

TRANSACTIONS OF THE FIFTH  
WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

ACTES DU CINQUIÈME  
CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

VOLUME III

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WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

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VOLUME III

THE SOCIOLOGISTS, THE POLICY-MAKERS AND THE PUBLIC  
THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT

LES SOCIOLOGUES, LES POLICY-MAKERS ET LE PUBLIC  
LA SOCIOLOGIE DU DÉVELOPPEMENT

Abstracts of Papers and Discussions  
Résumés des communications et débats

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION  
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## EDITORIAL NOTE

This volume contains a set of papers gathered within the sections: «The Sociologists, the Policy-Makers and the Public» and «The Sociology of Development».

Each published paper is placed within the sub-section where it was presented at the Washington Congress. At the end of each sub-section we published the relevant reports on the discussion. In other words, the structure of this volume is copied by the Vth Congress organigram as reproduced at the end of the IVth Volume.

We have to deplore the absence of two reports of the sub-section «Changes in Urban and Rural Areas», the appointed rapporteurs were not able to face their obligations.

At first our intention was to publish integrally all the papers presented during the Vth Congress, but considering the cost of such a project we had to give it up.

The standards of the selection have been the originality and the geographical repartition.

## AVANT-PROPOS

Ce volume contient une série de communications regroupées dans les sections «Les Sociologues, les «Policy-makers» et le «Public» et «La Sociologie du développement».

Chaque communication publiée a été intégrée dans la sous-section où elle fut présentée au Congrès de Washington. A la fin de chaque sous-section nous avons publié le rapport des débats qui y sont relatifs. En d'autres termes la structure de cet ouvrage a été modelée par l'organigramme du V<sup>e</sup> congrès tel qu'il est reproduit à la fin du vol. IV.

Nous avons à déplorer l'absence de deux rapports de la sous-section «Changements dans les zones urbaines et rurales», les rapporteurs désignés n'ayant pu faire face à leurs obligations. Notre intention était tout d'abord de publier intégralement toutes les communications présentées au cours du V<sup>e</sup> Congrès, vu le coût de ce projet nous avons dû l'abandonner. Les critères de sélection ont été l'originalité et la répartition géographique.

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THE SOCIOLOGISTS, THE POLICY-MAKERS  
AND THE PUBLIC

LES SOCIOLOGUES, LES POLICY-MAKERS ET LE PUBLIC



## PLENARY SESSION SÉANCE PLÉNIÈRE

### REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Joint Chairmen: P. LAZARFELD, Columbia University  
T. H. MARSHALL, Cambridge University  
Rapporteur : J. A. CLAUSEN, University of California, Berkeley

This session, sponsored jointly by the ASA and the ISA, was opened by its Co-chairmen, President P. Lazarsfeld of the American Sociological Association and President T. H. Marshall of the International Sociological Association. In welcoming participants P. Lazarsfeld noted that a major theme in the meetings of the American Sociological Association, of which this was the last session, had been the uses of sociology, including many uses relating to matters of public policy. In his statement of welcome to the delegates, T. H. Marshall stressed the need for sociologists to make themselves more comprehensible to the layman and to increase the inclination of politicians and policy-makers to turn to sociology and use sociological knowledge in the solution of major problems of policy. T. H. Marshall then introduced H. Friis, who served as Chairman for the remainder of the session.

H. Friis expressed the hope that the plenary session, and the work group to follow, would not only touch upon the interrelationships among the sociologists, the policy-makers and the public but would attempt to formulate concrete suggestions as to how sociological perspectives and knowledge could be made more effectively available. A. Sauvy then presented in abridged form his paper, *Sociologues et Politiques*, addressed to the general circumstances under which sociologists, very broadly conceived, come to exercise influence in the field of public policy.

F. V. Konstantivov of the Soviet Union next spoke, noting that the nature of our times demands sociological knowledge. He stressed that sociological theory must reflect social reality, must deal adequately with the existence of antagonistic forces in society, must



conceptualize the essential characteristics of social events, must consider society in process of development and must seek to provide accurate forecasts of the course and consequences of events.

D. Ghosh discussed the problems of bringing sociological knowledge to bear in policy-making in India, as related to the rapid expansion of the state, the general lack of public sophistication about sociology and the pressing nature of basic economic problems. Ph. Hauser expressed the conviction that the sociologist's role should be the dispassionate search for knowledge. He can then communicate his knowledge to the policy-maker, but the latter alone should be responsible for value orientations and commitment to a particular course of action. One task of policy-making is to increase the receptivity of the society to knowledge, but efforts to impose receptivity to particular kinds of knowledge are likely to boomerang, since these limit the possibilities of acquiring new knowledge.

A. Vratusa summarized his written paper, noting the efforts in Yugoslavia to achieve decentralization of policy and decision processes. He stressed the desirability that the sociologist be engaged whole heartedly in support of the political system, seeking to enhance its effective functioning.

After a brief intermission, E. Hughes summarized his paper, relating to communication between the sociologist and the general public. He noted that sociology can flourish only if sociologists have free and full access to facts, both those that are matters of record and those that are essentially private. The fact that publics are both the objects of study and to a degree the audience for sociological knowledge makes for a delicate relationship. The nature of this relationship is itself a significant topic for research in different countries, presenting as they do markedly different sets of considerations.

S. N. Eisenstadt commented on the diversity of publics with reference to sociology and the ambivalence and uneasiness in relations between sociologists and various publics. He noted three types of opposition to sociology, deriving from satisfaction with traditional patterns, commitment to ideological positions, and the potential threat posed by sociology to some personal positions. He urged study of the sociologist's publics and exploration of the means by which relationships between the sociologists and practitioners can be made more open.

H. Janne emphasized the role of the sociologists as the agent for bringing, to the public at large, awareness — *prise de conscience* —

of social trends and problems. Sociologists create a sector of pressure of opinion based on the progress of social research.

L. Rosenmayr expressed the view that part of the sociologist's task is to be aware of value considerations and to make what might be called «conditional value recommendations» in interpreting data and offering predictions.

H. Friis noted the substantial differences, even between Western Europe and the United States, in the extent to which social science is accepted as a part of the scientific culture. Thus social studies are frequently taught in secondary schools in the United States but hardly at all in Europe. He suggested the importance of working toward a greater exposure of the population at large to sociological knowledge, especially to the products of systematic empirical research. For example, in Scandinavian countries there is a certain ethnic uniformity and no illiterates, but the need to obtain funds for necessary investigation makes individual research very difficult. On the other hand, F. Fernandez pointed out here that in Brazil, which has a more diversified, heterogeneous population, the public is of a more complex nature and illiterates form an important minority. In Poland the public shows much sympathetic interest and awareness of the social change occurring in their own country.

Professor Sauvy's final remarks were that the considerable progress made in Marxism does not necessarily constitute a proof of a well-established doctrine: the same argument could serve for Buddhism, Islam, etc. The progress in technology in the U.S.S.R. is considerable and admirable but, in their most outstanding achievement — the conquest of space — there is no place for sociology. In fields in which sociology can play an important role (as in Agriculture and bureaucracy) their progress is less striking.

In closing the section, T. H. Marshall commented on the complexities of employing science in areas where human problems are concerned, and on the difficulties of making broad assertions which are valid in all countries. He noted the need for enhancing effective communication among sociologists across political boundaries.



## SOCIOLOGISTS AND THE PUBLIC LES SOCIOLOGUES ET LE PUBLIC

### SOCIOLOGY IN THE EYES OF POLISH INTELLIGENTSIA

ZYGMUNT GOSTKOWSKI  
Polish Academy of Sciences

In the cultural history of various societies some sciences often acquired a specific social importance. Such sciences exerted a significant influence on the ways of thinking which prevailed in the given epoch. As a result they aroused great expectations. Not infrequently their influence consisted in furnishing the cultural or political elites with basic ideas and value orientations.

Many examples could be cited to illustrate this point: philosophy and theology in the Middle Ages, ancient history since the Renaissance, law and political science in nineteenth century Germany, etc. In nineteenth century Poland a special importance was attached to literature and history. These two humanities were an integrating cultural factor in Polish society, disintegrated politically as a result of the partition among three foreign powers.

In modern times no science could be regarded as possessing a comparably dominant position. The general trend toward specialization and institutionalization precludes this type of dominance. But even so, it is often asserted that some sciences are more «popular» or «fashionable» or socially important than the other.

It is a common belief among Polish social scientists and, presumably, a more general «intellectual public» that sociology is at present such a fashionable science.

To investigate this problem empirically questionnaires were distributed among the readers of four Polish weeklies: *Polityka*, *Przegląd Kulturalny*, *Nowa Kultura*, *Zycie Literackie*. The weeklies selected are political literary magazines read by intellectuals as well as by white collar workers with a higher level of education. Their total average weekly circulation amounts to some 120 thousand copies. The readers were contacted at news stands selected at random as well as in a random sample of subscriber institutions. In this way, samples

of readers were secured in Warsaw, in Lublin (a voivodship town noted for its University run by the Roman Catholic Church) and in two small county towns near the Western Territories. Due to the intensive follow-up technique (home visits to the non-respondents by monitoring interviewers) a high ratio of returns was secured. As a result the samples numbered: in Warsaw 518, in Lublin 419, and in the county towns 104 respondents. One third of them were members of the Polish United Workers Party, males being a preponderant majority (63, 69, 76 per cent for three milieus, respectively). Except for the county towns, half the respondents were university graduates; those with only elementary school education did not exceed 2% of the total. Represented among the respondents were the following socio-occupational groups in Warsaw and Lublin: white collar workers, 19%; managers, 16%; scientific workers, 11%; university students, 11%; teachers, 9%; engineers, 8%; journalists, editors, 7%; secondary school pupils, 5%; physicians, 2%; military men, 2%; priests, 1%; others, 9%. In two county towns there were only: managers, 27%; secondary school pupils, 19%; white collar workers — mostly clerks, 19%; teachers, 18%; physicians, 6%; students, 3%; others, 8%.

The question intended to measure the popularity of sociology against the background of other alternative sciences read as follows: «Below are listed several social sciences. Please, mark two of them — the ones which deserve special support as being the most important socially.

Recent history	Philosophy	Law
Economics	Sociology	Pedagogy
Science of literature	Linguistics	Psychology

Substantiate your choice of each of the marked sciences».

Results are shown in table I.

Only in Warsaw did sociology win the first place, over one third of the respondents considering it to be of especial social importance. This proportion falls to one fourth in the provinces, i.e. in Lublin and two county towns. But even in this provincial milieu sociology remains still second only to economics and third to economics and history.

A detailed analysis of the distribution of choices by socio-occupational groups has revealed that in both Warsaw and Lublin the highest proportion of the adherents of sociology can be found among scientific workers in the field of social sciences and humanities and among the journalists and editors. In Warsaw 63% and in Lublin 48% of the former group chose sociology; the figures for the latter

TABLE I

*Choices of sociology as an important science in comparison with other sciences*

<i>Respondents from</i>	<i>Warsaw</i> N=518		<i>Lublin</i> N=419		<i>County towns</i> N=104	
	%	rank	%	rank	%	rank
Sociology	39	1	26	2	29	3
Economics	36	2	33	1	48	1
History	27	3	25	3	37	2
Psychology	26	4	23	4	17	5
Pedagogy	25	5	19,3	5	24	4
Sc. of literat.	15	6,5	18	8	12	7
Linguistics	15	6,5	18,3	7	11	9
Philosophy	14	8	19	6	12	7
Law	7	9	14	9	12	7
Total	204		195,6		202	

Percentages add up to more than 100 because most respondents chose as a rule two or more sciences.

group are, correspondingly, 57 % and 45 %. However, only in Warsaw sociology won the first place both among these and the next two socio-occupational groups: students of social sciences, 47 %, and natural science workers, 43 %. In Lublin no group chose sociology by a proportion of votes necessary to assure it the first place. Even among social scientists the first place belonged to recent history with 56 % of the choices.

Least prone to choose sociology were everywhere teachers, who favored pedagogy, secondary school pupils and brain workers. Managers were in between: 41 % of them chose sociology in Warsaw and only 26 % in Lublin. No statistically significant relationship was found between party membership and the predisposition to favour sociology.

All these figures are indicative of the considerable popularity of sociology in spite of the fact that in the provincial towns it was surpassed by economics and recent history. In this connection it should be remembered that the selectors were people with an education other than sociological: for the most part they had graduated in law,



economics, history etc. Sociologists were an insignificant minority among our respondents, about 15 persons altogether. Moreover, the other eight sciences are taught in secondary schools or are otherwise connected with well known institutions such as law-courts, whereas sociology can be found only at four universities, not to mention several years of interruption in sociological studies after the last war.

All things considered one is under the impression that sociology is popular out of proportion to its comparatively weak institutional setting in Poland.

It was necessary to find out what amount of knowledge of sociology our respondents possessed — especially those choosing it as a socially important science. An analysis showed that everywhere about two thirds of them read sociological articles just published in *Przegląd Kulturalny*. The corresponding percentage among the non-selectors was only 36 %. Although this analysis was applied only to the readers of *Przegląd Kulturalny* (about half of all respondents), the results seem to indicate that in most cases the choice of sociology was based on some contact with this science.

What was expected of sociology by its adherents ?

Among the 219 respondents who chose sociology, 64 % gave various reasons for having done so. These free answers were categorized in such a way as to construct a typology of expectations and opinions concerning the function sociology is supposed to perform in Poland today.

A social engineering function was most often expected of sociology. There were three kinds of tasks ascribed to sociology which were conceived in this way.

I. *Sociology is useful for managerial purposes.* So conceived, sociology is a basis for action by those preoccupied with organizing the production or otherwise controlling the people or social processes in different spheres of life. Among persons who conceive the social importance of sociology in this way, the party members were over-represented by 15 percent. Examples: «It is not possible to run state affairs without knowing the conditions of society», «In our system it is necessary to control knowingly the course of social processes...», «Sociology is important in the forming of *The New Man*».

II. *Sociology can be used for the improvement of human relations.* The difference from the preceding type of expectations consists in the lack of emphasis on the strictly managerial character of the action. Instead, a stress is laid on spontaneity and reciprocity. Mutual understanding is often mentioned as a basis for improvement in human relations. Party members were overrepresented among this

type, but only slightly: 1%. Examples: «Sociology — especially the sociology of work — has a basic importance in bringing about proper relations among people». «We live more and more socially — so it is a question of the rules of social life...».

III. *Sociology is useful in social diagnosis and in the solution of social problems.* Examples: «Sociology will help define social problems». «Sociology — because there are many social problems disturbing our society».

The following types of expectations are less of a social engineering character, except perhaps for type IV.

IV. *An exceptional speed of social change and the emergence of new phenomena require sociological explanation and study.* Implicitly, those expressing such expectations may have had in mind two things: either they were convinced of the practical usefulness of sociology, as in types I, II, III or they meant its purely cognitive and/or ideological function. Anyway — explicitly named was only the fact of social change as a sufficient reason for the choice of sociology. Examples: «We are changing — so we must know why and how...», «Sociology is important for the development and emergence of a new society based on novel principles», «Social bonds among people become more and more intricate; living together takes on increasingly newer forms...».

V. *The primary aim of sociology is to make people know their society and its laws.* Such a knowledge is essential to *Weltanschauung* and its importance stems from the fact that man and society are the highest values. Examples: «It is necessary to define the place of man in modern civilization», «To know the laws of modern society in both political systems of the world», «A better knowledge of the conditions under which we live — a turn toward man».

VI. *Sociology should be especially developed because it incurred serious drawbacks in the past so that it lags behind other sciences.* Examples: «Sociology and psychology were neglected in the past. This fact has caused much social damage», «There are new fields of study open for sociology — the ones formerly closed».

It is interesting to note that the party members were overrepresented by as much as 17 percent among respondents giving such reasons for favouring sociology. Overrepresentation is calculated in relation to the proportion of party members among all 219 persons substantiating the choice of sociology, i.e. 38%.

The table II gives a summary view of quantitative proportions among different types of expectations and opinions discussed above.

TABLE II

*Type of expectation or opinion*  
 N=219 respondents from all localities

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I. Managerial usefulness	22%
II. Improvement in human relations	15
III. Social diagnosis, problem solving	8
IV. Studying and explaining changes	22
V. Cognitive and Weltanschauung function	24
VI. A need to make up for drawbacks	10
VII. Others -and unclassifiable	14
Total	115

---

Percentages add up to more than 100 because some respondents expressed two or even more types of expectations.

In conclusion, one can say that in the opinion of the Polish intelligentsia sociology is a socially committed science. Its social involvement consists in both its usefulness for social engineering and its function as a basis for world outlook. As can be seen from Table II the types of expectations indicative of these two main functions are the most frequent ones. Such a structure of expectations of sociology is characteristic for a country like Poland where deep and fast social changes are planned and actively organized on the basis of a specific ideological programme.



## REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman : H.FRIIS, Danish National Institute of Social Research  
Rapporteur: J. A. CLAUSEN, University of California, Berkeley

### FIRST SESSION

As a point of departure for discussion, the Chairman and Rapporteur summarized the presentations at the Plenary Session and the published working papers. In order to achieve the maximum flexibility of discussion, no formal papers were presented at the meetings of the working group. The Chairman, H. Friis, expressed the hope that from the discussion it would be possible to distil at least a few recommendations as to how sociological knowledge could be more effectively communicated both to policy-makers and to the general public.

The materials prepared for the Plenary Session and the presentations at that Session permitted the establishment of an agenda of the following major topics for discussion: 1) the image of the sociologist and the conceptions of his role and function in various publics; 2) the nature of resistances to sociology on the part of the policy-makers, the general public and various other publics; 3) the various types of placement and function of sociologists vis-à-vis public policy and policy-makers; 4) the functional relations of the sociologist to the public in seeking access to, and reporting, data; and 5) potential means for increasing acceptance of sociological knowledge by policy-makers and the public. Discussion was wide-ranging and involved contributions from more than 30 participants. In consequence it has not been feasible to identify contributors in this brief summary.

#### *The image of the sociologist*

Z. Gostkowski's study of the image of sociology in Poland was the only specific investigation reported, perhaps bespeaking the greater interest in the topic among Polish intellectuals as compared with those of other countries. Public conceptions of sociology were, in general, felt to be vague and often erroneous. Even less clear is the

identification of the sociologist as such. In countries with established traditions of science and scholarship, sociology is to a degree assimilated to these traditions, though its acceptance even in university circles is far from complete in many countries. In rapidly developing countries, one finds little knowledge of the nature of social science among the general public, and among policy-makers one finds impatience with theorizing and research not directed to practical problems. It was observed that even among the sociologists present, there exist different images of sociology and sociologists.

### *Resistances to sociology*

Resistances on the part of the public derive from many sources — academic organization, the potential threats of sociological inquiry to traditional patterns or to entrenched interests, cultural orientations (in all countries there are some topics which are taboo to investigation), distrust of efforts to reduce human behaviour to systematic study (especially fragmented quantitative study), the lack of precision in social science research relative to that of the physical and biological sciences, ideological commitments and widespread convictions that everyone is equally competent to formulate his own views on the nature of human behaviour in societies. Some of these resistances are not subject to direct modification by the efforts of sociologists; others may yield to the provision of more adequate knowledge, especially as sociologists communicate more effectively their methods and findings, particularly knowledge that has significant implications for human betterment.

## SECOND SESSION

### *Relations to policy-makers*

The sociologist as professor and eminent scholar can only influence policy by informal and indirect means, but at times his influence may be extremely broad. By contrast, sociologists within government research bureaux are likely to have much narrower influence on policy, especially since situational aspects not subject to systematic research may often weigh more heavily in decisions than will research findings as such. While the demand for social science research would seem to be greatest in a planned society, there was some question as to whether sociology is really more highly utilized



in policy-making in such societies. It was observed that interest groups both in and out of the government may oppose wholly objective research.

Policy-makers will not turn to the sociologist unless they are aware of what sociology can do. The importance of research institutes and of having a body of valid knowledge bearing upon major problem areas was noted. It was observed that in certain areas — health and demographic research, for example — sociologists have accumulated a sufficiently impressive body of knowledge and have communicated this with sufficient cogency to policy-makers so that an ever-increasing number of officials turn to sociology for consultation and research. In other instances, the sociologist's methodological competencies — in assessing public opinion, for example — lead to a demand for his services and afford him an opportunity for communicating broader sociological perspectives. It was suggested that utilization of sociological knowledge for policy-making is likely to depend heavily on the sociologist's choice of research problems relative to the needs and the particular intellectual climate of a given country at a given time. In some countries, engagement in action programmes was felt to be essential if the sociologist were to have financial support and access to data. In other countries, the sociologist can remain uncommitted. Once involved closely with policy-makers, however, the sociologist is likely to encounter pressures to go beyond his role as scientist.

#### *Functional relations to the public*

As in the case of communication to policy-makers, there was widespread agreement that the public must first of all be given some idea of the nature and usefulness of sociological knowledge and methods. At the same time it was recognized that the image of sociology depends in part on the nature of inquiries undertaken and the way in which the public is involved. There was discussion of some of the most widely read writings by sociologists, attempting to ascertain what led to their success in reaching a wide audience.

#### *Potential means for increasing acceptance of sociological knowledge*

The chairman, H. Friis, called attention to the report of the Behavioural Science Sub-Committee of the President's Science Advisory Panel (U.S.A.), which recommended the teaching of social science in

secondary schools. It was suggested that when most secondary school pupils and all college students have had some exposure to sociology, there is likely to be a greater readiness to turn to sociology when today's students become tomorrow's policy-makers. It was recognized that any such programme must entail the adequate training of secondary school teachers and the preparation of instructional materials; ineffective teaching, or teaching by persons not fully qualified, might have the reverse effect from that intended.

There was general agreement that increased acceptance and utilisation will in the long-run depend upon increased effectiveness of sociology. Nearly every person who presented material at any length noted some inadequacies in the present organization of instruction or research, in the financing of research, or in the theories and methods available for studying the complex phenomena of social organization and social change. The organization of knowledge in given areas and the dissemination of this knowledge in forms most appropriate for use by policy-makers and by various general publics was regarded as an enterprise worthy of more effort than has been devoted to it in the past. At the same time, it is necessary to be realistic as to the adequacy of sociological knowledge for application in policy decisions, and to avoid «over-selling» sociology.

THE SOCIOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT  
LA SOCIOLOGIE DU DÉVELOPPEMENT

## PLENARY SESSION SÉANCE PLÉNIÈRE

### REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman : H. BLUMER, University of California, Berkeley  
Rapporteur: S. N. EISENSTADT, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem

In the discussion on development two major themes seemed to be recurrent. One was that of the great variety of different types of structural organisation in the major institutional fields in different modern and modernising societies. The older supposition that the process of development will ultimately give rise to forms of social organisation similar to those prevalent in the Western world was clearly seen as not holding up.

It was stressed that the types of structural differentiation which have taken place as a result of processes of modernisation certainly were not always of the type which was predominant in the West during its own processes of modernisation, i.e., those which a growing multiplicity of different collectivities with specialised functions in different institutional fields, i.e., economic, political cultural, etc., and seemingly continuously expanding the field of universalistic and achievement criteria in all institutional spheres.

A similar perspective can also be gained from a comparative study of the development of different institutional spheres in the process of modernisation and in different modern societies. Several recent researches tend to show that within each major institutional system, there exists a greater variety of structural arrangements which may go together with the processes of modernisation than has been often assumed in the previous literature.

It was pointed out that these varieties can at least partially be explained in terms of the origins, the starting points of the process of modernisation in different countries and that the process of modernisation both in its successes and in its failures can be found among all these forms.

The second major theme in the discussion was that although the



concern with modernisation was, in a way, closely related to problems of development and New Nations, and tended recently to focus on problems of economic development — yet in a sense it was deeply embedded in the classical tradition of social and sociological thought, starting from Comte, Spencer, Durkheim, Weber, and that the time might be ripe for an attempt at synthesis of the classical and modern concerns.

## THE BREAK WITH TRADITIONALISM RUPTURE AVEC LE TRADITIONALISME

### THE ROLE OF VIOLENCE IN THE BREAK WITH TRADITIONALISM: THE COLOMBIAN CASE \*

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For more than thirty years, a process has been occurring in Colombia which merits the attention of all sociologists interested in the mechanics of conflict. The process is known as the «Violencia»; as its name indicates, it consists of manifestations of violence in various areas of the country. It has been estimated that about 200,000 people have been killed during the course of this conflict, and property damage runs well into the millions of dollars.

As we know, very few detailed studies have been made of large groups in a state of conflict. Not much is known about groups under prolonged strife; even more rare are studies of the application of the techniques of violence on a grand scale, where the violence literally runs away with itself in an uncontrolled fashion, and produces unforeseen and unpredictable results. Since such was the case with the Colombian Violencia, it seems eminently worthwhile to present some elements of functional analysis of the process, which might be added to the fund of sociological knowledge concerning conflict. Accordingly, after a necessary description of the Violencia and its historical beginnings, we will proceed to see where the present body of theory of conflict is either corroboratory, or found lacking, in helping to explain this phenomenon.

#### THE BACKGROUND

During almost all of its history, Colombia was subject to a closed

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type of social structure — a structure based on practically hereditary differences of groups or families. The social structure found its principal support in seigneurial institutions emerging from the possession and use of the land; these were aristocratic in the political realm. Social life revolved around values, beliefs, and attitudes practically untouched and unchanging, that could easily be classified within Redfield's «peasant order». But, since the country could not be isolated, it did receive the impact of the industrial and secular revolutions of the 18th and 19th centuries, even though it was delayed. This began to be felt in the first five years of the 1920's, and the social processes were accelerated during the change of political regime in 1930, when the urban areas began to progressively differentiate themselves from the rural ones, by-passing them and adopting their own very different scale of values.

The contrasts between city and country were sharpened by the economic differences and faulty distribution of the wealth produced by the industrial boom. A first attempt at modifying the situation, especially the agrarian, was the «revolution on the march» of Alfonso López; it contained important political, economic, and religious innovations. But these innovations, originated under the impulse of the liberal hegemony, began to accentuate the conflict with the conservative party, which had very different ideas concerning such solutions. In addition, such changes challenged mores and taboos, thus arousing protests and denunciation by vested interests, who began to resist the change. The conflict became more acute, and soon acquired the characteristics of a social problem; the invasion of lands, forceful expulsion of land tenants, political persecutions, and similar events, were splitting the structure in two.

The persistence of the liberal regime's efforts to transform the country were such that, for the first time, it began to seriously create a popular following, which was later headed by Jorge Eliécer Gaitán. The pressure of the people managed to defeat the traditional élite or «oligarchy» of the party, whose power then passed to this quasi-charismatic leader. Gaitán's strength was founded mainly in the workers and urban groups, but he also attracted the peasants (regardless of party), although the latter do not appear to have totally absorbed the entire significance of the Gaitán movement. At any rate, the emergence of class consciousness could be observed. Until 1946 a type of revolution in attitudes was progressively emerging, which sought to leave behind the seigneurial kind of country which Colombia had been in the past. But the process was abruptly cut short with the assassination of Gaitán in 1948.

The death of Gaitán immediately crystallized whatever revolutionary drive his movement had carried — a considerable amount, to judge by the results — to the point where in one given moment it succeeded in dominating the entire nation. But it appears that neither the masses nor the leaders who survived Gaitán were sufficiently ready to act; political disorientation followed the surprise of the assassination. Some of the leaders were undoubtedly responsible for this situation — those leaders who didn't know or didn't want to understand the language which the people had scrawled on the walls of the institutions in letters of fire and blood. The rigid social system then in effect prevented the legal institutionalization of the Gaitán movement (which would have been a recognition of the events then occurring — it took power in many places on the 9th and 10th of April of 1948). Some leaders and the «oligarchs» of both traditional parties, united by the serious threat to their interests, then took over the reins of the state in order to carry out the counterrevolution. The effect on the masses was predictable: with the frustration of the hoped-for structural changes, many of them promised by Gaitán, the possibilities of conflict were multiplied among the affected groups at all levels of integration, thus setting the stage for a great catastrophe.

«...conflict tends to be dysfunctional for a social structure in which there is no or insufficient toleration and institutionalization of conflict», says Coser in his book, *Functions of Social Conflict*<sup>1</sup>. This hypothesis seems to find confirmation in the Colombian case. The base of common values of the largest and most inclusive social system (the nation) was attacked; its entire equilibrium was threatened. However, the subsequent conflict was not the major threat to the equilibrium and solidarity of the nations' structure. It was its very own intolerance and rigidity that constituted its greatest danger, since it permitted the feelings of aggression and hostility of individual Colombians to become accumulated and channelized up to the breaking points. These structural cleavages (which may differ in other countries and cultures) were apparently political, economic, and religious in Colombia. Through them the institutional dysfunction was perceived — the disparities between ideal norms and the real norms which govern fundamental institutions, and changes in the conception of power by the vested interests, who thus saw their predominance threatened. Through these cleavages the action of conflict was channelized, until it constituted the *Violencia*.

<sup>1</sup> Lewis F. COSER, *Funciones del conflicto social*, Mexico, 1961, p. 180.



## CONFLICT AND VIOLENCIA

Initiated as an expression of political struggle for supremacy of power, the *Violencia* had the effect of a snowball rolling downhill, progressively enlarging itself with the helpless mass thrown off by the slope at the passage of the turbulence. The national scene became saturated with violence, and the institutions were successively affected at various levels. The process passed from the national to the regional, from the regional to the communal, from the communal to the neighborhood, from the neighborhood to the familial and to the dyad level — and then in turn back in the opposite direction — causing what can best be described as a cleavage in the social structure. This «crack» led to the discovery of certain weak points in Colombian social structure — impunity in judicial institutions, poverty and the shortage of land in economic institutions, rigidity and fanaticism in religious institutions, and ignorance in educational institutions. The systemic linkage that existed between social systems of one locality, and between social systems at different levels of integration, constituted easy channels through which the slogans, attitudes, and communications of every type and inclination travelled. These modified the value-structure of the Colombian people, conditioning them for violence. In many cases the *Violencia* had as its source the legislative chambers and official dispatches of Bogotá, passing from level to level until it reached the common man.

The unchained dynamic had unforeseen consequences — unforeseen, because those who initiated the violence acted in complete ignorance of the social elements with which they were toying, at that unfortunate moment. What began as a polemic for the enjoyment of power within the democratic framework, became transformed into a full and open conflict. This conflict passed through successive stages: a) a stage of directed, or «teletic» conflict, and b) a stage of total conflict, or conflict of annihilation.

There has never been agreement in Colombia as to the conception and utilization of political power and of economic gain. The opposing groups or parties have conceived of power as a tool with which to impose their respective utopias. These utopias were often mutually exclusive, such as the one which on one hand demanded the separation of Church and State, versus its counterpart which would impose a clerical state; that utopia which advocated absolute liberty of education and thought, versus the one which would require controlled education and thought. Once the incompatibility of these values was realized, and once it was discovered that the only means

of imposing these values was through the State, the bases for inter-party conflict were established. On the basis of the Colombian evidence, conflict could then be defined as a social process which develops when two or more parties try to impose mutually exclusive values within a scarcity of positions and means, with the goal of influencing the behavior of groups and thereby determining the direction of social change in these groups.

The imposition of such exclusive values may be very subtle or quite open, depending on the circumstances. Nevertheless, a technique exists within the process of conflict — violence itself, defined as the employment of physical coercion to attain private or group objectives.

When conflict employs the technique of violence with the purpose of arriving at a rational goal, or when it appeals to a higher common good (real or fictitious) for the groups involved, it is in the «teletic» stage. With the exception of a few intervals, this stage occurred in Colombia between 1930 and 1932, and between 1948 and 1950, when the parties in power claimed the right to impose their ideas for the formation of a better Colombia (according to their own opinions). This stage is probably the one through which many disputes are settled, without the necessity of passing to the following stage, which is more destructive and chaotic.

Modern sociological analysis departs from the neutral position which accepts conflict as a basic natural process occurring in every society, and which employs the concept of conflict to explain changes experienced by society. This represents the position of classical sociology, whose first exponents were Simmel, Gumpłowicz, Oppenheimer, Mosca and Pareto. Until recently, the ideas of these pioneers have been simplified (almost to the point of emasculation) and contained in theories and concepts which are collected in academic texts under the rubric of «social disorganization». These texts, in turn, are based on the already much-discussed structure of advanced European and North American countries; as regards the observation of the real processes of social disorganization and reorganization, they suffer from empirical anemia. A static concept of society has thus emerged, which has led various sociologists into errors and partial conclusions. The sociology of conflict has scarcely advanced from the stage in which it was left by Simmel, and recently rejuvenated by Coser.

It has been observed that violence or the threat of violence, used with moderation and direction, is an important element in certain types of social transformations; even the early Christians and the



Crusaders used it to attain a higher common good. However, in the Colombian case the forms of physical coercion were applied to excess; the higher philosophy of both the action and the ideology of the conflict were thereby lost. Thus, on a grand scale, the people yielded to individual and group attitudes and acts of aggression, opposition, and destruction such as hatred, vengeance, jealousy, intimidation, robbery, arson, and homicide; much of this was justified or excused by the State, the political parties, or the ruling groups. For this reason some observers referred to this process as «the moral crisis of the country». It is this behavior which may be designated as *total conflict*, or conflict of annihilation, which reached its climax in Colombia between 1950 and 1953, and between 1956 and 1958. This is the type of conflict which, in Colombia, has been generically referred to as «the *Violencia*.» As can be seen, this type is technically distinct from classical violence; it is only a form or instrument of conflict. It is also distinct from the conflict of war, where violence is institutionalized, positively sanctioned, and the performance of the opposing individuals and groups is formally regulated. It can also be demonstrated that the true social revolution failed in Colombia as a result of having passed to the full stage of uncontrolled conflict, rousing primitive passions without stimulating intellect and reason.

Total conflict is shapeless (in which it differs from war), and possesses aims which may be manifest or latent. Thus, a group may organize itself in order to cruelly avenge its dead in the name of a political party, killing those of the opposite political hue; but in reality, it also does this for the purpose of appropriating the property of the victims. Another person might proclaim himself a defender of the faith, to expel or kill members of other sects; but in reality, in order to defend local vested interests, and thus *ad infinitum*, according to the antecedents of each neighborhood or community, and without a harmonious or unified plan. Total conflict produced this type of deviate and criminal behavior in Colombia, which was based on teleological disunity of the group, and which presented an impression of chaos, cruelty, fierceness, and of complete social decomposition. It was nourished on the breakdown of fundamental institutions, which apparently were found incapable of responding to the necessities of change and incapable of channelizing the new configuration of norms; or else they were obstructed by means of orders imparted by people of local power at various levels of integration.

## VALUES AND VIOLENCIA

The demographic, psychological, and economic dislocation and readjustment brought about during the two stages of conflict turned out to be of great consequence. Nevertheless, the scientist may not say whether these adjustments and readjustments were good or bad, since these concepts are subjective, and may vary according to temporal perspective. For example, the acceleration of the process of urbanization produced by the *Violencia*, currently condemned by some, will probably benefit the country in the long run; it will force the country to modify the structure of agrarian ownership, and compel it to enter the modern industrial era more completely. It would be impossible to determine more than this, except with the passage of time, and with a change in the idea of «good» which the Colombian people might adopt, institutionalize, and make normative. From another point of view, the aspects of brutality and murder might be considered in relation to norms that are more permanent and absolute, within Western-Christian culture, in order to condemn them with indignation and astonishment.

At any rate, it is indispensable to clarify the sociologist's position as regards social values, which are also verifiable facts in the community and in time. It would seem innocuous to simply declare, as did those of the functionalist school of Turner and Gluckman, that the process of the *Violencia* was functional on a national scale because before it could succeed in destroying the integration at this national level, it evoked a new type of social integration. Even if this were certain, such a declaration would not help to explain the phenomenon. The fact is that in Colombia the process of violence was total, with different characteristics at different levels of integration, ranging from the realignment of group interests on the national level, to the complete extinction of rural neighborhoods.

One might therefore postulate the existence of a principle of limits as regards function and dysfunction; beyond a certain point, an item that was functional, whether it be liberty or violence, might become dysfunctional, and vice-versa. It would certainly seem that the amount or intensity of an item or process would have some effect on its functionality or dysfunctionality within a given system.

There was a moment when an impressive social disintegration began to occur, even on the national level. In 1951 and 1952, the violence extended so far as to create many pockets of guerrilla fighters, autonomous commands, and «little republics.» In these small autonomous republics a local consciousness of nationality has not been



created. Formerly the consciousness of belonging to a greater entity — that of Colombia — had existed. But at present they do not recognize the Colombian state; it is divorced from their symbolic idea of «fatherland». The reality for them is the «little fatherland» — the father's or grandfather's territory or property, to be defended at any cost. A nation so weakly integrated by ideal symbols and norms could not continue to remain organized, and it appears that in Colombia the most extensive level of integration was almost completely cracked. But total collapse did not occur (the urban revolt was absent), although the entire period was characterized by an intense flight of the Colombian intelligentsia and other groups, in search of more propitious surroundings for living and working. The government attempted to regain the feeling of nationality, engaging the country in the Korean War, and creating a common enemy to help solidify the internal structure of the country. However, the enemy was very remote and quite alien.

As a basis for an objective interpretation it would be fitting to ask, then, what should be the attitudes of the observer before this complex phenomenon of integration and disintegration, of causes and effects of conflict. In the first place, from the point of view of the great majority of the Colombian people, the entire process of the *Violencia* constitutes a social problem; that is, a consciously troubling situation which requires adjustment or amendment by means of collective action, in order to restore or adapt existing social values. It is the exceptional Colombian who does not condemn the *Violencia* as something demoniacal; for the same reason, the role of those groups who have profited personally from the *Violencia* appears monstrous and negative to him. The *Violencia* has repeatedly been declared an enemy of the nation. Those who are governed seem to feel it, and those who govern have expressed it in various terms. Let us take, for example, the following words of President Alberto Lleras, uttered in his acceptance speech of August 7, 1958:

«There are no harsher years or more dramatic experiences in the entire history of the Republic. We descended, savagely and suddenly, to monstrous extremes. We saw with amazement how there had been a reserve of savagery in our people which defied entire centuries of Christian preaching, of civil order, and of advanced communal existence. More of our compatriots have died in this irregular war, than in the indispensable battles for Independence, or those other battles which formed the republic through blows of misery. The most humble people suffered martyrdom. But even more serious, over and above all this useless cruelty, there appeared in the highest circles practices such as speculation, illegal use of public funds, cynicism, a passionate



thirst for wealth, and an impenetrable indifference for the law of God, no less scoffed at and disavowed than the laws of men. To reduce and control the *Violencia* it is necessary that the entire nation, without exception, dedicate itself to this supreme undertaking. This must be done, not with the simple hope that each undertaking or each isolated action will produce the miracle of peace, but instead the entire nation must prepare itself for a long and arduous endeavor, which might require the alteration of most of our customs, our concepts, and our capacity to endure difficult trials».

According to theory, social problems do not exist without a corresponding series of values in predicament or transition. In the case of the *Violencia*, an impressive mass of values exists, which are openly or surreptitiously ignored. It would be almost interminable to enumerate them. In general terms, one can say that through the development of the process of strife and the employment of violence, the rural, sacred, and traditional beliefs, norms, and attitudes of Western-Christian culture were overthrown. Much of what had been admired and respected, venerated and established, fell to earth under the blow of violence.

The *Violencia* seems to have vented its fury among those groups which, through their contacts or because of their migratory origins, had begun to aspire to a better life. The feeling of dissatisfaction among the people became fuel which the flames of conflict rapidly consumed. Only in this way could one explain, for example, why there was no violence in the Andean cultural area of the Department of Nariño, even though various emissaries of the conflicting groups came there with assignments of beginning it. The people of Nariño, perhaps, had still not reached the stage of complete dissatisfaction with existing conditions, as had been the case in other regions; for that reason there was less fuel there for the *Violencia*. But of course, one would also have to study other possible causes, such as the incidence of economic feudalism or the Department's economic self-sufficiency.

On the other hand, neither did the *Violencia* occur in a great part of the cultural area of the Atlantic Seaboard. For this case an alternative hypothesis could be offered: the absence of intolerance. The factors which prevented the Coast dweller from falling victim to the *Violencia* are imbued in his culture and personality. His predominant social values are distinct from those of the politicians or farmers, which were basic in the conflict. The industrial and commercial revolution of Barranquilla seems to have opened very wide horizons for him, horizons that are far removed from the closed and fanatic world of the Andean communities.



Since life cannot develop in a vacuum, the groups affected by the *Violencia* were at the same time producing and molding a new set of values to take the place of those that had been destroyed. It is still quite difficult to determine this scale of values, since it seems to vary according to groups and levels. It does not appear to be a jump to the opposite pole of «secularism.» Instead, it is a conglomeration of conflicting values which have been juxtaposed and fused to the point of being contradictory and confusing — a condition which at times has encouraged anomia in groups, and suicide in individuals. If one could venture a typological innovation, perhaps the new scale of values could be described as «anomical», as a reflection of the insecurity of the transition; possibly as a symptom of a yet-indeterminate stage, through which the more developed countries have had to pass.

From observation of this phenomenon one can conclude that the «anomical» stage through which the Colombian people are now passing does not permit the complete realization of their original goals; instead, they are simultaneously constructing new foundations for the fundamental institutions. Relatively, therefore, one can consider this anomical stage as a transition, requiring care and perseverance in order to produce something «better». The definition of «better» reflects the values of the community, and as we have said, these can also be determined. «Better» in this sense refers to the configuration of a new social structure based on the actual application of recognized ideals such as justice, respect for life, and encouragement of the creative impulse. This is a combination of values which could easily be converted into a political platform.

The *Violencia* is a current topic of discussion in the Chambers of both Houses of the Colombian government. Not only are there areas where the *Violencia* still remains uncontrolled, but the embers of past flames are still alive today. The chain of vendettas, the spilled blood and the tarnished honor of the victimized families allows us to predict similar behavior for another generation, if we leave the dynamic in this unleashed form, without applying basic solutions. Colombia might continue to be a victim of violence for at least twenty more years. Can any social system support such strains?

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## OBJECTIVE FOUNDATIONS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF SOCIETY

Critical study of some sociological theories

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In my report I would like to dwell upon one question: how it is correct to use the term «traditionalism» in sociology.

In various scientific and social theories one very often meets terms the meanings of which are not strictly determined and, because of their vagueness and ambiguity, their usage is not understandable for readers and listeners. No doubt, the progress of scientific investigation leads to the necessity of introducing some new notions and terms, or at any rate of changes of content of the old terms in which a new sense is implied. In such cases, I think it is always necessary to give to the terms strict definitions, in order to avoid their various and sometimes even contradictory interpretations. The name of our working group is «The Break with Traditionalism». What does «traditionalism» mean? When in our ordinary speech we use the words: «tradition», «traditionalism», we change their meanings according to the context: whether we speak of some concrete forms of life, or of habits, views and so on inherited from previous generations and more or less firmly entered into contemporary life; sometimes we understand an established and rather rigid order in behaviour activity, as for instance systematically arranged World Congresses of Sociology (if these Congresses took place regularly).

But in recent years the word «tradition» strongly entered into the conceptual systems of Western sociologists, economists, historians, and this became a tradition itself. More than that, now they speak and write about «traditionalism», «traditional societies», and even about «the break with traditionalism».

In a short paper it is impossible to speak in detail about the various meanings that are sometimes tacitly implied in the term, though such an analysis—not etymological, but concerning the very content of the term — I suppose to be quite necessary. As a result of such an analysis, it would be not very difficult to show incompatibility of the strict laws of constructions of any scientific theory

with arbitrary manipulations of terms and notions. In this connection I would like to take the understanding of «traditional society» that is given in the book by Professor W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*. This understanding is now very popular in sociological theories of the Western countries.

The gist of the point is certainly not only in terms. One should make clear what is the purpose of such a usage, what it gives, how such terms «work» in theory.

At first glance it seems that Professor W. W. Rostow as an initial point takes the state of constant changes and development of human society. In his book he describes the development of human society as a process of transformation from one stage of development to another, this development being presented as a progressive motion in general.

Of course, one can hardly fall into the doubt that it is not so easy to compare contemporary civilized societies, with highly developed industries and agriculture, with those old, antique societies where people were striking fire from a flint. The great progress is evident. But if we analyze Prof. Rostow's «theory of stages» thoroughly enough we will find that it has no objective foundations and could be characterized only as pseudo-optimistic. Rostow divides all the history of human society into five stages — the traditional society; the preconditions for take-off; the take-off; the drive to maturity; the age of high mass-consumption.

I shall dwell only upon so-called «traditional society». Rostow writes: «A traditional society is one whose structure is developed within limited production functions, based on pre-Newtonian science and technology, and on pre-Newtonian attitudes towards the physical world»<sup>1</sup>. Though he says: «Newton is here used as a symbol for that watershed in history when men came widely to believe that the external world was subject to a few knowable laws, and was systematically capable of productive manipulation»<sup>2</sup>. According to the «theory of stages» one should come to the conclusion that all societies that existed before Newton (1642-1727) must be embraced by the term «traditional society».

What does it give? It is not a secret that human society existed for many thousand of years before Newton. The structure of this society had suffered decisive changes in various fields of life — political, economic, cultural.

<sup>1</sup> W. W. Rostow, *The Stages of Economic Growth*, Cambridge, University Press, 1960, p. 4.

<sup>2</sup> *Op.cit.*, p. 4.



An arbitrary and artificial amalgamation of various premises under the title of traditional society: primitive society — the first known form of social-economic formation of society, and followed by slave society and feudal society: to make a heap of all these societies under the name of the traditional society cannot help us understand either the history of human society or its structural features. According to such a classification (or to be exact, without any classification) it seems impossible to understand social take-off, which society suffered during its all history up to the seventeenth century.

Meanwhile, the transition from the primitive society to the slave society, and further — to feudal society — was subjected to objective laws of social development. Among these laws one can find specific laws that were inherent to this or that distinctive formation, as well as general laws that are characteristic for all formations. This is very important.

We must study history not for the sake of history itself. History must help us to learn and to know historical laws, to help people to use these laws consciously in practice, to forecast the very course of social events, to plan their life. Any scientific theory (on nature, society, or human thinking) must not only describe phenomena or events but it must disclose cause-effect relations between social events and phenomena, inherent moving forces, that determine progress in nature and society. Sociological theory must also help people to transform the world consciously, according to a plan founded on the general and specific-objective laws of social development, to help people actively and consciously to take part in social progress.

Does Rostow's «theory of stages» give answers to all these questions? I suppose not. This theory does not even raise such questions in a positive plan. It is impossible to find the objective criterion of social progress in «theory of stages».

As was mentioned, Rostow amalgamated various social formations under the title of «traditional society» and closed the way for historical approach to problems of social development.

I suppose he himself felt the term «traditional society» to be somehow ambiguous and vague. That is why he writes: «The conception of traditional society is, however, in no sense static; and it would not exclude increases in output»<sup>3</sup>. But the expression «is, however, in no sense static» does not help at all, because internal

<sup>3</sup> *Op.cit.*, p. 4.

moving forces of this so-called non-static situation are not clear.

Rostow might feel something like that, having admitted that «to place these infinitely various, changing societies in a single category, on the ground that they all shared a ceiling on the productivity of their economic techniques, is to say little indeed»<sup>4</sup>. One cannot help agreeing with it. But does it mean to say anything? It is doubtful. Indeed, Rostow asserts that «the central fact about traditional society was that a ceiling existed on the level of attainable output per head. This ceiling resulted from the fact that the potentialities which flow from modern science and technology were either not available or not regularly and systematically applied»<sup>5</sup>.

This «central fact» gives rise to at least two objections.

First, Professor Rostow maintains that in the «traditional society» a certain limit on the level of attainable output per head existed. How should one understand this «level of attainable output per head»? If this level should be understood in the sense that the level of output per head before the seventeenth century was determined by a certain level of development of science and technology, such an assumption might be right, but it is too trivial.

We can say that in our days the contemporary level of the development of science and technology has also some influence on the level of output per head. And in this sense contemporary societies also have some limits about which future generations perhaps would speak with some condescension. Thus, the notion of limits as it is understood by Rostow, is very relative and can by no means serve as a watershed in the history of human society. To say frankly and with facts in the hands the limits to output per head depends not only upon the development of science and technology but (and I would like to point this out as the most important fact) on the social organization of society which rules and determines both in the long run: the direction of the development of science and technology as well as the application of their achievements in industry and agriculture. Certainly the development of science has its own relative independence, but science is not the only force that determines the development of society. It is only derivative from the economic needs of society.

Thus, to determine the limit of output production as a decisive feature of «traditional society» is to say very little indeed.

Secondly, as far as I am concerned, this one-sidedness is not quite

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 5.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 4.



clear in the explanation of the question about output of production per head in «theory of stages». The crux of the matter is not only to provide a high level of output per head, though it is the basic condition. The thing is to investigate those social factors that favour the satisfaction of human needs and create equal rights to use all the material wealth, wealth of human labour.

The output of production does not always coincide with the needs of man. Though these facts are paradoxical they have place under the capitalism. And here also the basic reason is the social organization of society, forms of ownership, that prevail in society. It is a widely known fact that in societies with highly developed industry and agriculture, with a high level of output per head, there may be millions of unemployed living in poverty. This question should not be ignored in sociological theory. Thus, «theory of stages» does not give possibility either to explain social processes or to promote social progress.

Such are some questions and objections with which I would like you to become acquainted.



## TRADITIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY IN JAPANESE INDUSTRY

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### I

It has often been indicated that a variety of traditional practices carried over from the preindustrial stage still exist in industrial relations and management policy in present-day Japan, despite the fact that Japan is generally enumerated as one of the six leading industrialized nations in the world. The traditional practices are, among others, «permanent» employment, wage and promotion system based primarily on age and length of service, whole personality status distinction between superior and subordinates, importance attached to personal loyalty toward employer rather than efficiency of work, emphasis placed on intragroup harmony rather than individual competition, and paternalistic care for the welfare of employees extended to their private life. The social forces working for maintaining these practices may be called «traditionalism in Japanese industry».

Two contrasting views have been advanced regarding the traditionalism in Japanese industry. One of them—which will be referred to here as Theory X—points out that the aforementioned traditional practices are nothing but a remnant of feudalistic relations between lord and retainer and of patriarchal family relations applied to the field of industry. Industrialization and economic development progress according to a fixed universal pattern applicable to any nation or any area in the world. The fact that such practices are still in force, therefore, points to a disreputable backwardness which is the greatest obstacle to democratization and modernization of Japanese industry.

Furthermore, the theory asserts, such practices have brought about a variety of reverse effects on present-day Japanese industry. As a result of the permanent employment system, for example, many enterprises in Japan are facing the problem of reduced efficiency due to overstaffing and difficulty in discharging the incapable per-

sonnel. Again, a majority of Japanese companies employ a considerable number of «temporary» workers, in order to meet the necessity of discharging the surplus workers in time of depression while preserving the permanent employment system, which results in undemocratic discrimination in treatment between permanent or regular and temporary workers. Besides, originated partially from this practice, the greater part of labor unions in Japan are composed of what might be called «enterprise unions», *i.e.*, unions whose members are confined to a single enterprise. The fact that labor unions in Japan, on one hand, are often excessively militant, and yet, on the other hand, are strongly dependent on management is due to this characteristic.

Thus, the supporters of Theory X emphasize that in order to promote democratization and modernization of Japanese industry, it is vital to remove as soon as possible the traditional practices, particularly the permanent employment system, and that labor unions should be directed to break from the enterprise basis and establish an industrial united front. Theory X was a popular view among Japanese social scientists—especially those with left-wing inclinations—until quite recently<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> See, for example, NIHON JINBUN KAGAKU KAI [The Japan Cultural Science Society], *Hoken Isei* [Feudalistic Remnants], Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1951; Kazuo OKOCHI, ed., *Nihon no Rodo Kumiai* [Labor Unions in Japan], Tokyo, Toyo Keizai Shinpo Sha, 1954; SHAKAI SEISAKUGAKU KAI [The Society for the Study of Social Policy], *Chin Rodo ni okeru Hokensei* [Feudalistic Practices in Wage Labor Relations], Tokyo, Yuhikaku, 1955. William W. LOCKWOOD, in the Foreword to the Japanese edition of his book, *The Economic Development of Japan: Growth and Structural Change 1868-1938* [Princeton, N. J., Princeton University Press, 1954], sharply criticizes the left-wing inclinations of those Japanese social scientists who represent Theory X. Cf. William W. Lockwood, *Nihon no Keizai Hatten* [The Economic Development of Japan], translated by Ichiro NAKAYAMA, et al., Tokyo, Tokyo Keizai Shinpo Sha, 1958, Vol. 1, pp. v-vi. Robert N. BELLAH, author of *Tokugawa Religion: The Values of Pre-Industrial Japan* [Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1957], on the other hand, seems to hold a view closely allied to Theory X in his recent study by applying an abstract principle of a unitary pattern of development to the progress of modernization of Japanese society. Cf. Robert N. BELLAH, «Values and Social Change in Modern Japan», in INTERNATIONAL CHRISTIAN UNIVERSITY, *Asian Cultural Studies III: Studies on Modernization of Japan by Western Scholars*, Tokyo, Kokusai Kirisutokyo Daigaku, October 1962, pp. 13-56.



## II

The other opinion—which will be referred to as Theory Y—has been advocated since the 1950's mostly by American sociologists and labor economists such as William W. Lockwood, James C. Abegglen, Solomon B. Levine, Frederick Harbison and Charles A. Myers<sup>2</sup>. According to Theory Y, the existence of the same traditional practices does not necessarily mean backwardness, nor is it an obstacle to modernization of Japanese industry, though these practices themselves may well be said to be a remnant of the preindustrial stage. Rather, they form part of the very factors that enabled the unusually rapid and successful progress of Japanese industrialization during the period from the late 19th to the early 20th century. They have also performed an effective function in the reconstruction and prosperity of Japanese industry after the end of World War II.

Generally speaking, the theory asserts, the actual process of industrialization and economic growth for each country or each area of the world follows a certain number of dissimilar patterns in accordance with the differences in political situation, social structure, way of life, value system, and so forth, of the country concerned<sup>3</sup>. The same factors that promote the progress of industrialization in a certain country, therefore, may function as an obstruction in other countries, and vice versa. It is said that Protestant ethics, competitive and individualistic nature of social interaction, and rationalistic and impersonal character of industrial organization, for example, contributed constructively in the Western countries to the industrial productivity and economic development. In the non-Western countries including Japan, however, the same factors may not function likewise. By contrast, «nationalistic» motivation of entrepreneurs, immobility of work force, personal loyalty to employer, paternalistic care for the welfare of employees, or the principle of group responsibility in decision-making process of management, may seem to be inefficient and feudalistic from the viewpoint of Western indus-

<sup>2</sup> William W. LOCKWOOD, *op.cit.*; James C. ABEGGLEN, *The Japanese Factory: Aspects of Its Social Organization*, Glencoe, Ill., The Free Press, 1958; Solomon B. LEVINE, *Industrial Relations in Postwar Japan*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1958; Frederick HARBISON and Charles A. MYERS, *Management in the Industrial World: An International Analysis*, New York, McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1959.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. LEVINE, *op.cit.*, pp. VIII-IX; Clark KERR, John T. DUNLOP, Frederick H. HARBISON, and Charles A. MYERS, *Industrialism and Industrial Man: The Problems of Labor and Management in Economic Growth*, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1960, pp. 15-32, 266 ff.



trialism. Nevertheless, on the specific Japanese social and cultural background, the same traditional factors could have functioned efficiently to the progress of industrialization and the improvement of the mode of national life<sup>4</sup>. In the Western countries, industrial development was carried out by breaking up feudalistic and traditional practices; in the case of Japan, on the other hand, it has been achieved in preserving—and to a certain extent by utilizing—such preindustrial practices. In other words, industrialization in Japan is unique in that it has been carried out without destroying the social and cultural continuity<sup>5</sup>. According to Theory Y, it should be classified as a third pattern of industrialization which is quite different from that of either the Western or the Communist countries<sup>6</sup>.

### III

Which of these two contrasting theories is more in accord with reality? While acknowledging their merits, it is the present writer's opinion that both of the theories contain some exaggerations, and therefore, require a certain reconsideration and modification. Theory X is unrealistic in that it overlooks the fact that democratization of Japanese industry cannot be attained by mere elimination of the traditional practices. Moreover, the theory unduly adheres to the formulistic view that the progress of industrialization follows a unitary pattern everywhere in the world regardless of social and cultural differences. On the other hand, Theory Y can be misleading in that it places too much emphasis on the traditional factors and, at the same time, underestimates the rapid transformation that has been taking place in management policy and industrial relations in postwar Japan, especially since the latter half of the 1950's. Besides, the theory comprises various misinterpretations resulting from superficial observation of foreigners.

In the following pages, the present writer will deal primarily with the criticisms of Theory Y, as it is becoming more popular even in Japan, and in so doing, would like to point out some of the major trends of present-day Japanese industry<sup>7</sup>.

<sup>4</sup> Everett E. HAGEN, in the Foreword to Abegglen's book, laconically remarks as follows: «Indeed, if judged from the viewpoint of the American business executive, Japanese personnel principles and relationships are inefficient. Yet they are efficient—highly efficient. The proof of the pudding is in the eating». Cf. ABEGGLEN, *op.cit.*, p. vii.

<sup>5</sup> ABEGGLEN, *op.cit.*, pp. 134-135; LEVINE, *op.cit.*, pp. 32-35.

<sup>6</sup> ABEGGLEN, *op.cit.*, pp. 1-2.

<sup>7</sup> Similar critical views have already been published in Japanese by the

One of the writer's criticisms concerns with the fact that, as was stated above, the theory places too much emphasis on positive contributions made by the traditional practices to the progress of Japan's industrialization and economic growth. Because of this overestimation, the theory not only has conveyed a false impression to those who are not well acquainted with the reality of Japanese industry, but it has also exerted undesirable influences upon the thinking of Japanese businessmen and some of those scholars who serve as their consultants.

A good example to explain this point is found in the reactions produced among some Japanese businessmen which make them think that it is all right to preserve the traditional practices, «because the distinguished American scholars say so». Since most of these businessmen have held an antipathy to Theory X, the formulistic view that has been prevailing hitherto, they all the more favor Theory Y which approves such thinking. They may say: «The essential point is making profits in your enterprise by maintaining a high productivity. In comparison with this, it does not matter whether the traditional practices remain intact or democratization of industrial relations makes progress». It is not infrequent that such thinking brought about from Theory Y is used by them, especially by those with conservative inclinations, as a specious excuse for their negligence in making effort to democratize industrial relations or to introduce necessary administrative innovations into their company. The writer suspects that one of the reasons why the Japanese translations of Abegglen's and Levine's books have sold unexpectedly well in Japan may be found in such a convenience provided by their books<sup>8</sup>.

#### IV

The second point of the writer's criticisms on Theory Y lies in the fact that the theory contains various exaggerations and misinterpretations. Take, for example, the system of «permanent» employment which, according to Abegglen, is the «critical difference»

present writer. See Kunio ODAKA, «Sangyo no Kindaika to Keiei no Minshuka» [Modernization of Industry and Democratization of Management], *Chuo Koron* [The Central Review], July 1961, pp. 26-44; «Nihon no Keiei: Sangyo Shakaigaku no Atarashii Furonto» [Industrial Organizations in Japan: A New Frontier of Industrial Sociology], *Shakaigaku Hyoron* [The Japanese Sociological Review], Vol. 12, No. 1, September 1961, pp. 2-6.

<sup>8</sup> Both Abegglen's and Levine's books were translated into Japanese soon after the publication of the original.



between the Japanese and Western industrial organization<sup>9</sup>. This system, which in substance merely indicates a practice of comparatively long years of service and limited labor turnover, is considered by Abegglen and other foreign scholars to be a feudalistic remnant from the Tokugawa Period, *i.e.*, period previous to the Meiji Restoration of 1868<sup>10</sup>. While this view contains some truth in regard to the employment relationship of *shokuin* (office workers, including staff and management personnel), it obviously is a misinterpretation with regard to that of *koin* (shop workers, ranging from apprentices to foremen), who usually occupy the greater part of the total employees. Because it was not until the period of shortage of skilled workers which occurred in the 1920's, *i.e.*, after World War I, that length of service generally became much longer and labor turnover became definitely infrequent. Previous to this period, labor mobility was fairly frequent even in large enterprises. After the end of World War I, however, most of the large enterprises in Japan came to adopt, in order to prevent the shortage of skilled workers, a policy of planned training and long term detention of the newly recruited *koin* group, which resulted in forming the basis of the so-called «permanent» employment system. This practice was later reinforced at the time of shortage of skilled workers during World War II, which was accompanied by legal regulations such as the Labor Mobility Prevention Law. After the end of World War II, the pressure of the counter-discharge movement initiated by the newly organized labor unions has been working toward the direction of continuation of the practice.

In this connection, it is also erroneous to assert, like Abegglen and others, that labor turnover is generally rare in Japan, regardless of the size of an enterprise. For, in the case of minor enterprises in Japan, the ratio of labor turnover is probably as high as that in the Western countries<sup>11</sup>. Besides, it should be noted that the proportion

<sup>9</sup> ABEGGLEN, *op.cit.*, pp. 11ff.

<sup>10</sup> ABEGGLEN, *op.cit.*, pp. 130ff; LEVINE, *op.cit.*, pp. 32ff.

<sup>11</sup> According to the Labor Turnover Survey conducted by the Japanese Ministry of Labor, the ratio of separation for regular workers in manufacturing industries who quit the former establishments during the year 1959 was 27.8 per cent in the case of small-scale enterprises employing 30 to 99 workers, as against 16.1 per cent and 6.7 per cent in larger enterprises with 100 to 499 workers and those with over 500, respectively. The ratio of separation for all manufacturing establishments employing more than 30 workers amounted to 23.9 per cent, which was fairly comparable to the corresponding ratio of 27.2 per cent in Great Britain in the same year. See *Showa 34-nen Rodo Ido Chosa Kekka Hokoku* [Report of the 1959 Labor



of minor enterprises in Japan is much larger than in the West<sup>12</sup>.

From the above, it will be evident how exaggerating it is to state that workers at all levels of the Japanese industrial organization generally hold a «permanent and irrevocable membership»<sup>13</sup>. To emphasize that this employment practice is a «parallel to an essentially feudal system of organization»<sup>14</sup> is virtually the same as to consider the lengthened period of employment which resulted from the recent reinforcement of seniority rules, health and welfare plans, and negotiated pensions in the United States as a «new industrial feudalism»<sup>15</sup>.

Similar misinterpretation can be pointed out with regard to the wage and promotion system and the paternalistic care for the welfare of employees mentioned above. These practices were also established from a certain necessity after the 1920's—in some cases, even during World War II—and therefore, cannot be considered as a remnant carried over from the preindustrial stage. Further, it seems that studies in Japanese industrial relations undertaken by foreign scholars tend to overestimate the control exercised by management over the workers and, at the same time, unjustifiably underestimate the influences of the trade unionism<sup>16</sup>.

It may well be said that such misinterpretations and exaggerations have been inevitable for foreign scholars, who usually are handicapped by language barriers, difference of customs, and limited time of stay for an elaborate research on the actual condition of Japan<sup>17</sup>. They may also try to justify themselves by saying that their studies are published primarily for the reading public of their own country, and are not intended for Japanese social scientists. Even so, as one of those specialized in industrial relations in Japan, the present writer

Turnover Survey], Tokyo, Division of Labor Statistics and Research, Ministry of Labor, 1960.

<sup>12</sup> Statistics compiled from recent census data show that the proportion of minor enterprises employing less than 100 workers, where labor turnover is much more frequent, reaches the high percentage of 61 of the total number of enterprises in Japan, while the corresponding proportions for the United States, Great Britain, and West Germany are only about 25 per cent each. See NIHON SEISANSEI HONBU [The Japan Productivity Center], *Nihon no Chusho Kigyo* [Minor Enterprises in Japan], Tokyo, Nihon Seisansei Honbu, 1958.

<sup>13</sup> ABEGGLEN, *op.cit.*, p. 128.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 131.

<sup>15</sup> Cf. Arthur M. Ross, «Do We Have a New Industrial Feudalism?», *The American Economic Review*, Vol. 48, No. 5, December 1958, pp. 903-920.

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, ABEGGLEN, *op.cit.*, pp. 108-109.

<sup>17</sup> Both Abegglen and Levine admit that their studies have some limitations. Cf. ABEGGLEN, *op.cit.*, pp. xii-xiii; LEVINE, *op.cit.*, p. 31.

cannot remain a passive spectator to the fact that Theory Y is unduly considered to be an authoritative theory not only by the readers in the West but also by those of Japan.

It is the writer's opinion that some Western social scientists who have an anthropological inclination tend to overemphasize the differences in social and cultural background between their own and the non-Western countries, including Japan. One of the most marked examples of such overemphasized differences can be seen in Ruth Benedict's well-known interpretation of Japanese culture<sup>18</sup>. It seems that the advocates of Theory Y are no exception to this rule. What is worse is that the intellectual laymen in Japan, who generally have a strong tendency of admiring the West, are liable to be too lenient toward such exaggerations and misinterpretations made by foreign scholars, which results in forming a variety of distorted pictures of Japanese culture.

## V

Finally, it is the writer's opinion that Theory Y is misleading also in that it underestimates the significance of the rapid and reassuring process of transformation in management policy and industrial relations that has been taking place since the end of World War II, especially the latter half of the 1950's. The factors that appeared to bring about the transformation are as follows: 1) Effects of postwar labor legislation aiming at the protection of the interests of wage earners, represented by the enforcement of the Trade Union and the Labor Standards Laws; 2) influences of trade unionism that has rapidly spread over the country since the end of the war; 3) consequences followed by the introduction of various technological innovations, represented primarily by that of automation, into Japanese industry; 4) changes in the attitudes of industrial workers, especially of the younger generation, toward work and authority in industry, cultivated under the influence of the new system of education and the at least partially democratic social atmosphere in postwar Japan; and 5) factors resulting from the recent rapid growth of Japanese economy such as expansion of business, shortage of skilled workers,

<sup>18</sup> Cf. Ruth F. BENEDICT, *The Chrysanthemum and the Sword: Patterns of Japanese Culture*, Boston, Houghton Mifflin, 1946. The statement made by Jean Stoezel on the «general nature of social relations in Japan», which Abegglen emphatically endorses in his book, seems to contain similar exaggeration and oversimplification. Cf. ABEGGLEN, *op.cit.*, pp. 132-133.



migration of work force from rural to urban districts, increased ratio of labor mobility, and general improvement of national standard of living.

One of the major aspects of the transformation that have been produced from these factors can be seen in a marked decline of «authoritarian» philosophy in Japanese management which was fairly common in prewar years. Since postwar labor legislation and labor union movement have considerably undermined the authority of management, and have greatly restricted the coercive or arbitrary treatment of the employees, it is no longer justifiable to characterize Japanese management as «authoritarian» or «despotic», as is the case with Levine and others<sup>19</sup>. Moreover, unlike most of the prewar workers who came to cities from rural districts depending on their successful seniors in business, the *après-guerre* generation of labor force, who are mostly city-bred and imbued with democratic trends of postwar society, and who have less difficulty in finding another employment as a result of labor shortage, do not readily accept «patriarchal authority» of the employer. Again, with the gradual increase in the «professional» type, as against the «entrepreneur» type of management, there is a declining tendency for management to display their authority and prerogative to the employees.

Another point that should not be underestimated is the fact that benevolent influence and paternalistic care on the part of management are no longer recognized as such by the employees. According to Levine, postwar employers in Japan have dispelled «despotic tendencies inherent in the traditional approaches» and are resurrecting «managerial paternalism of the patriarchal type»<sup>20</sup>. While it is true that there still remain some exceptionally conservative employers who stick to the traditional strategy which demands company allegiance and higher work morale on the part of the employees in compensation for their benevolent attitudes and paternalistic care, the chances that this strategy will succeed are rapidly decreasing. A similar indifference of the employees can be seen, to a certain extent, in regard to the «human relations» approach in management policy which was introduced from America in the late 1940's and has ever since spread over the Japanese industrial world. As against this change in attitudes of the employees, a majority of Japanese management have also changed their attitudes, and have come to think of their welfare activities and various types of allowances not

<sup>19</sup> LEVINE, *op.cit.*, pp. 35; HARBISON and MYERS, *op.cit.*, pp. 127, 256, 262.

<sup>20</sup> LEVINE, *op.cit.*, pp. 53-54.



as their «benefit» to the employees but as a necessary means for keeping up a high level of work efficiency of the employees.

Along with the decline of «authoritarian» philosophy of Japanese management, the traditional practices of maintaining whole personality status distinction between superior and subordinates and of emphasizing intragroup harmony rather than individual competition among the employees, which were prevalent in prewar years, are also gradually giving way. Factors such as standardization of work resulting from the introduction of technological innovations, decline of the prestige accompanied by craftsmanship of skilled workers, and general loss of respect for seniors' authority on the part of the younger generation seem to have caused this transformation. Furthermore, there has been observed a growing tendency for the progressive elements of Japanese management to attach importance to the willingness to participate in the decision-making process of management, rather than the traditional attitude of passive obedience of the employees.

Such traditional system of wage and promotion, as described in Abegglen's book <sup>21</sup>, is also undergoing a transformation. Because of the development of new jobs brought about by technological changes, increase in demands for skilled workers qualified for such newly developed jobs, intensified competition among enterprises in scouting and enticing promising younger workers and experts, and general raise in initial wages corresponding to general improvement of national standard of living, many of the large enterprises in Japan have been forced to adopt a new system of determining wage and promotion on the basis of job specification and achievement of the workers, in addition to their age and length of service. This attempt of management to adopt a new system has been supported by at least some of the labor unions under the slogan of «Equal pay for equal work».

The traditional practice of «permanent» employment cannot be left untouched by the influences of this transformation. To be sure, the tendency of management to detain workers will continue to exist, owing to the shortage of workers resulting from the business expansion. Because of the remarkable growth of economy in recent years, however, management in Japan is made to prefer an aggressive policy of recruiting necessary personnel even by luring them away from other firms to a defensive policy of merely detaining them. There is little doubt that this new attitude of Japanese management

<sup>21</sup> ABEGGLEN, *op.cit.*, pp. 47ff.

will contribute effectively toward the development of a free labor market which enables an unrestricted transfer of workers from one enterprise to another without involving any offsetting disadvantages.

A number of similar instances may be added to explain the effects of the marked change that has recently been taking place in Japanese industry. Examples indicated above, however, will be sufficient to show that the traditional practices characteristic of Japan, though highly estimated in Theory Y, are losing effect in recent years, and that Japanese industry is now showing an unequivocal sign of making progress toward the establishment of an industrial democracy comparable to that of the free nations in the West. Yet, no matter how much it may be democratized and modernized, Japanese industry in the future will doubtless leave a certain tinge of its characteristics. In other words, management philosophy in Japan in 1970, for example, will never be identical with that in America in 1962.



## REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman : A. BRIGGS, University of Sussex

Rapporteur: N. ELIAS, University of Ghana, Legon

The Working Group was an object lesson of the strong as well as the weak points of present-day sociology with regard to the problems of social development. As for the strong points: the working group produced a number of quite excellent case studies. They were centred around two main problem areas — the problems that arise in villages if the traditional order is broken up and the problems that arise again and again in industry with the change in traditional techniques. A wealth of studies from a great variety of countries showed the progress as well as the urgency of sociological studies of the break-up of the traditional order on the village level. Contributions referred among others to changes of this type in Colombia, Egypt, Russia, Burma, Pakistan, Turkey, Greenland and Finland. They dealt with different aspects of this transformation, such as the effects of religion on attitudes towards modernisation and in turn of modernisation on religion, on values in general and on democratic values in particular, on the ranking of occupations, and on the methods of modernisation in highly centralised societies, to mention only a few.

Contributions to «the break with traditionalism» with reference to industry came, among others, from Japan with a striking criticism by K. Odaka of two conflicting views on the role of tradition in the process of modernisation, the one dismissing it, the other praising it; from Russia when, among others, A. A. Zworikin and Academician N. I. Grastchenkow reported on enquiries into workers' attitudes towards the introduction of automation, discussing not only the sociological, but also the psychological and neuro-physiological aspects of the problem, and from the U.S.A. with the stimulating report by W. H. Friedland on the formation and role of elites in a process of modernisation with special reference to African problems.

The discussion brought out more fully the need for systematic comparative studies of such transformations on both levels. A number of those who spoke were impressed by similarities in the dev-



elopmental problems that arise in countries which appear to be very different, such as Iceland and Turkey. Why is it that in some states, such as Colombia, violence becomes endemic without resulting in any basic change in the traditional structure and outlook of governments? Why, in some cases, does it take a long time before basic changes in the structure and outlook of governments affect the traditional order on the village level? Why do attempts to change radically the traditional order in the villages often result in a decline in agricultural production? Those were some of the points raised in the discussion.

A wealth of stimulating and instructive sociological case studies in limited empirical problems of social developments, produced in our group, provided an object lesson of the strength of present-day trends towards a developmental sociology. Seen in perspective, the problems raised by these studies were a striking reminder of the fact that apart from the narrower economic problems a wide range of specifically sociological problems of social development invite closer study if the practical problems of countries in a state of transition from their «traditional» order are to be brought nearer solution.

But the proceedings of the working group also indicated some of the shortcomings of contemporary sociology with regard to the problems of social development. Many of the present standard concepts of sociology, including concepts like structure and function, are wholly static and provide little help and guidance for developmental sociological studies. No sociological theory of social development, suitable as a unifying framework for empirical studies of developmental problems, exists. Hence, although similarities between developmental problems of different countries were often very noticeable in the papers presented in our working group, although, as H. A. Rhee remarked in the discussion, the work of the group provided a striking example of the need for closer collaboration between administrators and theoreticians, the need for a sociological theory of social development appropriate to such tasks has perhaps not found quite the attention it deserves. It was very noticeable throughout the work of our group that the conceptual framework used for discussions on social developments was borrowed from the work of an economic historian, and was, therefore, in many respects not wholly suitable as framework for sociological studies. The Chairman repeatedly drew the attention of the group to the lack of precision in the use of such terms as «break with traditionalism». The evidence provided by several papers, particularly that of U. A. Thein,

showed very clearly that the change of a «traditional» into a more «modern» order of society does not necessarily have the form of one single «break»; it may have the form of a series of major and minor «breaks» or sometimes that of a non-violent and more gradual transition. «Traditionalism» as a label for a specific type of social order may be quite sufficient if one thinks in purely economic terms. As a conceptual guide for the whole range of changes with which sociologists are concerned it is, as the work of our group showed, rather ambiguous and inadequate. My own paper in *The 'Break with Traditionalism' and the Origins of Sociology* tried to show some of the main features of this wider transformation, particularly specific changes in the distribution of power which are probably characteristic of «breaks with traditionalism» everywhere and the corresponding changes in the mode of thinking. Other contributions confirmed the fact that a transition to a more scientific mode of thinking was a general feature of the wider «break».

Several members of our group felt that its work pointed to a task which has yet to be accomplished — towards an undogmatic sociological theory of social development which could serve as a theoretical framework for the empirical studies and for the practical task with which sociologists will be increasingly concerned in the many developing countries all over the earth.



## RELIGION AND DEVELOPMENT RELIGION ET DÉVELOPPEMENT

### THE ROLE OF ISLAM IN THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

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#### INTRODUCTION

«A new religion usually arises in a situation where an extensive social change is required; but where there is not sufficient dynamism apart from religion to bring about that change. Hence religion appears as an ideational system specially linked with certain social changes»<sup>1</sup>. Thus the aim of a new religion is to effect radical changes in the people's mode of living. As such, religion may be considered a major driving force in the social change of society. The potency of the religious institution in the change process is attributed to the fact that its message is a Divine revelation for the welfare of society. For the purpose of delivering the Divine message and propagating its new ideas, an apostle is chosen from amongst the people concerned in the change process. Thus the apostle acts as guide, supervisor and leader. As such, his decisions are examples to be followed; for they are in accordance with the general spirit of the Divine message which he delivers and which is the main source of the new code of behaviour and the new rules of interaction.

Islam is a new religion that superseded Christianity which, in its turn, superseded Judaism. The Qur'anic revelation, which is the basis of this new religion, is a Divine message the aim of which is to change the whole web of the Arab society. The Prophet Muhammad was chosen by God to receive his Divine revelation and to be his apostle for the Arabs. Thus the Qur'an is the first and original source of the

<sup>1</sup> Montgomery W. WATT, *Islam and the Integration of Society*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, p. 182.

religion of Islam, whereas the Traditions of the Prophet Muhammad, known as «Sunnah» or «Hadeeth» (i.e. deeds and words) are the second source of the teaching of the new religion. Faced with new situations and problems, the Prophet acted and gave advice according to the dictates of reason guided by the ethical spirit of the Qur'an.

The practice of exerting the mind to reach decisions according to the general spirit of Islam as expounded in the Qur'an became a rule to be adopted, following the example of the Prophet. After his death, his followers as well as those who came after them resorted to the same practice of exerting the mind to decide on new cases, guided, not only by the Qur'an but also by Traditions, where guidance could only be found in Traditions. Thus «ijtihad» or «the exertion of the mind» has become the main device with which the learned could and still are able to answer new questions, solve new problems and reach decisions to meet the continuous social change and the innovations inherent in the process. Therefore, the real function of the «mujtahids», and later on the «muftis»<sup>2</sup> has been to guide and sanction the process of adaptation. When doubtful questions called for authoritative rulings, the «muftis», who were eminent jurists met this need by «exerting their minds» to discover, from the recognized sources of revealed law and the application of analogy, what the appropriate ruling should be<sup>3</sup>.

The main principle which guided the «'ulama» or the Muslim jurists in giving an answer to a question concerning a new point was the «maslaha» or public interest which also meant the welfare of society<sup>4</sup>. The learned Muslims perceived very clearly the reason for the flexibility of the legal rule with regard to its application; for societies undergo ceaseless changes which necessitate continuous reorganization and adaptation. But it should be borne in mind that the «'ulama» differed in their attitude towards innovations and change. Some of them were tolerant and broad-minded. Others frowned at new practices and were reluctant to give their decision on new cases. They were so conservative as to declare that the door of

<sup>2</sup> These are the scholar-jurists, or the «'ulama», the most important of intellectuals who sponsor the interpretation of the Divine Law, or «shari'a», by the systematic development of the principle of lawfinding and by the practice of delivering legal opinions, or «fatwas», when consulted on doubtful points.

<sup>3</sup> See H. A. R. GIBB and H. BOWEN, *Islamic Society and the West: A Study of the Impact of Western Civilization on Moslem Culture in the Near East*, London, Oxford University Press, 1957, vol. 1, part II, p. 133.

<sup>4</sup> See G. E. VON GRUNEBaum, *Islam: Essays in the Nature and Growth of a Cultural Tradition*, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1961, p. 133.



«ijtihād» was closed after the death of the four Imams who had been the classical «mujtahids»<sup>5</sup>. In this case, they were no longer «mujtahids», but «muqallids», i.e. imitators, in the sense that in reaching decisions on doubtful points, they were required to follow closely the precedents laid down by their eminent predecessors.

It is evident that the development of society depends not only on the system constructed to control its individuals, but also on the leaders who steer its wheel in the right direction keeping pace with new ideas and innovations which, if given due attention and care, would accelerate change. For different reasons beyond the scope of this paper, the East, for many generations, was covered with a dark veil of ignorance that encouraged indolence and propagated despair and self-abnegation. During these dark ages, Islam as a religion did not change; but the people who were responsible for its right interpretation were either incompetent, or unable to do so in the face of fanatic and ignorant, but powerful, opposition.

#### THE GENERAL ROLE OF ISLAM AS A MAJOR FACTOR OF SOCIAL CHANGE IN THE EAST

Islam does not run against natural law, for it suppresses the austerities and the numerous interdictions imposed upon the Jews by the Mosaic law, abolishes the macerations of Christianity, and shows its willingness to steer a middle course recognizing the weakness and frailty of human nature, and the practical necessities of life<sup>6</sup>. It is true that Islam has a tendency towards mysticism, but it is right against asceticism and the exaggeration of austerity, which weakens the body and suppresses the natural drives of man. It exhorts the Muslims to enjoy the bounties of God, provided they obey the precepts of the Qur'anic revelation which forbids excess and extravagance<sup>7</sup>. The fundamental precepts of Islam are the profession of the Divine Unity, prayer, fasting during the month of Ramadan, the payment of «zakāh» or poor-tax and pilgrimage to Mekka. On these five foundations rest the three main pillars of liberty, equality and fraternity. All Muslims profess belief in the Only God whose vigilance is upon

<sup>5</sup> See Maulana Muhammad 'ALI, *The Religion of Islam*, Lahore, The Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at Islam, 1936, pp. 111, 112.

<sup>6</sup> See D. DE SANTILLANA, «Law and Society», in *The Legacy of Islam*, edited by Sir Thomas ARNOLD and Alfred GUILLAUME, Oxford, The Clarendon Press, 1931, p. 288.

<sup>7</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 289.

His people whom He created. Between Him and His believer, there is no mediator. Thus all men are equal in their surrender to the Almighty, the chief ruler and law-giver of the world. Islam has no priesthood, no Church and no sacraments. «The most rigid protestantism is almost a sacerdotal religion, compared with this personal monotheism, unbending, and intolerant of any interference between man and his Creator»<sup>8</sup>. By liberty is meant the power of self-disposal. A freeman has no master but God to whom alone subservience is due. Hence liberty cannot be disposed of *ad lib.*<sup>9</sup>.

Islam is not only a religious institution, but also an integrated social system, which, within a reasonable margin of elasticity, consists of minute regulations and detailed prescriptions for the individual's conduct in all circumstances of life. Submission to the Divine law, or «shari'a», is both a social duty and a precept of faith. He who violates it, not only infringes the legal order, but also commits a sin, for the social and the religious parts of Islam are dovetailed and inseparable. Islam favours every practical activity and inculcates all noble virtues. It holds in great respect commerce, agriculture and every kind of honest labour that leads to good living. Moreover, Islam lays great emphasis on education and places reason on a pedestal; for only with reason can man live as a human being, cherishing his rights and fulfilling his obligations. It is with the gift of reason that man can appreciate God's creation and understand the wisdom behind all the Qur'anic rules and regulations that aim at the prosperity of mankind and the welfare of society. Therefore, Islam in search for truth, prescribes reason, condemns blind imitation and chides those who follow, without discrimination, the habits and ideas of their ancestors.

The Qur'an enjoins friendliness, good temper, hospitality, tolerance, forgiveness, equity, regard for elders; kind treatment of the weak, leniency with the fair sex, care of orphans, tending the sick, aiding the helpless and the destitute. Such being the ethics of Islam, as expounded in the Divine revelation and in the Prophet's Traditions, it is easy to form a clear idea of the exact nature and extent of the change effected thereby in the life and thought of the Arabs, who for some generations after adopting Islam, had an intricate culture and a highly-developed civilization which gave other nations enough ideas to ruminate over for centuries. After the decline and fall of the Abbasids, the East became gradually steeped in ignorance. Owing to

<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 287.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 293.



the narrow-mindedness, weakness and the vested interests of the ruling class including the Muslim intellectuals, who were mostly non-Arab invaders, religion came to a state of stagnation.

Such a lamentable state of affairs, which prevailed for centuries in Islamic countries, called for a religious revival, i.e., the return to the main sources of Islam and the direct approach to the Qur'anic revelation and the Prophet's Hadeeth. «Ijtihad» was then the only course to follow in order to reach decisions upon new points for the welfare of the rapidly growing society; especially after coming into close contact with the industrializing countries of Europe.

For the last hundred years, various efforts have been made to accelerate change in the face of the tyranny of the ruling class and the oppression of colonizers. Both groups, having similar interests, spared no effort to suppress the new ideas which, they believed, would disturb the web of the social interactions and change the status quo to their disadvantage. In many instances, they depended on the loyalty of some weak and ignorant «ulamas» who, for no ulterior motive, were hostile to new developments and, sometimes, consciously or unconsciously, made wrong interpretations of some Islamic principles. Many of them were rigorous formalists who occupied themselves with hair-splitting arguments and scholastic matters.

Such retroactive approaches to Islam were, undoubtedly, against its spirit which urged the faithful to resort to their reason to develop their knowledge and to perfect their understanding. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, the conditions of all Muslim countries were so lamentably backward that an Islamic revival movement was badly needed. The religious intellectuals who championed the new cause for development and reform on true Islamic lines were ardent and ambitious men like Jamal Al-Deen Al-Afghani in Turkey and Egypt, Muhammad 'Abduh in Egypt, Sayyid Ameer 'Ali and Muhammad Iqbal in India and Muhammad Kurd'Ali in Syria. It is due to their ceaseless efforts that Islam has generally become a major factor in the awakening of at least three of these countries.

#### NEO-ISLAMISM AND MODERN TRENDS IN THE UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC

Notwithstanding the continuous contacts between Egypt and Europe during the nineteenth century, especially after the British occupation of the country in 1882, the contrast between a rapidly changing European society teeming with new ideas and philosophies and the conservative Egyptian society holding tenaciously to its stagnant culture

was so well-marked, that it called the attention of those concerned with the reform and rapid development of the country. These ardent young people were divided into two distinct groups. One of them was bent on copying European civilization without reserve. The other saw that the only and best way for effecting a rapid but safe change of the stagnant conditions of the country was to resort to Islam in its pure original form through a movement of a strong religious revival. It goes without saying that both groups aimed at what was later called a rapid process of «modernism». But to the group of the ardent religious reformers, modernism meant «the necessity of intellectual response within a religious faith to the pressure of new circumstances and ideas, as they bear upon traditional dogmas and behaviour»<sup>10</sup>.

The two pioneers of this kind of modernism are Al-Afghani and Muhammad 'Abduh. The former's aim was mainly political, guided by the spirit of Islam. He did not object to the idea of borrowing from Western culture so long as what was borrowed could be adapted to suit the Muslim principle which put the welfare of society above any consideration. In his work «Al Radd'Ala Al-Dahriyyin» [The Refutation of the Materialists], Al-Afghani analyzed the essentials of Islam and pointed out very clearly that the modernist movement which he championed was «not only compatible with, but contingent upon, the retention of the rightly interpreted ancestral faith»<sup>11</sup>. He is well noted for saying: «Sometimes the materialists proclaim their concern to purify our minds from superstition and to illuminate our intelligence with true knowledge, sometimes they present themselves to us as friends of the poor, protectors of the weak and defenders of the oppressed... Whatever the group to which they belong, their action constitutes a formidable shock which will not fail to shake the foundations of society and to destroy the fruits of its labour... Their words would suppress the noble motives of the heart, their ideas would poison our souls and their tentatives would be a continual disturbance of the established order»<sup>12</sup>.

The great success which Al-Afghani achieved in launching his movement for an Islamic modernism materialized in a school of followers headed by his staunch disciple Al-Shaykh Muhammad'Abduh, whose programme was crystallized in a rally for Islamic edu-

<sup>10</sup> 'Othman AMIN, «The Modernist Movement in Egypt», in *Islam and the West*, edited by Richard N. FRYE, the Hague, Mouton, 1957, p. 150.

<sup>11</sup> GRUNEBaum, *op.cit.*, p. 187.

<sup>12</sup> 'Othman AMIN, *Lights on Contemporary Moslem Philosophy*, Cairo, The Renaissance Bookshop, 1958, pp. 62, 63.



cation. Thus Al-Afghani may be considered the philosopher of the Islamic revival movement, whereas Muhammad'Abduh was its practical leader who drew an elaborate plan for the application of his master's main theory for reform. Muhammad'Abduh was a master of practical ideas. He had projects for educating the Muslim child, for spreading simple knowledge to raise the cultural standard of the people, for training the research workers and the propagators of the new cause and, last but not least, for instructing young females. «Those who really desire good for the country», Muhammad 'Abduh wrote, «should turn their attention essentially to education. For it is by reforming education that one will most easily realize all other reforms. But those who imagine that in merely transplanting to their country the ideas and customs of European peoples they will in a short time achieve the same degree of civilization, deceive themselves grossly ... If we give ourselves up to this blind imitation of the West it is then to be feared that we shall only arrive at a superficial and scarcely durable transformation, which will suppress our morals, our customs and ruin all our personality»<sup>13</sup>.

Muhammad 'Abduh explained the deterioration of the Muslim community by the fact that the Muslims had strayed from their true religion. Therefore, he advocated for a far-reaching reform the regeneration of Islam and the restoration of the principle of «ijtihād» on the basis of understanding religion as it had been understood by «Al-Salaf», i.e. the traditionalists. This explains why Muhammad 'Abduh was, undoubtedly, both the greatest and the most influential of Islamic reformers. He left an important group of ardent followers to continue his work. Nearly all the men who became prominent in the cultural life of Egypt during the first three decades of this century had felt in one way or another the influence of his teachings. They all shared his belief that Islam, if correctly interpreted, would provide the adequate solution for modern social, political, economic and cultural problems.

Therefore, the aim of the modernists, since the last quarter of the nineteenth century, has been the removal of the obscurantist spirit that invoked authoritarian loyalties to the rigid schools of law and resisted reasonable and beneficial changes within the Islamic frame of reference. This aim has been achieved neither by the University of Al-Azhar, which has taught Islamic subjects with meticulous thoroughness and along rigidly conservative lines, nor by secular schools and colleges, which have fostered scientific thinking and modern skills, but have not concerned themselves much with Islamic

<sup>13</sup> 'Othman AMIN, «The Modernist Movement in Egypt», *op.cit.*, pp. 167, 168.



teachings<sup>14</sup>. This state of affairs is lamented by those Azharites who have had the opportunity of studying abroad in England, France or Germany<sup>15</sup>.

But there is a third institution that has ably filled the gap between these two extremes. It has made a happy combination between the true spirit of Islam and the scientific spirit of the modern age. This is Dar Al-'Ulum [Home of Science] College, which was founded in 1872. It is strange to say that almost all those who wrote on the modernist movement in Egypt, Egyptians as well as foreign Orientalists, have not mentioned a single word about this important educational institution which has been responsible for many fruitful modernizing efforts<sup>16</sup>. Dar Al-'Ulum College is mainly an Islamic institution; yet it has opened its doors to accommodate and assimilate Western culture. Since 1887, it has taught foreign languages, and a few years later geography, natural history, logic and philosophy. Since 1938, it has also taught psychology and sociology. In 1925, the undergraduates of Dar Al-'Ulum College revolted against the shaykhly dress and began to wear suits. The married graduates of this institution formed the staff who were the first to teach females in state secondary schools. Its old and learned graduates took an active part in reforming Al-Azhar and in teaching at the first secular university, which was officially founded in 1925<sup>17</sup>. At present, two of the champions of the movement of evolutionizing Al-Azhar University are from amongst the famous graduates of Dar Al-'Ulum College<sup>18</sup>.

<sup>14</sup> See Kenneth CRAGG, «The Modernist Movement in Egypt», in *Islam and the West*, *op.cit.*, p. 151.

<sup>15</sup> See Muhammad EL-BAHAY, *Al-Fikr Al-Islami Al-Hadeeth wa Silatuhu bil-Istimar Al-Gharbi* [Modern Islamic Thought and Its Relation to the Western Colonization], Cairo, Mekhaimer Press, 1957, pp. 464 ff.

<sup>16</sup> See Ahmed AMIN, «Al-Halqah Al-Mafqudah» [The Missing Link], *Al-Risalah*, Vol. I, N° 1, January 1933, and AL-BAHAY, *op.cit.* Also see Grunbaum, *op.cit.*, and Watt, *op.cit.* In his article, Ahmed Amin condemns the graduates of Dar Al-'Ulum College for their conservatism and stagnant methods. In the first issue of the Dar Al-'Ulum Review, Professor Mahdi 'Allam wrote a convincing article refuting Professor Ahmed Amin's argument and showed with poignant facts the big role of the graduates of Dar Al-'Ulum College in the Modernist movement in Egypt. See «Al-Halqah Al-Mafqudah» [The Missing Link], *Sahifat Dar Al-'Ulum*, Vol. 1, N° 1, June 1934, pp. 19-26.

<sup>17</sup> See Muhammad ABD AL-GAWWAD, *Taqween Dar Al-'Ulum* [Dar Al-'Ulum Directory], the diamond number on the occasion of the 75th anniversary of the College, Cairo, Dar Al-Ma'arif, 1952.

<sup>18</sup> These are Dr. Mahdy 'Allam, Professor Emeritus and ex Dean of the Faculty of Arts, 'Ain Shams University, and Professor Muhammad Sa'id Al-'Iryan, Undersecretary of State to the Ministry of Education. Both of them are on the Committee of Evolutionizing Al-Azhar University.



This movement aims at making of Al-Azhar a religio-secular university in the full sense of the term. This means that, in a few years time, students will be able to specialize, over and above their Islamic education, in medicine, agriculture, engineering, economics and arts in the new faculties of Al-Azhar University. In addition to that, a Women's college will start in October 1962, providing courses leading to degrees in Arabic literature, Islamic studies, commerce and administration and social studies.

The Modernist Islamic movement in the United Arab Republic gained momentum in the writings of Al-Shaykh Tantawi Jawahri and the ambitious efforts of Al-Shaykh Hassan Al-Banna, who were graduates of Dar Al-'Ulum College<sup>19</sup>.

The former developed the idea that Islam was a religion of reason and modernism, not of resignation and slavish imitation. He wrote a new interpretation of the Qur'an in which he reconciled the Divine revelations with modern scientific theories. Tantawi Jawahry was also a very active social reformer and took a leading part in many associations.

Hassan Al-Banna was both a religious and political reformer who led a movement for the revival of the Islamic social institutions as an attempt towards modernism. However, the fanatic spirit of his movement weakened it and finally led to its destruction.

#### MODERN ISLAMIC INFLUENCE

There is no denying the fact that the Western way of thinking had a well-marked effect on the religious intellectuals who came into contact with the European intelligentsia when they were sent abroad as scholars to study in the famous universities of England, France and Germany. This westernizing movement is vividly described by Professor Gibb who sees that the influence of the West has increased the need for more religious adaptation to the developing sciences and technology<sup>20</sup>. The Muslim intellectuals have an unshaken belief in the Qur'anic revelations. Among the recent attempts on the same line followed by Tantawi Jawahri has been Mr. Nofal's scientific inter-

<sup>19</sup> See 'ABD AL GAWWAD, *op.cit.*, pp. 192-196, 470, 471. Al-Shaykh Hassan Al-Banna was the founder and Guide General of «Jam'iyyat Al-Ikhwan Al-Muslimineen» [Muslim Brothers Association]. It was founded in 1929 and proscribed in 1953.

<sup>20</sup> See Sir Hamilton A. R. GIBB, *Modern Trends in Islam*, Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1947, ch. IV.

pretation of some Qur'anic verses with rather lengthy analysis<sup>21</sup>. His pocket book «Al-Qur'an w'al 'Ilm Al-Hadeeth» [The Qur'an and Modern Science] was so successful that similar attempts have been made by other writers. They have been encouraged by an increasing interest in the scientific interpretation of the Qur'an, which has been shown by many of the younger generation during the last ten years. To explain this trend, the same remarks concerning the current high prestige of religion in present-day America may be fitting. «It seems reasonable to suppose that if the pace of social revolution continues to accelerate in the ratio characteristic of the last one-hundred years, the strain upon individuals will drive them to a continuing exploration of the ultimate issues of life, whether in the name of 'religion' or not ... Is it not true that in the last ten years more than any other men have sought for the brotherhood which would bind them together in mutual awe and reverence toward one another, and toward the ultimate concerns of their lives?»<sup>22</sup>.

It goes without saying that what really matters in the modernist movement is not the external pressures and exogenic factors of social change, but the interior reactions of the custodians and adherents of Islam themselves. It has been succinctly remarked that, «Between Islam and Muslims there is, as there has always been, inevitable mutuality, as the believed and believing»<sup>23</sup>. This is true in the case of the United Arab Republic which did not give up the idea of reforming her political, social, economic and cultural organization on the basis of Islam or, at least, within its broad lines. Thus it has achieved a great deal of its reforming aims, because the religious intellectuals (Al-'Ulama) either kept silent and did not oppose the change, or welcomed and even encouraged it. The most influential reformers, in this respect, have been those who held the position of «Al-Ustath Al-Akber, Shaykh Al-Jami' Al-Azhar» [The grand Professor, Rector of the Azhar Mosque University], strong men like Muhammad 'Abduh, Al-Zawahri, Al-Maraghi, Mustafa 'Abd Al-Raziq and Mahmud Shaltut, the present Grand Professor, in whose rectorship the movement of the evolutionizing of Al-Azhar is taking place.

There is a widespread misconception among the intelligentsia

<sup>21</sup> See 'Abd Al-Razzaq NOFAL, *Al-Qur'an w'al-'Ilm Al-Hadeeth* [The Qur'an and Modern Science], Cairo, Dar Al-Ma'arif, 1959.

<sup>22</sup> Timothy L. SMITH, «Historic Waves of Religious Interest In America», *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, Vol. 332, November 1960, pp. 9-19. This is a special number of Religion in American Society.

<sup>23</sup> Kenneth CRAGG, *op.cit.*, p. 150.



concerning the role of Islam in the social and economic development of the United Arab Republic. They maintain an unrealistic view that the modernist movement, or the westernization campaign has been going on and is steadily gaining momentum irrespective of the opinion of the religious intellectuals. This view is based on the fact that social change is a dynamic continual process which may, sometimes, be impeded, but not completely stopped. This is true only in respect of urban communities and their well-educated inhabitants. But about three quarters of the Muslim population in the United Arab Republic live in rural areas and are still religiously minded. They are always worried about their actions and whether they are doing right or wrong. They consult the local shaykhs, usually the mosque «Imams», or leaders (i.e. preachers) to guide them to the straight path. These Imams, sometimes, direct questions to the official agencies of «ifta'» to give them the correct opinion concerning the points addressed to them.

For some years ending in 1955, Al-Ahram, a morning paper of wide circulation used to publish answers to questions raised by Muslim Enquirers<sup>24</sup>. Muslim reviews such as *Minber Al-Islam* and *Liwa' Al-Islam* often publish «fatwas» given by the Grand Mufti and Shaykh Al-Jami' Al-Azhar. Moreover, the United Arab Republic Broadcasting Station has, for the last few years, been broadcasting a weekly programme «The Friday Lesson» of half-an-hour, during which leading Muslim scholars give their opinion concerning problems sent to the Station by Muslims from all over the Muslim world. Furthermore, the same Broadcasting Station devotes a period every morning to a religious subject in addition to many other talks given on all religious occasions throughout the year. Since the introduction of the television service in the United Arab Republic, various religious features have been successfully presented and most appreciably accepted. It is worth recording that a public opinion test about the best T.V. programme revealed that it was the religious programme «Nur Ala Nur» [Light upon Light], which consists of a symposium on religious matters bearing upon modern problems.

This widespread interest in religious decisions concerning the problems that face a large number of Muslims is a clear proof that Islam still plays and will continue to play an important role in the social and economic life of the people. A recognition of this fact has been shown in the due attention given lately to the training of re-

<sup>24</sup> In 1956, these answers were collected in a book. See A. 'Abd Al-Haleem Al-'Askary, *Min Haqibat Al-Mufti* [Out of the Mufti's Bag], Cairo, Misr Press, 1956.

ligious preachers who are expected to effect a great deal of social change in rural and urban communities; for they are highly respected by their inhabitants. These influential persons form a very strong pressure group in the areas in which they preach and disseminate Islamic knowledge.

During the last decade, many books containing «fatwas» on modern problems have been published. Two of them are written by two eminent scholars, no less than an ex-Grand Mufti (Al Shaykh Hassanain M. Makhluḥ) and the present Grand Rector of Al-Azhar (Al Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut)<sup>25</sup>.

It is revealing that among the salient points discussed in these books are those pertaining to birth control, artificial insemination, interest on savings, shares and bonds, returns given by co-operatives, commission and the use of pawned land. In a country like the United Arab Republic which suffers from an acute population problem, a «fatwa» permitting the use of birth control methods is of paramount importance. At present, there are «fatwas» backing the socialistic laws promulgated in July 1961. Besides, the United Arab Republic Broadcasting Station is transmitting programmes under the headings «Shari'at Al-'Adl Shari'at Allah» [the straight way of justice is the straight way of God] and «Ra'y Al-Deen» [the opinion of Religion] to show how far Islamic principles support such a revolutionary measure in the economic field which aims at raising the standard of living of industrial workers as well as land labourers.

#### THE CONCEPT OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT IN ISLAM

The concept of planning and development in Islam may be traced in the Qur'an in certain verses concerning God's «taqdir», that is His «law or measure which is working throughout the whole of creation...»<sup>26</sup>. The Qur'an says, «Surely we have created everything according to a measure»<sup>27</sup> (i.e. according to a plan). Maulana Muham-

<sup>25</sup> See Al-Shaykh Hassanain, Makhluḥ, *Fatawa Shar'iyah wa Buhuth Islamiyah* [Religious Decisions and Islamic Studies], Cairo, Dar Al-Kitab Al-'Arabi, vol. 1, 1951, vol. 2, 1952. Also see Al-Shaykh Mahmud Shaltut, *Al-Fatawa: Dirasah li Mushkilat Al-Mu'asir fi Hayatihi Al-Yawmiyah w'al-Ammah* [The Decisions: A Study of the Problems of the Contemporaneous Muslim in his Daily and Public Life], Cairo, Al-Azhar, 1959.

<sup>26</sup> Maulana Muhammad 'Ali, *op.cit.*, p. 316.

<sup>27</sup> *The Qur'an*, chapter 54, verse 49. Translation by Maulana M. 'Ali, *op.cit.*, p. 316.



mad 'Ali comments on «taqdir» saying, «Thus the taqdir of everything is the law or the measure of its growth and development»<sup>28</sup>.

Al-Imam 'Ali, the fourth Caliph, says about planning for the future, «Work for this life as if you were going to live forever, and work for the Hereafter as if you were to die tomorrow».

In his answer to a question concerning traditions and evolution, Al-Shaykh Shaltut, the Grand Professor, says, «Our criterion in this respect is that Islam leaves for its followers the right to choose what they deem as fulfilling their scientific, economic, ethical and social awakening... If this is what is meant by evolution, religion (in this case) does not stop at making it permissible, but it makes it obligatory...»<sup>29</sup>.

In his answer to another question about bad innovations, Al-Shaykh Shaltut again points out that, apart from belief and worship, we are free to choose what is best for our welfare according to ages and environments. If we organize and alter conditions, this is not an innovation which affects man's religious attitude and his relation to God. It is an innovation necessitated by evolution which does not approve of standing still and being satisfied with old institutions. In the process of social change, the sons and grandsons should cast away what is unfit for their time. They should try hard to answer the call for development and progress, lest they should lag behind and be kept in isolation, neglected and unheard of. Man is free to manage his worldly affairs in the way best suited to him. He is enjoined to search for truth, to meditate and to work hard for the purpose of reform and development<sup>30</sup>.

In this, the Grand Shaykh was merely expounding the Prophet's Saying, when he was once asked about the best method of pollinating palm trees, «You are better acquainted with the affairs of your worldly life»<sup>31</sup>.

<sup>28</sup> Maulana Muhammad 'ALI, *ibid.*, p. 317.

<sup>29</sup> Al-Shaykh Mahmud SHALTUT, *op.cit.*, pp. 373, 374. Translation by the writer.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 163.

<sup>31</sup> SHALTUT, *op.cit.*, p. 167.

## PAGAN ELEMENTS IN THE RURAL TYPE OF REVEALED RELIGION

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The fact of social evolution related to the influence of religious beliefs in the social life implies the question of greater or lesser resistance that such beliefs are opposing to its different aspects. To be able to take into account the possibility of such an opposition, its forms and the means of coping successfully with it, one is obliged to have a clear idea about the substance and composition of such beliefs. And among such ascertainments, the not least important one has to bring forward the essential difference that exists between religious beliefs in urban areas and those professed in rural regions not affected by continuous processes of industrialization and urbanization.

When in the Sociology of Religion we deal with the impact of religions on the social life, we are inclined to consider concrete religions as given, precedently determined facts, without analyzing what they effectively represent as beliefs of social groups and individual members pertaining to religious communities. There is a bias to contemplate such beliefs as parts of dogmatical complexes contained in professions of faith — Catholic, Orthodox, Moslem or Buddhist. This may be true referring to beliefs professed by ministers and intellectuals in urban areas. But with regards to the population in rural regions there is a difference.

Already a superficial observation of faiths existing in the countryside of various societies shows that it would be a mistake to identify the creeds contained in dogmas of a Christian, Moslem or Buddhist religion, with beliefs as they are effectively professed by members of the same religious group living in the country and pertaining to the peasantry. The people in the countryside may formally adhere to a determinate Christian, Moslem or Buddhist religious group, performing all its rites. Nevertheless a thoughtful analysis of individual and group beliefs shows an inextricable medley of Christian, or Moslem, or Buddhist elements with pagan beliefs. These two groups of elements having different social origins are more or less consistently bound together in a particular creed, whose pagan components vary from one region to another.



A significant part of the urban population pertaining to religious groups frequently believes in charms, omens and other similar stereotypes inherited from their ancestors and considered manifestations of determinate supernatural forces, different from those worshipped in their religious communities. But such people are well conscious of the fact that the superstitions they are observing do not form an integral part of the religion to which they adhere. They observe such superstitious beliefs according to customs existing in their social groups, well aware of the difference that occurs between official dogmas and rites, on one side, and such customary superstitions, on the other.

On the contrary, the rural population, except the ministers of religion, is not aware of such a difference and does not make a distinction between the Christian, or Moslem, or Buddhist elements and the pagan components of their faith. The latter represent the core of peasant religious beliefs, while the observance of Christian, Moslem and Buddhist rites and creeds is only a manifestation of their external form.

This is a consequence of a different evolution of religious beliefs in urban and rural regions. The trait common to all revealed religions is that the origins of their expansion are distinguished by attempts to gain hold of the urban population. So, the revelation of Buddha began in the city of Benares; Paul of Tharsos preached the early Christian creed in cities and towns of the Roman Empire; and the object of Mohammed's revelation was the population of Medina first, and of Mecca second.

As a revealed religion gained a firm hold in the cities, particularly when becoming a State religion in a later phase of its expansion, it was possible to undertake its penetration in close and remote rural regions.

In Europe the diffusion of Christianity in rural regions was met by a stubborn resistance on the part of the peasantry. In order to subdue such an opposition the popes used particular tactics, preferring to attain their object by compromise. Therefore Gregory I gave the following instructions to missionaries going into the countryside: «Do not destroy the sanctuaries of their false gods; instead of that demolish only the idols which are standing there; besprinkle the sanctuaries with holy water and build there new altars. The people will see their sanctuaries still standing and will transfer their religious feeling from the false to the right divinity... Their custom is to sacrifice oxen to their devils; we will offer them rites adequate to substitute such offerings... Further: the Christian holidays must

be set just on the same days, when they are celebrating their feasts...».

The final result of such a policy of compromise was a superposition of Christian forms of worship on pagan religious beliefs. Its consequences are persisting till the present day, particularly in remote rural regions.

The peasant philosophy of life in various parts of Yugoslavia is principally based on pre-Christian religious beliefs. There are a lot of examples showing that the explanation of natural phenomena, upon which is depending the peasant life, was and is given mostly by means of pagan mythological elements.

Such an interweaving of pagan and Christian elements is shown in *Srpsko slovo o nebesima i zemlji* [A Serbian Explanation of Heaven and Earth] — a collection of peasant beliefs: «Of what is the sky made? — Of water! — How many heavens are there? — Seven! — Of what are the Sun, the Moon and the stars made? — Of God's universes! — Of what is the Earth made? — Of watery clay! — What sustains the Earth? — Water! — And what sustains the water? — A great stone! — And what sustains the stone? — Fourwinged sheep! — And what sustains the four sheep? — The fire, whence flow hot springs! — And what sustains that fire? — An oak, firstly planted by all (?!), and the roots of that oak stand on God's might, and God and his might originated and have not an end!»<sup>1</sup>.

With regards to the rites a most striking example of such an interfusion is given by the feast of *slava* (family name day) celebrated not only in rural regions, but in urban too. It was formerly a pagan feast of a kin group — sib or phratry — solemnizing the memory of its protector, one of the dead ancestors. The essence of *slava* is a very ancient cult of fertility, whose purpose was to ensure the fecundity and the successfulness of the whole kin group by intervention and help of their dead ancestor who probably long ago took on this function from the tribal totem-protector. After the conversion to Christianity the functions of this protector — once a living person or totem — were assumed by a Christian saint, who thus became a defender of the whole kin group, and — later — of zadrougas and individual families into which the kin groups did split. Still to-day in Montenegro

<sup>1</sup> M. KOLMAN RUKAVINA - O. MANDIC, *Svijet i život u legendama* [Universe and Life in Legends], Zagreb, 1961, p. 61.



the people pertaining to the same phratry celebrate in their families the same *slava*, and all of them are considered as kinfolk<sup>2</sup>.

It is common place that the figures of Christian saints became an integrated part of folk tales having mythological contents interwoven with pre-christian elements<sup>3</sup>. Another obvious fact is that the peasant universe is populated by all kinds of spirits, good and evil, on whose activity — as the rural folk believe — depend many aspects of their social life<sup>4</sup>.

All these examples show that in the beliefs of the rural population in Yugoslavia exists a high degree of interweaving of Christian and pre-christian religious elements. An analogous phenomenon occurs among the Moslems of the rural regions.

Having ascertained these facts it is necessary to draw an obvious conclusion that there are essentially two types of revealed religion. One is professed by the population of urban areas and corresponds to the dogmatic essence of a Christian or other revealed religion. Another type is peculiar to the peasant population, where the dogmatic elements of a revealed religion are the external form, and the pagan ones the core of peasant religious beliefs.

In the urban areas the people are more or less conscious of the difference existing between the religious beliefs they are professing, the superstitions they are observing as a consequence of inherited customs, and science as a separate field of psychical activity. These three areas are held separated one from another — superstitions not interfering with the observance of religious beliefs and rites, while the scientific activity is deployed apart from superstitions and religious beliefs.

Such a trichotomy does not exist in the countryside. There is not made a distinction between dogmatic beliefs and superstitions, because they are building an inseparable mythological whole, which in the same time gives a more or less fantastic explanation of natural and social phenomena, among which the peasants are living.

This interweaving of dogmatic and superstitious religious beliefs and pseudo-scientific explanations represents one of the great obstacles to the development of rural areas, particularly in the backward regions not influenced by industrialization.

<sup>2</sup> *Op.cit.*, p. 196; O. MANDIĆ, *Od kulta lubanje do kršćanstva* [From the Cult of Sculls to Christianity], Zagreb, 1954, pp. 89-90.

<sup>3</sup> YUGOSLAV ACADEMY OF SCIENCES AND ARTS, *Zbornik za narodni život i običaje Južnih Slavena* [Collection for the Folk Life and Customs of Southern Slavs], Zagreb, vol. XXX, pp. 179-210.

<sup>4</sup> *Op.cit.*, vol. XIII, p. 96; vol. XIX, p. 120.

## RELIGION, BUREAUCRACY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH

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In Max Weber's otherwise so lucid studies on the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism, the relationship between these elements during the Golden Age of the Dutch United Republic remains in a hazy twilight.

On the one hand, Weber stresses that contemporary foreign observers ascribed the tremendous growth of the Dutch economy in the first half of the seventeenth century to Dutch Calvinism<sup>1</sup>. On the other hand, he appears to have been aware that many of the patrician merchants of Holland were by no means Calvinists but members or sympathizers of a more liberal branch of Protestantism: the so-called Arminians, followers of Arminius, Professor of Theology in Leiden. Even after the Arminians were ousted from the official Church, in 1619, liberal orientations remained strong among the richer merchants. Weber notes that the Arminians rejected the orthodox doctrine of predestination and had no part in the inner-worldly asceticism considered by him one of the psychological roots of the rise of modern capitalism. Surprisingly enough, as appears from one of his footnotes, Weber considered this aspect, in connection with his thesis, «without interest» or even of «negative interest»<sup>2</sup>.

In another footnote<sup>3</sup> — one has quite often to look for Weber's main arguments into his footnotes — he elaborates his view of the Dutch case more explicitly. He acknowledges that Dutch Puritanism showed less expansive power than its British counterpart. But his argument seems to be that the Calvinist ethic and the ascetic spirit, which had called forward the rising of the Dutch against the Spanish king in the second half of the sixteenth century, began to weaken in Holland as early as the beginning of the seventeenth century. Evidently, in his view, the rapid rise of Dutch economic power was still related to the Protestant ethic, but its force had been somewhat im-

<sup>1</sup> Max WEBER, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism*, translated by Talcott PARSONS, 5th ed., 1956, p. 43.

<sup>2</sup> WEBER, *op.cit.*, p. 217 (ch. IV, n. 1).

<sup>3</sup> WEBER, *op.cit.*, p. 273 (ch. V, n. 67).



paired by the ascension to power of the patrician regents, whom Weber calls «a class of *rentiers*»<sup>4</sup>.

The inadequacy of Weber's theory for a clarification of the Dutch case has been pointed out by his manifold critics more than once<sup>5</sup>. Tawney has argued that the rise of a positive attitude to economic growth was a comparatively late development within Calvinism<sup>6</sup>. Hyma has shown the role of other denominations and spiritual currents in the process of economic development within the Dutch Republic, and more in particular the specific contribution provided by the Arminians<sup>7</sup>, generally called «Remonstrants» in Holland, a term derived from the *Remonstrance* presented in 1610 by the statesman John of Oldenbarnevelt<sup>8</sup>. Robertson has called attention to the importance of the rise of the Renaissance state and to the ascension of merchants to a position of influence in the state<sup>9</sup>.

Whereas Weber, in his assessment of the role of Calvinism within Dutch society, appears to perceive a declining influence of this creed in the first half of the seventeenth century, according to the view held by Dutch historians the actual development was rather the other way round. At the end of the sixteenth century a rather small percentage of the population of the Netherlands could be called Calvinist, and the adherents of this creed were not to be counted among the people in the forefront of economic growth, as prosperous merchants were rare among them at that time. In the course of the seventeenth century, however, their number and their power increased; and though, after the short period of persecution of the Remonstrants by Stadtholder Maurice, Prince of Orange, culminating in the execution of his rival Oldenbarnevelt (1619) and lasting until his death (1625), his successor and younger brother Frederick Henry (1625-1647) pursued a more liberal policy towards Arminian trends, the second quarter of the seventeenth century is still generally viewed as a period of an increasing impact of Calvinism upon social life in

<sup>4</sup> WEBER, *op.cit.*, p. 169.

<sup>5</sup> One of the best surveys of earlier critical studies of Weber's thesis has been published in Dutch by R. F. BEERLING, *Protestantisme en kapitalisme. Max Weber in de critiek* (1946).

<sup>6</sup> R. H. TAWNEY, *Religion and the Rise of Capitalism*, Pelican Ed., 1938.

<sup>7</sup> ALBERT HYMA, *The Dutch in the Far East*, 1942, p. 10 ff.; IDEM, *Christianity, Capitalism and Communism*, 1937, p. 144.

<sup>8</sup> JOHN LOTHROP MOTLEY, *Life and Death of John of Barneveld*, 1874, Vol. I, pp. 384-385.

<sup>9</sup> H. M. ROBERTSON, *Aspects of the Rise of Economic Individualism*, 1933, p. 56 ff., and more in particular pp. 86-87.

the Netherlands<sup>10</sup>. According to the thorough investigation undertaken by Beins, however, even at that time the economic tenets of Dutch Calvinism could hardly be called conducive to the growth of a capitalist spirit<sup>11</sup>.

Therefore, it is beyond doubt that the economic growth of the Dutch Republic during its Golden Age was largely due to forces other than the Protestant ethic as defined by Max Weber. And the inapplicability of Weber's thesis to the Dutch case has been of some help to those concerned with European religious history in bringing about a more balanced appreciation of the ultimate value of his brilliant conception.

One is tempted to ask to what extent the Dutch case might do more than serve a negative goal only: the disproving of part of Weber's thesis. In view of the fact that an important part of the present discussion regarding Weber's thesis is centred on the problem of its applicability in the modern Asian setting, I have set about to inquire whether a more thorough analysis of Dutch economic growth might contribute towards a better understanding of the relationship between religion and economic development in the Far East. It would appear that recent investigations in that field have carried the problem to a point where such a comparison may be fertile.

In his study of *The Origin of Modern Capitalism in Eastern Asia*, Norman Jacobs has attempted to draw a comparison between two great Far Eastern countries and societies — China and Japan. Jacobs states his central problem in this way: «Why did modern industrial capitalism arise in one East Asian society (Japan), and not in another (China)?»<sup>12</sup>. In accordance with Weber's concept, Jacobs endeavours to detect religious forces comparable with the Protestant ethic, but he is not able to find any: «there is no positive logical link between Japanese religion and the rising capitalist forces as such»<sup>13</sup>. Still, he clings to the belief that «Japan developed capitalism spontaneously»<sup>14</sup>. Thus Jacobs arrives at the conclusion that in Japan, «although no force arose positively to support the cause of modern

<sup>10</sup> See for example Conrad BUSKEN HUET, *Het land van Rembrandt*, II, 5th ed., 1920, p. 105; Pieter GEYL, *The Netherlands in the Seventeenth Century*, 2nd ed., I, 1961, p. 77 ff.

<sup>11</sup> E. BEINS, «Die Wirtschaftsethik der Calvinistischen Kirche der Niederlande 1565-1650», *Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis*, Vol. XXIV, 1931, p. 81 ff.

<sup>12</sup> Norman JACOBS, *The Origin of Modern Capitalism in Eastern Asia*, Hong-Kong, 1958, *Preface*, p. IX.

<sup>13</sup> JACOBS, *op.cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>14</sup> JACOBS, *op.cit.*, p. 216.



capitalism»<sup>15</sup>, there was at least no dominant ideology opposing its rise. On the other hand, the dominant Confucian ideology in China was definitely inimical to the development of capitalism. Jacobs even goes so far as to label China, in accordance with K. A. Wittfogel's view, as an example of an «Oriental Society» apparently incapable of independent economic growth<sup>16</sup>.

Much more enlightening is Robert N. Bellah's attempt to clarify the interdependence between religious values and economic growth in his brilliant work *Tokugawa Religion*. Jacobs does not attempt to draw any conclusions from the fact that, as he admits, «the religious values of Japan in the mid-nineteenth century, if they can be related to non-religious behaviour at all, were concerned with the problem of the establishment of a modern centralized state»<sup>17</sup>. Bellah, on the other hand, uses this striking phenomenon as a starting point for a searching analysis. Japan remains a riddle only to those who view world history from the usual platform occupied by Western observers, to whom there exists but one road to economic progress: the way of private capitalism. To those who share this view, there remains an aura of mystery about the question to what extent capitalism in Japan might be seen as a product of «spontaneous» growth, in view of the powerful state intervention during the Meiji period.

To Bellah, Japan is not a case apart; it only «takes on special significance when compared with other non-Western societies»<sup>18</sup>. Whereas industrialization in the West has been the product of a slow process of accumulation, industrialization in the East «has been government-controlled or government-sponsored, because only the government has been able to marshal the requisite capital»<sup>19</sup>.

Therefore, Bellah is not at all put out of countenance when he finds that religious values in Tokugawa Japan were not as positively correlated with the growth of private capitalism as would be required in order to justify an interpretation of Japanese economic history in Weberian terms. Nor does he feel any need to reverse Weber's basic thesis by stating, as Jacobs does, that the «absence» of impeding ideological factors would be enough to produce a «spontaneous» growth of capitalism out of a society with a «feudal»

<sup>15</sup> JACOBS, *op.cit.*, p. 211.

<sup>16</sup> JACOBS, *op.cit.*, p. 217.

<sup>17</sup> JACOBS, *op.cit.*, p. 214.

<sup>18</sup> Robert N. BELLAH, *Tokugawa Religion. The Values of pre-industrial Japan*, Glencoe, 1957, p. 192.

<sup>19</sup> BELLAH, *op.cit.*, p. 193.

structure. What Bellah tries to establish is that «Tokugawa Religion» contained several elements conducive to an ideology which during the Meiji period could bring about a profound government-sponsored economic change. It was the *samurai* class of aristocratic officials, not the merchants, who were the bearers of the new economic spirit. Principles of *samurai* ethics, as applied to the modern industrialized setting, are listed by Bellah as follows<sup>20</sup>:

- Art. 1. Do not be preoccupied with small matters but aim at the management of large enterprises.
- Art. 2. Once you start an enterprise be sure to succeed in it.
- Art. 3. Do not engage in speculative enterprises.
- Art. 4. Operate all enterprises with the national interest in mind.
- Art. 5. Never forget the pure spirit of public service and *makoto*.
- Art. 6. Be hard-working and frugal, and thoughtful to others.
- Art. 7. Utilize proper personnel.
- Art. 8. Treat your employees well.
- Art. 9. Be bold in starting an enterprise but meticulous in its prosecution.

In Bellah's view, then, the correlation between religion and bureaucracy was decisive in Japanese history. Whereas according to Jacobs, apparently, the correlation between bureaucracy and economic growth can only be negative, to Bellah it is precisely «a strong polity» which has accounted for the astounding growth of the Japanese economy.

Moreover, in Bellah's view there is no basic contrast between the Japanese case and the Chinese. Bellah, who is much more realistic in his assessment of what is happening in China and the Soviet Union, apparently rejects the «Oriental Society» approach advocated by Wittfogel. «China... since its shift from the traditional integrative values to the Communist political values has shown a marked spurt in industrialization and can be expected to join Japan and Russia as the third great non-Western society to industrialize.» And Bellah concludes with the observation that «political values and a strong polity would seem to be a great advantage and perhaps even a prerequisite for industrialization in the 'backward' areas of today's world»<sup>21</sup>.

Bellah's lucid analysis inspires us to inquire into its wider impli-

<sup>20</sup> BELLAH, *op.cit.*, p. 187.

<sup>21</sup> BELLAH, *op.cit.*, p. 193.



cations. If economic growth in the present world may be due to factors which can hardly be considered as «capitalistic» in the traditional sense, one is easily tempted to reconsider Weber's thesis in the light of recent developments outside Europe. Just as Weber's theory was developed by comparing the Protestant ethic with religious values in the Asian world, recent experiences in the same part of the world may provide an indication of which direction we should look for a revision of Weber's concept.

To put our new problem briefly: if state intervention is a decisive element in producing economic growth in the world of to-day, it may well be that past developments in the Western world were much less occasioned by «private» capitalism than has been generally assumed by Western observers grown up in a world which considered private initiative the decisive key to economic growth. In his analysis of the impact of different religious values Max Weber, too, started from the assumption that it was the attitudes of private capitalists that mattered. In this connection he hardly paid any attention to the spirit of bureaucracy, to other aspects of which he devoted some of the best chapters of his *magnum opus*: *Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft*. To quote Bellah, who also has detected this weak spot in the accepted approach to Western economic history: «The orthodox view of European economic history has generally considered the 'interference' of the state in the economy as inimical to economic development, though specific policies were often viewed as favorable. A general consideration of the relation of the polity and political values to economic development in the West might significantly alter the traditional view»<sup>22</sup>. As far as I am aware, Dr. Bellah has never elaborated this point.

It appears to me that the Dutch case, as expounded above, might provide a clue for further inquiry in this direction.

In Max Weber's opinion, mercantilism should be viewed as a transfer of the capitalistic ways of profit-seeking to the sphere of government. «The state is treated as if it consisted exclusively of capitalist entrepreneurs»<sup>23</sup>. In Weber's system, therefore, mercantilism was a phenomenon which could arise only after capitalism as a mode of production had attained its full growth. To Weber, mercantilism was born in Britain, as an alliance between capitalist in-

<sup>22</sup> BELLAH, *op.cit.*, p. 192.

<sup>23</sup> MAX WEBER, *Wirtschaftsgeschichte*, 1924, p. 296. (The English translation published in 1927 and 1951 under the title *General Economic History*, was not available to me.)

terests and the state<sup>24</sup>. The British mercantilist policy was primarily directed against Dutch trade. On the other hand, in Weber's time it was still a fashion among German students of economic history to consider the Netherlands of the first half of the seventeenth century as a country cherishing the principle of free trade; Laspeyres had written that in no other country were economic attitudes as far distant from the theories which Adam Smith characterized as «mercantilistic» as they were in the Netherlands<sup>25</sup>.

A different view is held by Albert Hyma. He recalls that even early in the seventeenth century Walter Raleigh had observed «that the Dutch government was vitally interested in promoting the welfare of its merchants wherever they might be engaged in commerce»<sup>26</sup>. In Raleigh's view «the government was exceedingly efficient in supervising all imports and exports, and in negotiating with foreign governments who had molested the Dutch merchants». According to Robertson, these remarks are wrongly attributed to Sir Walter Raleigh, since they were actually made by John Keymor<sup>27</sup>. The French archbishop Huet had also remarked that the States General «omitted nothing all that time to increase their trade where it was already established, or to establish it where they never had established it before». Hyma goes on to discuss several instances of state intervention on behalf of Dutch trade in greater detail, such as, for example, stimulation of the importing of vast amounts of raw materials, and the assistance provided to the exporting of manufactured goods. He also mentions the measures taken in order to prevent the imposition of any new customs or imposts on the navigation of the five great rivers of Germany and concludes that the Dutch «perfectly understood the good points of mercantilism»<sup>28</sup>. Moreover, the influence which the statesman Oldenbarnevelt brought to bear to call into life the United East India Company as a monopolistic commercial body (1602) is an outstanding example of official intervention in private capitalistic enterprise.

Who were those officials who played such an active part in the economic growth of the young Republic? They were the very «regents» whom Max Weber, in the few lines devoted to the Netherlands in his *Protestant Ethic*, dismissed as mere *rentiers*! That

<sup>24</sup> WEBER, *op.cit.*, p. 298.

<sup>25</sup> E. LASPEYRES, *Geschichte der volkswirtschaftlichen Anschauungen der Niederländer*, 1863, p. 134.

<sup>26</sup> Albert HYMA, *The Dutch in the Far East*, p. 14 ff.

<sup>27</sup> See ROBERTSON, *op.cit.*, p. 66.

<sup>28</sup> HYMA, *op.cit.*, p. 18.



is what these patricians became at a much later stage, when the Republic was past its peak. But in the period generally considered decisive for the rise of the Republic, in the first decades of the seventeenth century, they were for the most part vigorous and efficient administrators who were at the same time wealthy merchants actively interested in trade. And even after many of them had retired from active trade and had developed a more aristocratic style of life, in the second quarter of the seventeenth century, they remained enterprising gentlemen actively engaged in such pursuits as the reclamation of land.

The great majority of those people who led the young Republic during its flowering, were different indeed from the Puritan type considered by Weber as characteristic of the capitalist pioneer. Some of them were Calvinists, as for example the burgomaster of Amsterdam, Reynier Pauw, Oldenbarnevelt's great adversary, though the two of them had together played a prominent part in the foundation of the United East India Company. But the large majority of the regents and wealthy merchants belonged to a different type, as Weber himself acknowledges. Except for a short period after Prince Maurice had switched his allegiance to the Calvinist faction, the moderates and those sympathizing with Arminian trends formed a majority among the leading regents of Amsterdam. The Dutch historian Johan E. Elias, who has written a standard work on the history of the City Fathers of Amsterdam, notes twenty regents, among them six future burgomasters, in a list of those who in 1628 signed a petition to the city council of Amsterdam in behalf of the Remonstrants; most of the other signatures were from prosperous and prominent people as well. The same year Calvinist citizens sent a petition to the States of Holland complaining of the slack attitude of the Amsterdam authorities towards the Remonstrants. There was only one regent among the signatories; most of the others were shopkeepers<sup>29</sup>.

Apparently, during the flowering of the Republic the majority of those who were most active in developing large-scale capitalistic enterprise either belonged to the Arminian Remonstrants or were more or less indifferent in religious matters. An outstanding example of this type of administrator was the burgomaster of Amsterdam, Andries Bicker, who in the second quarter of the seventeenth century equalled or even surpassed Prince Frederick Henry in political power, and was once ridiculed in a satirical poem as aspiring to

<sup>29</sup> Johan E. ELIAS, *De vroedschap van Amsterdam 1578-1795*, I, 1903, p. LII, n. 5.

become the «sovereign» of the Netherlands. For example, it was he who brought about Dutch intervention in the war between Sweden and Denmark in behalf of the former, in order to enforce free passage through the Sound (1645).

The question arises to what extent the enterprising spirit of the Remonstrant merchants and regents could be attributed to their religious convictions in a positive way similar to the relationship between the Protestant ethic and the spirit of capitalism as elaborated by Weber. Should we attribute the sober and restrained way of life of the Dutch merchants in the early decades of the Golden Age, admittedly one of the prerequisites for capitalistic enterprise, at least to a certain extent, to their religious convictions? Or is it more probable that this way of life can largely be accounted for by the bourgeois origin of this patrician class, the members of which had not yet learnt to enjoy the fruits of their toil in opulence, as more matured aristocracies are accustomed to do?

At first sight, it might appear that the flowering of Dutch enterprise should rather be attributed to the absence of an all-pervasive conditioning of human actions by religious motivations, than to the positive qualities of the dominant religion: several contemporary foreign observers have attributed the prosperity of the Dutch Republic to the liberal attitude towards alien religions. Tawney<sup>30</sup> quotes William Temple, William Petty and de la Court as having attributed the prosperity of the Dutch to the fact that every man could practise whatever religion he pleased. If this were true, it would be indifference of moderation in religious matters that would account for economic growth, rather than the positive content or spirit of a specific religion. In that case, economic growth should by and large be attributed to the general spirit of humanism prevalent since the Renaissance, to the inquisitiveness of the adventurous human mind open to new discoveries, and to the absence of inhibitions rooted in religious dogma<sup>31</sup>.

But upon closer scrutiny it appears possible that the positive ideology of the Remonstrants fulfilled a more active role in the young Republic.

Whereas the original concept of the *Remonstrance*, drafted by the Arminian theologians after the death of Professor Arminius of Leiden, had the character of a religious credo and of a justification

<sup>30</sup> TAWNEY, *op.cit.*, p. 187.

<sup>31</sup> Jan en Annie ROMEIN, *De lage landen bij de zee*, Phoenix Pocket, 4th ed., II, 1961, pp. 133-134.



of Arminian exegetics, the final text, as amended by Oldenbarnevelt and presented by him in 1610 on behalf of the «Remonstrants» to the States of Holland, is said to have had a different character<sup>32</sup>. It had become a political document invoking the intervention of the state to guarantee freedom of worship to the Arminians. Thus, the relationship between State and Church was brought into play, and there are even indications that Oldenbarnevelt, whose personal convictions may have been nearer to the Calvinists than to the Arminians, was induced to make this move mainly in order to strengthen the position of the state. He represented in essence the regent class who could not bear the interference of dogmatic and narrow-minded clergymen in their worldly affairs. And Grotius, Oldenbarnevelt's famous companion in the struggle between the Remonstrants and the Calvinist Contra-Remonstrants, even went so far as to advocate the imposition of the Arminian religious doctrine as an official theology to be proclaimed by the state. On the other hand, it was also for political reasons that Prince Maurice sided with the fanatical Contra-Remonstrants, in order to defeat his adversary Oldenbarnevelt. There is a story — its authenticity is not beyond doubt — that before taking his dramatic decision, Maurice said that he really did not know whether predestination was green or blue<sup>33</sup>.

Weber maintains that the dogma of predestination contributed to the Calvinists' determination in worldly affairs. But at the time of the struggle between the Remonstrants and the Contra-Remonstrants it was precisely the former who, in rejecting predestination, based their position on a belief in the ability of man to improve his ways by exerting himself. In this case, such a rejection may have functioned as a stimulus to an energetic pursuit of the tasks with which the Dutch administrators were burdened.

A closer study of the Remonstrant movement and its relation to the bureaucratic ethic still needs to be undertaken. It is evident that there is an enormous distance between the appeal for religious tolerance supported by Oldenbarnevelt on behalf of the Arminian «libertines» (as they were called by their adversaries) and State Shintoism as developed in Imperial Japan during the Meiji-period. Still, as far as the interplay between religious beliefs and bureaucratic proficiency is concerned, a further inquiry into parallel phenomena might appear to be worth while.

Such a study should include the further role of state intervention

<sup>32</sup> H. Y. GROENEWEGEN, «Arminius en de Remonstrantie», in G. J. HEERING (ed.), *De Remonstranten*, 1919, p. 68 ff.

<sup>33</sup> ROMEIN, *op.cit.*, II, p. 38.



in the process of development of modern capitalism. In the nineteenth century, fierce competition from British interests made it impossible for German industry to flourish without strong support from governmental institutions. Werner Sombart has clearly demonstrated the role played by the Deutsche Reichsbank in promoting German industrial development<sup>34</sup>. Though the shares of the Reichsbank were in private hands, the directors of the bank were officials nominated by the Kaiser. Sombart calls the bank a cross-breeding of capitalist entrepreneurship and «old-Prussian correctness»<sup>35</sup>. This expression may provide an indication that a further inquiry into the ideology and religious beliefs of Prussian bureaucrats would contribute to a better insight into the ideological components of economic growth<sup>36</sup>. The influence of other governmental measures, such as restrictive tariffs upon the expansion of German modern industry throughout the nineteenth century should also be thoroughly reconsidered without any pre-conceptions about the benefits of economic liberalism.

The present analysis may throw fresh light upon the parallelism between the role of religious reform in Western Europe and in Far Eastern countries. Last year in a paper on «Religious Reform Movements in South- and Southeast Asia»<sup>37</sup>, I attempted to distinguish several stages in the development of religious attitudes towards emergent capitalism. I pointed out that, whereas the first reaction of reformists *vis-à-vis* capitalist developments may be one of rejection, a new trend develops after the self-reliant bourgeois has begun to yearn for an optimistic ideology which would affirm the possibility of increasing the productive forces of mankind. «The prosperous merchants, modern administrators and those engaged in liberal professions asked from their religion only a sanctification of their endeavours to expand their enterprises and radius of action, and to exist easily, comforted by their own enlightened views.» Within Christianity, I mentioned the Dutch Remonstrants as an early example of a reformist movement of this type, and then continued with an enumeration of several parallels in the more recent history of Asia. Further, I pointed to a third stage in the development of these religious movements: the stage when they tend to lose their

<sup>34</sup> Werner SOMBART, *Die deutsche Volkswirtschaft im 19. Jahrhundert und im Anfang des 20. Jahrhunderts*, 4th ed., 1919, p. 171 ff.

<sup>35</sup> SOMBART, *op.cit.*, p. 175.

<sup>36</sup> See also SOMBART, *op.cit.*, p. 64, for the role played by the Prussian bureaucracy in promoting economic growth before the nineteenth century.

<sup>37</sup> *Archives de Sociologie des Religions*, 1961, no. 12, p. 53 ff.



liberal character and become more rigid, after science and rationality have taken root amongst the petty bourgeoisie. Here I had in view the Protestant ethic, as conceived by Weber, which praises strenuous effort in commerce or manufacture as in itself pious. Those who looked for Weberian parallels in modern Asia were generally concerned most of all with a study of such groups of reformist traders of the latter «Puritan» type as the most probable agents of future economic growth. For example, Clifford Geertz, who has made a penetrating study of a region in East Java (Indonesia)<sup>38</sup>, apparently looks primarily to the stern and pious Moslems, the *santris*, who represent predominantly a petty urban business class of the *bazaar*-type, for the future agents of economic growth in Java<sup>39</sup>. It is a group of shop-keeping traders among whom Islamic reformism has firmly taken root. Geertz, thus, envisages present developments in an Asian country from a Western point of view that might be less appropriate for countries outside the West.

As I pointed out in my paper quoted above, it would appear improbable that in modern Asia the bearers of an ideology appropriate for a petty trading class might be granted sufficient time to imitate the role played by a more rigid Protestantism in Western Europe. The foregoing analysis makes it more likely that the builders of a modern economy should be looked for among efficient administrators taking over some of the qualities and conceptions developed in previous times by the Dutch Remonstrants, and latterly by their aristocratic and bureaucratic counterparts in modern Asia. Still, as economic growth ultimately presupposes a propensity to save, the desire «to exist easily», as shown by such social groups, should not predominate; the general way of life has to be sober and restrained, lest the effort to raise production be offset by increasing consumption.

In the case of Javanese society, for example, this might mean that in looking for the most propitious breeding ground for modern industrial growth, one should turn to tendencies manifesting themselves outside the class of petty traders representing a pious *santri* civilization. It may well be that the *santri* have no future under present world conditions and will be overwhelmed by groups with a different outlook. I would suggest that an ideology conducive to

<sup>38</sup> Clifford GEERTZ, *The Religion of Java*, 1960.

<sup>39</sup> See, for example, Geertz's mimeographed comparative study of two Indonesian Towns. *Social change and Economic Modernization in two Indonesian Towns*, 1959, ch. 3, p.25. His view of economic leadership in Bali is, however, different inasfar as the author stresses the importance of aristocratic elements as a dominant entrepreneurial group.

modern industrial growth in Java is much more likely to be developed, in the long run, among the modern representatives of the aristocratic *priyayi* class, which is more or less comparable with the regent class in the Dutch Republic, and among leaders emerging from the Javanese common people, the so-called *abangan*, whose general attitude towards life Geertz apparently considers incompatible with economic growth because of their collectivism rooted in Javanese rural tradition. In my opinion, this tolerant and syncretistic *abangan* collectivism, combined with the administrative qualities fostered among a modernized *priyayi* class, might well provide a basis for the creation of a bureaucratic apparatus and of modern organizational forms, such as cooperatives and unions, institutions which are, in the contemporary setting, much more conducive to industrial growth than old-style capitalism based on individual profit-making.

Max Weber's basic problem was to explain, why the modern industrial world was born in the West and nowhere else. As he could not conceive of a way other than the capitalist, he searched for psychological causes operating in the West which might account for the birth of a capitalist spirit, exclusive to this part of the world, out of comparable social and economic conditions — and these he found in religious values distinguishing the West from all types of oriental societies.

Since our experience goes beyond that of Weber, we have to shift to a different problem: why is it that the East has tended to follow a way to modern development different from the West? To what extent should our account of what happened in the Western world be revised on the basis of more recent experience in Asia?

To all appearances, the argument I have developed here runs counter to Weber's way of reasoning and, indeed, implies a reversal of his thesis, since the Protestant ethic combined with the spirit of capitalism as main agents of economic progress are replaced, in my hypothesis, by a sober and restrained humanism combined with loyalty to the state. But in its essentials Weber's approach may still have the fecundity to stimulate a more penetrating analysis of the problem. Over against the theoretical Marxists who sustained the thesis that religious ideologies were nothing but the reflections of economic conditions, Weber posited the autonomous significance of the spiritual forces dormant in religion. It may well be that in the relationship between ideology and bureaucracy as elaborated above, spiritual forces retain their autonomous role. Over against those who



would pretend that the spirit of those administrators who foster economic growth is nothing but a reflection of the existing economic forces, I hazard to put forward the thesis that the practice in countries under Marxist domination has demonstrated the spiritual strength dormant in an ideology. Without their Spartan sobriety and their strict devotion to their cause, the builders of modern industrial states in the East would never have been able to build a counterpart of the imposing edifice of British eighteenth century industrial society, which, according to Max Weber, was based on the Protestant ethic.

## RAPPORT DE LA DISCUSSION

Présidents : W. F. WERTHEIM, Université d'Amsterdam  
O. MANDIC, Université de Zagreb  
Rapporteur: H. DESROCHE, Collège coopératif, Paris

### *Première séance*

Cette première séance fut consacrée aux quatre communications concernant la problématique wébérienne et son application éventuelle à l'Islam asiatique.

Dans sa communication, *La thèse de Weber et l'Islam dans l'Asie du sud-est*, S. H. Alatas entend à la fois réfuter et confirmer les diagnostics de Weber dans ses essais sur la religion de l'Inde et de la Chine. Les réfuter, car il ne partage pas l'opinion de Weber attribuant le non développement de l'Asie à l'influence restrictive de ses religions. Les confirmer, car «l'esprit du capitalisme moderne peut naître en Asie de l'intérieur d'elle-même» et peut être porté à l'actif de la morale économique musulmane. Cependant cette influence éventuellement positive de l'éthique musulmane est exposée aux vicissitudes des situations historiques et sociologiques concrètes. Ainsi, «l'esprit capitaliste moderne ne se retrouve pas parmi les Malaisiens musulmans, mais il est très prononcé parmi les Indiens musulmans engagés dans les affaires». De deux côtés, la thèse de Weber se trouverait donc mise en question: d'une part, à l'esprit du capitalisme peut correspondre une éthique économique autre que l'éthique protestante et, d'autre part, cette autre éthique économique peut correspondre à d'autres attitudes que l'esprit d'entreprise et de conquête économique, telles l'évasion, ou l'indifférence au progrès technique.

C'est vis-à-vis des perspectives de modernisation que A. W. Eister, *Les fonctions de la religion dans un pays en voie de développement: l'Islam au Pakistan*, essaie de préciser les attitudes de l'Islam au Pakistan. Comme pour toute autre religion, une distance sociale s'établit entre l'Islam tel qu'il est défini par ses interprètes autorisés, et l'Islam tel qu'il est vécu par ses affiliés. C'est à ce second niveau que le rapport propose une typologie des attitudes musulmanes pakistanaises devant la modernisation: 1) *traditionaliste*: celle qui affirme l'unité de la religion avec tous les aspects de la vie; 2) *moder-*



*niste*: l'Islam doit assumer tout ce qui est bon en Occident, en particulier la démocratie politique, en laquelle il voit une version moderne de la *ijma*; 3) *fondamentaliste*: réformatrice comme la précédente, mais préconisant un retour aux sources; 4) *séculariste*: opinant pour l'incompatibilité de l'Islam avec toute modernisation et le confinant au rôle d'un grand héritage culturel.

Malheureusement, il n'est guère possible de distribuer selon ces catégories les musulmans pakistanais. Cependant, les résultats d'une enquête de 1960 auprès de 451 villageois semble permettre de conclure à une plasticité et une disponibilité beaucoup plus grandes qu'il ne pourrait paraître à première vue.

Pour N. Jacobs, *Religion et développement économique. Le cas de l'Iran*, trois niveaux sont envisagés: 1) Sacralisation religieuse et autorité politique. 90 % des Iraniens sont musulmans chiites, dominés par la croyance dans le douzième imamat, millénième pendant lequel le Shah représente une autorité politique objet d'un loyalisme religieux absolu. Cette conjoncture serait un facteur d'obstruction au développement économique. 2) Collusion entre le bas clergé et la protestation sociale de la classe moyenne: «association du bazar et de la mosquée». 3) Niveau des valeurs religieuses diffuses, de nature à entretenir l'absentéisme économique et l'évasion devant l'avenir.

Après ces trois communications, W. F. Wertheim souligne la diversité des diagnostics sur l'Islam asiatique face au développement: plutôt *optimiste* avec S. H. Alatas, plutôt *pessimiste* avec N. Jacobs, plutôt pluraliste avec A. W. Eister.

On pourrait dire que si W. F. Wertheim, dans *Religion, bureaucratie et croissance économique*, retient le principe d'une telle correspondance entre éthique religieuse et comportement économique, il ne conserve aucun des deux termes proposés par Weber.

Son étude porte sur le cas de la République Hollandaise au XVII<sup>e</sup> siècle, et s'il y découvre une *correspondance* économique ou religieuse comme moteur du décollage économique, ses deux pôles sont non pas des calvinistes, mais des Remonstrants Arminiens d'une part, et des fonctionnaires ou administrateurs *publics* de l'autre.

Si cette correspondance entre une *autre* éthique religieuse et un *autre* comportement économique pouvait être retenue, l'applicabilité du schéma wébérien à la modernisation de l'Asie pourrait être conçue en des termes exemplifiés justement par le cas hollandais. Ces termes se retrouveraient aussi dans le cas japonais analysé par

R. N. Bellah et la correspondance décelée par lui entre l'éthique économique des samouraïs et le développement économique du Japon. Cette analyse comparative met en question un certain monopole attribué par Weber, ou sa postérité, à l'apparition d'une classe d'entrepreneurs privés dans le déclenchement du développement économique. C'est là une voie de développement; ce n'est pas la seule.

R.F. Beerling verse à la discussion quatre questions: 1) Que veut exactement établir W.F. Wertheim à l'endroit de la thèse de Weber? Qu'elle est correcte, fautive ou incomplète? 2) A propos du cas hollandais, W.F. Wertheim n'a-t-il pas minimisé la part des *calvinistes* dans la période qui précède l'«Age d'Or», c.à.d. la fin du XVI<sup>e</sup> s., qui connut justement une immigration calviniste importante? 3) Le rôle de l'État et de la politique mercantiliste n'est pas aussi sous-estimé par les historiens que W.F. Wertheim semble le déplorer. 4) Quant à la classe bureaucratique-aristocratique décelée par W.F. Wertheim comme instrument du développement, elle n'est apparue en Hollande que dans la période post-napoléonienne et Weber lui-même a noté qu'elle ne pouvait être qu'un produit tardif du développement...

N. Jacobs tombe d'accord avec W.F. Wertheim que le rôle du pouvoir politique dans le développement économique de l'Occident a été sous-estimé. Mais la nature de ce rôle a été différente en Occident et au Japon d'une part, en Asie continentale d'autre part.

Sur le cas japonais évoqué par W.F. Wertheim, deux remarques: 1) Le rôle de l'État s'est exercé entre 1868 et 1880, alors que les entreprises étaient entre les mains du secteur privé. 2) Si le rôle de l'État au Japon fut essentiel, ce fut avant tout en assurant un climat de sécurité et de continuité aux entreprises industrielles.

Trois remarques sur le rôle attribué par W.F. Wertheim aux pouvoirs publics et à leurs agents font ressortir que la question clé n'est pas celle de la présence ou de l'absence de l'État dans le développement économique, mais celle de la nature de son association avec ce développement.

Pour terminer, le professeur W.F. Wertheim exprime sa reconnaissance pour les commentaires et critiques suscités par sa communication. Il souhaite que malgré, ou à cause des contestations soulevées par sa propre conclusion, celle-ci conserve quelque chose d'une valeur stimulante analogue à celle que gardent, après tant d'années, les thèmes de Max Weber.



*Seconde séance*

Les communications retenues pour cette matinée se groupaient sous la rubrique «L'interpénétration des institutions religieuses et séculières».

O. Mandic affirme dans *Pagan elements in the rural type of revealed religion*, que les croyances religieuses diffèrent entre les zones urbaines et les régions rurales. Ces dernières, en effet, introduisent plus largement des éléments de syncrétisme, et cela d'une façon tout à fait spontanée et inconsciente. Ce fait tient au mode d'apparition et de pénétration des religions révélées. Pour toutes, leur point d'origine est urbain. Quand par la suite une telle religion entame la pénétration des campagnes, elle est conduite à passer des compromis, illustrés par les instructions de Grégoire I recommandant d'utiliser temples et pratiques autochtones pour y loger églises et cultes chrétiens.

Cette interférence de croyances adoptées et de superstitions persistantes ne constitue-t-elle pas un des grands obstacles au développement dans les campagnes ?

Ce rapport est suivi d'une discussion portant essentiellement sur trois points: 1) les croyances traditionnelles diffuses dites «païennes»; 2) les croyances dogmatiques juxtaposées par les missionnaires des religions dites révélées; 3) les convictions rationnelles et séculières.

A. Donnelly, prenant exemple du Mexique, où des missions espagnoles ont surimposé des croyances chrétiennes à la religion Aztèque, aurait souhaité plus de détails sur le rôle négatif joué par un certain syncrétisme sur le changement social.

Selon une considération assez généralisée, l'Europe occidentale dans sa phase de révolution industrielle s'est surtout signalée par des processus de sécularisation se soldant par un déclin de la religion quasi proportionnel à ce développement.

L'objet du rapport de F. A. Isambert, *Religion et développement dans la France du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle*, est de dégager un cas limite où, au contraire, religion et développement semblent s'être conjugués. En effet, à partir des années 1820, une série de phénomènes religieux — culturels se fait jour, où le développement lui-même est pris comme objet de religion. Le plus exemplaire de ces phénomènes est le saint-simonisme. On pourrait caractériser ces phénomènes en proposant le titre de *Religion du développement*.

En France l'accueil des confessions chrétiennes dominantes se di-

versifie: a) le protestantisme semble mieux s'accomoder de cette surgescence; bien que sans connexion avec elle, il demeure sans conflit; b) le catholicisme s'avère plutôt sensibilisé aux contradictions, au malaise consécutif au développement en cours. Il en dénonce les méfaits plutôt qu'il n'en discerne les espérances.

M. Ostric entend dénoncer le concept de «religion du développement» comme contradictoire.

M. Matarasso souhaiterait que fussent distingués: a) une «foi au progrès» propre au XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle et b) une «religion du développement», voire même un «prosélytisme du développement» propre au XX<sup>e</sup> siècle et à la conscience des rapports entre nations modernisées et pays sous-développés.

En réponse, le rapporteur précise: 1) le terme «religion du développement» n'implique aucune conceptualisation normative, mais désigne simplement un fait historique. 2) La distinction proposée par M. Matarasso est supplémentaire à celle proposée dans le rapport entre l'idéologie du progrès véhiculée par exemple par Condorcet et ce complexe socio-religieux intervenu à partir de 1820 et nommé ici «Religion du développement». 3) La base sociale du protestantisme était plutôt urbaine, celle du catholicisme plutôt rurale.

Une partie du rapport de G. Perez Ramirez, *Religion et développement social en Amérique latine*, veut définir les concepts utilisés tels: religion, développement, fonction... et précise que si la religion a une fonction sociale, c'est comme une conséquence, non comme une finalité. Comme, d'autre part, cette fonction implique une interaction entre religion et développement, le rapport aborde l'analyse des effets positifs ou négatifs réciproques.

### Troisième séance

En abordant l'étude du «saint» comme institution socio-religieuse nord-africaine, E. Gellner, *Sanctity, Puritanism, Secularisation and Nationalism in North-Africa*, souligne quelques aspects problématiques généraux. 1) Le contraste entre la configuration religieuse de l'Europe et de l'Afrique du Nord. En Europe, la zone religieuse *centrale* présente une conception de l'Église hiérarchique, cléricalisée, à base fortement rurale, ritualiste, éventuellement syncrétiste. Au contraire, la zone *périphérique* (sectes, minorités religieuses) passe pour être puritaine, basée sur le Livre et son examen éclairé. En Afrique du Nord, cette situation est inversée: c'est la zone centrale



qui a des caractéristiques puritaines, alors que la zone périphérique représente un monde riche et varié de convictions religieuses et constitue comme autant de lignages autour de personnages que sont les «saints». 2) La pénétration coloniale ayant utilisé ces lignages comme autant de canaux, le déclin du colonialisme et l'accession à l'indépendance pourraient aussi signifier le déclin de cette institution du «saint».

Ces lignages spirituels sublimaient un certain tribalisme, alors que la zone religieuse centrale préparait le nationalisme. Il semblerait donc qu'on retrouve ici une connexion entre «protestantisme» et «nationalisme».

W. F. Wertheim ayant souhaité un développement sur cette connexion, E. Gellner commente surtout le point suivant: en Europe, les nationalistes protestants ont opéré par fragmentation d'un ensemble pré-existant. En Afrique du Nord, les nationalistes ont à opérer par concentration de la diversité tribale indirectement entretenue par les lignages de saints.

A. K. Saran dans *Hinduism and Economic Development in India* montre qu'en Occident alors que la naissance de l'«ascétisme intramondain», proposé par Weber à l'animation du capitalisme, représentait une rupture avec l'ancienne conception des relations de l'homme et de la nature, la seconde devenant dès lors objet de manipulation et de conquête pour l'homme, dans l'Hindouisme cet engrenage ne joue pas. Plusieurs traits s'y opposent en effet: son caractère a-temporel et an-historique; la nature de l'expérimentation dans la tradition indienne, visant non à une maîtrise de l'homme sur la nature, mais à une technique du corps en vue d'une délivrance finale; la doctrine de la vanité des perfectionnements successivement acquis.

Ainsi dans l'Hindouisme se produit-il une rupture avec la tradition sans qu'il y ait pour autant émergence d'un projet global nouveau. «L'Hindouisme et la science moderne sont opposés comme la vérité et l'erreur».

L'objet principal de la communication de R. Pieris, *Economic Development and Ultramundaneity*, est la dichotomie entre spirituel et temporel dans les attitudes préconisées dans certaines religions orientales, en particulier Hindouisme et Bouddhisme (plus spécialement Bouddhisme de Ceylan).

C'est seulement au Japon que le Bouddhisme Mahayana semble avoir préconisé une régulation religieuse des comportements économiques méritoires, qui n'est pas sans rappeler les attitudes calvinistes décrites par Weber.

J. Jacobs se demande si cette influence attribuée au Bouddhisme japonais est responsable du développement. C. Jedrzejewski attribue essentiellement au système hindou des castes la résistance au développement. A. K. Saran remarque que dans la tradition hindouiste il n'y a pas de dichotomie: tout est sacré, tout est profane. La virtuosité commerciale n'est pas nécessairement un facteur de développement.

Le rapport de A. Fiamengo, *Croyances religieuses et changements technologiques en Yougoslavie*, est fondé sur les chiffres du recensement de 1953, complétés par quatre enquêtes effectuées entre 1957 et 1962.

Le progrès technologique semblerait impliquer une décroissance de la religiosité et un accroissement de l'athéisme. Mais le changement des facteurs technologiques n'est pas seul à intervenir.

Des objections sont présentées par Mme Nalcic sur la validité des statistiques présentées. M. Ostric soulève des doutes sur l'indépendance scientifique des enquêtes.

W. F. Wertheim conclut la discussion en remarquant que les statistiques religieuses de recensement sont toujours de manipulation délicate et souhaite que, comme l'indique son auteur, la considération d'autres facteurs vienne enrichir ce dossier.



**CHANGES IN URBAN AND RURAL AREAS  
CHANGEMENTS DANS LES ZONES URBAINES ET RURALES**

**THE BURAKU MINORITY IN URBAN JAPAN**

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**INTRODUCTION**

The appearance of distinct urban settlements of outcast groups in the form in which they have survived to modern times dates from the late sixteenth century. As successive military rulers reduced the anarchic fluidity of medieval Japanese society to a system of hierarchically ordered hereditary status groups, the various degrees of untouchability and serfdom attaching to certain occupations were also more rigidly institutionalised. The lords of the new fiefs designated certain areas in their castle towns as outcast settlements and often had to bring members of the outcast trades from great distances to fill them. Other urban outcast settlements were to be found in the ports, highway posting stations and temple towns where something like free markets existed for the goods and services the outcast had to offer.

The pariah trades were mostly those in some way «unclean» according to Shinto ideas of ritual purity, or spiritually degrading according to Buddhist prohibitions on the taking of life (which had by this time made a mild vegetarianism almost universal in Japan). The outcasts were leather workers, dog-catchers, bamboo workers, makers of straw sandals, actors and entertainers, prison warders, executioners, subordinate constables. Most of their urban settlements were on the outskirts of towns (where the prisons were and where guard duties had to be carried out) and especially on the banks of boundary rivers where they could find water for their leather work.

Still by no means all the outcasts were town-dwellers. Chiefly in

the areas of oldest habitation in Western Japan there were many small rural outcast settlements, their inhabitants partly agricultural, partly engaged in the pariah trades.

Legally institutionalised discrimination against outcasts took several forms; they were forbidden to change their occupations; sumptuary restrictions confined them to clothing and food inferior even to that of the «common people»; and they received lesser protection in the courts — in one famous judgement the life of a murdered *eta* was held equivalent in value to one-seventh of that of a commoner. Social avoidances included refusal to take food or fire from an outcast. Physical contact and sometimes even verbal contact was thought to be «polluting», as was the presence of outcasts at religious festivals.

Of the many older names for outcast groups generally only *eta* and *hinin* survived in official documents at this time. There were some differences between them, though such differences varied locally.

With the formation of a central government and the proclamation of a new order in the nineteenth century, the *eta* and *hinin* were early beneficiaries of the move to abolish legal distinctions of status. They were given freedom of occupation in 1871 and declared the equal of the «common people».

Even today, however, in both rural and urban areas, former outcast settlements remain as socially distinct units, spoken of as *buraku*. (Literally «hamlets», a contraction of the euphemism «special hamlets» which was officially adopted by welfare agencies to replace the offensive and resented word *eta*. A new euphemism which has recently come into official use is «*dowa* district», literally «harmonious assimilation district», an expression of pious intention rather than of fact). Their inhabitants are either native-born or migrant descendants of *eta* or *hinin* families — the distinction has now been forgotten; they are normally referred to as *burakumin* («people of the *buraku*») — known as such by the residents of surrounding areas and subjected as such to varying degrees of avoidance and discrimination although they are outwardly distinguishable neither in physique, language nor religion. Many of them are still engaged in the traditional outcast occupations; they are generally poor and frequently live in slum conditions.

Now as in the Tokugawa period such *buraku* are found chiefly in Western Japan; in the east and north they are mostly confined to towns. Their total population is not known. An estimate of 1882



put the total number of «new commoners», as the former outcasts were then popularly known, at 520,000, or 1.73 % of the population (1). A Home Office survey of 1921 reported 830,000 people living in 4,890 settlements. (2: p. 61) A later survey of 1935 covered 5,371 settlements — some of them actually new settlements, some missed in the former survey — containing a population of 1,003,290 (1.46 % of the total). (2: p. 71) No more recent figures exist.

Statistical measures of mobility are equally hard to come by. It is clear that rural buraku people migrated to the cities as did other Japanese from rural areas, but it is equally clear that many of them migrated to urban buraku. The following figures refer to a sample of 701 buraku in 1935. Agricultural buraku are those in which two thirds of resident families were at least partially engaged in agriculture, but the non-agricultural buraku do not include any in the metropolitan centres. The family registers record all the members of families with a «home address» in the area, but migration does not necessarily lead to an official change of home address. (2: p. 73)

	Agricultural buraku	other buraku
Registered population	92,132	73,593
Registered but resident elsewhere	14,737	3,800
Resident but registered elsewhere	417	3,581
Total resident population	77,812	73,376

A minimum figure for net migration from all buraku — i.e. for «passing» into the outside world — can be derived from the 1921 survey (the reliability of which, however, is unascertainable). The figure of 830,000 residents is 70,000 less than the total registered population for these buraku. There is no means of knowing, however, how many more had confirmed their «passing» into outside society by legally transferring their family registers to a new «home address» in a non-buraku area.

#### BURAKU IN OSAKA, KYOTO AND TOKYO

Of these cities, Kyoto, as a religious, cultural and traditional craft centre, has been least affected by industrialisation and remained untouched by bombing. In a region which has a large number of both rural and urban buraku and where the social structure has been

least transformed, there is a much greater awareness of buraku difference and of the existence of a «buraku problem» than in Tokyo. Osaka lies between the two; although almost as much affected by industrialisation and bombing as Tokyo, popular attitudes are closer to those of nearby Kyoto. Kyoto (population 1.2 millions in 1955) has 19 buraku. Osaka (2.5 millions) has 14 and Tokyo (7.0 millions) has 13. They contain less than a third of one per cent of the total population in Tokyo and about 1.5 % in Kyoto.

The buraku are not concentrated in particular areas of these cities. For example Sujin, one of the largest Kyoto buraku, is bounded on one side by a commercial and on the other side by an industrial district, while another, Kinrin, forms an isolated island in one of Kyoto's best residential districts. Others, in what are still the outskirts of the city, are non-agricultural enclaves in predominantly farming areas. In general, Kyoto buraku remain little affected by changes in the ecological structure of the city brought about by industrialisation and urban growth.

In the reconstructed buraku of post-bombing Tokyo residential segregation is much less complete than formerly and the buraku districts now include large numbers of non-buraku origin (3). Kyoto buraku are more homogeneous, but a survey of eight Kyoto buraku in 1951 found an intermixed population of non-buraku origin, ranging from 2 % to 25 % of the total (average for the 8 buraku, 8 %) (4).

The size of the settlements known as buraku varies; in Kyoto from 150 to 1,340 households (5) while there are reports of a Tokyo buraku with as few as 20 households (6) and of an Osaka buraku with as many as 6,000 (7).

#### LIVING CONDITIONS

The word buraku is almost synonymous with «slum». Houses are poor and overcrowded and, especially in Kyoto, old and decayed; streets are narrow, unpaved and unclean. In a 1957 survey of eight of the largest Kyoto buraku, only 28 % of households had exclusive use of a kitchen and only 56 % of a lavatory (5). The pattern of house ownership varies from district to district.

#### POPULATION STABILITY

Figures for eight Kyoto buraku suggest a slow growth of population in the period before the war and a slight decline since, but it



should be emphasised that these are figures for the one Japanese city which has shown very little post-war growth (8). There is limited movement into these buraku from outside. Of family heads in eight Kyoto buraku, 76 % had never lived elsewhere, 9 % had moved from other Kyoto buraku and 14 % had moved from outside the city (5). Two similar sample surveys in Osaka found 88 % and 81 % respectively of family heads who had never lived elsewhere (9 and 10).

#### MARRIAGE AND FAMILY LIFE

Two sample surveys give some idea of the extent to which each buraku, or buraku society as a whole, are endogamous groups.

	8 Kyoto buraku for 5 post-war years (1) %	5 Osaka buraku for 8 post-war years (2) %
Marriage within same buraku	54.7	51.4
To resident of another buraku	26.5	31.6
		(3)
To non-buraku resident	18.8	17.1

1. Source, 4.

2. Source, 9, 10, 11.

3. This figure of 17.1 %, however, includes an unstated proportion of marriages to «partners of unknown origin», and an unstated proportion of non-buraku residents within the buraku area (who do not consider themselves and are not considered by others to be «people of the buraku») may be included in all the figures of this column.

Of the Kyoto marriages across buraku boundaries the great majority (15.4 % out of 18.8 %) were of buraku *girls* to outsiders, though another report suggests that this is by no means always the dominant pattern of intermarriage (17). This Kyoto figure of 18.8 % for the incidence of intermarriage conceals considerable variation between the 8 buraku, ranging from 12.3 % to 35.0 %. The variation reflects differences in the proportion of families of higher economic status, and of youths in employments which allow them to mix with outsiders, and possibly the differential proximity of non-buraku slum areas, whose residents are less likely to avoid intermarriage.

Most marriages across buraku boundaries are so-called «love mar-

riages» starting from free-enterprise courtship rather than from parental arrangement. There is no evidence that such marriages are less stable than other buraku marriages. The most discussed problems of intermarriage concern courtship broken off when it is discovered by one of the partners or his relatives that the other is in fact of buraku origin, but this is likely to happen only to those who are trying to «pass» in the outside world; for the resident in a buraku area there can be little chance of concealing his identity.

Average household size in the eight Kyoto buraku studied was slightly smaller than the general Kyoto average: 3.9 in 1951 and 4.1 in 1957, as against 4.2 and 4.4 respectively for the city of Kyoto as a whole, according to the Census returns of 1950 and 1955 (4 and 5). This smaller family size may be ascribed in part to early marriage and to the fact that married children rarely stay at home. Usually, there is not enough room for two married couples in one buraku house, and the traditional Japanese pattern whereby the inheriting eldest son brings his bride to live with his parents loses meaning when there is little of value to be inherited. In Osaka, according to one observer, it is more common for a youngest child to stay at home after marriage with his (by then aged) parents (13). Similar patterns, and a general disregard of the main-family and branch-family distinctions, common in outside society, are reported for a rural buraku (14).

This is not to say that kinship ties are unimportant in the urban buraku. Far from it, as will appear later. But they seem to be bilateral kin ties with less of the patrilineal emphasis of the traditional «Japanese family system». On the other hand, the family ancestral altars found in buraku houses, particularly in Kyoto, are often of a lavishly expensive kind, though this may be evidence less of a proud consciousness of patrilineal ancestry than of the hold which the Shin sect of Buddhism (to which they nearly all belong) has over them, or even of a heightened eschatological concern induced by the privations of their social situation.

#### OCCUPATION

Buraku inhabitants earn a living only in part from the traditional buraku crafts — leather work, straw sandal weaving, bamboo and wicker work. For the rest they are mostly casual labourers in construction, transport, dock work and refuse disposal. An approximate



classification of occupations in eight Kyoto buraku runs as follows (5). The percentages in brackets for 1951 are comparable figures for the Kyoto population as a whole.

	1941	1951	1957
	%	%	%
Agriculture	1	1 ( 5)	3
Craft/factory production	50	34 (36)	36
Commerce	25	17 (17)	16
Transport	4	4 ( 5)	3
Government and Professional	2	9 (28)	8
Others	18	36 ( 9)	35
	<hr/>	<hr/>	<hr/>
Total	100	100 (100)	100

Capitalist factory production of shoes and other leather goods was from the very beginning only partially under the control of men of buraku origin, and although the labour force in the early period was predominantly in the ill-paid small-workshop crafts or, if they are Buraku residents now engaged in craft and factory production are predominantly in the ill-paid small-workshop crafts or, if they are women, domestic workers under the putting-out system. The large proportion of «others» in the above table are mostly casual unskilled labourers, free-lance rag-pickers and scrap-collectors or (mostly women) employed in government «unemployment relief work» — usually road-mending. The latter schemes, intended as temporary relief for frictional unemployment, are by many buraku families relied on as a regular source of income.

Among these eight Kyoto buraku there are considerable variations in employment patterns. Two southern buraku, Takeda and Fukakusa, have considerable numbers of men employed in the city transport services as labourers and tramway staff, and of younger women in small dyeing establishments, while older women work at home making straw sandals. Residents of the northern buraku, Yosei, have since first world war been engaged in the local *yuzen* dyeing industry of that district (also a small-workshop industry) though they are concentrated in the less skilled trades (16). Sujin, the buraku which edges on a main street has a row of shoe retailers along that street while the residents of the back streets are partly leather workers, but predominantly casual unskilled labourers.

A tendency to move out of the traditional buraku trades is evident in the occupational figures for eight Osaka buraku, where a con-

siderably higher proportion of heads of families than of family members are reported in such trades (9, 10, 11, 12).

Labour force participation rates in the Kyoto buraku show significant differences from the city population as a whole. In the younger age groups a higher than average proportion of buraku residents are employed; while for the middle and upper age groups the reverse is the case. The overall rate is lower for the buraku than for the city as a whole.

Buraku residents find their buraku residence a handicap in seeking employment in the larger firms which pay higher wages and recruit school-leavers by careful selection procedures. It is common for employers to require with job applications not only details of personal and family history, but also a sketch-map showing the applicant's address — for possible use in checking on the details supplied. In these circumstances concealment of buraku origin becomes difficult.

#### SOCIAL ORGANISATION

In Japanese society similar «detective work» is standard practice on the part of a family whose son or daughter proposes to marry a person whose origin is not personally known. The consequent difficulty of «passing» into outside society through employment or marriage by concealing one's origin (otherwise easy since there are no external characteristics to give the buraku resident away) explains the persistence of the buraku as permanent and cohesive settlements in the towns. It is safer to stay among friends than risk rebuffs in the outside world.

Married sons and daughters typically set up home near their parents, and with a high proportion of endogamous marriages, each buraku thus becomes a close network of kin relations, frequently overlapping with, and supplemented by, economic relations, particularly in those buraku with a high proportion of craft workers, whose workplace, as well as home, is in the buraku. Even where labouring outside the buraku is common, the patron-client relations between gang foreman and worker serve to reinforce this social network, just as much as the relations between employer and employed, craftsman and apprentice or wholesaler and domestic worker in the craft trades within the buraku. The physically cramped living conditions, the sharing of wells, kitchens and lavatories, and the low residential mobility rates further strengthen the cohesiveness of buraku society. The proliferation of small credit societies of the *ko*



type, described by Embree in a pre-war Kyushu village (18), is one reflection of that cohesiveness.

The solidary nature of the urban buraku is also due to the existence of formal buraku associations, the origin of which must be partially sought in the general pattern of organisation found in Japanese cities. The wards (cho, chonai) into which cities are divided are more than postal districts; they have preserved into the modern period a certain community sense and certain selfgoverning functions performed by formal elected or coopted committees. This declining pattern was reinforced by government direction during the late war for civil defence, rationing, morale-building and other purposes. Since most buraku settlements coincide with a ward area, this general pattern of organisation has provided a frame-work for the community organisations of the buraku to develop.

Such organisations tend, however, to be more important in buraku than in other wards for two reasons: because the buraku are more cohesive social units; and because the buraku have been the focus of social movements and social policies explicitly framed with reference to their outcast status.

Social movements within buraku society have oscillated between two polar types. The one, led usually by richer members of buraku society, has usually aimed at the «improvement» of the buraku — the raising of standards of education, consumption and hygiene as a means of removing the stigma of buraku membership. The other, under leadership which has usually been associated with radical left-wing political movements, has been concerned to use demonstrations and public protest to attack all manifestations of discrimination against the buraku, at the same time attacking the leaders of «improvement» movements on the grounds that they seek only to strengthen their own economic domination over the buraku, gain influence in the wider society by manipulating their buraku support, and secure the approbation of outside society by a collaborationist admission that there do exist in buraku society reasonable grounds for discrimination. Since the first world war, when the stridency and radicalism of the latter type of movement (eventually coalescing in the national Levellers Society of 1922) first became alarming to the Japanese establishment, state and municipal governments have given financial and other support to movements of the first type. The Kyoto municipality has funds for such work in what its official jargon calls «districts of harmonious assimilation», *dowa-chiku*.

Hence, nine of the nineteen Kyoto buraku, in addition to the Self-government Associations such as are found in non-buraku as well

as buraku wards (with special women's committees, youth and recreation committees, public health committees, etc.) have neighbourhood centre buildings built and financed with the help of municipal funds. These are the centre of numerous activities organised by the education and child guidance committees (courses for housewives on the economical use of gas and water, cooking, knitting, laundry, flower-arrangement); they have clinics, one major object of which has been the elimination of trachoma; a youth room with a small library; a nursery school and a public bath house the profit from which helps to support the other activities.

Kyoto has been a pioneer in the development of neighbourhood centres. The first one began in Sujin (the buraku which borders on a main road and has numbers of shoe retailers) as an infants' creche in 1920. It was established on the initiative of the wealthier members of the buraku — leather merchants, shoe-store owners and money-lenders, the local post-master and a school-teacher. Soon after, and again with municipal assistance, a social centre was built to provide some health services and employment guidance and keep public assistance records. The two were amalgamated into a new neighbourhood centre in 1922. (Literature on neighbourhood centres in Japan, their indigenous and foreign roots and subsidy policies, may be found in 19, 20, 21.)

The formal organisation of these activities varies from buraku to buraku. In some, a strong central self-governing association has a number of sub-committees, whereas, in Sujin, for instance, the various committees and the neighbourhood centre management are more or less independent bodies which, together with the nursery school and the parent-teachers' association, form a self-government federation. The leadership of these bodies offers considerable opportunities for entering municipal politics. The Sujin president is a city councillor, and in Yosei the association is in a state of suspended animation, split between the supporters of a conservative, and of a left-wing, politician.

In Kyoto most of the buraku also have branches of the National Buraku Liberation League, the successor to the Levellers as the main buraku social movement of the second, or radical, kind. The leadership has close links with the Communist Party (like the Korean minority organisations in Japan) and also with the left-wing of the Socialist Party. Other associations include Shinto shrine and Buddhist temple organisations.

Some Osaka buraku have similar neighbourhood centres, though they are usually less developed than in Kyoto. In Tokyo, however



(and this is a reflection of the fact that there is much less consciousness of a «buraku problem» in the city and a less marked tendency on the part of employers and ordinary citizens to discriminate on the basis of buraku origin alone) there are only special slum welfare schemes—which include most of the buraku in their purview among other districts — but no designation of «harmonious assimilation areas» or any other policies which single out the buraku as such for special administrative treatment.

#### CONCLUSION

Given the sketchiness of the available data — most of it confined to Kyoto — only a few generalizations can be tentatively suggested.

1. As compared with rural buraku, urban buraku are generally bigger in size.

2. They are the main receiving centres for rural migrants of buraku origin, though some such migrants pass directly into outside society, and most urban buraku have a solid core of native residents, who are born and die there, and who perpetuate something of the urban buraku culture of pre-industrial times.

3. Yet residents of urban buraku have more diverse and less regularly patterned social relations with outsiders, than do rural buraku with neighbouring villagers.

4. Consequently, the urban buraku are more open to cultural influences from the outside society. Since they have also, for several generations, shared in the same standard Japanese school education, such minor elements of cultural distinctness, as they may once have had, have almost disappeared.

5. The urban buraku also offer a greater diversity of employment opportunities than rural buraku, but buraku residents tend to move into a limited number of new occupations en masse (as into tramways, *yuzen* dyeing, etc.) rather than to scatter widely and individually.

6. The urban buraku also offer more opportunities to marry into outside society, though usually with those of low socio-economic status in adjacent areas.

7. Provided that economic independence can be maintained outside the buraku there is no evidence of residential restrictions preventing buraku residents from setting up house elsewhere — as there might be in rural areas.

8. But yet the possibilities of concealing buraku origins in a highly

origin-conscious society being small, «passing», by concealment of origin, is attempted only by a minority.

9. Consequently the buraku keep their population and their separateness, though intermarriage and their physical contiguity with neighbouring areas (unlike the physical isolation of the rural buraku) means that their actual physical boundaries may become blurred.

10. There is greater economic stratification in urban than in rural buraku.

11. And the greater political importance of relations between urban buraku and the outside world provide wealthier buraku residents with a means of achieving status in the outside world *qua* buraku leaders. The leaders thus have a stake in the «burakuness» of the buraku.

12. But these generalisations apply more to Kyoto than to the less «origin-conscious» and «buraku-conscious» society of Tokyo. There, «passing» seems easier; residential mobility greater; the geographical boundaries of buraku areas far less distinct; buraku social organisation weaker; intermarriage more common. There, buraku leadership offers fewer satisfactions to the politically ambitious so that they are more likely to move out and so help to destroy, rather than reinforce, the cohesiveness of buraku society. In social policy terms, Tokyo now has only a problem of slum rehabilitation. Kyoto still has the related but separable problem of eradicating the vestiges of caste prejudice.

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## PROBLEMS OF RURAL ADJUSTMENT TO PLANNED DEVELOPMENT IN INDIA

J. P. BHATTACHARJEE

### INTRODUCTION

Development planning involves basic assumptions not only on the future economic structure of the country but also its social framework. The relative priority of these two aspects is, in a large measure, determined by the political system. The three Five-Year Plans so far formulated for the development of India, reveal a consistent attempt to work out the priority for the social framework, in and towards which the Plans are to be implemented. With each emphasis on the goals in this direction, the demand for meaningful sociological data increases, often leading to the search for new fields of study promising operationally useful results. There are, however, difficulties in which sociologists as well as economists are placed when planners and policy-makers come to them in search of prescriptions for tackling the social maladies besetting under-developed countries. Many of these difficulties arise from the 'terms of trade' between these two disciplines, a few remarks on which may be in order, before I go into my chosen topic.

With the emergence of the under-developed countries on the world scene and the economists' rush to study and solve their problems, the previously established lines of analysis began to show gaps and inadequacies. Under-development seemed as much of a social phenomenon as probably a state of economic stagnation, if not more; and economists came to accept the importance of the social factors in influencing the nature, path and rate of development of a country. Purely economic models and the rationality assumptions that go with these were found to be inadequate.

While many economists are now genuinely seeking help from sociologists, it is doubtful if all of them will readily agree to or accept serious modifications in the established lines of economic analysis, once such help is forthcoming. It is true that a few areas of economic analysis have been enriched, without much of disturbance, through the incorporation of variables reflecting the social aspects of individual behaviour. One can mention, in this connection, advances in the



analysis of consumption, savings and capital formation. Economic historians have probably shown more of flexibility in the process of adaptation. But, by and large, a field like economic sociology is yet to be developed. There is sometimes a danger if economists try to indulge in too many exercises in this field. I am myself conscious of this danger and became more so while reading a paper in which the economist-author, after making out an admirable case for primacy of social change, put forward the thesis that economic development in agriculture depended largely on the willingness of the farmer to accept change which in turn was conditioned by his attitude towards change in general. Frankly speaking, I am still at a loss to understand whether the author was trying to establish a new proposition, or failing to do so, fell into the trap of begging the question.

Such a situation places a heavy responsibility on the sociologists, for the onus of building up a body of relationships and theories integrating two well-established disciplines, is largely thrown on their shoulders. In fact, many economists hold that the development of a field like economic sociology is a job for the sociologists. With the growing emphasis on induced social change, one is, of course, conscious of the need for sociologists to come forward and establish operational relationships, say, between types of developmental efforts within a given framework of institutions, leadership, etc. and social and economic changes that these will induce within a specified time, the likely effect of such efforts on individual and community action to sustain such growth, and so on. It is a formidable challenge, which, somehow or other, will have to be squarely faced. Conclusions of limited applicability and doubtful validity, based on contingent associations of a few observed variables, may be useful as pilot exercises; but the stage has come to rise to higher levels of sophistication.

With the acceptance of the need for inter-disciplinary approach, cooperative efforts of economists and sociologists are readily recommended these days. Difficulties often arise, however, in pursuing such efforts to success. One or two of the difficulties I have faced may be mentioned for whatever they are worth. These are rooted in the stages of development of the two disciplines. Economics has to its credit more of exercises in model-building within a positivistic framework. Sociology, on the other hand, has retained more of the normative approach because of its closer link with the humanities, and may be poorer without it. It is not always easy to see how the two approaches with their specific biases can be readily combined. Secondly, economics has developed through analyses of the behaviour of

producing, consuming, trading, and financing units, the units being defined at the primary level with reference to their product functions and aggregated at appropriate levels of interaction or competition. Sociology, on the other hand, has largely dealt with groups of people, categorized with reference to status, class, etc. and their functional characteristics. An equation of such groups with product-based units is difficult to establish in many fields of behaviour and activity.

The reason I have taken pains to emphasise these points is the very nature of the topic selected for this session. Adaptation of rural communities in developing societies is a subject that is not merely of academic importance. Planners and policy-makers are equally interested in it, if not more. They will ask for prescriptions in many areas of action, such as promotion, encouragement and support to be given to various institutions, the extent of reliance to be placed on people's initiative and participation in different fields, the nature and direction of investment effort needed to bring about a rapid integration of the rural with the non-rural areas and groups, the nature and type of educational (including social education) activities needed in rural communities, and so on. We have with us a field in which discussions in the past have ranged from 'Protestant Ethics' to 'Peasant Society'. Against this background let me turn to an analysis of the problems that have been faced in India in inducing the rural communities to adjust to planned development over the last decade.

#### SOCIAL FRAMEWORK IN DEVELOPMENT PLANS OF INDIA

Development planning in India has been characterised by a large degree of realism unfettered by the rigidities of a doctrinaire approach. The social goal of the Five-Year Plans has been described as the establishment of a 'socialist pattern of society', based on the 'realisation and achievement of wider and deeper social values'. While it has been stated that in such a society «the basic criterion for determining lines of advance must not be private profit but social gain», it is not a rigid system rooted in any doctrine or dogma. «... The accent of the socialist pattern of society is on the attainment of positive goals, the raising of living standards, the enlargement of opportunities for all, the promotion of enterprise among the disadvantaged classes and the creation of a sense of partnership among all sections of the community...»<sup>1</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> PLANNING COMMISSION, *The Third Five-Year Plan*, New Delhi, 1961, pp. 4-6.



The developing society envisaged in the Plans is to be built, as will appear from the statements quoted above, on a foundation in three layers — a democratic political system of the parliamentary type, a socio-economic structure conceived on egalitarian lines, and an institutional set-up based on partnership and cooperation among people organised in communities. The logic of this framework lies in the desire to create a *milieu* in which the little man, so long denied of hope and deprived of opportunities of organised effort, will find a social and economic climate for initiative and action of which he is capable. Two points may deserve re-statement in this connection. In the first place, while productive activities have received their priority, a considerable amount of emphasis has still been given in the plans to the welfare aspects of social and economic policy — a rising level and standard of living for the individual, and promotion of the interests of the weaker sections or disadvantaged classes of the community. Secondly, the general approach to the achievement of these goals has been conceived in terms of 'framework planning', which is the basic feature of the plans of India for the development not only of the rural but also of other areas and sectors.

This approach to development planning in India has necessarily determined the choice of strategy. The broad elements of the strategy adopted for the development of the rural community as well as the overall society may be summarised here. In the first place, the Government have taken upon themselves the responsibility to revitalise the existing social and economic institutions, and organize or promote new ones that are expected to subserve the social interests. The methods followed have ranged from legislation e.g., on land reform, *Panchayats*, democratic decentralisation (*Panchayati Raj*), cooperation, Hindu Code and other civil codes, education, etc. to active promotion of institutions like cooperative farming, and general support and assistance to associate and voluntary organizations. Secondly, future expansion in certain key sectors of the economy, namely, power and utilities, basic and heavy industries has been kept reserved for the State, so that it can have a lever for directing the course and rate of economic growth. Thirdly, a country-wide organization for community development and national extension has been built up by the State, keeping in view the need for changing the outlook of the people in rural areas, offering them information and knowledge of modern sciences and improved technology, and assisting them in the adoption of economic and social change through the provision of supplies, credit, services, etc. The important thing to note here is that community development as adopted in India is very largely a method of

extension and a programme for comprehensive area-development through the agency and assistance of a multipurpose official machinery. This strategy with the support of the first one was conceived as the corner-stone in the induced development of rural communities. Fourthly, and as a corollary, the administrative machinery of the Government has been expanded in coverage as well as depth in order to equip itself for handling the rapidly growing magnitude of the tasks of economic and welfare administration. The contact of the people with administration has been sought to be increased at different levels; and a reform of administration in the direction of delegation of power and authority to lower levels has been aimed at. This has also had an impact on the rural scene. Finally, there has been an attempt to encourage and promote the growth of leadership as well as individual and group initiative, particularly in the rural areas, through statutory and voluntary organizations.

The list of strategies given above is not meant to be exhaustive, though most of the important ones have been included in it. One may easily notice that the individual or the family has been largely left out of the scope of these strategies, as much as possible. Regulation and control on the behaviour and action of the individual or the family as a means of enforcing change has not found a place in this approach. These have been left to be determined by the general economic and social forces as operating within a community setting; and the strategy of change has been largely directed in the rural areas on and at the level of the community and important groups. The successful working of these strategies thus depends not only on action by the Government, but also on the part played by social and economic institutions, the administrative machinery, the community and the leadership at different levels.

The system thus conceived is, of course, a rational one. One can hardly miss noticing, however, its essentially rural orientation. The working of this far-reaching scheme of induced and assisted change is, however, based on a number of hypotheses regarding individual and group behaviour. The first hypothesis is that the village as a community is a living entity exercising a certain measure of direction over the economic and social activities of all its members. This community can be helped to grow out of its traditional setting and orientation, so much so that it will be able to undertake productive and welfare activities for the good of all sections. Another assumption is that leadership in the village community is generally informed of social purpose, not merely of sectional interests, and tends to subserve the overall national ideology and objective. Thirdly, individuals



have the desire and the aspiration to rise above the restrictive and self-protective codes of traditional behaviour and identify themselves with the national society both in ideology and through rational behaviour. This broad hypothesis involves a number of assumptions bearing on the acceptance of institutions, innovations and economic forces of change. On the institutional side, there is the requirement that individuals have developed or are capable of developing fairly rapidly, specific interests centred round their welfare, production and other activities, and organizing groups round these interests. As regards the springs of motivation, the immediate needs and interests of individuals and their families will require some amount of subjugation to those of the community, particularly since the administrative unit for development programmes has been equated at the village level with the latter and its institutional embodiment in the *panchayat* (Village Council). The last hypothesis relevant for our purpose is that public cooperation for the purpose of accelerating social change can be promoted through administrative encouragement and sponsorship. In its more general form, this raises a basic question, whether and how far a climate or movement for social change can be created through an enlightened administration and accepted as such by the people.

It is within the framework of this grand strategy that specific schemes and reconstructional efforts have been undertaken in India over the last ten years. The expectation has all along been, if it may be repeated again, that once the State creates the legal, institutional and material conditions for the launching of technical, economic and social programmes, people in the rural and urban areas will identify themselves fully with the philosophy underlying the Plan, and take advantage, both individually and community-wise, of the overheads created and the facilities provided. Besides, the functioning of groups and institutions will spontaneously throw up the necessary leadership for sustaining the process of change. It is against this framework that the changes and adjustments noticed in the rural communities in India have been briefly evaluated in the remaining part of this paper.

#### GENERAL REACTIONS OF RURAL COMMUNITIES

Problems of rural adjustment have essentially a time dimension, which it is necessary to keep in mind in assessing the experience in India. If there had not been specific period-plans with deadline targets of achievement in different fields of production and social welfare, problems of rural adjustment might not have assumed any

serious proportion. Social change, for a variety of reasons, is known to be a slower process than the construction of steel mills or large dams or a network of power generators and grids. The initial assessment and acceptance of a scheme or programme by the people is largely conditioned by their needs and aspirations as felt at the time and as developed through the group processes of leadership, extension, etc. The equation of the felt needs with the plan priorities assigned to different fields presents one of the most difficult problems in rural adjustment. Nor is it a question merely of bringing the two in line; it is also one of ensuring a rate of acceptance and change in each field commensurate with the rate of growth provided for in the plan. The time factor comes as a problem also in the matter of establishment and rooting of institutions, particularly institutions of the contractual type organised round new interests, and in almost all spheres of administrative and other action. Time-lag is, indeed, one of the basic problems that arise in the process of adjustment to planned development. The more important of the areas in which the reactions of the people have raised adjustment problems may be briefly discussed.

The programme of rural and community development in India has been conceived both on the planning and the extension side as an integrated attempt to change the outlook, behaviour and conditions of the people on many fronts. It was not, however, envisaged that the integrated approach would not have any scheme of priority among the different components of the programme. The first priority has all along been attached to the improvement of agriculture in the 557,000 villages of India organised into 5,200 or so blocks (of which nearly four-fifths are already in position). In actual working, however, it was found that the rural communities tended to place a seemingly higher priority on some of the amenities and welfare facilities like health centres, schools and roads than on agriculture as such. In spite of ten years of community development in many areas, this scheme of priorities still obtains to a large extent, though rational considerations point to the need for an emphasis on the welfare programmes to the extent economic programmes for raising agricultural and other output are accepted and bear results. This divergence between the national and the felt-need orders of priority has manifested itself in the disparity in achievement in these fields. Whereas in 1950-51 there was no primary health centre in the rural areas, the number in existence in 1960-61 was 2800. Over this period, the number of hospital beds increased by about 65 per cent, and the number of students enrolled in schools by about 85 per cent, while the index



of agricultural production recorded a rise of the order of 41 per cent.

The problem of selective acceptance and the consequent unevenness of the impact of development programmes in different fields has to be seen not only in its general form but also in its differential incidence. Different groups within a community emerge with different degrees of adjustment and rates of adoption even of the same programme; different communities again display different levels of adjustment. For example, the health and education facilities have been accepted and utilized much more fully by the upper rural classes — owner cultivators, traders and professional people — than by tenants and agricultural labourers. The disparity is even more marked in the case of economic programmes for the improvement of agriculture, which we shall deal with later. In other words, the inter-class and inter-spatial differences in the absolute level as well as the relative extent of rural adjustment pose problems of graver dimensions with bearings on the bigger issue of the distribution of the benefits of development.

The rise of industries and urban growth exert their pressure, however feeble one may try to make it out, on the rural communities. In a country as vast as India and with urban population accounting for only 17.3 per cent, the inter-action between rural and urban areas is bound to be somewhat less vigorous. It is also uneven among different regions. Apart from physical distance from urban centres, the nature and lines of communication, the extent of penetration of the cash and market economy, the service facilities needed by villagers, and the natural and environmental factors are some of the more important determining forces in India. Broadly speaking, it is possible to classify villages in India into three groups on the basis of the degree of different influence. There are, at one end, the tribal and the hill areas where rural-urban integration is at its lowest. At the other end, are the villages within a radius of 25 to 30 miles from cities and metropolitan areas, and within five miles or so of the towns. These have absorbed more of urbanism through the channels of trade, commerce, education, services and cultural-recreational activities. In between, there is the vast heterogeneous category of communities on which the urban influence is much thinner and is noticeable in the changes that have taken place in agricultural practices, marketing and consumption patterns, and through the impact of administrative and judicial processes. It is this intermediate category of rural communities, that hold the key to the rate of development in the short run. The observable changes in these areas indicate probably the resultant of the inter-action of the traditional aspirations with the ones

thrown up by the type of industrial-urban society that obtains in India. If one is to be exact, however, one has to provide for two sub-groups within this large category, classified according to the degree of commercialisation of agriculture and village industries.

The reactions of the rural communities in the intermediate parts of this continuum give us an insight into the relative impact of different forces. A good section of these communities will have one or a few individuals who have received the benefit of higher education. Nearly all such persons live away in urban areas and are engaged in urban pursuits like service, trade, etc. Their contact with the village has decreased with the increase in the period of stay outside. They have not, in the past, brought about any significant change in the habits and behaviour of the rural people, though such persons are remembered in the village as examples to emulate. In short, the development of education, particularly higher education have not had in the past much of a backward flowing impact on village communities. No channel of impact, either through occupational pursuits or other avenues, was available. This position is, however, undergoing some change with the spread of secondary education among the villagers and the enforced stay of some of these people in the villages. Another source of contact is through seasonal and temporary migrants: the main gain to the village from these sources being the inflow of funds through remittances. The influence has been and continues to be weak.

Contact through the processes of administration and justice has had a hang-over of suspicion, if not mistrust from the past. One of the significant achievements of the community development administration in the last decade has, however, been in the breaking down of this suspicion and fear and in the awakening of demands among the people, on the administration. The recent move to place the machinery for development administration in the rural areas in the hands of statutory self-governing bodies is of far-reaching significance and has already shown signs of accelerating the acceptance of the development approach and mentality in the rural communities.

The interaction between agriculture and trade and marketing has displayed varying patterns. In general, price and cash consciousness has increased among cultivators, and affected the traditional patterns of disposal of surplus. Marketing of agricultural produce has become far more responsive to the price situation than it ever was. Hesitancy has, however, been noticed in extending the area of dependence on cash purchase of supplies, inputs and commodities coming from outside the rural sector. This has been noticed, particularly, in respect



of fertilizers, pesticides, and some of the consumer goods. One of the most common arguments put forward by cultivators reluctant to use chemical fertilisers in spite of knowledge of their favourable effect on yield, is that, once they apply it to their land, they will have to go on using it every year and enter into a commitment of cash expenditure.

A study of the programme for improved seed by the Programme Evaluation Organization revealed that nearly 38 per cent of the sample farmers showed first preference for self-supply in the matter of procuring improved seed. No other sources of supply received as high a preference. The figures for some of the States showed as high a proportion as 83 per cent of the cultivators preferring their own supply of improved seed, to dependence on institutional agencies<sup>2</sup>. This is, however, not a rigid resistance to the infiltration of the money economy as far as purchase and outflow of cash are concerned; it is more of a suspicion and a fear that leads to an attitude of trial and error and postponement of the decision for some time. This hesitancy arises largely from the fear of getting involved in market and price uncertainties in addition to the weather and environmental risks which they have to bear. For, the same study shows that the conditions imposed by the hesitant cultivators on their use of improved seed are, in order of importance, that they should be convinced of its superiority, and its physical supply and other services should be assured. Facilities of finance were mentioned by very few. Here also, the problem emerges as one of time-lag in the process of acceptance, and not one of rejection.

Urbanism has probably been strongest in its impact, particularly on the younger members of the rural community, in fields like sports and games, dress and clothing fashions and recreational media such as cinema and radio. While these changes are very much on the surface and can be noticed even by casual observers, there has been a fairly large infiltration of industrial consumer goods into rural families. The surveys conducted by the Agro-Economic Research Centre of the Visva Bharati University show that in most of the villages surveyed, more than 50 per cent of the families used crockery and between 10 and 30 per cent of the households owned bicycles. The use of fountainpens has also increased considerably in recent years<sup>3</sup>.

<sup>2</sup> PROGRAMME EVALUATION ORGANIZATION, *Government of India, A Study of the Multiplication and Distribution Programme for Improved Seed*, 1961, pp. 129-31, 145-63.

<sup>3</sup> The data are from the results of detailed socio-economic surveys of 23 villages in the States of Bihar, Orissa and West Bengal conducted by the

## ROLE OF DIFFERENT FACTORS IN THE PROCESS OF RURAL ADAPTATION

The reactions of rural communities to planned development in India have thus been neither uniformly favourable nor generally hostile. This is not unnatural; nor does it give any cause for alarm if one takes only an overall historical view. When we go to the micro-units below the level of the overall rural community, we, however, come across tendencies that are divergent from the goals of a 'socialist pattern of society'. The egalitarian assumptions behind such a society are not reflected in the relatively larger share that the better-off sections of the rural community have derived in the developmental benefits either from the economic programmes or from education or even from medical services. While different village communities have tended to show different degrees of ability to change, the extent of change in most cases is determined by the behaviour of individuals and households, particularly those belonging to the better-off classes. An analysis of the behaviour of individuals in their family and class (or group) setting thus becomes more meaningful for understanding the process of adaptation in rural areas. This will be attempted in brief with reference to the role played by institutions, leadership, contact and communications.

Institutions can promote growth and development to the extent they serve, on the one hand, as sources of education of the members and, on the other, as an organisation for developing and using opportunities for productive and creative activity. The basic assumption always is that the individuals who come together in an institution have a certain community of interests about which they feel strongly and are willing to accept action and decision at the group level. There have been one or two case studies that have thrown some light on the developments in this field. Broadly speaking, they tend to show that formation of interest groups round agriculture and its improvement has not made any significant progress yet in the areas studied. The source of authority and decision in matters relating to the adoption of improved practices, techniques and methods of farming is largely with the head of the household, except in times of emergency like floods, drought, locust attacks, etc. when the community plays an active role. The main change that has so far come about, at least in the areas covered by community development

Agro-Economic Research Centre, Visva Bharati University. These reports have not yet been published except for the following one: J. P. BHATTACHARJEE and Associates, *Sahajapur, West Bengal, Santiniketan*, 1959.



blocks for more than three years, has been in the farmers' acceptance of the Village Level Worker as a source from whom technical advice in respect of non-traditional practices should be sought. Progressive neighbour-farmers still continue to be the main source of ideas for the farm families as far as known practices and methods are concerned<sup>4</sup>.

These and other findings have probably a few lessons of some significance. In the first place, it appears that institutionalisation of new practices and innovations is beginning to take place outside of the household and in the Government extension machinery. This is a very promising sign. Secondly, the household continues to play a prominent role in decision making. There is no evidence yet to show that the community or any special group is emerging as the more dominant institution. If this is so, the implication is that all extension work should be directed to families or at least groups of families with similar needs and resources.

So long, we have talked of institutions in general. Panchayats (Village Councils) and cooperative societies stand apart, inasmuch as they have a history of functioning within the setting of the village community. One of the interesting and rather significant facts about the working of these institutions in India is that the strength and success of these institutions has generally been relatively greater in areas where peasant proprietorship has been the prevailing form of land tenure. Here again, the link between the success of institutions and the relationship between household and land is clearly established. Another aspect of the functioning of panchayats that is of some relevance for our purpose, is the state of development of an area. In parts of the country, where there have not been much of development in the past and where new opportunities are being created through the extension of irrigation and other schemes, the panchayats and cooperative institutions seem to have found a more responsive human material. Without going too far into the analysis of institutions, one can say that the process of institutionalisation has been determined by the parallel process of creation of opportunities for growth and development.

Attempts have been made to develop new forms of leadership, particularly of the functional type, in rural communities. In fact, considerable stress has been laid on a whole scheme of training and follow-up of functional village leaders (Gram Sahayaks) under the community development programme. A study in this field by the

<sup>4</sup> P.E.O., *op.cit.*, pp. 140-60.

Programme Evaluation Organization has shown that where the training scheme succeeded, the leaders that came forward were largely the traditional ones<sup>5</sup>. The extension of democratic institutions to blocks and villages has created new sources of representative authority for the growth of leadership. Even then, the hold of traditional authority on the minds of men does not seem to have undergone much change. In fact, this has proved in many ways a most difficult area for transformation. Considerable emphasis has been placed on the youth programme; and the youth have come up with leadership in the recreational and cultural activities. But the traditional hold of the family on the means of livelihood and the economic pursuit, stands in the way of the youth extending functional leadership, contact, and communications.

Communication channels in such a setting have changed and can only change in the directions in which institutions and leadership have adapted. In agricultural matters, the line runs from the family to neighbours within the kinship setting and in certain matters, from there through cooperatives and Village Level Workers to outside. In matters of education, health, etc. the family and the kinship groups are integrated with the Panchayat. In matters of dispute and justice, the traditional and caste groups are still strong and only slowly being replaced by new statutory bodies.

Contacts of villagers with outside have been conditioned both by economic opportunities and the social processes of action and interaction. Interesting changes have taken place in the latter area. By and large, ceremonial and ritualistic practices have undergone a transformation that shows a desire, on the part of the people in the weaker or subordinate classes and castes, to emulate those of the upper ones. This tendency has often led to a wasteful change.

Contacts with the outside world through economic channels have been slow to develop for agricultural labourers and other poorer classes of the village community. This indeed reflects the weaker side of the development that has taken place in India over the last ten years. Many are the factors that have been responsible for this situation. It is not possible to go into all of these in the course of this paper. It is known that land reform has taken a much longer time in going through legislation and being put on the field for implementation than was originally envisaged, and that some of the benefits originally expected of it may not be fully realised. Because of the politically controversial nature of land reform, administrative and

<sup>5</sup> P.E.O., *Evaluation of Gram Sahayak Programme*, 1961.



other institutions have largely been kept at a safe distance so that they could maintain their apolitical character. While this advantage has been secured, they have also in the process, become somewhat weaker in their appeal. Under these circumstances, employment, earnings and economic conditions of the weaker sections have largely depended on the opportunities available within the village. They continue to earn their livelihood through work opportunities in the village only. A survey of a village in West Bengal in 1956-57 showed that the agricultural labourers derived 92 per cent of their annual earnings from within the village, 6 per cent from the adjacent villages and only two per cent from outside. Nearly 60 per cent of them were not satisfied with the economic opportunities in the village. But most of them had no information about opportunities available outside the village. And in any case, they generally did not have any liking for employment in factories and preferred to wait for opportunities to become tenant farmers<sup>6</sup>.

For the better-off sections like medium and large cultivators, non-cultivating land owners and traders, contacts through economic channels have, on the whole, increased considerably over the plan period. They have gained from the inflationary conditions that have prevailed for the better part of this period, and, in fact, have been among the principal beneficiaries of rural development. Yet, they cannot be said to have done their best to help the weaker sections and to lift the village community to a higher level of partnership, as was envisaged in the hypothesis of the Plan. Notes of discord come largely from this section as land reform, taxes and other measures impinge on them. Their interests sometimes show divergences if not conflicts with the Plan ideology. And, because of this, they cannot also function effectively to communicate and disseminate it.

My attempt in this paper has been to analyse the framework of rural development in India and against this background, discuss some of the problems of adjustment that have been noticed in the rural areas. A short paper can ill afford to be exhaustive; it can only be illustrative. The main problem areas that emerge from this analysis seem to lie in the ability of the village as a community to rise and grow within a developing framework, and the capacity of rural families to accept and develop leadership along non-traditional lines. Changes and adaptations in these two areas have to cut across the authority

<sup>6</sup> J. P. BHATTACHARJEE and Associates, *Shahajapur, West Bengal*, Santiniketan, 1959, *op.cit.*, p. 91.

pattern that is symbolised in the rural family. The joint family as a symbol of strength and authority, as well as of some security, has probably displayed much more of resilience and vitality in the rural areas than most people tended earlier to believe, or were willing to accept on the basis of their rational outlook. There does not seem to be much prospect for any weakening of the role and authority of the family as long as agriculture continues to be subject to the pressure of population, risks, hazards and uncertainties. The incidence of these has not undergone any noticeable change for the better. Lastly, the adjustment of rural communities could have proceeded on a far more accelerated course, had there been more of opportunities opened up for the weaker sections. This is a problem of a much bigger dimension. One of the ways in which it can bear a fresh examination is a study of the native skills that still exist in the rural areas, particularly among these sections of the population. This has not been done in the past because, in our hurry to develop, we have tended to introduce from outside new skills and techniques without taking care to see how much of the native skills can stand revitalisation. The fundamental weakness of the poorer and weaker sections of the rural community lies in their lack of possession of the type of skills that are needed for the execution of the development programmes planned for the country. The desire to work and the aspiration to improve their earnings are there; but the means to do so are lacking.



## URBANIZATION PROBLEMS IN SOUTH EAST ASIA

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The present National States of South-east Asia are built up from ethnic units which live in valleys separated by mountain chains on the continent or on the various islands. Their most outstanding characteristics are a common language or dialect and a common value-attitude system. When individual members go to town, their language and value-attitude system go with them. In the urban environment they usually learn a new (the national) language, and gradually adjust to the prevailing urban way of life.

It is generally understood among sociologists nowadays that this adjustment process is not rectilinear from rural diversity towards urban unity. The picture which arises from the data available is much more complicated. In various historical situations urban society took the form of a pluriform society, with an increased awareness of their ethnic identity among the composing groups. In addition to this pluriformity on ethnic basis, we also find local differentiation within one and the same ethnic group; various urban local units show different characteristics, the ethnic origin of the inhabitants being the same.

It should be added here, that not only people coming to town for the first time, but also those who were born or who have lived there for years, generally have to cope with a feeling of physical as well as mental insecurity. It has been suggested that neurosis is frequent in the urban setting of South-east Asia; however, this aspect has not yet been adequately studied. The ethnic group here plays an important role in providing some of the security which is so badly needed. I propose to discuss this problem on the basis of data drawn in detail from one town in particular, as these data seem valid for most urban settings of the area. As such I have selected the Indonesian town of Macassar, the main port of South-Celebes. There I myself conducted a research in 1952.

At the outbreak of world War II, Macassar counted 92.000 inhabitants; between the end of the war and 1952, the number in-

creased to 250,000. The population pressure is thus evident. 80 % of the inhabitants were Macassarese<sup>1</sup>, the remaining 20 % consisted of a variety of small ethnic units.

As far as some of these small ethnic units are concerned, I found firstly, a tendency for the people to live near each other, as neighbours, in the same street, or in adjacent streets. 67 % of the 106 houses of Moslim Bandjarese from Borneo were found close together. In the same way, 46 % of the houses of Moslim Butonnesse and slightly more than 50 % of the 159 houses of Christian Sangherese from North Celebes were close together, the latter in clusters of 3 to 6 neighbouring houses.

Secondly we found a tendency to ethnic endogamy. 73 % of Bandjarese marriages, 60 % of the Butonnesse and 59 % of the Sangherese, were enacted between men and women born in the same ethnic group. The percentage of Sangherese marriages even rises to 72, if marriages with the Christian Menadonese also from North Celebes with whom intermarriage in the homeland is already frequent, are also included. As an additional figure, I would mention that of all Christian ethnic groups taken together, as it is laid down that all marriages between Christians should be registered in one and the same office. For the year July 1948 - July 1949 precisely 200 marriages were registered; 63 % of them were ethnic endogamic.

Thirdly, more difficult to put into figures, there is a high percentage of people within a group working in the same profession or, what is also of importance, in Government service in positions considered to be of about equal level. 61 % of Bandjarese males of working age are hatmakers and tailors. More than 60 % of the Sangherese work for the Government in the postal services, as nurses, teachers, in the seafishing departments, etc., all in about the same salaryscales.

The figures of these three aspects of ethnic groups in urban conditions show a rather high degree of cohesion. This can be partly understood from the need for physical and mental security in an uncertain environment. There is a strong tendency for people to help each other in the trivial things of daily life, to visit each other after working hours and on official Free days, to relax by speaking the same home language, and by sharing the same emotions as reactions to the happenings in their environment. The possibility of relaxation is of utmost importance for emotional stability in the daily

<sup>1</sup> Macassarese and Buginese are here taken under one name. There are according to rough estimates 4 to 5 million of them living in South-Celebes.



life of the people. The ethnic unit here plays an important role, as particularly in times of stress, the co-ethnic group member is the first person to rely upon.

The picture is somewhat different when we turn to the Macassarese ethnic unit, which makes up the bulk of the town population. People migrating from the countryside to town, tend to go to somebody they know from their own district, or subdistrict, and, preferably, to a relative, however remote. Members of the nobility who live in the country, usually have a townhouse where their young people may live for a short period after their arrival, and which tends to become a centre of activity for those originating from that same district.

A house to house census was taken in one of the town's sub-districts, which proved to be inhabited by a low income group, for the main part unskilled or semi-skilled labourers. 827 of the 854 houses registered were inhabited by Macassarese. The average number of inhabitants per house was 11.1, whereas the same figure for a rural village was 6.1, the type of houses being the same. I should add here, that this figure for each of the ethnic groups mentioned above, in Macassar town, (the Bandjarese and Sangherese) was 6.5.

It was not too difficult — in town — to extend the basic structure of Macassarese houses in order to provide space for more people. When the influx of migrants to town first started, houseowners tended to accept non-kinship relatives, «foreigners», who came to live in his house. After various more or less unpleasant experiences, the general pattern became to have people in one's house with whom either the man and/or his wife were related by ties of kinship. We also found a tendency for married brothers, sisters or cousins, to have their houses close together. In this way, small «joint family» groups have emerged who live and work together, helping each other in providing for the necessities of daily life. Basically it is the same structure as in the rural villages, where people mutually related by kinship ties live and work together, with a preference for the closer relatives. Under urban conditions, the role of these small and incomplete joint families increased considerably in the general search for more security.

In comparing this local unit with another one in Macassar town, we are aware of introducing a new phenomenon, differences in status here being of high importance. A similar census as indicated above was taken from a local group in another part of the town, consisting of 145 small sized stone houses inhabited by people from various ethnic groups, among them 18 Macassarese (12.4%). The occupa-

tions of these Macassarese were to be found in the middle layers of Government departments and of some big enterprises. The average number of inhabitants per house here was 6.7, the Macassarese not differing from the others. The difference with the local unit previously mentioned is striking.

What both units have in common is, in the first place, the fact, already pointed out by Freedman,<sup>2</sup> that «the administrative and religious officials fail to provide a pervading system of local leadership». The municipal structure may show some centralization at the top, but at the level of the local units under discussion, we found divided authority. The registration of marriages and divorces, births and deaths, under the Moslims, (who according to a rough estimate, form nearly 90 % of the total town population) is in the hands of Moslim officials, whose office is always apart and usually at some distance from that of the local unit's Chief. This Chief, also, has no say in educational matters or in other social or technical services. However, he is expected to know what is going on in his territory and to communicate information from the higher authorities to «his» people and vice versa.

Both local units also have in common a rather rural impression which one obtains when visiting them, an impression sustained by some figures. The considerable difference in the average number of inhabitants per house (11.1 resp. 6.7) does not greatly affect the population density. The average population per hectare was 478 for the Macassarese local unit and 436 for the last mentioned unit with stone houses. This means that the poor districts are not as crowded as they seem to be from the per house figures. This can be explained by the fact that there are no houses with more than two stories, and that distances between houses are still sufficient to allow compounds to be used for various activities which cannot be carried out inside, and also as a playground for the children. Shadow is provided by coconut trees. All this not only encourages a rural impression, but also helps to explain why no proletarianization is to be reported in units with low status occupations<sup>3</sup>.

The difference between the two local units mentioned is to be found in the varying occupations of the respective inhabitants, giving rise to differences in money income, which is higher and more sta-

<sup>2</sup> M. FREEDMAN, *A Note on Social Organization in a Rural Area of Greater Djakarta*, Man, 1960, p. 82.

<sup>3</sup> H. J. HEEREN, «The Urbanization of Djakarta», *Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia*, 1955, p. 20.



ble in the stone houses unit. As an important phenomenon I found that only 34 % of the total number of children of schoolgoing age (6-18) were actually enlisted in school in the Macassarese local unit, whereas the figure in the stone houses group was 76 %. This implies that the difference in status already indicated can be expected to continue for the coming generation; it may even be expected to increase.

The same phenomenon, namely the development of status differences within one and the same ethnic group in an urban environment, which we noticed here with the Macassarese, is even to be observed in the smaller ethnic units. The urban Butonese, a group of small traders and shopkeepers, could not provide the help expected from them by Butonese immigrants. These people came in increasing numbers, in groups of 30 to 60 young men, to earn some money as seasonal labourers. They chose their own group-leader, who alone was in contact with the old urban Butonese, asking their advice on various matters. Continued help in such a case would have meant, economically — and consequently socially — speaking, the breakdown of the social system of the «old» group. This last case shows that a sudden increase in population tends to break down ethnic group relations; the absorption process of immigrants can be speeded up to a certain extent only.

The increase of population indicated above, of almost 150.000 people in nearly seven years, meant a heavy pressure on the intra ethnic group relations. During those years it became more and more difficult to obtain a job in order to earn money and to have a house to live in; and, especially important, to get a school to improve the status of the next generation. It is in the struggle for jobs, houses, schools, that ethnic relations play an important role. It is at least partly via ethnic relations that these needs can be fulfilled. Ethnic relations tend to become strengthened in times of pressure. Co-ethnics treat each other as if they were kinshipmembers; they help each other to a considerable extent. But when the number of people arriving per time unit increases and passes a certain limit, no more help is given even for the primary needs of food and shelter. It is as if the old unit closes its ranks. The answer to the question whether relations with newcomers are to be established from now onwards does not depend on ethnic or kinship relationship only, but also on the individual capacities of the newcomers, which are supposed to be needed for successful participation in urban society. Here the process of adaptation to urban society begins. This process, however, seems to be not only an individual problem,



it also is a problem of changing social systems. Those systems best adaptable to the flexibility which the urban pattern demands, are expected to be most successful. On this point I would like to make some final remarks on the social system of the urban Macassarese.

This group is composed of a great number of centres each of which consists of people related by bilateral kinship ties. Each of those people individually has economic or social or kinship relations with people belonging to other centres. Small and loosely integrated centres are to be found in the poor parts of town; big and well integrated ones in the more well-to-do parts. These Macassarese kinship centres, in the countryside, usually show a weak and diffused authority pattern. This does not always hold in urban society. On the one hand leading personalities may prove successful in establishing good relations with people of other kinship centres or ethnic groups; they tend to become marginal to their own centre and it remains to be seen in how far they will still allow their co-members to benefit from the advantages they derive from these relations, as it happened in the years before the immigration increase set in, or as still is the case in the countryside. On the other hand those people who are not successful in e.g. finding a job and earning some money, will experience that they cannot ask much from their more successful kinship people. They tend to drop out gradually and are expected to build up new relations elsewhere in town, but this usually will happen at an economically lower and sociological less integrated level. In the same way we may say that newcomers with this sort of capacities are not easily accepted in the urban kinship centres. Selection is severe.

This bilateral Macassarese kinship centre shows a flexibility in structure which enables it to respond successfully to changing urban conditions. I worked for some time in a group of around 600 people; this number is mainly derived from the number of houses found together in clusters apparently having regular contacts. I should add here that this number is difficult to judge, as the impression of clear limits must be avoided; kinship ties spreading in various directions are numerous. The centre belongs to the middle class as far as their occupational structure is concerned. Members of centres like these want to maintain their — middle class — position and in this case they were able to do so 1) as some leading personalities were able to establish good economic and social relations with people of other ethnic groups or kinship groups, people belonging to the army or police force being in high esteem; 2) as it proved possible to keep newcomers out and even to persuade remote kin-



ship members, who were not too successful in their adaptation to live elsewhere; 3) as it proved possible to maintain an informal authority pattern and to provide guidance as well as protection to those centre members who voluntarily and actively responded to what was asked from them.

This favourable situation was reflected among others in the divorce figures. In a rural village, in the Macassarese countryside, I found one divorce to 15 marriages. In two urban districts inhabited by low income groups people, mainly newcomers, and living in small loosely integrated units, the figures were 1 to 3. But in the 600 people group under discussion here the figure was 1 to 7. My informants showed a certain pride in maintaining a behaviour pattern between the sexes that is according to them «rather similar» to the rural pattern. This pattern, in urban life, however, implies well functioning authority and obedience relations between the generations.

In the big centres of urban society more than in the countryside, authority has been concentrated in the hands of the few who are able to take decisions and to give advices which afterwards prove to be successful. This greatly informal authority pattern enabled this middle class centre to react efficiently to the demands of urban society, and ultimately to maintain a balance between changes and traditions in a turbulent town.

## CONDITION OF NEGROES IN AMERICAN CITIES

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A discussion of the condition of Negroes in American cities is concerned essentially with the problem of Negroes in American civilization since more than seven-tenths of the Negroes in the United States are city dwellers today. Until World War II much of the thinking concerning the condition of Negroes in the United States was dominated by the mistaken assumption that the major problems of Negroes were those growing out of their position in the rural South. While it is true that until World War I nine-tenths of the Negroes lived in the South and four-fifths of those in the South were in rural areas, the majority of the Negroes in the North have always lived in cities. In 1790 when the first Federal census was taken Negroes constituted, for example, 13.1 per cent of the population of New York City and 5.7 per cent of the population of Philadelphia. Since 1890 the proportion of Negroes in the North who live in cities has increased from 60 per cent to nearly 95 per cent. At the same time Negroes in the South have been migrating to cities, with the result that somewhat more than half of the Negroes in the South are in cities.

### I

Before the Civil War, in the South as well as in the North where there were relatively few slaves, free Negroes were concentrated in cities. In 1850, for example, there were 13,815 free Negroes in New York City; 10,736 in Philadelphia; 25,442 in Baltimore; 2,369 in Richmond, Virginia; 3,441 in Charleston, South Carolina; and 9,905 in New Orleans, Louisiana<sup>1</sup>. After Emancipation, Negroes migrated in large numbers to the cities of the North as well as the South. Between 1860 and 1870 the Negro population in fourteen southern cities increased 90.7 per cent as compared with an increase of 16.7 per cent

<sup>1</sup> *The Seventh Census of the United States, 1850.*



in the white population of these same cities<sup>2</sup>. During this same period the Negro population of eight northern cities increased 51 per cent. During the next two decades, 1870 to 1890, the movement of Negroes to cities slowed down and as late as 1910 nearly seven-tenths (69.0 per cent) of urban Negroes were in southern cities.

## II

The urbanization of Negroes during the twentieth century has followed a similar trend in the white population. In the South the urbanization of the Negro population closely paralleled that of the white, increasing from less than 20 per cent in 1900 to over 50 per cent in 1960. Between 1900 and 1930 a million Negroes moved from rural areas to 78 southern cities with a population of 25,000 and over and into 773 towns and cities with populations ranging from 2,500 to 25,000<sup>3</sup>. The movement of Negroes to southern cities was inconspicuous and occurred at the same time as the mass migrations to the North which were replete with dramatic incidents and were directed principally to a few cities—New York, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit.

The mass migrations to northern cities, which began during World War I and have continued to the present time, have resulted in a shift in Negro population which has changed fundamentally the relation of Negroes to American civilization. There has been a change both in the numerical distribution and in the proportion of Negroes in the population of the North and of the South. At the opening of the present century, 90 per cent of the Negroes were in the South, whereas today only 60 per cent are in the South<sup>4</sup>. In 1900 they constituted a third, whereas at the present time they comprise only a fifth of the population of the South. For 150 years Negroes did not constitute more than 3.3 per cent of the population of the North and only one per cent of the population of the West. At the present time the more than 6,000,000 Negroes in the northern cities comprise about 5 per cent of the population of the North. In New York City, Chicago, Philadelphia, and Detroit there is a total of 3,000,000

<sup>2</sup> George E. HAYNES, «Conditions Among Negroes in Cities», in *The Negro's Progress in Fifty Years*. The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 1913, p. 106.

<sup>3</sup> Frank A. ROSS, «Urbanization and the Negro», *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, Vol. XXVI, p. 118

<sup>4</sup> BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, *1960 Census of Population*. Supplementary Reports, September 7, 1961.

Negroes. In the 17 cities — six in the South, seven in the North, three Border cities and one western city — with Negro communities numbering 100,000 or more, there are to be found today about 6,000,000 or a third of the Negroes in the United States.

### III

The pattern of settlement of Negroes in American cities has always provided an index to their economic and social condition in urban areas. From earliest times Negroes have been concentrated in the slum areas of American cities. This has been primarily the result of their poverty. At the same time those who were economically better-off and educated were able to escape to some extent from the slums. In Philadelphia it was noted as early as 1847 that the more successful Negroes tended to move to the periphery of the Negro area or to escape from it altogether<sup>5</sup>. But, on the whole, the Negro population has been concentrated in the slum areas, especially in northern cities, where the processes of ecological segregation in the expanding cities are most manifest. Therefore, in considering the pattern of settlement of Negroes in American cities, it is necessary to recognize the differences between not only southern and northern but Border cities as well.

In the older cities of the South the location of Negroes was due largely to historical circumstances. The location of the widely-scattered Negro population in the older cities like Charleston, South Carolina, and New Orleans, Louisiana, was the result of small Negro settlements, comprised mainly of servants, which grew up close to the house of the whites in which the Negroes served<sup>6</sup>. These patterns of settlement took root before the spatial pattern of the cities was affected by the economic forces which have shaped the pattern of modern American industrial and commercial cities. Therefore, another pattern of settlement has appeared in the newer cities of the South where industry and commerce have determined their spatial pattern. In these cities there are several large concentrations of Negroes and the remainder of the Negro population is scattered over a large area. Nevertheless, in these larger cities of the South the majority of Negroes are concentrated in the slums and blighted areas.

On the other hand, in the larger northern cities Negroes have

<sup>5</sup> *A Statistical Inquiry into the Conditions of the People of Colour, of the City and District of Philadelphia*, Philadelphia, 1849.

<sup>6</sup> T. J. WOOFER, *Negro Problems in Cities*, New York, 1928, p. 38.



always been more segregated within a small area than in the larger southern cities. This has been due mainly to the operation of impersonal economic and social forces which has resulted in the segregation of other ethnic groups as well in slum areas. The concentration of Negroes in certain areas of Border cities has been somewhat similar to their concentration in the larger southern cities with one important difference. Neither historical circumstances nor impersonal ecological processes have been decisive in determining their location with the result that it was in the Border cities that the more important battles over residential segregation of Negroes have been waged<sup>7</sup>.

In view of the fact that Negroes have been concentrated in the slums of American cities, it would be expected that they would be housed in the worst dwellings. As Negroes moved into northern cities, the ghettos grew in size and became more crowded. Just before the United States entered World War II the housing situation of the Negro is indicated by the fact that about half of the Negroes in northern cities «lived in houses which needed major repairs or had serious plumbing deficiencies in 1940»<sup>8</sup>. The increased earnings of Negroes during the War years enabled them to demand better housing. But private housing schemes even with government assistance did little to improve housing facilities for Negroes. Improvement in the housing of Negroes appeared only when the federal government began to build low-cost housing projects and Negro workers began to occupy these projects. Nevertheless, these low-cost housing projects have been wholly inadequate to meet the housing needs of Negroes in American cities. Then the problem of racial segregation in government-supported housing has been inevitable since racial segregation is inseparable from the Negro ghettos. From all indications it is probably as true today as it was 20 years ago that a half of the Negro population in American cities live in substandard dwelling quarters.

When Negroes began to migrate to cities in large numbers it was believed that their high death rate in urban areas would soon eliminate them from the American scene. But in the 1920's, with the declining death rates and an increase in the birth rate of urban Negroes, it appeared that they were improving their ability to survive in the city<sup>9</sup>. The improvement in the vitality of Negroes in northern cities

<sup>7</sup> See E. Franklin FRAZIER, *The Negro in the United States*. Rev. Ed., New York, 1957, Chapter XI, «Urban Negro Communities».

<sup>8</sup> Robert WEAVER, *The Negro Ghetto*, New York, 1948, p. 66.

<sup>9</sup> S. J. HOLMES, *The Negro's Struggle for Survival*, Berkeley, Calif., 1937, pp. 202 ff.

was much better than in southern cities. Of course, the increase in the birth rate of Negroes in cities was due to the movement of large numbers of Negroes of childbearing age to cities. On the other hand, the greater improvement in the vitality of Negroes in northern cities than in southern cities has been due to better welfare and health provisions. Professor Hauser has made a significant contribution to the study of the differentials in the mortality of Negroes and whites in cities<sup>10</sup>. In a study of Chicago, it was revealed that economic status was an important factor in survival of both whites and Negroes. However, among Negroes of the lowest economic stratum 57 per cent of males as compared with 31 per cent of white males of the same economic stratum would die before 45 years of age, while 24 per cent of the white females and 31 per cent of Negro females of the same economic stratum would die before 45. The most recent materials on the fertility of Negroes in cities indicate that the vitality of the urban Negro population has improved during the past 30 or 40 years though it is still below that of whites. This improvement is associated with the decline in infant mortality and in the proportion of childless couples who are the victims of venereal diseases and a decrease in various forms of family disorganization<sup>11</sup>.

#### IV

The migration of Negroes to cities, especially the cities of the North, has accelerated the occupational differentiation of the Negro population. Negroes have ceased to gain their living primarily from agriculture and have become an important element among industrial workers. Likewise, they have become an important element in organized labor, especially in the CIO-AFL unions. The most rapid and important changes in the occupational status of Negroes have occurred in northern cities while in the cities of the South Negro workers are still largely excluded from skilled and white collar occupations. As the South has become industrialized, white workers from rural areas are absorbed into the new industries, while Negroes must live at a starvation wage in domestic service and in unskilled labor or are forced to migrate to northern cities. This is due partly to the fact that

<sup>10</sup> Philip M. HAUSER, «Population Problems in the United States». Unpublished study.

<sup>11</sup> See Clyde V. KISER, «Fertility Trends and Differentials among Nonwhite in the United States». *The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly*, Vol. XXXVI, April 1958, pp. 149-197.



in southern cities Negroes have no political power while in northern cities they are able to exercise considerable political power and the color line in industry and commerce does not exist as in the South. In many northern cities Negroes have entered practically the same occupations as whites and in recent years their entrance into clerical and other white collar occupations has been especially significant. Moreover, many Negroes are employed in white collar and professional occupations and other public services by the municipalities. Then it should be added that many Negroes are elected to public offices in northern cities. On the other hand, in the South practically all Negroes in white collar occupations are restricted to the institutions of the Negro community. This has resulted in an important difference between the incomes of Negroes in northern and southern cities. According to the federal census figures for 1960, for all cities in the United States the median income of a white family was \$6,163 and a Negro family \$3,894 and for unrelated white individuals \$2,130 and unrelated Negro individuals \$1,259<sup>12</sup>. But the difference between white and Negro families and individuals was much greater in the South than in the North. In southern cities the median income of white families and unrelated individuals was \$4,905 while the median income of Negro families and unrelated individuals was \$2,117. In northern cities, on the other hand, the median income of white families and unrelated individuals was about \$6,000 and that of Negro families and unrelated individuals was between \$4,000 and \$4,500.

The greater occupational differentiation of the Negro population of northern cities and their higher incomes have made possible the emergence of a sizeable middle class. In northern and western cities a conservative estimate indicates that 24 per cent of the Negroes are able to maintain a middle class way of life, while in southern cities only about 12 per cent of the Negroes have incomes and education to maintain middle class standards<sup>13</sup>. In this connection it should be emphasized that in northern cities Negroes have access to a standard American education to a larger extent than in southern cities and that there is more illiteracy among Negroes in southern cities than in northern cities. It has been mainly through education that Negroes have achieved and continue to achieve social mobility. The Negro middle class which has emerged in recent years is composed mainly of salaried professional and white collar workers with a goodly number of the higher skilled workers. The so-called Negro

<sup>12</sup> BUREAU OF CENSUS, *Current Population Reports*, Consumer Income, January 7, 1962, pp. 25 and 35.

<sup>13</sup> See E. Franklin FRAZIER, *Black Bourgeoisie*, Glencoe, Ill., 1957.

business enterprises are insignificant both from the standpoint of employment of Negroes and incomes. Moreover, Negroes are only beginning to secure employment as salaried professionals and white-collar workers in industry and commerce. Yet the emergence of a Negro middle class had created an important cleavage in Negro communities in cities<sup>14</sup>. Nowhere is this more evident than in the middle class Negro neighborhoods that are emerging, especially in the larger southern cities.

The movement of Negroes to cities, especially northern cities, has been regarded as the Second Emancipation of the Negro. In a sense this has been true. It has enabled them to escape to a large extent from the race prejudice and caste restrictions of the agricultural South; it has enabled them to escape from domestic service and unskilled occupations and enter most of the same occupations as whites; it has meant an increase in incomes and created a sizeable middle class. All of these changes have been in response to changes in the economic and social organization of American life and as a consequence Negroes have been faced with new problems. In the competition of city life the majority of Negroes have been confined to slums and forced to live in dwellings unfit for human habitation. Because of the lack of education and skills which are required by modern industry in which automation is becoming important, large numbers of Negroes are not only unemployed but unemployable. Therefore, it is in the city that the masses of Negroes with the added burden of racial discrimination are confronted with the frustrations of an industrial civilization. Many seek an escape from these frustrations in alcohol and in narcotics, while others seek an escape in the numerous religious cults which range from spiritualism to a militant black nationalism. Thus it is in the cities that Negroes are being subjected to the rigorous ordeal of American civilization, the outcome of which no one can predict with certainty.

<sup>14</sup> See James B. CONANT, *Slums and Suburbs*, New York, 1961, Chapter I.



## INSIDERS-OUTSIDERS

### The Position of Minorities \*

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The term 'minority group' has essentially a quantitative meaning — a minority as distinct from a majority. And yet when we use the term we do not apply it to the indubitable minorities in our societies — the most visible ones; the elites, singled out because they are in positions of economic and political power, or of exceptional distinction in the scientific and cultural scene. When we speak of minorities, here or elsewhere, we do not refer to the directors of Shell, of Krupps or of the Bank of England; to Mr. Nehru's or Mr. Kennedy's cabinets; to Nobel prize winners, royal families or Hollywood stars; nor even to that lofty team, Nikolayev and Popovich — this summer undeniably the most remarkable minority among mankind. Just because they are so distinctive, all such minorities, in the quantitative sense, do not look like minorities. They are taken for granted as top members of social hierarchies, national or international; and indeed as agents, exponents and symbols of national or supra-national integration.

By contrast, the groups which we usually acknowledge as minorities are among the mass of the people, among them and yet at the margins. It is that — the marginal location, the not-belonging or not-quite-belonging — rather than the relative size of the group, which is the most distinctive, and thus also the most general characteristic of the so-called minorities. For various reasons — ethnic origin, colour, religion, language, occupational specialization, social custom; or because of a combination of these and other factors — minorities are regarded, and often regard themselves, as being different; as being somehow apart; as outsiders.

But different from what? Apart from whom? Outside what? The criteria of differentiation are elusive because they are dependent upon

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a deceptively simple, dichotomous, two-dimensional geography of social structure — upon the assumption of fixed boundaries, irrespective of the scale and the vantage point of observation. And so the criteria become once again circular: we talk of minorities as distinct from the 'majority society', although there may be no such singular entity at all.

While minority groups cannot, therefore, be defined either by indices of mere numbers or by precise social location, the latter aspect, however vague — that of their 'apartness' — nevertheless brings us nearer to the primary element in the definition and condition of minorities. Both in practice and theory, hard or soft, minority groups are distinguished not in quantitative but in qualitative terms: they are categorized as such because of their social status; their identity is determined and perpetuated by their social status.

It is never a homogeneously high social status; and though it may not be a homogeneously or unambiguously low social status either, it is invariably a vulnerable one, associated with notions of inferiority<sup>1</sup>. By and large, minority groups belong to, or are heavily concentrated in, the 'lowers orders' — or even among the lowest of the low. And they may be so placed as a result of various circumstances: by deliberate direction and segregation; through the cumulative effects of deprivation and insecurity; or because, as migrants, they have in fact at some time come from the 'outside', and are thus liable to be seen and treated as a distinct group of strangers and competitors. Whatever the particular circumstances and modes of differentiation, members of minority groups are socially placed primarily not on grounds of their individual origins, conditions and aptitudes — but in their ca-

<sup>1</sup> Perhaps it ought to be stressed at once, so as to avoid misunderstanding, that the term 'social status' is used deliberately in this context, as distinct from occupational category. Though social status is largely dependent upon occupation, it is not, in most societies, synonymous with occupation — and less so in the case of minorities than in that of other groups in society. Indeed it is, in terms of the argument here presented, one of the distinctive features of minorities that their standing in society is ambiguous — determined by their collective label, as members of a minority, in addition to (or even irrespective of) their individual occupational positions. Moreover, minorities do not have a random occupational distribution, but a selective one. Both these aspects are clearly illustrated, for example, by the case of Jews in pre-Hitler Germany, or that of Indians in some parts of Africa, whose social status was (or is) ambiguous, although — or just because — a considerable number of them were (or are) located in specific corners of the middle and upper occupational levels. In such circumstances, commerce and real estate, or the arts and journalism, come to be regarded, with a derogatory connotation, as 'Indian' or 'Jewish' occupations.



pacities as members of a group to which particular roles and locations in society are assigned, explicitly or implicitly. The minority group is in a sense created, and certainly maintained, by such collective status assignation.

#### DUALITY

Clearly the main step, therefore, in the recognition and especially in the comparative study of minority groups is the recognition of the nature of the society in which, however marginally, minorities are located. And in this context, it would be appropriate to call such societies 'parent' rather than 'majority' societies, for it is usually *because* of them, as an offspring of *their* condition, that minorities *qua* minorities exist. Indeed, despite their peripheral location, their characteristic of being kept outside the front door, minorities are very much an inside group — an integral part of the parent social structure. Minorities would not for long be visible as such if the parent society did not need them — to do the dirty work; as scapegoats and punch bags; to assist both in camouflaging and in exploiting social conflict; to maintain, by the juxtaposition of their apparent distinctiveness, illusions of national unity and superiority. The more the minorities' role as outsiders is stressed, the more they are in fact insiders.

It is this contradiction in the position and functions of minorities which causes the constant tug of war between them and the parent society; and which thus also perpetuates their existence as minorities. The parent society needs and wants them as outsiders just because they can as such be looked down upon, pitied and resented. And so, by definition, members of minority groups cannot ever do anything quite right: they are criticized for trying to become indistinguishable, and also for remaining distinct. On the whole, however, it is the minority groups which affirm and preserve their apartness that are regarded as being more acceptable, and that are in a sense also more assimilated: for it is they who conform to the *status quo*, and who help to maintain it.

But of course it is not easy for them to do so unequivocally and wholeheartedly. The duality of their role, which inevitably causes frictions between minorities and the parent society, is also bound to produce internal schisms within their own groups and within their own minds — divisions between conformist and non-conformist attitudes, between a traditional and a non-traditional outlook. Pulled in opposite directions, functioning both as insiders and outsiders,

the minorities themselves are liable to be moulded in the image of the society in which they exist, by which they are tolerated at some phases and in some respects, and rejected in others. However much the minority may try to preserve its own structure and culture, the stratification and values of the wider society will be superimposed and may indeed become dominant. And in so far as these wider influences are divisive, they accentuate the cleavages inherent in the dual role of minorities. Thus at the very stage of crisis when the minority group needs to be most cohesive, it may in fact be deeply split. The heroic moments of history when a minority has fought jointly against segregation and the stigma of inferiority, extinguished its old identity and thus created a new one, such moments have so far been very rare.

#### THE PARENT SOCIETY

The influence exercised by the 'parent society' on minorities is indeed liable to be divisive.

For the kind of society which needs minority groups as such — and cannot, or will not, absorb them fairly easily — is one which itself lacks cohesion, which is vulnerable and unsure of itself. It therefore keeps some sort of buffer groups in reserve, that can be used so as to divert attention from its own shabby patches; that can be exploited in stages of depression; and upon which guilt can be projected in moments of crisis. (In many ways the functions of minorities are not unlike, and in fact often coincident with, those of reserve armies of unemployed or of cheap unskilled labour.) But of course there are few large-scale societies which are entirely free from such weaknesses; and thus there are few (if any) which have no minorities, actual or potential — that is, no inside-outside groups with a specific configuration of inferior social status. Nevertheless, as there are phases and degrees of segmentation and consequent vulnerability — socialist societies are far better off in that respect than capitalist societies — there are also corresponding marked variations in the condition of minorities.

The treatment of minority 'colonies' — which often has for various reasons a definite resemblance to the treatment of colonial subjects — can thus be regarded as an index of the state of the 'parent society'. The position of minorities is a critical instance of general social health (or sickness); it is a subject that belongs to the study of social pathology in the wider sense. And it is also a subject that belongs to the



study of social stratification in the wider sense. This is so not only because the specific places which minorities occupy in the social structure have to be identified in relation to the whole, but also because minorities, in their dual role as insiders-outsiders, tend to have a dual social structure — an internal and an external one. The interplay between these two, and especially the narrowing of the divergencies between them (as for example in the case of Negro communities in the northern United States) may well make it possible to observe the social conditioning imposed by the parent society under a microscope.

Most students of minority groups have recognized these links, though usually implicitly rather than explicitly. Somehow or other, their interest in a particular minority *per se* (or in several) has involved them in broader questions of social stratification and morale. Nevertheless, minorities have generally been studied *ad hoc*, more or less discretely — with the result that the wider implications of their situations for comparative analyses of social structure have been obscured, and have hardly been systematized. And in particular, there has been a scarcity of historical studies, which are not focussed on minorities as such, but which look at them, so to speak, from the outside — with the main purpose of viewing changes in their situation in a given society in relation to general socio-economic development<sup>2</sup>.

No doubt it is far easier to ask for such studies than to undertake them. They are rarely attempted because — quite apart from considerable technical obstacles — they would be beset by all sorts of complications.

The first series of these brings us back to the apparently simple, but in fact rather tortuous, question of the definition of minority groups. However hard we may try, it is difficult to shake off its quantitative connotation, and equally difficult to discard the conventional image of minorities — that of coloured groups in white societies; and also of immigrants (or descendants of immigrants) coming from poor to prosperous countries, from less industrialized to rapidly expanding industrialized nations. And most of all it is difficult to give up the imperial *idée fixe* of the unitary 'majority

<sup>2</sup> While this kind of approach has been adopted, at least to some extent, in writing about certain minorities — for instance, with reference to the history of Negroes in the Deep South — in general, social histories tend to be either very broad (with only passing references to minorities) or narrowly specialized. Consequently, minorities are kept apart from the 'parent society', and from one another, in retrospect as well.

society', in juxtaposition to which the minorities are usually seen. But so long as such connotations of the minority group concept persist, unadulterated, there is really no beginning or end to the study of minorities in the world of today.

#### PLURAL SOCIETIES

Thus the simple quantitative definition of minorities (irrespective of qualitative aspects) can cause a good deal of bewilderment. If we apply it, rather vaguely, would we not find that whole societies consist of minority groups? Indeed, that appears to be so when any society, large or small, is sorted through a very fine sieve of social categorization. And this can also be said of societies which appear to be disjointed (or in the process of becoming disjointed) in terms of a congruence of various indices—such as degrees of social mobility; distribution of income; modes of consumption and communication; variety of folkways and aspirations; formation of sectional versus national institutions and alignments<sup>3</sup>. And it can certainly be said of societies which show an overt criss-cross pattern of caste, class, race, of religious and political demarcation; as again of those which consist of a conglomeration of tribal communities.

It is evident, therefore, that comparative studies of minorities are bound up with the need for a growing understanding of plural societies — of their nature and of the distinctions between them — and thus also with a whole host of related topical questions, such as those of finding indices of social fusion and of an evolving national identity. It would be premature (and presumptuous) even to attempt a classification of plural societies in the present context. But perhaps some initial speculation may not be entirely out of place.

It is possible that, on the whole, the contrast between the so-called underdeveloped and developed countries is also one between two main types of plural society. On one side, there are poor societies which have traditionally consisted of many distinct components — and not only in terms of occupational and territorial differentiation — and whose divisions have in the past been sharpened by geographical and historical factors — not least by the experience of colonial rule. In such societies, the majority used to be the 'minority', in terms

<sup>3</sup> This list of factors, though elliptical, is not mentioned casually, merely as an aside. It is suggested as one which might well be considered and elaborated for comparative studies of social cohesion and fragmentation.



of its inferior status and lack of political power; and thus showed the fissiparous tendencies of minorities in an accentuated form. But in the process of economic development and national independence, old alignments are increasingly being re-shuffled; there is some loosening of the bondage of inferiority in which the most oppressed sub-minorities were held. (This is so, for example, in the case of the Harijans in India; and apparently also in that of the *eta* in Japanese cities<sup>4</sup>.) Moreover, the old white elites in Asia and Africa are on the way out, and may in several places be in fact reduced to the status of minorities. While in such countries the old divisive influences persist in some respects, or are even strengthened, a sense of single nationhood is beginning to emerge, or is already pervasive. There are signs, however ambivalent, of growing cohesion<sup>5</sup>.

On the other side of the world, in prosperous western societies, there are signs of increasing fragmentation, brought about (so it seems) by tendencies of social segregation and introversion. And these, in turn, are apparently induced by affluence, despite — or perhaps because of — the urge for togetherness, uniformity, conformity and the trappings of national prestige. (This kind of pluralism, or potential pluralism, is one about which we know as yet very little. We have heard more about caste in India than about social sectarianism and sub-cultures in the United States and Britain. But it is just those phenomena which studies of minorities in 'developed' nations — certainly the investigation of the 'colour problem' — have indicated, and which they can further help us to explore.)

There is another main type of society — an advanced socialist society — which in intention, if not invariably in fact, is a 'federal' rather than a 'plural' society. Its sub-national components are distinguished by their language and culture, and frequently by their

<sup>4</sup> Changes in the situation of the latter group were described in a paper by Kiyotaka AOYAGI and R. P. DORE, contributed to the same working group of the Congress.

<sup>5</sup> On the contemporary stage, there can hardly be any other country in which the interplay of contradictory trends towards segmentation and towards cohesion is so striking, so compelling — and where its outcome will be of such world-wide significance — as it is in India. It is there that the compound reasons — historical, geographical and constitutional — for the juxtaposition of these trends are both evident and bewildering, tangible and intangible. And this juxtaposition reflects not only old inherited facts of life and new external pressures — especially the tension between India and her neighbours, China and Pakistan. It is also, and perhaps in the long run decisively, influenced by the contradictory trends in the direction and structure of the economy, not least by the division between the public and private sectors.

habitat; but they are not differentiated in terms of social status. There is a random status distribution among them; and there are equal opportunities for social mobility, though some traces of traditional occupational specialization, as also of inherited group prejudices, may remain. And while such a society acknowledges and indeed supports sub-national entities, it has very powerful nation-wide institutions — decentralized for centralizing purposes — through which national imperatives are communicated, and through which the fusion of objectives and loyalties is perpetuated.

#### STEREOTYPES AND VALUE JUDGMENTS

Speculations on the forms, extent and degrees of segregation or integration in various societies, and on the hardening or softening of patterns of status differentiation, are bound to be most tentative and controversial. Even so, it is clear that the conventional images of minorities — as dark people in white societies; and as 'backward' foreigners (or offspring of foreigners) knocking at the gate of an advanced unified 'majority society' — are far too limited. Though still applicable in some situations, these images are not of much use in many others, which have to be taken into account for comparative studies of minority groups. There are dark minorities in dark societies and white minorities in coloured societies; there are minorities which are not distinguishable by their looks or race; as well as those which are singled out for minority status from among a multiracial population. There are dichotomous societies (such as British Guiana on a small scale) where either of the two groups, though numerically no (or hardly) less strong than the other, could develop features closely resembling those of a minority. There are minorities who are descendants of foreigners; and others who are survivors of natives, pushed aside by foreigners. There are also indigenous long established minorities which have traditionally fulfilled that role, and which can be regarded as strangers only because they have for long been degraded and kept apart. And these are only some examples from a long catalogue of variations.

The stereotype images of minorities are not very helpful, moreover, because they are conducive to taking notions of the inferiority of minorities for granted. And that is perhaps the most serious handicap in assessing the complexities in the status of minorities objectively — without complacency on one side, and without a 'chip on the shoulder' zeal for complaint, on the other. Indeed, it is one of the



main difficulties in the comparative study of minorities that their context, that of the wider social universe, is so blurred. When we look at the position and treatment of minorities, we tend to do so with the bias of our own conditioning, however unwittingly: we are shortsighted because we lack criteria of evaluation.

In other words, we lack models — for the absorption of minorities, and also for the kind of society in which they would be absorbed; or in which they would *a priori* not exist as minorities. There are plenty of negative models in the chamber of horrors of history — distant, recent and contemporary. But are there any truly positive models? Or are we sufficiently aware of them? Could we possibly agree in recognizing them? And again when we say — as we may well do — that the very existence, certainly the persistent existence, of minorities in a given society is a symptom of social malady, are we not bound to be rather glib so long as we are reluctant or unable to define a state of social health? Ultimately, the study of minorities is dependent upon an explicit comprehensive value system — at least upon an outline of the best of all possible structures for one of the real societies with a specific history which we know. And it is such a value system with its concomitants that we generally do not have, or that we are perhaps too inhibited to begin to formulate. (In the company of our professional colleagues, there would certainly be no unanimity in discussing its substance, or even in acknowledging the need for it.)

No study of any aspect of society can have cumulative results if it is based on the acceptance of the *status quo*. And in relation to the study of minorities, this has to be said with special emphasis.

#### AMBIGUOUS TREATMENT OF MINORITIES

Explicit criteria of evaluation are necessary, moreover — particularly in this field of study — because the treatment of minorities in a given society tends to be ambiguous, ambivalent and erratic. Not all minority groups are treated alike, nor is the treatment of any one of them consistent in all spheres and over a period of time. Discrimination against minorities, or the demand for discrimination, may be partially transferred from an older group to a new one (as in New York from Negroes to Puerto Ricans); and then again back in the opposite direction. (The latter kind of shift occurred, for example, recently in Britain when the colour bar agitators, having found some satisfaction in the passing of the Commonwealth Immigrants Act,

turned from the 'Blacks', as their primary target, back to their original one, the Jews.)

There are extreme, unmistakable minorities — so stigmatized, so exploited, so segregated in the dustbin area of the economy, and so much confined to the squatters' camps of the society that their chances of trespassing are almost nil. At the other end of the scale, there are 'hidden' minorities — hidden because discrimination against them is not overtly institutionalized; because they have, apparently, gained the right of entry at various levels; because the status differentiation to which they are subjected is not crude. They do not wear a striking label of inferiority. But if one looks closely, one can see that there is still a blank patch on the collar where such a label can be pinned on; and at any time of general social stress, it may indeed be stuck on again. Hidden minorities cannot rely on remaining hidden. (Two of the 'classic' minorities — the Jews and the East Indians in Africa and in the Caribbean know that very well.)

There are also potential minorities, such as groups of migrants who arrive as temporary visitors, as refugees and exiles from their native country to which their primary allegiance belongs, and to which they want to return. So long as such groups regard themselves as transients, take up the specific functions and locations assigned to them, and are satisfied with a rather precarious *modus vivendi*, they are accommodating and accommodated. But if they change their minds — if they want to stay — they may well find that their temporary status of limited privilege (or of occupational specialization) has become a fixed one: the 'host society', as their adopted 'parent society', makes them into a minority.

It is necessary to remember, moreover, that there is considerable variety in the mechanics of minority differentiation: discrimination against particular groups can have positive as well as negative motives; it can be the result of protection as well as of rejection. Indeed, there are groups which can be described as 'protected' minorities — they have acquired minority status and characteristics because they were initially for reasons of charity singled out for special treatment<sup>6</sup>.

Distinctions between the various types of minority are not neces-

<sup>6</sup> An example of the potential creation of minorities through positive motives was given in a paper, contributed to the working group by Ramkrishna MUKHERJEE, dealing with the stratification of East Bengali refugees in Calcutta. These 'marginal' groups could become 'protected minorities' if the public authorities adhere to the policy of settling them in special camps and colonies.



sarily hard and fast. For there are some groups which contain segments of several kinds — of potential, of hidden, of protected and of stigmatized minorities, and possibly of some other variants as well. Ranged between the minorities at either end of the scale, the least and the most segregated ones, there are many other mixed and intermediate types. (Quite apart from the fact that a particular racial, religious and ethnic group — Jews, Indians, Negroes, Irish, Poles — may play different minority roles in different societies and at different periods; and that certain kinds of occupational specialization — such as those of dealing with refuse or leather and money-lending — do not carry the same status rigidity, and thus a minority group connotation, everywhere.)

It is the treatment of the mixed and intermediate minorities, especially, that is likely to be apparently contradictory. Such minorities may enter some places and be kept out of others. (They may, for instance, as in the case of coloured people in Britain, be more easily accepted as employees than as tenants.) They may find few or no barriers in formal social relationships in the public sphere; and yet distinct barriers, however camouflaged, in informal relationships in the private sphere.

For all these and many other reasons, it is by no means a straightforward matter to assess the condition of minorities, actual and potential — or even in some cases to identify minorities. It is difficult to do so not only because of the inherent ambiguities both in the actual treatment of minorities and in the value judgments of observers, but also because there are shifts of emphasis on minority status from one group to another. It is therefore clearly not sufficient to observe minority groups out of context.

Nor is it advisable to be satisfied with small mercies (as American liberals generally are) however comforting that may be. In the current situation of the United States, for example, it would certainly be misleading to regard the apparent relaxation of minority status in some respects — or the growing acceptance of any one minority — as a definite sign of progress achieved by the parent society. While parts of the machinery of segregation are being removed, other segregatory tendencies are reinforced; and there are also new schisms within the Negro communities themselves. Negroes, together with Puerto Ricans, are still the reserve army of casual labour in the North; they are still in the grip of poverty and unemployment; the black ghettos of northern cities are growing, and are becoming more blighted. Many Negroes in the Deep South are still without the right to vote; and it is the franchise far more than education which is one

of the major institutions of White Supremacy. One James Meredith, however brave, does not make integration in Mississippi<sup>7</sup>.

#### CHARACTERISTICS OF MINORITY GROUPS

No doubt, we must be aware of the ambiguities in the treatment, in the condition and, consequently, in the identification of minorities. But this does not imply that such groups have no general, objectively ascertainable characteristics. On the contrary. In terms of the definition of minorities here given, there is a series of such specific characteristics; and it is their very combination which is the decisive aspect.

We may see a group of people with a congruence of certain features: a group which for several generations has been held more or less apart from the society in which it exists; which has been kept as an outsider in the sense that it is regarded as having a collective identity with an inferior status connotation — inferior to, or even incompatible with, the main symbols of national prestige; a group whose 'crossing points' to the wider social universe are restricted; and which has not a random distribution of social status (in keeping with the structure of that universe) but which is concentrated in the lower and marginal ranks. Alternatively, if the group's positions are more scattered, the status of its individual members on the higher levels is still determined by, or associated with, their collective label of inferiority, and is thus equivocal. (For instance, an American Negro on that level would not simply have the status of a banker, but that of a 'Negro banker'.) If such a group, with that combination of characteristics, has also to a considerable extent accepted the image of its collective identity — as shown by its possessing a marked specific internal structure — then we can be certain of having found a minority<sup>8</sup>.

<sup>7</sup> These points were strongly confirmed in the discussion of the Congress working group, particularly by Oliver Cromwell Cox and by others who commented on, or elaborated, a paper on *The Condition of Negroes in American Cities*, which Franklin FRAZIER had written for the group just before his death.

<sup>8</sup> There are two elements in this list of characteristics of minorities which should, so to speak, be italicized. First, (as stressed already) a group of people in a given society can be identified as a minority only if it has a combination of such characteristics: it is the congruence of these features which makes it a 'minority'. Second, a crucial aspect in distinguishing other groups with inferior status from minorities is that the collective status assignation of the



It is true that in a rigidly segmented immobile society, minorities (so defined) may well be indistinguishable from — or indeed identical with — castes, classes or sectors of classes at the lower or lowest levels. But in those societies, there would be no point in trying to draw such a distinction; and anyhow, there are presumably not many of them left. Minorities as we know them exist in stratified societies which allow some social mobility; which certainly promote illusions of mobility; which profess gospels of liberty and equality; and where minorities, although within the working or even middle classes, are distinguished by being more fixed in their status, more inbred, having a more specific in-group structure and culture than the rest. Minorities, however rebellious at times, are more inclined than others in the same or similar social positions to take their status for granted; and are less ambitious even in their hypothetical aspirations.

Thus minorities do in fact fulfil a conservative function: it is their role as outsiders which makes it possible for others to regard themselves as insiders, and to believe that their society is more integrated, more fluid, more satisfactory than it really is.

A society which needs such illusions has a vested interest in keeping minorities as an essential element for the maintenance of its class structure. And for long minorities have had a vested interest in preserving themselves as minorities. They have done so because they have, consciously or unconsciously, taken over the ideology of their parent society, including notions of their own inferiority. They thought, rightly or wrongly, that by accepting their roles as outsiders, they would be able to earn rewards and privileges far more easily than if they asserted their rights to be insiders. And indeed, by adhering to patterns of segregation, minorities have found the status, prestige and income denied to them in the outer society in their inner society — with its own middle class, its own sub-minorities — and with its antagonism to other minorities. (Minorities have often been notoriously frigid to one another.) And so long as they keep themselves to themselves, they can always bolster their morale by an occasional excursion across the tracks; and by listening spellbound to a messiah who preaches reform.

latter is incompatible with the main symbols of national prestige. For instance: it is perfectly possible at present for a Harijan to become President of India; it would be inconceivable at present for a Negro to become President of the United States or Secretary of the U.S. State Department — although American Negroes may be given, here and there, token positions of lesser prestige. (Not long ago, Mr. Robert Kennedy was reported as having said, to indicate 'progress', that a Negro might become acceptable as President of the United States in about 40 or 50 years.)

Hence in the past, minorities have had cumulative reasons for complying with the conservative function assigned to them. Through their compliance, they have attained short-term benefits — material, ideological and emotional. And having once been compelled, or having agreed, to become minorities, they have remained in that position — not least because, as outsiders, they were afraid of 'falling out' altogether, of not belonging at all. Minorities, and especially middle class members of minorities, have often been the most patriotic, the most loyal subjects of their parent society. (German middle class Jews were super-Germans; American middle class Negroes tend to be super-Americans.)

#### INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCES

But nowadays there is a new dimension in the situation of minorities. And it is one that is likely to affect significantly their location, their structure and aspirations. Many minorities no longer need to be afraid of falling out altogether: their status and horizons are no longer fixed by their parent societies alone; they have found, or will find, compatriots far and wide, and a patriotism that goes well beyond the national frontiers of the country in which they exist.

From now on, the condition of minorities everywhere will be strongly influenced by international trends — by the movements against colonialism, economic and political, and for national independence throughout the world. In the past, groups in a society which had, or were promised, a national home elsewhere have been in a category apart — not quite in that of minorities; or as 'transitory' minorities sustained by pride and confidence in acknowledging their separate identity. And at this stage, many minorities in the affluent countries can increasingly see symbols of national power, made in their own image, in other parts of the world. They themselves are often descendants of slaves, of indentured labourers or of colonial subjects — and they have in any case a semi-colonial status by virtue of being minorities. All that makes the affinity to anti-colonialism, and its example, so compelling.

At the same time, it is possible that on the other side of the world the new power elites may repeat some features of the pattern to which they themselves had been subjected. Will they create social cleavages, or even minority colonies, in the fashion of the old ones? And what of the new plural societies, or of the dichotomous ones, which are



socially and racially divided? Will we there see the re-emergence of minority group differentiation?

It is certain that more than ever before the status, as the study, of minorities has become indivisible. The situation of any one minority, or even of the whole series of them in any one country, at a particular moment of time is no longer merely determined within national boundaries. While in the past, minorities were largely (or wholly) the creatures of their parent societies, and thus their condition was symptomatic of the state of those societies, the links are no longer quite so direct. So far minorities, as insiders-outsiders, have had a dual role and status, a dual structure, culture and allegiance. But as they are increasingly subject to wider international influences, they may well develop a multiple structure, culture and allegiance. And here and there, they will discover that it is only by adopting a new non-conformist image of themselves as unequivocal outsiders that they can in fact permanently move into society — or take it over.

The world is being turned upside down. Minorities are becoming majorities; elites are becoming minorities; and the status of the rich now dominant western countries, the elites of today, will be so transformed in the international society of the future — if there is a future. Does this mean that all that we have known, or said, on the subject of minorities is already out-of-date?

I hope so.

## A MINORITY-MARGINAL GROUP IN CALCUTTA

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### I

In this brief communication I do not propose to deal with a minority group *per se*. Instead, I shall discuss very summarily only some specific features of a group so as to illustrate how intra-group variations may provide us with clues to diagnose soft spots in an organism through which measures may be taken to solve the problems of such groups.

This approach may also indicate, parenthetically, that studies of minority-marginal groups in this way may be useful to the implementation of a desired course of *induced change* in the society at large, which in India and elsewhere is the vital component of the planned programme of socio-economic development. Because the successful working of any action programme would lie in developing it into a self-generating process in society, and for this purpose the previous knowledge of how a group of people have *actually reacted* to a changed situation would be particularly advantageous, as indicating the soft spots in the organism under reference. And such reactions would evidently be high-lighted in the case of a minority-marginal group because its reactions in a society are likely to be very explicit.

Pursuantly, the group I shall discuss in this paper is constituted of displaced persons from East Pakistan (formerly known as East Bengal) who migrated to India after the partition of the sub-continent in 1947 and are still dribbling in. These people have not yet integrated themselves unequivocally to the social *milieu*, and the distinction they maintain is acknowledged by their relatively much larger counterpart in society. Also they claim special economic privileges from the government and receive some in the form of financial assistance to settle down in India, etc. So that, whether or not these persons should be considered as constituting a minority group, they obviously represent a marginal group in the society under reference. And, following therefrom, an examination of the process of assim-



lation of the members of this group in the society at large would conform to the objective of preparing this paper.

I shall not, however, deal with the total universe of displaced persons from East Pakistan. On the contrary, out of those who still claim the distinction of being «refugees from East Pakistan», I shall bring within the sphere of my examination only those who were found resident in Calcutta in January 1962 and accounted for about a tenth of the city population.

The limitation thus imposed on my field of observation may not be regarded to affect the aim of the study. For: 1) the bulk of the East Pakistan refugees has come to West Bengal; 2) the refugees who continue to live in the rural areas have been virtually assimilated in local societies; and 3) of those refugees in towns and cities who still claim to be so designated, the largest frequency is found for Calcutta<sup>1</sup>.

## II

The refugees in Calcutta may be categorized under four heads which would, schematically, represent four stages of assimilation of this group in the social *milieu*. The first refers to the refugee families (52 in January 1962) squatting on the platform of one of the railway stations of the city (Sealdah) which is the terminal point of the transport link between East Pakistan and India. This segment of the refugees — who have «nothing to lose» in the literal sense of the term — will be labelled henceforth as the *platform sample*.

Under the second head falls those refugee families which have built tiny hovels out of thrown away packing cases, tin sheets, etc., in the lawns and lanes adjoining or connecting the three main

<sup>1</sup> According to official figures, 3,14 million persons came as «refugees» from East Pakistan to West Bengal during 1947-61; and out of this number, 2,23 millions settled down in this State, while 0,18 millions settled down outside West Bengal. Of the remaining 0,73 million persons, 0,05 millions could be accounted for as inmates of Government Refugee Camps and Refugee Homes; the rest 0,68 millions remain untraced.

A sample survey, under my guidance, to study changes in family structures in West Bengal found in 1960-61 that out of 103 family and non-familial units in 20 sampled villages which have come from East Pakistan since the «partition» only 2 family-units declared themselves as «refugees». The corresponding numbers for 5 sampled urban areas (including Howrah city) and Calcutta were 231 and 53, and 251 and 97, respectively. (The study was sponsored by the Research Programmes Committee of the Planning Commission, Government of India.)

buildings of the station. Some 250 families have thus settled down semi-permanently, with those occupying the front line of the settlements having opened stalls in front of their hovels to sell tea, tobacco, and such articles as the railway passengers may require on their way to and from the station. This segment of the refugees will be categorized as the *hovel sample*.

The third head represents the displaced persons settled down in those swampy regions around the city where the normal citizen would not have liked to move in. There these people (nearly half of the total number of displaced families in the city) have moved mostly in groups representing their previous affiliation to particular districts (or even villages) in East Bengal, and have established «colonies» with distinct names for their identification. In these «colonies» they have erected huts, built roads, opened shops of all kinds, founded educational and recreational centres of their own, and some «colonies» have established colleges affiliated to the University of Calcutta. By and large, these displaced persons have thus built in Calcutta replicas of their previous settlements in East Bengal. Pursuant to their way of life in the city, this segment of the Calcutta refugees will be labelled as the *colony sample*.

Lastly, under the fourth head will fall the remaining refugee families (about half of their total number in the city) which have settled down in Calcutta among its other residents without making any distinction specific to themselves. That is, unlike the above three segments of displaced persons, this segment cannot be spotted on the map of Calcutta; and just as before the cataclysm of 1947 it was necessary to interrogate person after person, and family after family, to ascertain whether he/she/it was from East Bengal or West Bengal, so these persons can be identified as «displaced» only when they would declare as such *within* the social milieu. Hence as representing the «normal» process of contact and adjustment between the people of East and West Bengal in the city, this segment of the refugee families will be described as the *city sample*.

The four types of refugee families thus indicate, schematically, the process of assimilation of this minority-marginal group in society; schematically, because all these refugees need not have (and, in fact, did not) pass through the four stages sequentially or at all. On the contrary, they point to distinct categories of displaced persons in terms of their life and living in East Bengal, the course of their migration into Calcutta, and the socio-economic organization they could build up in the city.



## III

Thus, we find from a complete enumeration of the platform type and a sample survey of the other three types of Calcutta refugees<sup>2</sup> that while virtually all these people lived previously in rural areas of East Bengal, they belonged there to distinct strata in terms of the economic structure of the rural society. Namely, most of those in the city and the colony samples lived previously on their participation in wholesale trade in jute or cotton textiles which had their centres in big towns in East Bengal and/or in Calcutta, or they were posted in rural areas as local functionaries of the government or private organizations, or they were medical men, school teachers, etc., or they lived on the rent they received from the land they owned. All of them, therefore, were not unfamiliar with the urban way of life; and most of them had direct contact with the urban economy, some directly with Calcutta.

Contrariwise, we find that the life of virtually all those belonging to the platform and the hovel samples centred round the rural economy. They were cultivators, artisans catering to the immediate needs of the rural folk, petty shopkeepers and peddlars, and wage-earners doing sundry jobs for the villagers. To them, town-life was a foreign entity; Calcutta, a mental image.

This distinction between the city-colony and the platform-hovel samples is found to have a role in the process of emigration of these people from East Pakistan. Thus those in the city-colony samples who had no concern with the agrarian economy left Pakistan within three years of the partition, and they came directly to Calcutta. The remaining component of this social stratum, viz. the landowners, also came directly to Calcutta; but evidently because of their economic roots in Pakistan they were more reluctant to leave. Many of them, therefore, left Pakistan between three and five years after the partition.

The families belonging to the platform-hovel samples were still more reluctant to leave East Bengal as they were rooted to the soil.

<sup>2</sup> The study was sponsored by the Centre for Urban Studies, University College, London, at the instance of its Director, Mrs. Ruth Glass. It was conducted under my guidance by a sociologist, Kumarananda Chattopadhyay, and a statistician, Suraj Bandyopadhyay; involving intensive interrogation of 52 refugee families squatting on the platforms of Sealdah Railway Station, 54 sampled families living in the «hovels», 53 sampled families living in «refugee colonies», and the total number of 48 out of 795 sampled families resident in other areas of Calcutta who declared themselves as «refugees». A report on this study is under preparation.

So we find that most of them left Pakistan after five years of the partition and, in India, they first tried to rehabilitate themselves by settling down with agriculture or ancillary activities in rural areas of West Bengal, Assam, or other States. Only when that avenue of making a living failed because of natural calamities, lack of official assistance or inter-State tension, and they faced «no other alternative» (as they stated to our investigators), they came to Calcutta within the last five years as their last resort for survival.

#### IV

This varying course of migration of the displaced persons, reflecting their degree of inertia to the life they were leading in East Bengal and the relative order of difficulties they encountered in the process of rehabilitation in India, had a significant bearing on their nature of settlement in Calcutta.

Thus those functioning in East Bengal villages as agents or employees of merchantile organizations or the government had the least strong roots in the local societies. So for them to decide to leave Pakistan immediately after the violent shake-up in the country in 1947 was fairly easy. Also for an appreciable number of them to be transferred to their «business» headquarters in Calcutta or to resume similar activities there as they were doing in East Bengal was not a difficult task because of the previous contacts they had in Calcutta through business associates, friends and relatives. And for the same reason, a large number of them could settle down directly *within* the social *milieu*.

So we find that 66 per cent of the families in the city sample came to Calcutta more than 10 years ago as against the corresponding percentage of 57 for the colony sample. And we also notice that, as compared to the colony sample, the city sample gives proportionately a smaller representation of the previous landowners in East Bengal (20 per cent as against 23); and a larger representation of the families maintaining their previous economic status by following the relatively high-grade sources of livelihood noted before (92 per cent as against 81).

The relative differences between the city and the colony samples are, of course, of a small magnitude. Yet the trend of change found with respect to the previous livelihood of the displaced persons and the facilities they could get to settle down in Calcutta may be regarded as worthy of note. For this is brought into relief when distinguishing



the platform and the hovel samples with respect to the opportunities their constituent families received to adjust themselves to the changed situation.

Thus we find that while virtually all the families in the platform and the hovel samples first settled down in rural India, threefourths of the families in the platform sample were located outside West Bengal as against nine-tenths of the families in the hovel sample located within West Bengal. And thus located, most of the families now belonging to the platform sample could resume their familiar occupations of cultivation and ancillary activities, while only about half of the families now belonging to the hovel sample could thus rehabilitate themselves. Therefore, the remaining «unsettled» families were the first to move into Calcutta; and other «not properly settled» families followed in their wake. So that the hovel sample shows that 93 per cent of its constituent families came to Calcutta before last 2 years and built its peculiar settlement.

Meanwhile, the relatively stable life which the families presently affiliated to the platform sample had built up in villages outside West Bengal by dint of their own labour, and in conformity with the way of life they were familiar with, disrupted again. Due to anti-Bengali riots in Assam and for other weighty reasons, they had to be on the move again; and thus forced to migrate and eventually come down to Sealdah Station within the last two years, they found hardly any avenue left to settle down in Calcutta even semi-permanently. Because, in the meantime, the hovels had usurped the sites to erect shelters and their residents has used up practically whatever possibilities were there of making a living somehow.

## V

The distinctions thus brought about within the group of displaced persons as the upshot of their two different courses of living in East Bengal, the different courses of migration they undertook in one or more phases, and the nature of settlement they could establish in Calcutta accordingly, have led to distinct ways of life they have built up in the city.

For we find, at one extreme, that the platform sample of the latest immigrants to Calcutta exists barely. Squatting under the railway sheds, its constituent families had not observed a single rite or ceremony as indicative of living as social beings, and since their arrival in Calcutta they have no organized life at all. Begging and taking

to any kind of casual work (as available), they merely exist and await government help to settle them in rural areas wherever possible. Till then, they remain in Calcutta in transit.

Those living in hovels, on the other hand, have made use of whatever opportunities were there to make a living by opening shops in their hovels as reported earlier, by working as unlicensed porters for the railways, and by taking to sundry jobs in the vicinity. They have settled down to this state of living to such an extent that even marriages have taken place in their families in recent years; and in terms of inter-family cooperation in securing jobs, helping one another in case of illness in the family or tiding over some immediate difficulties, they have developed an exclusive neighbourhood with the least contact with others in Calcutta. Many of them are now reluctant to leave the city and want government help to settle down permanently by opening green grocer's or stationary shop, etc., or by taking to some regular jobs in place of the temporary or unstable occupations they are engaged in at the moment.

Parochial existence is less marked in the colony sample, but it is still the dominant note among these people. For instance, on rites and ceremonies in the families they were found to restrict invitees to the refugees of the same colony; and the priests and other officiators to the ceremonies also were refugees. Moreover, their economic activities are usually restricted to the local area, in a large measure within the colony itself; and their recreational activities are in respective colonies, as noted earlier. Significantly, an appreciable number of them (19 per cent of the total sample) have not yet been able to attain the economic status they had in East Bengal, as has been noted before. So they remain conscious as «refugees»; and many of them want government assistance in the form of loan for opening small-scale trading or manufacturing enterprise, for the ownership of the land they have occupied, etc., in order that they may attain economic stability and improvement within Calcutta society.

In the city sample, on the other hand, the situation is different. There the displaced persons were found to invite proportionately more non-refugees than refugees in connection with rites and ceremonies in their families, and to work anywhere in Calcutta. Also very few of these people were found to belong to any club or institution organized by the refugees or live in any way differently from the other citizens of Calcutta. And, significantly, 92 per cent of these families have maintained their previous economic status or have further improved upon it, as stated earlier.



Thus, at the other extreme of the different ways of life the displaced persons have built up in the city, the only distinguishing feature found worthy of record for the city sample is that its constituents still declare themselves as «displaced persons». But on that count also it was found that when asked how the refugee problem could be solved 88 per cent of the sample could not offer any specific suggestion; evidently because this was no more a «problem» to them.

## VI

The above account of the displaced persons may not appear as striking at all; for it is well known that the economic basis of societal groups plays an important role in the process of their adjustment or disintegration. But I feel it useful to stress contextually the relative importance of this factor to those commonly labelled as «value considerations». Because the apparent resilience and adaptability of the city-colony samples in contradistinction to the same of the platform-hovel samples have been interpreted in the latter way, and that has not led us to the solution of the problem.

For instance, the caste system and the joint family organization have sometimes been supposed to hinder the absorption of displaced persons in society. But whatever may be their importance in the day to day existence of all Hindu Bengalees, and surely these and similar social institutions are relevant that way, with reference to a major change in their life these were not found to be of any consequence.

Thus both the purest and the impure castes were found in successively higher proportions with respect to the platform-hovel, colony, and the city samples; pointing to the fact that the caste hierarchy as a social attribute remains irrelevant in the present context<sup>3</sup>. Only the artisan and peasant castes were found proportionately more in the platform-hovel than in the city-colony samples, evidently because the former two samples are essentially composed of families with such sources of livelihood. That is, the caste affiliation of the displaced

<sup>3</sup> In terms of the caste hierarchy of the topmost three castes (Brahmin, Kayastha, and Vaidya) in the first layer, the other Caste Hindus in the middle, and the Scheduled Castes in the bottom layer, it was found that the caste composition of the platform and the hovel samples is identically as 46, 50, and 4 per cents, respectively; of the colony sample as 67, 25, and 8 per cents, respectively; and of the city sample as 77, 13, and 10 per cents, respectively.

persons functioned as a random variable with respect to their reactions to a major shake up in their life.

Similarly, although it is often stated that the joint family organization forbids mobility of its members, the affiliation of these persons, prior to being displaced, to the extended family-units or not tends to present a picture contrary to such a supposition. For the city and the colony samples, which were the first to leave Pakistan, contained the largest proportions of extended families (81 and 79 per cent); the hovel samples a lesser proportion (76 per cent), and the platform sample the least (52 per cent). Furthermore, it is noticed that the force which drove these people away from Pakistan had its first impact on the joint family organization. Most of these people moved individually or in nuclear units of parents and children; and out of those who moved in «extended» units the disintegration of the familial organization was marked in the platform and the hovel samples during their successive phases of migration. Contrariwise it was found that after settling down in a favourable situation the joint family organization revived, to an extent, in the city and the colony samples; showing how this institution functioned as a dependent variable on the economic stability and improvement of the social segments.

In the present case, therefore, *a priori* «value considerations» do not appear to help us to identify the *soft spots* in the organism under reference, whereby how the problem for the group can be solved would have been indicated.

Likewise, abstract «value judgement» also do not lead us anywhere. For, more frequently than such «value considerations» as above, the interpretation of the failure of some segments of displaced persons to be adjusted to the social *milieu* has been based on «value judgement» on the intrinsic peculiarity of these particular «refugees» as being lazy, parasitic, and without any enterprise. This interpretation has mostly followed from the experience of governmental and non-governmental attempts to organize these displaced persons in handicraft centres or in other forms of production and services ancillary to the urban economy. But, on this count also, the displaced persons under review tend to indicate that such an interpretation is based on wrong foundation. Indeed, even those belonging to the platform sample are found to be *not* lazy or parasitic, or without any enterprise, but as referring to a particular *soft spot* which remains obscure in the light of abstract «value judgement» while without its recognition it is impossible to solve their problem.

Thus it should be recalled that, frustrated as they are, three-fifths



of the families belonging to the platform sample have not given up their urge to become peasants again. They want land for settlement *anywhere* in India. So the anachronism they exhibit in Calcutta society cannot be removed unless: a) they are *obliged* to adopt an unfamiliar course of living at the cost of whatever may be lost in the process of compulsion to them and the society at large; or b) they are helped to be settled within the orbit of a peasant economy and the rural life, and thereafter undergo the course of development desired for *all* in the *milieu*. Herein lies the *soft spot* of this societal segment as different from those of the others, respectively.

For even the residents of the hovels indicate a slightly different situation in spite of the fact that in terms of their life and living in the pre-partition days they could be identified with their compatriots in the platform sample. Because by being able to survive on the basis of whatever opportunities they could grasp within the orbit of the city economy at a desperate stage in their life, an appreciable number of them have broken away from the peasant inertia and now want to settle down in Calcutta at the fringe of her economy. Yet one-half of these residents wanted to be settled as peasants or their associates somewhere in West Bengal.

So that, for this segment *as a whole* the solution may be to settle its constituents either in rural areas or within the city by giving fillip to their present process of acculturation on the basis of economic stability and improvement. Or, in terms of the alternate *soft spots* these people have developed, they may be rehabilitated in respective ways.

For the colony sample, on the other hand, alternate solutions are irrelevant. Because it is evident from their background and the way of life they have built up in Calcutta that their *soft spot* refers to improving their position within the city's economy. Therefore, given the necessary economic stability to its residents, these foreign pockets in Calcutta are likely to be assimilated in the larger society. In fact, signs to this effect are already there with the measures taken by the Government to settle the ownership of the lands they have occupied forcibly.

And for the city sample, no such measures *specific* to the minority-marginal group are necessary. For it appears to be on the point of being merged in the social *milieu* in conformity with its background and the present way of life.

In short, instead of specific «value considerations» or abstract «value judgement», the classification of the displaced persons under the four mutually distinct segments in terms of the previously noted

attributes points to respective *soft spots* in the organism which should be taken into account for the resolution of the problem for the group as a whole.

## VII

The conclusion thus drawn, however, would require further elucidation. Because for the group under reference the fulfilment of the economic needs of its constituents comes up as the cardinal factor in solving its problem; as is further substantiated by the fact that practically all the displaced persons in rural areas of West Bengal who have settled down as peasants or their associates do no more declare themselves as «refugees». But merely to state the situation as such would be inadequate for the minority-marginal group under discussion and misleading for other such groups in the presently-considered society or elsewhere. Three points, therefore, are worthy of note at the end.

One, although a large number of the displaced persons have been rehabilitated satisfactorily within the sphere of the rural economy, their intra-group variations indicate that this cannot be accepted as the blanket-solution for all belonging to this minority-marginal group. On the contrary, such variations lead us to diagnose different *soft spots* in the organism for respective segments, and suggest accordingly different measures to solve their problems. Analogous situations may be found with respect to other varieties and types of minority groups in urban and rural areas; confirming the specific usefulness of studies like the present one.

Two, while the economic basis of the group under reference was found to demand primary attention to solve its problems, this need not be true in all cases. Specific «value considerations», in the sense this phrase has been employed in this paper, or other societal attributes may come up as requiring primary attention in some other cases. But for all such cases the fact would remain that whichever may be the cardinal factor or factors in specific contexts, it or they would not be revealed without examining intra-group variations like the above. This, therefore, would be the particular usefulness of studies like the present one.

Third, an examination of the minority groups in this way need not be relevant to themselves exclusively. For reasons stated in the beginning, the process may also be useful to the society at large as pointing to the *reactions* of the people to a course of induced change.



whereby any planned programme of social development could be efficiently designed and implemented. Thus in countries like India where the Government has adopted the policy of a planned development of society, controversies are there as to whether a course of development can be induced directly through specific «action programmes» or it would have to be left to the indirect process of sustained economic betterment and general education of the people<sup>4</sup>. In such a context, studies like the present one may indicate (or, at any rate, suggest further course of research to point out) whether specific «action programmes» would be relevant; and, if relevant, how best could they be launched. This, therefore, may be regarded as the general usefulness of studies like the present one.

<sup>4</sup> For a somewhat detailed treatment of this point, see the writer's «Sociologist and Social Change in India Today» in *The Nature and Extent of Social Change in India*, Decennial Celebrations Symposium of the Indian Sociological Society, «Sociological Bulletin», Bombay, 1962.

## FROM CLASS DIFFERENTIATION TO SOCIAL SIMILARITY

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Changes to occur in the town and the rural population body are being studied by Soviet Sociologists in close connection with a more general problem to eliminate distinctions between classes and social groups in Soviet Society.

If, in the past, historical development was inevitably remote from social similarity, being characteristic of the early stages of social development, to a more class differentiation, then in the present epoch the very course of historical development makes it necessary to eradicate class differentiation, to evolve a class-free society that will differ completely on account of its social similarity.

The Soviet Union experience that has already passed the decisive stages on the way to non-class society, shows real conditions necessary to achieve social similarity.

I should like to touch upon some conclusions that Soviet Sociologists have drawn as a result of this experimental study.

Fundamental changes have occurred in the class structure of society within the years of the Socialist Revolution in the USSR. This is proved by the following figures: long ago as 1913 in Russia industrial, office and professional workers (with families) constituted 17 per cent of the population, the number of peasants and artisans ran to 66.7 per cent, the number of landlords, town and rural bourgeoisie came to 16.3 per cent. Already by 1939 the bulk of industrial, office and professional workers among the population jumped by 50.2 per cent, the number of the cooperated peasants and artisans ran to 47.2 per cent and the individual peasants and the non-cooperated handicraftsmen numbered 2.6 per cent. By that time the column «Exploitation classes» did not appear in population body statistic tables since the former had ceased to exist<sup>1</sup>.

However, the victory of socialism has not eliminated all the class distinctions possible. Socialism, as the first stage of communism, inherits from old society social distinctions between town and country, mental and manual labour, which while remaining, no longer expres-

<sup>1</sup> See Statistic collection, *The USSR in Figures of 1962*, M., 1963, p. 22.



ses class oppositions. The workers and the peasant classes also remain; they differ in their attitude to means of production, the role in the organization of social labour, the distribution forms of social income. This is closely linked with the two forms of socialist property: state property and cooperative collective-farm property.

Of course, these are classes which have developed out of their own former meaning. Soviet society has no room for social groups which live from others. There are no social groups with opposite interests. Our society is the working people's society and this, first of all, defines its unity. The USSR social groups not only differ with respect to their attitude to means of production but they are also linked with their community attitude to the public means of production. Communism is the only common aim to construct it, common property on means of production and common labour. That is what unites all the social groups of the USSR.

I cannot share the opinion of those sociologists who suppose that at the present time property relations have lost their interpretation to define class distinctions. The experience of the Soviet Union proves that only a change in property relations effected by the Socialist Revolution is a major requisite to eradicate class distinctions and to gain the social, political and spiritual unity of society. Landlords, town and rural bourgeoisie do not exist any longer as social groups after private property on manors and land, factories and plants have been abolished. The peasants resolutely drew nearer to the working class after the former had entered the cooperative social farming. The radical changes of property relations resulted in national income distribution changes, production organization and management. Only these changes laid the basis for social-political and ideological unity being a characteristic feature of Soviet Society. One cannot imagine that such a unity could be arrived at while private property on means of production is retained. And, as is generally known, the latter disunites the people and gives rise to opposition in their interests. Whatever the social distinctions in the USSR were, the undisputed fact is that Soviet Society has no room for class oppositions. It led the way to eliminating relations of class rule and to developing a public socialist state.

Soviet sociologists fix special attention on analysis of process with respect to the complete disappearance of class distinctions in the USSR. For instance, the book *Changes in Class Structure of Society under the Process of Socialism and Communism Construction* written by a group of young scientific workers (M., 1961), gives a detailed consideration of the above said analysis.

The precondition to eliminate any class distinctions lies not only in the doing away with the exploiting classes but also in the change of the social nature of the working people. Under socialism the workers, the peasantry and the intelligentsia possess new traits, which draw them closer together.

In the USSR the working class is no longer the class to be exploited, the class to be deprived of property on means of production, and to sell its hands to the factories and plant owners. It is the master of major means of production and it possesses them together with the people. Anyone visiting the Soviet Union could not but catch the fact that the bulk of the workers regard enterprises as their own property. No artificial measures like, for instance, turning workers into «share holders» of an enterprise were needed to work out such an attitude to means of production; socialization is a natural consequence of radical changes in property relations. The working class of the USSR is no longer split into active and reserve. The elimination of unemployment has a high economic importance for the working class. It means that its total income does not run the danger of instability and is free of the losses caused by unemployment. In the USSR there is no room for such a factor as the pressure of the working class reserve body on the wages of the active body that might lead to a wage reduction of the employed. The psychological importance of full employment is noticeable among the working class. It makes the worker sure of the future. The worker knows that no changes in the production technique make him «an extra person», that he is not subject to any fluctuation in the market conjuncture, as systematic socialist economy development excepts such fluctuations and provides continuous expansion of production.

The steady cultural and technical rise of the working class in the USSR is typical of the latter. It embraces not separate working class groups and strata but the class at large. As everywhere, technical progress in the USSR results in changes in the workers' professional body and in the disappearance of some, while it gives rise to other professions. However, the feature of socialist production development is to make labour easy, to eliminate manual and hard monotonous work and to improve workers' skill.

A great number of Soviet sociologists' papers are devoted to studies of complex mechanization and production automation effect on the workers' skill<sup>2</sup>. These books exhibit a natural tendency for socialist

<sup>2</sup> One can mention here *Cultural and Technical Rise of the Soviet Working Class Level*, Moscow, Social Economic Literature Publishing House, 1961. The



production development which results in the elimination of hard manual labour and then of much unskilled labour. In consequence of this an ever-growing bulk of the unskilled industrial, office and professional workers become skilled ones. In their production activities mental labour being integrally linked with manual labour plays an ever-increasing role.

A similar development takes place in the peasantry. The peasantry of the USSR is a class absolutely different from the old one. It is completely free of landlords', banks', credit campaigns', usurers', kulaks' exploitation, and so on. This is the peasantry which does not know hypothecary arrears and does not face an age-old land problem. The Soviet peasantry is not concerned with the acquisition of land but with the struggle for a more complete development of the land in its own interests and in the interest of society.

The peasantry of the USSR is no longer the class of small commodity producers concerned about individual labour in their own private farming. They are the peasant co-operatives working on the big collective farms equipped with modern technical means. Collectivization has made a real revolution in the peasant's life. It has made him free of fear for his future caused by individual farm instability. Collectivization has opened the path for new agricultural techniques which could not be used before on small plots of land and separated strips. It has put an end to differentiation as a result of which, on the eve of the October Revolution, the poor peasants numbered two-thirds of the peasants; and the number of middle peasants came to only one fifth. Collective-farm peasantry is no longer parted into such social strata. It is a single whole from the social point of view.

Rapid changes in the farming workers' body, their rapprochement by professional structure, by skill, cultural and technical level to that of the industry workers run together with the new technique. In the past the Russian peasant called himself «a corn grower». There was almost no labour specialization, and a blacksmith represented handi-

book contains the results of a sociological analysis carried out at the Sverdlovsk Economic District Enterprise; *Soviet Workers and Automation* by A. OSIPOV, I. KOVALENKO, E. PETROV (Moscow, Profizdat, 1960); *Rise in Cultural and Technical Level of the Working Class* by O. V. KOZLOVA, M., Gospolitizdat, M., 1959; *Regarding Labour Turn into First Vital Need* by N. S. NOVOSYOLOVA, M., 1961; the thesis *Production Automation and Forming of a Worker of a New Type in the USSR* by A. B. MNOUSHKIN, M., 1961. The book deals with the result summed up by the scientists of the Moscow State University for sociological analysis of the first completely automatized enterprises in the USSR, and many other books.

craft labour in the village. Now in any collective-farm of the USSR one can find dozens of people possessing different professions: milkmaids, poultry-maids, fieldcroppers, etc. What is of striking importance is that there are many industrial labour professions: tractor-operators, combine-operators, mechanics, builders, drivers, electricians, etc. Sociological inspection having been carried out in the village Konstantinovskoye, Stravropolsky territory exhibited that there were workers of 60 professions in the collective-farm. Among 202 machine-operators questioned, 117 persons mastered two-three professions and 35 persons four-five.

In contrast to the working class which is growing in number, peasantry in the USSR is declining. By 1961 the collective-farm peasants quota in the population of the country with families had been reduced to 28 per cent; and the industrial, office and professional workers quota had jumped to 72 per cent. This steep decline of the peasantry is not at all a result of its ruin, differentiation and dissolution. In the USSR such development has stopped side by side with the abolition of capitalist relations. The rapid development of Socialist Industry, the establishment of a wide net of State Agricultural Enterprises (State collective-farms), the mechanization of agriculture production, the rise in labour productivity which gives way to systematic release of extra hands in agriculture, result in working class growth and fewer peasants.

According to the Soviet economists supposition for the forthcoming 20 years (1960-1980) the total number of those engaged in industry will increase by 35-50 per cent and in agriculture it will be cut down by 30-40 per cent. During this time the total volume of agricultural production will increase by 3.5 times and labour productivity will be considerably more, that is 5-6 times the former volume. Such a labour productivity growth will enable the number of workers engaged in agriculture to be reduced by around 15 per cent. By 1980 the ratio in the number of industry and agricultural workers will turn in favour of industry and make up approximately the ratio of 1 to 0,5<sup>3</sup>.

However, the complete disappearance of distinctions between working class and peasants will not be a result of progressive reduction of the number of peasants nor the result of their becoming the workers. The further advance of collective-farms and their rapprochement with public enterprises is of major importance to eradi-

<sup>3</sup> See V. MOSKALENKO, «Key Productive Force of Society», *Economic Newspaper*, No. 13, dated March 26, 1962, p. 5.



cate these distinctions. Already now, collective-farms have drawn nearer to public enterprises with regard to the degree of concentration and production socialization. Within the next decade (1961-1970) all the collective-farms and the State collective-farms will turn into highly remunerate and highly productive enterprises; and in the space of the following decade (1971-1980) there will be effected a gradual transition from the two forms of socialist economy to a common public economy. That will take place, not as a result of any administrative act, but it will ensue from the very economic development which favours social economy of collective-farms, unites them and at the same time more and more links them in productive process with the State collective-farms and local industry.

Parallel with the analysis of class-distinction elimination between the working class and the peasants, Soviet sociologists pay much attention to the tendency of overcoming the differences between manual and mental labour. (The latter used to be called the intelligentsia in the USSR). These distinctions are not in line with property relations and, therefore, out of class character. They are conditioned with the essential distinctions in the character of labour, cultural and technical level of the workers and the peasants on one side, and the intelligentsia on the other.

The Soviet society intelligentsia in its bulk has been maturing within the years of socialism. However, it does not at all mean that a new privileged stratum or class has appeared in Soviet society, as one often reads in the pages of the Western press. The Socialist intelligentsia means the intelligentsia of the people, serving the people, which is made up mostly of working class and peasants instead of the former nobiliary-bourgeois intelligentsia. It is not a process to isolate the spiritual energy of society from the people but the process of reducing the gap which formerly separated the intelligentsia from the people, and so troubled the best minds of Russia. The better part of the old russian intelligentsia which raised to the level of serving the people has joined the ranks of the new socialist intelligentsia.

As all the social groups, the intelligentsia has gradually stopped being a peculiar social stratum of mental labour workers, which considerably differed from the rest of the people. In due course the distinctions between it and the manual labour workers will become less noticeable as the economical and cultural development of the whole people increases. But it does not mean at all as if according to Marxists' views that the number of the intelligentsia must be cut down and disappear as sometimes the marxism critics confirm. The

Soviet sociologists, study is entirely concerned with the tendency of the growth of mental labour workers in the population. If in the USSR mental labour workers were some 2.5 mill. more in 1926, then in 1959 their numbers ran to 20.5 mill.; and in 1961 totalled more than 22 mill. persons<sup>4</sup>. Under socialism the rapid technical development, the growing application of science to production which turns into an immediate productive force, systematic organization on the basis of science of all social life, society's care for a more complete satisfaction of material and cultural needs of the people lead to the growth of the intelligentsia. To illustrate the last statement it would not be out of place to observe that the number of workers in public health care, public education, science, culture, etc. will almost treble during the next 20 years (1960-1980) while the number of those engaged in the USSR national economy will only increase by 40 per cent during this time.

The continuous cultural and technical development of the great bulk of the population matters a great deal in the removal of the distinctions between the intelligentsia, the workers and the peasants by drawing closer together manual and mental labour on the ground of complex mechanization and automation of production.

Soviet society is faced with a most grave problem: how to strive for the system of education which through centuries and millennium favoured the isolation of mental and manual labourers and which now should be used to link all social groups more closely. This problem is being solved through compulsory education which became a reality in the USSR. Practically speaking, all our rising generation passes through secondary school. At present time universal compulsory eight-year schooling has been realized and later on a full secondary education will be provided. The securing of real conditions to make not only secondary but also higher education (free education, system of scholarships) available for all people of all social walks is of major importance. The same applies to linking the education of the rising generation with training in productive labour and to spreading a wide net of evening and correspondence educational establishments which grown-ups working at factories could attend to raise their educational level.

The Soviet sociologists' studies confirm that the system of people's education in the USSR cannot create any social partitions, but, on the contrary, favours the close links of social groups and the elimination

<sup>4</sup> See Statistic collection. *The USSR in Figures of 1961*, Moscow, 1962, p. 45.



of distinctions between them. If as long ago as in 1939 workers with secondary and higher education totalled 8.2 per cent among workers and it totalled 1.5 per cent among collective farmers, then in 1961 already 40 per cent of workers and over 23 per cent of collective farmers possessed this education. These figures illustrate not only the cultural level rapprochement between the workers and the peasants with the intellectuals but they also exhibit the workers and the peasants contacts. The gap in the number of the educated people among workers and the peasants which ran to almost 5.5 times in 1939 has now been reduced threefold. In 1926, before mass collectivization, the educational level of the peasants with respect to the workers came to only 19 per cent, and in 1961 it ran to almost 60 per cent. The education level of the machine-operators in the collective-farms is still higher. It topped 80 per cent with respect to the workers level<sup>5</sup>.

There are certainly still slight distinctions between town and country cultural and living conditions. But it is important to point out that in the USSR class affiliation does not play the major role in deciding the opportunity for a man to receive education, to choose a job according to his bents and abilities, to take part in the political life of the country. A showing of the former class isolation elimination lies in the fact that the USSR is having still more families which include people belonging not only to different professions but also to different social groups (for instance, such families with the parents being workers and peasants and the children being intelligentsia: engineers, teachers, agronomists, doctors, etc.). In old time in a big working family of Chernishov (City of Perm) only one of the sons, Dmitry by name, has with difficulty received some education. And in Soviet times all the ten Chernishov's sons and daughters have received higher education. Today the family of Chernishov including all his children and grandchildren totals 32 degrees of higher and secondary educational institutions.

The development to draw all the social groups nearer lies in the fact that known distribution inequality under socialism is being gradually overcome on the ground of common growth of skill and labour productivity. The distinctions in the income of the peasants and the workers, of the working people—low paid and highly paid—are being reduced. The same is happening with the income of the population of different parts of the country. Side by side with

<sup>5</sup> See V. N. STAROVSKY, «Production of Social Labour and Problems of Population», *Vestnik of the Academy of Sciences of the USSR*, No. 5, 1962, p. 52.

drawing the lowest income levels to more higher ones, the development of social forms to meet requirements plays an essential role in this process. Free education, medical treatment, free and privileged keeping of children in children's institutions smooths away material well-being distinctions of small, large and childless families. The distribution through public funds has already now approximately increased the real incomes of the factory, office and professional workers by one third. For instance, the state annual expenses on education of every schoolboy amounts to 90 roubles and as to a student it comes to more than 500 roubles. Therefore, a family in which children have been through school and then a higher educational establishment, has been practically paid in addition by the State at the rate of 3.5 thousand roubles per each child for the whole educational period.

As to the estimates of the Scientific Research Institute of Labour, difference in pay level of 10 per cent for the highly paid and 10 per cent for the low paid groups of factory, office and professional workers is a ratio of 5.8 to 1 and by the end of 1965 it will have been cut down by 3.8 to 1 under the rise of the living standards of the whole nation. If one compares not only pay levels but also the rate of a family income with regard to payments and benefits from the use of a public fund, then the difference between these incomes will be cut down even more; the latter will be approximately 3 to 1<sup>6</sup>.

The eradication of social distinctions still preserved in Soviet society will demand the solution of pressing and grave problems and immense production and cultural growth. At the same time, the analysis of tendencies for the development of all our society's social groups proves perfectly clearly that they are drawing near to each other.

It goes without saying that social similarity does not clear up the differentiation of occupations and social functions of individuals. In future specialization will remain. The same is with the division of labour, but distinctions in the line of business will no longer be linked with distinctions in the individuals, social position and the degree to satisfy their needs. Side by side with the society's movement to a more social similarity there would be achieved the social equality among people. It means the equality among people in their social position, their labour conditions, material well-being, etc. But this, of course, does not mean the levelling of creative abilities and individual peculiarities. On the contrary, the individuality of man

<sup>6</sup> Collection «Questions of Labour», Moscow, 1959, vol. IV, p. 147-148.



freed from need, from anxiety over his subsistence will have an absolute development.

Communist society which the working people of the Soviet Union are building now will be a society with a complete social similarity and at the same time the greatest abilities and absolute individuality flourishing.

## REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman : R. GLASS, University College London

Rapporteur: E. GELLNER, London School of Economics

The discussion in this group began with tributes to the memory of E. F. Frazier, who was to have been one of the principal participants, and whose paper on the *Condition of Negroes in American Cities* was presented on his behalf by F. Edwards. The early part of the discussion of the group was concerned with this classical «minority» problem, the position of American Negroes, notable contributions being made by C. Senior and O. C. Cox. The central theme running through the presentation of the material was the recent transformation of the problem, arising from the new distribution of the Negro population, its urbanization and geographical diffusion. A feature of the discussion was the combination of factual and statistical richness, of detail and accuracy with strong moral feeling and commitment: the contributors clearly did not feel that this problem, at any rate, called for any pretence or affectation of *wertfreiheit*.

The next contribution was from a Soviet participant, G. E. Glezerman (and on G. E. Glezerman's behalf by U. S. Semenov). His report contained both statistical information concerning broad classifications of the Soviet population (e.g., «peasant», industrial and office worker) in the past and present, and also interpretations and anticipations of future developments. The Soviet Union is a society which, unlike most contemporary societies, possesses a doctrine concerning social stratification in its official ideology. Some aspects of this ideology were elaborated in G. E. Glezerman's conclusions, in which he spoke, with optimism, of the ability of Soviet society to change the old patterns of stratification; to overcome class antagonisms, and to eradicate status distinctions between mental and physical labour.

A contribution by E. Gellner described the political situation of a minority (Moroccan Berbers) who provide an instance of a type which is at present becoming very common — a minority which comes into being through the incorporation of «tribal» communities, previously isolated in the traditional or colonial situation, in the new national political units of Africa and Asia.



There were two remarkable contributions concerning specific minorities in Asia. One was by K. Aoyagi and R. Dore, presented by the former, concerning the *eta*, a minority in Japan which had once been formally and professionally segregated, but which continued to be informally segregated in modern conditions. The other paper, by R. Mukherjee — and presented in his absence on his behalf by J. P. Bhattacharjee, who also commented on the paper — gave the results of a study of various groups of East Bengali refugees in Calcutta. Some of these groups, now «marginal groups» as described by R. Mukherjee, might be regarded as potential minorities.

The subsequent contribution came from G. Germani, who discussed some general themes from the theoretical paper by the Chairman, R. Glass (concerning the definition and sociological analysis of «minority»), and also presented Latin American and specifically Brazilian and Argentinian material. In certain localities and periods in Argentine, for instance, immigrants — who as such constituted «minorities» — outnumbered locals in the proportion of 4 to 1: a point which illustrated one of the Chairman's main points, i.e., that «minority» cannot really be defined numerically.

Y. Talmon-Garber contributed a paper concerning that extreme case of a «minority» situation, Israel, where a multiplicity of minorities fuse to form a new majority. Y. Talmon-Garber's paper was particularly concerned with the conscious administrative and sociological attempts to deal with the social problem of the relationships between the various «national» groups amongst immigrants to Israel. She observed that one consequence of the pervasiveness of this problem and the need to cope with it has been the institutionalization of sociology in Israel.

Towards the end of the discussion, further more informal contributions were made by J. M. Miller, H. Gans and R. Glass. Owing to pressure of time, the Chairman did not read her own theoretical paper on the notion and problem of minorities as such and its changing context in the modern world. Whereas the other contributions tended to be specific in being concerned with some one minority, this paper supplied an analytic framework for the treatment of the problem. But although this paper was not formally presented, many of its themes were introduced into the discussion through various observations or informal contributions by the participants and the Chairman.

## CITIZENSHIP AND POLITICAL AUTHORITY CITOYENNETÉ ET AUTORITÉ POLITIQUE

### MONOLITHIC IDEOLOGIES IN COMPETITIVE PARTY SYSTEMS

#### The Latin American Case

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Latin America has provided, in recent years, a number of cases of transition from a monolithic to a competitive political system. In this paper the evidence will be analyzed to draw some hypotheses about the way the process is taking place.

This process will be considered within the wider theoretical background provided by G. Germani and K. Silvert's model of stages of political development in Latin America<sup>1</sup>. The stages are the following:

1. Revolutions and wars for national independence.
2. Anarchy, «caudillismo» and civil war.
3. Unifying dictatorships.
4. Representative democracy with limited participation.
5. Representative democracy with enlarged participation.
- 6A. Representative democracy with total participation.
- 6B. Total participation through «National-Popular» revolutions.

These stages are largely self-explanatory, but it is worth concentrating on the latter two. They are interpreted as alternative ways of providing for total participation in a common culture and in national life. The first of the two alternatives comes near to the European or North American model of pluralism, and it is particu-

<sup>1</sup> G. GERMANI and K. SILVERT, «Politics, social structure and military intervention in Latin America», *European Journal of Sociology*, II, 1961, pp. 62-81; G. GERMANI, «Démocratie représentative et classes populaires en Amérique Latine», *Sociologie du travail*, III, 1961, pp. 408-425.



larly difficult to establish it in Latin America. This is due, according to Germani and Silvert, to the «revolution of aspirations» that underdeveloped countries in general are undergoing, as a result of which there is a degree of mobilization of mass feelings and activities difficult to integrate into the political system. The likely outcome is the breakup of the system of limited or enlarged democracy (stages 4 and 5) and its replacement by an authoritarian structure (stage 6B). This authoritarian structure is built upon two supports: the mobilized masses, and some type of elite drawn from the upper or middle strata of the population, or from the army. The ideology of the elite generally differs markedly from that of the groups that have linked themselves to mass movements in the European historical experience. The mixture may be called by the general term «nacionalismo popular», and it includes such different political movements as peronism, castrorism, the Mexican PRI, and the Bolivian MNR. The aprista type parties also fall into this category, though they have had more difficulties in exercising full power (the Peruvian and Venezuelan cases being the most important ones).

The model does not attempt to account for the presence of the relevant elites which link up with the mobilized masses. Probably by implication it supposes that at this period of development there are almost always some type of «available elites» ready to merge into a nacionalista popular coalition. Anyway, the presence of these elites is an important and strategic point, which may merit more detailed analysis. Without their presence presumably the nacionalista popular movement wouldn't get started. The mass mobilization would produce results of a type nearer to the Chartist agitation in Britain, or the anarco-syndicalist movement in France, or simply a spread of wildcat strikes or some other anomic expression<sup>2</sup>.

In order to account for the strategic presence of these elites it is convenient to remark that the nacionalista popular coalitions are typically formed during periods of early industrialization or economic development. At these periods it is usual to have some groups around the middle or upper middle strata suffering a pronounced status incongruence. That is, their status level varies markedly according to the scale of values with which it is measured (economic strength, traditional prestige, ethnicity, education, political influence, foreign-originated values, etc.). As has been pointed out by Everett Hagen<sup>3</sup>,

<sup>2</sup> The word «anomic» is used in the same sense given to it by George Almond in G. ALMOND and J. COLEMAN, *The politics of the developing areas*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960.

<sup>3</sup> E. HAGEN, *On the theory of social change*, Dorsey Press, 1962.

these groups tend to develop a peculiar type of motivation and to adopt or create new ideologies of industrialization. These ideologies are likely to have the power to arouse mass enthusiasm.

If this is correct, the «bonds of organization» of a nacionalista popular coalition would include the following:

a. an elite placed at the middle or upper middle levels of stratification, characterized by incongruence of status and reacting to it by feeling insecure and threatened.

b. a mobilized mass formed as a result of the «revolution of aspirations» and heavily loaded with recent migrants from the countryside to the industrial or commercial centers.

c. an ideology or a typical dominant psychology sufficiently spread as to perform the functions of communication and enthusiasm-building.

The *three* conditions are necessary to bring a nacionalista popular movement into existence, and probably into power. It is particularly important to visualize that the ideology or dominant psychology is not something that can be arbitrarily or synthetically produced by any dominant group, because it needs the support of the above mentioned elite. That elite will exist only if certain structural requirements are present: above all, status incongruence and insecurity.

Given these three basic «bonds of organization», the nacionalista popular movement develops a number of monolithic characteristics. It is likely to have a «vertical» organization, pretty much run from the top in spite of democratic appearances in some cases. It will most probably be in favour of the violent overthrow of the existing regime, with the proposal to replace it with a one-party State in theory or practice. What is more, not only will it be theoretically in favour of this, but it will give concrete proof of being serious about it: cases of personal sacrifice, violent action, terrorism, sabotage, are common in its ranks. Strong emotional loyalties are likely to develop among the followers of the movement, and especially towards their leader; and the activists typically perceive themselves as the «chosen few» having some sort of super-human power behind them, be it the wisdom of the leader, the faith of the masses, or an esoteric doctrine. In the more underdeveloped versions, some form of asceticism and self-control play an important part in the training of the militant. This latter characteristic is particularly true of the aprista and castriista cases, but it does not apply to the Argentine case, for reasons linked to the degree of economic development already attained there.



## WEAKNESS OF THE WORKING CLASS AND STRENGTH OF NACIONALISMO POPULAR

In Latin American countries the working class is numerically and organizationally weak. Only in some of the more developed cities does it come near to having some sort of autonomous organization of its own with any political weight. With economic growth there is a tendency to increase the numbers of the working class, but mostly with recruits from the countryside. This does not increase its capacity to run voluntary associations. It rather has the opposite effect. By putting a large, politically illiterate mass nearby the old established working class, the old voluntary associations become more difficult to manage by the voluntaristic methods typical of their first period of existence. They need a bureaucracy, which many of the old militants are reticent to accept, and become more influenciabile by demagoguery and other methods of mass persuasion. These methods are more easily managed by the non-working class elites of the nacionalista popular movements, than by the leaders of the old associationist network spread among the urban working class<sup>4</sup>.

To have a clear picture of the situation of the working class, it must be kept in mind that parallel to this organizational weakness, a system of universal suffrage exists which provides the more legitimized channel of participation to the mass of the population. Even if the results of elections are not always respected, ballot stuffing is comparatively rare, and the legitimacy of electoral decisions is seldom denied by the larger part of public opinion and the mass media. The availability of the electoral channel and the relative unavailability (or immaturity) of the organizational channel, has produced the characteristic for the working class to be integrated in mass movements where the social distance between leaders and led is particularly great and relatively unmediated. This situation makes it necessary that such movements be strengthened by manipulation of mass media and collective emotions. Otherwise they would disintegrate, because of their low organizational level. The hypothesized authoritarian characteristics of the lower strata of the population concur in this direction. The outcome generally is a nacionalista popular movement, if the required elite exists, which is likely during the first periods of economic growth.

<sup>4</sup> Alain Touraine has recently brought attention to this «choc» to the old established nuclei of the urban working classes. Alain TOURAINE, «Industrialisation et conscience ouvrière à Sao Paulo», *Sociologie du Travail*, III 1961, pp. 389-407.

## THE FUNCTIONS OF NACIONALISMO POPULAR

Is nacionalismo popular functional or dysfunctional to the establishment of a pluralistic, competitive political system? The question is only too often answered in the negative, on the basis that the monolithic characteristics of the nacionalista popular movements and ideologies make them almost by definition enemies of competitiveness in the political system. Yet the problem merits closer attention.

In a period of limited or only partially extended participation (stages 4 and 5) the opposition to the conservative establishment of landed, exporting and foreign interests was provided by some form of political organization of the urban middle classes. This was not the case in all Latin American countries, but it could be observed in most of them, particularly the more developed ones. But in a period when the masses demand larger participation in the affairs and the goods of the society, these parties no longer provide the basis for a strong opposition to the conservative interests. The ideology and the vested interests of the bulk of the middle classes make them incapable of integrating the mass of the working class into the same party as their own. In front of the heightened demands of the working class, the middle classes tend to see their interests better protected by an alliance with the conservative interests than by continuing to lead an opposition movement which would include the lower strata and cater to their aspirations. This trend is well in line with the experience of more developed areas, particularly the European case: «liberal» and «radical» parties (using the name in the Continental connotation) ceased there to be the main opposition to the conservative established order when the working class emerged with aspirations of its own. The important difference between the European and the Latin American situation, though, is that in Latin America the emergence of the working class, as far as aspirations go, has been quicker; and at a time when that class could not back its aspirations with a strong organization of its own. Therefore, the popular upsurge of aspirations and demands took the form of nacionalismo popular and not of the more traditional working class parties. Furthermore, this upsurge was led by some elites drawn from a *minority* of the middle and upper middle levels of the society. It is true that the traditional working class parties of the European model have also received an important contribution from the middle and higher strata in terms of leadership groups. But



apparently this contribution was much less important than the one received by the nacionalista popular parties.

The peculiar situation in Latin America is that the period of partially enlarged democracy has been replaced by a stage of total participation before the working class is capable of developing its own organizations for the purposes of participation. This is the main aspect that differentiates the Latin American situation from the one obtaining in Europe during the XIXth century and the beginnings of the XXth.

The outcome of the above process is a situation which may seem paradoxical if judged with the standards and concepts developed out of the European tradition. It may be briefly stated in the following terms:

1. If there is to be a pluralistic political system in a period of total participation, it needs a strong opposition party against the conservative establishment.
2. Strong opposition parties must be based on the working class and tend to be of the nacionalista popular variety, and to have strong monolithic characteristics in their ideology and internal structure.
3. Therefore, nacionalista popular parties are at the same time a threat to a competitive democratic system, and the more likely support for one of its essential components: an opposition with the guts to oppose. In other words, before having a *legitimized* opposition, it is necessary to *have* an opposition.

Actually, what has been happening in Latin America is that in some cases the nacionalista popular party takes over political power and establishes a monolithic party system (or a close approximation to it), as in Argentina under Perón, Brasil under Vargas' first government, Bolivia, Mexico and Cuba. In other cases it is kept off from power by a military dictatorship or only allowed to hold office under continued army control, as in Venezuela and Peru. Both in the former and in the latter cases the idea that the nacionalista popular party might be one of the legitimized parties alternating in office with its opponents, seems out of the question.

#### THE CHANGING NATURE OF NACIONALISMO POPULAR

In more recent years, approximately since 1955, this picture has been somewhat changing. It seems that the situation is evolving in several countries towards an «armed truce» between the conservative

establishment and the nacionalista popular parties<sup>5</sup>. This is due to the accumulation of political experience on both sides, to the changed international situation, which puts a premium on democratic forms, and to changes in the structure of the conservative establishment and the nacionalista popular movements themselves. It is proposed here to analyze particularly the changes in the latter, in order to have some idea as to their possible future orientation.

The main characteristic of nacionalista popular parties is that they are coalitions between working class strata, urban or rural, and non-working class elites. The presence of the non-working class elites is central to the existence of the nacionalista popular movement, as without them there wouldn't be strong enough «bonds of organization» to keep the masses together, at least during the typical period of formation and consolidation of such a political movement. It is suggested here that changes in the structure and functioning of the nacionalista popular parties have to be mostly traced back to what happens to their non-working class elite components. It was hypothesized at the beginning that these elites were characterized by some sort of incongruence of status due to the strains put in the stratification system by the process of early economic growth, or by the mere fact of a traditional economy coming into contact with advanced countries, or being influenced by their ideologies, attitudes or levels of aspiration. The more likely sources of status incongruence in these countries are the following:

1. *Education outstripping economic growth*: particularly in the

<sup>5</sup> In Brasil Vargas' followers are organized in the Trabalhista Party, which is becoming one more among the various parties competing for office. The 1961 Quadros-Goulart crisis showed that that party (of which Goulart was the head) still was far from obtaining complete legitimation in army circles. But it must be kept in mind that the abruptness of the crisis, triggered by the president who had been elected supposedly as a conservative, put a special strain on the system. If the Brazilian case is to be judged by Latin American standards, the surprising element is not the military coup and beginning of civil war which followed it, but the fact that a transaction was arrived at, which almost restored the status quo, of which the Trabalhista Party is a junior member. The same can be said of the Argentine situation, as the continuous military interventions in that country have been unable to wipe off peronism. However illegal, the peronist party is still quite powerful and wealthy in its organization, and the peronista trade unions have remained untouched and autonomous. In Peru and Venezuela important sectors of the conservative establishment have come to terms with the nacionalista popular movement (aprista type) which has been legalized after years of very bitter persecution (in Peru up to 1956 and in Venezuela up to 1957).



case of secondary and higher education, which presumably produces aspirants to middle class positions. Often the economic structure does not expand fast enough to provide occupational possibilities to the new products of the educational system.

2. *War-induced growth of industries*: it has often been the case that during a war local industry develops because of the protected market created by lack of imported goods. The approach of peace and normal conditions threatens the new industrialist group, creating in it a particular type of insecurity of status.

3. *Weakening of old elites based in the traditional economy*: some sections of the old elites, particularly the provincial ones, see their economic position gradually eroded by the development of the new economy, but cling to their status based on way of life and lineage.

4. *Changes in the status of the white collar employee*: this is a special case of a world wide phenomenon. It occurs particularly rapidly in some areas quickly overtaken by a modern type of economic relations.

5. *Creation of new strata of highly paid semiskilled workers*: this is the result of the establishment of new industries, often by foreign capital, or by State enterprise. This is a further threat to the situation of many middle class groups, not only clerical but also professional or small business.

6. *Settlement of small but visible groups of highly paid foreign managers*: this affects local groups at various levels, but mostly in the middle sectors.

7. *General influence of the foreign produced mass media*: this contributes to the heightening of aspirations, but mostly among the middle classes, main consumers of those mass media.

It can be hypothesized that during the beginning of industrialization or the first impact of foreign influence, these sources of status incongruence are at a maximum. But it is safe to predict that with the consolidation of economic growth, or the end of war-induced tensions, these sources of status incongruence and insecurity diminish, other things being equal. As status incongruences disappear, the social bases for the elite component of *nacionalismo popular* will also disappear. And this seems to be what has been happening recently in several cases of *nacionalismo popular*. Impoverished middle classes become respectable, marginal industrialists are finally integrated into the upper or upper middle classes, and a new scale of wages for clerical skilled and unskilled jobs becomes accepted. To the extent that this happens, the non-working class elements of the *nacionalista popular* coalition are lost over to the more conservative

or middle of the road parties, or they may contribute to the formation of right wing fractions of the original movement (MNR Auténtico in Bolivia, Tres Banderas in Argentina, probably a similar phenomenon in Venezuela). Anyway, the fact that the nacionalista popular movement becomes more working class centered does not mean that it will become more difficult to integrate into a pluralistic system. On the contrary, the opposite effect is more probable. The tendency of the movement to overflow the channels of pluralistic democracy is due to the combination of «mobilized masses» plus available elites. When economic growth sets in, the available elites tend to disappear, and the frustrations of the mobilized masses diminish. As a result the nacionalista popular movement may become increasingly a middle of the road party, facing the conservatives on the right and the new «anomic» agitation on the left (Venezuelan case). Or it may become a trade-union centered party, having the support of the majority of the working class, and clearly sharing the reformist and gradualist outlook that characterize the working class of an industrialized and urbanized country (the Argentine case).

In both cases, the nacionalista popular movement develops more clearly the characteristics that enable it to function in a pluralistic system. This is of course not always understood by conservative or military circles, which often react to the new version of nacionalismo popular in the same way as before. But if the tendency towards change is there, presumably political groups will adapt to the new situation.

It is important, though, to consider the place of the nacionalista popular ideology in this new phase. It had been earlier suggested that the three bonds of organization of the movement were (a) the status-incongruent elite, (b) the mobilized mass, and (c) the enthusiasm-building ideology. In the new phase of nacionalismo popular the bulk of the non-working class elite tends to disappear, and to become more similar to that linked to traditional working class parties. The mobilized masses to a large extent are changed into organized workers, or else fall into apathy and non-participation. The ideology remains, though expressed in a more moderate form.

The changes are great enough as to justify doubts as to whether the movement is still of the nacionalista popular type, according to our definitions of it. The important point, anyway, is that if the ideology — however moderated — remains, a historical link between both versions of the movement exists. Probably it will maintain its name, its traditions and a continuity in its leadership. There may be forced changes of name (as in Argentina from Peronismo to Justicialismo)



but for all practical purposes there will be a continuity. And this continuity will be also sensed by the political opponents of nacionalismo popular, who will tend to remark the coincidences with its earlier versions. Besides, the basic continuity of the ideology and of most of the dominant psychology of the movement are important for its continued existence. They continue to be an essential «bond of organization», which needs to maintain its character in order to compensate for some of the organizational weaknesses of its supporters.

It is often suggested as an alternative model of change that the process above described will end in the dissolution of the nacionalista popular movement, and in the absorption of its supporters into the traditional parties, or new «democratic» ones. This ignores the difficulties of formation of large political parties, and particularly it ignores the resentments on the part of the nacionalista popular supporters towards the old parties. There aren't enough «bonds of organization» to integrate those supporters into the old parties, or to form a new one which will be clear of authoritarian attitudes or involvements with the tradition of nacionalismo popular.

The tradition of nacionalismo popular, and its ideology or set of beliefs, remain therefore the most likely cement on which to base a movement of opposition to the conservative establishment, at this period of growth of Latin American representative government. As such, it must be reckoned as an essential part of any pluralistic settlement which will be viable in those countries in the near future.

## CONSERVATISM, INDUSTRIALISM AND THE WORKING CLASS TORY IN ENGLAND

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### THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT

Since 1886<sup>1</sup> there have been thirteen British elections which have produced a House of Commons in which a single party held a «working majority» of seats; and on eleven of these thirteen occasions it was the Conservative Party which found itself in this position. The most heavily urbanised and industrialised electorate of any democracy has only twice returned a parliament in which a party of the Left has had a working majority.

The Conservative achievement is particularly striking if it is recalled that the modern party was born (after 1832) specifically of resistance to the idea of political equality and that it was, in its beginnings, largely out of sympathy with industrialism. In addition its leadership, always drawn overwhelmingly from the upper and upper-middle classes, has faced a preponderantly working class electorate without the advantage of explicit religious support of the sort that has bolstered the Right in the preponderantly Catholic countries of continental Europe.

What accounts for the Conservatives' success in holding power alone (or in Conservative-dominated coalitions) for three-quarters of the period since Britain became a political democracy? In part the

<sup>1</sup> 1886 marks the beginning of modern electoral history in Britain since the Third Reform Act of 1884 and the re-distribution of seats in 1885 carried the country almost the whole way to «one *man* one vote» and «one vote one value». The Liberal Party won its only clear-cut victory in 1906, although it was able to rule with the support of other parties after the election of 1892 and the two elections of 1910; Labour won its only working majority in 1945, although it formed minority governments in 1924 and 1929-31 and ruled briefly without a working majority in 1950-51.



answer lies in the fragmentation of the non-Conservative vote. At the beginning of the period the Liberals split (in 1886) over Gladstone's proposals for Irish Home Rule and an important wing of the party entered what was to be a permanent alliance with the Conservatives. Meanwhile after 1900 the emergent Labour Party drained off working class support for the Liberals; and when the latter were again wracked by bitter quarrels during and after the first world war Labour was able to supplant the Liberals as the second party in the state. The Socialists, in turn, virtually fell apart in 1931; and again, twenty years later, after their only period of majority rule Labour became absorbed in internecine conflict which was to last for almost a decade. Meanwhile the Liberals, who had continued to poll a small but significant share of the electoral vote, began to regain marked public support (in by-elections at least) during the early 1960's. The Conservatives, although often deeply divided during the years since 1886, were a far more cohesive political force than their opponents on the left. Undoubtedly this was a major factor in enabling them to retain their parliamentary ascendancy, even though their share of the total votes cast in elections during the period 1886-1959 was no more than 47 %.

But Conservative electoral success in Britain is not solely or even primarily the consequence of the fissiparous tendencies of the British Left (or of its political ineptitude, striking though that has been). A much more important consideration is the fact that the Conservatives have been one of the most successful of all Right-wing parties in coming to terms with the political implications of industrialism and the «age of democratic revolution»<sup>2</sup>. It can be argued that the true forerunners of modern sociology are those European Conservatives (like Burke in England, Bonald, de Maistre and others on the continent) who were profoundly concerned about «the poison of social disintegration» which they saw flowing from the French Revolution and the breakup of the old pre-industrial society<sup>3</sup>. They became deeply concerned with the concept of order; they saw society as an organic whole, not as a mere aggregate of individuals; they stressed the interdependence of institutions, customs and habits; they argued that re-

<sup>2</sup> For a perceptive analysis of the problems involved in the adjustment of western European political societies to these social and political changes see R. BENDIX, «The Lower Classes and the Democratic Revolution», *Industrial Relations*, Vol. I, No. 1, October 1961, pp. 91-116.

<sup>3</sup> The most recent exposition of this view is to be found in LEON BRAMSON, *The Political Context of Sociology*, Princeton, 1961, Chapt. I.

ligion (and even folk beliefs and «prejudices» in Burke's terminology) acted as an «emotional cement» within society. Above all they insisted on the importance of a structured group life, and an hierarchical social order in which each is assured on his status.

Certain of the more pessimistic (and frightened) continental conservatives concluded that the answer to the problem of social disorganisation raised by the industrial and democratic revolutions lay with «the Pope and the executioner». But British Conservatives (which in any case could not rely on the Pope) were wise enough for the most part to eschew the assistance of the executioner; they perceived that the answer lay with the reinforcement of those institutions in British society which would help to maintain cohesion and strengthen consensus in that society<sup>4</sup>.

The greatest of nineteenth century British Conservative leaders, Benjamin Disraeli, recognised as vividly as did his contemporary Karl Marx the existence of «the two nations» in nineteenth century industrial Britain. Disraeli and his followers rejected of course the Marxist view that this division was the inevitable precursor of a revolution out of which a new consensus would be established in a classless society. But they also rejected the view of those Liberal advocates of *laissez-faire* who were prepared to depend on the self-regulating mechanisms of the market automatically to produce a harmony of interests. Nor were they in the least attracted by the doctrines of Social Darwinism.

The Conservatives accepted the inevitability of the class system since they believe that it reflects the innate inequality of men. They realised however that conflict was immanent in the worker-owner relationship, and they therefore tried to redress the balance of interests when it shifted too far in the direction of the owners of industry. Hence their willingness to sponsor legislation recognising trade unions and governing the condition of work in factories. In addition they, rather than the Liberals, took the initiative in bringing the urban masses within the pale of the constitution by the first major extension of the franchise to the urban working classes in 1867. But above all else the Conservatives under Disraeli's inspiration, attempted to ally themselves with the forces of social cohesion within British society; they championed the monarchy and the system of «orders» reflected

<sup>4</sup> It is not intended to suggest that the British Conservative party was monolithic in its reactions to the political problems of industrialism; at many critical periods there were acute internal tensions within the party between the advocates of differing political strategies.



in the peerage, religion, nationalism, (and toward the end of the century, imperialism), indeed all the institutions and forces likely to eliminate domestic strife, to ensure stability and to override sectional interests.

In what was perhaps the most important address ever made by a British Conservative Leader, Disraeli, in his Crystal Palace speech in 1872<sup>5</sup> declared that the fundamental purposes of Conservatism were to maintain the institutions of the country; to uphold the empire of England; and to elevate the condition of the people.

With characteristic audacity Disraeli hereby claimed for his party a unique role as custodian of the national interests (as a contemporary Conservative publication puts it «there is no textbook of Conservatism, except the history of Britain»); but Disraeli also demonstrated the wisdom of British Conservatism by coupling with the national appeal a concern for the welfare of the masses. This programme was to prove attractive not merely to the upper strata of British society, but also to a large section of the working class which has remained unmoved by appeals to class solidarity even though, by sheer weight of electoral numbers, the working class has been in a position to control the levers of political power for the past eighty years.

From their earliest beginnings the Conservatives had been able to rely on the support of the «squirearchy» and of a large part of «the landed interests»; in addition, by the turn of the century they had become the acknowledged champions of the business community; and, with the decline of the Liberals, they were to inherit the preponderant part of the middle class vote. But these sources of electoral support would not have enabled the Conservatives to maintain their parliamentary ascendancy had they not also been able to win and retain the support of a very considerable proportion of the working class, which from 1884 onwards represented two-thirds of the electorate. It would appear that at most elections the Conservatives have won about one-third of the working class vote and that this working class element has constituted about one-half the party's total electoral support.

The phenomenon of working class Conservatism has long been a source of exasperation to the Left in Britain. After the general election of 1868, (following the passage of the Second Reform Act of 1867 which enfranchised a large proportion of the urban working class) Engels wrote to Marx:

<sup>5</sup> T. E. KEBBEL, (ed.), *Selected Speeches of the Earl of Beaconsfield*, Vol. II, pp. 530 ff.

«What do you say to the elections in the factory districts? Once again the proletariat has discredited itself terribly... it cannot be denied that the increase of working class voters has brought the Tories more than their simple percentage increase; it has improved their relative position»<sup>6</sup>.

Ninety years and thirty-three elections later a considerable section of the proletariat was, in the view of the Left, still «discrediting itself terribly». After the Labour Party's ejection from office in 1951, an official party publication brooded over the failure of universal suffrage to produce the expected result:

«Once the mass of the people have the vote, Socialists were convinced that Conservatism and all that it stood for would be swept away. Their victory seemed certain, for conservatism which was based on privilege and wealth was inevitably a minority creed, whereas socialism, with its appeal to social justice and economic self-interest, would recruit the big battalions of the poor and under-privileged, whom the vote would make the masters of political democracy... Yet it is clear that events have falsified these predictions... The question which must now be asked is why the fruits of universal suffrage have taken so long to ripen. How is it that so large a proportion of the electorate, many of whom are neither wealthy or privileged, have been recruited for a cause which is not their own?»<sup>7</sup>.

One need not accept the assumptions underlying either of these quotations to recognise that working class Conservatism has been a major factor in determining the distinctive pattern of modern British politics.

#### THE TORY WORKER TODAY

This section of the paper provides a very brief preliminary account of some findings from research undertaken by the present writers into the nature of contemporary working class Conservative allegiance in England. A sample survey undertaken in 6 urban constituencies — in London, Manchester, Halifax and Coventry — yielded 604 working class voters, including 178 Conservatives. The research was not concerned with the social psychological mechanisms of particular voting choices, nor with the effects of an electoral campaign,

<sup>6</sup> *Karl Marx and Frederick Engels on Britain*, Moscow, 1953, pp. 499-500.

<sup>7</sup> Peter SHORE, *The Real Nature of Conservatism*, Labour Party Educational Series, No. 3, September 1952.



but rather with the relatively enduring conditions out of which party affiliations emerge under the pressures of events, issues and propaganda<sup>8</sup>.

Two kinds of approaches to the material are possible: straightforward comparisons of working class Labour and Conservative voters, and internal analyses of the population of working class Conservatives. In the former — the comparative — procedure, we ask what characteristics are associated with the frequency with which working class electors vote Conservative. In the latter procedure, we are less interested in the frequency of working class Conservative voting, and more in the conditions and consequences of differences in the social and ideological bases out of which this behavior emerges.

The most general impression one gets from a comparison of Labour and Conservative working class voters in this sample, is of a prevailing homogeneity between the two groups. There is little difference between them in terms of sex, income, or occupational skill level and only a moderate difference in terms of age. No comparable studies exist to provide a base line, but previous research does suggest that an earlier tendency for working class Conservatives to be older and have lower incomes than Labour voters is disappearing, though the Conservatives are still somewhat older.

These aggregate results conceal some diverging trends: among the lower income group, older voters more frequently vote Conservative than younger; and, while age and sex separately are either moderately related or unrelated to voting Conservative, older working class women vote Conservative with considerably more frequency than do other groups. We shall return to these findings later, in another context.

The political and social perspectives of Labour and Conservative working class voters differ where one would expect them to — with respect to objects of partisan concern like the issue of nationalization, key power sources such as the trade unions, big business and the upper classes, and the parties themselves. Yet the differences are not such as to over-ride an impression that conservative values pervade much of the urban working class, including many Labour voters. There is, for example, a widespread dislike or distrust of trade unions: more than half of the entire sample agree that unions have too much power. The unions are often perceived — even by working

<sup>8</sup> Field work was carried out during May-June 1958, a time of political quiescence in Britain, and 18 months before the subsequent general election.

class Labour voters — as unduly disruptive or officious — and there is a good deal of feeling that strikes are called too frequently, despite the far lower strike rate of Britain compared to that of the United States. The organic view of society, promulgated by the great Conservative spokesmen, Burke and Disraeli, finds a responsive echo in the contemporary urban working class. For such reasons, it is hard to think of working class Conservatives in Britain as normatively deviant from working class political culture; on the contrary, they seem to express aspects of a wide national consensus.

It is also difficult to think of working class Conservatives as apathetic, ignorant or alienated people — a kind of psychological *lumpenproletariat*. Working class Conservatism cannot, apparently, be ascribed to political pathology in ways analagous to the alleged link between the «authoritarian personality» and clinical pathology. In fact, the working class Conservatives in our sample tend to be better informed than the Labour voters in terms of political knowledge; somewhat more of them (to take but one example,) knew the name of the Leader of the Labour Party. Furthermore, Conservative voters show no signs of a greater sense of political futility. In short, the Conservatives appear to be as integrated as Labour voters into the political process in contemporary Britain.

Conservative working class voters proved to be much more committed to their party in terms of a range of criteria than Labour voters. While Labour is widely perceived as more concerned with the interest of the common man, it is often perceived as more solicitous than efficacious, while the Conservatives are widely seen as more efficacious than solicitous. In short, it is widely believed that the Conservatives have a capacity to get things done — a superior executive ability — which appears to offset their lesser concern with the class interests of manual workers.

«Concern for the interests of the common man» is almost the only criterion on which Labour is consistently ranked higher than the Conservatives. With respect to foreign policy, Commonwealth relations, national prosperity, and the sense of patriotism, the Conservatives are evaluated as far superior by Tory voters, and as almost the equal of (or superior to) Labour by Labour voters. In fact, Conservative voters in the working class appear to enjoy greater congruence between voting behavior and broad perceptions of the parties than do Labour voters, who seem to be linked to Labour almost entirely in terms of class interest. In a political culture which values so highly the Burkean themes of consensus and national identity, this suggests



that working class Conservatives may be under less ideological cross-pressure than Labour voters.

Let us turn, for the moment, from the comparative analysis of working class Conservative and Labour voters, to consider the population of working class Conservatives alone. Here, we can no longer rely upon the dichotomous choice situation imposed by a two-party system to provide the categories of analysis. Rather, it is necessary to develop and impose analytic categories derived from the historical origins of working class Conservatism in Britain.

Both Marx and Disraeli conceived working class Conservatism to be based on what Walter Bagehot, in *The English Constitution*, called «deference»: the voluntary abnegation of power by the working class in favor of an hereditary, or quasi-hereditary elite. A reading both of Bagehot and of Conservative propaganda directed at the working class suggests the following set of definitions of «deferential» Conservatism:

1. Deferentials prefer ascribed, socially superior political leadership.
2. Deferentials prefer power to originate from the elite, rather than from the mass franchise.
3. Deferentials form and express political judgements in terms of the intrinsic characteristics of leaders, not pragmatically in terms of issues or the outcome of policy.
4. Deferentials view political outcomes benefiting the working class as indulgent or paternalistic acts by the elite, not as flowing from the machinery of government or the economy.
5. Deferentials prefer continuity to change.
6. Deferentials view the Conservative Party as more patriotic than the opposition.

We have also used a typological opposite to deference — working class Conservatives whose perspectives tend to run counter to these traditional values; these people we have called «seculars». The question then becomes: are all, or almost all, working class Conservatives deferentials — as envisioned by commentators so diversely committed as Marx, Disraeli and Bagehot; if not, what are the conditions and consequences of these two bases of working class Conservatism?

By the criteria used in this research, both deferential and secular bases do indeed exist. For example, we asked respondents to explain their choice for prime minister between two men — one of them the son of a banker and MP, a graduate of Eton and Oxford, and an officer in the Guards; the other, the son of a lorry (truck) driver who went to a grammar school, won a scholarship to a provincial univer-

sity, entered the Army as a private and was promoted to officer rank. We have, then, caricatures of ascribed, elitist leadership and achieved leadership of working class origin. About half of the Conservative voters in our sample preferred each candidate. A few illustrative quotations will give the flavor of the distinction between deference and secularism in this criterion:

*Deferential responses:* «[Respondent prefers son of MP.] Because he should have the brains or instincts of parents. The qualities to make a prime minister are in the breeding. When it comes to critical questions like whether the country should go to war you want someone with a good headpiece who knows what he's doing. It's born in you».

«The MP's son. Breeding counts every time. I like to be set an example and have someone I can look up to. I know the other man has got a long way on his own merits, and I do admire that, but breeding shows and is most important in that position».

*Secular responses:* «[Respondent prefers lorry (truck) driver's son.] He has struggled in life. He knows more about the working troubles of the ordinary person. Those who inherit money rarely know anything about real life. This man has proved he is clever and can achieve something without any help from others».

«Either of them because it depends upon their individual ruling ability.»

Inspecting responses relevant to all criteria, we classified working class Conservatives as either deferential, secular, or as «mixed» types manifesting aspects of both sets of values.

When we look for differences between deferential and secular working class Conservatives, the classically conservatising factors of age, sex and income that failed to discriminate — or do so decreasingly — between Labour and Conservative voters, come to life: deferentials tend strongly to be older than seculars and have lower incomes; and there is a marked, but lesser tendency for women to be more frequently deferential than men.

Insofar as youth and higher incomes are linked to postwar social change — to which women can be thought of as less exposed than men — secularism may be displacing deference as an ideological basis of working class Conservatism in Britain, although it is not possible of course to establish this conclusion by means of observations at one point in time. Moreover, the themes and motifs of traditional, hierarchical Conservatism — so richly available in British culture —



may well be available for resuscitation under the impact of future events.

The deferentials and seculars are found to have a number of important differences in their political attitudes. Seculars for example are less often unconditionally committed to the Conservative Party: almost all the deferentials, but only half the seculars, told us that they would definitely vote Conservative in an imminent, hypothetical election — a result obtained long before the pressures of the campaign, and of the necessity for choice, precipitated long-standing loyalties. There is a moderate, but consistent tendency for seculars to be more frequently «leftist» on a variety of issues and judgements. There is considerable evidence to suggest that seculars are more concerned with social mobility: many more of them than deferentials endorse a complaint that it is «too hard to get ahead in Britain». Finally, seculars seem to be more sensitized to economic deprivation: among low income working class Conservatives, seculars are much more likely to identify with the working class than are deferentials.

Keeping in mind that deferentials are considerably older than seculars, we can now suggest why, as we have reported, low income has a conservatizing effect among older working class voters, but seems to move younger ones in the direction of Labour. Low income may be tolerated by deferential Conservatives and, indeed, be experienced as calling for increased reliance upon the traditional elite. But for seculars, low income may represent a severe strain upon their commitment to the Conservative Party — a commitment based upon pragmatic rather than traditional grounds. The political impact of low income, then, depends on the values and perspectives upon which party loyalty is based. Analogous reasoning may account for the uniquely high level of Conservative voting among older, working class women: both their age and sex combine to leave them relatively unexposed to secularization among Conservative voters; hence, they have a lessened capacity to withdraw support from the traditional elite.

We can also suggest why the classic demographic correlates of working class rightist voting — age, sex and income — do not obtain, or are decreasing, in contemporary Britain. We are, perhaps, witnessing a shift from the politicized ethos of earlier working class protest in what has been called the «post-political» age. In the earlier context, traditionalist ideologies like deference were linked, in the working class, to low income (among unskilled rural migrants from traditional backgrounds), to women, and to the older (who had been

socialized into traditional values); hence, these characteristics in turn were often linked to rightist voting. But as working class Conservatism is stabilized in Britain on the basis of ideologies appropriate to industrial culture, like secular Conservatism, the earlier empirical correlations between working class rightist voting and these demographic attributes begins to diminish.

Does this mean that something like Jacksonian, or more generally egalitarian perspectives, are emerging in the working class electorate? Not necessarily. Even in the United States, Robert Lane has suggested<sup>9</sup> that inegalitarian values have important functions for the industrial working class. And, as Gabriel Almond<sup>10</sup> has argued, the traditional elements in modern political culture can be seen not as deviant, anachronistic or atavistic, but as serving critically important expressive and symbolic purposes. Where would this be true more strongly than in the peculiarly and triumphantly mixed political culture of Britain, in which traditional themes bear so close a relationship to the very sense of nationality?

The data contain other suggestions as to the future of deferential values in the working class electorate. For example as younger working class Conservatives appear to abandon deference — at least for the present — younger Labour voters may be moving towards deference. Thus, while proportionately more younger than older Conservatives tend to prefer the lorry (truck) driver's son as prime minister, more younger than older Labour voters prefer the candidate of elite origin. It is possible that, while secularism is modern for working class Conservatives, deference — in some form, at least — is increasingly modern for working class Labour voters.

It may be, then, that as recent social change in working class Britain — the expanded horizons, improved education, higher income, slow erosion of class boundaries — is diluting deference among Conservatives, the greater integration of the working class into British society is confronting Labour voters with traditional themes to which they had been hostile or unexposed. These traditional themes, deference among them, may in the Britain to come begin to lose their intimate connection with the Conservative Party and become more than ever norms for the good citizen regardless of party loyalty. Or the apparent movement of younger working class Labour voters

<sup>9</sup> R. E. LANE, «The Fear of Equality», *American Political Science Review*, Vol. LIII, No 1, March 1959, pp. 35-51.

<sup>10</sup> G. ALMOND and J. COLEMAN, *The Politics of the Developing Areas*, Princeton, 1960, pp. 20-25.



towards a form of deference may represent an increased reservoir of potential Conservative converts.

At the moment, however, it appears that post-war prosperity in urban Britain has acted less dramatically to change the frequency with which working class electors vote Conservative, than to shift the social and ideological bases of working class Conservative allegiance from the older and poorer to the younger and more prosperous, from deferentials to seculars. The larger meaning of these trends remains to be clarified by time, research and the course of political events.

## CLASS, TRIBE, AND PARTY IN WEST AFRICAN POLITICS \*

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In a colonial situation, political parties are born to protest and to seek change. For this reason, they were not encouraged in West Africa by the colonial authorities. Indeed, at first, they were not permitted. Before World War II, proto-parties existed in some of the few municipal centers where elections of a non-traditional variety were held; such as Dakar (Senegal), Freetown (Sierra Leone), Accra (Gold Coast), Lagos (Nigeria).

The voters were a handful of urbanites, the most educated and Westernized in West Africa. They were involved in the modern money economy, largely as civil servants, merchants and professional men, and represented by a small minority of the total African population. The governmental posts they filled by their votes were scarcely a determining element in the political structure of the colony.

This handful were a middle class group, situated in prestige, power, style of life, and often income between a small ruling caste of European officials and the vast majority of the African population. Their politics consisted largely of attempts to secure, reinforce, and extend their privileges within the colonial system. Such political cleavages as existed were largely grouped around personality differences, although occasionally an undertone of different economic interests was present. In the early days West African political associations were in the hands of a small elite, mostly lawyers and tended, in Hodgkin's words, to be "exclusive clubs for the professional and prosperous business classes which were now emerging"<sup>1</sup>.

The grievances of these political associations were directed against the colonial authorities whose system created both political and economic limits to the aspirations of this middle class, and against the traditional chiefs whose ways seemed onerous and irrelevant to this urbanized group. In the organs of limited deliberation that were established the major division was between the nominated traditional

\* This is a condensed version of the original paper which will appear in full at a later date.

<sup>1</sup> T. HODGKIN, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, London, Muller, 1955, p. 141.



members and the elected representatives of the urban middle class. The colonial government often gave tacit support to the former for fear of the ultimate consequences of the demands of the latter.

Most observers agree that West African nationalism, then, was, at least initially, a «middle-class phenomenon»<sup>2</sup>. The defining feature for inclusion in the middle class is uncertain, the new elites having a dual origin, the development of the economy and of the educational system. These two groups — the moneyed and the educated — are closely linked but the overlap is not perfect.

The exact contours of the «middle class» varied from territory to territory. Yet, it was an identifiable group who indeed developed a reasonably marked class consciousness, in the sense that they realized they had a set of economic interests, separate from that of the European ruling elite and separate from that of the African peasant masses. They acted on this realization and created political associations to pursue these class interests. There are, however, two qualifications to be made to this statement. First of all, traditional systems of stratification still existed and still had an effect, albeit a declining one, upon men's social action, even those of the educated urbanite. Here we may note, however, a trend over time to translate traditional social status into modern social status. The second qualification is that class and ethnic group were not necessarily distinct categories.

The second World War, by altering both the political and economic contexts, created a new situation in which political action would take new forms. The proto-nationalist, exclusive groupings of the «middle class» were to be superseded by or transformed into mass nationalist movements. The social composition of the leadership was to get more complex, the lines of class and tribe submerged somewhat in a revolutionary situation, and an ideology of national unity would be propagated by the new parties.

The second World War was critical to West African political development. The economic expansion caused by wartime activity, and which continued after the war, led to the multiplication of junior cadres — junior clerks, mechanics, skilled artisans, health personnel, primary school teachers — who began to form in the various territories a sizeable «lower middle class». For the first time, enough leadership, with some training in modern ways, was available to man a mass nationalist movement. Furthermore, this group of men found

<sup>2</sup> M. KILSON, JR., «Nationalism and Social Class in British West Africa», *Journal of Politics*, XX, 2, May 1958, p. 376.

not merely the colonial administration a barrier to their personal development, in terms of career and income, but the older, more educated middle class of higher civil servants, professionals, and wealthier merchants. Furthermore, these new cadres emerged at a time when the world political scene was changing radically.

The various constitutional reforms of the early post-war years meant that West African politics had now become a serious matter. Everywhere parties were formed to contest the new elections. Rather, one should say electoral committees were formed, which were often grouped around a personality or an ethnic group. This kind of committee, with no real organizational structure, membership or continued activity, has been called a «patron party» or «elite party»<sup>3</sup>.

Within a few years, however, various mass movements had emerged quite different from these electoral committees: the inter-territorial *Rassemblement Démocratique Africain* (R.D.A.) in much of French West Africa; the *Convention People's Party* (C.P.P.) in the Gold Coast, the *National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons* (N.C.N.C.) and the *Action Group* (A.G.) in Nigeria; the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais* (B.D.S.); the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* (C.U.T.); and the *Sierra Leone People's Party* (S.L.P.P.). There were differences in party structure, contours of membership, and political effectiveness of these parties. Their common denominator is that they all eventually came to power as incarnations of the spirit of nationalism and that they all sought to recruit support from all sectors of the community. Furthermore, they all, to a greater or less degree, sought to represent a «modernizing» point of view, but they also represented in many cases a reaction against the prewar educated elite who now seemed too moderate in their nationalism, and too rooted in the privileges of the colonial system.

The new electoral systems brought into the political arena not only urbanites but the rural masses, and the attempts by the mass parties to organize the peasantry were increasingly successful and either diminished sharply the political role of traditional chiefs or forced them to devise formulas of compromise with the parties. For this reason, in most areas the prewar split between the educated elite and the chiefs tended to be submerged in their common op-

<sup>3</sup> For a development of the distinction between patron parties and mass parties, see R. SCHACHTER, «Single-Party Systems in West Africa», *American Political Science Review*, LV, 2, June 1961, pp. 295-296. Cf. HODGKIN, *op.cit.*, pp. 139-168.



position as privileged groups to the new mass parties, the basic class split of post-war West African politics. Mass nationalist movements were not however class parties. They could not be in a population most of which were peasants still living partially in a subsistence economy. Rather, these parties were national movements with populist undertones, led by emerging middle-class, largely urban, elements with strong grievances against the colonial administration. The degree to which these populist grievances were also directed against an indigenous urban elite varied with the strength of this elite, but the complaint of the nationalists that there was a group of men (senior civil servants and professionals) who were insufficiently militant was standard.

This populist cause included in large measure the African commercial classes, who saw their economic interests hindered by the colonial system. It included as well the new rural bourgeoisie, the African cash-crop planters, most notably in the Ivory Coast, where there was a class of European planters who had received before and during the second World War favored treatment by the colonial regime. It included the urban salaried workers in both the governmental and private sectors, many of whom were to be organized in trade-unions, more or less linked to the nationalist parties. It collected those with grievances and organized them into a revolutionary movement.

West African colonial society in the postwar years can thus be said to be a complex fabric of economic-interest groups, many of whom were coming into existence and expanding in size as a result of economic development. The fact that the political structure prevented these emergent «middle classes» from attaining personal goals which seemed to them technically realizable led to a bipolarization of the society. On the one side were the European ruling elite, allied in some cases with a small urban educated group, and those traditional rulers who had become virtual clients of the colonial administration. On the other side were the bulk of the middle-class elements, supported by the peasantry and an urban quasi-proletariat, quasi in the sense that they were often rural migrants retaining their links to the land to which they would eventually return.

The basic reaction of the colonial ruling elite to the emergence of a mass nationalist movement was to encourage and promote divisions within it, partly on class grounds but largely on ethnic and regional bases. Parties based on these latter, more traditional, criteria risked having a widespread appeal to the peasantry who, being largely outside the money economy, felt no necessary national or class



consciousness. The period from 1945 to 1960 was characterized by a struggle between the colonial ruling elite and the emergent middle class elite for the loyalty of the peasant masses. The essential doctrine of the colonial ruling elite was that the meaningful social entity remained the tribe (and, by extension, the region). By upholding this traditional definition of the situation, they hoped to maintain their power by control via their clients, the chiefs. The nationalist movement defined the situation as a «class struggle» in which the only «objective» members of the ruling class were Europeans and a handful of African client professionals and chiefs. Thus, African society was «classless», which was another way of calling for the revolutionary unity of the oppressed majority. The middle-class definition of the situation was to prevail, thus enabling the nationalist movement, given the favorable world context, to achieve a relatively rapid and non-violent change in the basic political structure.

If virtually all West African countries arrived at independence with a single, dominant nationalist party, they reached this point by many different paths. In the Gold Coast (Ghana) the old established urban elite of lawyers, doctors and businessmen, who had been the spokesmen of Gold Coast nationalism since 1897 founded the *United Gold Coast Convention* (U.G.C.C.). They sought to turn the organization into a mass movement and found that thereby the leadership escaped them. Under the leadership of the Secretary-General, Kwame Nkrumah, the younger and more radical elements broke away from the U.G.C.C. in 1949 to form the Convention People's Party (C.P.P.) which made its prime demand «self-government now». The split between the old urban elite, the intellectuals, and many of the chiefs on the one hand and the emerging town and village elites, of medium education, would remain the central focus of Gold Coast politics through independence, and even after.

A similar split developed in Senegal. There the old elite of the four communes developed a special juridical status. They were French «citizens» (as opposed to «subjects») long before 1946 when all French Africans acquired this tribute. They had long participated in the election of a deputy to the French Parliament. The most radical of their groups was the Senegalese section of the S.F.I.O. founded in 1936 during the Popular Front by Lamine Guèye. After the war, the S.F.I.O. sought, as did the U.G.C.C., to claim the new political power. They were undone by the extension of the suffrage to the former «subjects», living in the rural areas and as laborers in the cities. These dissensions led to the formation in 1948 of the *Bloc Démocratique Sénégalais* (B.D.S.) by Léopold Senghor and Mamadou Dia.



Unlike the C.P.P. however, the B.D.S. was based essentially in rural areas, because the French traditional system of administration had consolidated the urban middle cadres, and especially the civil servants, behind the old urban elite. Ancient privileges had become transformed into value patterns. The consolidation of urban areas led to the consolidation of rural areas. The B.D.S. organized its strength in collaboration with the traditional rulers who, in Senegal, are principally Moslem religious leaders. Thus, the B.D.S. was less urban-oriented and less anti-traditional authority than the C.P.P., and therefore less radical in terms of its anti-colonial militance.

Sierra Leone was in many ways quite similar to Senegal. Here, too, there had existed for over a century, an urban group with special privileges, less judicially ensconced, but taking the even more solidifying form of an ethnic group, the Creoles. Post-war constitutional change took the form of extending the suffrage to the rural areas (known as the Protectorate, as opposed to the Colony which was Freetown and its environs). In 1950, the Creoles formed an exclusive party, the *National Council of Sierra Leone*. In 1951, several Protectorate groups along with some Colony elements merged to form the *Sierra Leone People's Party* (S.L.P.P.) which quickly proved itself the majority party. Here the radicalism and the drive to modernization was even more muted by its close alliance with the chiefs, brought about by the formal Colony-Protectorate (or urban-rural) split. The politics in the Gambia followed a similar pattern of division between Colony and Protectorate, the *People's Progressive Party* playing a role similar to that of the S.L.P.P. In the Gambia, however, the conflict was less acute. There was no ethnic group in the Colony similar to the Creoles, and the strong Islamization of the country helped bridge the rural-urban gap.

In the Ivory Coast, the prewar urban elite was tiny indeed and concentrated in an ethnic group, the Agni, not located in the capital. This elite formed a party, the *Parti Progressiste*, but they were overwhelmed right from the beginning by the mass party, the *Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (P.D.C.I.-R.D.A.). The basic split was not rural-urban as in Senegal, Sierra Leone and the Gambia. It was rather a coalition, like the C.P.P., of urban and rural emerging elements against the colonial administration, and their allies among the educated elite and the chiefs (both much weaker, however, in the Ivory Coast). Politics did not start with an urban privileged group, overwhelmed by the hinterland by an extension of the suffrage. Political parties, from the beginning, had to «coordinate a

widely scattered electorate»<sup>4</sup>. There was, however, one crucial difference with the Gold Coast situation. The existence of a privileged European planter group led to the organization in 1944 of the *Syndicat Agricole Africain*, led by Félix Houphouët-Boigny, and representing the demands of the African cash-crop farmers for equal treatment. It was this group which formed the basis for the creation of the P.D.C.I., thus giving middle-class farmers rather than middle-class urbanites the leadership of the nationalist movement, explaining the later relative conservatism of the P.D.C.I. and why no split between the nationalist movement and the rural bourgeoisie occurred, as it did in the Gold Coast in 1954.

In Guinea, there was virtually no prewar urban elite. Nor was there a significant class of cash-crop farmers. Politics had to start from zero. The very few educated persons entered the civil service. The emerging urban elements found themselves organized in the trade-union federation, the C.G.T., which from the beginning formed the backbone of the P.D.G. The nationalist leader, Sékou Touré, was originally the Secretary-General of the C.G.T. The later anti-colonial radicalism of the P.D.G., which contrasted with that of its sister party (co-member of the R.D.A.), the Ivory Coast P.D.C.I., is explained by these structural factors. The party coalitions in Guinea, the Ivory Coast and the Gold Coast were substantially the same but the leadership in Guinea and the Gold Coast was urban, and the split between the mass party leadership and the intellectuals and professionals remained acute, unlike the Ivory Coast.

Togo developments might have resembled of the Gold Coast, had it not been for the special situation of being a trust territory, coupled with a tribal irridentism. In 1946, the *Comité de l'Unité Togolaise* (C.U.T.) was constituted as a political party. The social origins of its leadership were similar to that of the U.G.C.C. in the Gold Coast: the old elite of civil servants, professionals, and businessmen. This leadership had, however, been active in the *All-Ewe Conference*, a group that was organized in the Gold Coast and in both British and French Togoland. The links of the C.U.T. with the Gold Coast opened these men to the nationalist currents operating there. Combined with the fact that Togo as a trust territory was destined to become self-governing, this meant that the C.U.T. outspokenly avowed independence (and reunification, first of Eweland, later of the two Togolands) as its objective. This demand for independence was unique

<sup>4</sup> A. R. ZOLBERG, «One-Party Government in the Ivory Coast», Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Univ. of Chicago, 1961, p. 91.



at that time among the parties in the French areas of West Africa. Despite this advanced position, the younger elements of the C.U.T. split off in 1951 to form *Juvento*, ostensibly a youth movement. This was a split reminiscent of that of the C.P.P. with the U.G.C.C., and over the same issue: nationalist militance. Before *Juvento* could develop into a full-fledged mass nationalist party, French fears of C.U.T. demands, however moderate they seemed to *Juvento*, led to the ouster of C.U.T. from the local legislative bodies and elective posts, thus throwing *Juvento* back into an alliance with the C.U.T. When later, the administration parties were swept away in the tide of Togolese nationalism, the nationalist movement was firmly in the hands of the C.U.T., that is, of the old urban elite. Dahomey has a social structure similar to that of Togo. The old elite founded in 1946 the *Union Progressiste Dahoméenne* (U.P.D.). The party, however, split, largely on ethnic lines. The younger, more radical, new elites tried in 1955 to start a new party built around the remains of the U.P.D. and called the *Union Démocratique Dahoméenne* (U.D.D.), which attempted to assert its militance by affiliating to the R.D.A., from which the U.P.D. had split in 1948. The U.D.D. was however not able to bridge the ethnic divisions which had split the parties rather evenly in a tripartite fashion, and a unified national party was only achieved after independence.

The inland, savannah countries under French administration (Niger, Upper Volta, the Soudan, now Mali, and Mauritania) did not have an urban educated elite like Senegal or the Gold Coast, or even like Dahomey and the Ivory Coast. In all these territories, the traditional chiefs wielded considerable authority, more than in the coastal territories under French rule. Such elites as existed were mostly civil servants. In the Soudan, the new urban elements allied themselves with a traditional commercial class in opposition to feudal chiefs, a small bourgeoisie of higher civil servants and merchants very Westernized in style of life but with strong links to traditionalist elements. This was to be the basis of the ultimate success of the *Union Soudanaise* (U.S.-R.D.A.). In both Niger and Upper Volta, the new urban groups and anti-traditional elements were also to be found in the R.D.A. However, in both countries, splits in the local R.D.A., reflecting differences on major policy questions in the inter-territorial R.D.A. and linked to the question of militance, led a relatively more conservative wing to purge a trade-union oriented, relatively more radical wing. In Mauritania, the new elites were simply too weak and the traditional rulers too strong to enable the former to come to power.



Nigeria presents the strangest picture of all, because the federal structure of the country led to an anomalous party development, unlike the «normal» West African pattern. The *National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons* (N.C.N.C.) was founded in 1944. It represented a middle-class attempt to create a mass structure, which paralleled, indeed preceded, such attempts in other West African territories. It became strong in the southern half of Nigeria. In 1945, the Richards Constitution definitively created three regions in Nigeria, the North, West, and East. (The latter two being in the south). This meant that the meaningful political structures were regional as well as federal. In 1951, a new group was formed in opposition to the N.C.N.C. based on the leadership of the Nigerian Youth Movement. It was the Action Group (A.G.), a party that grew out of Yoruba cultural society, the Egbe Omo Oduduwa, the Yorubas being the principal ethnic group in the Western Region. The A.G. was created in part because the Egbe was too conservative. Its effect on Nigerian politics as a whole, however, was that it represented a regional-ethnic opposition to an N.C.N.C. accused of being eastern-based and Ibo-dominated, rather than a breakaway of radical elements.

The Ibos were the principal ethnic group in the Eastern Region and Nnamdi Azikiwe, the leader of the N.C.N.C. is an Ibo. Tribal rivalries, as we shall see, are not unusual in West African politics. This one was, however, constitutionally reinforced by a regional structure. Thus, in terms of social composition and even ideology, the N.C.N.C. and the A.G. presented somewhat similar images, both dominated by the new urban middle class but retaining reasonably good relations with (albeit control over) traditional elements.

The bastion of strength of traditional rule in Nigeria was to be found in the Emirates of the Northern Region. Indeed, these were the most powerful traditional rulers to be found anywhere in West Africa. They did not need to seek an alliance with urban professionals, as in the Gold Coast, to safeguard their power. They relied on the regional structure and gave their blessing to a moderate popular party, the *Northern People's Congress* (N.P.C.), founded in 1949, which made its appeal on the basis of northern particularism. The Emirates, however, had a traditional feudal structure in which the Hausa majority were ruled by Fulani overlords. The N.P.C. which in the context of the north represented an attempt by certain educated elements to encourage a quite moderate degree of modernization, saw its radical elements break away in 1950 to form the *Northern Elements Progressive Union* (N.E.P.U.). N.E.P.U. is allied on the federal level with the N.C.N.C. In the north, its action is based



on a traditional class conflict. Yet, even with universal manhood suffrage, the N.P.C. has been able to repel decisively the onslaught of N.E.P.U. They have done this by welcoming into high posts in the party structure non-Fulani businessmen who are *talakawa* (traditional commoners) despite their new economic wealth:

Generally the merchants are populist in their social attitudes and sympathetic to the feelings of the people among whom they live. Their influence in behalf of the N.P.C. countervails N.E.P.U. appeal to *talakawa* values.... It is a paradox of Northern social development that traditional class consciousness dulls the political edge of modern class struggle<sup>5</sup>.

Thus we have seen that, in almost every instance, the political struggle in post-war West Africa reflects some clear divisions over economic interests, although the details have varied widely according to the strength and structure of the middle class, the juridical framework, and the strength of traditional rulers. In fact, however, only the emergent middle classes of the towns can be said to think in class terms to any substantial degree. The peasants, who are the majority of the population, act everywhere primarily in terms of tribal loyalties. The activation of such tribal loyalties in the modern political arena has been a commonplace of West African politics. Colonial regimes have often encouraged it. Traditional rulers have often employed it. Sometimes the emergent middle class elements of «backward tribes» have seen it as a path to power. In any case, all the nationalist movements have had to contend with it and surmount ethnic divisions insofar as they to be successful in their objectives.

The nationalist movements collected grievances and sought to place emphasis on those grievances which united them against the main enemy, the colonial power. Ethnic regional parties divided the nationalist movement and thus served to vitiate its effects. In the early period of active struggle with the nationalist movements in West Africa, the colonial authorities gave active support to such ethnic «administrative» parties. This was particularly true of the French administration.

The phenomenon of regional-ethnic parties occurred throughout West-Africa. One can distinguish, however, two varieties which have opposite economic bases: the assertion of separate identity of the

<sup>5</sup> R. L. SKLAR, «Nigerian Political Parties», Unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Princeton Univ., 1961, Vol. II, pp. 524-525.

poorer region (or backward group), and that of the richer region. The poorer region usually is the home of a group considered culturally backward, although of course there are situations in which both sides have opposite evaluations of cultural prestige levels. The antagonisms that manifest themselves here may predate the colonial era. Instances of such an attitude can be found in the northern Savannah regions of those coastal states which are economically and educationally dominated by the southern forest regions: the Ivory Coast, Ghana, Togo, Dahomey, and Nigeria. In all these cases, the northern areas are Islamized, as opposed to a Christianized and more Westernized south. Each of these countries has seen a northern regional party emerge. In Senegal, such a movement flourished in the Casamance, and in Mauritania in the Vallée du Fleuve. In 1947, such a movement among the Mossis in the Ivory Coast led to the reconstitution of Upper Volta as a separate territory.

In Christian-pagan countries, Moslems, who occupy lower-status positions, felt threatened and organized political associations. Christian-pagan minorities have reacted in the same way in Moslem areas. In some cases, ethnic political reactions can be traced in part to the economic expansion of a politically dominant group. In all of these cases, the objective of political organization by the weaker group was to assure a maximum of local autonomy, thus servicing the local emergent middle class elements as well as the traditional rules, both of whom are threatened by advance of the educated members of the dominant group. It also was a method of obtaining political leverage so as to increase their share of the distribution of national income and social expenditures.

The case of separatism of the richer region is more acute, more spectacular and often more successful. If the relatively rich region coincides with the region relatively high in modern education and the region supplying a large proportion of the political personnel of the nationalist party, no problem is posed. Often, however, for reasons of geographic or historic accident, this was not the case. The three clearest examples in West Africa are the separatist movements of the Ivory Coast, the Western Region of Nigeria, and Ashanti in Ghana.

The nationalist parties, faced with ethnic-regional claims, which often were masked economic claims, tended to treat these claims at their face value and sought to make the emotional appeal of cultural reassertion an ally rather than an enemy. They looked for ways of giving representation and recognition to these claims. They tried in fact to make these forces a channel for their own objectives. Such



groups as the N.C.N.C. in Nigeria and the B.D.S. in Senegal were in fact, at the beginning, primarily a federation of organizations including various ethnic-regional associations. The N.C.N.C. and the B.D.S., however, in time shifted to a structure of regularly constituted party sections. Even more extreme was the example of the P.D.C.I. in the Ivory Coast which was constructed, in the words of one of its leaders, as a «federation of tribes»<sup>6</sup>. In Sierra Leone, the S.L.P.P. used the chiefs and Native Authorities in the Protectorate as its main mode of intra-party communication. Even where ethnic-regional groups were not formally recognized in the party structure, party leaders took care to include in proper dosage persons representing all the major ethnic groups. Conversely, dissidents from the party tended to assert themselves in ethnic terms.

Of course, the assiduous attention and even deference to ethnic claims ran counter to the ideological position of most nationalist movements. Open recognition of these claims could only weaken the hands of modernizing elements, as well as risk the disaffection of rival ethnic groups. Still, the nationalist party, if it wanted to be a national party, had no choice but to collect ethnic support. A resolutely anti-traditionalist party such as the P.D.G. of Guinea found it very difficult to make headway in the Fouta-Djalón where chieftaincy was still strong.

Urban modernizers, then, in order to make the mass party into an effective anti-colonial weapon tried to create intertribal coalitions. To do this, they could not always impose the terms they would have preferred. Often instead of building party cells, they made alliances with traditional chiefs or did a bit of both. Obviously, this would affect the nature of the mass parties. In Northern Nigeria, the N.P.C. was greatly indebted to the emirs and the *Sufi* brotherhoods and could for this reason scarcely qualify as a mass party, although it received the majority of the votes and party activity was reasonably extensive. In Sierra Leone, the S.L.P.P. felt compelled to work through the chiefs in the rural areas and to share power with them. In fact, the result was a sort of division of domain, national affairs being left in the hands of an urban, educated group and rural local affairs in the hands of the chiefs. In the Western Region of Nigeria, the relative strength of the modern Yoruba elites meant that though they were allied in the party with the traditional chiefs, they dominated the policy councils of the party. The relationship of the B.D.S. and the Islamic religious leaders in Senegal was similar. In many of the

<sup>6</sup> Cited in ZOLBERG, *op.cit.*, p. 129.

French areas, however, the French administration had installed non-traditional authorities as *chefs de canton*. These chiefs were more easily ignored or swept aside by the nationalist parties, especially after they compromised themselves in the post-war period by support of «administrative» parties. This was the case particularly of parts of Guinea, the Ivory Coast, the Soudan (Mali), and Togo.

The basic aim of the nationalist movements was to overcome *tribal* differences within the African community. Their attitude to *class* differences was more ambivalent. They utilized antagonisms against a small upper elite, but this had many dangers. For one thing, the middle-class status of the nationalist leadership was ultimately not too different from that of the small upper elite. For another the small upper elite had needed skills. Thus, as time went on, the class-struggle ideological overtones of nationalism came to be blunted by a new unifying doctrine of anti-colonialism. As long as two parties existed, however, the class lines were never entirely effaced.

If, at the moment of independence, nationalist parties were tending to efface class as well as tribal differences, the problems of the post-independence period strongly accentuated this trend. The party, come to power in an independent, sovereign state, had many weapons at its command to consolidate its power. The various elements of the bourgeoisie—administrative, commercial and rural—were all highly dependent on the state. A new subcategory of professional politicians, a sort of political bourgeoisie, was even more obviously at the mercy of the party. The traditional chiefs no longer could count on any protection from the colonial authorities. The governments could use the power of political appointment or golden ambassadorial exile to bring leaders of former ethnic-administrative opposition parties into line. They also could manipulate the electoral systems to assure the elimination of opposition representation in the legislatures.

The reasons why the new West African nations felt such a need to create one-party states derived from the structural problems of national integration in new politics. The drive for a one-party state has been accompanied by a theory to justify it, particularly explicit in the various parties that once were linked in the R.D.A. (of former French Africa). The original claim that the class war was irrelevant to the African political situation was made by the R.D.A. in 1951. The theory was much elaborated by Sékou Touré in Guinea between 1958 and 1960.

There is almost no data available yet with which to analyze the relationship of position in traditional class structure and the modern



class structure, although there seems to be a correlation. Even «proletarian» organizations like trade-unions are dominated by persons of traditionally high status. For, disproportionately, traditionally high status has been translated into modern education and, as Little argues, «The (social class) system, as a whole, has its main genesis in literacy and in the opportunities afforded by literacy»<sup>7</sup>. If the upper castes, as a group, where they existed, have tended to furnish much of the new emerging classes, this has not prevented conflict between those whose immediate interests lie more with one system than another; thus, the politics of chiefs vs. emerging middle classes. The emerging middle classes are, nevertheless, relatively open to talent, and access via education or politics is possible to others. The immediate economic struggles in the post-independence period remain struggles within this middle class; for example, the administrative bourgeoisie (organized in trade-unions) vs. the political bourgeoisie (the government and party functionaries) allied sometimes with a rural planter class (Ivory Coast) or with urban businessmen (Nigeria).

The single political party has become an instrument of these emergent groups collectively to organize the nation for greater production and to mediate the claims of redistribution of income among the emergent classes. A true party system must await the large-scale entry of the population into the money economy (peasants becoming cashcrop farmers or urban laborers) in sufficient numbers, and having sufficient income level, to support combative instruments for their economic interests. The social structure of West African countries has not yet evolved to this point.

<sup>7</sup> K. LITTLE, «Social Change and Social Class in the Sierra Leone Protectorate», *American Journal of Sociology*, LIV, 1, July 1948, p. 21.

## REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

### First Session

Chairman : R. ARON, La Sorbonne

Rapporteur: E. K. SCHEUCH, University of Köln

The report by R. Bendix and S. Rokkan *The Extension of National Citizenship to the Lower Classes: A Comparative Perspective* compares the processes by which lower classes in 12 Western European societies acquired the right to fuller participation in the nation-state. Using in part the conceptual scheme developed by T. H. Marshall in his «Citizenship and Social Class», 1950. R. Bendix and S. Rokkan also distinguish between three elements of «National Citizenship» as «the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society». These aspects of national citizenship are: a) civil rights, such as the freedom of expression and other civil liberties; b) political rights as the franchise and the access to public office; c) social rights, as expressed in social welfare legislation, and systems of public education. In this study, one indicator each was to stand for one of the three elements of citizenship: the steps in the direction of equal, free, direct, and secret suffrage as representing political rights, the right to form trade unions as exemplifying the evolution of civil rights, and the universality of elementary public education as standing for the development of social rights.

No simple regularity was found in the extension of these rights, but such generalizations proved possible after one constructed three models of polities, and observed the extension of national citizenship in each of these separately. By distinguishing between the various roles of intermediary groups, the following models of polities were derived: a) corporatist polities, where participation is channelled through institutions and organizations with compulsory membership; b) pluralistic polities, where there is both direct citizenship and mediation via voluntary organizations; c) plebiscitarian polities with immediate relationships between central authorities and citizens.

T.H. Marshall had implied that there was a universal pattern of



succession in the granting of rights, from the extension of civil liberties to political rights, and from there on, as a final step, to social rights for all. The longitudinal and cross-cultural comparison of R. Bendix and S. Rokkan indicated that the sequences in which the various rights are extended to successive groups would vary with the policy models dominant or competing with each other in different societies showed equal progress with regard to all rights. Thus, pluralistic societies as the Scandinavian countries or Switzerland placed greater emphasis on civil rights, and by awarding voluntary associations greater importance in promoting social mobility, did not press forward government sponsored social legislation until two or three decades after Bismarch took such steps in Prussia. In France, the plebiscitarian model had been the dominant one and direct political rights had been extended before trade unions had been given their civil rights and before compulsory education had been introduced. From this perspective, political tensions in Western European countries become understandable partially as a result of imbalances in the extension of various rights.

While the first contribution traced the process by which workers obtained national citizenship, the second paper (R. T. McKenzie and A. Silver: *Conservatism, Industrialism and the Working Class Tory in England*) delineated the present reaction to this extension of rights.

An analogy to the entry of workers into European politics would be in the South of the U.S.A. — the political participation of poor whites and Negroes. In examining participation rates for these groups over time, P. H. Howard in *New Groups in Louisiana Politics* shows that an important difference to the development in Europe emerges: the increased voting of poor whites and Negroes during the last decade is actually a re-entry of groups into politics. Since the Civil War there had been a continuous disenfranchisement, until by 1898 most Negroes and a large part of the poor whites in Louisiana had been disenfranchised. Extension of the vote to women obscured the fact that the height of the disenfranchisement for Negroes was reached in 1940 (with a registration of 0.1 % of the population), while the turning point for the «poor whites» was reached in 1930. Even in 1960 the Negro and poor-white participation in voting was still lower than in 1900. Louisiana is not even a particularly virulent anti-Negro state, and the disenfranchisement of large population groups is to be seen more as a class struggle, as a means of maintaining Feudalistic control.

Official statistics were used by W. Shteinberg in *Some Aspects of Democratization in Sowjet Union Republics* to demonstrate increasing citizenship participation in the Latvian Republic of the USSR, since this country ceased to be independent. W. Shteinberg related this increase in participation both to the changes in the economic system and the work of particular institutions, notably the local Sowjet. Citizen's committees are growing around local Sowjets, and it is now common that citizens turn to the local Sowjet with suggestions for specific improvement in every-day life. According to W. Shteinberg such citizen participation will lead to continuous reductions in the state apparatus, until eventually communist cells will have absorbed the government.

The chairman had invited a number of speakers for comment, and subsequently opened the floor to other contributions. The majority of comments referred to the papers by R. Bendix and S. Rokkan.

T. H. Marshall objected that R. Bendix and S. Rokkan had used his element of citizenship in a different way than was intended by him. Civil rights were meant to refer to formal rights, while social rights were to denote the substance of civil rights. In this way, the distinction could be used to demonstrate the acquisition of the substance of rights. However, social rights as formal legislation could only insure a minimum of participation in the resources of a society. In discussing the effects of various ways in which these rights may succeed each other, T. H. Marshall distinguished between long-range and short-term effects of social legislation. Social rights — though being an extension of citizenship — may initially be disintegrative by marking a group of the population as inferior, while in the long run such rights should have an integrative effect. The granting of political rights prior to some expansion of social rights might be disintegrative, as may be observed in the experience of developing countries. The order of succession: civil rights to political rights to social rights mentioned in his study was not meant to suggest a universal law, but was used only as a description of English development. Commenting upon the proposed models of societies, T. H. Marshall suggested that «plebiscitarian» and «corporativist» are elements present in every complex society, and should thus not be used as criteria for the establishment of models.

W. Kornhauser advocated distinction between the range of rights and their distribution within a population. A differentiation between wide versus narrow rights, and equal versus unequal distribution



of rights would result in a fourfold classification that should be more meaningful than the typology developed by R. Bendix and S. Rokkan. W. Kornhauser also warned against an uncritical use of unadjusted participation figures in cross-cultural comparisons, and in general questioned the meaningfulness of participation rates as indicators for integration.

J. Linz maintained that R. Bendix and S. Rokkan had implied an autonomy of the political sphere from the general social context. The list of rights referred rather to industrialized societies only, and would be of questionable value already in a country such as Spain. A selection of other concrete rights as indicators would undoubtedly have led to different conclusions, as e.g. would be true for the rights and duty of universal military service. So far it had been ignored how people felt about additional rights, and the significance of such rights would be different whether they were granted paternalistically or won after a struggle. Also in the discussion so far, it had been tacitly assumed that decision makers had a correct appraisal of the consequence of their actions, but the study of R. T. McKenzie and A. Silver had shown that just the opposite was true.

Y. A. Zamoshkin accused the discussants and specifically T. H. Marshall of ignorance about conditions in the Sowjet Union, and asked social scientists to learn Russian as an important tool for the exercise of their profession. All the discussion had failed to consider the conditions under which certain rights were just illusions and when they were real. Y. A. Zamoshkin attacked Western social scientists as formalists, abstracting from the essential interdependence of all societal phenomena.

J. J. Wiatr emphasized the necessary interdependence of the three elements of citizenship. Accordingly, the Communist countries have introduced all three types of rights simultaneously.

D. Lerner cautioned against building typologies on the basis of manifest properties. In underdeveloped countries — e.g., the Near East — one may observe the whole range of manifest features selected by R. Bendix and S. Rokkan, but this leads by no means to individualistic societies. Questionable is also the meaning of the indicators, as it becomes apparent in the assumption of a great similarity between England, France and Germany with regard to suffrage.

J. Kolaja saw considerable similarities in the results reported by R. T. McKenzie and A. Silver for English workers, and the information about Polish workers. If British and Polish workers both displayed

conservative sentiments, there would be good reason to assume this condition would also exist in the USSR, and indeed in most industrialized societies.

S. M. Miller cited studies which showed the situation in Britain as reported by R. T. McKenzie and A. Silver to be quite unusual, due to the high rate of downward mobility in that country. The absence of strong differences in economic beliefs among workers with different political orientation might be a consequence of the two party system where economic issues necessarily become blurred.

A. Tourraine proposed additional refinements in the approach of R. Bendix and S. Rokkan. In a way, the granting of formal rights and a high level of integration appeared to him as alternatives. Given a low level of activation one can grant formal rights without causing disturbance, while with a high level of activation such rights would result in disintegrative processes. Activity or participation is not just a possible consequence of the granting of rights, but a condition determining the extension of such rights.

## Second Session

Chairman : S. M. EISENSTADT, Hebrew University

Rapporteur: E. DE DAMPIERRE, École Pratique des Hautes Études, Paris

This second session started with the following introduction by the Chairman S. M. Eisenstadt:

In this session I would like the discussion to focus around several problems. The problems with which we would deal would concern the conditions of perpetuation or stability of modern political frameworks, especially in so-called New States, and not only the initial conditions of political modernization, but rather those which deal with the problem of the stability or continuity of these systems after they have been initially established.

Here I would like to propose several concrete problems for discussion.

A. One is the analysis of different ways through which such modern systems are established and the influence of the patterns of their establishment on their institutional framework, and on their ability to sustain continuous political modernization and change.

We may distinguish here roughly between several ways of such initial establishment of modern political frameworks.



One is the «usual» (ie. European) mode of development of modern political frameworks from more «traditional» — feudal or absolutist policies — mainly through the activities of a small modernized oligarchy. The best examples of this are England, France, the Scandinavian countries and Japan.

The second major historical pattern of establishment of modern political institutions through a colonizatory-social movement or sects — the best examples of which are the U.S. and the Dominions.

The third pattern, of establishment of modern political frameworks, most prevalent nowadays in many of the New States, is through «nationalistic», anti-colonial movements, and the different political frameworks which they tend to develop, be they centralized or federative.

The fourth is what may be called the «national» or «social» movement or revolution — the best examples of which are Mexico and Kemalist Turkey.

Lately there have developed also several different mixed cases — the most interesting of which are perhaps those like Uganda or Morocco — in which some combination of traditional-oligarchic and national-movement orientations have developed.

B. An important problem for discussion in this context is first the extent to which each of these patterns of initial modernization tends to emphasize different types of political organization — whether the party, the executive or the legislation — as the major foci of political activities and decision-making, and in what way this may influence their basic institutional contours and their ability to absorb changing political development and to deal with new political organizations and demands.

C. The pattern of initial modernization also greatly influences the problem of the new country's political identity which tends to develop in the New States.

Here the problem of federalism and regionalism and of the extent and ways in which traditional symbols become incorporated in common symbols, is very important. The nature of these developments may greatly influence the ability of these systems to deal with different cleavages and which may arise after the establishment of the initial modernization.

Thus a comparison of the cleavages that develop, on the regional, «ethnic», and class basis in such countries as Uganda and Northern Nigeria as compared with countries like India or Ceylon, can provide a very important focus of discussion.

D. Next I would like to propose that we suggest the ways in which various traditional forces influence the process of modernization. Two major problems may be singled out in this context. One is the already aforementioned problem of the influence of the «modernizing» traditional elite on the process of modernization.

Here I would like to distinguish cases in which such a modernizing elite was entirely independent (Ethiopia, Thailand) from those in which it acted under colonial rule (Northern Nigeria) and to analyze the differences between these on the process of modernization.

The second problem here would be the extent to which the transformation to modern political activities, organization and frameworks was facilitated or impeded by different types of traditional forces.

E. Next I would like to propose that we discuss some of the problems of the interrelationships between economic and political development.

These general problems can be subdivided into several major sub-problems. First, the extent to which the same social conditions which were found to be indispensable for political modernization are also important for economic development. Second, and probably more important, is the problem as to the extent to which these two processes (political and economic development) once they have been started, reinforce or impede one another. This problem is very closely related to that of the social conditions of the development of different types of political systems in the New States, as such developments are very often very closely influenced by the tempo of modernization, of economic developments and by the forces «interested» by these forces and by the reactions of different ruling elites to these forces.

Thus to illustrate only a few central problems with which such an analysis could deal, we may mention first the problem of the extent to which modern economic enterprises can coexist together with more traditional types of social and political organizations and what are the limits of such traditional organizations.

This is very closely related to the second problem, namely that of the extent to which stability of the development of modern economic and political frameworks can be best assured through a rapid breakdown of traditional forms or, conversely, through more gradual transition from traditional to modern social structure.

Third, is the problem of the ways in which political demands and pressures made by «modernized»-urbanized, mobile groups, may



help or limit the continuous institutionalization of economic development.

Fourth, is the problem of the relation between modern political leadership and economic entrepreneurs, the condition under which these two reinforce one another or, conversely, the extent to which they develop in opposing direction. There exist many concrete case-studies which could provide the basis for a systematic analysis.

Of great importance in this context is the problem of the place of bureaucratic organizations, the conditions under which they develop and the extent to which they facilitate or impede both political and economic development.

Four prepared discussants made the following observations:

M. Bekombo, referring I. Wallenstein's paper, made the following remarks: 1) The existence of a West African «middle class» is questionable. It might be debated whether these people might not be more properly classified and defined as an occupational group with permanent income. In fact, most of them remain full members of ethnic groups or primary social *milieux* and no attempt at an explanation can be successful without taking this fact into account. 2) Most political parties were first created by the colonial administration and were defined as such by the masses. Only later, when and where they could, did they lend themselves to become mass movements. 3) Proper attention must be paid to messianisms, which are often in fact political parties of a particular type. 4) Tribalism is a more complex phenomenon than it does sometimes appear to be in sociological writings. Born out of colonial oppression, it is as such a modern feature, not something bequeathed by precolonial times and traditions. Moreover, the political parties themselves put it to good use, as it was often more convenient for them to fit their organizational apparatus into linguistic cleavages. It would not be correct to say that tribalism had always been fought by independent governments which, far from trying to destroy it, made use of its channels and capitalized its strength. 5) Parties are not always of the type described by I. Wallenstein. Many of them are no more than temporary clusters of groups around personalities, although it is quite correct to say that their recruitment is no longer made on an ethnic basis.

R. Bendix asked for more «caution». He contested F. X. Sutton's and L. W. Pye's postulate that «some modern state will emerge» out of the process of modernization and the accompanying assumption

that these new states will become industrial societies. Modernization comes now from the top; it used to be not so. F. X. Sutton and L. W. Pye imply that the process of industrialization and modernization will run its course wherever it is initiated, so that sooner or later the developing societies will be like the developed societies, just as the latter have become more like each other already. This reasoning is fallaciously based on predictions which we are in no position to make. There is much evidence to suggest, rather, that in many of the so-called developing societies modernization occurs in the absence of the conditions underlying the industrialization of Western societies. Indeed within Europe, England and France were the pioneers of industrialization and democratization respectively, while other countries underwent corresponding processes of change partly in response to these antecedent stimuli from abroad. The farther east we go in Europe, or the more we go outside the perimeter of Western civilization, the more is this likely to be the case. Because of industrialization it is true of many Western societies that the way of life of the few and the many changed together and that new political accommodations were found in the relations between them. In the absence of industrialization the masses retain their traditional ways, while the few respond to the forces of modernization emanating from the West; as a result industrialization is introduced from the top down, following (rather than preceding) modernization. [Medicine, education, new methods of transports are examples of easily transferred elements of modernization.] The fact is that we do not know what the political and social structures of incompletely modernized societies will be like, and we tend to cover our ignorance by unwarranted inferences from Western experience. Instead, we should remember that these inferences tend to be by-products of Western modernization itself and can, therefore, be applied elsewhere only after critical self-scrutiny.

D. Marvick wondered whether the speakers and discussants did not show too much concern with «top-or-bottom» analysis: Western Europe had changed on the top *and* at the bottom.

T. S. Di Tella, commenting upon G. I. Blanksten's paper, said that it was surprising that G. I. Blanksten should have arrived so easily at the conclusion that the Mexican revolution was a case of successful modernization while the Cuban one was a failure. It was groundless, he asserted, to compare the Mexican case, which had had over fifty years to show its results, with the Cuban experience, only a few years old. If there is any generalization that seems valid about



revolutionary movements, it is that in the first years after the revolution the economic situation deteriorates. The Mexican revolution only started showing appreciable results in terms of modernization some twenty years after its inception. Besides, modernization in Mexico is still very uneven, as is shown by the high illiteracy rate, the low efficiency of the small productive units in the countryside, and the difficulties in evolving a competitive party system.

Other discussants were thereafter given the floor:

G. A. D. Soares commenting upon G.I. Blanksten's paper pointed out some limitations of the models so far used when analyzing the relationships between economic development, taken as the independent variable, and political radicalism in general.

Basically there are two opposed theories, he said, the Marxist which assumes a positive correlation and current sociological theory which assumes a negative one, each one with its own time bias. Marx, dying in 1883, had his observations limited to a period which roughly corresponds to the early stages of economic development, when social conditions might have been worsening and inequality in income distribution was possibly widening. A linear projection developed into his theories. Modern political sociologists have had to limit themselves to the period for which data are available. Census and electoral statistics, to say nothing of survey data, seldom go back before the turn of the century. In most cases comparisons are made taking nations as units, usually Western European nations, USA and Canada, and data pertain to post-war years. The unavailability of reliable data for the early stages of economic development has imposed a time bias, certainly less justifiable than the Marxist one in view of the availability of historical materials and of the Marxist theory itself.

This contradiction between the two theories disappears if one accepts that the association between the two variables might have been positive during the former and troubled stages of industrialization turning negative afterwards. Therefore, the hypothesis to be tested is that this association is curvilinear. Internal analysis shows already that for Latin-American nations (Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru and Venezuela) the correlation between certain standard censal indicators of economic development and the percentage of the total vote given to leftist parties or candidates is positive, *not* negative.

Another observation referred to the «development syndrome». Is

not an extreme consistency between economic and social indicators of development a characteristic of stable, industrial societies? In a highly tentative study with the above countries and Panama, using Thurstone's centroid method, G. A. D. Soares said he came out, not with a single factor, but with at least two. The first indeed seemed to be a general factor of development, but the second was clearly bipolar. Usually these two account for almost all the common variances. Therefore it cannot be taken for granted that «development» is unidimensional; different dimensions may have different effects on political radicalism. It is when the rate of urbanization is much higher than the rate of industrialization that appears an urban mass of unemployed and underemployed which can be readily mobilized by radical parties.

A third observation referred to the incompleteness of the models. Traditionalism may be an intervening variable inhibiting the growth of radical movements where socioeconomic conditions strongly favour them. It is, therefore, advisable to look for more complex models, for economic development *per se* seems to explain but a limited amount of the variance in political radicalism.

A final remark referred to the role of certain values when analyzing the impact of hypothetical communist revolutions on economic development — now taken as the dependent variable. The Parsonian universalism-particularism dimension is specially helpful here. The widespread use of patronage, the allocation of public jobs to friends, relatives and political allies is done by urban leftists, presumably oriented by universalistic ideologies as well as by rural-conservative politicians. The overall result has been a tremendous increase in public bureaucracy, followed by large deficits and chronic inflation.

K. A. Busia made a few remarks in relation to I. Wallerstein's and F. X. Sutton's papers. 1) More attention should be paid to the problems of *local* government. Central authority is not everything, all the more so when there is actual divorce between those who make the decisions and the others. Control from the centre should not rule away a sound division of responsibilities. And it must be borne in mind that solutions to this problem become inbedded into political ideologies. 2) Conflict between local leaders and political leaders should receive proper attention. The tribe *is* a basis for social and national integration, and is not offensive to it at all costs. 3) K. A. Busia then mentioned local problems of export crops: «This would save us from easy sociological generalizations».



F. Lindenfeld asked why countries with communist governments were by definition not considered as «modern» by some of the speakers.

B. S. Brown disagreed with one of I. Wallerstein's statements according to which the West African «need to create one-party states derived from the structural problems of national integration in new polities». Some intervening variables were needed he felt.

The floor was then given to speakers, to answer the criticisms offered by the discussants.

L. Pye and G. I. Blanksten answered the objections made against the «indispensable stages of modernization». F. X. Sutton agreed with K. A. Busia on the necessity of investing at the local level. I. Wallerstein defined M. Bekombo's position as «ideological» and added he was himself using the word «class» in an old-fashioned way; he agreed with B. S. Brown's intervention, mentioning that in his opinion the most important intervening variable was the degree of moral consensus.

### Third Session

Chairman : S. M. LIPSET, University of California, Berkeley  
 Rapporteur: E. M. ALLARDT, University of Helsinki

In the session's first paper by M. Janowitz on *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: A Comparative Analysis*, the speaker directed particular attention to two questions about the role of the military in producing social change. First, what are the factors which lead to military involvement in domestic politics. Second, what are the capacities of the military to supply effective national political leadership in new and developing nations? On the basis of an analysis of the military establishment in 53 new nations, M. Janowitz stressed in particular the following two relationships: 1) *Social Origin*. In the new nations, the military is recruited from the middle and lower middle class drawn mainly from rural areas and hinterlands. Consequently, it lacks a feudal tradition and allegiance to the upper class, and has often a radical approach to modernization. 2) *Capacity to contribute to social and economic modernization*. Both the tendency to become politically involved and the capacity to provide political leadership is strongly related to the capacity to contribute to social and economic modernization.

The military have an active role in social modernization because of its contribution to citizen training. As a modernizing force, however, the effect of the military establishment is often reduced by the fact that very few people in many countries receive military training. Among other factors apt to increase the military's capacity for leadership M. Janowitz mentioned organizational format and social cohesion of the military establishment.

In the second paper of the session by S. Di Tella on *Monolithic Ideologies in Competitive Party Systems — The Latin American Case* the Latin American countries were held out as illuminating examples of change from monolithic to pluralist systems. Typical of Latin America is a coalition of monolithically oriented elites cooperating with a massified working class leading to political movements which in the literature have been labelled *nacionalismo popular*. From the point of view of the creation and maintenance of a democratic system these movements have often constituted a threat to democracy. However, in certain stages of development and modernization *nacionalista* popular movements may on the contrary become functional for the establishment of a modern pluralist system. First, the *nacionalismo popular* is often the only coalition which can oppose conservative political blocks. Second, with continuing economic growth marginal members of the middle and upper class tend to become respectable and integrated into the upper and middle classes. They tend to leave the *nacionalismo popular* and adhere to conservative or moderate political parties. The remaining working class element which at the same time has experienced a rise in its standard of living develops a more moderate political outlook. In such cases the *nacionalista* popular movements develop the characteristics that enable them to function in a pluralist system.

The third paper of the session by R. Scott on *The Political Culture of Mexico* dealt with the difficulties to motivate the Mexicans to full participation in their national political system. The current situation expresses itself in crises of identity and difficulties to integrate personal and national identity. In terms of the level of identity integration several categories may be distinguished. First, the Parochials, who do not think in terms of national identity at all. Second, the Subjects, the largest group, among which the lack of integration between the personal and national identity is crucial. The lack of integration displays itself both as low participation and as lack of acceptance of other nationalities. Third, the Participants, drawn mainly from upper and middle class, among which a certain degree



of identity integration already exists. The crucial problem in the Mexican system is to turn Subjects into Participants.

The first discussant, R. Aron stressed the lack of clarity in the concept of modernization. Political, social and economic modernization should be kept apart, as for instance considerable economic development may be the case without a simultaneous development toward competitive politics. He also questioned whether the role of military in one-party and multi-party states can be discussed on a similar basis since the role of the military will have different effects in the two systems. Some of M. Janowitz propositions do not take into consideration the differences between political and economic development. If the military take the power without having enough technical skill the result will be that no development takes place. In many instances one can assume that the military first of all prefer order which may mean ineffectiveness as far as economic development is concerned.

J. Wiatr maintained that the influence of the military very much depend on the values prevailing both among the military as in the society as a whole. Also, the social role of the military is probably very different in different stages of transition. In modern societies the role of the military will probably be reduced by the fact that popular participation is greatly growing.

G. Catlin said that T. S. Di Tella's presentation suggests practical measures which almost could be placed on a time scale for the road to political modernization. One of the greatest difficulties in many countries is to eliminate the overrich without at the same eliminating the skill.

D. Bell maintained that any discussion of the role of the military should be related to as well the moral order of society as to the prevailing system of power. The military establishment might be both a too broad and too narrow category as it does not take into consideration either the small c's (clubs, cliques, committees) or the total social system.

According to G. Germani the reason why the military form parties is the fact that they lack consensus which they tend to do as soon as there are legitimacy crises in the society. The speaker agreed with R. Aron as to the lack of clarity in the concept of modernization, but said that we should also consider that participation does not mean the same in developed and underdeveloped nations.

S. N. Eisenstadt questioned whether the problem had been adequately expressed. One-party and multi-party systems are not the only alter-

natives. There are other ways by which modernization has taken place. When the modernization started in Japan there were no parties at all. It is also questionable whether a discussion of the role of the military really belongs to a discussion of change from monolithic to pluralist systems. The army can hardly be seen as a functional equivalent to monolithic parties.

J. Linz pointed out two problems. First, as one of the main functions of the political system is to provide ways for putting people into power we should study closely how the mechanisms for raising to power are institutionalized. Second, when discussing the role of the military we should direct particular attention to the military mentality. For instance, in many contexts the idea of costs is very alien to military mentality.

A. E. Solari pointed out a clear-cut exception to T. S. Di Tella's propositions concerning the role of *nacionalismo popular*, namely the situation in Uruguay. Popular mass politics has not been concentrated to a single movement. Neither can the political mass movements be seen as the sole opposition to traditionalism and conservatism.

W. J. Cohnman maintained that it was of crucial importance whether the modernization was led by an educated bourgeoisie or by a strong government with mass support.

M. Janowitz replied to some of his critics that his study was based on empirical evidence. A crucial fact about the military is that they tend to withdraw from the day to day politics. The idea of public service is on the other hand very important and military officers are, therefore, very concerned by the moral implications of the use of force.

T. S. Di Tella admitted that Uruguay formed an exception to his presentation of the Latin American case. He also addressed himself to G. Catlin saying that many of the measures G. Catlin had proposed to be put on a time scale would almost presuppose a system with monolithic ideology.



## TRADITIONAL AND MODERN ELITES ÉLITES TRADITIONNELLES ET ÉLITES MODERNES

### THE FORMATION OF NEW REPRESENTATIVES OF THE INTELLIGENTSIA AND LEADERS IN THE COURSE OF THE BUILDING OF SOCIALISM

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There are some difficulties in discussing problems of traditional and modern elites for a sociologist-marxist. It comes from the fact that in marxist sociology the conception «elite» itself is not used in the meaning defined by G. Moska and V. Pareto, as well as in the meaning used now by various advocates of this conception. It can be explained, of course, not by some kind of «prohibition» of this term but by more serious and fundamental reasons: from the standpoint of the Marxian sense of correlation of the masses and leaders in the development of a society<sup>1</sup> the conception elite as a whole is not acceptable.

But the study of the content of investigations of «elite» in Western sociology shows that we have undoubtedly a general subject for discussion, because social processes considered and described in these investigations are objective processes characteristic of different types of societies at the present time. Thus the discussion is being developed just around the conception of the nature of these processes, around the estimation of them in sociological theory, which are determined by various social problems, ideological orientation and various methodological principles.

In recent years in the Soviet Union a number of sociological investigations have been carried out which are directly or indirectly connected with this problem<sup>2</sup>.

<sup>1</sup> The term «elite» can be used only conditionally for describing status of the privileged minority in all types of pre-socialist formations.

<sup>2</sup> On the one hand, these are general investigations concerning historical conditions of the formation of the new intelligentsia in connection with general changes of the class structure of society (the works of Professor G.

The object of this paper is not to sum up all these investigations. The problem consists only in putting some fundamental questions concerning both the essence of the problems and some aspects of methodology.

#### SOME METHODOLOGICAL PREREQUISITES

In analysing the problems of correlation of the masses and leaders in the socialist society we take at least two important methodological prerequisites.

Firstly, from the stand point of materialist sense of history, at the very beginning we, naturally, refuse from discussing the problem about reasons for dividing the society into the guiders «leaders», and the masses, «crowd», in the spirit of E. Lederer's conception — the power is subjected to the leader's magic, allotted with charisma — or D. Schumter's conception — the leader's abilities are determined by biopsychological factors only. The only possible aspect for the discussion is a consideration of the problem of the ruling of the society by the representatives of political power, engineers and other technical organisers of industrial establishments and other categories and groups of the intellectuals. The break with the traditional society with its privileges of the nobility, insuring with the guiding force in society, may be considered at two stages: in the conditions of capitalist society and — as a subsequent development — after the socialist revolution when, in the cause of the ruling of society, absolutely different traditions are formed. The investigation of these new traditions, specific ways and forms of their establishment, is an important problem of sociological investigation. Entering into polemics with a number of Western sociologists we insists on *the specific character* of the processes in capitalist and socialist societies and

E. GLEZERMAN and his collaborators under his guidance), new forms of raising the cultural and professional standards of the workers and making them closer to that of the intellectuals (the works of a group of authors under the guidance of Professors M. T. JOVSJUK and M. N. RUTKEVITCH), modern functions and status of the intelligentsia (the works of Professors F. V. KONSTANTINOV and V. S. SEMENOV), etc. On the other hand, these are investigations dedicated to describing the conditions of the development and functions of some groups of intellectuals, for example, engineers and technicians in view of new conditions in automatized production (the works of Professor A. A. ZVOROKIN and the author of this paper). In the latter sphere common investigations are being prepared together with Polish sociologists (in particular with the participation of Professor J. SZCZEPANSKI).



proceed from the impossibility of identification of these processes, as if they belong to the general type of «industrial society».

Secondly, as we are talking about quite concrete social groups performing the ruling functions in socialist society it is important to define the social nature of these groups. The most important common feature for them lies in the fact, that they are engaged in mental labour which, as a matter of fact, gives the reason for the formation of the conception «intelligentsia». But the engagement in mental labour indicates not only a professional sign. Since the difference between mental and physical labour as a form of division of labour in class society is founded historically, the intelligentsia represents not simply a professional, but a social group. Therefore it is impossible to consider the social functions of the intellectuals without considering the whole social structure of society, the correlation between the intelligentsia and the main social classes being the basic problem.

Owing to the social heterogeneity various strata of the Russian intelligentsia apprehended the socialist revolution differently. The great bulk of democratic representatives of the Russian intelligentsia followed the road of socialism (among them we can mention the names of such outstanding Russian scientists as J. J. Pavlov, K. A. Timirjazev, A. E. Fersman, V. L. Komarov). They formed a certain part of the new Soviet intelligentsia. But the main task of the social society was to form new personnel of the intelligentsia. It was being accomplished together with deep reorganizations of the whole social structure. There began a recruiting of intellectuals from workers and peasants and, in accordance with this, the social nature and public functions of the intelligentsia changed. It continues to be a special social group as before, but the common social nature between this group and other social groups — the classes of workers and peasants — makes it impossible to set the problem of the elite. These methodological prerequisites are the basis of sociological investigations.

#### THE STATUS OF THE INTELLIGENSIA IN SOVIET SOCIETY, ITS ROLE AND BASIC SOCIAL FUNCTIONS

In the Soviet Union persons who are engaged in mental labour form one fifth of the population. According to the figures of the census of the population in 1959 we have the following distribution of employment among the population:

Persons engaged in mental labour . . . . .	20,3 %
Persons engaged mainly in physical labour . . . . .	79,3 %

the figures refer to persons who are employed.

Thus we see first of all a great numerical growth of the personnel of the intelligentsia as a result of the cultural revolution, democratization of the whole popular education.

New conditions of genuine freedom for the workers of mental labour and a great care of the society for them stimulate a further growth of the intelligentsia. True, rates of the growth of various groups of intellectuals are different. For example, in comparison with 1939 the number of engineers in 1959 made up 337 %; doctors, 276 %; scientific workers and teachers of higher educational institutions, 294 %; which is indicative of technical progress and cultural growth. While such a category of intellectuals as leaders of the governmental organs in 1959 made up only 88 % of the level of 1939, the increase of the number of enterprise managers was also small — 126 % — in spite of the fact that the number of enterprises was increased in connection with the total growth of industry.

Such statistics indicates the deep social processes which are taking place in the life of the society.

The working class is the leading power of socialist society. Representatives of the whole working people and directly workers and peasants take more active part in the guidance and management. In such a situation the problems of the ruling of society have quite another statement. Of course the ruling functions remain but more and more masses of people are involved in the carrying out of these functions. Speaking of the terms of the elite theory it is impossible to use here even the conception «open elite». The conception of a vertical mobility which is the basis of this theory makes sense only in the case of the presence of a certain hierarchy of social strata and groups, irrespective of the fact of whether this hierarchy is based on the privileges of wealth, power or status. The idea of the entry of a representative of «the masses» into the elite is always thought of as a dynamic movement of the individual up the social scale of ranks. But as far as the intelligentsia of Soviet society is concerned it has no privileges named above with respect to other social groups. In a marxist interpretation «the privilege of wealth» means first of all an economic status of one or other class or status, which is determined by its relation to property on means of production. In this respect the intelligentsia in Soviet society does not differ from the



classes of workers and peasants, for all means of production are on the whole in the hands of the public state or on the hands of the collectives of co-operated peasants-kolhozes. As we know, among a number of Western sociologists there is discussion concerning the role of property on the means of production for the formation of an «economic elite».

Characterizing the economic elite in a capitalist society it was pointed out that it is formed not so much of proprietors as of managers and technocrats. Conformably to the socialist society the problem is more often raised on an other plane: for giving proofs of an economic «domination» of the intelligentsia they assert that in the USSR there arose a new form of property which is connected with the intelligentsia.

The property on means of production is the most important characteristic of the status of one or other social group but the socialist public property does not give reason to a single social group, including the intelligentsia, for pretending to economic privileges. Another aspect of «the privilege of wealth» is size of income. Various categories of the population of the USSR have different sizes of income. More skilled labour is paid more than simple and unskilled labour. From this point of view various professional but not social groups indeed have different conditions. But speaking about the distribution of incomes in the socialist society we cannot but take into account public funds of consumption (free public health, education, a number of cultural services, etc.). These funds, already now, make up a large per cent of the distribution of incomes and to some extent they correct the existing difference between the wages of various categories of workers. The problem of raising the living standards of all groups of the population is the most important problem of the building of communism.

The intelligentsia has no special «privilege of power» too. The big vanguard of Soviet intellectuals represents the leaders of the state institutions, party and public organizations, as well as the managers of various enterprises. But we cannot say that this group represents the «political elite». Firstly, it is necessary to look at the social origin of the representatives of leadership: the majority of them were formerly workers and peasants who occupied the leading posts on account of their abilities and experience at the time, when according to their social status they did not yet belong to the intelligentsia.

Secondly, as to the political power as a whole, its substance is determined by the nature of state policy and its formation by the

structure of the government bodies. A sociological analysis of one or other measure taken by Soviet government clearly indicates to the public, the nature of the policy of the Soviet government (among these measures we can mention, for example, the labour laws, the whole complex of measures on raising of agriculture taken in the Soviet Union for recent years, and the tasks put by Party Programme for the next twenty years).

The structure of the organs of the governmental bodies lends itself to pure statistical analysis. For example, the highest legislative body, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, has the following composition of deputies: workers: 339, collective farmers: 307, workers of the party, trade union and Komsomol organizations: 277, workers of the Soviet and economic organizations: 239, cultural workers: 152.

Thirdly, if we consider the problem of power in separate enterprises we can see again quite new traditions of interrelations between the managerial staff and workers. Of course the position of a manager of a shop is a position of a leader of the enterprise. But he always represents the public state, i.e. such a state in which the working class is a guiding force.

His work is controlled by the whole collective of the workers — through trade unions as well as special organs — the so-called standing production meetings and general meetings of the workers.

Thus, the problem of power in the conditions of socialism is put in absolutely new interrelations between the leading workers and the masses, which deprives the intelligentsia of the status of «political elite».

Finally, we consider the problem of «privilege of status», social standing and status of «prestige». Strictly speaking, the term «status» is a derivative conception of an economical and political status. In my opinion, in sociological investigation this is a conditional category in general because, after all, the definition of one or another social group in the system of public production, as well as its relation to political power, already gives the conception «status».

But so far as the definition of «status» can be supplemented with such indices, as distinguishing features of a mode of life traditions, a tenor of life and education, ways of spending free time, we can analyse the status of the intelligentsia from this point of view. The socialist society has broken with traditions of the old society in these spheres too.

First of all, the privilege of the children of intellectuals in getting an education has vanished. In this respect changes in the system of higher and secondary education which took place in recent years are



particularly indicative. For example, in the school year 1960-61, 593,1 thousand people were admitted to the higher, educational schools, 257,9 thousands (43,5 %) of them being admitted to day schools, 77 thousands (13 %) to evening classes and 258,2 thousands to correspondence courses. About 81 % of them are representative of workers and peasants.

A rapid growth in the culture of the families of workers and peasants changes family traditions in reference to a general tenor of their life<sup>3</sup>, so that, in the end, the conditions of life of various social categories are continuously becoming equal though, of course, all this cannot be accomplished in one day without conflicts and difficulties, without a tribute of respect to the old remaining in certain cases.

#### THE BUILDING OF COMMUNISM AND ELIMINATION OF SOCIAL DISTINCTIONS BETWEEN THE INTELLIGENTSIA AND OTHER SOCIAL CLASSES

All presented aspects for the consideration of the problem give only statistics of social relations between the intelligentsia and the other masses of the working people. The most important methodological demand of marxist sociology is to study the process in its dynamics. From this point of view it is necessary to consider those changes in the standard of the intelligentsia, which take place in the period of the building of communism, alongside with general changes in the social structure of society being accomplished at that time.

A general tendency of these changes is defined quite clearly: during transition from socialism to communism, socialist society goes from a social differentiation to more social integration. A part of this process is a process of elimination of distinctions between the intellectuals (as yet a special social group) and the classes (workers and peasants).

Nevertheless the absence of named privileges for the intelligentsia does not mean yet that the distinction of this group is fully eliminated. Only communism provides every kind of social distinction between people with full liquidation. Therefore the intelligentsia will remain as a special social stratum up to the highest phase of communism. But already now a process of elimination of existing

<sup>3</sup> As an objective demonstration of this in sociological investigation we may cite the analysis of the budget of leisure-time (See «*Vestnik LGU*», N° 23, 1961).

distinctions is going on. The basic task of this process is to make closer mental and manual labour. And this is clear because the intelligentsia as a special group is connected with a specific form of labour-mental labour. Furthermore the general cultural and professional standards of the intelligentsia is in the main higher than that of workers and collective-farmers. For example, according to the census of 1959 for each thousand persons with higher and secondary education there were 884 persons engaged in mental labour and 316 persons engaged in mainly physical labour.

An automation of production which creates prerequisites for a liquidation of social distinctions between workers and engineers and other technical workers is a decisive factor for changing the character of labour of workers, which makes it closer to the labour of engineers and technicians. A special investigation, carried out by us at one of the biggest works of our country, the first State Ball-Bearing Plant, which has an automat-shop, gives a substantial information on this subject<sup>4</sup>.

The main trends of changing the character of the labour of workers are the growth of a share of mental operations, and, in connection with this, the change of the meaning of the term «profession» and «qualification» (a smaller share of «skill» and greater share of «knowledge») and finally the growth of a creative initiative in labour.

As to raising the standard of knowledge of workers this is as a rule, a direct consequence of the automation of production. There is only one illustration of this. By 1965 at the first State Ball-Bearing Plant, as a result of the growth of a share of the automatized production, the percentage of the workers with a secondary education will be increased by 19,2%, with a technical and an incomplete higher education by 9,9% and with a higher education by 26%. In 1959 we had the figures 11,3%, 6,1% and 1,7% respectively. It is indicative that already in 1960 at this plant there were 13 engineers with diplomas who continued to work as workers; thus there appeared a new category — «engineers workers».

The rise of the general standard of education of workers is a spiritual rise of a person. As we see, automation of production has two kinds of influences on the one hand the demand of higher standards of general education involves naturally higher standards of general culture. On the other hand, it is automation of production which, in

<sup>4</sup> See G. M. ANDREEVA, «An Automation of Production and Elimination of Social Distinctions between the Working Class and Engineers and other Technical Workers». *Philosophical Sciences*, N° 4, 1961.



condition of socialism, leads to the shortening of the working day and thus gives more opportunity for the intellectual development of a person. The extending leisure time is used by workers for raising the standards of their general culture as well as for more operative participation in the guidance of production, other forms of public life, direct participation in political campaigns, etc. Thus, here we speak about a lowering of intellectual labour, but only in the sense that more masses of people are accustomed to this labour<sup>5</sup>.

The approximation of workers of physical and mental labour carried out not only in the sphere of production but in other spheres of public activities, thus conditions are being created for raising the material and cultural level of just the whole masses, the whole members of society. The problem of leadership remains, of course, as a pure by professional problem, which will have no social meaning in the communist system — in the system of socially equal and all-around developed toilers.

<sup>5</sup> All that of course does not exclude the genuine flourishing of professional science, professional art, etc.

## THE PROFESSIONS IN NORWEGIAN SOCIAL STRUCTURE \*

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### THE ORIGIN OF THE PROFESSIONS

It is hardly possible to date the origin of a profession. The theoretical basis, as well as the accumulated practical skills of a profession, presuppose a long and piecemeal evolution. It is possible, however, to date certain formal steps on the road towards the full-fledged profession. With regard to the profession of law in Norway, it is thus natural to take as a point of departure the year 1736, when a legal degree from the University of Copenhagen was made a formal prerequisite for incumbents of legal positions in the union-state of Denmark-Norway.

The development of a profession is dependent upon the growth of a body of theory, a science, which the professionals can apply to the solution of practical problems. The full understanding of how a profession originates and develops, is tantamount to the understanding of the growth of systematic human thought. But our interest is not limited to this, nor is it the aspect of professional growth which will concern us here. Quite apart from the availability of knowledge and skills, an inspection of the circumstances surrounding the origin of the professions, suggests that certain social conditions must prevail in order that the professions may arise and mature.

The tasks which later became the monopoly of university-trained professionals existed prior to the professions. Thus, government, administration and adjudication took shape long before we can speak of a legal profession in the modern sense. The same is true of healing and of religious and military leadership. Before the advent of professionalization these tasks were taken care of by very different types of people, socially speaking. A basic dilemma seems to have arisen because of the wide status gap between people who

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worked within separate areas that were later to be subsumed under one profession.

Elias has shown how difficult it was to establish a true professional group of naval officers in England, because it required a fusion of what he calls «Gentlemen» and «Tarpaulins». The former term refers to the noble, or at least court-connected, young men who became officers by virtue of largely ascriptive criteria. The latter referred to the people of much lower status who had served an apprenticeship on board ships, slept under a tarpaulin, and learned the craft of navigation and of the maintenance of a ship. A full-fledged professional naval officer should ideally fulfill both demands. This turned out to be very difficult to achieve. For a long time command on board naval vessels was shared, and later was given to one or the other of the two types, thus making for heterogeneity in the officer corps<sup>1</sup>.

The history of military education in Sweden similarly shows the great obstacles that hindered the establishment of a common training scheme for officers, which would comprise a curriculum ranging from the study of French, fencing and dancing, to fortress building and weaponry<sup>2</sup>. In fact most of the professions have faced the problem of combining characteristics of high and largely ascribed, social status with the acquirement of skills presupposing willingness to enter into social relations on a basis apparently incompatible with noble rank. The modern professionals have two sets of ancestors: one which, by virtue of birth and other marks of general superior status, exerted influence in a specific field, and one consisting of commoners who by practice and individual achievement came to master necessary skills within the same field. The merger of a craft in the hands of commoners with office occupied by people of high ascribed social status, was the first sociological condition for the origin of a profession.

The second, and related, condition had to do with the status of — and recruitment to — higher education. Ability to read and write, and the possession of intellectual skills generally, have not always and everywhere been socially evaluated as they are in our professional society<sup>3</sup>. As late as in the 17th and 18th centuries the

<sup>1</sup> Norbert ELIAS, «The Genesis of the Naval Profession», *The British Journal of Sociology*, 1950, pp. 291-309.

<sup>2</sup> Wilhelm SJÖSTRAND, *Grunddragen av den militära undervisningens uppkomst- och utvecklingshistoria i Sverige till år 1792*, Uppsala, 1941.

<sup>3</sup> Cf. Hannah ARENDT, *The Human Condition*, New York, Doubleday Anchor Books, 1955.

institutions of higher learning were beset by severe ambiguities in terms of status. After the Reformation the government of Denmark-Norway encouraged the sons of farmers, craftsmen and the clergy to enter the grammar schools and latter to study theology at the University. Since they were often poor, they were subsidized by the state through scholarships. Behind this policy was the need of the king for officials, especially in the lower ranks which did not attract the nobility. The policy left a mark of poverty and low social status upon the Latin schools however<sup>4</sup>.

By the beginning of the 18th century the government felt the situation to be untenable. It believed the stipends to be misused by farmers' sons who wanted a livelihood and an escape from military service, but who lacked the proper qualifications for an official's career. In part, the attempts to reform and increase the status of the grammar schools was a means of attracting people of high social status to the schools and the University.

It is a common sociological notion that the introduction of education, examination and achievement as a basis for recruitment to positions with high social rank, must favor social mobility<sup>5</sup>. This may be true in the long run. In the short run the situation has often been otherwise. When the principles of achievement were strengthened in the grammar schools in the first half of the 18th century, the aim was to cut down recruitment from the lower classes and make the nobility willing to undergo formal training before they entered the positions for which they were qualified by birth. A policy of recruitment through patronage of lower-class men was gradually supplanted by a system where qualifications alone counted, but where the poor had to fend for themselves.

The new educational policy of the Danish government had, as I have mentioned, a double target. It aimed at limiting recruitment from the lower social classes, and removing the previous stigma attached to the grammar schools. But it also aimed at applying standard educational requirements to noble incumbents of high ranking positions. This latter aspect of the policy was, however, practised with leniency until as late as the end of the 18th century. By the turn of the century the professions of law and medicine, a professional ministry and an officer corps, were well established. Through

<sup>4</sup> Sigurd NØRSTEBØ, *Preliminæreksamen og «norsk» embetsekamen ved Universitetet i Oslo*, Oslo, Universitetsforlaget, 1961, p. 21.

<sup>5</sup> Bernhard BARBER, *Social Stratification*, New York, Harcourt, Brace & Comp., 1957.



elimination of the majority of lower-class recruits, the social homogeneity of the professional strata had been enhanced by the successful inclusion of the nobility and other high-status groups into the educational system.

Still, the professions functioned in many ways very differently from the way they do today. Internal differences of status were still much greater than they were subsequently. For instance, between the higher and the lower civil servants, military officers and clergy, there was a very considerable gap in terms of remuneration<sup>6</sup>. The specificity of professional tasks was still not developed very far. Thus, the ministers served many functions which were subsequently taken over by other professionals. The minister-doctor was a well known type around the turn of the 18th century<sup>7</sup>. Theology can in many ways be regarded as the mother discipline of other professions, of medicine, philology and natural science, to some extent even of law. Ministers adjudicated in disputes, administered the schools and experimented with new agricultural methods.

The diffuseness of the professional roles at the beginning of the last century was not solely dependent on the concentration of many specialties in one profession. It was also the consequence of a lack of clear distinction between public and private interests. A state official, whether civil, military or clerical, was put in charge of a district (almost as a fief), out of which he was to extract taxes and enlisted men, and enforce obedience to the laws and the true faith. The salary he received from the state was often inadequate; but he was entitled to various taxes, fees and provisions from the inhabitants of the district. Thus the incumbency of a government post in no small measure took on the character of a private business, with much scope for the commercial abilities and motives of the officials. In some cases it went so far that the official started a regular shop to sell the produce he had received as fees *in naturalia*, in order to provide himself with cash to pay the Crown<sup>8</sup>.

We can thus distinguish between two stages in the origin and development of the professions. The first is characterized by a merger of tasks and personnel, previously separated by status barriers and traditional lines of division of labor. The most striking illustration of this is perhaps the merging of the old University-trained

<sup>6</sup> Sverre STEEN, *Det gamle samfunn*, Oslo, 1957.

<sup>7</sup> I. REICHBORN-KJENNERUD, FR. GRØN, I. KOBRO, *Medisinens historie i Norge*, Oslo, 1936, pp. 124, 133.

<sup>8</sup> P. A. MUNCH, *Landhandelen i Norge*, Bergen, 1948.

high status *Doctores Medecinae* with the lower-status barber-surgeons<sup>9</sup>. This merger got its formal stamp after 1814 when the new Norwegian University gathered all medical education under the Faculty of Medicine. The second stage is characterized by a differentiation of tasks and a specialization of fields according to new principles of the division of labor. These emerging lines of differentiation are by and large unconnected with the traditional division of labor in strict class terms. This also makes for a somewhat looser connection between occupation and class, in the sense that a son may retain the status of his father without being bound to inherit his occupation.

#### FROM ESTATES TO CLASSES

It is commonly assumed that certain systematic relationships must obtain in any society between the three institutions, family, occupation and social class. Family solidarity requires that spouses enjoy fairly equal social rank, and expect children to obtain niches in the social stratification not too far removed from that occupied by their parents. These requirements can, however, be fulfilled in at least three different ways, through a society of estates, through a class society and through an egalitarian «educational society»<sup>10</sup>. In the first case, family solidarity is assured through principles of recruitment by which the sons enter the occupations of their fathers, and the daughters marry their fathers' colleagues. In the second case, the sons may choose occupations differing from those of their fathers, but still conferring fairly similar social rank, and the daughters marry men from a variety of occupations, but with similar positions in the class structure. In the third case, which is still half-way utopian, class differentials have been sufficiently reduced to permit almost any combination of father — son (or son-in-law) occupations without creating undue strains upon family solidarity. It need hardly be emphasized that this model of three stages in the principles of recruitment to the professions (or any other occupations) is grossly simplified, and does not take into account the obvious consideration that the family institution itself has changed with the macro-structure of society.

The professional world of 18th century Norway suggests an approximation to a society of estates in the specific sense outlined

<sup>9</sup> REICHBORN-KJENNERUD et al., *op.cit.*, p. 135.

<sup>10</sup> The term is coined by the Swedish sociologist Torgny T. Segerstedt.



above. As many as half of the ministers of religion came from a minister's home, and half of the officers — or at least those of higher rank — came from an officer's family. The marriages of the clergy suggest a similar pattern. This cannot as truly be claimed when we inspect the recruitment to the legal profession. Barely one fourth of all lawyers came from a legal background, and even fewer married the daughters of lawyers. If we compare the total pattern of recruitment and marriages during the 18th century with the data from the 19th and 20th centuries, it does, however, represent an approximation to the society of estates.

Statistics bear witness to the consolidation after 1814 of an upper class composed of incumbents of a variety of professions and other occupations (especially merchants), linked by kinship bonds. Self-recruitment within the clergy and the legal profession was still high, but lower than it was before 1814. Lawyers and doctors were often the sons of ministers or officers, while ministers, for some decades at least, were often recruited from lawyers' or officers' families. (Unfortunately there is a gap in the available data on the officer corps between 1814 and 1880). Most important, in all professional groups a fair share of the recruits — between one fourth and one fifth — were derived from the business-community. The data on marriages suggest that probably an even higher percentage of the professionals married the daughters of business-men. Thus, whatever inherent tendency there may be in higher education to produce an isolated estate of mandarins, this possibility was counter-acted by forces making for close ties between academically trained people and practical business-men. Our data strongly suggest that the rapid increase in the number of professionals in Norway during most of the 19th century, parallels the establishment of a fairly homogenous «modern» urban upper class. The available criteria of ascription and achievement seem to have pulled together.

What are the causes of the shift from estate to class recruitment, and of the apparent consolidation of an urban upper or upper-middle class in Norway? No sociological formula can be true to the historical complexities of the development which include the dissolution of the union with Denmark in 1814, the somewhat looser merger with Sweden in a new union, the establishment of a Norwegian University in Oslo in 1811, etc<sup>11</sup>. Let us, nevertheless, attempt to list some of the developments which seem to be related to the changing position of the professions in the social structure.

<sup>11</sup> Cf. STEEN, *op.cit.*

The demand for trained personnel increased rapidly, especially within government administration and within the economic sector of society<sup>12</sup>. The same was true with respect to health, and later with respect to education itself. We find a shift of emphasis from the ministry and the officer corps, to law, and later to medicine natural science and the humanities. Thus, the two professions where the traditions, and possibly the conditions making for self-recruitment, were strongest, played a diminishing part, relatively speaking, in the professional world. On the demand side this situation implied that many sons of officers or ministers would have to choose the law or medicine, in order to keep their social status or improve it.

The development of the school system itself meant that all sons of upper class people would be increasingly exposed to melting-pot influences, where they might previously have relied upon private tutoring or other more parochial training systems. In the Latin schools also, the sons of upper-class people would become acquainted with professional opportunities other than those represented by their fathers, thereby making personal abilities and predilections more relevant to their choice of career.

After 1814 political factors may have operated in the same direction, towards unity and solidarity within one urban upper or upper-middle social class, tearing down the old barriers between occupational groups which had been based upon differences in subculture. The Norwegian upper classes, professionals and merchants, had common political enemies. These were in the first place external ones, Denmark and to some extent Sweden, but they soon came to realize that they had common enemies within, the farmers, represented by a growing proportion of the members of Parliament. The major line of political demarcation in 19th century Norway was drawn between the urban upper class, composed of merchants and civil servants and the farmers, meaning the most prosperous part of the rural population. The data on recruitment to the academic professions accord well with this political situation.

#### THE LOOSENING UP OF THE CLASS SOCIETY

Until well into the second half of the 19th century we can discern no appreciable change in the basis of social recruitment to the professions, although the composition of the professional world, in terms

<sup>12</sup> Cf. for Sweden, Sten CARLSSON, *Ståndssamhälle och ståndspersoner 1700-1865*, Lund, 1949.



of relative strength of the professions, did change. From 1870, however, new groups of recruits to the professions begin to emerge. This change had been preceded by a sudden and rapid growth in the number of high-school graduates (*artium*), after decades of stagnation<sup>13</sup>. The shift in recruitment pattern to the professions can be divided into three stages: the entrance of farmers' sons, the entrance of workers' sons and the entrance of women.

The first appearance of these new recruits coincides very neatly with the victory of the opposition in Parliament and the introduction of a parliamentary system of government. This meant the end of the undisputed rule of the civil servants. The functional relationship between the two events, on the political scene and in the recruitment to the professions, is a very complex one. Both events have their background in a similar general development, and probably also mutually reinforced each other.

The simultaneity of the appearance of rural recruits in all professional groups suggests that we are witnessing a phenomenon associated with a general, albeit moderate, change in Norwegian class structure. But the consequent dissimilarities in recruitment patterns in the various professions suggest that factors other than those associated with class, status and income must be considered in analyzing the place of the professions within a social structure.

Rural recruitment has been particularly strong within the clergy, subsequently within philology and science, recently also within the officer corps. Within law and medicine rural recruitment has been more restricted, and reached an early peak around the turn of the century. What holds for rural recruitment, is by and large also true with respect to recruitment from the urban lower classes, the industrial workers. Here it must be noted, however, that there are two possible perspectives on recruitment patterns: the point of view of the sons' generation and the point of view of the fathers' generation. If we ask what the most probable professional choice of a farmer's son was after 1870 the answer is law. Law was the one profession capable of absorbing the largest share of recruits from all backgrounds, including a rural one. In spite of this, the differences in recruitment as between the professions, mentioned above, is significant. The relationship between a social group of recruits and a profession must be analyzed with due consideration for the different demand for various types of professionals. Relative to the

<sup>13</sup> Henrik PALMSTRØM, «Om en befolkningsgruppes utvikling gjennom de siste 100 år», *Statsøkonomisk Tidsskrift*, Oslo, 1935, pp. 161-370.

demand, lower class recruits have tended to choose theology, philology, science, and recently military education. Relative to the demand, they have been poorly represented in law and medicine, and also in engineering.

To explain these differences would take us far beyond the scope of this paper. Let me merely suggest some general factors making for more or less open recruitment, and give a few examples of how they seem to apply to the present data. A new and rapidly expanding profession will thereby tend to offer opportunities to new groups of recruits, where an old and established professional group can base itself more upon self-recruitment or at least upper-class recruitment. A profession with a high status will attract upper-class recruits, thereby presenting lower-class recruits with severe competition in which they will suffer from some handicaps, while they meet less competition if they aim at professions with somewhat lower status.

By the first criterion the clergy should be a narrowly recruited profession. Since the social rank of the minister has been decreasing, however, some widening of the recruitment base could be explained in those terms. But this explanation is obviously insufficient, since the status of the minister still ranks high, especially in rural districts. The recruitment pattern to the clergy cannot be understood without considering the trend toward secularization, which has made the ministry appear to most young people from the urban upper and middle classes, to be a career out of tune with the cultural trends of our time. Religion as such is probably on the decline, but even more important, the diffuseness, impracticality and somewhat «un-professional» nature of the tasks of the clergy have lessened its appeal to people with an urban middle class background. On the other hand, particular developments within Norwegian theology and religious organizations have made the ministry a natural opportunity for social mobility within certain enclaves of the rural population<sup>14</sup>.

A somewhat similar explanation may be given for the broadening of the recruitment base of the officer corps. In spite of the present enormous emphasis upon military preparation and the danger of war, the culture of the military officers is also out of tune with the cultural trends of our times. The lack of specificity in the training and skills of officers<sup>15</sup>, and their inability to demonstrate profession-

<sup>14</sup> Sonja POLLAN, «Prestetradisjon og presterekuttering 1720-1955», *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning*, 3. Oslo, 1962, pp. 83-98.

<sup>15</sup> Francesco KJELBERG, «Offiserene som sosial gruppe», *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning*, 3. Oslo, 1962, pp. 113-31.



al competence and utility — except in wartime — make the military career unattractive to middle class recruits. Due to specific historical circumstances the status of the military profession in Norway has probably declined a great deal in this century.

If we consider the recruitment to the humanities and the natural sciences, we find that these constitute the basis of the teaching profession. This profession has been expanding very rapidly, but without achieving very high social rank. In these cases it may be sufficient to apply the model suggested above for an explanation of the trends. On the other hand, law and medicine are well established and are simultaneously the highest ranking among the professions. It is true that within law the rank differentials are very great, but an upper group of judges, attorneys and higher civil servants rank with the top of the professional world.

The entrance of women into the professional world raises some new problems<sup>16</sup>. The question of professional subculture becomes more salient, although we have already seen that it cannot be ignored in the analysis of male recruitment either. To some extent it seems that the women are channelled by the same factors which favored lower-class male recruitment to some professions and not to others, especially to the humanities. It should be emphasized that women tend generally to be more narrowly recruited than the male professionals. If one inspects the distribution of men and women within various professional groups, one may discern a pattern which cuts across the considerations of social class. Whether women become numerous in a profession or not, seems to depend upon a combination of three factors: how absorbing and time consuming the education and the professional work is, how well the professional tasks are assumed to fit the alleged abilities of women and the norms governing their sex-roles, and, finally, whether the discipline as such is in harmony with the life-style of a woman. While medical work may be assumed to correspond well with some of woman's traditional tasks and with the norms defining her role, it is a very time consuming and demanding field, hard to combine with a family, and it is based upon pre-medical training in science and mathematics, from which girls are traditionally steered away. Legal work may, on the other hand, be less demanding, easier to combine with family life in practical terms, but considered to be contrary to a woman's natural disposition and innate abilities. When

<sup>16</sup> Vilhelm AUBERT, «Kvinner i akademiske yrker», *Tidsskrift for samfunnsforskning*, 2, Oslo, 1961, pp. 238-63.

we come to the humanities however, we find more harmony between sex-role and educational and occupational requirements. Women are traditionally considered responsible for upbringing and teaching, good with children and young people, and language and the arts is considered to be the proper domain of the female mind.

#### THE PLACE OF KNOWLEDGE IN THE SOCIAL STRUCTURE

We started out by claiming that the origin of the professions could not be understood merely in terms of a growing body of theoretical knowledge on the one hand, and certain practical needs on the other. Neither should the later evolution of the professions be studied without some attention being paid to the general problem of where knowledge is located in the social structure. Knowledge is a resource with a capacity to flow, but within channels defined by the social structure of any particular period.

During the 18th and the beginning of the 19th centuries higher learning and superior knowledge were located in Norway within government bureaucracies, civil, military and clerical. Moreover, those in possession of such knowledge were typically decision-makers, not scholars, teachers or service professionals, although these latter types of educated people did exist. The knowledge of each professional group was general and composite, if compared with that of modern professionals. The dogmatic, normative and historical mode of thought predominated, while scientific, functional and future-oriented disciplines were poorly represented.

Before 1814, and for some time afterwards, lawyers were predominantly decision-makers in the service of the state. Even the service-practitioners, the attorneys, were appointed civil servants until 1848, at which time the law was made a free profession as the consequence of a general move towards the abolition of protectionism and formal economic privileges.

What is true of the legal profession is also true of the professions as a whole. Ministers, officers and a great many of the first medical doctors and liberal arts graduates, were also public officials, servants of the King. Decision-making was a very salient aspect of their function. The attorneys and the doctors, whether public or private, were the budding service professionals, still a tiny minority within the professions. The graduates of liberal arts, and more often of theology, formed another minority, which was later to develop into the teaching profession. But on the whole, higher learning was inti-



mately bound up with officialdom. The universities were schools of preparation for the servants of the state, above all for decision-makers.

It is one of the most striking trends in the later development of the professions and of higher learning, and certainly one with very far-reaching consequences, that this bond has become weaker. This is true in the sense that the scientist, the teacher and the service-practitioner have come to constitute a much larger proportion of the professional stratum, at the cost, relatively speaking, of the decision-maker. And it seems also to be true in the sense that more and more professionally trained people have come to operate on a private basis, and not as part of a government bureaucracy. This latter trend was very striking until the period between the two world wars, but has possibly been reversed during recent decades, due to the vast growth of the high-school system and the teaching profession, and also to the expansion of public hospital services.

Among the professions the weight has been shifting from the numerically stagnating military officers and ministers, first to the legal profession, then to the medical profession, and even more recently to engineers, philologists and natural scientists. The most recent step so far in this development is represented by the growth of the social sciences, economics, political science, psychology and sociology. These latter disciplines are interesting in this context primarily because they make competing claims to competence in areas previously monopolized by lawyers.

The legal profession has participated in the general trend towards «privatization» of the academically trained. The shift of emphasis from decision-making to service is striking if we compare the development of the attorneys with that of the judiciary. Between 1815 and 1950 the number of attorneys increased by a factor close to 20, while the number of judgeships was not more than doubled. During the same period the population increased four fold, and the whole society was transformed from a predominantly rural and agricultural society to an industrial one, in which half the population live in cities or urban-type settlements, and city culture has reached every backwater.

TABLE I

*Graduates of Medicine, Philology, and Science from the University of Oslo in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries, and Norwegian Engineers graduated in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century, Distributed According to Father's Occupation. Percentages*

	Year of Graduation								
MEDICINE *	1810	1830	1850	1870	1890	1910	1930	1940	
Father's Occupation	-29	-49	-69	-89	-09	-29	-39	-51	
Medical Doctor, Dentist	17	8	11	15	9	15	9	10	
Other Academics	26	42	47	31	23	22	17	22	
Businessman	19	26	25	27	26	22	23	20	
Functionary	10	13	11	13	20	19	24	25	
Farmer	3	4	2	6	13	12	12	7	
Artisan	5	5	3	8	6	6	8	7	
Worker	1	—	—	—	2	1	4	3	
No Information	19	2	1	—	1	3	3	6	
N	100 (84)	100 (279)	100 (249)	100 (458)	100 (890)	100 (1058)	100 (942)	100 (1405)	
PHILOLOGY	1820	1850	1870	1890	1910	1920	1930	1940	1950
Father's Occupation	-49	-69	-89	-09	-19	-29	-39	-49	-55
High School, Un. Teacher	4	3	9	13	12	11	9	8	8
Other Academics	42	52	28	28	24	14	16	13	14
Businessman	24	20	17	18	14	17	16	13	8
Functionary	18	12	24	21	23	31	29	35	34
Farmer	2	1	8	11	18	16	14	12	14
Artisan	—	10	11	8	5	6	8	8	6
Worker	2	1	2	1	3	3	5	8	7
No Information	8	1	1	—	1	2	3	3	9
N	100 (50)	100 (79)	100 (159)	100 (211)	100 (149)	100 (270)	100 (526)	100 (721)	100 (344)
SCIENCE									
High School, Univ. Teacher		4	10	7	13	18	6	8	6
Other Academics		55	24	18	14	6	13	15	12
Businessman		15	17	15	24	12	12	15	16
Functionary		11	24	24	24	27	32	35	34
Farmer		4	12	21	17	21	19	11	8
Artisan		4	10	9	6	9	10	6	8
Worker		—	3	5	1	4	6	6	9
No Information		7	—	1	1	3	2	4	7
N		100 (27)	100 (71)	100 (105)	100 (80)	100 (131)	100 (275)	100 (444)	100 (281)
ENGINEER					1901-09				
Engineer, Architect				6	7	7	13	15	13
Other Academics				21	21	22	21	15	13
Businessman				23	23	25	20	19	17
Functionary				22	23	21	23	25	24
Farmer				10	10	10	8	9	10
Artisan				4	4	4	4	4	3
Worker				4	5	5	6	9	11
No Information				10	7	6	5	4	9
N				100 (1208)	100 (1553)	100 (1543)	100 (1582)	100 (1996)	100 (2177)

\* Included in this Table are also a number of graduates from other Universities — especially the University of Copenhagen — who at some time served in Norway.



TABLE II

*Norwegian Theologists and Lawyers Graduated from the Copenhagen University and the University in Oslo in the 18<sup>th</sup>, 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries, Officers Appointed until 1815, and Officers Graduated from the Military Academy in Oslo in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries, Distributed According to Father's Occupation. Percentages.*

THEOLOGISTS *	1720	1740	1760	1780	1800	1810	1830	1850	1870	1890	1910	1930	1940	1950
<i>Fathers' Occup.</i>	-39	-59	-79	-99	-09	-29	-49	-69	-89	-09	-29	-39	-49	-55
Minister	43	39	50	45	38	33	25	37	21	21	14	8	12	14
Other Academics	6	11	14	12	16	33	24	15	13	13	6	5	6	10
Businessman	12	14	10	11	9	19	27	20	17	21	15	11	15	11
Functionary	8	7	6	11	14	11	16	11	18	21	25	25	24	22
Farmer	2	3	2	3	3	2	4	8	18	21	25	31	16	14
Artisan	1	2	2	3	5	—	2	2	9	2	7	11	14	7
Worker	1	1	1	2	—	—	1	2	3	1	6	6	5	12
No Information	27	23	15	13	15	2	1	5	1	—	2	3	8	10
N	100 (369)	100 (512)	100 (346)	100 (352)	100 (147)	100 (255)	100 (455)	100 (388)	100 (642)	100 (435)	100 (603)	100 (702)	100 (275)	100 (205)
														**New stu- dents
LAWYERS	1736	1760	1780	1800	1815		1830	1850	1870	1890	1910	1930	1941	
<i>Father's Occup.</i>	-59	-79	-99	-15	-29		-49	-69	-89	-09	-29	-40	-55	1958&59
Lawyer	24	25	28	23	18		23	20	20	16	19	16	11	20
Other Academics	26	28	23	27	23		25	29	19	19	17	17	15	16
Businessman	18	16	18	17	21		22	22	27	24	23	21	19	18

Functionary	9	9	13	14	19	14	14	17	23	21	25	28	19
Farmer	4	2	2	6	6	4	4	7	11	10	9	9	8
Artisan	3	6	4	2	4	4	7	7	5	5	6	5	4
Worker	—	—	1	1	2	2	1	1	1	2	4	6	10
No Information	16	14	11	10	7	6	3	2	2	3	2	7	5
N	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
	(239)	(328)	(360)	(265)	(259)	(775)	(695)	(1044)	(1620)	(1575)	(1665)	(1650)	(245)
		1740-65		1765-89		1790-1815							
OFFICERS		<i>Major</i>	<i>Captain</i>	<i>Major</i>	<i>Captain</i>	<i>Major</i>	<i>Captain</i>	1880	1890	1910	1930	<i>aspir.</i>	
<i>Father's Occup.</i>		<i>and</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>and</i>	<i>and</i>	-89	-09	-29	-39	1950	
		<i>higher</i>	<i>lower</i>	<i>higher</i>	<i>lower</i>	<i>higher</i>	<i>lower</i>						-60
Officer		49	32	49	28	43	20	22	15	13	20	7	
Other Academics		13	6	8	8	17	12	24	23	18	10	9	
Nobleman, Occ. not specified		3	—	2	1	2	1						
Businessman		3	3	3	3	9	4	15	23	15	15	9	
Functionary		4	3	1	3	2	6	16	21	24	23	26	
Farmer		—	1	—	1	2	2	9	11	23	13	21	
Artisan		—	—	1	—	—	—	5	4	4	1	5	
Worker		—	—	—	—	1	—	2	1	1	7	19	
No Information		28	55	36	56	24	55	7	2	2	11	4	
N		100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100
		(294)	(408)	(219)	(516)	(236)	(891)	(68)	(569)	(528)	(71)	(572)	

\* Inclusive Graduates of Theology from other Universities who at any time held position in Norway.

\*\* Includes only those with Examen Artium before 1943.



TABLE III

*Number of Graduates from the Universities\* of Norway in the 19<sup>th</sup> and 20<sup>th</sup> Centuries. Distributes According to Field of Graduation. Absolute Figures*

Time Period	Theology	Law	Medicine	Philol.	Science	Economics	Pharm.	Engin.	Mag. Sc.***	Mag. art.**	Psychology	Dentistry	Agriculture	Business	Management
1815-1829	255	259	84	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1830-1849	455	775	279	43	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1850-1869	388	695	249	79	27	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1870-1889	642	1044	458	159	71	—	—	466	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1890-1909	435	1620	890	211	105	40	—	1570	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
1910-1929	602	1575	1058	419	211	458	—	2226	27	2	—	—	1074	—	—
1930-1949	977	3101	1984	1247	719	462	385	2419	116	54	24	24	791	1128	902****
1950-1959	334	1564	1251	802	760	382	244	4374	194	58	206	799	743	—	—

\* The University of Oslo.

The University of Bergen, established 1948.

The Technical College, Trondheim.

The Agricultural College, As.

The Business Management College, Bergen.

\*\* Exclusive magisters who are also graduates of philology.

\*\*\* Exclusive magisters who are also graduates of science.

## THE EDUCATION OF AN ELITE: LAW FACULTIES AND THE GERMAN UPPER CLASS

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### I

In a sense, Germany society as a whole has never had an identifiable and reasonably homogeneous upper class. German history since the foundation of the Empire in 1871 may in fact be described as a continuous process of decomposition and displacement of the old Prussian aristocracy of civil servants, soldiers, *Junker*, and diplomats. Even as an intact elite, this group could never be called the upper class of the whole of German society: Bavaria had her own aristocracy, Württemberg and the Hanseatic Towns had their patriariate; other distinct elites prevailed in other parts of the country. As it is, however, the traditional and authoritarian elite of Prussia was already, in 1871, no longer an intact upper class. Even in Prussia herself, other groups had begun to compete with the *Junker* elite for economic and political power. In the industrializing society of late 19th century Germany, the feudal upper class of Prussia was an elite in retreat.

However, the displacement of this elite in the decades after 1871 was neither as rapid nor as complete as the corresponding process in England half a century earlier. This is why the upper class of German society remained extremely heterogeneous throughout the last century. Aristocrats and *homines novi*, Prussians and Bavarians, Protestants and Catholics, civil service groups and entrepreneurs, National Conservatives and National Liberals competed and continue to compete for social acceptance, economic position and political power. Even the two German societies of the present could be described in terms of the varying fortunes of one or the other of these elites; this is certainly true for the inter-War years.

Of course, analysis must be pushed further than stating that numerous groups were competing for upper-class status. Some of these groups obviously stood a better chance than others; in fact, some were successful in their claims, and others not. In a formula, the



development of German elites presents the picture of a pre-industrial upper class holding on to its position despite a rapid and radical process of industrialization. The incongruities of German economic development on the one hand, and social and political structure on the other, have been noticed by many analysts before and after Veblen's study of *Imperial Germany and the Industrial Revolution*. Contrary to what, in the 19th century, was still considered the English «model», industrialization strengthened rather than weakened the traditionalism of German values and the authoritarianism of German politics. At the same time, it did produce new claimants for power — as did the unification of Germany under Prussian hegemony. Although, in the early years of the Empire, most of these groups strove to be accepted by the established upper class rather than to assert their own interests (and although, therefore, industrialization in Germany did not produce a tradition of representative government) the years of the Weimar Republic bear witness to the fierce competition between the old Prussian elite (DNVP — German National People's Party), South and West German Catholics (Z — Centre Party, and BVP — Bavarian People's Party), a more or less liberal bourgeoisie (DDP — German Democratic Party, DVP — German People's Party, and several other groups), and the more radical groups of the Right and the Left. When, in the final years of Weimar, German society once again called upon the «proven» aristocratic and military elites of the past (in the persons of Hindenburg, Schleicher, von Papen, and many others), this was the last appearance — apart from the tragic revolt of the 20th of July, 1944 — of the Prussian tradition of leadership in German politics<sup>1</sup>.

This context has to be seen in order to understand a distinction which lies at the basis of the following analysis of the recruitment of German elites. There are upper classes of an almost tangible reality, easily identifiable, visible to most people in a society, with well-defined borders and conditions of entry. I shall call them elites of the *establishment type* or *established elites* (thereby alluding to the English case which is perhaps unique among industrial societies). Here, most incumbents of top positions in politics, in the civil service, in the economy, the military, the educational system, and elsewhere, are connected by numerous important links: more often than not, they are — however distantly — related; many of them have

<sup>1</sup> I am not sure that a quasi-historical sketch of this length is really permissible. As it is, it can do no more than indicate the necessity of a historical perspective on the problem of this paper.

been either to the same, or the same kind of school; if they went to universities at all, only a few were in question; there are often sustained personal relations between the members of such a class, including memberships in the same or similar organizations of many kinds<sup>2</sup>. By contrast, there are elites of an extremely *abstract type*, or *abstract elites*, and it can be shown that for these, German society is a case in point. Members of abstract elites have nothing but their elite position in common: there are few if any family relations between them; they did not attend significantly similar schools; they have no personal relations to speak of; in fact, their subjects of conversation are limited to the «shop talk» emerging from their common incumbency of positions of leadership<sup>3</sup>.

Without doubt, historical conditions could be specified, under which the upper class of a society tends toward either the established or the abstract type. So far as the latter is concerned the brief sketch of the development of German elites above may contain a few hints. But here, as elsewhere, it would be wrong to confuse our pure and neat concepts with reality. By simply describing the British upper class as an established elite, one would miss out all the important changes which have taken place in the last decades. Similarly, German elites are in fact neither quite as heterogeneous nor quite as abstract as implied by the definition offered. There are certain ties which apart from social position, if they do not define elite membership in German society, certainly facilitate it. Among these, the most important one has been throughout the last century and continues to be training in the law faculties of German universities. A significant section of the German elite has been trained in law faculties. Some discussion of the extent of this training, its specific features, and its consequences for elite membership may help to elucidate further both the distinction introduced above and the peculiarities of German social structure.

<sup>2</sup> No better illustration of the nature of an established elite can be given than the fact that the Prime Minister and the Leader of the Opposition are — however distantly — related, as Mr. Macmillan and Mr. Gaitskell were. I owe this information as well as many other fascinating details about the established elite of Britain to the (as yet unpublished) work of Dr. T.J.H. Bishop on Winchester College.

<sup>3</sup> The range of topics of conversation seems a useful index for types of elites. In this way, the preference for «small talk» in England and «shop talk» in Germany could be explained: The latter is born of necessity, that is, of the fact that people have nothing else (such as sport, hunting, housemasters at school, common relations, and the like) to talk about.



## II

For purposes of this analysis, the terms «elite» and «upper class» (used interchangeably) will be applied only to incumbents of indubitable top positions in the institutional orders of politics, economy, education, law, the military, religion, and cultural institutions<sup>4</sup>. Moreover, I shall here confine myself largely to political and economic elites: i.e. directors of the largest industrial and commercial enterprises, members of parliament and the cabinet, the highest civil servants and comparable groups in some other spheres. Of these, it can be shown that throughout the last decades, and more particularly in contemporary German society, a significant proportion has been trained in the law faculties of German universities. There is considerable evidence to support this claim.

1. *Cabinet Members*: In his study of *The German Executive 1890-1933*, M. E. Knight reports that 40.7 % of all members of Imperial Cabinets between 1890 and 1918 had come from «nonpolitical occupations» classifiable as «law»<sup>5</sup>. In the Weimar Republic, this proportion had dropped to 31.1 %; the decrease continuing in the Nazi period to 15.2 %. These figures are likely to be incomplete since many of those included in the categories of «civil service» and «business» are probably also lawyers by training. The estimate would seem conservative that throughout the period in question (with the possible exception of the Hitler governments<sup>6</sup>), about half of all cabinet members had been trained in law faculties.

This estimate is confirmed by an analysis of the four cabinets of the Federal Republic since 1949, where more precise data are available<sup>7</sup>. 35 of the 44 members of Chancellor Adenauer's four cabinets have university degrees; of these, 18 have law degrees, and a further

<sup>4</sup> Enumeration is often one of the best methods of avoiding the wearisome business of defining terms like «elite» or «upper class». Operationally speaking, I mean here those top positions in various social contexts about the elite quality of which any sample of people would readily agree.

<sup>5</sup> M. E. KNIGHT, *The German Executive*, T. 23, Stanford, 1952, p. 41. The classification used here is not very clear.

<sup>6</sup> However, 56 % of a random sample of Nazi leaders studied by D. Lerner were graduates of law. Cf. D. LERNER, *The Nazi Elite*, T. 39, Stanford 1951, p. 47.

<sup>7</sup> The following data about Federal Cabinets have been collected by a student of mine, Miss Hannelore SCHMIDT, in her *Die deutsche Exekutive 1949-1962*, European Journal of Sociology 4/1 (1963).

six degrees in economics involving at least some legal training<sup>8</sup>. Furthermore, it is instructive to look at the Cabinet offices most frequently occupied by lawyers since 1949: The Chancellor is a lawyer; both Foreign Ministers, all four Ministers of Interior, all three Ministers of Finance, all five Ministers of Justice have been lawyers; the Ministers for Family Affairs and for Health are both lawyers; two out of three Ministers for Economic Property of the State, two out of four Ministers of Housing, one out of three Ministers for Refugee Affairs, and one out of two Ministers for Affairs of the Federal Council have been lawyers. Among important offices, only those of Economy and of Defence have been occupied by non-lawyers; and in both cases this is a matter of personality rather than principle<sup>9</sup>.

2. *Highest Civil Servants*: With respect to our problem, no detailed statistical analysis of this group is needed, since a law degree is a condition of entry to most positions in the higher civil service in Germany. This *Juristenmonopol* has only recently been broken by the formal admission of graduates of economics, political science and sociology, but it seems safe to predict that this extension of qualifications will have no noticeable effect on the composition of the higher civil service in the foreseeable future. The only realistic exception to the rule of legal degrees as conditions of entry to the higher civil service is at the level of secretaries of state (*Staatssekretäre*), i.e. the highest civil service positions in the various ministries, filled not necessarily by career civil servants but on political grounds. Even here the number of non-lawyers is however very small<sup>10</sup>.

3. *Members of Parliament*: Surprisingly, there is little difference between the proportions of legally trained members of parliament in Germany and a number of other countries. Some comparative figures about the proportion of lawyers in various parliaments are

<sup>8</sup> It could be amusing and would be important to discuss the precise place of the study of economics in German society, since, like law, it has many aspects quite unrelated to the skills of the subject. In fact, there are many similarities between law and economics as means of elite formation, except that economics does not lead quite as close to the top as law. But that would be the subject of a separate paper.

<sup>9</sup> The persons involved are, of course, Ludwig Erhard (graduate in economics), and Franz-Josef Strauss (graduate in classics).

<sup>10</sup> The composition of the German higher civil service is presently being studied by Mr. M. Albrow, M.A., of the University of Leicester. Some of the statements in this paragraph are based on information from Mr. Albrow.



given by G. Franz<sup>11</sup>. According to these, the proportions are 7% in Germany, 13% in France, 19% in Britain, 26% in Italy; but 56% in the United States House of Representatives, and as much as 68% in the Senate. The German and French figures are, however, considerably too low, since they do not include those legally trained members who are not actually barristers. In fact 21.9% of all members of the fourth *Bundestag* (elected in 1961) have law degrees<sup>12</sup>, so that we may describe a proportion of about one-fifth as the normal rate of lawyers in European parliaments.

Although their explanation is difficult and cannot be attempted here, a few further facts about lawyers in German parliaments are worth considering. It is striking that the last freely elected *Reichstag* of the Weimar Republic (Seventh Period, 1932) only had 54 lawyer members among a total of 584. Could this be a sign of the decreasing legitimacy of the system? Among the 466 members of the East German *Volkskammer*, there are but 15 members with a law degree, seven of whom have recently acquired this degree in correspondence courses<sup>13</sup>. It is clear from this fact that a deliberate attempt has been made, in East German society, to destroy the very structures under discussion in this paper; an attempt, moreover, which — in so far as one can tell from an analysis of the *Volkskammer* delegates — appears to have been successful.

Of the 114 lawyers in the fourth West German *Bundestag*, seven are judges or public prosecutors, 44 barristers, 21 higher civil servants, and the remainder in a variety of political and business occupations. The proportion of lawyer members is highest in the FDP (Free Democratic Party), 21 of the 67 members of which are lawyers, and lowest in the Social Democratic parliamentary party with a mere 14% (28 of 203 members).

4. *Entrepreneurs and Managers*: In 1954, H. Hartmann conducted a study of the education of 2,018 top-level entrepreneurs and managers in Germany who had university degrees. Of these, the highest

<sup>11</sup> G. FRANZ, «Der Parlamentarismus», *Führungsschicht und Eliteproblem*, Jahrbuch der Ranke-Gesellschaft, Nr. 3, Frankfurt, 1957, p. 98n.

<sup>12</sup> This and all following data about German parliaments have been compiled by myself from the following sources: *Reichstags-Handbuch*, VII. Wahlperiode, Berlin, 1933; *Amtliches Handbuch des Deutschen Bundestages*, 4. Wahlperiode, Bonn, 1962; *Handbuch der Volkskammer der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik* 3. Wahlperiode, Berlin, 1959.

<sup>13</sup> Of the remaining eight, no fewer than four are Cabinet Ministers or Deputy Ministers, so that the *Volkskammer* is almost entirely deprived of legal skill.

proportion (36 %) had engineering degrees, but the second largest group (19 %) consisted of lawyers, followed by economists (17 %). It would seem probable that a portion of those graduates whose professional field could not be identified (18 %) as well as of those members of top management who, from the sources used by Hartmann, could not be identified as university graduates because they had no academic title, are in fact also trained lawyers. Probably, almost ten percent of all entrepreneurs and managers of the highest level are, in present-day Germany, graduates in law<sup>14</sup>.

In addition, it would seem that, by and large, lawyers have a considerably greater chance to reach the very highest positions than, say, engineers. There are few chairmen of the boards of large enterprises who are engineers, but many who are lawyers. Some of the evidence pointing to this conclusion is presented by Hartmann, who summarizes his analysis as follows: «Our results show that graduates of a law faculty have a greater chance to be promoted to top management positions at a comparatively young age than graduates in other fields... Moreover, among all entrepreneurs with academic training, lawyers have the relatively best chance to be called into one or more supervisory boards (Aufsichtsräte). More than half of all LL.D.s are members of both board of directors and supervisory board... In addition, the group of LL.D.s includes the relatively largest number of members, who sit in one or two boards of directors and four or more supervisory boards at the same time»<sup>15</sup>.

5. *Other Elite Positions*: Needless to say, the legal institutions themselves are borne exclusively by trained lawyers. But another point is worth mentioning, since it distinguishes German society from some others. By tradition, or rather, by the absence of a liberal tradition, a large number of activities in Germany are more or less directly controlled by the State. The administration of schools and universities, of many cultural activities including State Opera Houses and museums, of church funds, of the Federal Railways and many other State-owned enterprises, and of numerous other activities is carried on entirely or partly by public bureaucracies, i.e., by civil

<sup>14</sup> Cf. H. HARTMANN, *Authority and Organization in German Management*, Princeton, 1959, p. 165. The 2,018 graduates were taken from a total of 6,578 entrepreneurs, but it would seem that Hartmann missed some of those whose degrees are not associated with titles. This group includes lawyers.

<sup>15</sup> H. HARTMANN, «Der zahlenmässige Beitrag der deutschen Hochschulen zur Gruppe der industriellen Führungskräfte», *Zeitschrift für die Gesamte Staatswissenschaft*, 112, 1, 1956, p. 161sq.



servants. Since most higher civil servants are trained lawyers, many of the elite positions in the spheres mentioned are occupied by graduates of law faculties.

The numerical importance of lawyers in the German upper class is not, perhaps in every respect, surprising or unusual. There are elite positions which are filled by lawyers as often, or even more often in other countries. In any case, too little comparative evidence has been presented to justify dogmatic conclusions. But it may be said that legal training is certainly a considerable advantage, in some cases a condition for entering leading positions in important spheres of German society. In this, there is also considerable continuity throughout the last century or so. Looked at from a different angle, this means that many members of the German upper class, however abstract an elite it may be, have at least one experience in common: they attended the law faculty of one of the German universities. This conclusion is further strengthened by the findings of studies showing that a large proportion of incumbents of elite positions in Germany come from families of lawyers. Probably, one out of five university students in Germany has a father who was trained in law; the proportion is certainly very much higher among law students<sup>16</sup>. The question is, then, what does it mean for German law faculties, for the German elite, and for German society that a common experience of legal training connects so many members of the upper class?

### III

If we interpret our findings in terms of the English experience, the point I am trying to make in this paper is that, for German society, law faculties are the «functional equivalent» of the Public Schools in English society. As the British elite is educated in the Public Schools, the education of the German elite takes place in the university faculties of law. In view of the evidence presented, this is, as far as Germany is concerned, clearly an exaggeration. But it is a useful exaggeration since its very statement suggests a number of questions. The first of these will be discussed in this section: How can German law faculties act as «functional equivalent» to English

<sup>16</sup> Some of the evidence on the social origin of various elite groups in German society is presented in the essay «Deutsche Richter», included in my *Gesellschaft und Freiheit*, München, 1961. Cf. especially p. 185.

Public Schools, when there are no restrictions on entry? Obviously, Public Schools, can serve as an agent of social selection by admitting some and rejecting others; but in German law faculties, there is no formal admission procedure and, above all, no possibility of rejecting any qualified applicant. I shall suggest that we encounter, within German universities, a subtle system of selection and stratification in a framework of formal openness.

Ever since the Humboldt reforms of the early 19th century, anybody with the necessary qualification (which means today: the *Abitur*, or School Final Certificate) may register for any subject at any German university. There is no entrance examination of any kind, nor any control of a student's movements from subject to subject, faculty to faculty, university to university in the course of his career<sup>17</sup>. Yet the analysis of the social origin of students in various faculties shows remarkable differences. In general, the proportion of university students from working class homes is still extremely small in Germany (5.0 % in 1958). But it is much smaller in some fields than in others, the extremes being medicine with as few as 1.9 %, and theology (both Catholic and Protestant) with as many as 12.2 % students of working class origin<sup>18</sup>. Probably, law is close to medicine, but exact figures are not available since in the official statistics students of law and economics are always combined, although they presumably display rather different social characteristics<sup>19</sup>. There are, of course, some obvious explanations of such differences, including above all the length of study required in various fields, i.e. the cost of different degrees. But even allowing for this economic argument, the differences in the social stratification of faculties without any differentiation of formal access remain surprising. As far as law faculties are concerned, a few suggestions may be made.

<sup>17</sup> There are today a number of exceptions to these general rules in subjects where students need training equipment (medicine, science), but these need not concern us here.

<sup>18</sup> Cf. my essay «Deutsche Richter», l.c., p. 187.

<sup>19</sup> This is a serious shortcoming in view of the following analysis. The combined figure for students of law and economics is 4,5 % of working class origin. Since these data are collected by faculties, and since in some universities there are combined Faculties of Law and Economics there is however no way of separating the two. I am confident, though that the social composition especially of students of business economics (*Betriebswirtschaftslehre*) differs radically from that of students of law in that it is often chosen by lower-middle class students. It seems safe to assume therefore that the composition of law students is close to that of students of medicine.



It is clear that those who make their choice of subjects of study — that is, the secondary school leavers — have some notion (correct or not) of what would expect them in various fields. Of all faculties, that of law probably presents, in Germany, the least specific «image». In fact, it is a standing joke among older schoolboys (very few girls study law) that those who do not know what they want will take up law. Whereas fairly clear professional careers may be associated with almost all other fields of study, that of law opens up a wide and unspecific range of positions. However, it may well be that there is a profound mistake in the schoolboy's jest about those who do not know what they want, in that they are in fact (more or less consciously) those who want to get to the top, and who therefore reject all those professional fields which lead very nearly, but not quite, to the top. It seems a general feature of modern social structure that specific professional qualifications are in fact a barrier for those who aspire to positions in that small layer of real power where interchangeability is the first condition of entry. Thus a combination of high caliber and unspecific aspirations in the individual is the appropriate motivation for leadership positions; and, in Germany, it is the law faculties which seem to attract this kind of person.

No systematic study has yet been made of the motives for abandoning law and switching to other subjects of study, although it is well known that the number of students who do so is fairly large. Again, it may be suggested that one of the main complaints of those who change their field of study is lack of specificity and, quite often, lack of intrinsic interest which really amounts to the desire for professionally useful information. Ex-law students often switch to economics, more rarely to subjects leading to secondary school teaching, sometimes to disciplines without clear professional image such as philosophy, or sociology. In all these cases, however, one contributing factor for giving up law may well be a lack of motivation to achieve positions of extreme power rather than of specific skill.

Apart from such complex (and, for the individual concerned, evidently at best subconscious) motivations, the obvious social attributes of the study of law must of course not be underestimated (although frequently they require an explanation themselves). Thus, it is an often-confirmed observation that students of law are generally much better dressed than students in other faculties. It would not be surprising to find that there are more cars among law students than among others. The proportion of students organized in

fraternities (Korporationen), duelling and non-duelling, is higher in law faculties than in others. Generally speaking, the mixture of hard work (or the appearance of it), artistic interests, and a certain sloppiness of personal appearance which characterizes so many university students is rare among law students, who seem more interested in politics than in art, and in social life than in hard work. Since these differences are easily noticeable, it seems plausible to assume that they work as a system of selection.

One further observation may be added. Many law students sincerely believe that as such they are engaged in something special, if not «better». This feeling of belonging to an elite is systematically fostered by at least some professors who continue to tell their students that the lawyer has a special responsibility «for the whole» (of society, presumably) in a manner in which other professionals do not. What is meant as a demand for responsible behaviour, is understood by many as a promise of exceptional status which reinforces the other motivations mentioned.

Evidently, many of these suggestions are of a rather unsystematic kind. Even if they hold, they do not, moreover, fully explain the surprising social stratification of equally accessible university faculties, and the exceptional role of law faculties. Suggestions of this kind may, however, indicate how subtle a system of social selection is required where the crude principles of restricting access to elite schools are absent. Possibly such invisible mechanisms of elite formation are of much greater interest to the sociologist than the traditional caste-like systems which are so often described. In any case, the subtlety of the mechanisms of selection inherent in the law faculties of German universities confirms the description of the resulting upper class as an «abstract elite», i.e., an elite which is ignorant of its status and limits.

#### IV

In many societies, it would be misleading, if not incomprehensible to distinguish training in law from training for other professional occupations. Law, of course, is a profession, and there is little reason why legal training should be less specific than, say, medical training. But I am trying to suggest that, in Germany, the distinction between law on the one hand, and the professions on the other does in fact hold — at least in so far as the students of



law are concerned. A professional training and ethos for more narrowly legal positions is only part of what characterizes training in German law faculties. The subject matter taught, and, even more, the ways in which students learn and spend their time generally, are subtly affected by the place occupied by law faculties in German social structure. In this process, the teaching of law loses in professional specificity.

This effect is often not recognized because most professors of law belong to the atypical group of professional lawyers. Contrary to their students, they (or most of them) have a specific scholarly interest in their subject matter. While unconsciously furthering the elite function of law faculties by insisting on the unique place of law and the study of law in society, most professors of law would resent the suggestion that they are using their subject matter almost as a chance instrument for educating the elite of their country. Yet from the point of view of the student this is exactly what happens (and for this reason the gulf between professors and students is nowhere quite as pronounced as in law faculties). Law is probably the only field of study in which students try to outdo each other in their confessions of disinterest in the subject. Some, of course, begin to take a professional interest in law either shortly before or, more often, after the first state examination. But the majority never cease to ridicule the substance of what they hear and learn, and to assert how boring it all is. For most students of law in Germany, the acquisition of specific professional knowledge is clearly a consideration of secondary importance. What matters is to pass the examinations, and — significantly — to pass them with average marks, for it is distinctly «not done» to get the equivalent of a «First» or «Upper Second» in law (nor is it particularly useful in one's later career). In most German universities, «cramming» is the accepted method of acquiring the necessary knowledge, and experienced «crammers» manage to impart this knowledge to even their laziest customers in less than one year. Thus, what is learned and assimilated by law students in the four or more years of study at the university is clearly something other than specific skills; the subject of law merely functions as an occasion for a more important social process.

This conclusion — speculative as it is — requires one important reservation. It would clearly be wrong to describe the choice of law faculties as places of selection and education of the German elite as purely accidental. It is unlikely that faculties of medicine or of

engineering could function in the same way<sup>20</sup>. The reason for this might easily be that the legal system has in fact a special place in any social structure; a place, moreover, which under all conditions connects it very closely with the more general system of values by which a person's social worth in a given society is measured. At the same time, elites are almost by definition the embodiment of such prevailing values in that they control the sanctions with which the conformist is rewarded and the deviant punished. Thus, the norms of a society and its ruling groups are intertwined to the extent of being inseparable — whether one chooses to express this fact by saying that the ruling elites are the groups who «lay down the law», or, more conservatively, that there is some kind of prestabilized structural harmony between the reasonable and the real, i.e., society's values and the interests of its elites. If any subject of specific professional training (rather than, say, the kind of general education imparted by secondary schools) has to be chosen as an instrument of selection and preparation for positions of power, none is more suited to this purpose than law. The study of law is always both specific and general, both technical and almost philosophical, both professional and educational; and perhaps societies differ merely in the extent they emphasize one or the other aspect of legal training. While in Britain, there is considerable emphasis on the technical and professional side of legal training, Germany tends to the other extreme. The future members of the German upper class learn the values of their society at the same time as the allure and technique of elite status.

## V

Many general analyses of German social structure could take off from the thesis that, in Germany, law faculties function as an equivalent of the Public Schools in England, and other more or less explicit institutions for elite formation in other countries. Here, I shall confine myself to explore two more general consequences of this thesis. The first of these follows directly from the discussion of the social motives for choosing faculties of law rather than medicine or engineering as agents of elite selection. Evidently, the social function of faculties of law has ramifications both for the legal

<sup>20</sup> Or is a society conceivable in which there is no top layer of interchangeable people, but merely professionals with specific skills?



system and for the characteristic attitudes of German elites. As far as the legal system is concerned, the main consequence is a depreciation of its institutions, and of the legal profession in the technical sense, which becomes especially visible in the comparatively low status of the position of judge. Since the technical aspects of legal training occupy but a secondary place in the minds of many students and since a majority do not enter the legal profession after their training, there is no distinct professional group which might be described as a guardian of the legal institutions. What is more, for many students of law, the professional side of their training is not only secondary in importance, but also in value. Since studying law offers many more attractive prospects of status, there seems for many no point in aspiring to a place in the legal profession. There are without doubt many other reasons for the comparatively low status of judges, the widespread tendency to denounce the quality of professional lawyers, and a generally low level of confidence in the legal system in Germany, but the present analysis suggests a further contributing cause.

For German social structure in general, however, the other side of the picture is even more important. An elite educated in law faculties is bound to think and act differently from an elite educated in Public Schools or more comprehensive university courses in the humanities. This difference is accentuated by the difference between legal systems of Roman and of common-law tradition. If the present analysis is at all plausible, it is clearly no accident that many decisions made by leaders of politics, business, and other spheres of German society are inspired by a kind of authoritarian legalism: Those in power believe themselves to be experts for almost all decisions, and they often justify such presumed expertise by reference to the «letter of the law». The widespread distrust of common sense follows directly from the confidence of German society in an upper class reared in the tradition of Roman Law. In the interest of a spreading of liberal ideas, almost any other subject would be a better medium of elite education than law.

A second general consequence of the analysis presented in this paper leads us back to our point of departure. Even accepting the attempt to compare German law faculties in their social function with English Public Schools, there are a number of obvious differences between the two which are bound to affect their social context. One of these differences has been mentioned before; it is the simple fact that fewer members of the German upper class have

studied law than there are Old Boys of the accepted Public Schools in the British elite. There is clearly much less homogeneity in the German elite than in that of Britain and of many other countries. The factor singled out for discussion in this paper is the only one creating some kind of common experience, if not coherence, for a large proportion of the German upper class.

Another difference between law faculties and Public Schools is equally evident: Boys enter law faculties eight to ten years later than Public Schools. By the time they begin their university career, they are much more finished already than at the age of eleven. Thus most members of the German elites in question have received their most effective education and training in their families, and at one of the numerous State secondary schools among which there is, in most areas, no hierarchy of social or scholastic status. The additional influence of training in the law faculties must, of course, not be discounted, but it is not likely to change the ways of grown-up students.

This limitation is further emphasized by the peculiarities of German university structure. To speak of any formal training in many faculties, including that of law, is at best an euphemism. There is no supervision of what students are doing; they may go to courses and seminars or not; in view of the large numbers it is not infrequent that they meet their professors for the first time in the examination room. Under such conditions, it is surprising that faculties of law or any other field of study should continue to exert any influence on their students at all, to say nothing of an influence strong enough to mould a homogeneous social elite.

What these differences prove, is that despite the considerable unifying impact of law faculties, the German upper class is still an elite tending towards the abstract type. There have been remarkable changes in the composition of the German elite, especially in recent years. New groups have risen to political prominence; for the first time in German history, there is a really strong representation of business in other spheres of power. Throughout these changes, the avenues leading to prominence have remained remarkably stable. Today, as in Imperial Germany, the safest way to the top leads through the law faculties of German universities. But the combination of changes in composition and continuities in education has not as yet sufficed to weld the German upper class into an established elite. Recently, the Bonn correspondent of *The Times* remarked in an article: «Certainly, one would be hard put to discover any real



'society' in Bonn, in the rather esoteric sense of that word»<sup>21</sup>. The absence of a «society» is usually a clear indication that there is no elite in the established sense, i.e. no group of top people connected by more than the abstract fact of incumbency of similar positions. By many, this lack of a «society», and of an established elite will not be regarded as a terrible loss to a country. But the resentment of many may be too quick. It is just possible that where there is no established elite and no «society» in the esoteric sense, there is also no real society in the exoteric sense, no reliable structure of social relations.

<sup>21</sup> *The Times*, February 22, 1962.

## QUELQUES APERÇUS SUR L'ÉVOLUTION DE LA STRATIFICATION DES ÉLITES EN FRANCE

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On dispose dans la littérature sociologique d'un si grand nombre de définitions de l'élite qu'on est bien embarrassé de faire un choix. Je ne cède pas à la tentation d'en ajouter une de plus, car ou bien on sait ce qu'est l'élite, et alors on n'a pas besoin d'une définition formelle, ou bien on ne le sait pas, et dans ce cas toute une série de définitions ne nous serait que d'un faible secours. En revanche, il me semble utile de déterminer l'élite en quelque sorte quantitativement et de distinguer plusieurs types d'élites: économique, politique, intellectuelle, administrative, technicienne, militaire, ecclésiastique.

### *Délimitation de l'élite*

Dans un pays comme la France, on peut inclure dans l'élite quelques milliers de personnes ou quelques centaines de milliers. Si l'on considère le revenu comme un des critères valables pour déterminer qui appartient à l'élite, on pourrait retenir, en 1960, les 719 personnes ayant déclaré un revenu net supérieur à 300.000 F, ou les 9.000 personnes disposant de plus de 100.000 F ou les 30.000 personnes avec un revenu de plus de 60.000 F etc. Ce problème de la délimitation quantitative se pose pour chaque catégorie de l'élite. Ainsi, pour l'élite administrative, la forte hiérarchisation qui existe au sein des organismes de l'État permettrait d'utiliser comme critère l'indice du traitement. On pourrait retenir les 120 hauts fonctionnaires classés hors-échelle, ou y ajouter les 600 hauts fonctionnaires compris entre les indices 750 et 800. On peut évidemment descendre les échelons et s'arrêter à l'indice 700 ou 600. On peut aussi renoncer au critère de l'indice et considérer comme appartenant à l'élite administrative les membres des grands corps de l'État. Pour l'élite intellectuelle nous nous trouvons de même devant une diversité de critères possibles, et du choix que nous en ferons dépend l'importance numérique de cette élite. Faut-il insérer dans l'élite tous les titulaires de chaires de Facultés ou certains d'entre eux? Les membres de l'Académie de Médecine ou tous les médecins patrons des hôpitaux?



Tous les avocats à la Cour d'Appel ou seuls les avocats les plus connus ? Les écrivains couronnés d'un prix littéraire ou les auteurs de best-sellers ? On peut longuement hésiter avant de fixer le seuil d'accès à l'élite.

Mais quels que soient les critères que l'on adopte, on trouverait, pour la composer, très peu d'hommes de moins de 40 ans, et très peu de femmes. Si parmi les hommes âgés de plus de 40 ans on retient un sur mille, dans l'élite figureraient cinq mille personnalités. Depuis un siècle et demi, en effet, la population française comprend environ cinq millions d'hommes de cet âge. Si, par contre on retient 1 % de la population masculine de même âge, l'élite comprendrait 50.000 personnalités. Le choix est large, les critères peuvent être plus ou moins restrictifs. Tout dépend de ce qu'on se propose d'observer.

Deux aspects de l'évolution de l'élite sont à souligner. D'abord, les changements intervenus dans le recrutement social de l'élite en général et de chacune de ses catégories en particulier. Ensuite, la mobilité horizontale au sein de l'élite, c'est-à-dire les transferts qui ont pu se produire entre les divers types d'élites. Pour l'examen du premier aspect, la délimitation de l'élite pourrait être assez souple, quitte à procéder par étapes, à élargir progressivement le champ. Par contre, pour l'examen du second aspect, il est nécessaire de circonscrire quantitativement l'élite avant d'essayer de déterminer la place et le rôle qui, à diverses époques, revient à chaque type de l'élite. La démarche méthodologique n'est pas la même dans un cas et dans l'autre, ni les sources documentaires auxquelles on peut recourir.

Vu la complexité du sujet et les limites qu'impose une communication, je ne saurais évoquer ici toutes les composantes de l'élite. Aussi, me suis-je borné, partant de la Révolution, à poser quelques jalons, dont voici le tracé qui nous mènera de l'élite économique à l'élite intellectuelle, en passant par l'élite administrative, pour aboutir, en une brève analyse, à l'évolution de la stratification de l'élite en général.

### *L'élite économique*

Aux premiers temps du développement industriel, les grandes entreprises appartenaient à un petit nombre de familles, dont l'histoire est parfois bien connue. C'était l'époque du capitalisme familial ou interfamilial. La direction de l'entreprise se transmettait de père en fils, et d'inextricables liens familiaux reliaient les membres de cette

aristocratie de l'argent, qui ne se commettait qu'avec l'ancienne noblesse foncière, pour redorer le blason. Le facteur héréditaire jouait à plein.

Mais à partir du milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, pour des raisons multiples, qui ont été bien étudiées par de nombreux auteurs, les grandes entreprises de type familial commencèrent à se transformer en sociétés anonymes. Pendant un bon demi-siècle le capitalisme fut mi-familial, mi-anonyme. La bourgeoisie des affaires adopte la pratique de l'élite traditionnelle, soit, le mariage en vue du fief, avec cette différence que le fief convoité c'est le conseil d'administration de l'entreprise concurrente ou complémentaire. Ainsi, les rivalités économiques pouvaient s'éteindre en famille.

Dans une nouvelle phase, dont il est difficile de situer les débuts, les détenteurs de capitaux s'adjoignent des hommes de compétence. En même temps s'accélère la transformation des entreprises familiales en sociétés anonymes. Aujourd'hui, sur les 2.000 entreprises les plus importantes, 28 seulement ne sont pas des sociétés anonymes. D'autre part, un nombre assez élevé de grands industriels ne sont pas fils d'industriels. Comment expliquer ce fait ? Parmi les hommes d'affaires importants on compte plus de diplômés des grandes écoles (Polytechnique, Centrale, etc.) que de fils d'industriels parmi les élèves de ces écoles. Mais beaucoup de ceux-ci épousent de riches héritières. En choisissant comme gendre un jeune polytechnicien, l'industriel s'assure un collaborateur à la fois compétent et fidèle, et ce dernier fait un beau mariage. Ainsi, l'élite économique se renouvelle en recevant du sang frais. Phénomène de capillarité sociale par la cooptation, qui tend à se répandre.

### *L'élite administrative*

Sous l'Ancien Régime, la plupart des postes de la haute administration était aux mains de la noblesse. La Révolution et l'Empire abolissent les privilèges héréditaires. Des hommes d'origine bourgeoise envahissent l'appareil de l'État, accomplissant des réformes importantes. Sous la Restauration, ces bourgeois, fort compétents, résistent à l'ultime assaut des nobles délogés. Mais ils devaient bientôt recourir, à leur tour, au recrutement par la cooptation népotique. On pourrait, en effet, citer de nombreuses dynasties de hauts fonctionnaires d'origine bourgeoise.

Le népotisme ne garantissait pas toujours la compétence, mais à l'époque du libéralisme cela importait peu. A partir des années 1880, les impératifs de l'évolution économique et sociale amenèrent l'État



à accroître ses fonctions. La puissance et le prestige de l'élite administrative se trouvèrent renforcés. Si bien que des familles appartenant à l'élite économique estimèrent fort honorable et utile de pousser leurs fils vers l'Inspection des Finances, pépinière des élites administratives. Les liens du sang s'entremêlèrent à ceux de l'argent. Il est vrai que pour devenir haut fonctionnaire il ne suffisait pas d'être bien né, il fallait encore être bien instruit. Jusqu'à la veille de la guerre, le personnel de la haute administration intérieure se recrutait de préférence dans la bonne bourgeoisie, et le corps diplomatique, dans la vieille noblesse. On assiste à une mobilité sociale horizontale, plutôt que verticale.

Une nouvelle étape commence au lendemain de la Libération, avec la création de l'École Nationale d'Administration, et le recrutement par un concours parallèle réservé aux jeunes fonctionnaires de rang moyen ou subalterne. Concours difficile qui tend à éliminer de plus en plus le facteur héréditaire dans la sélection des élites administratives.

De l'intendant de l'Ancien Régime à l'inspecteur de l'Économie Nationale d'aujourd'hui, l'évolution est lente, irrégulière, mais le changement social est néanmoins profond.

### *L'élite intellectuelle*

Je réunis sous ce vocable une grande variété d'intellectuels: écrivains, savants, professeurs, artistes, acteurs, avocats ou journalistes notoires, etc. ce qui rend notre aperçu fort hasardeux. Mais comme je n'envisage que les figures de tout premier plan, on pourrait à la rigueur admettre l'existence d'une certaine parenté d'esprit entre eux.

Pour l'élite intellectuelle, la mobilité sociale verticale est supérieure à celle que l'on observe pour les autres corps d'élite. Ce fait qui remonte assez loin, au-delà même de la Révolution, est facile à expliquer: l'hérédité sociale n'assure pas l'accès à l'élite intellectuelle. Elle ne joue que par le privilège de l'éducation et de l'instruction. Elle n'est pas un facteur direct de la sélection, et de plus les généticiens nous enseignent que les qualités intellectuelles ne se transmettent pas.

Plutôt que l'évolution de l'origine sociale de l'élite intellectuelle, c'est l'évolution de son audience sociale qui doit attirer notre attention.

Au XVIII<sup>e</sup> siècle, les moyens d'information étaient faibles, les possibilités de diffusion restreintes, le livre cher, le nombre de

lecteurs et d'auditeurs, limité. C'est dans un cercle d'initiés que l'élite intellectuelle s'exprimait. Ce fut le règne des Salons. Mais au siècle suivant les moyens de diffusion s'étendent et l'instruction se répand. L'écrivain, l'artiste descendent de leur tour d'ivoire. A chaque crise sociale ou politique, les intellectuels lancent des manifestes. Ils deviennent même les idéologues des classes les plus déshéritées. En peu de temps, l'audience des intellectuels s'étend considérablement. Au livres, journaux, revues — qui se multiplient — s'ajoutent le cinéma, la radio, le disque, la télévision. L'élite intellectuelle «s'industrialise» en quelque sorte. Elle change de visage aussi. Elle touche des millions de gens. Les artistes sont «ceux dont on parle» peut-être le plus. Ils sont connus de tous, pauvres et riches. Ils réalisent en peu de temps des fortunes fracassantes, prestige, gloire, ascension fulgurante, quelle que soit leur origine sociale, bien souvent modeste, alors que les élites traditionnelles par excellence — haut clergé, noblesse terrienne, chefs militaires — déclinent.

Dans le cercle de ces nouvelles élites — littéraire et artistique tout particulièrement — règne une démocratie insolite. Bien plus le jeune compositeur ou le romancier de talent est accueilli par la vieille haute société, même s'il est de «basse extraction». Le talent brise les barrières sociales. Les titres de membre de l'Académie des Sciences ou de professeur au Collège de France sont, pour un large public, les nouveaux titres de noblesse, qui font oublier les anciens.

#### *Stratification des fortunes et stratification des élites*

Si l'on considère que l'élite traditionnelle doit sa position sociale à la fortune et aux relations héritées, et l'élite moderne, plutôt à sa propre activité, les statistiques sur les revenus, successions et donations constituent en quelque sorte un indice du rythme de remplacement des élites traditionnelles par les élites modernes.

Jusqu'au milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle, la fortune de la majeure partie de l'élite était due à l'héritage. Mais, depuis un demi-siècle c'est l'activité personnelle qui, de plus en plus, constitue la principale source de revenus pour l'élite. A la charnière du siècle, les fortunes héritées compensaient à peine les revenus annuels. En 1955-1960 le nombre de personnes à qui leur travail rapporte un revenu annuel supérieur à dix millions d'anciens francs est deux fois plus élevé que le nombre de personnes qui reçoivent un héritage de même ordre. Bien entendu, la part de l'héritage est plus importante pour l'élite économique, et celle des traitements, pour les autres catégories de l'élite.



Si on établissait une liste des 5.000 personnalités occupant le haut de l'échelle ou le devant de la scène, les personnalités «dont on parle», et si l'on pouvait confronter cette liste avec celle des 5.000 hommes qui possèdent les plus grosses fortunes ou jouissent des revenus les plus élevés, on constaterait, probablement, que pour le milieu du XIX<sup>e</sup> siècle les deux listes coïncident, à peu d'exceptions près (notamment pour l'élite intellectuelle), et que pour le milieu du XX<sup>e</sup>, un tiers seulement, en tous cas moins de la moitié, des noms inscrits sur l'une des listes figure aussi sur l'autre. Si cette hypothèse se vérifiait, on pourrait conclure que dans le passé la fortune — héritée ou acquise — était, dans la plupart des cas, un critère suffisant de l'appartenance à l'élite, et qu'il ne l'est guère aujourd'hui.

#### *L'élite et les centres de gravité sociale*

Cette évolution de la stratification des élites ressort aussi de l'observation du déplacement des centres de gravité sociale du pays. Est-il nécessaire de rappeler que le transfert du pouvoir politique du palais royal au parlement a valorisé les députés et limité l'influence des généraux et de la noblesse ? Aujourd'hui aucun groupe d'industriels ne détient autant de pouvoir que le directeur général du budget ou celui des impôts, représentant typique de l'élite moderne. Dans les années 1930 l'économie française était peut-être dominée par «les deux cents familles», mais une étude attentive du mécanisme des décisions économiques sous la IV<sup>e</sup> République montrerait qu'en moins d'une génération — grâce aux nationalisations, au dirigisme et à la planification étatiques — le centre de gravité de la vie économique s'est déplacé vers le ministère des Finances. Il en résulte un accroissement de l'importance de l'élite administrative au détriment de l'élite économique. De nos jours, les leaders syndicalistes appartiennent à l'élite nationale au même titre que les dirigeants du conseil du patronat. Les chefs syndicalistes constituent une élite, moderne elle aussi, car ils parlent et agissent au nom de millions de salariés. Ils sont, pour le gouvernement, un interlocuteur valable. Une fraction du pouvoir est passée aux syndicats, dont les chefs, plus connus du public, ont plus de prestige que les grands capitaines d'industrie. L'autorité des chefs de l'armée ou celle des princes de l'Église — élites des plus traditionnelles et des plus traditionalistes — a progressivement décliné, en même temps que s'étendait l'influence des nouvelles élites, comme par exemple les maîtres de la presse ou les intellectuels qui, sortis de la petite bourgeoisie, ont accédé, par le tremplin de l'Université, au rang de guides de l'opinion publique.

*Mobilité verticale et mobilité horizontale*

Pour suivre l'évolution de la stratification des élites on pourrait se référer encore aux annuaires du genre *who's who* publiés à diverses époques. Source critiquable à bien des égards, car les auteurs de ces publications, de valeur très inégale, n'ont pas adopté des critères rigoureux pour leurs choix. Ils n'avaient pas une conception claire de la hiérarchie sociale et des rôles sociaux joués par les divers types d'élites. Ils avaient néanmoins une connaissance empirique de la réalité, et leur sélection, quoique souvent arbitraire, ne manque pas de quelque signification. D'ailleurs, même le sociologue ou l'historien le plus exigeant, s'il devait choisir les 5.000 ou 10.000 personnalités méritant de figurer dans l'élite, serait bien obligé, quelle que soit la définition qu'il en donne, de procéder parfois arbitrairement.

L'exploitation de ces documents demanderait un énorme travail, devant lequel j'ai reculé. Je me suis limité à quelques rapides coups de sonde, effectués au hasard, à peine suffisants pour formuler plus que des hypothèses bien fragiles, je le reconnais. J'en ai tiré l'impression que parmi les noms de famille cités dans les *who's who* des années 1950, moins d'un tiers figuraient déjà dans ceux des années 1900, et que ces derniers comprenaient moins d'un tiers des noms cités par les dictionnaires au temps de la Restauration. D'une époque à la suivante de nouveaux noms apparaissent, de vieux noms disparaissent, si bien qu'entre 1800 et 1950, selon toute vraisemblance, s'est produit un renouvellement à 80 ou 90 %.

Deux interprétations sont possibles. Ou bien la mobilité sociale a été plus forte qu'on ne le croit généralement. Ou bien les critères qui ont présidé au choix des noms méritant de figurer dans ces annuaires ont été très différents avant hier, hier et aujourd'hui. Il me semble que les deux explications peuvent être simultanément admises, mais que la seconde a plus de poids.

D'une part, si la proportion des hauts fonctionnaires n'a guère changé à un siècle de distance, nous devons remarquer aussitôt que les origines sociales de ces hauts fonctionnaires ne sont plus les mêmes. Le nombre de noms à particule diminue progressivement même quand il s'agit d'ambassadeurs. Par ailleurs la part faite aux hommes politiques parmi les 5.000 ou 6.000 noms retenus dans chacun de ces dictionnaires est sensiblement égale, mais la provenance sociale des ministres, députés, sénateurs, chefs de parti est bien différente.



On peut remarquer aussi, dans la mesure où l'on retrouve les mêmes noms de famille, que le grand-père, par exemple, était propriétaire foncier, le père diplomate, le fils général et le petit-fils ingénieur polytechnicien qui, épousant la fille unique d'un banquier, devient lui-même un grand industriel. Cette famille a appartenu à l'élite pendant quatre générations, mais elle s'est déplacée horizontalement d'un type à l'autre de l'élite: de l'aristocratie terrienne à l'élite administrative, puis de l'élite militaire à l'élite économique. L'arrière-petit-fils appartiendra peut-être à l'élite intellectuelle.

D'autre part, dans les bottins des années 1930 ou 1950 on trouve les noms d'un plus grand nombre d'écrivains, savants, artistes, techniciens, syndicalistes, que dans les dictionnaires de 1880 ou 1900, qui par contre abondent en noms de propriétaires fonciers, militaires, ecclésiastiques. Il y a cent ans tous les évêques et généraux avaient «droit» à une notice biographique dans le dictionnaire. Dans les who's who les plus récents, la plupart d'entre eux ne figurent pas. D'une génération à l'autre, on compte dans ces publications de moins en moins des provinciaux, et de plus en plus des parisiens.

En bref, l'évolution de la stratification des élites en France se caractérise par un triple phénomène. D'une part, une mobilité sociale verticale, dont l'ampleur reste à déterminer. D'autre part, une mobilité horizontale. Il existait, en effet, au sommet des hiérarchies sociales des passerelles qui permettaient une circulation entre les diverses catégories de l'élite. Enfin, un phénomène de restructuration typologique de l'élite prise globalement, plus exactement une redistribution différente des divers types de l'élite, résultant du déplacement des centres de gravité sociale, déplacement engendré à son tour par l'évolution économique, le progrès technique, les processus sociaux et les événements politiques.

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## RELATIONS DYNAMIQUES DES ÉLITES TRADITIONNELLES ET DES ÉLITES NOUVELLES DANS LES PAYS EN VOIE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT \*

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### *La Structure en quadrillé*

Toute société complexe est constituée par une «structure en quadrillé» qui consiste en le croisement d'une stratification verticale et d'une stratification horizontale<sup>1</sup>.

La stratification verticale se compose des grandes organisations fonctionnelles de la société: l'industrie, l'armée, les Églises, l'organisation politique, la science, etc... Dans chacune de ces organisations, il y a une hiérarchie sociale très formelle. Par exemple, dans l'industrie moderne cette hiérarchie descend des grands magnats de holdings jusqu'aux manœuvres, en passant par les «directeurs», les ingénieurs et les diverses catégories de techniciens et d'ouvriers. Bien entendu, le même individu appartient à plusieurs organisations simultanément ou successivement: tel ouvrier est aussi milicien dans l'armée, membre d'un parti et membre d'une Église. Ces statuts particuliers sont inégalement déterminants du statut social des individus.

Les organisations fonctionnelles verticales tendent à être fortement intégrées en fait et en droit.

La stratification horizontale comprend les couches classiques de

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<sup>1</sup> Voir à cet égard EUG. DUPRÉEL, *Sociologie Générale*, Paris, 1947 et H. JANNE. «Un modèle théorique du phénomène révolutionnaire?» dans *Annales* (Paris), n° 6, 1960, pp. 1138-1154.



la hiérarchie sociale, définies chacune par leurs similitudes de mentalité, d'intérêts, de mode de vie. Par la prise de conscience, tantôt plus, tantôt moins marquée, de leur existence, elles engendrent une solidarité explicite de leurs membres. Elles sont intégrées en fait et en droit.

D'une manière générale, elles sont moins structurées et intégrées que les organisations fonctionnelles. Ces dernières ont normalement plus de solidarité organique et formelle; les premières plus de solidarité psychique et spontanée. Certains des noyaux des couches horizontales peuvent être cependant fortement structurés, ainsi pour les classes sociales dont la conscience s'est éveillée et affirmée.

Dans la stratification horizontale il y a une couche «supérieure»: l'ensemble des cadres dirigeants des diverses organisations fonctionnelles. Cette couche se caractérise par le fait qu'elle contrôle l'État *de jure* ou *de facto*. Cette couche supérieure c'est l'élite. Or, dans la société globale, l'État dispose du monopole de la force.

### *Relativité de l'élite*

L'élite est psychologiquement fondée sur une appréciation subjective. Pour les esprits conservateurs l'«élite» s'identifie exactement avec «les gens en place». L'ordre social étant excellent, le fait même d'appartenir aux cadres est en soi la preuve suffisante de la possession des qualités requises. Titres, fonctions et mérites se superposent normalement. Les esprits révolutionnaires, au contraire, suspectent plus ou moins, conformément à leur attitude critique à l'égard de la société, tout membre de l'élite, d'un certain degré d'imposture sociale.

### *Élite et valeurs*

En bref, appartient à l'élite d'une société celui qui réunit suffisamment en sa personne les valeurs supérieures admises par les couches dirigeantes de cette société. Les vues des dirigeants pénètrent, jusqu'à un certain point, l'ensemble du corps social, sauf si se développent des conditions révolutionnaires. Ils contrôlent, en effet, les normes du système éducatif, la majeure partie des activités culturelles et des moyens d'information.

Donnons deux exemples de valeurs typiques qui ont servi à caractériser et à former des élites.

Dans une société révolutionnaire: l'absolu respect de la «ligne», l'éloquence ou la capacité dialectique et doctrinale, l'aptitude à l'organisation, un style de vie austère. C'est l'idéal du jacobin ou du communiste.

Dans une société d'hommes d'affaires: le respect des engagements commerciaux et de la parole donnée (morale du contrat), la priorité du travail sur les autres activités (*time is money*), le contrôle des signes extérieurs des sentiments, l'importance de l'argent dont l'emploi doit cependant être modéré; on y affecte l'ouverture d'esprit aux idées nouvelles mais avec une grande horreur du désordre; on y coopte volontiers des gens de classes inférieures s'ils ont d'excellentes qualités professionnelles et surtout s'ils acceptent sans restriction les valeurs de la société.

### *Élite sociale et cadres professionnels*

Jusqu'à ce point de l'analyse, l'«élite» apparaît comme identifiée à la classe dominante. Mais aucun régime social ne pourrait se passer de cadres fonctionnels intermédiaires entre la masse des exécutants et les vrais détenteurs du pouvoir économique. Ces cadres vont de la haute direction exécutive aux chefs directs des groupes d'exécution.

Ces hommes indispensables font nécessairement partie de l'élite, car s'ils ne participaient pas aux valeurs du régime, ils constitueraient un grave danger pour sa stabilité. Et participer aux valeurs n'a de sens que si l'on participe notablement aux droits et aux privilèges qu'elles confèrent.

### *La mobilité sociale, facteur de formation d'élites*

Ici intervient un facteur sociologique important: les nécessités fonctionnelles des sociétés complexes postulent une certaine mobilité sociale.

La classe sociale dominante n'est, en effet, pas assez nombreuse pour fournir tous les cadres indispensables et, d'autre part, n'est jamais assez polyvalente pour répondre à tous les besoins techniques. Plus élevé est le niveau technique atteint par la société, moins la classe dominante se trouve être une base humaine de sélection qui puisse fournir tous les talents. Plus la société est affectée par le



progrès technique plus elle exige de mobilité sociale. Mais le fonctionnement de toute société exige certains chenaux de mobilité.

Sous l'Ancien Régime, ce chenal était l'Église qui pouvait porter aux plus hautes fonctions des hommes venant des couches sociales inférieures. Durant la Révolution et l'Empire ce rôle était assumé par l'armée. Dans les sociétés industrialisées, la mobilité sociale se réalise principalement par les études.

### *La théorie sociologique de l'élite*

Dans une société industrialisée comportant des niveaux sociaux plus ou moins cristallisés (ce qui est évidemment encore le cas de notre société occidentale actuelle), l'élite est constituée par deux catégories de membres:

1. Ceux qui, appartenant à la classe dominante par leur naissance, ont assimilé le minimum nécessaire des qualités et des valeurs de celle-ci et jouent un rôle fonctionnel dans la société (dans ce cas la participation à l'élite est de source héréditaire).

2. Ceux qui sont «parvenus» à cette classe par le phénomène de la mobilité sociale (ici la participation à l'élite résulte de plus en plus d'une sélection scolaire que rétrécit la classe dominante pour réserver des «places» à ses enfants).

Dès lors, si trop peu de membres de la classe dominante assimilent les valeurs de l'élite, cela équivaut à une démission. Le processus sera lent si les dirigeants accueillent en plus grand nombre des membres des couches inférieures. Si, au contraire, ils résistent à cet accès, ils accumuleront une force d'opposition qui produira inéluctablement une révolution, ceci d'autant plus que l'affaiblissement de l'encadrement social aura porté atteinte à la cohésion de la société globale.

Le mécanisme de la formation de l'élite dépend des besoins fonctionnels en cadres. Pour y répondre joue la concurrence entre la classe dirigeante qui forme ses enfants d'une manière privilégiée et use de sa force sociale pour leur réserver le maximum de places, et les autres couches sociales qui s'efforcent principalement d'user du chenal offert par la démocratisation progressive des études. Les besoins en cadres s'élargissent avec le développement des techniques.

Ainsi est tracé à larges traits le cadre théorique général des mutations sociales et du rôle qu'y joue le concept d'élite.

## APPLICATION AU CAS DES PAYS EN VOIE DE DÉVELOPPEMENT

*Le facteur de l'intégration globale de la société*

Les pays non industrialisés se caractérisent par la faiblesse d'intégration de la société globale: «l'Inde aux 500.000 villages». Les hommes se sentent appartenir à leur communauté locale: la grande nation n'est pas pour le paysan un phénomène vécu.

Dans certaines régions du monde, l'intégration sociale ne dépasse guère le cadre tribal: les élites traditionnelles n'y possèdent aucun des attributs qui font la force et l'unité d'élites à l'échelon global. Le cadre d'intégration globale d'un pays comme le Congo a été créé de l'extérieur par le colonisateur. Les élites nouvelles ont été uniquement son œuvre et portent la marque de la situation coloniale: ce sont des *cadres d'exécution*. La proclamation de l'indépendance laisse un tel pays pratiquement dépourvu d'une élite autochtone formée à l'échelon global: l'échelon de *direction* de la société<sup>2</sup>.

La nouvelle république du Congo se trouve, dans l'ensemble, actuellement, dirigée par d'anciens sous-officiers, commis d'administration, adjoints syndicaux, etc. Ces anciens «cadres d'exécution» constituent incontestablement une élite à l'égard du milieu tribal et du prolétariat détribalisé des villes. Quant aux élites locales elles tendent à s'intégrer au niveau global par l'usage du moyen que leur offre une démocratie politique formelle<sup>3</sup>.

Mais si, pour d'autres régions du monde l'intégration globale reste encore partielle, elle n'en est pas moins exprimée par des structures économiques et sociales autochtones. Il s'agit généralement de classes aristocratiques de type féodal. Ces élites contrôlent la dispo-

<sup>2</sup> Pour ce qui concerne les aspects multiples de la question des cadres, voir *Incidi*, 32<sup>e</sup> Session, 1960: Problème des cadres dans les pays tropicaux et sub-tropicaux; et spécialement l'analyse sociologique de G. BALANDIER (p. 593).

<sup>3</sup> Les consultations populaires, dans certains cas, passent par les conseils coutumiers, par exemple, en Arabie séoudite et au Yémen. Voir *Incidi*, 32<sup>e</sup> Session, 1960, *op.cit.*, pp. 512-513. Les procédures démocratiques servent souvent à renforcer les structures tribales: exemples du Congo et du Sud Cameroun (cf. *ibid.*, p. 517). Mais en Guinée, au Ghana, au Nigeria, les chefs nationalistes utilisent les formes démocratiques pour opposer un soutien populaire aux élites traditionnelles. Mais les «panchayats» de l'Inde, assemblées de villages traditionnelles, concourent réellement au progrès démocratique et économique.

Voir OPLER, *The problems of selective culture change in the progress of underdeveloped countries*, éd. HOSELITZ, Chicago, 1952.



sition des terres<sup>4</sup>. Elles sont porteuses d'une culture quelquefois raffinée, voire d'une religion, lesquelles comportent un système d'éducation. La faible mobilité sociale joue par relations personnelles et alliances matrimoniales<sup>5</sup>.

La colonisation a ainsi trois effets:

a. elle *superpose* une structure étatique, administrative et militaire à la société traditionnelle,

b. elle juxtapose une société blanche de caractère industriel, technique, tertiaire et financier à la société traditionnelle; cette société induite comporte généralement l'exploitation de plantations industrialisées et commercialisées par des colons individuels et collectifs (grandes sociétés),

c. elle *intègre* fonctionnellement<sup>6</sup> dans cette société blanche juxtaposée à la société traditionnelle, des autochtones enlevés à leurs structures sociales propres; ceux-ci comportent trois strates:

1. des cadres d'exécution formés par le système scolaire créé par le colonisateur;

2. des classes moyennes constituant un tertiaire complémentaire au secteur tertiaire blanc;

3. un prolétariat ouvrier et domestique.

Le pouvoir colonisateur associe en outre quelques autochtones à la haute direction de l'État: ces élites nouvelles sont partiellement issues des élites anciennes, elles-mêmes partiellement assimilées (notamment par l'université occidentale); elles comprennent aussi des «évolués» issus des classes inférieures et montés par les cadres. Quelques intellectuels nationalistes ou membres «résistants» des élites anciennes, constituent les cadres — plus ou moins tolérés — de mouvements nationalistes ou syndicaux.

A l'heure de l'indépendance une tension se manifesterait donc entre — l'élite restée purement traditionnelle refermée sur elle-même, s'opposant à tout changement et identifiant nationalisme et tradi-

<sup>4</sup> Pour ces structures agraires, voir NICOLAS PLESZ, «Méthodes d'études des réformes agraires dans les pays insuffisamment développés», dans *Revue française de science politique*, IV, 1, 1954, p. 57 et ss.

<sup>5</sup> Pour le freinage du développement économique à cause des rapports sociaux traditionnels, voir HOSELITZ, «Le recrutement des employés dans les pays insuffisamment développés», dans *Bulletin international des sciences sociales*, vol. 6, 3, 1954. Hoselitz a également fait remarquer au Congrès International d'Étude du problème des zones sous-développés (Milan, 1954, voir «aspects sociologiques») que dans ces pays les rôles sociaux et économiques sont tenus en vertu du rang et des relations sociales et non en vertu de la compétence et de la valeur individuelle.

<sup>6</sup> L'intégration est partielle sur le plan culturel.

tion; sa richesse, son pouvoir féodal, son prestige antique en font une force sociale redoutable bien que discrète<sup>7</sup>: le colonisateur a trouvé son intérêt à la respecter;

— l'élite traditionnelle ayant collaboré avec le colonisateur et tendant à maintenir le maximum de relations positives avec l'Occident;

— l'élite nouvelle arrivée par l'école et par les cadres de la colonisation et tendant à évincer les deux fractions précédentes;

— l'élite nouvelle politico-syndicale visant essentiellement au pouvoir politique; elle est opposée aux classes dirigeantes traditionnelles et généralement antioccidentale, avide pour elle-même de prestige et de puissance et pour la nation de développement économique.

On voit que la structure traditionnelle reste, après la décolonisation, en état de tension avec la structure de l'État national, hérité du colonisateur. Le premier processus d'intégration se fonde sur les valeurs, les relations, la religion traditionnelle; le second sur des valeurs empruntées à l'Occident: le nationalisme<sup>8</sup>, le développement économique, le progrès technique et la démocratie formelle.

Les élites traditionnelles tentent de capter la force du nationalisme pour maintenir intégralement les structures sociales féodales sous un verni démocratique et au nom des traditions «nationales».

### *Stratification verticale*

Le développement économique voulu par les nouveaux États reprend en les nationalisant les organisations fonctionnelles induites par l'Occident: l'armée, l'administration, l'enseignement<sup>9</sup>.

A ces organisations fonctionnelles s'ajoutent les structures politiques (mouvements et partis) et syndicales, formées en opposition plus ou moins violente au colonisateur. La structure syndicale constituait, au départ, l'organisation et la prise de conscience du prolétariat et des «clercs» créés par la colonisation. Avec l'indépendance,

(7) En Irak, Liban, Iran et Inde le recrutement des administrations reste influencé par des critères de rang, de naissance et de relations personnelles (voir *Incidî*, 32<sup>e</sup> Session, *op.cit.*, pp. 599-600). Pour l'Amérique du Sud, voir FRIAS, *Rapport du V<sup>e</sup> Congrès de l'Association Internationale de Science Politique, sur l'Amérique latine*.

<sup>8</sup> Celui-ci, bien sûr, annexe les «fastes» de la tradition à son idéologie.

<sup>9</sup> En fait, le pourcentage des illettrés reste considérable: de 45 à 50 % dans l'Asie de l'Est (à l'exception du Japon: 5 %) à 85-90 % en Afrique du Nord et aux Indes. Cf. *Faits et Chiffres*, Statistiques Internationales relatives à l'éducation, la culture et l'information, Unesco, 1957. Voir aussi, Y. LACOSTE, *Les pays sous-développés*, P.U.F., 1959, p. 23.



cette structure tend à devenir fonctionnelle et à se «verticaliser» au service de la société globale. Par l'action de l'État et sous la pression politique et syndicale, l'économie occidentale induite est soit nationalisée, soit contrôlée, soit truffée de cadres autochtones qui prennent leur part de son administration (l'exemple de l'«africanisation des cadres»).

En résumé, une partie de la stratification verticale reste constituée par l'énorme masse agraire organisée en féodalité traditionnelle. Une autre partie est formée des organisations fonctionnelles modernes. Elites traditionnelles et élites nouvelles sont aux sommets respectivement des deux groupes d'organisations fonctionnelles verticales<sup>10</sup>. Mais ce n'est pas aussi simple; il y a des entrecroisements. L'élite traditionnelle, grâce à ses méthodes propres de mobilité sociale par relations personnelles et alliances matrimoniales, prend pied dans la direction politique, militaire, administrative, industrielle où elle rencontre les élites nouvelles venues des écoles, du cadre ou de l'opposition nationaliste. Les structures féodales résistent plus ou moins passivement à l'occidentalisation démocratique et économique. Le développement économique créant une situation de «mobilité sociale provoquée»<sup>11</sup> ne cessera d'exiger l'accroissement du nombre des élites techniques dans l'industrie et l'administration, tandis que la structure féodale agraire va s'affaiblir soit qu'une réforme agraire ait été entreprise pour détourner le mécontentement des populations dû au désordre économique résultant nécessairement de la mutation des cadres dirigeants<sup>12</sup>, soit que l'économie monétaire par son extension même favorise des transferts de propriété du régime féodal au régime privé. Ainsi les élites nouvelles par le jeu de la stratification verticale accroissent progressivement leur pouvoir social au détriment des élites traditionnelles. Le développement économique postule en effet l'importance accrue des organisations fonctionnelles modernes, tandis que l'économie va cesser d'être essentiellement agraire.

<sup>10</sup> Dans l'économie induite, les cadres restent en plus ou moins grande partie, occidentaux.

<sup>11</sup> Les besoins en cadres sont considérables et l'incapacité d'y répondre freine le développement. Voir SAUVY, *Le Tiers Monde*, P.U.F., 1961, p. 65, et surtout, UNESCO et BUREAU INTERNATIONAL D'ÉDUCATION, *Formation des Cadres techniques et scientifiques*, Genève, 1959, pp. 10-11.

<sup>12</sup> Et cependant, il y eut jusqu'à présent peu de réformes agraires (à Cuba récemment) vraiment générales et profondes (voir N. PLESZ, *art. cit.*, pp. 59-62) tant restent puissantes les classes féodales traditionnelles; souvent laissées en marge des développements nouveaux, elles sont assez fortes pour faire craindre des réactions en cas de réforme agraire.

### *Stratification horizontale*

Les transformations de la société au plan horizontal étaient déjà marquantes dès le développement induit par le régime colonial. Elles s'expriment par la détribalisation ou l'extraction hors des structures féodales, d'une masse de travailleurs qui sont prolétarisés dans les exploitations minières, dans les plantations, dans les villes qui prolifèrent sans arrêt (Brazzavilles noires, « cités indigènes », favellas, barrios, etc.<sup>13</sup>). Certes, ces travailleurs sont libérés des contraintes et des conditions précaires et misérables du milieu coutumier; ils trouvent des modes nouveaux de consommation et de loisir qui expliquent l'attrait exercé par la vie urbaine. Toutefois, perdant leur encadrement social, étroit mais solide, éloignés de l'influence des valeurs ancestrales, les autochtones prolétarisés sont démoralisés, désocialisés. Leur psychisme, vidé de son contenu, n'attend qu'à être comblé par des valeurs qui puissent alléger leur anxiété et leur détresse. Le nationalisme fera de leur masse un levier décisif du « power system » des sociétés en voie de développement: leur nombre donne sa force à l'élite nouvelle constituée par les hommes politiques et les syndicalistes; c'est là un facteur important des rapports entre les élites traditionnelles et les élites nouvelles.

Le gonflement du milieu urbain détermine la naissance de classes moyennes nouvelles qui édifient leur prospérité sur des activités de commerce et de service. Ces classes moyennes, couche encore bien mince de la stratification sociale, fournissent les enfants qui seront dans les meilleures conditions pour user des possibilités de mobilité sociale, offertes par l'enseignement.

### *Ebranlement des élites traditionnelles*

Cessant d'être la plus haute classe dirigeante, bien qu'elles soient fortes de leur richesse et du pouvoir que leur confère le régime foncier, elles subissent une perte irréparable de prestige social; en dépit

<sup>13</sup> Voir Aspects sociaux de l'industrialisation et de l'urbanisation en Afrique au Sud du Sahara, *Unesco*, P. CLÉMENT: « Formes et valeurs de la vie sociale urbaine », p. 483. Dans les villes de nouveaux rapports sociaux de caractère socio-professionnel tendent à se créer, alors que les structures sociales traditionnelles restent solides dans les campagnes. Et cependant le pourcentage de la population urbaine (villes de plus de 100.000 habitants), représentait, vers 1940, quelque 6 % de l'ensemble en Asie et quelque 4 % en Afrique (cf. A. LANDRY, *Traité de Démographie*, Payot, 1949, p. 103). Mais le rôle des villes dépasse de loin leur force démographique.



du parti pris à mépriser le «barbare», les valeurs qu'elles représentent passent au second plan dans l'ensemble de la société globale<sup>14</sup>. Le droit occidental imposé dans beaucoup de cas par le colonisateur trouble les liens de clientèle traditionnels et substitue aux relations de personnes des relations de propriété. Aux relations de service, de redevance et de protection, elle substitue des contrats de location et d'entretien. Les détenteurs individuels ou collectifs de capitaux achètent des terres aux féodaux endettés et s'introduisent comme des corps économiquement et socialement hétérogènes dans le système agraire. Néanmoins si forte est la tradition que les travailleurs de la terre prolongent volontairement leur sujétion tant sont grands leur crainte du changement, leur besoin de protection et même de dépendance<sup>15</sup>. Au surplus, l'exploitation des terres est souvent rendue plus difficile par l'émigration vers les villes.

Les élites de type local sont également ébranlées, car outre les effets de l'émigration, le retour de certains hommes au village les pose en rivaux des chefs coutumiers: auréolés du prestige urbain, pourvus d'un pécule qui les rend relativement «riches», ayant acquis quelque expérience, rapportant des outillages et des produits occidentaux, ils altèrent la hiérarchie coutumière des valeurs.

#### *Faiblesse technique des élites nouvelles*

Les élites nouvelles formées par les écoles du colonisateur et par l'apprentissage au niveau des cadres d'exécution ou des techniques administratives, marquent une grande faiblesse au point de vue technique: leur niveau est objectivement très bas et leur respect de

<sup>14</sup> Voir BALANDIER, «Sociologie de la dépendance», dans *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, 12, 1952, p. 59. Le colonisateur altère le prestige des élites traditionnelles. Cf. LLOYD FALLERS, *Bantu Bureaucracy*; l'auteur montre la discordance entre le pouvoir traditionnel (fondé sur des relations personnalisées) et le système colonial. Voir aussi MANNONI, *Psychologie de la décolonisation*.

<sup>15</sup> Par exemple au Japon en dépit de la réforme agraire imposée par le gouvernement militaire américain, la plupart des métayers, devenus propriétaires ont remplacé les anciennes «redevances» aux grands propriétaires, par des «cadeaux». Le cas est loin d'être isolé. Voir N. PLESZ, *art.cit.*, p. 61 et suiv. Cf. *Incidî*, 32<sup>e</sup> Session, *op.cit.*, p. 600: au Pakistan, en dépit des limitations imposées par le régime militaire en 1958, les propriétaires fonciers continuaient à former une classe dominante.

la déontologie, non soutenu par une imprégnation suffisante des valeurs et des réactions du type occidental, est souvent déficient<sup>16</sup>.

Les hommes qui poussent leurs études le plus loin choisissent en majorité des sections autres que les sciences exactes et appliquées: sciences politiques et administratives, droit, littérature, langues sont les plus recherchés. Ceci s'explique pour diverses raisons:

— ce type d'études est moins hétérogène aux traditions culturelles autochtones;

— les écoles du colonisateur, souvent créées à des fins missionnaires, étaient d'une qualité inférieure à celles de l'Occident, spécialement pour la préparation aux mathématiques et aux sciences exactes;

— le colonisateur avait besoin avant tout de «clercs» car les occidentaux appelés des métropoles pour remplir des fonctions administratives coûtaient extrêmement cher;

— les autochtones eux-mêmes cherchent à améliorer leurs aptitudes à faire de la politique et à se substituer, dès l'indépendance, aux dirigeants occidentaux de la haute administration publique.

Cette faiblesse technique constitue un handicap objectif au développement économique; mais ces élites «littéraires» constituent, en fait, une transition: celle de la «prise de conscience» et celle de la mobilisation nationaliste des esprits. Ces élites n'en sont pas moins de haute orientation technique par comparaison avec la routine du milieu traditionnel. Leur valeur est dans la mentalité qu'elles ont acquise, plus que dans leurs capacités réelles. Néanmoins, la faiblesse technique est, dans beaucoup de cas, facteur de graves mécomptes qui ne peuvent être surmontés par la seule assistance technique venant de l'Occident, laquelle ne pourrait être efficace que si elle était investie des responsabilités.

### *Le substitut militaire*

Aussi les cadres militaires peuvent-ils apparaître comme apportant seuls la solution.

Toute imparfaite qu'elle soit objectivement, l'armée constitue l'organisation fonctionnelle verticale de loin le mieux intégrée. L'exercice du pouvoir hiérarchique, la discipline — même relative, mais tellement supérieure à l'anarchie qui règne dans les autres secteurs—

<sup>16</sup> Pour ce manque de formation technique, voir SAUVY, *Le Tiers Monde*, P.U.F., 1961, p. 65. Voir aussi, Y. DROR, *Rapport sur Israël au V<sup>e</sup> Congrès Mondial de Science Politique*, 1961.



l'accomplissement de tâches coordonnées au niveau des divers états-majors, ont procuré aux cadres de l'armée une initiation, élémentaire mais solide, à l'efficacité des actes administratifs et de commandement<sup>17</sup>. Le prestige de la force, la concentration de celle-ci avec le pouvoir de décision, l'idéal nationaliste qui est le propre de l'armée, une hiérarchie complète allant du sommet à la base, le prestige de la force et de la cohésion militaires, autant de facteurs qui, dans les conditions analysées, font des cadres d'officiers, l'élite nouvelle de transition vers l'élite civile technique.

### *Multiplcité des élites nouvelles*

Ainsi, dans le temps, l'on voit se profiler la succession, en concurrence avec la force acquise des élites traditionnelles, de quatre types d'*élites nouvelles*:

- l'élite constituée par les cadres d'exécution d'avant l'indépendance;
- l'élite «littéraire» de mobilisation politique;
- l'élite militaire de transition et de substitution à l'efficacité technique;
- l'élite, qui n'existe pas encore en général, techniquement valable pour le développement économique.

Bien sûr, chaque groupe subsiste au moins partiellement à l'étape suivante. Ce qui importe, c'est la place occupée par chacun dans le «power system».

<sup>17</sup> Voir RONDOT, «Le problème des cadres de l'État dans l'Orient arabe», dans *Civilisations*, 10, 1, 1960, not. p. 28. J. MEYNAUD, considère l'armée comme constituant un pouvoir technocratique. Voir «Technocratie et Politique», *Études de Science Politique*, vol. 2, Lausanne, 1960.

## NEW ELITES IN CEYLON

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### TRADITIONAL ELITES

The traditional social order was based on a complex of village communities, knit together for purposes of revenue, government and defence through a hierarchy of officials ranging from village headmen through provincial governors, to the king who was at the apex of the social pyramid. The traditional elite comprised, by and large, these royal officers, recruited from certain families of the most numerous caste, the farmers, *goyigama*. Possessed of land in hereditary succession and liable to royal service by virtue of their land holdings, these officers and their kin constituted a superior stratum. Land, the principal form of wealth, did not of itself ennoble: caste and kin were crucial. A stratum of royal officials, *radolan*, is mentioned in tenth century inscriptions. By the nineteenth century that stratum, known as *radala*, consisting of a powerful group of intermarrying families<sup>1</sup>, had been consolidated in the interior, and their principal representatives were signatories of the Kandyan Convention of 1815 by which the British already in control of the Littoral, claimed sovereignty over the whole country.

The British already had two decades of experience with the native chiefs of the Littoral to conclude, in the words of an early Governor, that they operated as «a paralysing medium between government and the people». A proclamation issued after the suppression of the Great Rebellion of 1818 — the most memorable of several abortive revolts led by the chiefs — declared that «the plotters against the State were found among the very persons who had been restored to honours and security by the sole intervention of British Power». This Proclamation was accordingly designed to circumscribe the power

<sup>1</sup> Cross cousin marriage and polyandry were common in the interior (see R. PIERIS, *Sinhalese social organization*, Colombo, 1956, for an account of traditional society).



of the nobility and to remind the people that the King of England, through his officials, «is alone the source from which all power emanates, and to which obedience is due». Bereft of the substance of power, the chiefs clung grimly to their ceremonial rights and privileges. By the last decades of the century jealously-guarded patents of nobility, such as the gold-embroidered hat of the highest chiefs, had been usurped by lesser functionaries.

The official policy of strengthening the power of the imperial government by circumscribing and gradually undermining the authority of the Ancien Regime, led to a transition from a system of indirect rule through native chiefs to the institution of a colonial bureaucracy, although the two systems co-existed for well over a century of British rule. As early as 1818 a British Governor declared that his aim was to reduce the chiefs «from an aristocratic faction to the rank and office of stipendiary organs for effecting the regulations and orders of the supreme executive authority»<sup>2</sup>. The chiefs themselves did not accept this new role with equanimity. They resorted to rebellion, without success; several of them were tried for treason at a state Trial in 1834, and though acquitted, their moral guilt was not doubted by the Governor who dismissed them from office. British administrators were divided in opinion as to the wisdom of undermining the ascribed status of the old nobility. Sir William Gregory declared that during his governorship (1872-1877) «there was no doubt that matters went on far more smoothly and efficiently when the native officers were selected from families of ancient lineage rather than from men, who, though of excellent character and of experience, had risen from the ranks»<sup>3</sup>. It is hardly two decades since the residuary functions of the remaining provincial chiefs were taken over by a new administrative cadre — the District Revenue Officers — recruited by competitive examination open to graduates. The headmen are controlled by these officers on behalf of the Government Agents.

#### THE COLONIAL ELITE

British administration was little more than the substitution of a relatively small cadre of imperial officials for the displaced indigenous rulers, but their regime was buttressed by a colonial elite

<sup>2</sup> *Report of Governor BROWNRIFF, 25-9-1818* (London, Public Record Office, C.O. 54/73).

<sup>3</sup> Sir William GREGORY, *Autobiography*, London, 1894, 277-278.

which provided personnel for the bureaucracy. This elite was recruited from a wider circle than the aristocracy of the Ancien Regime. Individuals who welcome the opportunity of placing themselves on the fringe of a new culture are usually those who are dissatisfied with the traditional values. Barnett has gone to the extent of concluding that «some kind of personal conflict» provides the primary motivation for cultural innovation. While westernization proceeded apace amongst the traditional aristocracy, mainly through education, «personal differences and incompatibilities foment in the high places as well as the low»<sup>4</sup>. Through the acquisition of status-roles — e.g. white-collar and professional careers — and prestige-symbols — e.g., western dress and English education —, the elite was increasingly alienated from their traditional values. Increasingly differentiated from the masses, they scorned the caste-determined occupations of the common people, even the traditionally esteemed vocation of a farmer.

The creation of a restricted colonial elite was in part a conscious policy. As a British resident observed, «a body of men, respectable from superior education, and property, is absolutely necessary as a means of good government»<sup>5</sup>. In the Littoral the early pupils in the government schools were sons of Modliars, described as the «first class of people in the country». The government proceeded to establish a number of English schools in the first half of the nineteenth century, and many enterprising youths were quick to avail themselves of the educational facilities offered by the government and mission schools. But it was the «higher classes» who «whilst giving their children an English education, are teaching them to aspire to those offices which confer real and just influence on the possessors»<sup>6</sup>.

In 1841, the Central School Commission concluded that «English education has now been extended as far as there is a legitimate demand for it». The «legitimate demand» was not reckoned solely from the point of view of requests from the people for English schools, but rather by taking into account the capacity of government services, commercial firms, and other establishments to employ English-educated youths during the fifties. There was no point in multiplying expensive state-financed schools which were reported producing westernised youths, frustrated and discontented for

<sup>4</sup> H. G. BARNETT, «Personal conflicts and culture change», *Social Forces*, 20, 2, 1941.

<sup>5</sup> Letter in the *Colombo Journal*, 11.1.1832.

<sup>6</sup> J. FORBES, *Eleven years in Ceylon*, London, 1840, Vol. I, p. 62.



want of suitable employment. In fact, the English schools were reported to have been producing «a class of shallow, conceited, half-educated youths, who have learned nothing but to look back with contempt upon the condition in which they were born, and from which they conceive that their education has raised them, and who desert the ranks of the industrious classes to become idle, discontented, hangers-on of the Courts and Public Offices»<sup>7</sup>.

The educational system produced a vast body of competitors for every minor clerical appointment, and the abundant supply of prospective employees depressed the wages of the successful candidates, leaving a large number of frustrated youths with a school-leaving certificate of no commercial worth. The returns of 44 secondary schools stating the employment of former pupils in 1922 indicates the extent of the problem:

Unemployed	34 %	Unknown	17 %
Clerical	22 %	Business	5 %
Teaching	18 %	Agriculture	4 %

These figures indicate how rapidly the situation had changed since an optimistic report of an Education Committee declared in 1911-1912 that «on the whole, we are justified in inferring that both in government service and out of it the demand at present exceeds the supply of suitable young men», since subordinate employments (clerical and secretarial) constituted «the necessary callings of large numbers». In other words, the colonial elite, so long an undifferentiated group of high-ranking families, was becoming differentiated.

The mass of the population was provided with vernacular education, giving rise to a bifurcation of the population into an English-speaking minority and a vernacular-speaking majority. In 1922 the proportions were as follows:

	<i>Schools</i>	<i>Scholars</i>
English	189	32,176
Bilingual	50	9,383
Vernacular	2,538	283,723

<sup>7</sup> Sir W. J. SENDALL, *Report of the Central School Commission*, Sessional Paper, 1862.

Only 14.3 percent of the schoolgoing population was qualified to enter the ranks of the elite. In 1928 only 50 per cent of children of schoolgoing age were receiving instruction in state-aided schools: there were 51,000 in English schools and 436,500 in vernacular schools. In other words, only one-tenth of pupils receiving instruction in schools were English-educated, or only 5 per cent of the juvenile population of school age qualified for membership of the elite. The government's policy of extending vernacular education only led to a decline in that percentage, for while population increased, the English-speaking section remained relatively static (in 1850 at least 19.4 per cent of the school-going population was English-educated).

The Great Schism is vividly brought out in the statistics of literacy in successive Census Reports. In 1901, 2% of the population was literate in English; in 1921, 3.7%; in 1946, 7% (Literacy in any language was 39.9% in 1921; 53% in 1946). A select Committee of the State Council, appointed in 1946 to report on Sinhalese and Tamil as official languages, reported as follows:

«The total number of adults therefore who can lisp in English — the test for literacy is mere ability to read or write without any inquiry into the quality of that knowledge — cannot be more than 400,000. Of this 400,000 government service contains, exclusive of the minor employees about 20,000. The present government of this country is therefore a government of the Sinhalese or Tamil speaking 6.200,000 by the English speaking 20,000 government servants, for the 400,000 English speaking public».

The Report goes on to say that «it is possible to attain the highest post in the land, amass wealth and wield influence, without knowing a word of the national languages», whereas a knowledge of these languages does not qualify one for these coveted posts. It is for this reason that we have included the gross English-speaking population in our computation of the elite, but it is better described as a middle class, a proto-elite<sup>8</sup>. In fact, there are distinctions within this group based on caste, income, degree of westernisation, and other criteria — even a rudimentary «class» stratification, in the modern industrial sense, might be discerned. But the crucial bifurcation is that be-

<sup>8</sup> H. ABAYAVARDHANA, «The role of the western-educated elite», *Community*, 4, 1, 1962, p. 4 refers to «the English-speaking middle class», the greater part of which «is completely lacking in elite qualities and presents a pathetic appearance of what might be called cultural mongrelism» (i.e., cultural marginality).



tween vernacular-speaking and English-speaking: the latter group constitutes a different «stream» in the educational system.

The «liberal professions» attracted a high proportion of the elite. Even a generation ago, the alternative careers facing an ambitious youth were severely restricted. They were law or «government service» (which included the bulk of the medical men, and a number of lawyers). A Who's Who of 1916-1917 states the occupations of the Sinhalese intelligentsia as follows:

Law	54	Business	4
«Proprietary planter»	19	Schoolmasters	2
Medical	17	Others (Bank employees)	3
Government Service	16		

British officials were gradually replaced by native officials in the higher rungs of the administrative hierarchy. The slow tempo of democratization (within the ranks of the elite) is indicated in the number of men recruited to the Government services in the higher grades. These positions were exclusively held by Europeans in the early decades of British rule. The following table gives the proportions of Sinhalese and Tamils (S/T) to Burghers<sup>9</sup> and Europeans (B/E) recruited into the administrative Civil Service — regarded by generations of Ceylonese youths as the high water mark of achievement — from 1863 to 1947<sup>10</sup>.

Year	1863	1870	1873	1878	1883	1888	1893	1903
E./B.	72	72	79	77	86	76	81	77
S./T.	5	6	4	4	4	5	6	7
Year	1909	1913	1918	1923	1928	1933	1939	1947
E./B.	80	88	103	110	91	86	74	49
S./T.	6	7	14	35	47	46	75	120

#### RECENT TRENDS

By the turn of the century the western educated elite constituted an influential body of persons who were employed in the English schools and academic institutions, dominated the professions (particularly law and medicine) and filled the higher government posts.

<sup>9</sup> Burghers = Dutch descendants.

<sup>10</sup> Statistics from the official *Civil Lists* (annual).

Proprietary planters, particularly those who had enriched themselves by opening up the pioneer coconut estates in the North Western Province, entrepreneurs who engaged in plumbago mining, transport and business enterprise, joined the ranks of the elite. In the present century they launched a movement for constitutional reform, through organisations such as the National Association and later the Ceylon National Congress. In 1909 their representatives proposed that those eligible for jury service — that is, the professional and middle classes comprising in the Western Province some five thousand persons in a population of one million — be made the basis of the franchise. The governor of the time rightly reported to the Colonial Secretary that this elite had no claim to represent the people of Ceylon<sup>11</sup>.

Culturally alienated from the masses, the elite displayed a fervent xenophilia which made them anathema to the vernacular intelligentsia. The latter reacted by ridiculing their «denationalised» way of life and advocating a return to tradition. The early Sinhalese novels were an expression of the national and religious revival which was almost completely divorced from the political movement launched by the elite. The national movement set in motion by the vernacular intelligentsia «sought to revive Buddhism, but they were not always able to distinguish between Buddhism and superstition. They spent a good amount of their energies in such activities as the propagation of temperance and asking people not to break eggs<sup>12</sup>. The literature of this movement, therefore became an exclusively lower-middle class literature, and its main preoccupation became the criticism of the upper classes who were quite unaware of even its existence. Instead of being, therefore, a sober criticism of europeanisation, it took the form of a bitter class attack»<sup>13</sup>.

The advent of universal franchise in the thirties encouraged democratically elected politicians to nurture the «nationalist» sentiments of the masses. The socio-political movements which appeared sporadically in late British times, and in profusion after Independence, bear the stamp of what anthropologists designate nativistic movements which are «part of a process of imperfect social and

<sup>11</sup> Governor McGallum to the Earl of Crewe, Despatch N° 346 of 26.5.1909 (reprinted in *Community*, 4, 1, 1962, pp. 57-61).

<sup>12</sup> The novelist Piyadasa Sirisena referred to a wedding-cake as a cemetery of potential chickens (E. R. SARATHCHANDRA, *The Sinhalese Novel*, Colombo, 1950, p. 216). According to WORSLEY, *The trumpet shall sound*, London, 1957, p. 117, «this austerity of behaviour, this insistence on relinquishing enjoyment of life ... is a necessary transitional stage without which the lowest strata in society could never start a movement».

<sup>13</sup> SARATHCHANDRA, *op.cit.*, p. 213.



economic adjustment to the conditions arising directly or indirectly from contact with the West... Absurd as they may seem when considered as rational solutions, they are creative attempts of the people to reform their own institutions, to meet new demands or withstand new pressures»<sup>14</sup>. The elite was identified with the foreign rules. In 1956, in the wave of a nativistic upsurge led by the lower middle class traditionalists represented by village school teachers, ayurvedic physicians, and Buddhist monks, the elite came under severe criticism, and many of its members were left in a mood of despair. Yet, by virtue of their specialised skills, «nearly six years of assault on the positions they occupy have failed to dislodge them»<sup>15</sup>.

<sup>14</sup> R. FIRTH, «Social changes in the Western Pacific», *J. Roy. Anthrop. Inst.*, CI, 1953.

<sup>15</sup> ABAYAVARDHANA, *op.cit.*, p. 7.

## REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman: H. JANNE, Université de Bruxelles  
Rapporteur: A. H. HALSEY, University of Oxford

The working group on traditional and modern elites met three times: its first session was concerned with the historical development of elites in the industrialised countries, its second with the relations between traditional and modern elites in the new states and «underdeveloped» areas of the world and its third with the role of education in the formation of elite groups, both industrial and industrialising. Throughout the three sessions there was a tacit assumption that the whole world is in the grip of social change either into industrialism or through its further stages. On this view, interest in the classical problem of the relation between elite and mass, governor and governed, leadership and followership, is an interest in the changing patterns of recruitment to and changing functions of groups holding power, knowledge and prestige in societies moving along a trajectory from relatively simple pre-industrial social structures towards advanced, differentiated society exploiting a scientific and technological culture.

This is not to say that either the papers or the discussion of them left an impression of a unified body of knowledge. Differences of method, of terminology and above all of ideological presupposition or commitment impede progress, though they may at the same time stimulate interest in a range of topics which certainly now attracts energetic attention in many countries. Indeed only in one paper, that of H. Janne in the second session, was an attempt made to set out a general theoretical framework for the analysis of elites.

H. Janne conceives of society as having a chequer-board structure, *une structure en quadrillé*, of vertical mobility between classes or social strata and horizontal mobility between the great functional orders or institutional complexes. The elite he defines as a top stratum in the former which is also *l'ensemble des cadres dirigeants* of the latter and which controls the state either *de jure* or *de facto*. Among the other contributors only M. Dogan, in a paper on the development of elites in France over the past 150 years, explicitly used the distinction between horizontal and vertical mobility —



in this case to identify a system of bridges linking the upper levels of the functional hierarchies and so allowing a communication between the many branches of a modern differentiated elite.

M. Dogan was at pains to emphasise the fact of differentiation of the traditional hereditary elite of the *Ancien Régime* into the complex arrangement of economic, political, intellectual, military, technical etc. elites of the present day. He also emphasised the loosening of the relation between wealth and elite membership which this process has involved. In the middle of the 19th century a list of the 5.000 people *dont on parle* would have coincided with a list of the 5.000 richest. Now, he asserted only a third of the one would also appear on the other. Other speakers too, including P. Naville and R. Dahrendorf, sought to distinguish different types of elite in order to analyse either the general evolutionary process of power and prestige in modern science-based society or the differences in elite formation between societies having a similar material culture, e.g. R. Dahrendorf's distinction between *established and abstract* elites in comparing Britain and Germany.

Most Western contributors while emphasizing the differentiation process also assumed the continuance of hierarchy albeit complex. The authoress of a paper from the U.S.S.R., G. M. Andreeva, however, rejected this conception. The term elite with its connotation of separate social groups in unequalitarian relations of wealth, status and power, and the notion of individual vertical mobility between them, was held to be irrelevant to the analysis of a developed communist society and to be used «only conditionally for describing the status of the privileged minority in all types of pre-socialist formations». G. M. Andreeva prefers to think of leadership functions rather than elite groups when contemplating contemporary Russia. Nevertheless she recognises that beyond the differences, conceptual and ideological, between communist and non-communist sociologists there are «objective social processes» which stand in need of sociological appraisal.

Among these «objective social processes» is the growth of the professions, «technical elites», «mental labour», or whatever term is preferred to refer to the use and control of modern scientific culture. The papers presented at the first session all bore upon this general aspect of the historical development of elites in Europe. V. Aubert, with special reference to Norway, gave an analysis of the social conditions necessary for the development of the professions. W. L. Guttsman traced the decline of the British aristocracy as a political elite and exclusive social group in the period since 1880, though his

emphasis was challenged by M. Young in discussion. M. Dogan traced not so much the decline of the *ancienne noblesse foncière* as the rise of the modern elites with more specialised functions and wider social bases of recruitment.

The second session, at which H. Janne's general paper was presented in application to the problems of elite formation in underdeveloped countries, also heard A. Karim and R. Pieris speak to their papers on East Pakistan and Ceylon respectively. A paper by J. Goldthorpe on mobility and kinship among the educated African elite of East Africa was also submitted. All these countries in different ways illustrate the sharpening or dramatization of conflict between traditional and modern elites under circumstances where the traditional basis of social cohesion is the small scale tribal, regional or ethnic group whose cultural heritage is threatened by the aspirations to modernity of nationalist «westernised» leaders. The case of East Pakistan shows how «imported» institutions like parliamentary democracy can be the victims of conflict between elites. Ceylon illustrates the phenomenon of nativistic movements in response to contact with the West through a westernised elite. J. Goldthorpe showed how the typical western pattern between modern family and social mobility in European society is modified when elite recruitment through education is introduced into a society with a viable extended kinship structure. In general the distinction between traditional and modernizing sources of prestige and power seems to have more comprehensive implications for social change in the new states than it had in the early stages of industrialisation in Europe — and the paper sent in by W. H. Friedland which pointed to the use of «harmless» traditional symbols by modernising African leaders served to emphasise the real disparity between African history and the ambitions of the new African elites. In discussion S. Shukla returned to the basic distinction between horizontal and vertical mobility and its relation to the integration of society in order to cast doubt on its applicability to India. The fragility of social consensus in the new states was referred to by several speakers including J. d'Haucourt and J. Boute who drew attention to the position of alien middle class groups in such countries, usually introduced by the colonial power, which now block upward mobility for the indigenous masses.

A strongly attended third session discussed papers presented by M. Young, R. Dahrendorf, L. Labedz, P. Naville, S. Shukla, E. Shils and V. Isambert-Jamati. Other papers were submitted but not discussed. They included one on the place of Israel's school system in elite



formation by C. Adler, one by R. Girod on social selection through schools in Geneva, a comparison between Victorian England and Confucian China by R. Wilkinson which discusses the role of education in maintaining a gentlemanly political elite and an essay by M. Clifford-Vaughan on the changing role of the «Grandes Ecoles» in the formation of French elites.

The discussion fell into two parts. In the first part R. Dahrendorf spoke to his paper on the functional equivalence of German law faculties with English public schools in selection and socialisation for elite status. M. Young then presented his hypothesis that the level of «intelligence» in the upper classes falls from one generation to another as a result of (environmentally determined) regression, but is restored by a process of negative feed-back through mobility. The hypothesis was criticised by A. H. Halsey, M. Trow and R. Dahrendorf. The «fact» of constant rates of mobility in industrial society (attributed to S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix) was questioned and it was suggested that measured intelligence is, at least partially, an indicator not of a separate causal factor but of the «propensity to mobility» which is to be explained by the theory.

The second part of the discussion turned on the papers by E. E. Shils, P. Naville, S. Shukla, L. Labedz and V. Isambert-Jamati. In E. Shils' paper emphasis was laid on the crucial part to be played by universities in building and maintaining the differentiated elite required for a modern society. P. Naville also discussed the changing nature of elite formations in advanced industrial society and especially the rise of a technical elite while V. Isambert-Jamati traced the related development and expansion of secondary education in France. S. Shukla echoed E. Shils' concern with the uncertain relation between education and the requirements of modernizing elites and illustrated the theme by reference to the case of India.

Lively debate centred on L. Labedz's paper on *The Party, Intelligentsia and Education in the Soviet Union* in which it was argued that the Soviet faces dilemmas arising from the political goal of classlessness and the «functional necessities of industrialisation». The latter include demands for a differentiated, i.e. stratified labour force and this, L. Labedz argued, is «hardly compatible with the idea of a classless society». S. Kuznetsova rejected the dilemma and argued that the course of educational development in Russia together with the raising of the intellectual content of traditional manual labour was leading to a rapid elimination of old social and cultural differences.

## THE MAINTENANCE OF GROWTH LE MAINTIEN DE LA CROISSANCE

### THE UNITED STATES — THE FIRST NEW NATION \*

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Concern with the social conditions which foster economic growth and stable nonauthoritarian political relations in the new nations of Asia and Africa has become a major preoccupation of politicians and academics alike in the post-war era. A new field of inquiry, the study of development, has emerged within economics, political science, and sociology. The very fact that this Fifth World Congress of Sociology takes as its major theme for plenary sessions the sociology of development is an indicator of its growing significance.

In defining the problems to be studied in order to advance knowledge and policy recommendations in this area, most scholarship properly devotes itself to detailed case examinations of the relationship between different developmental models and the existing situations in specific underdeveloped or new states. This is particularly true for the work of political scientists and sociologists. Political scientists concerned with problems of national legitimacy, linguistic integration, and the relation between social classes and party systems in new states have for the most part dealt with these without attempting to generalize from the experience of old states. The sociologists, demographers apart, have been equally at fault. They, too, have analyzed the evolution of national identities, integrated value systems, and changing class relationships in Asia and Africa, as if

\* Second plenary Session — Deuxième séance plénière.

\*\* I am indebted to Gene Bernardi and Audrey Wipper for assistance. This paper contains part of Section I of my forthcoming book, *The First New Nation: The United States in Historical and Comparative Perspective* (New York, Basic Books, 1963), Chapters I and II. The members of the Research Group on Comparative Development commented on an earlier draft, and I am especially grateful to them. These include, in particular, David Apter, David Landes, and Neil Smelser.



they were *sui generis*. This ignoring of «old states» largely reflects the anti-historical bias of functionalist social science. The social scientists involved in this task have not used historical material to test their hypotheses; in part because the data available for historical generalizations have seemed less reliable than those gathered with today's latest techniques<sup>1</sup>.

If the sociology of development is to have any meaning, it must include analyses of past developmental processes of the already industrialized states as well as the processes of the now developing nations. In this context it is important to note that the first major colony to successfully break away through revolution from colonial rule was the United States.

The United States may properly claim the title of the first new nation, because of this fact, that it was the first major colony to successfully break away from colonial rule. It was, of course, followed within a few decades by most of the Spanish colonies in North and South America. But while the United States exemplifies a new nation which successfully developed an industrial economy, a relatively integrated social structure, and a stable democratic polity, most of the nations of Latin America have failed to develop as rapidly along these three dimensions. Most remain underdeveloped economically, divided internally along racial, class, and in some cases, linguistic lines, and have unstable polities, whether democratic or dictatorial. So perhaps the first new nation can contribute more than money to the latter-day ones; perhaps its development can show how revolutionary, equalitarian and populist values become incorporated into a stable nonauthoritarian polity.

Those interested in problems of newly developing polities may find in early American history much that has relevance to the current scene. Like all nations that have recently gained independence, the United States differed from most older European nations in that it had made a break with the past. Like other new nations, it was

<sup>1</sup> However this method of relying extensively on secondary authorities, without going back to the original sources has been defended by T. H. MARSHALL, one of the deans of British sociology, «Nothing is more unreliable than the first-hand account of an eye-witness, nor more liable to deceive than diaries and correspondence whose authors throughly enjoyed writing them. And even the accounts of treasurers cannot always be accepted as representing the final and absolute truth. It is the business of historians to sift this miscellaneous collection of dubious authorities and to give to others the results of their careful professional assessment. And surely they will not rebuke the sociologist for putting faith in what historians write». *Sociology at the Crossroads and Other Essays*, London: Heinemann, 1963, pp. 36-37.

unstable because this break was associated with a rejection of traditional institutions and values as means and standards for solving national problems. As a result it had to find new ways to meet these problems. Thus this early period is of particular importance because new patterns were then becoming established, patterns which were reinforced by succeeding events, and which eventually culminated in the institutional framework characteristic of America today.

Here I will examine the early period of America's history as a new nation in an effort to elucidate through comparative analysis some of the problems and some of the developmental processes that are common to all new nations. And in so doing, I will also highlight some of the circumstances that were unique to American development, some of the conditions that made young America a particularly auspicious place to develop democratic institutions.

There is a tendency for those nations which have solved the problems of development to view with impatience the internal turmoil of new nations and to become especially alarmed with the oligarchical-dictatorial and revolutionary forces that are shaking their tenuous foundations. Coupled with this is the tendency to expect them to accomplish in a decade what other nations have taken a century or more to do. A backward glance into our own past should destroy the notion that we proceeded easily toward the establishment of democratic political institutions. In this period which saw the establishment of political legitimacy and party government, it was touch and go whether the complex balance of forces would swing in the direction of a one- or two-party system, or even whether the states would remain together as a unit<sup>2</sup>. It took *time to institutionalize values, beliefs, and practices*, and there were many incidents that revealed how very fragile were the commitments to democracy and nationhood. There were plots to prevent the duly elected from taking office, the passing of laws that gave the party in power the right to persecute its political opponents<sup>3</sup>, a struggle between parties representing elitist and egalitarian values, and virtually one-party rule for thirty years.

It was from this crucible of confusion and conflict that values and goals became defined, issues carved out, positions taken, in short an *identity established*. And we cannot appreciate the tremendous problems faced by contemporary post-revolutionary societies, with

<sup>2</sup> See pp. 22-23.

<sup>3</sup> For the various conditions under which federal troops have been called out see Bennett M. Rich, *The Presidents and Civil-Disorder*, Washington, The Brookings Institute, 1941, p. 212.



much more complicated and less advantageous conditions than ours, unless we recognize that these difficulties we encountered in establishing a legitimate authority separate from its agents almost resulted in a failure to create a nation. Clearly, the odds are against democracy in the new states of Africa and Asia. Many experts on these countries suggest that democracy may be a utopian short-term objective for such nations. Instead of speaking generally about democracy, it may be necessary to focus on the conditions which protect personal liberty, that is, on due process and the rule of law, rather than on the requirements for free elections and competitive party struggle. Perhaps, we should ask, as we look at new countries, what are the conditions under which authoritarianism is compatible with the rule of law, rather than compare them with presently stable democracies.

The United States is the oldest of the new nations, that is, of those formed deliberately after a break with an imperialist ruler. And consequently, an intensive look at some of its institutions and patterns of development which derive from its effort to form a stable new society and polity may contribute to an understanding of the factors affecting similar efforts in contemporary post-colonial societies.

Let us now turn to a more detailed examination of some of the specific problems common to new nations.

#### THE CRISIS OF LEGITIMACY AND THE ROLE OF THE CHARISMATIC LEADER

A core problem faced by new nations and post-revolutionary societies is the crisis of legitimacy. The old order has been abolished and with it the set of beliefs that justified its system of authority. The imperialist ogre upon whom all ills were blamed has now disappeared, and with it the great unifying force, nationalism, under whose banner private, ethnic, sectional, and other differences were submerged, has been weakened. The new system is in the process of being formed and so the question arises, to whom is loyalty owed? What kinds of values will legitimize the exercise of power? For the essence of legitimacy, be it traditional, charismatic, or rational-legal, is derived from shared beliefs, that is, feelings among the members as to what constitutes allegiance. In new states, the government finds that it cannot assume loyalty among the majority of its citizens, for such feelings, or even the experiences that give rise to them, develop slowly. Ernest Renan in a lecture in 1882 pointed to

*consent* as the essential factor. He said, that if the people do not believe in the government's right to act, if they question its basis of authority, then the very essence of a stable polity is under attack<sup>4</sup>. Particularly in new states the governing authority faces situations in which significant segments of the society feel that it is ineffective or directly hostile to their interests. In such situations the question as to why such groups should obey, why they should accept a decision that works against their values and interests, may arise.

As Max Weber pointed out, there are essentially three ways in which an authority system may gain legitimacy. (1) It may gain this right through *tradition*, through «always» having possessed it and by reinforcing the belief in its rightness through various symbolic acts. The title held by monarchical societies is essentially of this type. (2) *Rational-legal* domination exists when those in authority are obeyed because of a general acceptance of the appropriateness of the system of rules under which they hold office. (3) *Charismatic* authority, a concept introduced by Max Weber into sociology, «rests upon the uncommon and extraordinary devotion to the sacredness or the heroic force of the exemplariness of an individual and the order revealed or created by him»<sup>5</sup>.

Old states possess traditional legitimacy, and new states may sometimes be in a position to enhance their own legitimacy by incorporating the already existing legitimacy of heads of subordinate authority centers. Thus, nation states which retain local rulers, for example dukes, counts, chiefs, clan heads, and create a larger national authority system based on them, may be more stable than those which seek to destroy local centers of authority. For instance the national legitimacy of Europe's most stable republican government, Switzerland, may be the consequence of the preserved legitimacy of cantonal government and power. Contemporary Malaya is a recent example of an effort to foster national legitimacy by retaining traditional symbols of local rule.

But where traditional legitimacy is absent, as it was in post-Revolutionary United States or France and much of contemporary Asia and Africa, it can be developed only through reliance on legal and/or charismatic authority. Legal domination, resting on the as-

<sup>4</sup> Cited in Frank H. UNDERHILL, «A United Nation is Not Enough», *The Globe Magazine*, March 24, 1962, p. 5. For a more detailed discussion of the relationship of legitimacy to democracy see S. M. LIPSET, *Political Man*, Garden City, Doubleday, 1960, pp. 77-90.

<sup>5</sup> Max RHEINSTEIN, ed., *Max Weber on Law in Economy and Society*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954, p. xi.



sumption that the created legal structure is an effective means of attaining group ends, is necessarily a weak source of authority in societies in which the law has been identified with the interests of the colonial exploiter.

Charismatic authority is well suited to the needs of newly developing nations. It requires neither time nor a rational set of rules, and is highly flexible. Such a leader plays several roles. He is first of all the symbol of the new nation, its hero who embodies in his person its values and aspirations. But more than merely symbolizing the new nation, he legitimizes the state, the new secular government, by endowing it with his «gift of grace». Apter shows the ways in which the government of Ghana gained diffuse legitimacy from the charisma of Nkrumah. The institutionalization of a legal-rational order, of parliamentarianism, of due process and the like were made possible because of Nkrumah's sanction<sup>6</sup>.

Charismatic justification for authority can be seen as a mechanism of transition, an interim measure, which gets people to observe the requirements of the nation out of loyalty to the leader until they eventually learn to do it for its own sake. In short, the hero helps to bridge the gap to a modern state. The citizens can feel an affection for the hero which they may not for the abstract entity nation<sup>7</sup>.

Charismatic leadership, however, because it is so personalized is extremely unstable. Unlike the situations of traditional or rational-legal authority where it is possible to remove subordinates without undermining the source of authority, be it the monarch or the constitution, in a charismatic system the source of authority is never separated from its agent of implementation<sup>8</sup>. Given the inability to separate the sources from the agencies of authority, the charismatic leader must either place himself in a situation where he is not subject to criticism, e.g., a strong one-party system, or he must transcend partisan conflict. And, as long as the charismatic leader is present, there may be opposition on an individual or even informal factional basis but not an Opposition that is organized into a formal party with its own leader.

A consequence of this personalized leadership is that the kinds of

<sup>6</sup> David APTER, *The Gold Coast in Transition*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1955, p. 303.

<sup>7</sup> See Edward SHILS, «The Concentration and Dispersion of Charisma», *World Politics*, 11, 1958, pp. 2-3; and Immanuel WALLERSTEIN, *Africa, Politics of Independence*, New York, Vintage Books, 1961, pp. 85-102.

<sup>8</sup> For a discussion of this point see W. G. RUNCIMAN, «Charismatic Legitimacy and One-Party Rule in Ghana», *European Journal of Sociology* (Forthcoming).



patterns that become institutionalized are determined to a considerable extent by the inclinations of the particular leader. He may gather around himself a staunch group of disciples, men who feel a personal loyalty to him as their chief, and concentrate both the symbols and the practice of power in his own person. Or, by playing a role comparable to that of a constitutional monarch, who possesses both a government and a loyal opposition, but stands above partisan struggles, he may encourage the development of political parties and the evolution of a bureaucratic system. Thus the framework for the eventual development of either democratic or dictatorial institutions may be established.

The early American Republic, like many of the new nations, was legitimized by *charisma*. We tend to forget today that George Washington was idolized as much as many of the contemporary leaders of new states.

In the well-worn phrase of Henry Lee, he was *first in war, first in peace and first in the hearts of his countrymen...* He was the prime native hero, a necessary creation for a new country. For America, he was originator and vindicator, both patron saint and defender of the faith, in a curiously timeless fashion, as if he were Charlemagne, Saint Joan and Napoleon Bonaparte telescoped into one person... Babies were being christened after him as early as 1775, and while he was still President, his countrymen paid to see him in waxwork effigy. To his admirers he was «godlike Washington»<sup>9</sup>.

Washington's role as the charismatic leader under whose guidance democratic political institutions could grow was not an unwitting one. He self-consciously recognized that he alone could help the new nation gain stable legitimate institutions.

«With me... a predominant motive has been, to endeavor to gain time for our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption to that degree of strength and consistency, which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes»<sup>10</sup>.

The charismatic legitimacy which Washington conveyed upon the new political institutions was clearly necessary. Like latter-day leaders of new states, he was under pressure from those close to him to actually become a monarch. However, he recognized that his most

<sup>9</sup> Marcus CUNLIFFE, *George Washington, Man and Monument*, New York, Mentor Books, 1960, pp. 20-21, 15-16, 22.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 149-150.



important contribution to the new state was to give it time to establish what we now call a rational-legal system, a government of men under law. He permitted the members of his cabinet to form factions under the leadership of Hamilton and Jefferson and to fight over issues, even though he personally disliked the views of the Jeffersonians.

Washington wished to retire after one term in office, but the conflict between his two principal collaborators would not permit it. And on the urging of many, including Hamilton and Jefferson, he agreed to serve another term, thereby unwittingly permitting the further peaceful intensification of the conflict and the gradual formation of opposition parties to occur while he was still President, though, of course, he bitterly regretted the emergence of opposition politics. This turned out to be a crucial decision since, during the second administration, the country was torn apart by diverse sympathies for the French Revolution, and between Britain and France as military opponents.

Although there seems little question that Washington was treated like a charismatic leader, it may be argued that he was not one, since, unlike the ideal-typical example, he sought to retire from leadership. His ultimate success in refusing to accede to the demand that he act out his potential charisma — he withdrew from the presidency while seemingly in good health — may have pushed the society faster toward a legal-rational system of authority than would have evolved had he taken over the charismatic role *in toto* and identified the laws and the spirit of the nation with himself. This particular halfway type of charismatic leadership probably had a critical stabilizing effect on the society's evolution, for had Washington taken full advantage of his godlike position, the transition to a more stable form of authority would have been much more difficult. Of particular importance in this regard is the fact that the first succession conflict between John Adams and Jefferson took place while he still held office, enabling him to set a precedent as the first head of a modern state to turn over office to a duly elected successor. If he had continued in office until his death, it is quite possible that subsequent Presidential successions would not have occurred as easily.

The importance of Washington's role to the institutionalization of legal-rational authority in the early United States is best expressed in the role's four most pertinent dimensions: 1) His prestige was so great that he commanded the loyalty of the leaders of the different factions as well as the general populace. Thus, in a political entity marked by much cleavage he, in the person of himself, provided a

basis for unity. 2) He was strongly committed to constitutional rules of the game and exercised a paternal guidance upon those involved in developing the machinery of government. 3) He stayed in power long enough to permit the crystallization of factions into embryonic parties. 4) He set a precedent as to how succession should be managed by voluntarily retiring from office.

In most new nations the charismatic leader has tended to fulfill the first dimension only, acting as a symbol which represents and prolongs the feeling of unity developed prior to the achievement of independence<sup>11</sup>. Thus, following the Revolution, the charismatic personality is invaluable as a force continuing to bind together otherwise diverse private, ethnic and sectional groups formerly held together by a common antagonism to the «imperialist ogre». However the neglect of the other three important dimensions of Washington's role results in «charismatic personalities... not ordinarily build[ing] the institutions which are indispensable for carrying on the life of a political society». Thus, the disappearance of charismatic personalities raises again, as did the achievement of independence, the difficult problem of maintaining national unity among a conglomeration of groups and interests.

#### THE PROBLEM OF NATIONAL UNITY AND THE ROLE OF THE INTELLECTUALS

In new states, it is the young revolutionary intellectuals who have been the contenders «for the nation's right to exist, even to the extent of promulgating the very idea of the nation<sup>12</sup>». They have realized that the creation of a feeling of national unity among diverse elements, being necessary for the achievement of nationhood, is one of the most important problems of their new nations. The intellectuals have recognized «the parochialism of the constituent segments of the societies of the new states... [and that] the sense of membership in the nation, which is more or less coterminous with the population residing within the boundaries of the new states, is still very rudimentary and very frail<sup>13</sup>». This tendency toward parochialism is common because the boundaries of new national communities are artificial in the sense that they follow those «established by the

<sup>11</sup> See Donald S. ROTHCHILD, *Toward Unity in Africa*, Washington, D.C., Public Affairs Press, 1960, p. 2.

<sup>12</sup> Edward SHILS, «The Intellectual in The Political Development of The New States» (mimeographed, 1962), pp. 3-4.

<sup>13</sup> Edward SHILS, «Political Development in the New States», *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 2, 1960, p. 283.



imperial power rather than those coincident with pre-colonial socio-political groups<sup>14</sup>. Myron Weiner suggests the urgency of this problem when he reports with specific reference to South Asia that «the maintenance of national unity in the countries of South Asia is perhaps their most severe political problem<sup>15</sup>». In Africa also the «issues and problems of national unification are at the center of politics in the new and emergent societies<sup>16</sup>».

The problems of national unity and consensus alluded to by the various writers cited above are clearly more complex than those faced by the United States when it broke with Britain. Many African and Asian states are separated internally because of numerous linguistic groups and tribal units<sup>17</sup>, many of which have histories of bitter antagonism. India has been unable to resist demands that its internal state boundaries be drawn along linguistic lines, a development which places severe strains on its ultimate national unity<sup>18</sup>. Pakistan is divided into two sections, which vary in language and in level of economic development. Indonesia has faced the difficulty of resolving differences between the Javanese and those living in the outer islands, as well as ethnic and religious cleavages. Burma has had at least five different separatist movements struggling for autonomy or independence. The West Indian Federation, in spite of a similar language background, has broken up. The various efforts to create a federated structure out of the successor states of the French African Empire have failed. This has been true also with respect to attempts to unite any two or more of the Arab nations. And the tragic story of the Congo presents the most extreme example of the difficulties inherent in winning the loyalty of areas and groups with diverse cultures and histories to a new political authority system which is dominated by others.

<sup>14</sup> James S. COLEMAN, «Nationalism in Tropical Africa», in John H. KAUTSKY, ed., *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries*, New York, John Wiley, 1962, p. 189. See also Thomas HODGKIN, *Nationalism in Colonial Africa*, New York University Press, 1957, pp. 22-23.

<sup>15</sup> Myron WEINER, «The Politics of South Asia», in Gabriel ALMOND and James S. COLEMAN, eds., *The Politics of Developing Areas*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1960, p. 239

<sup>16</sup> COLEMAN, «Nationalism in Tropical...», *op.cit.*, p. 367. See also Max F. MILLIKAN and Donald L. M. BACKMER, eds., *The Emerging Nations*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1961, pp. 76, 77-78.

<sup>17</sup> See KAUTSKY, *op.cit.*, p. 34.

<sup>18</sup> For an analysis of the relationship between variations in knowledge of different languages and the statistical chances for the triumph of a language as the national one, see Karl DEUTSCH, *Nationalism and Social Communication*, New York, John Wiley, 1953, esp. pp. 97-126, 170-213.

Early American history presented similar problems and reactions even though the oldest new nation was relatively unified in cultural terms. Its Western European heritage «established certain common traditions in advance, facilitating the task of harmonizing differences of language, culture, religion and politics<sup>19</sup>». Nevertheless, «throughout the colonial period, Americans had tended to assume that these differences of language, culture, and religion would prevent the growth of a common loyalty<sup>20</sup>».

Deutsch and his associates point out that one of the essential conditions for the amalgamation of small political units into a larger one is the growth of «compatibility of the main values held by the politically relevant strata of all participating units». They observe that values current in the colonies underwent «accelerated change and development in the course of the American Revolution and its aftermath<sup>21</sup>». «During the Revolutionary era the need to stress national unity sometimes induced Americans to become forgetful of their diverse ethnic origins and to overlook the persistence of cultural differences. Particularly was this so among men who were anxious that the young republic should not be fatally weakened by a denial of adequate powers to the federal government<sup>22</sup>».

One of the processes by which the integration of political units often proceeds is by the decline of «party divisions which reinforce the boundaries between political units eligible for amalgamation, and the rise in their stead of party divisions cutting across them<sup>23</sup>». Early America possessed social bases for political cleavage which cut across the established political units: the states. In many of them, demands emerged for broader voting rights and for proportionate representation in the legislatures for rural and western counties as against the richer or more urbanized seaboard. These cleavages provided one basis for trans-state parties.

However, before parties based upon these cleavages could play a role in unifying portions of the polity across state lines, interest groups in the different states had to learn to see beyond the particular issues with which they were concerned. They had to recognize

<sup>19</sup> ROTHCHILD, *op.cit.*, p. 6.

<sup>20</sup> Maldwyn Allen JONES, *American Immigration*, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1960, p. 40.

<sup>21</sup> Karl W. DEUTSCH, S. A. BURRELL, R. A. KANN, M. LEE, Jr., M. LICHTERMAN, R. E. LINDGREN, F. A. L. LOEWENHEIM, R. W. VAN WAGENEN, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1957, p. 48.

<sup>22</sup> JONES, *op.cit.*, p. 39.

<sup>23</sup> DEUTSCH et al., *op.cit.*, p. 76.



that they had something in common with other groups advocating different forms of equality. And a political arena in which the individual rather than the state was the political unit had to be created<sup>24</sup>.

In spite of working and fighting together in a seven-year struggle for independence, the best governmental structure which the Americans could devise was a loose federal union under the Articles of Confederation. This union lacked any national executive, and in effect, preserved most of the sovereignty and autonomy of each state. This effort at a supra-national state was concerned with limiting any central authority.

The pressure to establish a unified central authority structure in the contemporary new states comes mainly from the nationalist intellectual elite who are concerned with creating an important arena of effective operation through which the new nation, and they, can demonstrate their competence. Currently, the main instrument for such action has been the revolutionary party.

After 1783, a national party that unified interests across state lines was approximated by «the advocates of central authority, who set up the plans for a convention on federal authority, to be held in Philadelphia... A small group of political leaders with a Continental vision and essentially a consciousness of the United States' *international* impotence, provided the matrix of the movement... Indeed, an argument with great force — particularly since Washington was its incarnation — urged that our very survival in the Hobbesian jungle of world politics depended upon a reordering and strengthening of our national sovereignty<sup>25</sup>». Many of those served as delegates in what became the Constitutional Convention had served in the Revolutionary Continental Congress. «If there is any one feature that most unites the future leading supporters of the Constitution, it was their close engagement with this continental aspect of the Revolution... All of them had been united in an experience, and had formed commitments, which dissolved provincial boundaries... The future of this generation's careers was staked upon the national quality of the experience which had formed them. In a number of outstanding cases energy, initiative, talent, and ambition had combined with a conception of affairs which had grown immense in

<sup>24</sup> See William N. CHAMBERS, *Parties in a New Nation*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1963, Chapter I, p. 11 (in manuscript).

<sup>25</sup> John P. ROCHE, «The Founding Fathers: A Reform Caucus in Action», *The American Political Science Review*, 60, 1961, p. 801. (Emphasis in the original).

scope and promise by the close of the Revolution. There is every reason to think that a contraction of this scope, in the years that immediately followed, operated as a powerful challenge»<sup>26</sup>. Shils points to an analogous situation in a discussion of the nationalist movements in Asia and Africa when he states that young intellectuals «drew inspiration and comfort from abroad [and] felt that their actions were one with a mighty surge all over the world... *This sense of being a part of the larger world infused into the politics of the second [younger] generation the permanently bedeviling tension between province and metropolis...*»<sup>27</sup>.

Deutsch and his associates discovered that the growth of a new political generation is common in the growth of a new political community from several smaller ones. It breaks habits of thinking in terms of the older political units. «The younger men were usually more committed to new ways of doing things and more willing to accept the new size of political units than their predecessors had been»<sup>28</sup>.

The Constitutional Convention being composed mainly of these young ambitious «Continentalists», was relatively free of ideological clashes, and therefore much like a political party convention of unitary-state advocates, meeting to create a political platform acceptable to the public.

John P. Roche has argued that there was no ideological rift within the Constitutional Convention because almost all the delegates belonged to the central government party. He suggests that the differences of opinion which did emerge were structural or tactical rather than ideological. That is, there was no conflict between «nationalists» versus «states-rightists» but rather an argument over representation, the small states versus the big states. «The Virginia Plan [which] envisioned a unitary national government effectively free from and dominant over the states ... may ... be considered, in ideological terms as the delegates' Utopia...»<sup>29</sup>. However, «the delegates from the small states ... apparently realizing that under the Virginia Plan, Massachusetts, Virginia and Pennsylvania could virtually dominate the national government — and probably appreciating that to sell this program to the 'folks back home' would be impossible ... dug in their heels and demanded time for a consideration of alternatives». Out of this consideration came the New Jersey

<sup>26</sup> Stanley ELKINS and Eric MCKITTRICK, «The Founding Fathers: Young Men of The Revolution», *Political Science Quarterly*, 76, 1961, p. 202-3, 205-6.

<sup>27</sup> SHILS, *op.cit.*, p. 277 (emphasis mine).

<sup>28</sup> DEUTSCH et al., *op.cit.*, p. 86.

<sup>29</sup> ROCHE, *op.cit.*, p. 805.



Plan, which according to standard analyses was an expression of the 'states-righter's' «reversion to the *status-quo* under the Articles of Confederation...». However, Roche, suggests this was a political maneuver designed to gain support from those not represented at the Convention, rather than a defense of states' rights among the delegates.

It is true that the New Jersey Plan put the states back into the institutional picture, but [Roche] argues that to do so was a recognition of political reality rather than an affirmation of states' rights. A serious case can be made that the advocates of the New Jersey Plan, far from being ideological addicts of states' rights, intended to substitute for the Virginia Plan a system which would both retain strong national power and have a chance of adoption in the states... In other words, the advocates of the New Jersey Plan concentrated their fire on what they held to be the political liabilities of the Virginia Plan — which were matters of institutional structure — rather than on the proposed scope of national authority<sup>30</sup>.

This «group of extremely talented democratic politicians» were not «rhapsodic» about the final form of the Constitution, but they had «refused to attempt the establishment of a strong, centralized sovereignty on the principle of legislative supremacy for the excellent reason that the people would not accept it ... *political realities* forced them to water down their objectives and they settled, like the good politicians they were, for half a loaf... The result was a Constitution which the people, in fact, by democratic processes, did accept, and a new and far better national government was established<sup>31</sup>».

Thus the energy behind the «nationalistic» aims of the Constitutional Convention came from leaders who were mainly a young generation whose careers, having been launched in the Continental war effort of the Revolution depended upon the continuance of a nationalistic outlook provided by a centralized government. In age and aspiration, they resembled the leadership of many contemporary new states which usually consists of young revolutionary intellectuals, often antagonistic toward the older generation, who do not share their nationalistic vision because they are better established in local social hierarchies. Similarly, those opposed to a strong central American government, who had little, if any representation at the Constitutional Convention, came from an older generation whose careers were not only state-

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 806.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 813, 815, 816.

centered but had been formed prior of the Revolutionary war effort<sup>32</sup>.

The young intellectuals in contemporary new nations experience political antagonism to the powers that be. This often comes from a sense of frustration because they have no place in the old society. Their new values do not coincide with those that would place them in honored positions in the old local hierarchies. Opportunism more than economic or class differences accounts for the conflict between the old and the new «generations».

Unlike the «old» predominantly sacred intellectuals most of whom represented or spoke for the powers-that-were,... non-western intelligentsias do not, sociologically speaking, as a rule represent anyone but themselves. It is the exception rather than the rule that the young aristocrat, the landowner's son or for that matter even the scion of a newly-established bourgeois class, once he has acquired a western education... becomes the defender and spokesman of the class of his social origin...

In short, non-western intelligentsias, in so far as they are politically active... tend to be social revolutionaries whose ideological aims as often as not militate against the *status quo*<sup>33</sup>.

Following the American revolutionary war «the spirit of unity generated by the struggle for independence ... lapsed» and the older generation reverted to its old provincial ways, the particularism and inertia of local authority<sup>34</sup>. With the exception of Pennsylvania this meant primarily that men far more than measures, personal connections rather than party machines played the most significant role in the conduct of politics<sup>35</sup>.

In this respect, the difference between the anti-Federalists and the «Continental» Federalists is suggestive of Hodgkin's classification of the structure of African parties into primitive and modern.

Parties of the former type [primitive] are dominated by 'personalities', who enjoy a superior social status, either as traditional rulers or members of ruling families, or as belonging to the higher ranks of the urban, professional elite (lawyers, doctors, etc.)... Their political machinery, central and local, is of a rudimentary kind... They have little, if anything, in the way of a secretariat or fulltime officials... They depend for popular support less upon organization and propaganda than on habits of respect for traditional authority, or wealth and reputation...

<sup>32</sup> ELKINS and MCKITRICK, *op.cit.*, pp. 203-4.

<sup>33</sup> See KAUTSKY, *op.cit.*, p. 240.

<sup>34</sup> ELKINS and MCKITRICK, *op.cit.*, p. 206.

<sup>35</sup> CHAMBERS, *op.cit.*, Chapter I, p. 5.



Parties of the second type [modern] aim at... a much more elaborate structure. Since their chief claim and function is to represent the mass, they are committed to a form of organization that is (certainly on paper and to some extent in practice) highly democratic.... Parties of this type are able to achieve a much higher level of efficiency than the 'parties of personalities'; ...because they possess a continuously functioning central office.... Indeed, dependence upon professional politicians — *permanents* — 'who naturally tend to form a class and assume a certain authority' for the running of the machine is one of the most distinctive features of the 'mass' party.... It depends for its strength not on the backing of traditional authority but upon propaganda, designed to appeal particularly to the imagination of the young, to women, to the semi-urbanized and discontented; to those who are outside the local hierarchies, and interested in reform and change<sup>36</sup>.

«Modern» national parties are serving to unite the varying ethnic divisions in emerging African states. However, early America differed from the nations in Africa in that it did not have «modern» parties after which to model its own attempts to unify the country. These emerged as a result of needs in the American situation, some of which, nevertheless tend to parallel those which stimulate «modern» party organization in Africa and Asia today.

The continental «caucus» at the Constitutional convention did not represent a full transition to a modern party. Such a transition implies the growth of an organization that is rationally calculated toward vote getting. It also implies that this organization is connected with a social base whose ideological interests are common. The struggle for ratification was particular to each state. In some the upper classes were for it while in others they were against it according to the peculiarities of politics in each. The «Constitutionalists» relied on old political techniques, including the manipulation of notables, cliques and coteries to get ratification through.

However, in so far as the transition to modern parties implies the rational calculation of what policies are necessary to get votes, the Constitutional convention marked a step in this direction. First, it created an organ in which policies touching on the interests of persons in all of the states were to be debated. Secondly, it marked a movement away from the politics of notables and coteries who were deeply tied to the old political structure of state supremacy. By establishing the principle of rationally calculating how to marshal public support, it opened the door for policies that circumvented state politics and addressed themselves directly to specific interest groups in all

<sup>36</sup> HODGKINS, *op.cit.*, pp. 156-159.

states. As such it cast the die (to use Weber's analogy) in the direction of popular based parties that could unify the polity across state lines<sup>37</sup>.

This is similar in some respects to the policies of nationalist intellectuals in new states who espouse populism as a consequence of their opportunistic politics. Where they are not connected to the existing power hierarchies, their only source of power lies in the people. It becomes a way of legitimating their leadership, be it democratic or oligarchical, because the people constitute the substance to be served by governmental policy. However, their populism is derived from their ambivalence toward more developed nations. In attempting to establish a national identity that will make their nation one among many, they feel they need to play up those elements that make their nation unique. They may try to overcome their own feeling of cultural inferiority by rejecting the premises of «culture» in the more developed countries and lauding the values in their own culture on some other grounds. The cult of populism, the «belief in the creativity and in the superior moral worth of the ordinary people, of the uneducated and the unintellectual»<sup>38</sup> enables the intellectuals to have faith that the culture of their embryonic states will quickly far surpass those of the decadent imperialist nations.

The Federalist party organization could be described as parallel to those patron parties in Africa that are national but which represent a linking of local notables rather than an organization designed to mobilize the common people<sup>39</sup>. The first «modern» party in the sense that there was a «coordination in activity between leaders at the capital, and leaders, activities and popular following in the states, counties, and towns»<sup>40</sup> was to come with the crystallization of the Jeffersonian Democratic Republican party.

The Democratic Republicans developed party organizations for some of the same reasons that leaders develop such organizations in Africa today. They were opposed to the established authorities whose policies largely dominated politics through the Federalist or-

<sup>37</sup> MAX WEBER, *The Methodology of the Social Sciences*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1949, pp. 182-185.

<sup>38</sup> EDWARD SHILS, «The Intellectuals and the Powers: Some Perspectives for Comparative Analysis», *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 1, 1958, p. 20.

<sup>39</sup> RUTH SCHACTER, «Single-party systems in West Africa», *American Political Science Review*, 55, 1961, p. 297.

<sup>40</sup> CHAMBERS, *op.cit.*, Chapter 4, p. 8.



ganization<sup>41</sup>. When the Jay treaty caused popular indignation and concern on the part of some merchants that the British would not pay their war debts, the Republicans took advantage of these disaffected elements to organize an opposition based on popular support. They appealed to social categories that cross-cut existing political boundaries just as the African mass-based parties do<sup>42</sup>. In so doing, the Democratic-Republican party served as a means of uniting the citizens of the several states in national citizenship by mobilizing their common interests in the national power arena.

However, as is well known, the evolution of national political parties could not erase differences in regional interests. Nor did the ratification of the Constitution serve to legitimate the new governmental structure, even though it provided a basis for national unity. Only with time, and after many attempts to thwart its powers, was the federal government finally able to achieve a high degree of political legitimacy.

A number of Southern apologists after the Civil War, and more recently Arthur Schlesinger, Sr., (who definitely doesn't fall in that category) have documented the proposition that almost every state in the country and every major political faction and interest group attempted, at one time or other between 1790 and 1860, to eliminate the power of the national government or to break up the Union directly<sup>43</sup>.

There were many threats to secede in the first decade of national existence coming from both northern and southern states<sup>44</sup>. In 1798 two future Presidents, Jefferson and Madison, sought the passage of nullification ordinances by state legislatures which proclaimed the right of each state to decide on national authority within its boundaries.

After leaving national office in 1801, various Federalist leaders sought in 1804, 1808, and 1812 to take the New England or northern states out of the Union or to push the western ones out. Aaron Burr, Democratic-Republican Vice-President from 1801-1805, tried to organize a secession by the West. The New England Federalists opposed

<sup>41</sup> SCHACTER, *op.cit.*, p. 295.

<sup>42</sup> See *Ibid.*, p. 301 for a description of the unifying functions of the African mass parties.

<sup>43</sup> See Arthur SCHLESINGER, [Sr.], *New Viewpoints in American History*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1922, pp. 220-240; Jefferson DAVIS, *The Rise and Fall of the Confederate Government*, New York, Collier Books, 1961, pp. 56-60.

<sup>44</sup> See Marshall SMELSER, «The Federalist Period as an Age of Passion», *The American Quarterly*, 10, 1958, p. 393.

the War of 1812 and many of them, including elected state officials, sought to sabotage the war effort.

Secessionist threats are characteristic in contemporary new nations. For example Rothchild states that one of the «basic problem[s] which Nigerians must be prepared to face is secession [for] during the last decade politicians from every area in the country have threatened secession...»<sup>45</sup>. However, he feels that «the growth of national parties will do a great deal to make the federal government a dynamic and unifying force in Nigerian life»<sup>46</sup>.

In the United States, when the slavery issue became important, both abolitionists and defenders of slavery talked of destroying the Constitution and the Union. In the early period of the struggle when the abolitionists despaired of eliminating slavery because of guarantees in the Constitution, it was described by some as a «slave-holders» document and Garrison called it «a covenant with death and an agreement with hell»<sup>47</sup>.

Because of opposition to slavery, some northern states argued non-cooperation with the government during the Mexican War, perceived by them as a struggle to extend slave territory<sup>48</sup>. There were, in fact, many deserters from the American Army during this war. It is «apparently the only case known in which a body of United States soldiers after deserting subsequently formed a distinct corps in the enemy's army...»<sup>49</sup>.

Various northern states passed laws during the 1850's, the so-called Personal Liberty Laws, which were designed to prevent the enforcement of federal legislation, the Fugitive Slave Law<sup>50</sup>.

Thus, in the early United States, as in contemporary new states, the achievement of national unity, in part based upon the development of respect for a national authority, was no easy task.

The possibilities of secession remain one of the basic problems facing many new states. Their unity immediately after gaining independence «is largely explained by the negative, anti-Western, anti-colonial content of non-Western nationalism. One need not be a prophet of doom to anticipate that this negative unity may in

<sup>45</sup> ROTHCHILD, *op.cit.*, pp. 174-175.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 176.

<sup>47</sup> W. L. GARRISON, *The Words of Garrison*, Boston, Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1905, p. 25.

<sup>48</sup> See SCHLESINGER, *op.cit.*, pp. 230-231.

<sup>49</sup> Edward S. WALLACE, «Notes and Comment — Deserters in the Mexican War», *The Hispanic American Historical Review*, 15, 1935, p. 374.

<sup>50</sup> SCHLESINGER, *op.cit.*, p. 231.



time, and perhaps before long, weaken, and that the newly independent non-Western nation-states may then find themselves confronted by some of the dissensions and antagonisms which nationalist aspirations have so often brought in their wake elsewhere<sup>51</sup>.

#### OPPOSITION RIGHTS AND THE ESTABLISHMENT OF NEW POLITIES

The issues involved in the emergence of legitimate national authority and of the creation of national unity and those which pertain to the establishment of democratic procedures are clearly separate problems, although they are sometimes confused in discussing the politics of new nations. Democracy may be conceived of as a system of institutionalized opposition in which the people choose among alternative contenders for public office<sup>52</sup>. To create a stable representative decision-making process which provides a legitimate place for those without power to advocate «error» and the overthrow of those in office, is extremely difficult in any polity, and is particularly problematic in new states which must be concerned also with the sheer problem of national authority itself.

In a recent Ghanaese White Paper seeking to justify legislation and police actions which involved restrictions against and actual imprisonment of opposition politicians, the Ghana government suggested that these actions were necessary because of plots, saboteurs, subversion, and threats of foreign intervention. The White Paper argues that: «[T]he strains experienced by an emergent country immediately after independence are certainly as great as, if not greater than, the strains experienced by a developed country in wartime<sup>53</sup>». According to Nkrumah, a new state «is still weakly expressed as a national unity», and its frail structure must be protected by «identifying the emergent nation with the party», that is, by denying the possibility of a legitimate opposition since the latter would endanger the stability of the nation<sup>54</sup>.

<sup>51</sup> BENDA, *op.cit.*, p. 40-1. See also COLEMAN, *op.cit.*, pp. 167-194.

<sup>52</sup> I have elaborated the concept of democracy in other writings. See my *Political Man*, *op.cit.*, pp. 45-47; «Introduction» to Robert MICHELS, *Political Parties*, New York, Collier Books, 1962, pp. 33-35; and S. M. LIPSET, M. TROW, and J. S. COLEMAN, *Union Democracy*, Glencoe, The Free Press, 1956, pp. 405-412.

<sup>53</sup> Discussed and cited in Dennis AUSTIN, «Strong Rule in Ghana», *The Listener*, 67, 1962, p. 156.

<sup>54</sup> *Loc. cit.*

Restrictions on democratic rights and opposition parties are, of course, not unique to Ghana among the contemporary new states. In Africa, the only new state with more than one significant party is Nigeria, «and this is true only because it is a federal ... [system] reflecting one-party domination in the regions»<sup>55</sup>.

Essentially the establishment of democratic rights requires the institutionalization of the rules of the political game. In the absence of such institutionalization, the participants are involved in situations where the rules are not clearly defined, at least there are no formal guarantees, and hence they have no assurance that their sense of morality, what they believe should or should not be done, is shared by others. Their status is insecure and is easily threatened by the presence of opposing groups who may press for «evil» measures and personal power. The desire to foster one set of goals, or to protect prestige and power, press those involved to ignore weak rules designed to protect opposition rights. An examination of history provides the argument that tolerance or protection of «error» usually emerged as a result of conflict among diverse factions. Sometimes it occurred because opposing groups found they could not destroy each other, and, after a long conflict came to accept each other. On other occasions, opposition groups, denied democratic rights by power-holders, have advanced a democratic ideology as part of their criticism of the incumbents, and upon succeeding to office enacted juridical protections of freedom. The history of efforts to institutionalize such rights in voluntary associations and in new states and post-revolutionary societies, indicates how fragile is a simple intellectual commitment to democratic rights, when placed against the conviction that truth will vanish with the opposition's triumph, or that present office holders will lose all claim to significant status.

The early history of the United States reveals many of the same problems and pressures to eliminate democratic rights as do those of contemporary new states. During Washington's first administration, all important differences of opinion could be expressed within the government since both Jefferson and Hamilton, the leaders of what were to become the two major parties, were the most influential members of the Cabinet. After Jefferson's withdrawal at the end of Washington's first term, and the subsequent formation of an opposition party around 1797, tactics such as subversion and defiance on both sides increased greatly<sup>56</sup>.

<sup>55</sup> RUNCIMAN, *op.cit.*

<sup>56</sup> Joseph CHARLES, *The Origins of the American Party System*, New York, Harper Torch Books, 1961, p. 42.



In many respects, even though early America had no «modern» type parties on which to model its political organization, the evolution of a «government» party and then an «opposition» party parallels developments in contemporary new states. Hamilton, the political genius behind the first incumbents, organized the first party to insure popular support for governmental policies. It was a national «government party» as opposed to the previous state politicking. It was «a party of stability, dedicated in effect to the idea that the first imperative of government in a new nation was that it must govern and sustain itself»<sup>57</sup>. As such, organized opposition to it was contrary to its conception.

Opposition to the government's policies did not grow initially as a party but as individual protest both on the popular level and within the political elite. The idea of political organization was itself new. However, opposition gradually crystallized into a political movement around the leadership of Madison and Jefferson. Its adherents were asserting «that the new polity should also [in addition to maintaining its stability] provide room for counter action, ...». So «the emerging republicans were 'going to the people' in a virtually unprecedented attempt not only to represent popular interests and concerns, but to monopolize popular opposition to those who held power. ...[I]f their appeal to planters, farmers, and 'mechanics' was broadened sufficiently to succeed, it would end by displacing the Federalists in power and substituting a new set of governors»<sup>58</sup>.

The Federalists viewed such organized opposition in much the same light as many leaders of the contemporary new states view their rivals.

[T]he Federalists took an intolerant position regarding the opposition party, which seemed to be a race of marplots characterized by excessive ambition, unwholesome partisanship and a dangerous reliance upon the judgment of the voters... Federalist private correspondence was peppered with references to Republican disloyalty, insincerity, intrigue and demagoguery... The conclusion almost forced upon the reader...is that the *two-party system is immoral...* It became almost normal to consider opposition as seditious and, in extraordinary cases, as treasonable<sup>59</sup>.

In a sense, Madison and Jefferson were feeling their way. They were loyal to the nation they had helped to create but they felt that

<sup>57</sup> CHAMBERS, *op.cit.*, Chapter 3, p. 15.

<sup>58</sup> *Ibid.*, Chapter 3, p. 16.

<sup>59</sup> SMELSER, *op.cit.*, pp. 394-395 (emphasis mine).

the principles, such as equality, which justified its creation were being undermined. Madison evolved a novel solution to the problem of discontent. It involved acceptance of organized opposition within the system, one that would permit the displacement of the present holders of power «not by intrigue or violence but by peaceful means, by the weight of votes in elections, by popular choice or decision»<sup>60</sup>. Thus there were provided ways for the political system sketched in the Constitution to continue gaining legitimacy among those portions of the public and politicians who opposed the policies of office holders at any given time.

The strains endemic in the establishment of a new structure of authority were enhanced by the fact that the nation and the embryonic parties were divided in their sympathies for the two major contestants in the European war, Revolutionary France and Great Britain. Each side was convinced that the other had secret intentions to take the country to war in support of the forces of evil. The French terror was a particular evil to the Federalists, and they, like conservatives in other countries, were convinced that French agents were conspiring with sympathetic Americans to overthrow the government here<sup>61</sup>.

The Federalists, frightened by the French Revolution and by various examples of domestic violence, were opposed to any form of organized opposition. They were much more violent in their denunciations of the treasonable activities of the Republicans than were the Jeffersonians in return<sup>62</sup>. The Alien and Sedition Acts passed in 1798 gave the President «the power to order out of the country any alien whom he thought dangerous to the public peace or whom he had reasonable grounds to suspect of plotting against the government» and left such aliens without recourse to the courts<sup>63</sup>. The Sedition Act «was intended to deal with citizens or aliens who too severely criticized the government.... In its final form it was made a high misdemeanor 'unlawfully to combine and conspire' in order to oppose the legal measures of the government ... [t]o publish a false or malicious writing against the government of the United States, the President, or Con-

<sup>60</sup> CHAMBERS, *op.cit.*, Chapter 3, p. 16.

<sup>61</sup> John C. MILLER, *Crisis in Freedom. The Alien and Sedition Acts*, Boston, Little, Brown and Company, 1951, p. 14.

<sup>62</sup> SMELSER, *op.cit.*, pp. 397-398.

<sup>63</sup> See MILLER, *op.cit.*, and James M. SMITH, *Freedom's Fetters, The Alien and Sedition Laws and American Civil Liberties*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1956.



gress with the purpose of stirring up hatred or resistance against them...»<sup>64</sup>.

The fact that the law was designed for partisan purposes was obvious. All those arrested and convicted under it by the Federalist officials and juries, were Republicans<sup>65</sup>. These efforts to undermine democratic rights gave Jefferson and Madison a major issue which historians believe played an important role in defeating the Federalists in 1800.

Once defeated for the Presidency in 1800, the Federalists never were able to regain office on a national scale and virtually disappeared after 1814. The causes for the downfall of the Federalists are many and complex. Among them are the extension of the suffrage, and their unwillingness or inability to learn how to perform as an opposition party in a democracy, particularly one which emphasized equality. Some historians suggest they failed basically because they did not believe in parties which appealed to the people, and particularly as men convinced of the propriety of their right to rule, they did not believe in an opposition party<sup>66</sup>.

The civil liberties record of the Jeffersonians, in office, is a better one than that of the Federalists. Their years of opposition had led them to make many statements in favor of democratic rights, but oppositionists in other lands have forgotten such programs once in power when faced with «unscrupulous criticism». Perhaps more important is the fact that the Democratic-Republicans did believe in states rights and did oppose using federal courts to try common law crimes. Also, the federal judiciary remained for some time in the hands of Federalist judges, who presumably were loath to permit convictions of their political co-thinkers. Finally, there was the difference in the nature of the opposition. The Federalists were dealing with a growing party that could realistically hope for eventual victory; while the Democratic-Republicans, when in office, were faced by a rapidly declining party, whose very lack of faith in the extension of democratic processes was to undermine any chance it had of returning to office. Since the Federalists were committing political suicide, there was no urgent need for the administration to find extreme means to repress them. The existence of a real but declining op-

<sup>64</sup> John Spencer BASSETT, *The Federalist System*, New York, Harper and Bros., 1960, pp. 258-259.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 263-264.

<sup>66</sup> William O. LYNCH, *Fifty Years of Party Warfare (1789-1837)*, Indianapolis, Bobbs Merrill, 1931, pp. 122-123.

position may, therefore, be regarded as a contribution to the institutionalization of democratic rights.

Yet it should be noted that on the level of state government, Democratic-Republicans did use their power to crack down on Federalist opinion. «Jefferson was no advocate of a 'licentious' press; like Hamilton and Adams, he believed that the press ought to be restrained 'within the legal and wholesome limits of truth'. He differed from the Federalists chiefly in favoring that this restraint be imposed by the states rather than by the Federal government...»<sup>67</sup>. In 1803, Jefferson wrote to Governor McKean of Pennsylvania in the following terms:

The Federalists, he noted, having failed to destroy the freedom of the press «by their gag law, seem to have attacked it in an opposite form, that is by pushing its licentiousness and its lying to such a degree of prostitution as to deprive it of all credit... I have long thought that a few prosecutions of the most eminent offenders would have a wholesome effect in restoring the integrity of the presses»<sup>68</sup>.

Where the Federalists controlled a state government, as in the case of Connecticut, and hence prevented the application of the Democratic doctrine that seditious libel was a state offense, Jefferson was not loath to inaugurate prosecutions in the federal courts. In 1806, six indictments were drawn against four Connecticut Federalist editors and two ministers on the charge of seditious libel of the President. The ministers were charged with committing the libel in *sermons*<sup>69</sup>.

Leonard Levy concludes his survey of freedom of speech and press in early American history by arguing that the Democrats, no more than the Federalists, believed in these freedoms when confronted with serious opposition. Each was prepared to use principled libertarian arguments when his «ox was being gored».

The various efforts by both Federalists and Democratic-Republicans to repress the rights of their opponents clearly indicate that in many ways our early political officials resembled those heads of modern new states who view criticism of themselves as tantamount to an attack on the nation itself. Such behavior characterizes leaders of polities in which the concept of democratic turnover in office has not been institutionalized. To accept criticism as proper, demands the belief that men may be loyal to the polity and yet disapprove of

<sup>67</sup> MILLER, *op.cit.*, p. 231.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 300. The state did indict a Federalist editor shortly thereafter.

<sup>69</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 302-305.



the particular set of incumbents. The defeat of the Federalists in the elections of 1800 represented *the first occasion in modern politics in which an incumbent political party suffered an electoral defeat and simply turned over power to its opponents*. This acceptance of the rules of the electoral game has not occurred in many new states, and even in some of the old states which have had democratic elections for many years.

The decline of the Federalists after 1800 meant that the United States did not experience a real succession problem again until 1829 with the inauguration of Andrew Jackson. The Virginia Dynasty of Jefferson, Madison, and Monroe, governed the country for 24 years, one succeeding the other without difficulty. A national two-party system did not emerge anew until the 1830's, when President Jackson's opponents united in the Whig party.

The almost unchallenged rule of the Virginia Dynasty and the Democratic-Republican Party served to legitimate national authority and democratic rights. By the time the nation divided again into two broad warring factions which appealed for mass support, the country had existed for 40 years, the Constitution had been glorified, and the authority of the courts had been accepted as definitive.

#### THE NEED FOR PAYOFF

All claims to a legitimate title-to-rule in new states must ultimately win acceptance through demonstrating effectiveness. The loyalty of the different groups to the system must be won through developing in them the conviction that this system is an excellent way to accomplish their objectives. And even claims to legitimacy of a supernatural sort, such as «the gift of grace,» are subjected on the part of the populace to a highly pragmatic test, that is, what is the payoff? For new states, demonstrating effectiveness means one thing, economic development. Given the revolution of «rising expectations» that has swept the emerging nations, need for payoff in terms of economic goods and living standards is more important than ever<sup>70</sup>.

As most new states lack intrinsic means for rapid economic growth, their goals have led in recent years to large-scale government planning and direct state intervention. Although such efforts concur with socialist ideology, the desire to use the state to direct and speed up the processes of economic growth has deeper roots than ideolog-

<sup>70</sup> See David APTER, *The Gold Coast...*, *op.cit.*, p. 322-323.

ical conviction. To a considerable degree the leaders seek development as part of their more general effort to overcome feelings of national inferiority by establishing their new nation as a major one in the eyes of the world, and particularly of the former metropolitan ruler. A continued lack of development would mean a continuing sense of inferiority.

Similar processes were at work in the United States, even though after the Revolution, many leaders, particularly Jefferson opposed any federal aid to manufacturing or commerce. As one economic historian has put it:

American industrial consciousness grew out of the broad wave of political and economic resentment against England, but was mainly directed ... toward the transfer of English skill and technique to this country. By 1830, it had succeeded, and American technology and industrial organization were by then comparable to those of England<sup>71</sup>.

There was an «appreciation of the fact that English superiority in technique could be overcome only by borrowing it. The new wave of industrial agitation rose to a rapid climax in the first years of the federal government. Manufactures, like the Constitution, were expected to strengthen the country and help it achieve true independence»<sup>72</sup>.

Even Jefferson, the enthusiastic supporter of the physiocratic doctrine that agriculture was the only source of true wealth, felt compelled, when President, to modify his former objections to manufacturing. «As early as 1805... [he] complained that his former views had been misunderstood. They were intended to apply only to the great cities of Europe and not to this country at the present time»<sup>73</sup>.

In evaluating early American economic development, it should be recognized that there was a *great deal of government intervention, and even public ownership and investment, in the economy, designed to develop industry and commerce*. As Carter Goodrich has pointed out in discussing such activities, «The closest modern analogy, indeed, is to be found in the current projects of so-called underdeveloped countries... So much, indeed, was done by public initiative that the distinguished economic historian, G. S. Callender, declared

<sup>71</sup> Samuel REZNECK, «The Rise and Early Development of Industrial Consciousness in the United States, 1760-1830», *Journal of Economic and Business History*, 4, 1932, pp. 784-785.

<sup>72</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 788.

<sup>73</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 799; V. L. PARRINGTON, *Main Currents in American Thought*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1930, I, pp. 347-348.



that this country was at the time an early and leading example of the 'modern tendency to extend the activity of the state into industry'<sup>74</sup>. On a national level, efforts were made, stimulated by Albert Gallatin, Jefferson's Secretary of the Treasury, to foster direct federal support for companies building new transportation facilities. But, with some minor exceptions, these proposals, though advocated by Jefferson and Monroe, failed. The most important federal measures directly supporting economic growth took the form of investment in the Bank of the United States and, more importantly, protective tariffs to encourage domestic industry as against buying products manufactured in England<sup>75</sup>.

The failure of the effort to involve the federal government directly in economic activities did not reflect the strength of business opposition or *laissez-faire* beliefs. «States' rights, state and sectional interests, and a belief in the capacities of the several states seem to have played the decisive role in the downfall of national planning. By contrast business enterprise offered far less formidable competition»<sup>76</sup>. As a consequence, most governmental efforts occurred at the state level. Many states felt it proper and necessary to use public funds to develop transportation facilities, banking, manufactures, and the like. Since such matters were seen under the new Constitution as largely in the province of state authority, it is necessary to look into the flurry of state intervention for evidence of the desire of the American polity to further economic growth.

State intervention, on behalf of economic growth, took various forms, sometimes regulative, as in the setting up of inspection standards, and sometimes directly encouraging, as in financial assistance from lotteries, or in the form of bounties. A third method was the franchise which amounted to a monopoly that protected a company from competition during its early growth. And not unimportant in many states was direct government investment in, or outright ownership of, various companies whose development was deemed necessary for economic growth or the public welfare.

The system of public inspection «set up categories of goods which could not be sold and thus placed in a privileged position those

<sup>74</sup> Carter GOODRICH, «National Planning of Internal Improvements», *Political Science Quarterly*, 63, 1948, p. 18.

<sup>75</sup> See Fred A. SHANNON, *America's Economic Growth*, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1940, pp. 187-201, for an exposition of United States protective tariff policy.

<sup>76</sup> GOODRICH, *op.cit.*, p. 39.

the state judged fit»<sup>77</sup>. The government relaxed its laws against gambling to sanction lotteries, the proceeds of which were used to finance various state projects such as the building of bridges and roads, paper mills and glasshouses<sup>78</sup>.

The granting of franchises was particularly important in the construction of bridges, aqueducts and mills, all of which interfered in some way with public waterways and fishing rights. The building of dams flooded adjacent lands and diverted water from natural channels, «Without the state's tolerance, builders faced unlimited responsibility for damages. To encourage industry, the government generously dealt out such franchises... But no grant was forthcoming without justification in terms of the interests of the state as a whole... All franchises included an element of privilege, permitting to a few, as special assistance in a worthwhile enterprise, what was forbidden to all»<sup>79</sup>.

While applying the techniques of inspection, lotteries, bounties and franchises, the states soon found the granting of charters to new corporations the most successful means of promoting economic development for the «coercive power of assessment... gave the corporation a more efficient fund-raising mechanism»<sup>80</sup>. Consequently, the state's most important promotional policy became that of chartering business corporation. «After ... [the Revolution] charter policy gradually established itself as one of the primary concerns of American state governments and expanded steadily throughout the pre-Civil War epoch»<sup>81</sup>.

The granting of bank charters was closely linked with development in transportation. «This was due to an established legislative practice which frequently incorporated into bank charters requirements for assisting specified transportation companies. Such assistance usually took the form of stock subscriptions, loans, or outright grants of money»<sup>82</sup>.

<sup>77</sup> Merchants to far-off ports, responsible for wares they purchased from others, approved of these acts which guaranteed quality and added the prestige of state approval to their goods. Oscar HANDLIN and M. F. HANDLIN, *Commonwealth: A Study of the Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-1861*, New York, New York University Press, 1947, pp. 72, 67.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 73.

<sup>79</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 76-8.

<sup>80</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 105.

<sup>81</sup> Louis HARTZ, *Economic Policy and Democratic Thought: Pennsylvania, 1776-1860*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1948, p. 38.

<sup>82</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 46-47.



Direct government financing of economic activities which required large sums of capital occurred in many states. During the first 30 or 40 years of the nineteenth century, the States created a funded debt of more than \$ 200,000,000, «a larger debt than even created by the government of any country for purely industrial purposes»<sup>83</sup>. Internal improvements, particularly turnpikes and canal companies, constituted the most general form of direct state intervention. Railroads, also, were built with government support in many states. And many banks were formed with governmental help.

In Pennsylvania, a state under one-party Democratic control for the first 35 years of the nineteenth century, there was considerable direct government intervention in the form of public ownership of transportation facilities and banks. The state encouraged the growth of credit facilities by investing heavily in bank stocks between 1800 and 1815. Similarly, a number of turnpike, canal and navigation companies were owned jointly by the state and private investors. With the coming of railroads, Pennsylvania added railway stock to the list of companies in which it had investments. Local governments, counties and cities invested even more heavily than did the state in such businesses. «Total municipal and county investment between 1840 and 1853 were estimated at fourteen million dollars — over twice the state investment at its 1843 peak»<sup>84</sup>. Direct public ownership occurred as well in many of these areas. Thus Pennsylvania built and owned the first railways along the main line<sup>85</sup>.

For the first forty years of Pennsylvania's existence as a state within the Union, there was little question of the propriety or even necessity of direct state participation in ownership as a means of facilitating economic developments. In effect, as in many contemporary new nations, Pennsylvania and other American states followed a policy of government investment in areas basic to economic growth where private efforts seemed inadequate. The *doctrine of*

<sup>83</sup> G. S. CALLENDAR, «The Early Transportation and Banking Enterprises of the States in Relation to the Growth of Corporations», *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 17, 1902, p. 114.

<sup>84</sup> HARTZ, *op.cit.*, p. 88.

<sup>85</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 145. The record of Virginia was similar to that of Pennsylvania. See Carter GOODRICH, «The Virginia System of Mixed Enterprise», *Political Science Quarterly*, 64, 1949, pp. 355-387. For similar activities in Georgia see Milton S. HEATH, *Constructive Liberalism: The Role of the State in Economic Development in Georgia to 1860*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954. For a similar story in Missouri, see James N. PRIMM, *Economic Policy in the Development of a Western State. Missouri 1820-1860*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1954.

«laissez-faire» became dominant only after the growth of large corporations and private investment funds reduced the pressures for public funds.

A similar situation existed in New York where the outstanding example of direct interventionism was the construction and operation of the Erie and Champlain canals. The story of how this project was originally financed through the state's sale of canal stock to small investors, and the working people's Bank for Savings is a fascinating one<sup>86</sup>. Of even greater interest is the indirect facilitation of economic development which grew out of investment made by local banks in which the toll revenues of the Canal Fund were deposited. «The Canal Fund became a development bank less by design than by dint of circumstances»<sup>87</sup>. Only after several attempts to remove their deposits from banks, without sufficient notice, created difficulties did the Commissioner of the Canal Fund realize the heavy reliance of local economies on these publically controlled deposits. Agricultural and salt manufacturing interests as well as the completion of the Tonawanda Railroad depended upon them<sup>88</sup>. During the railroad building era, many lines were built in New York with large state and city investments<sup>89</sup>.

Local governments, especially cities, also played a major role in fostering economic development. Cincinnati owned a major railroad, while Baltimore was an extremely important investor in the Baltimore and Ohio and other lines<sup>90</sup>. In New York State 315 municipalities were involved in the construction of railroad lines<sup>91</sup>. In Pennsylvania, cities and counties contributed far more to railway construction than the state<sup>92</sup>. «The major portion of the stock issued

<sup>86</sup> See Nathan MILLER, *The Enterprise of a Free People: Aspects of Economic Development in New York State during the Canal Period 1792-1838*, Ithaca, New York, Cornell University Press, 1962.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 263.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 146-151. Of interest also are the Canal Commissioners' deliberate programs for alleviating the economic panics of 1834 and 1837 and the crisis after the great fire of 1835.

<sup>89</sup> Henry PIERCE, *Railroads of New York. A Study of Government Aid, 1826-1875*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1953.

<sup>90</sup> See Carter GOODRICH, «Local Government Planning of Internal Improvements», *Political Science Quarterly*, 56, 1951, pp. 411-445; Carter GOODRICH and Harvey SEGAL, «Baltimore's Aid to Railroads. A Study in the Municipal Planning of Internal Improvements», *Journal of Economic History*, 13, 1953, pp. 2-35.

<sup>91</sup> PIERCE, *op.cit.*

<sup>92</sup> HARTZ, *op.cit.*, p. 86.



by Missouri's state aided railroads in the 1850's was sold to counties and municipalities»<sup>93</sup>.

The story of state and local investment and planning of early economic development in the United States clearly justifies the conclusion that government in this period played a role corresponding to that envisaged in most new nations today. The need for large sums of investment capital in a new and as yet undeveloped economy could only be met domestically from government sources. Given the commitment and need of new states to develop economically, the American political leaders found the arguments to justify state intervention, even if socialist concepts did not yet exist. A reviewer of various recent works by economic historians dealing with economic development on the state and local level summarizes the conclusions to be drawn from these studies.

[These studies suggest] a new view of American capitalism in its formative years ... [T]he elected official replaced the individual enterpriser as the key figure in the release of capitalist energy; the public treasury, rather than private saving, became the major source of venture capital; and community purpose outweighed personal ambition in the selection of large goals for local economies. «Mixed» enterprise was the customary organization for important innovations, and government everywhere undertook the role put on it by the people, that of planner, promoter, investor, and regulator<sup>94</sup>.

Rapid economic growth during this formative period in our economy not only benefited from assistance by the states, themselves, but perhaps even more from the massive «foreign-aid» furnished the new nation by outside investors, particularly British. There is a definite parallel between the dependence of contemporary new nations on such aid to begin their expansion and the conditions which facilitated development here<sup>95</sup>.

England was the principal source of loans to American enterprise, both directly ... through the purchase by Englishmen of stock in American banks or railways, as well as indirectly through the purchase by English investors of American State bonds, the proceeds of which

<sup>93</sup> PRIMM, *op.cit.*, p. 106; for Iowa see Earl S. BEARD, «Local Aid to Railroads in Iowa», *Iowa Journal of History*, 50, 1952, pp. 1-34.

<sup>94</sup> ROBERT A. LIVELY, «The American System: A Review Article», *The Business History Review*, 29, 1955, p. 81.

<sup>95</sup> See LELAND Hamilton JENKS, *The Migration of British Capital to 1875*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1927, p. 66.

in large measure were employed in the furtherance of «internal improvements»<sup>96</sup>.

The dependence of American expansion on foreign capital was to be seen in all areas of economic development: trade, internal improvements, banking, agriculture, and industry. Jenks has summarized the story:

...Promoter-politicians, who perceived the advantages, whether public or private, which could accrue from the building of highways, canals and railroads, turned to foreign capital, filtered through the public treasuries for support... State-owned and state-constructed the Erie Canal was financed by the issue of New York state bonds. Something over seven million dollars' worth were sold between 1817 and 1825, and they passed almost at once into the hands of Englishmen.

Before 1836 over ninety million dollars has been invested in canals and railways in the North, of which more than half was a charge upon public credit. The bulk of this capital has been procured from England...

*It will not be far wrong to estimate the total quantity of British capital invested in the United States during the thirties as approximately equal to the indebtedness incurred by the several states*<sup>97</sup>.

It should be noted that the willingness of English holders of capital to invest heavily in American economic development was not unrelated to the governmental policies which fostered the growth of industry. Government planning and ownership was fostered by the need for large sums of capital since both domestic and foreign investors were often not willing to expend the large sums necessary for speculative and unknown ventures in distant lands. «The only securities that could do this were public securities, or the securities of corporations which were guaranteed or assisted by the government... Accordingly, we find that English foreign investments in the early part of the nineteenth century were made chiefly in public securities. The stock and bonds of private corporations formed in foreign countries, unless endorsed by the government, played but a very small part on the London stock market until after the middle

<sup>96</sup> W. B. SMITH and A. H. COLE, *Fluctuations in American Business 1790-1860*, Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1935, p. 42.

<sup>97</sup> JENKS, *op.cit.*, pp. 68, 73, 75, 77, 85 (Emphasis mine); Frank THISTLETHWAITE, *The Great Experiment*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1955, pp. 71-78.



of the century»<sup>98</sup>. And the legislation which gave corporations various governmental protections, referred to earlier, fostered the trans-Atlantic migration of capital.

[T]he fact that the privileges of incorporation were much more easily acquired in America than in England in the first half of the [nineteenth] century gave certain types of American industry readier access to nonindustrial savings and indeed, it was sometimes said, gave them readier access even to English «blind capital» than English industrialists themselves enjoyed<sup>99</sup>.

But if the activities of state governments and foreign investors contributed to economic growth, the rapidity of that development must also be credited to a particularly productive symbiotic relationship between capital and a value system. The existence of a set of values that enshrined «the good life» as one of hard, continuous work, frugality, self-disciplined living and individual initiative provided the necessary ideological framework for making use of foreign capital in terms of long-range industrial development. Also the weakness of aristocratic traditions meant that the United States was free to develop a dominant economic class of merchants and manufacturers whose passion for the accumulation of wealth was unfettered by values that deprecated the concentration of capital and hard work. The rationale for concentrating national resources and energies on such pursuits violated the anti-urban, agrarian Utopia of the Jeffersonians but was defended on nationalistic grounds, that of economic independence. The picture of spiritual and economic domination at the hands of European manufacturers was viewed as especially degrading since this group was presided over by a «devilish class of aristocrats» to whom were attributed all kinds of aristocratic corruption from immoral leisure to extravagance and intellectual cunning.

Convinced, on the whole, of an identity between moral and material progress, these industrialists, while not averse to profits, were conscious of making a patriotic contribution and of trying to establish a pattern in manufacturing for the nation...

The rising tide of nationalism stimulated by the American Revolution and the War of 1812 made it popular to justify American manufacturing on the ground of economic independence. Such pleas for a

<sup>98</sup> CALLENDAR, *op.cit.*, pp. 153, 152.

<sup>99</sup> H. J. HABAKKUK, *American and British Technology in the Nineteenth Century*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1962, p. 71.

national economic independence, however, usually pointed to the horrifying alternative of a moral and spiritual as well as economic prostration at the feet of the manufacturers of Europe.

Belief in the existence of a conspiratorial European devil led also to the patriotic contrast of honestly made American manufactures with reputedly fraudulent European goods<sup>100</sup>.

Foreign visitors to the United States were struck, from its earliest days, with the greater emphasis on materialism here, on economic gain, as contrasted to that present in Europe, including even Britain<sup>101</sup>.

Given the absence of a traditional aristocratic class, and the withdrawal into Canada of many of those who most sympathized with such a societal model, the entrepreneur became a cultural hero and rapid growth followed. Canada, on the other hand, though possessing many of the same material conditions, did not develop as rapidly or as strongly. The combination of foreign rule and a different class model apparently had negative effects on its development possibilities. And the new states of nineteenth century Latin America led by traditional Catholic oligarchies, drawn mainly from the landed aristocracy, were even more backward economically. They retained many of the pre-industrial values of the Iberian Peninsula. Latin America lacked a dynamic business class, a Protestant work ethos, and an ideological commitment to economic modernization.

The emergence of a functioning polity in the first half-century of American independence was accompanied by rapid economic growth and territorial expansion<sup>102</sup>. Within a few decades the American economy was supplying the population with a larger payoff in consumer goods than was true in the European nations. And a perusal of the foreign traveller literature indicates general agreement, among those who compared life in America with that in other countries, that the social position of the American lower strata reflected an emphasis on egalitarian social relations such as the world had never before seen<sup>103</sup>.

<sup>100</sup> Charles L. SANFORD, *The Quest for Paradise. Europe and the American Moral Imagination*, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1961, pp. 158-163.

<sup>101</sup> See Jane L. MESICK, *The English Traveller in America, 1785-1835*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1922, pp. 309-310, for a detailed analysis of the writings of English travellers for evidence supporting their beliefs.

<sup>102</sup> See John R. BODO, *The Protestant Clergy and Public Issues 1812-1848*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1954, p. 193. See also p. 205 for documentation of the conservative opposition to the expansionist wars.

<sup>103</sup> MESICK, *op.cit.*, pp. 306-308.



The United States was gradually acquiring legitimacy as a result of being *effective*. There was no question that it worked, that its economy had «taken off», to use Walt Rostow's image. It is important to recognize that this effectiveness in the economic sphere is a basic condition for acquiring legitimacy in a state which does not have the advantage of traditional legitimacy. In return for support, the populace demands from its leaders rewards, some symbolic in content, such as national heroes and military prestige, and others, perhaps more important, of an instrumental nature like economic benefits. The rules of the game in a new polity must be justified as means to desired ends, since the symbols of authority are not yet separated from the uses of authority. Denis Brogan has well described the rules of a working polity which lacks an ancient claim to rule:

The first and almost the last rule is that the rulers must deliver the goods, that they must share some of the winnings of the game with their clients, with the great mass of the American people, and that these winnings must be absolutely more than any rival system can plausibly promise. I have used the word «clients» advisedly, for the rulers of America have not the advantage of some of their European brethren, the advantage of a patina of age<sup>104</sup>.

#### THE NEED FOR AUTONOMY AND NEUTRALITY

In addition to laying the institutional framework, the new government faced the task of proving to the populace that the system could establish America as a nation. But by what standards were its growth toward nationhood to be judged? We have seen that achieving economic independence was one of them. But even here there was little agreement as to what economic course the nation should follow. As Chambers points out:

There was, indeed, irony in the economic position of both parties. The general ideological theme of the Federalists was conservative and traditionalist, whereas new parties in later emerging nations have been radically innovative and anti-traditionalist. On the other hand, Federalist economic policy was highly innovative and modernist, emphasizing government action toward an advanced industrial capitalist society — again, however, contrary to the often anti-capitalist attitudes of 20th century new nations. The Republicans were post-Enlightenment and anti-traditionalist in political ideology, but still largely wedded to agrarian economic conceptions in a pre-industrial economy — con-

<sup>104</sup> D. W. BROGAN, *American Themes*, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1948, p. 37.

ceptions the American nation with its already comparatively prosperous agricultural economy could afford, but which stood in sharp contrast to the intense drives for industrialization in new nations today<sup>105</sup>.

The Federalist and the Democratic-Republican economic policies only appear contradictory to their political ideologies in the light of comparisons with current new nations. When viewed together, each of their political and economic ideologies forms a coherent, but different kind of nationalism. On the one hand, the Federalists were saying that America as a nation should be just as good as England. In so doing they accepted her economic as well as some of her political standards of nationhood. On the other hand, the Democratic-Republicans were saying that America as a nation was just as good as England but that it should be judged by different standards. They therefore lauded and sought to maximize what was unique both in American political ideals and in the American economy.

As such, the Federalists' and the Democratic-Republicans' views represented two poles of an ambivalence toward the Mother Country that is characteristic of all new nations. The need to dissociate themselves from any deep identification with their former imperialist ruler, or any major foreign power, is characteristic of all new states. But along with self-conscious effort to establish a separate identity there continues to exist a deep-rooted admiration for its culture and values. So that on the one hand, the former colonial power is hated as an evil imperialist exploiter or «monarchical» conspirator, and, on the other hand, it is emulated and admired as the representative of superior culture.

Perhaps a consideration of these ambivalent attitudes, as well as of the need to conserve energy to cope with the special problems of national growth and survival (i.e., lack of legitimacy, an unstable polity, and the need for economic development) will lead to a better understanding of the positions taken by «new» nations relative to those international crises in which the «old» nations are involved. In the contemporary world, we have witnessed the rise of neutralism as the dominant tendency among the new nations of Asia and Africa. This concept of nonalignment has proved frustrating to the contenders in the Cold War who see the struggle as one between freedom and tyranny. They cannot understand why nations which have just won their own independence can be so blind to an international struggle involving the same issues. And the new nations' tactics of

<sup>105</sup> CHAMBERS, *op.cit.*, Chapter 5, p. 10.



selling their support to the highest bidder by bargaining the Communist bloc off against the non-Communists is regarded as a high-handed display of blatant self-interest. Placing the issue in these terms ignores the fact that nations are inherently egotistical, that they act in terms of what they believe will enhance national growth and survival, and not in terms of universal morality.

The United States, in the early years of its independence, exhibited, above all else, the need to conserve its energies for internal growth by remaining unentangled from the conflict of European nations. It began life as a unified nation about the same time that Britain and France started their almost 25-year-long conflict stemming from the French revolution. The behavior of the United States toward these nations was often inconsistent. This arose from the new nation's ambivalence toward the value system of England as shown in the division along left-right lines between those liberals who backed the egalitarian values of the French Revolution and those conservatives who feared them.

Ambivalence toward England, with its concomitant American nationalism, was reflected in the objections to the Jay Treaty. In this instance, as in many others, America's leaders successfully avoided taking the young nation into war. If America could not secure all the points it bargained for, this was not as great a threat to its incipient nationhood as the controversy that the French-English war raised within the country's boundaries. It was a controversy over the basic political principles by which the society should be run. It must be stressed that the leaders of both American factions, the Republicans and the Federalists, desired above all else to keep the young nation out of the war<sup>106</sup>.

In 1793 when France declared war against England, the latter strongly urged the United States to declare its neutrality. At this point, Jefferson firmly opposed any declaration of neutrality<sup>107</sup>. Hamilton, on the other hand, «was strongly in favor of the issuance of such a proclamation»<sup>108</sup>.

Five years later, war with France was threatening and the position of the two men is reversed. Then it is Jefferson who is most certain of the value of neutrality, and Hamilton was inclined to give more attention to subordinate questions. But the depth of the neutral con-

<sup>106</sup> See Charles M. THOMAS, *American Neutrality in 1793*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1933, pp. 14-18.

<sup>107</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 35-37. See also Stuart Gerry BROWN, *The First Republicans*, Syracuse, Syracuse University Press, 1954, pp. 96-98.

<sup>108</sup> THOMAS, *op.cit.*, pp. 38.

victions of each man is indicated by the restraint exercised by Hamilton in 1797 and 1798 and that of Jefferson in 1793<sup>109</sup>.

In 1798, when French policies ordered the confiscation of all American ships bound for England and closed French ports to any American ships that had visited an English port, the Federalists assumed a belligerent stance, passed legislation creating a standing army, increased armaments, and enacted the Alien and Sedition Acts designed to repress foreign or citizen criticism of the government in time of crisis. Hamilton, though bitterly anti-French, worked to restrain efforts by his Federalist friends to have war with France. During the subsequent Democratic-Republican administration, Jefferson successfully pressed policies designed to avoid war regardless of British provocations; such as declaring an embargo and ordering American ships not to go into war ports.

War, of course, finally did come in 1812. The French had withdrawn their embargo on American ships which had dealt with the British, but now the British enforced a strong blockade on shipping to France which reached almost into American waters<sup>110</sup>. The pressure for American entry into war did not come so much from the specific annoyances imposed by Britain, but rather reflected the growth of nationalist sentiment, particularly among the new western states<sup>111</sup>. Also, to some considerable degree, the decline of the pro-British Federalists made possible the war with England.

The weakness of the United States in this war was due to the lack of unanimity behind the war effort and to various efforts to resist it<sup>112</sup>. It showed the danger of taking a new nation into war before effective national unity had occurred. And, most important of all, it illustrated the basic opportunism of American foreign policy. During this period of bitter European and even world-wide international

<sup>109</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 40.

<sup>110</sup> See Henry ADAMS, *History of the United States During the Administration of James Madison*, New York, Albert and Charles Boni, 1930, Book V, pp. 133-153.

<sup>111</sup> See D. R. ANDERSON, "The Insurgents of 1811", *Annual Report of the American Historical Association*, 1911 (Washington, 1913), Vol. I, pp. 167, 173, 174; and Julius W. PLATT, *The Expansionists of 1812*, New York, Macmillan, 1925, pp. 133-153.

<sup>112</sup> In their remaining New England strongholds, the Federalist merchants "were able to convince themselves that Jefferson and Madison were sold to France... the Federalist members of Congress issued an Address to their constituents... [which] declared the war to be unnecessary and inexpedient". ADAMS, *op.cit.*, pp. 399-401.



war, the United States did all it could to avoid any entanglements though many of its political leaders had strong sympathies. It threatened war at one time or the other with both sides, and it sought to capitalize on their weaknesses by taking their territories in America (Louisiana, Florida, and Canada). Ideological alignment with the French Republic, ancestral solidarity with Britain, opposition to the conquest of all Europe by the French Emperor Napoleon, these played little role in determining our ultimate policy. And in a sense, in order to «liberate» Canada, we finally ended the period in alliance with the tyrant who had destroyed the French Republic and sought to subordinate all of Europe and Britain to his will.

Again, in 1823, our foreign policy was somewhat opportunistic in that the Monroe Doctrine implicitly depended for its implementation on Britain, the symbol of monarchy and oppression, our ancient enemy in the struggle for liberty. Before delivering his message to Congress, President Monroe asked Jefferson's advice regarding the British Foreign Secretary's proposal of «cooperation between Great Britain and the United States against the designs of the Holy Alliance upon South America». Jefferson replied:

...Our first and fundamental maxim should be, never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs. America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own... While the last [Europe] is laboring to become the domicile of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom. One nation, most of all, could disturb us in this pursuit; she now offers to lead, aid, and accompany us in it. By acceding to her proposition, we detach her from the bands, bring her mighty weight into the scale of free government, and emancipate a continent at one stroke, which might otherwise linger long in doubt and difficulty<sup>118</sup>.

The «neutralism» of early American foreign policy, as well as that of many contemporary new states, has been of extreme importance in reducing some of the internal tensions which might serve to break down the weak authority structures which have characterized such polities. Insofar as attitudes to foreign affairs touch on deeply held sentiments or strong interests, to become involved in a struggle against one set of foreign powers could destroy national unity and the sense of national identity. Many Republicans would have refused to support a war against the French Republic in 1798. Although the

<sup>118</sup> JEFFERSON, *Writings*, X, p. 214, cited in BROWN, *op.cit.*, p. 130.

Federalist party was near death in 1812, some of the states which it controlled in New England openly sabotaged the war effort. And the subsequent heavy immigration from all parts of Europe in the latter part of the nineteenth century reinforced these neutralist tendencies since it gave rise to ethnic pressure groups which reacted sharply to American policies that effected their homelands.

Though few of the new states are divided internally among ethnic groups which have national or cultural ties to external power blocs, they, like the young United States, have been divided as to whom they should be «neutral against». And many leaders of such states take the same position that Jefferson and Hamilton did in the 1790's. They may hope for the victory of one or the other side, or in some cases that neither side secure international supremacy, but they feel that as a new nation with the need to secure a legitimate structure of authority and rapid economic development, they must abstain from involvement in «foreign entanglements».

#### REVOLUTION AS THE SOURCE OF NATIONAL IDENTITY

Most post-colonial nations differ from those which evolved from traditional origins in that what are conventionally thought of as revolutionary ideas are associated with the national image in the former, while conservative values are associated with the latter<sup>114</sup>. The United States is an example of a nation whose legitimacy stems from revolutionary roots, and which consequently has had a political history in which liberalism rather than conservatism has been both legitimate and widespread. Conversely, the political history of its Mother Country, Great Britain, reveals the associations of conservatism with national tradition.

The leftist emphasis in the values of new nations may not only derive from their need for a revolutionary doctrine, but also from the fact they have all come into existence after the old emphasis on Estates or ascriptive status derivative from feudalism had begun to collapse. New states could not secure general support if they insisted on traditional values. As Karl Deutsch has put it:

<sup>114</sup> Amitai Etzioni has argued that in Israel and most contemporary new states «left-of-center ideologies and groups have stronger political, economic and prestige positions than the right and liberal forces...». «Alternative Ways to Democracy: The Example of Israel», *Political Science Quarterly*, 74, 1959, pp. 213-4.



Behind the spreading of national consciousness there was at work perhaps a deeper change — a new *value* assigned to people *as they are*, or as they can become, with as much diversity of interlocking roles as will not destroy or stifle any of their personalities. After 1750 we find new and higher values assigned in certain advanced countries to children and women; to the poor and the sick; to slaves and peasants; to colored races and submerged nationalities....

National consciousness thus arises in an age that asserts birthrights for everybody, inborn, unalienable rights, first in the language of religion, then in the language of politics, and finally in terms involving economics and all society...<sup>115</sup>.

In societies based on traditional legitimacy, there is congruence between conservatism, respect for the existing pattern of social and political organization, national symbols, and stratification system. Value consensus sustains these elements as an interrelated whole. When such societies developed economically, new classes were created, the bourgeoisie and the workers, who had no initial political rights and were subordinate to the old aristocracy and the monarchy. As these new classes became politically conscious, developing values based on their needs as socially inferior groups, they faced the problem of reconciling these new norms with the dominant cultural norms that supported the political and social position of the old elites. In large measure, the general cultural values strengthened conservative beliefs among all strata and reduced the strength of those factors making for left-wing predispositions. Political movements advocating basic change in the stratification system were faced with mobilizing support from groups who had previously accepted the old institutional order and the values it entailed. One finds generally that parties upholding traditional values retain the support not only of a large majority of the privileged strata, but that a considerable section of the depressed classes also retain their beliefs in the existing order. As Bagehot suggested in discussing England, where traditional class values have not been destroyed by revolution, deferential ties will help to maintain the polity<sup>116</sup>.

In newly independent societies there has often been a transition from a system dominated by traditionalist, usually elitist aristocratic values, to one characterized by egalitarian-universalistic concepts. The elitist ideology takes for granted the desirability of the hierarchical ordering of society. In such systems, it is not the people who are assumed to be the source of power and values but the elite whose

<sup>115</sup> DEUTSCH, *op.cit.*, pp. 153-155.

<sup>116</sup> Walter BAGEHOT, *The English Constitution*, London, Oxford University Press, 1928, p. 141.

members view their «special qualifications» as fitting them for office. The vast inequalities in the distribution of the system's rewards serve as a powerful ideological weapon in recruiting the masses for the struggle for independence and a more equitable share in the system's rewards. And with independence, the values of hierarchy, aristocracy, privilege, primogeniture, and more recently capitalism, all associated with the foreign imperialist power, are often rejected.

Consequently, most struggles for independence have employed leftist ideologies, that of equality in revolutionary America, and of socialism in the contemporary new states. The political tendencies identified with more conservative values are considerably weakened in the new nations that emerge. The radical and democratic ideologies that become dominant emphasize the principle of equality in all spheres. Man's status is to depend not upon inherited, but achieved qualities; hence the system must be geared to abolish all forms of privilege and to reward achievement. The franchise is to be extended to everyone, the people being regarded as the source of power and authority; and various social reforms, such as economic development, the elimination of illiteracy, and the spread of education, are to reduce inequalities in status. We have seen how the need to legitimate the democratic goals of the American Revolution made mandatory a commitment to sharply improve economic circumstances of the mass of the population, even though the struggle for independence was conceived by some of its leaders as primarily concerned with the issues of political independence.

Although many of those involved in a nationalist movement may have been conservative on most matters other than the issue of foreign domination, the need to mobilize support against the ruling oligarchy forces even the conservative nationalists to use the leftist vocabulary of the time. Every group proclaims «*all men to be equal*», to have «*inalienable rights*», or advocates a «*classless society*», the elimination of minority rule in politics, and the end of private property. However, beneath this vocabulary of egalitarian principles there are profound differences in the ways in which various parties or strata interpret these statements.

In the United States after the adoption of the Constitution, the conservative elites who had taken part in the anti-imperialist revolution continued to play a dominant role. This resembles the post-independence situation in Pakistan, Ceylon, Morocco and others of the Arab states, where conservative elites have held the reins of government. Although formally committed to carrying out the social objectives of the nationalist revolution, the conservatives have at-



tempted to resist the institutionalization of these goals. The American Federalists, though convinced advocates of views, radical and republican by the standards of Europe, sought to limit the application of egalitarian principles in such fields as property relations, religion, and the suffrage<sup>117</sup>. But as in most of the contemporary new states in which conservatives have tried to defend traditionalist values after independence, the right wing party soon lost office.

The defeat of the «conservatives» in the early political conflicts in new states usually results in national identity and left wing values being intertwined. In the United States, the end of Federalism meant that henceforth all American political parties were to be egalitarian in overt ideology. The extension of adult suffrage solidified such sentiments. The dominant «one party», the Democratic-Republicans, ruled, as has been noted, without effective national opposition until the 1830's<sup>118</sup>. A historian of Pennsylvanian affairs explains this phenomenon in terms which apply, in large measure, to most other states:

It was supported by the evocative power of certain dogmas which reversed the party allegiance ... a power deriving in large measure from the early inception of virtual manhood suffrage. The mass base of political life in Pennsylvania meant that equalitarian slogans always had a profound, even mystical appeal there. The vaguest atmosphere of aristocracy was a decisive political handicap...<sup>119</sup>.

Although conservative groups in most new nations are deprived of the link with historic national values which they have in Old States, there is at least one traditional institution with which they may identify and whose popular strength they may seek to employ—religion. Leftist nationalist revolutionaries often perceive traditional religion as a great obstacle to the modernization of various institutions which are usually identified with ancient religious beliefs. The efforts by the New State leaders to challenge these traditional concepts serve to undermine the authority of the conservative religious leaders.

The politics of contemporary new nations indicates that in many,

<sup>117</sup> See BASSETT, *op.cit.*, p. 295, and Walter FEE, *The Transition from Aristocracy to Democracy in New Jersey, 1789-1827*, Somerville, Somerset Press, 1933, p. 101 and 107.

<sup>118</sup> In the elections of 1824 and 1828, all candidates for President were nominally members of the same party.

<sup>119</sup> HARTZ, *op.cit.*, pp. 23-4; see also Philip S. KLEIN, *Pennsylvania Politics, 1817-1832*, Philadelphia, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, 1940.

religion has formed the basis for conservative parties. Thus in Indonesia, two Moslem parties, Masjumi (Indonesian Moslem) and Nahdlatul-Ulama (Moslem Teachers) secured almost half (40 per cent) of the votes in the one election in that country<sup>120</sup>. These parties were subsequently dissolved by the Nationalist governing party. In India, today, a conservative party, the Jana Sangh, has arisen to defend Hindu values. In Pakistan, the Moslem League, the party which established the nation, lost power after Independence, but remained as the major conservative group until parties were dissolved. Similarly, in most of the Arab states, conservative politics and Islamic religion have been closely intertwined. The situation is more complicated in most of the Negro African states since there is no dominant national religion in many of them. But, where Christianity is strong, it faces the difficulty of being identified with the former colonial rulers. Islam has been able to form the basis for conservative groupings in parts of Nigeria.

In the United States, the various efforts to sustain or create conservative parties in the early decades of the republic were closely tied to religion. The picture, here, however, was clearly not one of religion versus irreligion, since the «dissenting sects», such as the Methodists, Baptists, and Catholics, all opposed the privileges of the Established Churches, that is the Congregationalists in New England and the Episcopalians in the South. The Democrats received considerable support from these dissenting sects in their efforts to eliminate the tie between Church and State. Faced with the difficulty of combatting the political left on most social and political issues, the conservatives, whether religious or not, quickly saw the political potential of an identification with religious institutions and morality. As Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., has well described their reactions:

Federalism ... mobilized religion to support its views of society. At the very start, many conservatives considered religion indispensable to restrain the brute appetites of the lower orders but hardly necessary for the upper classes. As...the clergy loudly declared Jeffersonian deism to be a threat, not only to themselves, but to the foundations of social order, conservatism grew more ardent in its faith. In 1802 Hamilton, seeking desperately to rejuvenate the Federalist party, suggested the formation of a Christian Constitutional Society with the twofold purpose of promoting Christianity and the Constitution<sup>121</sup>.

<sup>120</sup> *A Review of Elections 1954-1958*, London, The Institute of Electoral Research, 1960, p. 67.

<sup>121</sup> Arthur SCHLESINGER, Jr., *The Age of Jackson*, Boston, Little, Brown and Co., 1946, p. 16: Tocqueville has pointed out how in France, first the upper-



With the growing strength of the Jeffersonians, dubbed irreligious Deists by their opponents, the religious conservatives, largely of Calvinist persuasions, banded together to form a number of moralistic organizations «to save men from folly, vice, and sin»<sup>122</sup>. By winning men to the path of righteousness, they would also guarantee their vote for Federalist principles.

Perhaps the first major example of this reaction was the temperance movement which developed in the early years of the nineteenth century. To a considerable extent this movement was dominated by members of the Federalist upper class and Congregationalist ministers. The downfall of the party and the disestablishment of the Church faced them with the need to explain their defeats in a way which would permit them to act. And they found their explanation in the low cultural level of the common man, his drunkenness and lack of education. The drive against alcohol became part of the «Puritan Counter-Reformation» designed to rebuild their influence over the masses<sup>123</sup>.

Issues concerning the place of religion played a major role in structuring the revived two-party system which formed around supporters and opponents of Andrew Jackson. One of the first efforts to organize an anti-Jackson party, the Anti-Masonic party, which was to become one of the major constituent elements in the Whig party, sought to bring together those who favored an alliance between Church and State. And the Whig party took over this task:

Battlegrounds shifted over time, but the lines drawn in the 1830's between the «Church and State party» and the «Jackson party» held fast. Struggles over Sunday laws, the sustained effort to open public assemblies with prayer, Jackson's refusal to act against Georgia for

class and later the middle-class returned to religion when they recognized that they needed it to stabilize a post-Revolutionary society. Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Recollections of Alexis de Tocqueville*, London, The Harvill Press, 1948, p. 120.

<sup>122</sup> Clifford S. GRIFFIN, *Their Brothers' Keepers*, New Brunswick, Rutgers University Press, 1960, p. 43.

<sup>123</sup> John A. KROUT, *The Origins of Prohibition*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1925, pp. 83-100; David M. LUDLUM, *Social Ferment in Vermont, 1791-1850*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1939, p. 65; Joseph GUSFIELD, «Status Conflicts and the Changing Ideologies of the American Temperance Movement», in David PITTMAN and Charles R. SNYDER, eds., *Society, Culture, and Drinking Practices*, New York, John Wiley, 1962, pp. 105-6. See also GRIFFIN, *op.cit.*, pp. 36-7, and Alice TYLER, *Freedom's Ferment*, Minneapolis, The University of Minnesota Press, 1944, p. 317.

imprisoning missionaries to the Cherokees — on these and like issues party differences were distinct, passionate, and enduring<sup>124</sup>.

The northern Whig spokesmen, like the Federalists before them, gave voice to the values of the dethroned Puritan Establishment. They argued that the State was a proper instrument to eradicate moral evils such as gambling and «grogselling», while the Democrats sought to limit the role of the state to the prevention of evils which resulted from individuals or groups being interfered with by others. The religious feeling and action that underlay the Federalist and Whig moralistic concerns may be seen in the activities of Lyman Beecher who as a key figure in the Congregationalist Church also was involved successively in Federalist, Whig, and later Republican politics. He, like many others of the New England theocrats, «sought to re-establish a clerically dominated social order by means of voluntary social and moral reform societies that would give the clergy an influential role in forming public opinion and molding public legislation»<sup>125</sup>.

The party struggle was clearly not between religion and irreligion, although apparently most free-thinkers and their organizations backed the Democrats, while the very devout, particularly among the older once-established groups, backed the Whigs<sup>126</sup>. There was, however, considerable congruence between the Jacksonian concern for secular egalitarianism and the struggle against the domination of the theocracy in religion.

While religious and moralistic issues provide conservative parties with a popular appeal, which is not necessarily in conflict with the national commitment to leftist values, they have not proven sufficient in most contemporary new states to permit such parties to hold or win power democratically. Hence many of these parties also adhere to some variant of a socialist program. And the situation in the early United States was somewhat similar. The Federalists had failed in their efforts to sustain a party which defended aspects of inequality, and their Whig successors sought to learn from their errors<sup>127</sup>.

<sup>124</sup> Lee BENSON, *The Concept of Jacksonian Democracy*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1961, p. 196.

<sup>125</sup> WILLIAM G. McLOUGHLIN, «Introduction», in Charles G. FINNEY, *Lectures on the Revivals of Religion*, Cambridge, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1960, p. xviii.

<sup>126</sup> BENSON, *op.cit.*, pp. 198-207.

<sup>127</sup> Clinton ROSSITER, *Conservatism in America*, New York, Vintage Books, 1962, pp. 117-119.



When conservatism revived as a political party in the form of Whig opposition to Andrew Jackson, it took very different shape from the relatively elitist Federalists. In attacking Jackson, the counsel of the plebs, the new conservatives tried to fix the label of royalist and Tory on him; while the term Whig, the name of the groups opposed to Toryism and royal absolutism in Britain, was taken by the American conservatives fighting «King Andrew». One of the major elements which went into forming the new Whig party was the Anti-Masonic party, an anti-elitist group which had emerged in the late 20's to fight the presumed influence of a Masonic cabal, one of whom was Andrew Jackson. The complete supremacy of egalitarian values in politics may be seen by the Whig behavior in the Presidential elections of 1840, incidentally the first such contest they were able to win:

Harrison and Tyler were selected as the party candidates.... Webster was rejected on ... [the] ground, he was «aristocratic». This consideration showed how completely the old order had changed. The men of wealth well realized, now liberty and equality had shown their power.... Property rights were secure only when it was realized that in America property was honestly accessible to talent, however humble in its early circumstances.

A fierce rivalry in simplicity sprang up between the parties. Charles Ogle, of Pennsylvania, made a speech in Congress arraigning President Van Buren as a sybarite, who drank Madeira wine, and had made a palace of the peoples' White House by his enormous expenditures for decoration. This speech, spread throughout the country, was the Whigs' most effective tract.... They circulated drawings of the President, pictured as the model of sartorial perfection, seated at his table heaped with massive gold and silver service...

When an Democratic paper in an ill-starred moment made a jest about the obscure Harrison, who, if left alone, would be content with his log cabin and hard cider, the Whigs realized that their opportunity had come. It mattered not that the general really was in fairly comfortable circumstances and had recently been drawing an annual stipend of six thousand dollars; he was to be the log-cabin candidate... the farmer of North Bend, whom visitors had recently discovered flail in hand, threshing out his grain upon his barn floor<sup>128</sup>.

<sup>128</sup> Dixon Ryan Fox, *The Decline of Aristocracy in the Politics of New York*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1919, pp. 411-413. For a detailed description of the 1840 campaign, see Robert G. GUNDERSON, *The Log-Cabin Campaign*, Lexington, University of Kentucky Press, 1957, see also BENSON, *op.cit.*, p. 251.

Actually, many of the candidates in the Whig party were «gentlemen», men from some of the country's first families<sup>129</sup>. But in keeping with the democratic spirit of the times, they campaigned on a ticket of fraternity and equality, even appealing to class hatred against the elite<sup>130</sup>. Many Whigs, however, concentrated their egalitarian concerns on the need to make opportunity possible as distinct from an emphasis on egalitarian social relations. Thus, Whig leaders such as William Seward in New York, Charles Sumner in Massachusetts, and Thaddeus Stevens in Pennsylvania, gave vigorous support to the demand for a state supported common school education, a demand which earlier had been espoused primarily by the radical Workingmen's parties. The Whigs, in fact, sought and sometimes received the support of the Workingmen on the basis of agreement on the school issue.

For both the Democrats and Whigs, the aristocratic, monarchical, and oligarchic societies of Europe were anathema. Both looked at the United States as a new social order which should be an example to the downtrodden of the rest of the world. While today competing parties in new states advocate differing brands of «socialism», American political leaders in the first half-century of our existence advocated democracy and egalitarianism (albeit for white men only)<sup>131</sup>.

The significance of «leftism» as characterizing the core values in the American political tradition may be best perceived from the vantage point of comparative North American history, that is, from the contrast between Canada and the United States. For though American historians and political philosophers may debate how radical, liberal, leftist, or even conservative American political patterns and events have been, there is no doubt in the mind of Canadian historians. Looking at the divergent political history north and south of the border, Canadian historians see their nation as a descendent of the counter-revolution, and the United States as a product of the successful revolution. Once the die was cast, consisting of a triumphant revolution in the 13 colonies and a failure to the north, an institutional framework was set, and consequent events tended to reinforce «leftist» strength in the south and conservative policies in the north.

<sup>129</sup> Carl R. FISH, *The Rise of the Common Man 1830-1850*, New York, Macmillan Company, 1950, p. 165.

<sup>130</sup> Their successors, as the party of the more privileged strata, took the name by which the Jeffersonians were best known, the Republicans, as their own in 1854.

<sup>131</sup> For discussion of the predominant liberal ideology in America see Louis HARTZ, *The Liberal Tradition in America: An Interpretation of American Political Thought Since the Revolution*, New York, Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1955; and ROSSITER, *op.cit.*



The success of the revolutionary ideology, the defeat of the Tories, and the emigration of many of them north to Canada or across the ocean to Britain, all served to enhance the strength of the forces favoring egalitarian democratic principles in the new nation, and to weaken conservative tendencies. On the other hand, the failure of Canada to have a revolution of its own<sup>132</sup>, the immigration of conservative elements and the emigration of radical elements, and the success of colonial Toryism in erecting a conservative class structure all contributed to making Canada a more conservative and rigidly stratified society<sup>133</sup>.

In any evaluation of the consequences of establishing the American New Nation it is important to recognize how revolutionary in a social sense the American Revolution actually was. The English historian, Frank Thistlethwaite, has pointed up many of these changes:

[The insurgents] confiscated the Crown lands and most of the Tory estates, large and small, redistributing some of the land to small farmers and old soldiers. They abolished quit-rents, entails, primogeniture and titles of nobility.... Henceforward the aggregation of great estates, which remained a typical feature of American growth, had no longer as its sanction customary privilege with attendant duties, but property right. The change loosened the social bond between landlord and tenant; it increased the mobility of real estate and shifted the basis of proprietorship from social position to mere wealth.... The radicals also disestablished the Church of England where established. The new Episcopalian body, bereft of its ancient authority was reduced to the somewhat anomalous position of being merely another independent sect...<sup>134</sup>.

The cultural and institutional differences between the United States and Canada offer a useful basis from which to estimate the extent to which the revolutionary break from colonial rule, with

<sup>132</sup> See Frank H. UNDERHILL, *In Search of Canadian Liberalism*, Toronto, The Macmillan Company, 1960, p. 12.

<sup>133</sup> See A.R.M. LOWER, *Colony to Nation: A History of Canada*, Toronto, Longmans, Green and Company, 1946, pp. 114, 120. See also S.D. CLARK, *Movements of Political Protest in Canada 1640-1840*, Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1959, pp. 111-12.

<sup>134</sup> Frank THISTLETHWAITE, *The Great Experiment*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1955, pp. 38-41; see also Hans J. MORGENTHAU, *The Purpose of American Politics*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1960, p. 11-37.

The classic statement elaborating the radical character and consequences of the American Revolution is, of course, that of J. Franklin JAMESON, *The American Revolution Considered as a Social Movement*, Boston, Beacon Press, 1956.

its concomitant legitimation of various egalitarian ideologies and institutions, has been a major determining factor in affecting the national ethos, against such factors as an «open frontier», and the absence of European feudalism and primogeniture. Canada shares with the United States many of the same ecological conditions, but differs in the way its national identity was established. Though Canada is more similar to the United States along many dimensions than it is to Britain or other European nations, it does differ sharply from the United States in being a more conservative country culturally, and a more steeply stratified nation in terms of its society and polity.

#### CONCLUSION

All states that have recently gained independence are faced with two interrelated problems, legitimating the use of political power and establishing national identity. If they seek to establish a democratic polity, they must develop institutional and normative constraints against efforts to inhibit organized opposition or to deny civil liberties to critics.

This paper has explored several development processes, as they emerged in the early United States. National identity was formed under the aegis first of a charismatic authority figure, and later under the leadership of a dominant «left wing» or revolutionary party led successively by three Founding Fathers. The pressures in new nations to repress opposition movements which exacerbate the strains in such societies were reduced in America by the rapid decline of conservative opposition. The revolutionary, democratic values, which thus became part of its national self-image and the basis for its authority structure, gained legitimacy as they proved effective. Under them the general standard of living improved and the nation came closer to equalling the nations of Europe economically.

The need to establish stable authority and a sense of identity led the leaders of the United States to resist efforts by «old states» to involve the young nation in their quarrels. But at the same time that Americans rejected «foreign entanglements», they clearly used the Old World as both a negative and a positive reference group, rejecting its political and class structures as backward, but nevertheless viewing its cultural and economic achievements as worthy of emulation. The intellectuals, particularly, expressed this ambivalence since they played a major role in establishing and defining



the state, but then found that the task of operating and living in it required them to conform to vulgar populist and provincial values.

In specifying the processes in the evolution of the first nation that are comparable to those in contemporary societies of Asia and Africa, I am arguing by analogy. «We cannot assume that because conditions in one century led to certain effects, even roughly parallel conditions in another century would lead to similar effects. Neither can we be sure, of course, that the conditions were even roughly parallel»<sup>135</sup>. It is fairly obvious that conditions in the early United States were quite different; as compared with most of the new nations of today, it had a simpler set of problems.

America grew up in a world that was very different from the one that the new nations face today. Although internal conflicts stemming from attitudes toward the French Revolution disrupted the young American polity, there was no world-wide totalitarian conspiracy seeking to upset political and economic development from within, and holding up an alternative model of seemingly successful economic growth through the use of authoritarian methods. Also the absence of rapid mass communication systems meant that early Americans were relatively isolated, and hence did not compare their conditions with those in the more developed countries. The United States did not face a «revolution of rising expectations» based on the knowledge that life is much better elsewhere. The accepted concepts of natural or appropriate rights did not include a justification of the lower classes' organized participation in the polity to gain higher income, welfare support from the state, and the like. And whatever the effects attributed to the existence of an open land frontier, there can be little doubt that it contributed to social stability.

America possessed a number of other advantages that made its birth, as a democratic nation, easier. Internal value cleavages, which frustrate contemporary new nations' efforts to establish a national identity and which plagued many European nations' efforts to establish a stable democratic polity, were comparatively less significant in young America. The United States was formed by a relatively homogeneous population, most of whom came from Britain. There was a common language, a relatively similar religious background (although denominational differences did cause some problems), and a common cultural and political tradition. And, the class structure of America, even before the establishment of the new nation, came closer to meeting the conditions for a stable democracy than those

<sup>135</sup> DEUTSCH *et. al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 11.



of the Old World. Writing shortly before Independence was finally attained, Crèvecoeur, though sympathetic to the Tory cause, pointed up the egalitarianism of American society:

The rich and the poor are not so far removed from each other as they are in Europe.... A pleasing uniformity of decent competence appears throughout our habitations.... It must take some time ere he [the foreign traveler] can reconcile himself to our dictionary, which is but short in words of dignity, and names of honor.... Here man is free as he ought to be; nor is this pleasing equality so transitory as many others are<sup>136</sup>.

The ability to work the institutions of a democratic nation requires sophistication both at the elite level and the level of the citizenry at large. And as Carl Bridenbaugh has well demonstrated, the America of revolutionary times was not a colonial backwater<sup>137</sup>. Philadelphia was the second largest English city, only London surpassed it in numbers. Philadelphia and other colonial capitals were centers of relatively high culture at this time. They had universities and learned societies, and their elite was in touch with, and contributed to, the intellectual and scientific ideas of Britain.

In this respect, the common political traditions that the American colonists held were of particular importance since they included the concept of the rule of law, and even of constitutionalism. Each colony operated under a charter which defined and limited governmental powers. Although colonial subjects, Americans were also Englishmen and thus accustomed to the rights and privileges of Englishmen. Through their local governments they actually possessed more rights than did most of the residents of Britain, itself. In a sense, even before independence, Americans met a basic condition for democratic government, the ability to work its fundamental institutions<sup>138</sup>.

Unlike many contemporary new states, the United States was not bedeviled in its first decades of existence by a potentially politically powerful military class who could use the army to seize power. The entire army in 1789 consisted of 672 men<sup>139</sup>.

<sup>136</sup> J. Hector St. John CRÉVECOEUR, *Letters from an American Farmer*, New York, Dolphin Books, n.d., pp. 46-47.

<sup>137</sup> Carl BRIDENBAUGH, *Rebels and Gentlemen, Philadelphia in the Age of Franklin*, New York, Reynal and Hitchcock, 1942.

<sup>138</sup> See John PLAMENATZ, *On Alien Rule and Self Government*, London, Longman's, Green and Co., 1960, pp. 47-8.

<sup>139</sup> James R. JACOBS, *The Beginning of the U.S. Army, 1783-1812*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1947; see also DEUTSCH *et al.*, *op.cit.*, p. 26.



However, of prime importance in facilitating America's development as a nation, both politically and economically, was the fact that the weight of ancient tradition which is present in almost all the contemporary new states was largely absent in early America. It was not only a new nation, it was a new society, much less bound to the customs and values of the past than any nation of Europe. Crèvecoeur has well described the American as a «new man», the likes of which had never been seen before<sup>140</sup>.

Religion, of course, may be viewed as a «traditional» institution which played an important role in the United States. The separation of Church and State is particularly crucial in new nations which are by definition committed to change. In the first half-century of the American Republic, as we have seen, the defenders of religious traditionalism were seriously weakened. Following Independence, the various state churches were gradually disestablished.

On the other hand, the new United States was particularly fortunate in the religious traditions which it did inherit. The special religious tradition of Calvinistic Puritanism, which was stronger in the colonies than in the mother country, contributed greatly to making the new nation work. A positive orientation toward savings and hard work, and the strong motivation to achieve high positions which derive from this religious tradition, have been seen as elements which make it one of the principal causes of the remarkable economic expansion that made possible the legitimation of equalitarian values and democratic government. Max Weber, the most prominent exponent of the thesis that ascetic Protestantism played a major role in the development of capitalism in the Western world, stated ... «The whole typically bourgeois ethic ... is identical with the ethic practiced by the sects in America... The survivals in contemporary America are the derivation of a religious regulation of life which once worked with penetrating efficiency»<sup>141</sup>. Their «insistence that ones' works were signs of eternal grace or damnation» has been transformed into a secular emphasis upon achievement<sup>142</sup>.

The Puritan tradition may also have made it easier to legitimize American democracy by the rule of law. Tocqueville saw that an equalitarian and democratic society has a special need for a self-

<sup>140</sup> CRÈVECŒUR, *op.cit.*, pp. 49-50.

<sup>141</sup> MAX WEBER, «The Protestant Sects and the Spirit of Capitalism», in *Essays in Sociology*, translated by Hans GERTH and C. W. MILLS, New York, Oxford University Press, 1946, pp. 309, 313.

<sup>142</sup> ROBIN WILLIAMS, *American Society*, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1957, p. 313.

restraining value system in order to inhibit the tyranny of the majority<sup>143</sup>.

The Calvinistic-Puritan tradition was particularly valuable in training men to the sort of self-restraint that Tocqueville felt was necessary for democracy. By making every man God's agent, ascetic Protestantism made each individual responsible for the state of morality in the society, while making the congregation a disciplinary agent helped to prevent any one individual from assuming his brand of morality was better than others<sup>144</sup>.

Despite all these advantages in the United States which have been discussed above, the evidence suggests that this new nation came very close to failing in its effort to establish an unified legitimate authority. The first attempt to do so in 1783, following on Independence, was a failure. The second and successful effort was endangered by frequent threats of secession and the open flaunting of central authority until the Civil War. Thus the advantages, which the early United States possessed, compared to most of the contemporary new states, only show more strongly how significant are the similar reactions experienced by developing states of the present and the past.

<sup>143</sup> Alexis DE TOCQUEVILLE, *Democracy in America*, New York, Vintage Books, 1959, I, p. 316.

<sup>144</sup> WILLIAMS, *op.cit.*, p. 312.



## REPORT ON THE DISCUSSION

Chairman : Y. A. ZAMOSHKIN, University of Moscow  
Rapporteurs: S. ROKKAN, Michelsen Institute, Bergen  
P. MINON, Université de Liège

The final plenary session on «The sociology of development» was organized in three steps as follows: 1) presentations of the four *principal papers* submitted for the session; 2) a *discussion* of these papers; 3) reports by representatives of each of the five *Work Groups* organized to discuss particular aspects of «the sociology of development».

### I

J. Maquet, J. Stoetzel, S. M. Lipset and M. Crozier, presented the essential points of their papers. T. H. Marshall summarized W. E. Moore's and A. S. Feldman's papers. These five papers are integrally printed in the *Transactions*.

### II

K. Busia focused on the normative problems of a sociology of development. Sociologists tended to take it for granted that industrialization and modernization would bring about better conditions and a better life for the peoples of the developing countries. But had they really consulted the peoples themselves? Too much emphasis had been given to the needs for material improvement, too little to the need for cultural autonomy and to the importance of personal integrity in the face of changing conditions. What was needed was a dialogue between the economically advanced and the economically backward countries: there were values to be preserved in both cases and much could be lost through ruthless modernization. Quite particularly, K. Busia called for increased attention to the problems of local self-government in the new states: the centralization of bureaucratic structures had tended to

sap the strength of local traditions and to create dangerous conditions of *anomie*.

G. E. Glezerman criticized a number of passages in the papers on industrialization and economic growth by B. Hoselitz and by W. E. Moore and A. S. Feldman. He emphasized the importance of scientific progress as a stimulus to development. Scientific advances would bring about a division between the technically skilled professional elite and the manual workers, but this division need not take the form of a class conflict. A socialist system of production would reduce conflicts between skill groups and also ensure harmony between social and cultural development and economic growth. The essence of Socialist success lay in scientific planning and concerted efforts to mobilize workers and peasants to active participation in the process of production.

A. Kolman criticized the pessimism of Western sociologists and denounced their defeatism in the face of the problems of underdevelopment. Under a socialist system the advances of science and technology could be fully utilized in production.

B. Minc analyzed in further detail the differences between capitalist and communist approaches to the problem of economic growth. The capitalist countries are seriously handicapped by the difficulties of raising sufficient private funds for the investments in the collective services required before any «take-off». The capitalist concentration on consumption and the consequent neglect of public services could not provide a model for the new states: what they needed were vigorous collective efforts of investment under the aegis of the government.

### III

N. Elias reported on the discussions in the Work Group on «The Break with Traditionalism». This group had dealt with a series of case studies of the break-up of the traditional order in the countryside and of the changes brought about within industrial organization through technological innovations. Much of the discussion had focussed on the need for systematic comparative research on such processes of change. There was general agreement on the need for the development of a conceptual framework for such comparisons of sequences of development. It had become clear that there was rarely any question of a single «break» with the traditional order:



there were processes of change and these took more time in some sectors than in others. A systematic theory of change would have to focus on such imbalances. Given the difficulties of comparison, large portions of the work sessions were necessarily devoted to discussions of specific cases. The Soviet participants had given several illuminating accounts of specific experiences in their country, but there was a widespread feeling in the group that they tended to shy away from research on the tensions and strains necessarily brought about, in their system as in others, through the process of modernization: thus there was hardly any work on the «break with traditionalism» in agriculture.

W. F. Wertheim reported for the Work Group on «Religion and Development». Much of the discussion in this group had centered on the conflict between Marxian and Weberian interpretations: was religion a product of economic change or was it a prime mover of development? There was no general answer to this question: much depended on the broader social setting. A number of papers suggested that Weber had tended to overlook the differences between the traditional folk beliefs of the rural areas and the articulate doctrinal systems of the urban centres. Several papers had dealt specifically with Weber's analysis of Asian religions. It was generally agreed that such religious systems as Islam, Hinduism or Buddhism had provided little or no incentive toward initial growth. It was emphasized, however, that the type Puritanical asceticism which had helped to produce investments in Western enterprise need not be a prerequisite for economic growth in Asia. In these countries, as in many systems of the West, growth could only get under way through collective efforts and governmental planning: to ensure the success of such efforts, strong ideological commitments might be essential, but not necessarily any specific body of religious doctrine.

J. P. Bhattacharjee reported on the papers and discussions in the Work Group on «Changes in Urban and Rural Areas». This Work Group has been organized in three sessions, the first on «Social and Ecological Stratification in Urban Areas», the second on «Minority Groups on Urban Areas» and the third on the «Adaptation of Rural Communities in Developing Societies».

1. In the session on stratification, attempts were made to formulate models of the process of change brought about in the class systems and the mobility patterns under the impact of industrialization and economic growth. Particular stress was given to the conditions for the emergence of new middle strata and for increasing



vertical as well as ecological mobility to these strata. Outside the West, a variety of factors had tended to retard the growth of the middle sectors and this had had implications for the stability of the developing nation-states. Papers on Latin-America had given particular emphasis to this point.

2. In the session on urban minorities, there were papers not only on such classic cases as the American Negro and the European immigrants to Latin America, but also on such recent cases of minority incorporation as that of the Berbers in Morocco and the East Pakistanis in Calcutta. Particular attention was given to the analysis of majority — minority relations. «Majority» was not a mere question of numbers: it was in most cases more appropriate to discuss the relationship to the «parent» or «host» society without direct reference to numbers. This discussion underscored the need for a typology of minority constellations and of plural societies. With the acceleration of industrial growth and national centralization there would clearly be greater need for comparative studies of ethnic and group conflicts in the urbanized sectors.

3. In the third session, focussed on changes at the village level, papers were presented on rural adjustment in India and the West Indies, in Colombia, Indonesia and East Nigeria. Metropolitan — rural tensions were found to differ markedly between smaller and larger national units. In the West Indies, British rule had brought about a diffusion of urban ideas and reduced the contrasts between cities and rural areas. In Southeast Asia and Africa there had been marked increases in the urban population but no corresponding growth of urban traditions: many of the in-migrants look upon themselves as only temporarily divorced from their local rural community and maintain strong loyalties to rural traditions.

R. Aron reported on the deliberation of the Work Group on «Citizenship and Political Authority». This Work Group had been organized in three sessions: the first focussed on «The Entry of New Groups into Politics», the second dealt with «Problems of Political Modernization in Developing Societies» and the third was concerned with the conditions for «Monolithic vs. Competitive Politics in the Early Stages of Development». The discussions were essentially focused on a comparative analysis of the initial stages of political modernization in two distinct historical settings: the Western systems after the American and the French Revolutions and the non-West in the post-colonial era. The crucial question concerned the relationship between economic growth and political modernization: could



economic growth get under way without some changes in the political system and could the basic political framework remain unaffected by commercialization and industrialization? The papers presented did not provide any evidence in one way or the other. There was no one-to-one relationship between economic growth and political modernization. There was general agreement on the essential traits of political modernization: increasing centralization, standardized administration, extension of participation rights to traditionally underprivileged groups, mobilization of new forces in support of central decision-makers. But such processes might get under way at very different stages of economic growth and might lead to institutionalized rivalry among opposing leaders as well as to monolithic concentrations of power. Several approaches were suggested in the papers and the subsequent discussions: a) there were attempts at essentially historical analyses of the processes of structural change in particular cases or in particular areas of the world, b) there were suggestions of statistical analysis of the frequencies of particular political constellations at different stages of growth, essentially a probabilistic line of analysis, and c) there was an attempt, in the paper by R. Bendix and S. Rokkan, to formulate a set of alternative models of political development and to discuss differences in rates of modernization in terms of the strength of such models in each policy-making process.

R. Aron finally discussed the Soviet contributions to the discussions of «the sociology of development» and deplored the one-sided glorification of conditions under Communist rule: Soviet sociologists had forgotten that Marx had conceived of the science of society as a systematic *critique* of conditions, whoever the rulers.

J. Floud finally reported on the Fifth Work Group on «Traditional and Modern Elites». The term «elite» was used loosely in the three sessions of this Work Group to refer to the especially influential and/or powerful individuals within the ruling class of each political system. Much discussion centered on the distinction between «abstract» or «functional» elites recruited through professional skill and organizational knowledge and «established» elites recruited through kinship and other social networks.

With the advance of industrialization the avenues to power and influence change and so do the size, accessibility and representativeness of the ruling class and its component elite groups. The tendency for the characteristic social exclusiveness of elites in industrial or industrializing societies to be undermined was discussed from



several points of view. P. Naville was concerned to show that the knowledge, particularly scientific knowledge, on which power in modern societies rests heavily, is such that socially distinctive and cohesive elite groups are increasingly difficult to realize; that technical elites do not readily become social elites based on the monopolistic privilege of transmitting a relatively stable cultural heritage.

A Soviet participant resisted the use of the term «elite» in respect to Soviet society, arguing that the function of leadership in that society had no tendency to become the prerogative of a *social* elite.

The discussion ranged over the tension in *non-socialist* societies between established social elites and modern technical elites born of the functional necessities of a modern economy; and the problem of whether in *socialist* societies there was or was not a propensity for technical elites to transform themselves into social elites.

Two meetings were devoted to discuss the particular contribution of education to the formation of elites. Inevitably in this connection the group was exercised over the question of the recruitment and circulation of elites: what is the relation between educational opportunity and social mobility in industrial society? Does education significantly influence the rate and volume of interchange between the social classes or does it merely act as the prime avenue of mobility and thus as the major selecting agent in industrial society? M. Young attacked what he believed to be a widespread notion amongst sociologists that the increase of educational opportunity had raised the rate of mobility; and he revised to show a) that mobility rates had not increased and b) that education was in any case no significant factor in the determination of mobility rates. His attempt to formulate a homeostatic principle of the circulation of elites was discussed with much interest but in a spirit of scepticism.

Finally, there was raised the question of the extent to which an industrial society's education plays its traditional role in creating and sustaining the cohesion of elite groups. What is the functional equivalent in other societies of the English independent so called «public» school, which provides such an important body of shared experiences, assumptions and values for the English ruling class? R. Dahrendorf attempted to establish a case for so regarding the law schools of the German Universities.

Y. A. Zamoshkin, concluded the session with a personal statement. He had been impressed by the quality of the contributions both in the plenary sessions and in the Work Groups, but felt he ought to warn against widespread tendencies to over-generalizations and



unwarranted extrapolations, particularly from capitalist societies to socialist ones. He took issue with several criticisms of conditions in Soviet society, and stressed the need for detailed objective studies of the processes of change in different countries.

The President of the International Sociological Association, T. H. Marshall, thanked the Soviet chairman for his fair and efficient handling of this plenary session of the Congress.