaviour; in other words, that he takes him as the unit of sociological investigation and theory. This is certainly not incumbent on the holist. In fact the ontological atomism to which he has been committed here in advance is inconsistent with a sound holistic position. A holist can reasonably hold the concept of individuality to be insignificant and the individual as unreal when considered apart from a group or a social whole which he may define as a system of meanings and norms underived from discrete human purposes and attitudes. This misrepresentation of Holism greatly facilitates its refutation. But even apart from this it is important to note at the outset that the rejection of holism does not entail acceptance of methodological individualism.

Elaborating the first thesis, Mr. Watkins makes the following points: «An understanding of a complex social situation is always derived from a knowledge of the dispositions, beliefs, and relationships of individuals» (1952a; 29).

Further, he regards it as a truism «that whereas physical things can exist unperceived, social things like laws, prices, prime ministers and ration-books, are created by personal attitudes (Remove the attitudes of food officials, shop keepers, housewives, etc. towards ration-books and they shrivel into bits of cardboard)» (1952b; 185).

Dispositions are never formally defined. They are, Mr. Watkins observes, «So much the stuff of our every day experience that they have only to be stated to be recognized as obvious.» (1952a; 32).

Dispositions resemble scientific laws in two ways:

1. They are postulated hypotheses which correspond to nothing observable, although observable behaviour can be inferred from them in conjunction with factual minor premises. Consequently, in judging their validity we want to know not the mental process by which the historian arrived at them, but judge them by their degree of success in accounting for what is known of the man's behaviour.

2. Like scientific laws, dispositions form a hierarchical system. The «historian who can explain some aspect of a person's behaviour up to a certain time in terms of certain dispositions although his subsequent behaviour conflicts with this disposition, must not merely say that it gave way to another. He should find a higher order disposition which helps to explain both earlier and later lower order dispositions, and hence the whole range of the person's behaviour.»

Summing up, «it should be said that the personality of a man in society comprises dispositions both of a mere private and temperamental kind, and of a more public and institutional kind. Only certain individuals are disposed to weep during the death scene in Othello, but all policeman are disposed to blow their whistles under certain circumstances and any Speaker in the House of Commons is disposed to disallow parliamentary criticism of exercises of Prerogative. And these more public and institutional dispositions which vary very little when one man undertakes another's role, can be abstracted from the total variegated flux of dispositions and to provide the social scientist with a fairly stable subject-matter.» (Watkins: 1952a; 40).

There is no need to go further in elaborating the position of methodological individualism. For, in the above passage, Mr. Watkins, while apparently summing up the implications and importance of his principle, is led on to abandon it completely and explicitly. His distinction between private and public dispositions is an excellent argument for the Holist position.

If this obvious point has not been noticed by Mr. Watkins and his critics (e.g. Goldstein, Brodbeck and more recently J. Agassi) the reason is that both have been preoccupied with the tenability of Holism. Another and more fundamental reason is their common adherence to positivism in its aspect of atomism (humanly chosen discrete ends of action). Dispositions seem to be the master concept of Mr. Watkins. 'What sort of creatures' are they supposed to be? Before we come to examine Mr. Watkins' answer let us note that the term has obviously been used on the model of dispositional properties as used in the formulation of natural laws. There is, however, an important difference between the use of the word in the social and the natural contexts which Mr. Watkins throughout ignores.

When 'soluble' or 'brittle' is ascribed to, say, sugar or glass, it is clear that sugar or glass could not do anything to change this characteristic. When we ascribe a disposition to a human being we cannot mean the same; for there is nothing odd about the concept of a man acting against his disposition. On the other hand, if man is

bound by them they must be a specifiable set and the scientist should discover the nature of their binding force. Mr. Watkins never faces this difficulty. As it is, he says several disjointed things about the nature of dispositions none of which is illuminating. Dispositions, he says, are things with which we are all only too familiar. Are they, then, instincts? Or, certain universal, culture-free traits of human nature? No answer is available. Are they passions of the soul? Do they represent natural propensities of man? Again we are not told. Are they habits? All that one can learn is that a disposition should not be just a description of human behaviour in 'dispositional terms'. Do they then represent a contemporary version of Pareto's Residues?

While dispositions could be any of these, this last suspicion about their nature is strengthened by Mr. Watkins' assertion that they are postulated things: indeed, so much so that it does not matter at all how the scientist should get his knowledge of them. (Watkins rejects Hayek's introspectionism). What matters is that by means of them he should be able to explain observable behaviour. If so, are they what the mediaeval thinkers called 'theories' which were thought out in order to save the appearances and as such neither true nor false? If dispositions and attitudes are theoretical entities which give meaning to our behaviour and those of our fellowmen they cease to have any thing to do with psychology. They are not psychic entities at all, nor need they be derived from the behaviour of individuals. If this seems like a travesty of Mr. Watkins' position and hence makes our argument look somewhat suspicious, let the reader ask why is it that Mr. Watkins neglects the problem of constructing an individual person from disposition-sets. Or, if the existing individual is somehow taken as the starting-point and prior to the dispositions, how are dispositions acquired by him; what makes for their differentiation, typicality or coherence in the life-history of the individuals? It is very significant that Mr. Watkins does not think these to be the really crucial problems for his theory, assuming apparently that contemporary psychology takes good care of them. (It is surprising how easily he mixes up divergent trends of psychology, and by implication, dismisses Jung's work and certain other holistic schools of Social psychology without so much as a mention).

The nearest approach to an appreciation of these problems on the part of Mr. Watkins is his concept of a hierarchy of dispositions. But here too it should be noted that Mr. Watkins emphasises an analogy which dispositions have with scientific laws in this respect. Now a scientific law is certainly independent of individuals: even a law of psychology is not a psychic entity — at least not in the sense in which

a desire or, an emotion or an attitude is. However, analogy is not identity and a disposition being only analogous or similar to a law, may still be a psychic entity and organically related to individuals. But then we are told that a higher-order disposition *explains* an earlier and lower-order disposition. (I shall disregard the case of a lower-order disposition that is *not* earlier, the possibility of which cannot be ruled out). If this is intended strictly and seriously, it means that dispositions form an autonomous deductive-system. If we now recall that Mr. Watkins has a rule against treating dispositions as 'mere *ad hoc* translation of known occurrences into dispositional terms' (1952a; p. 39) and add to it his insistence that the dispositions are postulated, it will become quite clear that methodological individualism is not individualistic in any usual sense of the term and certainly not in any sense that permits the individual human beings to be treated as the 'atoms' constituting the society. The human individual himself is treated as a complex to be analysed into dispositions which are the ultimate atoms in this version of methodological individualism. Now while we cannot expect Mr. Watkins to give a complete set of laws describing how the disposition molecules combine into complexes called individuals, he is certainly required to tell us what the constants will be in this system of psychological atomism and whether or not they would represent.

Mr. Watkins may, however, say that his methodological position is derived from a factual thesis that societies are not organisms and so long as that is not disproved his thesis stands as a methodological rule. But his own clear recognition of institutional and public disposition and hence of the fact that individuals do often act independently of their private and temperamental dispositions, is a strong evidence against his thesis. Mr. Watkins admits that a policeman has to blow his whistle under certain circumstances and that this remains invariant when one policeman is replaced by another. Is it not clearly because policemen are required to do so, whatever their individual propensities, habitual or momentary? In fact, if he did not bring himself to conform to these requirements, he would cease to be a policeman.

To be consistent in his methodological individualism Mr. Watkins should have shown how public and institutional dispositions could be reduced to private ones. His failure to do so is another proof that his «factual assertion about the ultimate nature of society» is false.

But perhaps Mr. Watkins does face this objection in a different form: He examines Adam Smith's demonstration that private, individual intentions in situations that are very different from the agents'

original designs. But he thinks that this does not affect his principle. Unfortunately, however, he fails altogether to see the nature of what may be called the problem of the Invisible Hand. Adam Smith invoked the Invisible Hand to explain the unintended promotion of public interest through discrete private interests and motives¹. Smith's postulate is dismissed by Mr. Watkins as 'strictly gratuitous and misleading.' For, he says, «what Smith actually showed was that individuals in competitive economic situations are led by nothing but their *personal dispositions* to promote, unintentionally, the public interest. Here again methodological individualism is altogether adequate.» (1952b; 188).

What Adam Smith showed was obviously just the opposite—namely, that individuals by *their personal dispositions* are led to promote only their personal interests, and that to the resultant promotion of public interest there corresponds *no* personal disposition of altruism or the like. There is thus a gap in the explanatory apparatus, which Adam Smith and so many other individualists clearly saw and which Mr. Watkins fails to see. Does he mean that there is a species of «disposition» which has the intentional result of promoting private benefit and the unintentional result of furthering public benefit? Or, does he mean to say that Smith was mistaken in thinking that only one disposition was operative: actually there are two in simultaneous and perhaps overlapping operation: conscious egoism and unconscious altruism? Be that as it may, how are we to understand the qualifying clause «in competitive economic situations»? If the logic of this situation is irreducible to the logic of specific individual disposition — as Smith evidently implies — Watkins' explanation is irrelevant. And if it is reducible, it would be viciously circular to use it as an element of the explanatory scheme.

Psychological atomism as an aspect of Positivism in sociology then breaks down completely at two points: one is the recognition that certain dispositions have to be (are required to be) displayed in certain situations. The validity of this positivistic reduction depends not on showing the unprovability of holism, but on a non-circular dispositional theory of this requiredness (norm).

The second is the unintended consequences of individual actions. If dispositions are the sources of all action, and if all social action is to be analysed into individual actions, then it follows that either

¹ It is true that Adam Smith did not always explicitly assert the working of an Invisible Hand. He often seems to suggest an 'as if' attitude towards it. Later in this essay we say something about the significance of this 'as if' strategy.

we posit unconscious dispositions and a scientific theory of them or a large area of social reality remains unexplained.

In his own version of Methodological Individualism, Professor Popper has clearly recognized this second difficulty. He is also quite clear that in any understanding or explanation of collective life and history, one simply cannot neglect what he calls the logic of the situation. He sees quite correctly that a psychologistic reduction cannot be carried out on account of the unintended consequences of human action, which following Marx and Karl Menger, he regards as the fundamental problem of the social sciences (1950, Ch. 14; 1960, Chs. III & IV).

Unfortunately, however, Popper gives no systematic solution to this problem, or at least his solution does not look like one to us. He thinks that individualism and psychologism are not logically necessary to each other; he shows the untenability of psychologism, but he believes in the 'absolute' correctness of individualism. He avoids the necessity of psychologism by inserting institutions between the individual and the society. But he holds that institutions and (traditions) must be analysed in individualistic terms — that is to say, in terms of the relations of individuals acting in certain situations and of the unintended consequences of their actions.

In other words, assuming understanding and explanation of social phenomena to be the central task of sociology, Popper's contention is that the individual is the ultimate constituent of the society (just as atoms and particles are of physical systems) provided that we interpolate one other factor viz., institutions. However, they are not independent or autonomous. They can also be reduced to individuals, not in the sense of their psychic make-up but in terms of their rational needs and decisions and the unintended consequences of their action. The latter represent the key problem area of sociology and should be solved piecemeal by what may be called social engineering. (This seems to me the import of Professor Popper's note (1950; 668) making a comparison with physical science and pointing out that it is the business of technology to solve such problems.)

There are three assumptions here: and I think they are central to positivism. 1) The unintended consequences of human action can be anticipated; 2) A humanistic-Rational theory of institutions is possible, and 3) One can construct a consistent theory of human individuality which involves neither psychologism nor metaphysics.

I shall not attempt a formal examination of these assumptions. About the first, it should not be difficult to see that if all the unintended consequences could, in principle, be anticipated, the uninten-

tionality will have been overcome in principle — at least, if one did not take too voluntaristic a view of human action. But this is impossible: not primarily because of the fact of human freedom (which many people reconcile with a certain kind of determinism) but because of another fact: that of novelty and creativity which the individualist emphasises. Professor Popper's own argument from invention and scientific discovery against complete prediction establishes that a set of consequences of human actions will remain incalculable and unintended (1960, Chs. IX, x).

And if this be so, it not only gives a blow to the causal theory of human action as the foundation of naturalistic positivism; it also shows that the means-end schema (which is the foundation of the humanistic Positivism) cannot be adequate to the analysis of human action. (For, on the above showing, the result of action is, in principle, incommensurable with the intention of the agent, but this cannot be formally permissible in analysis. Even if the concept of «intention of the actor» be eliminated by some methodological device — and in a sense, the Hindu social theory does eliminate it — the inadequacy of the means-end schema will remain; for it requires the concept of a finite and anticipatable set of results). It is obvious, therefore, that once the problem of unintended (and unanticipatable) consequences of human action is acknowledged, neither institutional individualism nor modern methodological holisms, particularly those constructed by the individualists for purposes of demolition, will be adequate to deal with it. A radically different concept of action will be required.

Our examination of Popper's version shows that everything hinges on whether one could have a humanistic-rational theory of institutional behaviour. Professor Nagel (who bases his positivism on a common natural science method) also comes to the same point in his criticism of Watkins. He emphasises that the human individual loses his humanity if he is reduced to a set of dispositions (which, in the individualist theory, hang together; one is not told how) or to a set of physical or physiological properties. He, therefore, proposes an individual who acts according to a certain standard of reason. This reason is, of course, what is determined by science (1961; 540).

Before we examine this question, we may say a word or two at this stage about the concept of reduction which we have been using so frequently. Professor Nagel (1961; ch. XI) has given a very careful analysis of this concept, which appears to me wholly sound. He has drawn a very important distinction between reduction of properties and reduction of one system or science to another in terms of fun-

damental laws. He has shown that under specified assumptions and conditions one science or theoretical system (B) is said to be reduced to another (A) if the laws of (B) can be logically derived from the laws of (A) but the converse is not true.

He has also shown, quite convincingly I think, that the concept of reduction applies properly to laws and theories alone. Properties of one level cannot be reduced to another, because this will require a decision as to which property is essential and this decision can be made only in terms of laws.

Now if this analysis of reduction is correct, it will be readily seen that a large majority of sociological positivists operate in terms of reduction of properties, which is inadmissible. So far as reduction in terms of laws is concerned, one has to recognize a major difficulty, namely that in the strict sense neither psychology nor sociology have a coherent system of laws.

Consider the following instance of a law: «If an action is socially sublimated by a positive social reaction on the part of an individual or group not the original object of the action, the original tendency becomes a conformist one» (Znaniński, 1925; 112-270). In the first place it hardly fulfils the requirements of a law; but let us waive this point. In the context of reduction the question is: Is it a psychological law? Professor Znaniński calls it a law of social psychology, but that does not meet the point at issue here. The manner in which this and other laws have been formulated makes it clear that the social terms occurring in them cannot be replaced by psychological terms. Nor can it be shown that the above law can be deduced from some more elementary postulates. It is, therefore, clear that the case of sociology and psychology is quite different from that of say biology and physics, or physiology and psychology. Here we have to explore how far the description of a social phenomena can be completely translated into descriptions of individual behaviour. In fact, here again we will have the same difficulty, namely of determining the essential quality or property of the individual which already presupposes a theory and hence cannot be the starting point of reduction. To translate social phenomena into terms of individual behaviour assumes that the admittedly social, collective or simply, non-individual components which are empirically inseparable from it are inessential. In other words, the distinction between microscopic and macroscopic laws does not hold here in any simple manner. And that means that the contrast between individual and group properties also does not arise in any simple manner. That the issue, in this

form, is not one between sociology and psychology is evident from the fact that the question whether perception of the whole is prior to that of parts arose mainly in Psychology and led to the development of the Gestalt school. In India it was a major issue among the grammarians and rhetoricians who were chiefly concerned with the theory of meaning.

These highly important points are obscured by the individualist's talk about «explanation in terms of individuals and their behaviour» presupposing a prior reduction of all human social reality to individuals but, oddly, never establishing it. That it is the individualistic reduction which is the most important point may be seen from the fact that most of the critics of Methodological Individualism (Goldstein, Popper, Brodbeck, Agassi and even Nagel) have attacked its psychologism, its absolutism in denying macroscopic and relying entirely on microscopic concepts and laws. As to the individual and his decision being the ultimate locus of society and history none has any doubt. The important difference between Mr. Watkins or Hayek, and the more 'scientific' positivists like Popper and Nagel seems to be the stress on institutions as the penultimate reality, as against the insistence on operating with «dispositions» and «subjective psychic states.» What it means is that the individual should be conceived not in terms of needs and dispositions but in terms of reason and rational purposes.

In order to examine this position, we may take an example, a very commonplace one, from the field of social relations. Let us analyse the relationship between a father and a son, or the relation of authority and subordination. These relations do not depend on the purposes, attitudes, dispositions, feelings and volitions of the parties to it. To think that they do, is to invert the relation: A is not the father of B because there exist between them parental and filial attitudes, dispositions etc.; nor even because they want the relationship: these facts are certainly there, but as a consequence of the relationship and not as its cause or basis. The same is the case with the authority relationship which cannot be said to depend on the attitudes of dominance and obedience; it is the attitudes which are manifest because of, and for the sake of, the authority relationship; otherwise the distinction between power and authority, in fact, between Rule and the Law of the jungle — even between *de facto* and *de jure* authority, makes no sense.

Now once it is clear that individual will, purpose and dispositions have to conform to the requirements of roles and not vice versa, the individualist reduction is out of the question in a positive and direct

sense. It can now be maintained only in one of the following senses: (i) The denial of emergent properties and of the thesis that the whole is more than the sum of its parts (Society is more than an aggregate of its parts); (ii) A Functionalist theory of Institutions and (iii) A positivistic theory of norms.

Let us briefly examine each. About the first point we have already pointed out that a denial of gestalt properties does not entail the ultimacy of the individual. However, the thesis that 'society is a whole which is more than its parts' is not necessary to a non-positivist metaphysical theory of society and history. Its basic thesis completely supersedes the dichotomy of individual and society, for, it is that society (and hence the individuals) is the reflection of something higher, transcendent. It does deny the «reduction» of the macrocosm to the microcosm, but this is because the traditional view is metacosmic and regards the micro and macro as equally derived from a single set of principles. So the challenge for the positivist is not the existence or otherwise of specific macroscopic laws; it is the problem of eliminating the so-called higher and establishing the self-sufficiency of the human social.

Durkheim's celebrated attempt to equate the Religious, the sacred, to the social is fundamental. It fails.

Durkheim regards society as a collective representation-i.e., as a symbol. This is hardly consistent with positivism. Led by the logic of symbols, he brings in the idea of transfiguration. Durkheim admits that the Sacred, the Divine, is not simply another name for society; it is society 'transfigured and symbolically expressed' (1953; 52). It is a good question to ask if this transfiguration is illusory or real. If the latter, a higher reality has been obviously posited (in terms of which alone the transfiguration can have any meaning) and then society is the higher symbol of this ultimate reality: this is the traditional position. On the other hand if it is illusory, there must be an adequate theory to account for a persistent and systematic illusion². Durkheim does not recognize this problem.

It should be clear then that in rejecting a transcendental Absolute while insisting that society does not derive from the associated individuals and consequently surpasses them (1953; 54), he is, in the last analysis, making society a Reflexive symbol, i.e., a symbol which represents nothing but itself. And this means that either it has no

² In fact this is the trouble with almost all theories of «nothing but» pattern. In Hindu Thought, with which the idea of illusion is so generally associated, it is explained in terms of the concept of 'Maya' which is an aspect or form of the creative energy of the Absolute.

meaning, or it is a potentiated symbol. In the latter case, it involves more metaphysics than the reduction is designed to eliminate.

It may be illuminating to note that in the passage in which the quoted phrase occurs Durkheim says, «In the world of experience I know of only one being that possesses a richer and more complex moral reality than our own, and that is the collective being. I am mistaken, there is another being which could play the same part, and that is Divinity. Between God and Society lies the choice. I shall not examine here the reasons that may be advanced in favour of either solution, both of which are coherent. I can only add that I myself am quite indifferent to this choice, since I see in the Divinity only society transfigured and symbolically expressed» (1953; 52). This is an echo, I think, of the famous passage from St. Augustine, «Accordingly, two cities have been formed by two loves: the earthly by the love of the self, even to the contempt of God; the heavenly by the love of God, even to the contempt of self. The former, in a word, glories in itself, the latter in the Lord. For the one seeks glory from men; but the greatest glory of the other is God, the witness of conscience» (1948, xiv, 28, p. 47). The fierce clarity with which the perennial issue has been presented by St. Augustine, makes it easy to see why Durkheim decided to evade the choice when he said, «Thus to love society is to love both something beyond us and something in ourselves» (1953; 55). It seems as if he were clearly trying to convince himself that the two loves could be fused and the necessity of choosing between them avoided. This faith in the fusion of the two loves has remained the greatest single inspiration of positivism in the social science from Comte to Norbert Wiener.

Durkheim, was unusually clear about the key issues involved. He says, «In fact individualistic sociology is only applying the old principles of materialist metaphysics to social life. It claims that is, to explain the complex by the simple, the superior by the inferior and the whole by the part, which is a contradiction in terms. The contrary principle does not seem to us to be any less questionable. One cannot, following idealist and theological metaphysics, derive the part from the whole, since the whole is nothing without the parts which form it and cannot draw its vital necessities from the void» (1953; 29).

This gives us the clue as to how the penetrating thinking of Durkheim goes astray. After having clearly seen that it is a question of the inferior and the superior and that the latter cannot be reduced to the former, he assimilates it to the question of part and whole, and goes on to the concept of emergent realities. This frame of reference

enables one to obscure the rather plain fact, which we have laboured to point out here, that the question of reduction of the social to the individual, of the sociological to the psychological, is not an issue between the macroscopic and the microscopic; it is the problem of higher and lower levels; and in this context reduction has no meaning. If this is repeatedly forgotten it is because the positivist can easily show the absence of *sui generis* macroscopic laws and from this infer (fallaciously) the truth of the individualistic thesis. Durkheim at least saw this problem clearly as that of locating the norms. Accordingly, he tried to effect the radical reduction of sociological positivism: of the Sacred to the Social.

IV

Another well known attempt to show the ultimacy of the human universe is the functional (or as Malinowski calls it, the scientific) theory of institutions. A systematic critique of functionalism, is not required here, only a few observations particularly relevant to our present concern may be made. Allowing for some simplification, it may be said that functionalism insists upon the principle that in every type of civilization, every custom, material object, idea and belief fulfils some vital function, has some task to accomplish, represents an indispensable part within a working whole.

From our point of view, Functionalism is important as a school which emphasizes the role of institutions and tries to take a rationalist, as opposed to a historical, view of them. Functionalism arose from a sense of the failure of theories of institutions stemming from the natural law and rationalist tradition, and from a recognition of the inadequacy of the historical and evolutionary schools which dominated the social sciences after the decline of the traditional modes of thinking. Functionalism tries to explain the persistence of irrational elements in culture, a fact which the Rational-utilitarian approach could not explain. Functionalism presents a sort of socialized version of utilitarianism and thus is a species of positivism particularly suited to solve the problems of survivals and unanticipated consequences of actions. Malinowski took up this programme in right earnest; he saw the need to go to the foundations. Correctly seeing that the individualist had no theory of language, though language is the foundation of all social human life, he propounded systematically what he called an ethnographic theory of language, in which we find a clear attempt to have a sociological theory, which may eliminate metaphysical views of language. (In earlier positivism, an evo-

lutionary theory of language was developed; with the general assessment of social evolutionism as more speculative than empirical and scientific, the prestige of the evolutionary theory of language has also naturally gone down; moreover, the pattern of change in language is very different).

However, Functionalism not only fails as a version of rationalism; it also does not succeed in being «scientific». From the 'scientific' point of view Professor Nagel has developed a number of very forceful criticisms. Among the more important ones, the following may be mentioned:

(i) The pattern of functional explanation is basically teleological. But as used in the study of social systems, it does not fulfil the logical conditions of such explanations, that is, it cannot specify precisely the state of the system that a given institution helps to maintain. This is because the concept of «maintenance of a social system» cannot be given independent and verifiable reference.

(ii) This is clear if one examines Radcliffe-Brown's idea that the major task of social science is to discover how a given structural form is preserved. Now each social system has a class of (social) relationships which remain invariant with respect to a given class of changes; since there cannot be any coherent notion of absolute disorder, the notion of preserving a structural form is relative to the type of changes being considered and hence cannot be discovered by functional analysis. (In other words, functionalists implicitly adopt the unwarranted notion of an absolutely invariant set of relations).

(iii) This is further seen in the fact that the notions of «internal consistency of a system», «functional unity», «indispensable role», etc. are not scientifically sound in the sense that claims for these cannot be subjected to empirical control.

(iv) Functional explanations in social sciences are seldom full-fledged teleological ones. For such explanations it is necessary to show that the variables maintaining a state in some system are *state variables*, that is, they are independent of one another. Functional explanations in social science seldom satisfy this requirement (1961; 520-535).

From our point of view the crucial concept in Functionalism is that of system. As has been indicated before, its methodological importance is two-fold; firstly, it is designed to overcome the difficulties of a positivism that depends on an ultimate reduction into psychic states. In the second place, it is conceived and constructed to conform to the empirical scientific requirements and it is expected to provide a sound alternative to metaphysical Holism. It can thus eli-

minate the necessity for transcendental norms by a theory of systemic interlocking.

However, quite apart from the objections which have been summarised above, the question is: does not the functionalist theory of institutions always presuppose an integrated system? If it does, how does the theory apply to systems with varying degrees of integration? How does it apply to modern cultures where integration is low? In other words, can it, in understanding systems with low degree of integration, operate in a really value-free manner? Does not a functional analysis make integration itself a supreme value? Integration, however, cannot be the ultimate value, for it remains instrumental with respect to the system. Hence an ultimate value has to be posited. Malinowski tried to establish Freedom as such a value. But could it be scientific? And, then, there is the question of integrating the various and often divergent functions of an institution. To solve this, Malinowski has put forward a theory of bio-psychic foundations of institutions (1944). This is perhaps conditioned by the fundamental motive of positivism; but it represents a relapse into reductionism which is against the basic principles of functionalism. Even if it were not so, it will be inadequate to explain the culture of archaic man which is based on the transformation of the bios into the mythos. Other well-known objections are that many institutions thwart rather than fulfil man's biological needs and that many institutions either do not have a somatic correlate, or it is just a postulated substratum of observed patterns of behaviour. These criticisms are only aspects of the above objection.

Difficulties of a still serious nature are encountered when we come to the central problem: that of unintended consequences of individual actions and public policy. One of the best functionalist answers is to be found in Merton's famous theory of manifest and latent functions. (1957) The terminology is inept, for 'latent' as used by Merton does not always mean «to be real or active in future» nor do latent functions necessarily operate secretly and in disguise. Merton defines manifest functions as those which are both intended and recognized, and latent functions as those which are neither intended nor recognized. Such a definition, as Hempel (1959) points out, has the unintended consequence of allowing for functions which are neither latent nor manifest. That is, those that are intended but not recognized and others which are unintended but recognized. Hempel, therefore, suggests that the distinction be based simply on whether or not the stabilizing effect of the given item was deliberately sought.

But though Merton's formulation could be technically improved,

the trouble lies deeper. For the distinction will ultimately become psychological and will even lie on the borderline of the subjective if the criterion of 'recognition' is eliminated. But if the functions can be calculated, why are they latent? Unrecognized by whom? Will the recognition by the social scientists not count as recognition? But why? The distinction between latent and manifest functions which is presented in empirical trappings does not differ basically from the conscious and unconscious motivation and its role in psychoanalytic theory and hence it is bound to suffer from similar difficulties.

On the philosophical plane it is derived from the infinity of human action chains. A proper recognition of this inherent characteristic of human action will necessitate the supersession of the means-end schema.

Indeed, to give up this schema will mean not merely the abandonment of Functionalism: it will mean the abandonment of all forms of modern rationalism and positivism.

Before passing on to a more general consideration of the humanist positivist view of norms, I shall consider one more specific attempt to eliminate the suprahuman dimension from the theory of social order. I refer to Professor Gouldner's theory of Reciprocity. (1959, 1960). In my opinion it formulates a fundamental idea of the liberal *Weltanschauung* and hence merits close attention.

Professor Gouldner has laid great stress on this idea of reciprocity which he thinks, to be the master cohesive principle of all social systems. «Contrary to some cultural relativists», he says, «it can be hypothesized that a norm of reciprocity is universal» (1960: 170). He also claims that 'reciprocity' because it operates as a starting mechanism, goes beyond functional theory which is concerned merely with the maintenance of systems. He holds that this is the best device for maintaining the self-regulatory character of social system. The principle of feed-back is, so to say, built into the concept of reciprocity.

Professor Gouldner, however, recognizes that Reciprocity should be exalted into a general and supreme norm. Given this, no suprahuman principle is needed for social order. It is also assumed that quite from the fact that it has actually been the foundation of most of the historical societies, the necessity for such a preeminent norm can be rationally demonstrated.

As Professor Gouldner points out the principle of Reciprocity is the foundation of Parsons' elaborate theory of social system. But in addition Parsons recognizes the necessity of a Common value-system. Though Professor Gouldner does not say this in so many words, it is clear that by elevating reciprocity itself to the status of the highest

norm, the necessity for taking a common value-system as ultimate is eliminated, and thereby a loophole for insinuating absolutist notions securely plugged.

If Professor Gouldner's contentions are correct, the foundation for an individualistic and positive (humanistic) sociology seems to be well-laid.

But they are not. And Professor Gouldner himself is aware of the sources from which difficulties may arise, though, as is frequently the case in the history of thought, he does not expect them to be crucial or insuperable. Before, however, coming to these let me ask an elementary question: why is Professor Gouldner not satisfied with reciprocity as a fact, and what does he mean by a norm? He seems to mean that regardless of what an individual may, in the given situation, naturally think or feel about reciprocity, he should be *required* to reciprocate, that is, to play the game, an almost absolute negative value being placed on failure to reciprocate adequately. This is clear from the following observations:

«The norm thus safeguards powerful people against the temptations of their own status; it motivates and regulates reciprocity as an exchange pattern, serving to inhibit the emergence of exploitative relations which could undermine the social system and the very power arrangements which had made exploitation possible.» (In a footnote he continues): «This line of analysis is further strengthened if we consider the possibility that Ego's continued conformity with Alter's expectations may eventually lead Alter to take Ego's conformity for «granted» and thus lead Alter to reciprocate less for later acts of conformity by Ego. In short, the value of Ego's conformity may undergo an inflationary spiral in which his later conforming actions are worth less than earlier ones, in terms of the reciprocities they yield. As reciprocities tend to decline, the social system may experience mounting strain, either collapsing in apathy or being disrupted by conflict. In this connection the general norm of reciprocity may serve as a brake, slowing the rate at which reciprocities decline, or preventing them from declining beyond a certain (unknown) level and thus contributing to the stability of the system» (1960; 174).

This shows quite clearly that reciprocity itself, does not work as a cohesive and stabilizing force, because, among other things, it generates what may be called a self-neutralizing dialectic. It is a substitute for principles defining rights and duties according to status; but it is not a mere substitute, since it also reinforces them if transformed into a general form.

It is clear that in his 'Norm' of Reciprocity Professor Gouldner is

developing a sociological substitute for the famous Felicific Calculus. What is, however, not so clear is Professor Gouldner's belief that an appeal to recognize the dues of reciprocity has a great chance of being successful particularly in situations where a power position tends to blur one's sense of duty and responsibility. Stranger still is his idea that the obligation of reciprocity continues to hold its own even when the system of obligation has been weakened; indeed it reinvigorates the enfeebled system of social and moral obligations. If the magic is in reciprocity, why insist on its status and recognition as a norm? If it is in its normative status, why bring in reciprocity? Will not any absolute norm do as much? It is obvious that in Professor Gouldner's view Reciprocity has a special, pre-eminent position. Its special virtues are the following:

- (1) The requiredness of the obligations of Reciprocity is self-evidently rational.
- (2) It is intimately related to the individual and is concretely specifiable; it operates on the recognition of a personal debt hence is free from the weakening effect of norms which operate in terms of generalized and abstract principles.

A closer look at Professor Gouldner's own list of unsolved problems will show the untenability of the above assumptions.

«That the norm commonly imposes obligations of reciprocity only «when the individual is able» to reciprocate does not guarantee agreement concerning the individual's «ability». Furthermore there may be occasions when questions as to whether the individual's return is appropriate or sufficient (apart from whether it is equivalent) that arise by virtue of the absence of common yardsticks in terms of which giving and returning may be compared. Moreover, the norm may lead individuals to establish relations only or primarily with those who can reciprocate, thus inducing neglect of those unable to do so. Clearly, the norm of reciprocity cannot apply with full force in relation with children, old people, or with those who are mentally or physically handicapped, and it is theoretically inferable that other fundamentally different kinds of normative orientations will develop in moral codes» (1960; 178).

(To this penetrating agenda we may add the case of relationships where one willingly and freely gives in exchange more than one receives, and that is regarded as the usual mode of reciprocity. A strict application of the norm of reciprocity will introduce alien strains into such relationships).

Professor Gouldner would consider these problems later. However, a careful study of the nature of these problems shows that they cannot be solved without a radical shift in the positivist-functional point of view, and that the norm of reciprocity necessitates something fundamentally different from a calculus of reciprocal obligations. In the first place, the «requiredness» (or, the obligation) of reciprocity implies a principle higher than reciprocity, namely the principle of responsibility, of which the essence is that one ought to be intellectually aware of whatever is done to him. But this obligation to be aware of what has been done to one's self can have no rational ground: at least, not within the positivist anthropology and atomistic sociology. It requires the recognition of man's creatureliness, the recognition that he cannot be the ground of his own being, neither individually nor collectively.

Professor Gouldner's other problems make this quite clear. He recognises that what counts as proper return will depend on the normative system of the society; further the fact that in a quite general class of cases asymmetry of reciprocity has to be recognised and institutionalized and his insight that relationships for the sake of reciprocity have to be disallowed as a dominant form, rule out the ultimacy of the 'Norm' of Reciprocity and point unmistakably to a higher normative system. This also shows that exploitation cannot be defined in terms of reciprocity alone³.

Professor Gouldner's whole theory of social order depends on the recognition by individuals of their mutual debts and here he states a principle indispensable to any theory of the social order. The concept of debt, however, cannot be meaningful merely in the context of interpersonal relations. The recognition of one's debt to ancestors and to many indirect and unknown benefactors; in a word, to the continuity of the Tradition of knowledge and culture is equally essential. (This is implicit in the asymmetry of reciprocity and in the distinction between reciprocity and complementarity recognized by Gouldner). But this means that the ultimate principle from which the «Norm» of Reciprocity is derived is that of maintenance of the cosmic order. As Coomaraswamy puts it: «The Sacrifice, like the words of the liturgy indispensable to it, must be understood (*erlebt*) if it is to be completely effective. The merely physical acts may, like

³ In view of difficulties of this type, I proposed, in a previous publication, the following analysis of human 'exploitation': «... exploitation of man by man means the use of one group of man (A) by another (B) such that it benefits neither the former (A) nor the whole of which both are part, but only the latter group (B) either wholly or largely.» (1959; 5).

any other labour, secure temporal advantages. Its uninterrupted celebration maintains, in fact, the endless «stream of wealth» (*vasor dhara*) that falls from heaven as the fertilising rain, passes through plants and animals becomes our food, and is returned to heaven in the smoke of the Burnt-offering; that rain and this smoke are the wedding gifts in the sacred marriage of Sky and Earth, Sacerdotium and Regnum, that is implied by the whole operation» (Coomaraswamy: n.d.; 21).

This has been the traditional theory of social order. Just as the fulfilment of individual reciprocities is essential for maintaining and stabilizing the interpersonal order, social order requires the redemption of cosmic debts which is necessary for avoiding a disruption of the cosmic order of which the social order is a dimension or link. Human responsibility — if it is not to be assumed arbitrarily — and then it can be refused in the same way — arises ultimately from the creation of the cosmos and has a metaphysical foundation or none at all. Indeed, even if one considered the matter on what may be called a submetaphysical plane, a debt has no power of its own: Man may not acknowledge it, and hence may refuse to redeem it. And not only does it happen occasionally: it is an ever present fear. The foundation of his obligation to honour his debt arises from man's basic creatureliness. He cannot create *ex nihilo*, nor can he undo what he has brought forth. Any one with this power will have neither the will nor the reason to acknowledge any debt, norm, or value. The conception of human society as a self-regulated system controlled by the 'norm' of reciprocity, if carried through, will thus culminate in the traditional concept of society. As a modern thinker puts it, «Human Society is not merely a fact, or an event, in the external world to be studied by an observer like a natural phenomenon. Though it has externality as one of its important components, it is as a whole a little world, a cosmion, illuminated with meaning from within by the human beings who continuously create and bear it as the mode and condition of their self-realization. It is illuminated through an elaborate symbolism, in various degrees of compactness and differentiation — from rite, through myth, to theory — and this symbolism illuminates it with meaning in so far as the symbols make the internal structure of such a cosmion, the relations between its members and groups of members, as well as its existence as a whole, transparent for the mystery of human existence. The self-illumination of society through symbols is an integral part of social reality, and one may even say its essential part, for through such symbolization the members of a society experience it as more than

an accident or a convenience; they experience it as of their human essence» (Voegelin: 1952; 27).

V

For reasons of space, we cannot examine the general positivistic theory of norms, such as, for example, Kelsen's (1949); we cannot discuss certain modern attempts to reduce imperatives, prescriptives and deontic concepts to indicatives. Nor can we examine the emotive theory of normative and ethical conduct.

We shall, however, examine in brief the positivistic assumption which underlies a large variety of sociological theory and particularly empirical research.

It is this: Normative behaviour is a general and generally accepted pattern of behaviour: and it can be explained and understood through methods of scientific generalization.

A generalization formulating observed uniformities and regularities of behaviour does not necessarily represent a norm-governed behaviour. On account of similarity of circumstances, overt or subliminal advertising, high pressure salesmanship, coincidence of interests or attitudes people may and do come to behave in a similar manner. And this may last for a long time. But there may be no requiredness about it. Often the positivists contend that all that the sociologist needs is a basis for asserting that «a probability exists for certain courses of action», and this observed uniformities and regularities of behaviour can do for him. (For instance, it is well-known that according to Weber (1947; 107) a social relationship consists solely in 'the probability that there will be in some meaningfully understandable sense a course of social action'). The rather detailed analysis of Professor Gouldner's theory shows that this is not so. But the general argument against this may be formulated as follows: An observed uniformity and regularity, does not explain a pattern of human action nor does it give it a high degree of probability, unless an additional assumption is made, namely, that people either prefer or are bound to behave in the manner they have been doing in the past.

Thus, since there can be normal, eccentric, accidental, and, in extreme cases, abnormal uniformities and regularities of human behaviour, the method of empirical generalization cannot be adequate to deal with normal behaviour.

Now it will not do to assimilate norms either to customs or to

habits. Norms are not customs because, among the people who have the highest regard for them, customs are adhered to not because a pattern of conduct is customary, but because it is considered the right form. To explain customary behaviour in terms of preference for custom is not to explain it all, for custom does not originate in custom. (The mistake arises because the positivist decides to obscure the distinction between original and degenerate forms of customary behaviour, and perhaps unwittingly takes the latter as a paradigm).

And a norm is not the same as habit because admittedly a large number of habits are formed in accordance with certain norms and are deliberately strengthened in order to conform to those norms.

The inadequacy of scientific method for dealing with norms can be seen from another characteristic feature of theirs. Propositions stating norms are universals of a special kind. The counter-factuals which they support ought not to be falsified. Thus the normative is a universal which is verified but never refuted. To give an example: Radcliffe Brown notes: «For ritual obligation conformity and rationalization are provided by the ritual sanctions. The simplest form of ritual sanction is an accepted belief that if rules of ritual sanction are not observed, some undefined misfortune is likely to occur» (Radcliffe-Brown, 1939; 42).

Now what is the status of this belief? It is not a kind of scientific generalization, for nothing can refute it. If the tabu is not observed, and nothing untoward happens, this does not refute or falsify the belief, for the testing is not permitted; it is not a move in this game. The tabu (any norm) is observed not because people want to avoid certain evil or undesirable consequences — if this were so, testing would be permitted. They observe it because a norm is simply the right way of doing things on the part of man; the prevention of untoward events is one of its results. The belief in the sanction for the prescribed action being part of its normality, it is not correct to say that a norm is weakened by being proved false, for the idea of proving a norm cannot arise without a prior weakening of the belief.

This aspect of what may be loosely called the logic of normal action has been clarified in a masterly way by Ramsey:

«When we deliberate about a possible action, we ask ourselves what will happen if we do this or that. If we give a definite answer of the form 'If I do p, q will result', this can properly be regarded as a material implication or disjunction 'Either not p or q'. But it differs, of course, from any ordinary disjunction in that one of its members is not something of which we are trying to discover the truth but something within our power to make true or false. If we go on to

'And if q , then r ', we get more material implications of a more ordinary kind.

«Now suppose a man is in such a situation. For instance, suppose that he has a cake and decides not to eat it, because he thinks it will upset him, and suppose that we consider his conduct and decide that he is mistaken. Now the belief on which the man acts is that if he eats the cake he will be ill, taken according to our above account as material implication. We cannot contradict this proposition either before or after the event; for it is true provided the man doesn't eat the cake, and before the event we have no reason to think he will eat it, and after the event we know he hasn't. Since he thinks nothing false, why do we dispute with him or condemn him?» (1931; 246).

Since normative propositions are not universals of fact but have certain special features, they cannot be dealt with in terms of inductive generalizations. A distinction between factual and nomic universals, or between essential and accidental generality has to be drawn for understanding their nature.

We speak of Essential Generality when a universal statement asserting a quality or a relation is true by virtue of the nature of the relation or quality involved. In logic, it expresses a tautology or an analytic truth, or an internal relation of meaning. In human action it formulates the conditions under which alone an action, relation or situation is meaningful and real.

Now it should not be difficult to see that if normal human actions exemplify, in principle, essential generality and human relationships cannot be subsumed under Factual universality or empirical generality, perhaps the only alternative for the positivist is to maintain a sort of antithesis between fact and value, the positive and the normative, and to adopt a value-neutral, scientific attitude and method of study for the latter.

The following considerations will show that this antithesis is untenable.

In the traditional theory meaning, value and reality are analogously equated. In this it differs radically from non-traditional, modern thought, which either reduces value to fact or maintains a strict dichotomy of the two. However, on close examination it can be seen that the traditional is the only possible view of the matter, for there can be no value and meaning in anything unreal; while to project or superimpose value or meaning upon a reality is either arbitrary and thus merely a form of make-believe, or it must transmute it into a different reality.

Our failure to see this is, in the final analysis, due to our neglect

to solve the problem of physical reality. The phenomenal reality of our every day world is not accepted as ultimately real by the physicist. For him the real matter is something different, (atoms, waves and all that). Now when we insist on the reality of something apart from its meaning and value, do we not mean simply reality on the physical plane? We are inclined to say that a table is real, whether well-made or ill-made; an action is real, whether good or evil, normal or abnormal.

We often know what is to be done and yet what we do is something else — is that not real?

However, an ill-made 'table' or an abnormal action has no reality whatsoever on its own plane — an ill-made table is not a table except by courtesy; it is real only in the sense of continuing to be an agglomeration of matter. But we shall not be interested in asserting its material or physical reality if we cared to remember that the atomic structure to which the phenomenal table is reduced by the scientist can in no way be called a table and that the phenomenal table is a collective representation (a logical, or better, a 'sociological' construction), which obviously has no reality whatsoever apart from the meaning we attach to the word 'table'. Analogously, if teachers play chess when they 'ought' to be teaching, this certainly detracts from their reality as teachers⁴, and it is pointless to regard this as a value-judgement and insist that as a scientist we should look only to what the teachers 'really' do, leaving alone what they 'ought to'; for the 'teacher' has no 'reality' apart from the significance of his role; and it is no use reducing the teacher to the psycho-physical organism, since that would lead us back to all the difficulties of atomism. And in the same way, the case of felt strain generated by the hiatus between the 'Ideal' and the 'real' can be understood only in terms of higher and lower levels of reality. When I say I know what I ought to do, but I cannot or do not, do it, what else can be the explanation except that there are two in us? Both the natural and the spiritual selves are real and the conflict is caused by a disturbance in the hierarchical relation of the selves.

It is true that the (non-naturalistic) positivists themselves emphasize the cardinal importance of meanings and values in the study of society. But they do not see the synonymity of meaning and reality to which it leads. They insist on treating 'meaning' in some way as «a

⁴ Admittedly it involves the notion of degrees of reality and the doctrine of degrees of knowledge. They are full of serious difficulties. It is a pity we cannot discuss them here.

superimposition». This inconsistency is inevitable so long as trans-human 'meanings' are not admitted.

That reality, meanings and values have been seen as transtemporal is historically true. The positivists have their own way of dealing with such a situation, and it looks plausible only because its logic is not examined. They examine a value or meaning which is real for a people in terms of a methodological bracket — let us treat it *as if* it were real, suspending judgement on its ontological validity. This procedure is faulty in two respects. Firstly, in terms of this method one does not, and in fact cannot, specify what level of reality one is refusing to attribute to a phenomenon. Even if, however, some indication of it is available, it is never shown that that is the level proper to it. It follows that the social scientist studies a curious reality. It is not the existing reality, for the 'as if' attitude is not part of it. Of course, one may abstract from reality for scientific purposes, but the final explanation or theory must cover the whole reality, and not merely its abstracted version. In fact, the decision to eliminate certain features of a situation and treat them merely as a fiction cannot but be based on the acceptance of a certain view of the nature of 'reality as such' — and so long as the connection and the validity of this and the bracketed theory of reality is not explained, the 'as if' method of understanding normative systems (in any case, the traditional ones) is logically untenable.

In fact, there is an inconsistency involved here. The positivistic theory of propositions (and generality), at least in its strict forms, leaves no place for modal sentences like 'People of culture x believe that p'. They have either to be eliminated from the system, or a special modal or intensional logic has to be constructed for their proper analysis. The «as if» strategy of the positivists in sociology accomplishes nothing of the sort. On the other hand, it involves the recognition of a special class of propositions which are meaningful and non-tautologous, but neither true nor false.

An illustration may be permitted to make this clearer. Consider two sets of sociological propositions:

- (A) People of society A believe that the displeasure of a certain deity causes small-pox.
- (B) People in society M believe that certain micro-organisms cause small-pox.

Now if the positivist puts both (A) and (B) in his methodological

bracket and refrains from giving them any truth-value, this would imply one of the two positions:

- (i) There are no truths, only hypotheses.
This would not be consistent with positivism. According to one philosophy of science there are certain verified propositions. Taking this view, if a belief-sentence can be validated in terms of these, it must be called true. According to another philosophy of science, there can be no *conclusively* verified scientific propositions, but propositions can be conclusively refuted and hence rejected as false. On this view, the scientific sociologist has to regard some beliefs as false.
- (ii) There are truths; the methodological bracket applies only to beliefs.

Now since true statements can be, and often are, objects of belief, the sociologists' bracket is practically meaningless in the case of beliefs whose objects are true statements.

It seems to me that the consistent positivist has only two alternatives: the Wittgensteinian and the Paretian.

According to the *Tractatus* doctrine of Wittgenstein: «The proposition «A thinks P» is an assertion about the behaviour of a human being on the same level as «P is found in Chapter I of the Book of Genesis». It is thus reducible to a set of elementary (and hence empirically grounded) propositions. P, in the significant use, does not occur in «A thinks P» any more than in «P is found...»" (Weinberg: 1936; 62).

According to Pareto the question of the truth of beliefs (and validity of norms) is, in the last analysis, a matter of consistency with the accepted (naturalistic) scientific system (cf. Neurath) and, accordingly he unhesitatingly rejects a large class of behaviour patterns as non-logical and belief systems as false because unacceptable to up-to-date science. True to his conception of Science, he explicitly leaves open the possibility of today's scientific beliefs proving false and yesterday's beliefs (now regarded unscientific and false) proving scientific and true tomorrow. This is, however, by no means value-neutralism nor is it variety of fictionalism.

I do not necessarily imply that either Wittgenstein's or Pareto's view is tenable. But they are consistent with the general principles of Positivism. But the value-neutralism or the idea of studying norms and values as behavioural facts which contemporary sociologists adopt is neither tenable nor consistent with their positivism

which (unlike the earlier Wittgenstein) admits (for investigation) both a world of facts and a world of values.

In order to have a correct approach to value judgements we should be clear about the manner in which the dichotomy of the 'is' and the 'ought' arises. It arises because the possibility of failure is inherent in man's time-bound existence. It represents not a disjunction of 'fact' and 'value', but of two levels of judgements of reality. When a modern medicine man says: 'One ought to eat these and not those', we usually don't call it a value-judgement because we think it is based on a knowledge of the relevant reality. The same is true of all «value-judgements» — either they are based on judgements of reality or they are simply meaningless. If there is no moral, or axiological reality; or, if its knowledge is not possible, then there are no propositions—neither factual nor valuational—in that sphere. What seems to us wholly unwarranted is to deny the possibility of judgements of reality and then claim to understand systems of norms. This position is adopted because it is held that no 'ought' can be derived from an 'is'. One will not puzzle oneself about this derivability if one realized that the 'Is' is understood only in terms of the 'Ought' and the 'ought' represents nothing more nor less than the conditions of the intelligibility of the relevant level of reality. It is here that the positivist goes wrong. After seeing clearly that there are levels of reality, he fails to see the imperative necessity of establishing their continuity, in the absence of which one level is bound to be judged in terms of another and thus misunderstood. Our contention here has been that this continuity can be established only through a Traditional symbolic⁵.

And this, if sound, should destroy the foundation of the positivist rule that the scientist should arrive at systems of norms by observing regularities and uniformities of behaviour.

⁵ One of the most important attacks on this argument is that of Lovejoy (1936; see esp. chapters III & XI) Even if I knew how to deal with it satisfactorily, a whole paper will be required for it.

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THESES ON THE ROLE OF HISTORICAL METHOD IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

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I. HISTORICAL METHOD AS A PART OF PRACTICALLY ALL METHODS OF THE IDEOGRAPHIC AND NOMOTHEIC SCIENCES

1. By *historical data* are meant all data that involve the category of time. By *sociocultural historical data* are understood all sociocultural facts viewed in their time-occurrence¹.

2. By *historical method of study and historical interpretation of socio-cultural phenomena* are meant all methods and interpretations that use and are based upon utilization of sociocultural historical facts.

3. Viewed so, this method (or interpretation) is possibly one of the most widely used methods in the ideographic as well as the nomothetic sociocultural sciences. Besides being a main method of investigation in a large number of studies, it enters as a part into almost all methods of exploration of sociocultural facts.

II. THE COGNITIVE VALUE AND FUNCTIONS OF THE IDEOGRAPHIC HISTORICAL METHOD

4. a. In the ideographic investigation of unique, unrepeated, sociocultural phenomena — be it a unique person-group-event-institution-cultural object-value-or other individuality — the ideographic variety of historical method is *the main method of cognition of especially the «origin, development, and changes»* of such a phenomenon throughout its whole existence and in lesser degree of its *specific less changeable characteristics* — because without a study of its changes

¹ See the definition and analysis of the sociocultural phenomena as three componential phenomena ((physical-vital-meaningful) in difference from one (physical) componential structure of the inorganic and two componential (physical plus vital) structure of the organic phenomena in P. SOROKIN, *Society, Culture and Personality*, ch. 3, New York, 1947. There are also Spanish and Japanese, Hindi, and Portuguese editions of this work.

we often cannot discover which of its traits are changeable and which are comparatively constant *or static*.

b. In addition to the ideographic knowledge of the life-course of a given unique phenomenon, and of its essential characteristics, the ideographic history delivers to us its *vivid and concrete image* or a *living portrait*, which are not given by the nomothetic disciplines.

c. These cognitive functions of the ideographic historical method will explain its use as the main method of ideographic historical science since the ancient times of the earliest chronicles and «histories» of Herodotus up to the «orthodox» ideographic histories of modern historians. Through use of this method «the primitive» *homo sapiens* obtained his earliest cognition of many phenomena important for his well being, activities, and survival. Its more scientific use by the modern historians continues to supply us with indispensable knowledge of the phenomena which appear to us particularly important for our «life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness.»

d. Further on, the *ideographic historical data and their configurations once in a while serve as starters or suggesters of the initial ideas of several nomothetic generalizations or formulae of uniformities* as illustrated by the works of such ideographic historians as Thucydides, Polybius, Gibbons, Mommsen, F. de Coulanges, M. I. Rostovtzeff, and other eminent historians. Their ideographic study of certain historical phenomena now and then led them to formulation of several nomothetic generalizations scattered throughout their «histories.»

e. Likewise, a detailed study of the concrete circumstances of a singular historical event sometimes led and can lead to a discovery of the significant cases of «*the singularistic causality*» meaning by it a specific combination of certain conditions explaining the why and how of the occurrence of the singular event studied. In its essentials this procedure is similar to the clinical investigations of the combination of the factors responsible for the illness or state of health of a given patient: correct etiology of his sickness represents in many cases the discovery of the *singularistic combination* of several variables responsible for the patient's sickness.

f. *As a rule however an ideographic study of the unique historical phenomena rarely delivers to us valid nomothetic generalizations or formulae of uniformity. Neither such a study gives a solid basis for predictions of the future course of sociocultural phenomena.* In this respect such unique or rarely repeated sociocultural facts are somewhat similar to the microphysical single atoms or elementary particles or to their small aggregations. Many an eminent physicist call

such a world of single or of small aggregations of atoms and particles as «the microcosm of lawlessness,» «the realm of discontinuity, uncertainty, and unpredictability.»² For somewhat similar reasons the world of the unique or rare sociocultural phenomena can also be called «the realm of discontinuity, uncertainty and unpredictability.»

III. COGNITIVE VALUE AND FUNCTIONS OF HISTORICAL METHOD IN THE NOMOTHETIC SOCIOCULTURAL DISCIPLINES

5. In discovery and formulation of all, including sociocultural, nomothetic generalizations and formulae of uniformities we can distinguish three different stages: a) emergence of the initial idea of generalization or uniformity, b) unfolding and development of this idea in its implications and consequences and c) empirical testing or verification of its validity or correctness. In *great* scientific discoveries and important achievements in all fields of creativity the initial idea is ordinarily inspired by supra-sensory and supra-logical intuition or genius as the way of cognition and creativity different from sensory observation or logical reasoning, while in *mediocre* discoveries, inventions, and achievements the initial idea often emerges as a result of sensory observation, logico-mathematical thought or of just a lucky chance.³ The second stage of unfolding and development of the initial idea of nomothetic generalization or uniformity is ordinarily done through deductive and dialectic logic and «seductive» mathematical inferences and calculations. Finally, the developed hypothesis must be tested by the relevant empirical facts through experimental, statistical and other reliable methods of empirical verification.

In the stage of emergence and development of nomothetic theory historical method does not play an important role (except the infrequent role of a starter or suggester of the initial idea of generalization mentioned above). When however a nomothetic hypothesis reaches the stage of empirical verification, the role of historical method in that stage becomes quite important, often indispensable, no matter whether the nomothetic generalization or uniformity be of

² See on this P. SOROKIN, *Fads and Foibles in Modern Sociology and Related Sciences*, pp. 151 ff. Chicago, 1956. There are French and Spanish translations of this work.

³ See the evidence for that in P. SOROKIN, *The Ways and Power of Love*, chps 5, 6, Boston, 1954; P. SOROKIN, «How Are Sociological Theories Conceived, Developed, and Validated», *Social Science*, April, 1960.

causal, or causal-meaningful, or probalistic, or immanent type⁴. The historical method becomes a part and parcel of practically all methods of testing empirical correctness of a generalizing theory or formula of uniformity.

6. It becomes an important part of a strictly *experimental* method of investigation of sociocultural phenomena if and when such a method is really applicable⁵. In the terms of J. S. Mill's the experimental induction according to *the canon of concomitant variation* represents but the defined historical method in its experimental application. Such a canon requires an observation of the variations of the phenomena A and B at *different moments* or *during certain period of time* (with other conditions kept constant). Historical method quite frequently enters also the experiments using the *inductive canons of identity, difference, and residue*. If the experiment deals with the same phenomenon, most of the experimental studies consist in systematic observation of this phenomenon *before* it is exposed to Factor X and *after* such an exposure. Then in view of the extreme difficulty of keeping really constant all the other conditions of experimental situation from interference of unknown or unsuspected factors, experimenters usually find it advisable to repeat their experiment *several times* and at *different moments of time*. In these and other ways historical method in the defined sense enters almost all experimental studies based upon practically all canons of experimental induction.

7. Still more unavoidable is the use of historical method in *pseudo-experimental research* typified by a matched comparison of the experimental individual or group or phenomenon with a so-called «control» individual-group-or phenomenon, or by observation (in loosely experimental conditions) of the same person, group or phenomenon *before and after* exposing them to the variable X experimented with. So long as the «before and after» enter the experiment (and factually they enter almost all pseudo-experimental-psychological, sociological, economic, political and other investigations histo-

⁴ Cf. on these forms of uniformities and relationships, rarely distinguished by social scientists, in P. SOROKIN, *Fads and Foibles*, pp. 151-60 and ch. 11; P. SOROKIN, *Society, Culture and Personality*, chps 3, 4, pp. 145-46; P. SOROKIN, *Sociocultural Causality, Space, Time*, chps 1, 2, Durham, 1943.

⁵ Unfortunately in sociocultural research its applicability is very limited and confined to a study of very narrow and simple psychological and sociocultural variables. Most of so-called «experimental» investigations in these disciplines are pseudo-experimental, having far relationship to the real experimental research. Cf. on that P. SOROKIN, *Fads and Foibles*, pp. 175 ff.

rical method becomes an essential part of pseudo-experimental procedures.

8. The same is to be said about an establishment of *probabilistic* (chance) *nomothetic uniformities* through statistical method⁶. A systematic observation of large aggregations of atoms or of a large number of repeated sociocultural phenomena of the same kind (like deaths, births, marriages, divorces, suicides, crimes, etc., in sociology, perceptions, emotions, associations, and so on in psychology, now and then discloses an existence of certain uniformities in these phenomena and in their relationships to other phenomena (variables). Most of such probabilistic uniformities are not based upon experimental or pseudo-experimental evidence of the existence of causal ties in these phenomena and relationships; neither are they based upon a knowledge of the properties and movement of each single unit of a large aggregation or of a mass of these phenomena. The main basis of chance-uniformities is just the fact of their repeated recurrence «visible» to repeated observation. The probability of the recurrence of such uniformities is respectively measured by the coefficient of probability, that is by the ratio of all the cases where the observed uniformity occurs to the total known number of the occurrences of this phenomenon. The nearer this coefficient is to one the higher is the probability of the recurrence of the uniformity studied and the more certain is the prediction of its recurrence. In a study of probabilistic association and co-variation of two or more phenomena the closeness of their relationship is often measured also — rightly or wrongly — by the various coefficient of correlation, of contingency and by other quantitative indexes designed for that purpose.

For discovery and formulation of these probabilistic uniformities the investigator must often obtain the *time series* of the occurrences of such mass phenomena. Whether the *time series* represent the occurrences of the sun spots or meteorological conditions or fluctuation of business conditions or movement of specified morbidity, suicide, deaths, births, marriages, divorces, crimes, wars, revolutions, etc.,

⁶ In difference from strictly causal or causal-meaningful relationships and uniformities contemporary methodology of physical as well as psychosocial sciences distinguishes *probabilistic or chance uniformities* based upon an observation of vast aggregations of atoms or particles or of large number of biological, sociocultural and psychological phenomena of the same class. Most of the laws and uniformities of macrophysics are viewed by contemporary physicists as probabilistic (chance) uniformities. And such also are many psychological and sociocultural uniformities.

each of such time series is constructed through application of historical method in the defined sense of this term.

9. a. This *probabilistic use* of historical method has been one of the main methods for building and testing of a large portion of *broad nomothetic generalizations* in sociocultural sciences, particularly of the *theories of so called factors* of various sociocultural phenomena and of *their allegedly uniform causal connections*. Whether we take the existing generalizing theories of geographic, climatic, biological, demographic, economic, religious, technological, political and other interpretations of sociocultural phenomena as the dependent variables of one of these factors, a large portion of all such theories use historical facts (and historical method) for corroboration of their scientific validity. The same is true in regard to the theories of mutual interdependence of two or more of these «variables» in their causal co-existence and co-variation⁷.

b. Still greater is the use of such a method in sociological, anthropological, economic and other nomothetic theories dealing with the problems of *various sociocultural and psychological trends and «Laws of Evolutions and Progress.»* As a matter of fact all such theories and their «laws» are based mainly, sometimes exclusively, upon some sort of historical data allegedly confirming their «laws» of evolution and progress or their hypotheses of various «linear», «spiral», or «branching» social trends.⁸

c. The same can be stated in regard to *generalizing theories of sociocultural rhythms, cycles, and periodicities*: economic, political, artistic, scientific, religious and others⁹. Almost all such theories are based upon *short or long time series* of respective phenomena.

d. Historical method represents also one of the main methods of verification of *the broadest nomothetic theories and philosophies of history*. By this method, combined with its «immanent» variety (see on this variety next paragraph) Plato, Aristotle, and Polybius endeavored to test and confirm their generalizations concerning the main forms and their «immanent» uniform sequences in a change of

⁷ An overwhelming majority of the generalizing theories of this sort analyzed in P. SOROKIN, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, New York, 1938, display a use of historical data and method as corroborative evidence.

⁸ Cf. a concise survey of such theories and generalizations in P. SOROKIN, «Sociocultural Dynamics and Evolutionism», in G. Gurvitch and W. E. Moore, *Twentieth Century Sociology*, pp. 96-120, New York, 1945.

⁹ See a survey and analysis of such theories in P. SOROKIN, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, vol. 4, chps 8, 9, 10, 11, New York, 1941; G. CAIRNE, *History of Cyclical Theories*, New York, 1962; also many studies published in *the Journal of Cycle Research*, East Brady, Pennsylvania.

political regimes, forms of arts, revolutions, wars, mores, types of personality, movement of populations, cycles of the *annus magnus* and other periodical rhythms in historical processes. Essentially the same probabilistic and immanent varieties of historical method are used by G. Vico or Ibn-Khaldun for many generalizations given in their works. In recent times the same procedures are utilized for proving the validity of several nomothetic generalizations given in the works of F. de Coulanges, N. Danilevsky, O. Spengler, A. Toynbee, A. Kroeber, N. Berdyaev, S. C. Northrop, P. Sorokin and other sociologists, historians, anthropologists, and philosophers of history. Having formulated their nomothetic hypothesis and having given sometimes (but not always) some logical reasons for its validity, for its empirical verification all these scholars enumerate and analyze a long or short, complete or incomplete time-series of the relevant historical cases confirming their hypothesis.

10. Finally, historical method finds its wide application *in testing and prediction of immanent nomothetic uniformities recurring in the life-course of the unified biological, personal, and sociocultural systems*. By systems are meant biological or personal or sociocultural unities, *Ganzheiten*, whose important parts tangibly depend upon one another and upon the whole and the whole system is dependent upon its important parts. In biological systems the ties of this interdependence of the parts and the whole organism may be viewed as of vital-causal nature inherent to the whole organism while in the integrated human personality and sociocultural systems these unifying forces — still not fully known — are of vital-meaningful-causal kind. Such systems sharply differ from mere congeries or heaps of biological, personal, and sociocultural phenomena. The parts of such congeries or heaps do not show any causal interdependence and are «united» only by a mere spatial adjacency¹⁰.

While many sociologists are still not fully aware of the essential difference between sociocultural systems and congeries, modern physicists, holystic biologists and psychologists are cognizant of it and of the deep difference between purely probabilistic uniformities dominant in the world of congeries and immanent uniformities prevalent in the systems. The modern physicists sharply separate the class of the systems from the phenomena of the «lawless microcosm» of single atoms and particles or of their small aggregations as well

¹⁰ See a detailed analysis of the profound difference between systems and congeries in P. SOROKIN, *Society, Culture, Personality*, chps 3, 4, 8, 17, 18, 35.

as from large aggregations of macrocosmic physical phenomena and their relationships. While the subatomic phenomena display discontinuities, irregularities, and uncertainties; and while the large macrophysical aggregates manifest chance (statistical) uniformities, biological and psychosocial systems, no matter how small an aggregation of atoms they represent, display static and dynamic uniformities quite different from the above two classes. Physicists call these uniformities by terms ranging from «the inner law of direction» (A. Eddington) all the way up to the order determined by a «free will» (M. Planck), by «conscious, voluntaristic decision» (H. Margenau), and by «conscious mind» or Athman, or by the Cosmic Self or Braham (E. Schrödinger).

Schrödinger's analysis of genes and organism clearly shows the difference of the systems from the small congeries and large aggregates of atoms or elementary particles. Genes represent very small aggregations of atoms. As such, genes belong to a microphysical world and should display the discontinuity, uncertainty and «lawlessness» of subatomic phenomena. Instead genes appear to be highly integrated systems. They contain in themselves a «plenitude pattern» or «phenotype» of the respective organism. Even more, they preserve their specific individuality unimpaired from generation to generation of the respective organism. Amidst ever changing environment they carry on their integrity and phenotype, and thereby pre-determine the essential characteristics of an organism. Instead of chaotic «lawlessness», they display orderliness, regularity and predictability for the anatomical, physiological characteristics and for all the main states of the life cycle of the organism. Thus «incredibly small groups of atoms, too small to display exact statistical law, do play a domineering role in the very orderly and lawful events within a living organism» and through «astonishing gift of concentrating a 'stream of order' on itself» an organism «escapes the decay into atomic chaos». In the physical world there is nothing like this «organism's orderliness that maintains itself »and immanently bears in itself the reason of its individuality, perpetuation, and of self-directing orderly change¹¹.

In terms of O. Spengler this immanent orderliness, self-determination, self-direction and uniformities in the life-course of a socio-cultural system is a «living potentiality (life, soul) in a state of

¹¹ E. SCHRÖDINGER, *What is Life*, pp. 2, 19-20, Cambridge University Press, 1947.

incessant becoming that fulfills its unique life-course or Destiny in the Timeprocess... flowing from the past through the present to the future. It has destiny as its organic necessity of potentiality passing into actuality.¹²

What Schrödinger and other physicists say of a biological organism can be said, with some modifications of an integrated personality, organized group, and unified cultural system. Whether we take an *integrated* personality whose «self», values, ideas and overt acts are unified into a consistent system; or we take an *organized social group*, be it an harmonious family, a school, a business enterprise, the state, an occupational union, a political party, or religious organization; or we consider a consistent system of scientific, philosophical, religious, aesthetic, ethical and other cultural ideas «objectified» in their «material» vehicles and operated and used by its human agents—each of these systems, like genes, has its own individuality, interdependence of its parts and the whole, a margin of autonomy from environmental forces, immanent self-determination and self-direction of the main phases of its life-course. The forms of change of a «univariant» system are different from those of «bivariant» or «multivariant» systems; the forms, phases, rhythms, periodicities, and directions of their changes differ in each system according to its nature. In this sense any personal or sociocultural system largely (though not so rigidly as a biological system) moulds its own destiny.¹³

The order and uniformities of these systems are not of a chance character but of «vital-meaningful-causal nature» inherent in the systems themselves since the moment of their inception and emergence. They are of *sui generis*-immanent-kind. For this reason their study requires a combination and modification of the methods used in a research of the sociocultural congeries or heaps.¹⁴ One of these requirements is that they always have to be treated as *Ganzheiten*, as the unified wholes, even when we study their parts and smallest elements.

Among the combined methods of their cognition historical method plays again an important part especially at the stage of testing the empirical validity of the tentatively formulated nomothetic generali-

¹² O. SPENGLER, *Decline of the West*, vol. I, pp. 117-24, New York, 1947. See a detailed analysis of the immanent change and uniformities of sociocultural systems in P. A. SOROKIN, *Society, Culture and Personality*, ch. 46; *Fads and Foibles*, pp. 155-161.

¹³ A detailed development and analysis of sociocultural systems and their characteristics is given in my *Dynamics and Society, Culture and Personality*.

¹⁴ Cf. P. SOROKIN, *Fads and Foibles*, pp. 158 ff.

zations and uniformities. The theories of Danilevsky, Spengler, Toynbee, Northrop, Kroeber, O. Anderle, Sorokin and of the «Organicist» and «Holistic» schools in sociology give an example of this use. All these theories deal with «Society», «Civilization», «High Cultures», or «Cultural Systems and Supersystems» as *Ganzheiten* or integrated wholes. And all of them for empirical corroboration of their generalising theories and uniformities lay down a series of the relevant historical facts as the proof of their empirical correctness.

To sum up: this concise survey shows that in its modifications historical method is indeed one of the most widely used methods in cognition and interpretation of sociocultural phenomena. Besides being the main method of study in the ideographic disciplines, it enters as an essential part practically of all methods of nomothetic sciences: experimental, pseudo-experimental, statistical, and immanent-holystic in all their variations. Whether we are interested to know the realm of unique and rare sociocultural and personal phenomena in all their individuality and concreteness or we aim to discover the main types of «singularistic causal complexes», or endeavor to formulate strictly causal and causal-meaningful uniformities or «probabilistic (statistical) uniformities», or «laws of evolution and progress», or various «trends and tendencies», or immanent regularities, repeated rhythms and periodicities-in all these studies historical method is regularly used especially for empirical verification of respective nomothetic theories and uniformities.

IV. SCIENTIFIC VALIDITY OF HISTORICAL METHOD AND INTERPRETATIONS

The wide use of historical method does not necessarily mean that it always delivers scientifically valid results. Depending largely upon the manner and conditions of its use, this method, like practically all the other methods of cognition, yields different results ranging all the way from the comparatively correct up to the grossly fallacious ones. In a concise formulation here are some of the important conditions of its comparative scientific fruitfulness.

1. In *its ideographic application*, typified by the best historical studies, it gives to us a comparatively reliable, concrete knowledge of its ideographic phenomenon, if and when the hard core of the relevant facts is more or less complete, well ascertained, and accurately described. (Modern ideographic history has an elaborate set of techniques of a sound historical research for meeting these basic conditions.) The more fragmentary and defective this hard core of

relevant facts, the less carefully they are authenticated and less accurately described, the more unreliable is the knowledge delivered by the ideographic historical method.

Its further limitations are, first, that even a best ideographic historical study does not deliver to us a nomothetic knowledge nor can it serve as a solid basis for nomothetic generalizations. Second, its hard core of relevant facts does not preclude a wide diversity of evaluations and broad interpretations of these facts. The hard core of facts about Caesar or A. Lincoln, or Lenin; about the Great French Revolution or the Italian Renaissance or the German Reformation is essentially the same in all competent histories of these phenomena; but their evaluations and broad interpretations are almost as many and as different as there are the outstanding historians of these phenomena. And these evaluations and interpretations undergo a substantial change from period to period: in ideographic history, as in the field of women's and men's apparel, there are also the waves of different «fashions» that follow one another in the course of time. This means that the nomothetic generalizations derived from an ideographic historical study and the above evaluations and interpretations are much less scientific than the knowledge of the hard factual core supplied by the ideographic historical method.

2. *The experimental variety of historical method* in the form of a use of the inductive canons of concomitant variation, identity, difference and residue delivers a relatively reliable nomothetic knowledge if and when all the requirements of a genuine experimental setting are met, particularly the requirement of keeping «all the other conditions constant» and applying the inductive canons as rigorously as the genuine experimental methods demands. Unfortunately, as mentioned above, such a rigorous application of experimental method, including the historical experimental method as its part, is rarely possible in nomothetic investigations of the broad and important classes of sociocultural phenomena.

I hardly know any single experimental study of such broad sociocultural «variables» as: «religion», «science», «economics», «politics», «wars», «revolutions», «fine arts», «law and ethics», «*Wirtschaftsethik*», «Capitalism», «Democracy», and so on. All the existing so called «experimental» studies of this sort of variables are in fact «pseudo-experimental»; often even do not deserve this name. Only in regard to very narrow and simple «variables» the experimental method has been more or less successfully applied; but a study of such narrow «variables» gives, at the best, only narrow and simple generalizations and uniformities frequently representing «an expe-

perimental elaboration of the obvious». Furthermore due to the extreme complexity and variability of sociocultural phenomena and to a continuous operation of *the factor of creativity* in human affairs — the factor which by its very nature often defies and transcends rigid determination and invariant uniformities, — even this sort of experimental uniformities can hardly be considered as universal, perennial, and invariant. We should be satisfied if they are roughly correct and valid for a large portion of occurrences of the events with these variables during comparatively long periods of human history.

3. *As to the pseudo-experimental application of historical method* its results are almost always uncertain so long as the total pseudo-experimental setting notably differs from the genuine experimental situation. Here again I hardly know any single study of this sort which meets the elementary requirements of a real experimental method. Only a small fraction of such investigations somewhat approximates these requirements, especially the requirement of «keeping all other conditions constant». ¹⁵ Greater part of pseudo-experimental research essentially fails in this matter. Therefore the results of such investigations are hardly more reliable than those of a systematic non-experimental observations of the phenomena studied.

4. Validity of the nomothetic theories and their uniformities, derived through *probabilistic and immanent use of historical method*, is hardly ever certain, universal, perennial, valid for all times and all parts of the human universe. Their comparative accuracy however widely fluctuates from approximately valid for, at least, a large portion of the phenomena whose observation led to a discovery and formulation of a given nomothetic theory up to the outright fallacious hypotheses and generalizations. In order to be approximately correct the probabilistic and immanent theories must meet a number of conditions concerning the logical clarity of the hypothesis itself as well as the procedures of its empirical verification. Not entering here into an analysis of all the detailed requirements of this sort (which for purely statistical studies are minutely specified by modern statistics and mathematics), I would mention only those conditions which appear to me basic.

¹⁵ Perhaps my «Experimental Study of Efficiency of Work under Various Specified Conditions», *American Journal of Sociology*, March, 1930, and «an Experimental Study of the Influence of Suggestion on the Discrimination and Valuation of People», *American Journal of Sociology*, March 1932, approximate the conditions of a real experimental study to a considerable extent; but even so these studies do not meet fully the requirements of a real experimental research.

a. First of these is that the nomothetic hypothesis must be clearly formulated and the phenomena whose uniformity is going to be tested by the relevant empirical facts must be defined. Otherwise neither the hypothesis, nor uniformity can be well understood, nor their sound empirical verification is possible. For instance, Marxian concept of «economic factor», («means and instruments of production» etc.) or M. Weber *Wirtschaftsethik* and «rationality» or Danilevsky-Spengler-Toynbee's concept of «Culture-Historical Type», and «High-Culture-Civilisation», or the Freud's «id», libido» and «unconscious», not to mention the concepts of «social class», «functionalism», «democracy», «freedom», «capitalism», «progress», and many other concepts current in sociocultural and psychological sciences, are very vaguely defined and for this reason have been quite differently interpreted and could not be adequately tested, either decisively confirmed or repudiated, by the relevant empirical facts. This unclearness makes exceedingly difficult, practically impossible, to decide even what sort of empirical facts are relevant or irrelevant for their empirical verification.¹⁶ This initial vagueness is also responsible for ambivalence and doubtful character of a large part of generalizations and uniformities built upon such vague concepts.¹⁷

b. Second important condition of empirical verification of nomothetic-probabilistic and immanent-uniformities, *via* of historical method, is that the total body of verifying empirical facts — confirming and especially contradicting the tested generalization — would be as complete as possible and that each of these facts would be well ascertained in its occurrence as well as in its relevancy to the tested hypothesis.

This requirement has not been met by an overwhelming majority

¹⁶ Not only the anti-Marxians but the Marxians also are still disagreeing about what K. Marx exactly meant by «economic factor»; in M. Weber's works one finds from six to nine different definitions of «rationality» and several of the *Wirtschaftsethik*. S. Freud gives, at least, three mutually contradictory definitions of the unconscious id; an unclearness of Toynbee's earlier concept of «civilisation» made him change several basic points of his theory of history (including a new classification of civilizations and admission of three models of the life-course of civilizations instead of one given in the first six volumes of his work). See A. J. TOYNBEE, *Reconsiderations. A Study of History*, vol. XII, Oxford University Press, 1961.

¹⁷ Glaring examples of this defect can be found in statistical studies published almost in each copy of the *American Sociological Review*, *American Journal of Sociology* and in other journals of sociology and psychology. See a criticism of several defective studies of this kind in my *Fads and Foibles*, chps. 3-7, *et passim*.

of the generalizing theories in psychosocial sciences. Empirical corroboration of many of such theories and uniformities consists merely in mentioning some favorable illustrative cases or in giving fragmentary time-series representing only a fraction of the total relevant facts available and often completely disregarding the facts contradicting the contended uniformity. There is no need to stress that such an evidence is scientifically worthless: anyone can pick up a few illustrative cases for confirming all sorts of fallacious theories and generalizations.

No wonder therefore that when such defective generalizations have been tested by a more systematic, more complete, and better analyzed series of relevant facts, including also the facts contradicting the generalizations, most of such theories and their uniformities have partly been found to be either inadequate or wrong. This can be said, first, of a majority of various nomothetic theories claiming diverse «laws of social, mental, and cultural evolution and progress», various perennial social trends, cycles, rhythms and periodicities, such as: Herder-Fichte-Kant-Hegel's theory of the central trend of human history as a progressive decrease of violence and war and systematic increase of freedom; as Turgot-Condorcet-Saint Simon-Comte's «law of the three stages»: theological, metaphysical, and positive; as Novicow-Ogburn-Hart's «law of acceleration of the tempo of change» in the course of human history; as Ratzenhofer-A. Small's historical trend from «the conquest state» to «the culture state»; as Bahofen-McLennan-Lubbock-L. Morgan's historical trend from «the primitive, promiscuous family» to the monogamic family; as the theories of evolutionary trends from «religiosity to irreligiosity», from «autocracy to democracy» (or vice versa), from primitive poverty to bigger and better prosperity, from *Gemeinschaft* to *Gesellschaft*; as the theories of a uniform sequence of blossoming of the fine arts in time order: architecture-sculpture-painting-literature-music, F. Petrie and P. Ligeti; or of a uniform sequence of the stages: lyric, epic, and dramatic in development of literature, V. Hugo and E. Bovet; and so on. A more careful test of all these theories by a more complete series of the relevant facts has clearly shown their inadequacy, their illegitimate elevation of a few temporary and local cases observed into universal and perennial uniformity.

The same can be said of many theories of uniform cycles, rhythms, time-sequences and periodicities in sociocultural processes.¹⁸

¹⁸ See the factual data, analysis, and criticism of these theories in P. SOROKIN, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, on fluctuation of wars, revolutions, totali-

A more complete series of the relevant facts has largely invalidated also all the univariant theories of the life-cycle of civilizations or the *Hochkulturen* developed by N. Danilevsky, O. Spengler and A. Toynbee.¹⁹

This statement applies also to a multitude of generalizing theories of various causal uniformities in relationship of two or more socio-cultural variables contended by many a social scientist. When, for instance, M. Weber's theory of Protestantism-Capitalism has been tested by an incomparably more complete series of the relevant facts than those given by Weber and when the emergence and development of European Capitalism, Protestantism, with their *Wirtschaftsethik* and satellites has been studied in a larger and more adequate framework of the dominant sociocultural supersystem of Europe of the centuries from the thirteenth to the twentieth, (in which supersystem Capitalism and Protestantism have been just two «variables» among several subordinated systems and sub-systems of this supersystem.) the inadequacy of Weberian as well as of the opposite Marxian theory has become transparent.

«In a somewhat simplified form Marxianism offers the equation: Protestantism is the function of capitalism: $P = f(C)$. Max Weber turns it around making capitalism the function of Protestantism and its *Wirtschaftsethik*: $C = f(PW)$. As a matter of fact both equations and related theories are untenable. The adequate formula is: capitalism, Protestantism, utilitarian ethics and law, science and technology, rationalism, individualism, contractual relations, visual-sensate art, materialistic philosophy, empiricism, singularism, nominalism and relativism—all are the manifestations of the decline of the ideational and rise of the sensate supersystems. As parts of one supersystem they are all dependent upon one another and upon the whole supersystem. Protestantism was not the preponderant factor of capitalism, nor was capitalism the cause of Protestantism; both were inter-dependently changing in togetherness with the supersystem as a whole. The situation is analogous to a large number of anatomical, physiological, and psychological changes experienced by an organism when it passes from childhood to youth and maturity: weight and stature increase; muscles, glands, and organs undergo important changes. All these changes

tarian and democratic regimes, prosperity and impoverishment, in Vol. III, *passim*; on fluctuation of the styles and contents of the fine arts and the alleged sequences of their blossoming, in Vol. I, chps 5-13; on fluctuation of scientific discoveries, inventions, and main types of philosophy, ethical systems, and law codes, in Vol. II, *passim*; on rhythms, cycles, and periodicities, temporal sequences and time-uniformities in cultural change and in mobility of cultural phenomena, in Vol. IV, *passim*.

¹⁹ See analysis and criticism of these theories in P. SOROKIN, *Social Philosophies of an Age of Crisis*, chps 3, 4, 5, 12.

proceed interdependently, in togetherness, as manifestations of the basic change of the whole organism. It is ridiculous to take one of these changes, like the increase in stature or the appearance of a moustache as the cause or «preponderant factor» of all the other changes». And that is exactly what Marx and Weber do²⁰.

Similarly when, for instance, such opposite generalized theories as the proposition: «frustration, calamity, catastrophe uniformly generate aggressiveness, increase of criminality, demoralization and irreligiosity» and the proposition; «these factors uniformly generate and reinforce sympathy, benevolence, decrease of criminality, moral and religious ennoblement», when these mutually contradictory generalizations have been tested by a more complete series of the relevant facts, both theories have been found to be onesided and superseded by a more adequate theory of *moral and religious polarization* according to which mass-frustrations and calamities fairly uniformly produce an increase of the more religious and more moral as well as the more irreligious and more criminal persons and processes at the cost of the majority of the members of such a society which in normal times is neither intensely religious or atheistic, criminal or virtuous. In regard to various individuals, these factors make some of them more creative, moral and religious while some other individuals are effected by these factors in the opposite way of increasing their mental disease, suicide, criminality, cynicism, atheism and decreasing their creativity.²¹ In a similar manner a more careful and complete series of the evidential empirical facts have made untenable such nomothetic theories of causation as: that strikes uniformly increase in the periods of economic depression (or the opposite theories); that revolutions uniformly tend to explode and criminality tends to increase in the times of economic impoverishment; that democracies are more peaceful than autocracies (or the opposite theories); that progress of science and school education uniformly leads to a decrease of wars, internal disturbances and crimes; that an increase of economic prosperity (without any limits) uniformly

²⁰ P. SOROKIN, *Society, Culture and Personality*, p. 657. See the factual criticism of Weber's theory in P. SOROKIN, *Contemporary Sociological Theories*, pp. 673 ff.; *Social and Cultural Dynamics*, vol. II, p. 500 ff., vol. IV, pp. 361 ff. See also K. SAMUELSSON, *Religion and Economic Action*, New York, 1961; H. M. ROBERTSON, *Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism*, Cambridge, 1933; A. FANFANI, *Catholicism, Protestantism and Capitalism*, New York, 1935.

²¹ Cf. for the evidence and analysis of this problem in P. SOROKIN, *Man and Society in Calamity*, New York, 1942. *The Ways and Power of Love*, ch. 12.

leads to an increase of creativity of such a society; that the main factor of suicide or mental disease is either climate or biological heredity, or economic conditions or irreligiosity or the sun spots, etc; that the essential characteristics of an individual or of a nation are largely determined by the ways of the infants' swaddling and training in micturition or defecation (the Freudians, M. Mead, G. Gorer, J. Rickman), — «swaddling and defecative philosophies of history»; and so on and so forth. This sort of generalizations and uniformities still occupy a large place in the nomothetic parts of sociology, psychology, economics, philosophy of history, and other social sciences.²² The sooner they are tested by more adequate series of relevant facts, the quicker their fallacies will be exposed and the defective theories will be replaced by the more sound and scientific ones.²³

Unfortunately, for empirical testing of a number of probabilistic uniformities sometimes the more or less complete sets of the relevant facts is unobtainable simply because no complete records of these exist and no adequate ascertainment of the real occurrence of the facts and their exact location, and time is possible. Likewise, due to the complexity of these phenomena their adequate quantification and measurement often meets insuperable difficulties. In all such cases we seem to have to be satisfied with the very tentative hypotheses backed up with the completest set of the fragmentary data available.

As mentioned before, even the documented probabilistic uniform-

²² Exactly the desire to avoid this important defect was one of the reasons of why in my *Dynamics* I gave for empirical test of my hypothesis instead of just illustrative and fragmentary samples, practically the complete series of *all the known* scientific discoveries and inventions, almost of *all the known* important paintings and sculptures in European culture, of *all the wars* and important internal disturbances recorded in Greco-Roman and the Western history from 600 B. C. to A. D. 1925; of *all the historical persons* mentioned in the *Encyclopedia Britannica* and so on.

Further on, to avoid the personal biases in the phase of collection of the relevant facts in each field, I asked the internationally known leading specialists to do this task without informing them for what purposes I needed each series of the relevant facts. This precaution and much greater completeness and accuracy of the relevant facts in all fields of culture (studied in the *Dynamics*) clearly disclosed many inadequacies of the respective nomothetic theories based upon a few fragmentary data.

²³ In many such studies the complete series of the relevant facts cannot be replaced by their «representative samples». Even in simpler, purely statistical studies frequently it is exceedingly difficult, even impossible, to find out what samples are representative and what are not. Still less possible to find «representative samples» in time-series of complex sociocultural phenomena.

ities give to us the important knowledge of these uniformities but they rarely deliver to us the knowledge of the reasons (or causes) of their occurrence or the reliable explanation of their why. The scholars discovering the valid uniformities tend naturally to answer also these why in the form of this or that hypothesis. Many of these are suggestive and in their own way enrich our understanding of these uniformities. As such they deserve our attention and further exploration. But most of them usually remain uncertain in their validity. A mere discovery of even sound probabilistic uniformity and of its how does not necessarily disclose the secrets of its why.

c. Third important condition of the correctness of probabilistic and immanent uniformities (derived *via* of historical method) is that their formulae would indicate the *limits* within which respective uniformity of either historical trends or association of the variables is valid and beyond which the uniformity ceases to be observable or existent. Not only all probabilistic and immanent but practically all the causal and causal-meaningful relationships between two or more variables A and B have certain definite limits: beyond a given value of A and B the uniform-probabilistic, causal and causal-meaningful relationship ceases to exist or undergoes a radical change. Within certain limits the more strongly we strike a piano key, the louder the resulting sound. Beyond this point the result will be not a louder sound but a broken key-board. Physical and biological sciences are well aware of this principle of limits and therefore they ordinarily formulate their «laws and uniformities» with precise indication of the «stability limit», «critical temperature», «critical pressure», «critical concentration» and other limits of the correctness of their formulae of uniformities. Sociologists and social scientists are still not fully aware of this principle.

«When they formulate valid or invalid causal or probabilistic relationships between business depression and criminality, prosperity and birth-rate, education and criminality, farm income and illiteracy, economic conditions and the forms of the fine arts, social class and certain ideology and so on, they rarely mention any limits within which the uniform relationship between their variables hold. They seemingly assume that it has no limits no matter what values we assign to the variables». This not-mentioning the limits makes all respective uniformities and theories largely indeterminate and uncertain»²⁴.

Indeterminate also become all theories of uniform, linear trends or of the laws of evolution and progress which neglect to indicate the

²⁴ P. SOROKIN, *Society, Culture, and Personality*, p. 700.

time and space limits of such trends and laws. Indefinite too become all theories of uniform stages and variations of sociocultural systems which fail to point out the limits of the change of a system beyond which any further change renders it unidentifiable and either non-existent or basically changed into something quite different from the given system. In contrast to physicists, chemists, and biologists, sociologists and social scientists rarely indicate these three forms of limits in their nomothetic theories of historical trends, laws of evolution, and of the number and scale of possible variations of a given sociocultural system beyond which it ceases to exist or become unrecognizable²⁵.

d. Finally, one additional condition of scientific validity of nomothetic theories is to be briefly mentioned, namely, the clear distinction between sociocultural systems and congeries. At the very outset of his nomothetic exploration an investigator must be aware and must ascertain as to whether he endeavors to discover and formulate a probabilistic, causal, or causal-meaningful uniformity valid for a system or for congeries. This point must be cleared by the investigator because not all the research procedures proper for investigation of probabilistic uniformities of sociocultural congeries are applicable to those of the systems, and vice versa; and because the congeries-uniformities are often quite different from those of the system-uniformities and therefore being valid for the congeries are often invalid for the systems, and vice versa.

This distinction and methodological rule are often neglected by sociologists, economists, psychologists, philosophers of history and by other social scientists. The neglect is often responsible for «the error of misplaced uniformity» and important defects of such theories²⁶.

A scientific study of the immanent uniformities of sociocultural systems—the *organized* social systems (groups), the *integrated* systems of culture or civilizations—must also meet the above conditions: *a*, *b*, *c*. Otherwise, if the system's unity and reality is not well ascertained, if all the main varieties of each system are not studied, and if the limits in their trends and recurrent uniform changes are not indicated, respective theories and uniformities are likely to be inadequate. Recent example of such an inadequacy is given by even such a magnificent work as A. Toynbee's *Study of History*. As he him-

²⁵ See a detailed analysis of the principle of limits in its three forms in P. SOROKIN, *Society, Culture, and Personality*, pp. 699-705; *the Dynamics*, Vol. IV, chps. 12, 13, 14, 15.

²⁶ Cf. on this mistake in P. SOROKIN, *Fads and Foibles*, pp. 161 ff.

self says the univariant uniformities in the life-course of all civilizations, developed in his first six volumes of the *Study of History* were derived mainly from a study of such uniformities in the Hellenic civilization. His subsequent investigation of the uniformities in the life-course of other civilizations led him to the conclusion that «I have been at fault in having been content to operate with the Hellenic model only. Though this particular key has opened many doors, it has not proved omniscient. For example, it has not opened the door to understanding of the structure of Egyptian history».²⁷ As a result of Toynbee's more careful and more complete study of the uniformities in the life-history of other civilizations he replaced his earlier theory of an univariant model of the life-cycle of all civilizations by, at least, three different models of the life-course of civilizations exemplified by the Hellenic, the Chinese, and the Jewish civilizations. This more complete study led him to a number of other important changes in his earlier theory of history.²⁸ In its present form Toynbee's nomothetic theory of historical uniformities recurring in the life-course of civilizations is in a greater agreement with the theories of other nomothetic investigators of the civilizations or cultural systems, like the theories of A. Kroeber, F. S. C. Northrop, J. Ortega y Gasset, F. R. Cowell, P. Sorokin, and others.²⁹

I am reasonably certain that if in the future studies of the causal, the causal-meaningful, and the probabilistic uniformities in the worlds of the sociocultural systems and congeries, the studies using the historical method in its experimental, pseudo-experimental, and probabilistic (statistical) varieties, if in such investigations the conditions of the validity of respective theories mentioned in this paper are more fully met, our knowledge of these uniformities would be progressively growing and the nomothetic sociocultural theories would be becoming more adequate and less discordant with each other.

²⁷ A. J. TOYNEEBE, *Reconsiderations*, quoted p. 186.

²⁸ See for these changes the whole volume of the *Reconsiderations*.

²⁹ Cf. A. L. KROEBER, *Configurations of Culture Growth*, Berkeley, 1944, and *Style and Civilizations*, Ithaca, 1957; F. S. C. NORTHROP, *The Meeting of East and West*, New York, 1946; J. ORTEGA Y GASSET, *Man and Crisis*, New York, 1958; F. R. COWELL, *Culture in Private and Public Life*, London, 1959; P. SOROKIN, *Social and Cultural Dynamics* and other works mentioned in this essay.