TRANSACTIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

ACTES DU TROISIÈME CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

AMSTERDAM, 1956

VOLUME V

INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION
ASSOCIATION INTERNATIONALE DE SOCIOLOGIE

1956

TRANSACTIONS OF THE THIRD WORLD CONGRESS OF SOCIOLOGY

ACTES DU TROISIÈME CONGRÈS MONDIAL DE SOCIOLOGIE

VOLUME V

PUBLISHED BY THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIOLOGICAL ASSOCIATION, SKEPPER HOUSE, 13, ENDSLEIGH STREET, LONDON, W.C.1, AND MADE AND PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN BY THE HEREFORD TIMES LTD., GENERAL PRINTING WORKS (T.U.), LONDON AND HEREFORD

Contents

PART ONE

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN INDUSTRIAL SOCIETIES

L'EDUCATION ET LA MOBILITÉ SOCIALE DANS LES SOCIÉTÉS INDUSTRIELLES

PART TWO

EDUCATION AND SOCIAL MOBILITY IN ECONOMICALLY UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

L'EDUCATION ET LA MOBILITÉ SOCIALE DANS LES PAYS D'ECONOMIE SOUS-DÉVELOPPÉE

PART ONE

Education and Social Mobility in Industrial Societies: Introductory Remarks

D. V. GLASS

(Professor of Sociology, London School of Economics, University of London)

The papers submitted for this section of the Congress come from a wide range of countries and deal with an almost equally wide variety of problems under the general heading of the section. Because this is so, it may be useful, in opening the session, to draw attention in the first place to the countries and topics, and to raise one or two points which might be taken up in the subsequent discussion.

At one end of the scale, so to speak, there are papers which might equally fall within the second part of the section dealing with economically underdeveloped societies. This is especially the case of Dr. Bonač's paper, which examines the variations of literacy in Yugoslavia in relation to religion, national group and economic status. With 60 per cent. of the 1953 population consisting of peasants and with the high correlation between the percentage of peasants and that of illiterates in the population, Yugoslavia, with almost a quarter of its population illiterate, still faces problems comparable with those in a number of underdeveloped areas. In one respect Professor Kairov's paper also comes at this end of the scale—not because illiteracy is reported to be a problem in the U.S.S.R., but because the account given, contrasting the position 50 years ago with that today, is in fact a record of the transformation of an under-developed into a highly industrialised society. And Dr. Muhsam's contribution might equally be regarded as falling at this end of the scale in that it is concerned with attempts to reverse the usual order of development—to divert into agriculture a population with a long tradition of employment in trade and commerce. At the same time, however, the experiments reported by Dr. Muhsam have a wider relevance than he himself has indicated, since they bear on a problem common to all industrialised countries, that of changing the prestige hierarchy of occupations in accordance with the changing needs of the society.

The remaining papers may be divided—though rather arbitrarily—into two groups. The first group deals with relatively specific aspects of education and social mobility. Dr. Jacoby is concerned with the consequences in New Zealand of the new post-primary education system which, instituted just over a decade ago, aims to " satisfy the educational needs of every adolescent ", instead of providing for the much more limited proportion of children who will later attend a university. Professor Turner examines the aspirations of a sample of secondary school boys in Los Angeles in order to see how far the increasing emphasis on formal education is modifying the traditional

ideology of success associated with business ownership and an " unremitting drive for eminence ". Mademoiselle Berger, drawing upon the results of some pilot studies, considers the extent to which the system of compulsory primary education established in France in the 1880's in response to the demands of industry and commerce, has provided in the thus expanded teaching profession new opportunities of employment with " status " and new channels of social mobility. And, to complete this group of papers, Professor Anderson has used a variety of sources to produce an international survey of the relative frequency of university attendance and of the social background of university students. As might be expected, the higher the general frequency of university attendance, the higher is the relative proportion of students with " manual worker " backgrounds. Nevertheless, students from " professional " families show far more than their arithmetical share even in countries with the highest overall attendance. At the same time some Western European countries, even against the low level for all the countries covered, appear to show unusually small relative frequencies of students with " manual worker " backgrounds —especially Western Germany (1953), the Netherlands (1948), and France (1948). Though the data are subject to many qualifications, they are nevertheless sufficiently comparable to suggest that inequalities of this magnitude will not yield to any " normal " increase in university provision, but require deliberate action designed to meet the economic and non-economic factors which at present influence movement through the secondary schools and into the universities.

The second and final group of papers is focused upon rather broader issues. Professor Clark is not concerned with the educational system as a mechanism for promoting social mobility, but—in English-speaking Canada—as a focus of conflict between traditional values and social change. The products of higher education, and especially the professions, have a vested interest in the costly process which enabled them to become leaders in their society. But at the same time there are large sections of the society which, while showing a naïve faith in " education " and an anxiety for their sons and daughters to be " educated ", reject a leadership which is costly and which offers no certain remedies for current ills. Professor Connell takes up a similar point for Australia, though he sets it in a rather different context. The frequently held view of the rôle of the " open " educational system in a class society assumes, he states, that all we can do is to make the best of the class system by using the schools to create an élite drawn from all social strata in accordance with individual ability. Thus fluidity, efficiency and democracy would all be served. But in his view, this assumption is neither democratic nor realistic. The élite so recruited has no particular competence on the general social problems in respect of which leadership and decisions are required, and it is to the " common man " that the tasks of leadership will fall. In that sense, an open educational system, while providing opportunities for

individuals to rise in social status, may act on the whole as a " lowerer " of social status, and Professor Connell suggests that this may be happening in Australia. In Sydney, from which he draws his illustrations, the measure of educational achievement has become success in the public examinations, with an elimination of the particular prestige of private schools, and the eradication of " characteristics, in so far as schools can provide them, distinctive of an upper class . . ." Hence the upper class is falling in status and merging with the middle class, while the latter is not throwing up any new group to replace the former upper class. Moreover, no new pattern of leadership appears to be emerging among the group of middle-class adolescents; rather, " the function of leadership passes constantly around and is shared among a large number of the group's members ".

The object of writing the above notes has been to illustrate some of the main emphases in the papers which follow, and to suggest points for discussion. And there are clearly many such points relating to the data presented and their interpretation, as well as to the existence of common patterns of development in the various industrial societies. On the latter question, for example, it would be interesting to know of evidence in other countries of the new pattern which Professor Connell suggests is appearing in Australia. There is little evidence of it in England, but there the private sector of the secondary education system is costly, largely separate and highly distinctive. In the U.S.A., on the other hand, such private schools have never had so powerful a rôle, yet there is little reason to believe in the elimination of the upper class in that society. Again, Mademoiselle Berger has drawn attention to the special position of the primary school teacher in the process of social mobility in France. A forthcoming study by my colleague, Dr. A. Tropp, suggests that similar developments have occurred in England—in a way, even more so, for elementary school teaching there was deliberately created from the artisanate, offering status and security, but providing relatively low salaries and weakening the " professional " status of the occupation by the ever present threat of dilution. How far the position of primary school teachers constituted an intermediate step in the inter-generation process of upward social movement is not yet known, though information comparable to that collected in France is available both in our own social mobility sample and in the new sample survey of the teaching profession now being carried out by Mrs. J. Floud. It would be of considerable interest to learn of comparable data and findings for other countries—for the Netherlands, for example, where several professions have been studied rather closely during the past few years.

But in addition to questions of this kind—and there are no doubt many others which participants will wish to raise—there are also more general problems with which the Congress should equally concern itself. In the rest of these introductory notes I should like to draw attention to some of those problems.

Looking at the papers contributed to this section, it is evident that, interesting as they are in themselves, they do not provide anything approaching an overall view of the relationship between education and social mobility in industrial societies or of the direction in which that relationship may have been changing during the present century. No doubt this is in part due to the way in which this section was organised. If, under the general heading, a series of linked, specific topics had been listed when the Congress was first announced, we should certainly have received more papers and, probably, papers which taken together would have given a wider view of the field of interest. In large part, however, the difficulties derive from the lack of pertinent data available to answer the questions with which we are concerned. This may be seen particularly in Professor Anderson's commendable attempt to produce a comparative survey of the social origins of university students. If he had had more time and assistance he might perhaps have improved the comparability of his data, but the improvement would have been marginal. He could not, for example, have included any comparable material on Britain—our own social mobility sample would have been too small for his purpose—for, in spite of the great educational developments which have occurred there since the beginning of the century, it was not until last year that the first comprehensive study of the intake of university students was initiated. Similar difficulties arise in respect of many other sectors and aspects of educational systems, and it would be appropriate for the Congress to consider what kinds of periodic data should be provided, with what frequency, and with what minimum level of comparability. On some questions decennial surveys would suffice, and sampling might often replace complete enumerations, an excellent example here being the illuminating sample inquiry into early leaving in English grammar schools, carried out for the Ministry of Education (*Early Leaving*, H.M.S.O., London, 1954).

In many cases the relevant data could and should be provided by the government departments responsible for public education. But there is also need to consider what complementary non-governmental inquiries would throw most light on the problems with which this section is concerned. Much new material will be provided by the new social mobility inquiries sponsored by the I.S.A.—in the same way that the British inquiry supplied new data on the rôle of secondary and further education in social mobility in Britain. Nevertheless, the detailed study of the interaction of education and other factors will require much more specialised investigations, particularly of the " follow-up " or longitudinal type, of which so far there are relatively few examples.

Although the existing information is highly imperfect and incomplete, and although systematic research into the relationship between education and social mobility is of very recent origin, we should not call upon these limitations as an excuse for avoiding discussions of practice and policy.

There are many matters on which we cannot, at present, offer an expert opinion. But there are many more which demand our consideration, and to refuse to give it would rightly lay us open to the charge that, as sociologists and as citizens, we are neglecting our duty. This is all the more important in that in many industrial countries, in response to new pressures, educational change is now taking place rather rapidly, not seldom without due thought being given to the social implications of the new policies or to the social context in which they are being implemented. Professor Connell gives an example of this for Australia where, he states, " educators have as yet scarcely begun to think or to work knowingly towards any adequate alternative substitute " for an élite, though the concept of such an élite may no longer be desirable or realistic. By way of provoking discussion, I should like to give two other examples to remind you of the kinds of problems which arise.

It is becoming increasingly assumed in industrial societies—though it is by no means accepted universally—that a major principle of a national educational system should be " equality of opportunity ". In England this principle was, so to speak, written into the 1944 Education Act. In the U.S.A. the most recent reaffirmation is contained in the report of the White House Conference on education, which claims that the schools now represent " the chief expression of the American tradition of fair play for everyone and a fresh start for each generation " (reported in *The Times*, April 7, 1956). But if that principle is accepted, several questions are immediately raised. Equality of opportunity to what end ? To enter the ranks of the traditional élite or to become a fully conscious and responsible citizen ? It by no means follows that educational provisions which fulfil the one purpose reasonably effectively will automatically be equally effective for the other. And educationalists do not always appear to be certain that they know which end is envisaged. Further, is the existence of a costly, private sector of secondary education compatible with the principle ? If not, may it not be necessary to accept—if the absorption of that sector makes it unavoidable—some short-term lowering of pedagogic standards for the sake of more long-run developments ? And what does equality of opportunity involve in respect of the relationships between a child, his home environment and his school, and especially in respect of the part which the school may have to play for children from homes which are economically poorer or educationally less " enlightened " than those from which secondary school pupils came formerly ? In turn, can the schools be expected to undertake their new functions unless the economic and social status of teachers is deliberately raised, and what, if these new functions are not undertaken, will be the meaning in practice of the principle of equality of opportunity ?

Another development which raises questions of this kind, is the post-war drive to increase the numbers of technicians and technologists in industry. In Britain the most recent official proposals envisage an

expansion of university departments of technology, but a far greater expansion of technical colleges to provide for the much larger numbers of students who, it is hoped, will take " certificate ", rather than degree, courses. This, in part, means maintaining the traditional status of the technician as inferior to that of a university graduate. This may be what industry wants, but is it what industry or the society needs ? A recent article by Professor D. G. Christopherson (*District Bank Review*, December 1953) gives an illuminating comparison with the experience of the U.S.A., where less emphasis is placed on skill and experience in industry (supposedly the characteristics of a technician) and more on " flexibility of methods " (requiring more workers with a background of technology), and where there is a massive annual output of first degree graduates in engineering. Many of these do not proceed further with their studies, but go directly into industry, and " it is on the work of very large numbers of these men ", says Professor Christopherson, " with their broad education of a generally academic character, that the astounding achievements of American industry on the technological side have been built ". But it may also be the case that these graduates have been attracted to industry at least partly because they had whatever status and promotion opportunities the possession of a university degree provided, and that such status and opportunities in turn raised the general prestige of technical occupations relative to clerical and equivalent employment. In England, by contrast, technical occupations in industry have had a relatively low status, not unrelated to the fact that technicians were not graduates and that so far as promotion prospects in industry were concerned, it was the clerk who, as Lord Eustace Percy put it, carried the field-marshal's baton in his knapsack. In such circumstances, and with the substantially increased opportunities since the war for university education in England, will students be attracted by the new proposals for technical education ? Indeed, can proposals to increase the supply of technicians and technologists be realistically considered unless there is also taken into account the possible impact on the status of such groups of the sectors of the system of further education through which they are to be recruited and trained ?

There would be no purpose in extending this list of examples, which in any case are intended only to remind you of questions that you will have often considered. Clearly, we cannot give categorical answers to such questions at the moment. Yet we cannot refrain from discussing them, from drawing attention to the theoretical problems which need to be solved if practical proposals are to be practicable, and from reviewing our research plans in the light of the joint interests of practice and theory.

Illiteracy as a Social Factor

VLADIMIR BONAČ
(Chief of the Department of Vital Statistics, Statistical Office of Slovenia, Ljubljana)

THE ANALYSIS OF ILLITERACY IN YUGOSLAVIA

In Yugoslavia to-day illiteracy is widespread, and the battle for its quick and radical elimination is a major political goal.

According to the most recent population census, there were in Yugoslavia in 1953, 3,255,000 illiterate persons and 85,000 who could only read.[1] But comparison with previous censuses of the population in Yugoslavia[2] shows that the proportion of illiterates (in spite of different definitions) has decreased considerably during the last decades :

Table I : *Extent and decrease of illiteracy*

Year	Illiterates as % of the total population	Statistics based on the following age-groups
1921	50·5	12 or more years of age
1931	44·6	11 ,,
1948	25·4	10 ,,
1953	24·4	10 ,,

For a correct interpretation of the reasons for the high incidence of illiteracy, plural stratification is necessary, according to regional, biological, cultural, and social factors. The following analysis uses, in addition to data from the 1953 Census, data from 1948[3] which are not strictly comparable but enable us to describe the elements of the situation.

(*a*) *Regional Variations*

The incidence of illiteracy in Yugoslavia varies according to region: in some parts there are practically no illiterates, while in others they are in the majority. Table II shows the situation in 1953 in the Peoples' Republics and in the three bigger administrative units which are part of the Serbian People's Republic: Serbia proper, the autonomous province of Voivodina and the autonomous region of Kosovo and Metohia (Kosmet). The data concerning peasants, fishermen and lumber workers were published as preliminary results of the 1953 census.[4] The data in the last column, representing the proportions of illiterates in the predominant national groups in each region, are from the first post-war census in 1948.[5]

Illiteracy increases as one moves from the north-west to the south-east. Slovenia, Croatia and Voivodina were part of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, where compulsory education was introduced in

Table II: *Some Characteristics of Regional Variations*

Region	Illiterates as % of population of the region	Peasants, fishermen and lumber workers as % of population of the region	The predominant national groups as % of the population of the region	
Slovenia	1·9	42·9	Slovenes	97·0
Voivodina	12·2	59·4	Serbs	50·1
			Magyars	25·8
Croatia	15·2	56·3	Croats	79·2
Montenegro	28·3	62·3	Montenegrins	90·7
Serbia proper	28·4	67·4	Serbs	92·1
Macedonia	33·8	60·5	Macedonians	68·5
			Shqypetars	17·1
Bosnia and Herzegovina	39·7	63·5	Serbs	44·3
			Bosnian Moslems	30·7
			Croats	23·9
Kosova and Metohia	52·8	71·8	Shqypetars	68·5
			Serbs	23·6

1869 or, formally, as early as 1774. In Serbia, laws were enacted enforcing compulsory education in 1857 and 1863, i.e. even before she became completely independent. In 1878, Austria occupied Bosnia and Herzegovina, both until then under Ottoman Turkey, where there was no compulsory education. Soon after this Austria issued an education act which was, however, only formal. Macedonia and Kosmet remained under Turkey until 1913 (the first Balkan war) and therefore had no compulsory school system. Montenegro followed the example of Serbia.

(b) Differences in age groups

Reading and writing is functionally connected with age, since every new generation has a greater chance of education in a state where the total number of schools is not complete but only developing. The percentage of illiterates in different age groups shows the direction and tempo of this development process. In spite of the great regional differences already mentioned, the average percentage of illiterates in the whole of Yugoslavia shows a decisive decrease according to generation. Table III shows the situation in 1948.

Every generation is more literate than the previous one, although there are slightly more illiterates in the youngest age group due to the war and after-war period.

This analysis shows a very great decrease in the number of illiterates. Slowly but surely, and with an increased pace, the old world, whose culture was based on oral traditions, is disappearing.

(c) Differences between sex groups

Stratification by sex is necessary for a clear picture of the illiteracy problem, since men and women are not equally distributed among illiterates. In 1948, 15·4% of the men were illiterate and 34·4% of

Table III : *Age and illiteracy*

Year of birth	% of illiterates
Before 1883	55·7
1883–1887	46·7
1888–1892	44·8
1893–1897	37·0
1898–1902	35·0
1903–1907	29·8
1908–1912	27·0
1913–1917	22·0
1918–1922	16·8
1923–1927	12·8
1928–1932	12·5
1933–1937	15·5

the women. This was true in all generations and indicates the social rôle of women in present-day Yugoslavia as well as in the past decades. Further, in spite of the fact that illiteracy is decreasing among women, it is decreasing much more quickly among men, and this widens the gap between the sexes.

A struggle is going on between progress on the European model and patriarchal traditional concepts of the rôles of men and women. Old cultural values are only slowly surrendered. New methods of production, industrialisation, mechanisation, the stabilisation of state administration, and especially the introduction of compulsory military training, all draw the men away from home. For them, reading and writing, or, in other words, elementary schooling, became a necessity. In addition all who served in the army became more or less literate. But for the women who remained at home and did not participate in industrial production, reading and writing were not necessities. If the population was eager for schooling they forced the boys to attend, but did not encourage girls to do so. The consequences can be seen in Table IV (after Babić) which shows the increasing differentiation in formal knowledge between the two sexes in conservative surroundings :–

Table IV : *Sex and illiteracy*

Year	% of illiterates among men	% of illiterates among women	Number of illiterate women per 100 illiterate men
1921	40·3	60·0	149
1931	32·3	56·4	174
1948	15·4	34·4	223

(d) Differences according to religion and nationality

Such a difference between men and women can be understood only after further stratification according to cultural and historical factors relevant in different parts of Yugoslavia. In this respect the

strongest influences are those of Christianity on the one hand and Islam and Turkism on the other. All regions south of Sava river (except along the coast) were partially, until 1913, in the Ottoman Empire, which, in the five centuries following the battle of Kosovo in 1389, gave its own character to the public and private life of the Slav inhabitants of those regions. Turks and Shqypetars settled in the region, while many Serbs and Croats fled to the north and west ; in the matter of religion, many were partially converted to Islam ; in economic matters, feudalism remained long after capitalism was introduced into Western Europe. Cultural and spiritual emphasis was on strong conservatism, fatalism, passivism and spiritual inertia.

Unfortunately neither official statistics nor other sources permit us to make a direct correlation between religion and illiteracy. We must therefore study the data on literacy and nationality, relying on the well-known affinity between nationality and religious adherence.

We may select for consideration the Slovenes, Macedonians, Bosnian Moslems and Shqypetars. So far as their ethnic and cultural composition is concerned, these four groups are characteristic of the population of Yugoslavia.

(a) Slovenes are South Slavs and in 1948 numbered 1,400,000. They inhabit the north-western part of the state, are Christians (Catholics) and they lived till 1918 in the Austro-Hungarian Empire, which since the mid-nineteenth century had had a regulated school system. It should be noted that here and elsewhere where religious affiliation is mentioned, atheists are left out of account since we are only concerned with cultural characteristics.

(b) Macedonians are South Slavs, number 800,000, and live in the south of the state. They are mostly Christians (Orthodox) and until 1913 they lived under Turkish rule. They had almost exclusively confessional primary schools. In addition to primitive Moslem schools there were quite a number of private Serbian and Bulgarian ones.

(c) Bosnian Moslems, said to be of undeclared nationality, number 800,000, and are South Slavs speaking the Serbo-Croat language. They live in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the centre of the state and they adhere to Islam, having embraced this new religion as far back as several centuries ago. Until the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the Austro-Hungarians in 1878 they lived under Turkish rule, and, like the Macedonians, had no compulsory education. Nor, later, were Austro-Hungarian school laws anything more than formal, and girls were not compelled to go to school.

(d) Shqypetars (750,000) are the descendants of Illyrians and Thracians who had populated the Balkan Peninsula before the arrival of the Romans and Slavs. They live now in the autonomous region of Kosovo and Metohia (Kosmet) as well as in Macedonia in the south-eastern part of the state. They are Moslems and until 1913 they had lived

under Turkish rule. They speak Albanian which has many peculiarities of its own compared with the language spoken in the state of Albania. There were no primary schools teaching in the national language either under Turkey or in pre-war Yugoslavia.

There are great differences between the four nations discussed above. There are on the one hand the highly literate Slovenes and on the other, three groups with a low percentage of literacy. In Slovenia, among those 10 or more years old there were (according to Babić) the following percentages of illiterates :

Year of Birth	%
1880	43·6
1890	28·5
1900	18·2
1910	10·8

By the middle of the twentieth century, of young Slovenes born between 1933 and 1937, less than 1% do not know how to read or write, while illiterates number 14% of Macedonians, 42% of Bosnian Moslems and 59% of Shqypetars in this age group.

Of the last three nations, the lowest percentage of illiterates at the beginning of the century was among Macedonians, who already in the 19th century had private schools and a greater possibility of educational development than their neighbours the Shqypetars. They could rely on Serbian teachers and Serbian literature in spite of the fact that their national character was not always conceded. Moreover, their religion did not prevent them from acquiring secular knowledge.

Quite different was the situation of Bosnian Moslems and Shqypetars. Bosnian Moslems could have relied also on Serbian and Croat teachers and Serbo-Croat literature, but the conditions under which they lived were completely dissimilar to those existing in Macedonia. First of all they were Moslem, and it was widely believed that lay knowledge was opposed to the Koran. The Turkish feudal system in this border country was stronger than in the interior, and other forms of the Turkish social system remained more or less intact. Constant fighting prevented communication with other areas. When Austro-Hungary occupied Bosnia in 1878, there was a sharp emergence of Serbian and Croat nationalism accompanied by a resistance to Austria, the occupying power, in all fields, the educational one included, since it was believed that the spread of school knowledge was intended to denationalise and to estrange the people from the Moslem religion. Schools had a hard time making their way, and the mass of people remained suspicious of them, the more so as school knowledge alone did not bring about any noticeable betterment of the grave economic situation.

The same, even to a greater extent, can be said for Shqypetars. The country in which they live is not easily accessible and there are very

few internationally important communications. Mohammedan religious prejudices preventing Bosnian Moslems from becoming educated were equally strong with Shqypetars. In addition to this there was the fact that they are members of a nation with a less developed literature, being without any strong cultural hinterland either in Turkey or in pre-war Yugoslavia, where they were treated as a national minority without minority rights.

The problem of illiteracy among these nations is thrown into relief if one considers the distribution of illiterates among men and women. Among Slovenes, even among the oldest illiterates there are relatively only a few more women than men. This ratio undergoes a radical change among the other three groups, in whose patriarchal systems women played a quite different social rôle. Islam is not the only factor in this situation, although the subordinate rôle of women is more pronounced in the Moslem areas. There are striking differences between literacy rates of men and women in the more patriarchal South European catholic countries : for example, in Spain in 1940, 17·3% of the men were illiterate and 28·5% of the women, in Portugal 43·2% of the men, 60·2% of the women.[6] A great contrast with the situation among the Slovenes is already apparent among the Macedonians, who are Orthodox Christians. Whereas slightly under half of the men born before 1883, are illiterate, there are nine-tenths of Macedonian women of the same age group who do not know how to read and write. Among those born a little more than half a century later this difference has almost disappeared. Out of 100 boys, born during the period from 1933 to 1937, 11 are illiterate while out of 100 girls the corresponding number of illiterates is 17. In the present situation the literacy rates are almost balanced owing to a uniform school system and literacy courses that the women have also attended. Such a development implies a gradual abandonment of the hitherto prevailing ideas of the social status of women and is partly a sign of formal recognition of their equality by the male population. Religion among the Macedonians is not one of the factors slowing down the schooling of women.

We get quite another picture if we look at the situation among Bosnian Moslems and Shqypetars. Both saw a rapid dwindling of the number of illiterates and every new generation had a much greater chance of learning to read and write than the older one. Of Bosnian Moslems, born before 1883, 81% are illiterates, of Shqypetars 95%. But the illiteracy rate has dropped much less rapidly among the women than among the men in these two groups. In 1948, 54% of Bosnian Moslem girls born between 1933 and 1937 were illiterate, and 78% of Shqypetar girls. There is a similar situation in Turkey where in 1945 83·3% of females aged 10 years or more were illiterate.[7] In Yugoslavia, an important stimulus to the spread of literacy was the law issued in 1950 by the republics with a Moslem population, forbidding women to veil their faces in public.

(e) Differences because of economic reasons

In 1953, 60% of the population of Yugoslavia were peasants. In areas where peasants are more numerous, illiterates are also relatively more numerous. (See Table II). Between these two phenomena there is a strong positive correlation ($r = 0{\cdot}86$). Peasants on the whole derive less economic advantage from schooling than any other group : their skills are passed from generation to generation without the use of books. Even where schools are available, the fact that school-children are not productive but highly consumptive acts as a deterrent to sending children to school. The worker in the city, on the other hand, appreciates the value of schooling, even if he comes from illiterate surroundings, and parts of his expenses for the schooling of his children are met by the State.

ACTIONS FOR THE ELIMINATION OF ILLITERACY IN YUGOSLAVIA

The percentage of illiterates in a country reflects economic and political constellations as well as the cultural environment existing in the past. The attitude of the ruling classes towards the phenomenon may be passive or active. The state authorities may endeavour to diminish the number of illiterate persons or they may not undertake sufficiently strong measures.

Pre-war Yugoslavia was among those states which wished to do away with illiteracy without too great expense of money and time, thinking that the abolition of illiteracy is a problem to be solved over generations through the gradual education of youth. The new Yugoslavia, realising Socialist society, is one of those states that consider illiteracy to be one of the greatest impediments to economic progress, and it is trying to eliminate it as soon as possible and as radically as possible regardless of cost and of mental resistance. Probably the mass campaign for the abolition of illiteracy which had started already during the National Liberation Struggle and took on gigantic dimensions after the war, represented one of the greatest actions of its kind in the modern world.

Whole brigades of teachers, students as well as other schooled and unschooled people were organised. They enthusiastically carried out propaganda among the population urging them to join the courses for illiterates and often teaching them in inadequate rooms with bad lighting and poor teaching aids.

At the same time a series of measures were taken to ensure complete school attendance of all school children, since the struggle against illiteracy, as the campaign was named, can be conducted under two aspects : teaching children at schools and teaching adults in special courses. In the new Yugoslavia all school children must attend school while adults capable of instruction must be taught how to read and write.

It is almost impossible to measure the cultural and economical advantages of such action against illiteracy. But reading and writing

without other general knowledge does not greatly assist technical advancement. *General* education is an economic necessity for modern States.

The same is true for further education of former illiterates. It does not help much if the people learn how to read and write but cannot use the knowledge gained. They must start reading newspapers and books and in this way gain general knowledge. This education has an economic effect only when the output in general increases because of it. This is a new phase requiring greater use of means, a greater amount of currency in circulation, a smaller barter economy, a strong market which can absorb overproduction, and increasing demands which can be met only by industrial production.

NOTES

[1] The preliminary results of the census dated 31 March, 1953. "Results by sampling," Statistical bulletin No. 29. All the following data concerning illiteracy in 1953 are from this bulletin and take into consideration people above nine years. Persons who can only read are not counted among illiterates.

[2] See : Milan Babić, *Statistika nepismenosti u Jugoslaviji*, (Statistics of illiteracy in Yugoslavia); *Statistička revija*, (The Statistical Review), Beograd, 1951, pp. 209, et seq.

[3] Published in *Statistički godišnjak FNRJ*, (The Statistical Annual FRPY), Beograd, 1954, table 27.

[4] "Results by sampling," Statistical bulletin No. 28.

[5] *Konačni rezultati popisa stanovništva, sv. IX, Stanovništvo po narodnosti* (Final results of the population census, Vol. IX, Population by ethnic nationality), Beograd, 1954

[6] L'analphabétisme dans divers pays, UNESCO, Paris, 1953, p. 208, p. 210.

[7] L'analphabétisme, p. 144.

The Development of Public Education in the U.S.S.R.

I. A. KAIROV
(Professor, R.S.F.S.R. Academy of Pedagogical Sciences)

The twentieth century has been marked by great cultural progress, and a rise in the educational level of the population of many countries. In the U.S.S.R., progress in science, culture and education has attained great magnitude, diversity and profundity. Tuition in the general schools (1st to 7th class) is free of charge. Beginning with the 1956–57 academic year tuition will be free of charge at all types of educational institutions including higher schools.

Pre-revolutionary Russia was a technically and economically backward country; its heavy industry was very poorly developed and foreign capital predominated. Russia was an agrarian country of small peasant holdings, cultivated by the most primitive implements. The poverty of the proletariat and peasant poor, economic crises and unemployment, and the absence of legislation prohibiting the exploitation of child labour, were the reasons for the low literacy level of the population. At the beginning of the 20th century, 70 per cent. of the men and 90 per cent. of the women in Russia could neither read nor write. The national minorities were almost totally illiterate. Of the 71 nationalities inhabiting pre-revolutionary Russia, 48 had no written language.

In pre-revolutionary times, however, there was a development of democratic thought. It is sufficient to mention such progressive cultural leaders of the peoples of Russia as Lomonosov, Pushkin, Herzen, Belinsky, Shevchenko, Chernyshevsky, Franko, Nalbandyan, Gogebashvili, Akhundov, Akaki Tseretelli, Leo Tolstoy, Chekhov, Gorky, Repin, Ushinsky, Mendeleyev, Sechenov, Pavlov and Michurin.

The socialist revolution and the new social conditions determined the course of development of Soviet culture and education. In the U.S.S.R. the socialist system based on the social ownership of the means of production has become consolidated; it is a system under which there is no exploitation of man by man, and the national economy develops according to plan. The U.S.S.R. has become a country with a highly developed heavy industry equipped with up-to-date technique. And instead of small peasant holdings the country now has large-scale, mechanized collective farms.

Here is a concrete example of the stupendous development of the country's national economy. The amount of electric power produced in the entire year of 1920 was produced in 1955 in one day, pig iron in 1·5 days, coal in 8 days, oil in 20 days, etc.

The broad public participation in state administration, and the steady rise in socialist production due to the introduction of advanced techniques, necessitate the constant elevation of the cultural level of the working people.

In the early months of Soviet power the obstacles hindering the extensive development of public education were eliminated, feudal privileges and the remnants of serfdom were abolished, and the equality of all the peoples inhabiting the Soviet Union, irrespective of race, nationality, social status, sex or religious faith was proclaimed an inviolable law; and every citizen of the country received the right to an education, work and leisure. We may now confidently state that these principles are applied throughout. In our country state concern for children begins in their very infancy. The mother working at a factory or office may, if she desires, place her child in a *crèche* where it is given the food and medical attention its age requires. From three to seven years, the children attend permanent or seasonal *kindergartens*. Kindergartens are maintained by the state, enterprises and collective farms. The children here are in the care of especially trained kindergarten teachers from 9 to 12 hours a day. In 1953, 1,438 thousand children attended kindergartens.

The schools of the Soviet Union are attended by children of all *nationalities*. *Seven-year education* is universal and compulsory, and compulsory secondary education is being introduced, and will be completed, in the main, in 1960. In hundreds of towns all children of school age are already enrolled in ten-year schools.

The working class is now being supplemented by young people who have secondary school training, and the time is not far distant when a great majority of the workers and peasants will have complete secondary education.

Universal education is of great *importance to the national economy*. When universal four-year education was introduced in the country Academician S. G. Strumilin calculated that its benefit to the economy would be 43 times greater than the sum expended on it.

One of the principles of the Soviet school is to give tuition *in the native language* of the children. It is particularly noteworthy that many nationalities of the Russian empire which had no schools to speak of and some without a written language, now have universal seven-year education. In the Uzbek S.S.R., for example, where the overwhelming majority of the population was illiterate, there are now 5,200 schools with an enrolment of 1,300 thousand pupils. Approximately the same number of children are enrolled at the schools in the Kazakh S.S.R. Universal secondary education has been introduced in a number of towns in these republics. Universal education in the U.S.S.R. is guaranteed by a broad network of schools, a strict record of all children of school age and a systematic check on their attendance.

The schools of the country *are co-educational.* For many centuries, in Turkmenia as in the other colonial hinterlands of the Russian empire, women had no rights, they were illiterate and enslaved by age-old customs. And now, many Turkmenian girls are graduating from secondary schools. Hundreds of them are college students. The Constitution of the U.S.S.R. ensures citizens freedom of conscience. The church is separated from the state, *and the school from the church.* Freedom of religious worship and freedom of anti-religious propaganda is recognized for all citizens. The decree of the Soviet government, proclaimed on January 21, 1918, prohibited the teaching of religious faiths in the schools. Citizens can teach and be taught religious faiths in private.

The socialist state directs the moral and mental education of the growing generation; all the schools, from the elementary to the higher, belong to the state and are maintained by it. The school system in the Soviet Union, from the elementary to the higher school, is *unified.* This makes it possible for all pupils with the required knowledge to pass from one stage to the next, higher stage; from the elementary school, for instance, to the seven-year school and then to the secondary school; on graduating from secondary school—to the higher school. This is possible because of the sequence of curricula. Thus, the country's entire young generation has every possibility to pass without any difficulty from the elementary stage of education through the highest.

The Soviet universal school system is *closely linked with the life* of the country and the tasks of socialist construction. The *subject matter* of general school education provides for a system of knowledge, skills and habits that are the foundation of the all-round mental and physical development of the children, and the formation of their scientific views and a high standard of behaviour. The Soviet school gives the pupils a systematic grounding in the sciences, including the natural sciences and mathematics (biology, physics, chemistry, mathematics) and humanities (native language, history, literature, foreign language, etc.), and also polytechnical education, physical development, moral and æsthetic training.

One of the educational elements—*polytechnical education*—should be mentioned at greater length. The nature of work in industry and agriculture changes constantly due to the application of advanced techniques. Arduous physical jobs are steadily being replaced by machines, and the need to apply mental faculties is growing. The conditions are being created to overcome the basic difference between physical and mental labour. This will, to a certain degree, be facilitated by polytechnical education. The *task* of polytechnical education is to give the pupils a knowledge of the fundamentals of the sciences and of their application to socialist production, to develop their interest in techniques and their scientific and technical trend of thought. Its object is to train them to handle the most common worktools by teaching them work suited

to their age, and to inculcate the desire to work in industry or agriculture, to develop the necessary work stamina and know-how, to instil in the pupils socialist labour efficiency. Polytechnical education should give the pupils a vocational guidance that will conform to the needs of the national economy and to their own inclinations and aptitudes. General education is the basis of polytechnical education, and the higher the level of general education, the more successful will be polytechnical education. At the same time, polytechnical education facilitates better progress in general education and guidance at school. In acquainting the pupils with the general scientific principles of the major process in modern industry and giving them a grounding in work skills and habits common to many trades, polytechnical education makes it easier for them to choose the vocation they would like to follow. Polytechnical education is one of the best ways of preparing the pupils for future work.

A new Soviet general education curriculum was introduced for the 1955–56 academic year to ensure polytechnical education ; it provides for manual arts training, practical lessons at the school's experimental gardening plot, at workshops, farm work training, and the study of mechanical engineering and electro-technics.

Of particular importance is the inculcation in the children of a love and respect for *work*, both mental and manual, and the habit of engaging in useful occupations. The school inculcates in the pupils a *socialist attitude towards public property*. Throughout the ages the property-owner psychology and selfishness have been developed in man. The entire socialist state system instils in the Soviet people the feeling of responsibility for the products of social labour. The education of staunch defenders of public property is the bounden duty of the school.

One of the basic principles of Soviet education is that children must learn to *live and work in community*. Life at school engenders fellowship and the feeling of responsibility for one's own behaviour and the behaviour of one's schoolmates. In the school community the pupils learn to solve their problems in common, and to appreciate the bonds of fellowship; they cannot tolerate disregard for the rules and traditions of the school community. The complex problem of social adjustment is solved by Soviet education through skilful combination of the interests of the individual and those of the group; the individual is not suppressed by the group, but on the contrary his personality is fostered in the group. The inculcation of the group spirit, respect for work and public property is unthinkable without the development of *self-discipline* in the pupils, or without their strict observance of the established school rules and regulations.

Æsthetic training is an important part in the all-round development of the individual and gives him a profound understanding of the beautiful in life, nature and society. Closely connected with the general tasks of education is physical training which is necessary to strengthen the health of the young people and to develop their agility and grace

of movement. The teacher must take into consideration the age of the pupils, their interests and inclinations and be able to guide their training along definite lines.

Due to wartime conditions, many young workers and peasants did not get a secondary school training. Now they are getting it through part-time education in general secondary schools for young workers and farmers.

A most necessary aid in school education are the *extra-mural activities centres.* These are the palaces and houses of Pioneers, theatres for young spectators, children's parks of rest and recreation, tourist stations, young naturalists' stations, young technicians' stations, etc.

The development of culture, science, education and art demands highly skilled workers, technicians and engineers, teachers, doctors and other experts with secondary and higher school education. A broad network of elementary, secondary and higher professional and engineering schools has been established in the country.

The labour reserves system which trains skilled workers, in 1955 embraced over three thousand establishments. In the fifteen years since its organization it has given the country's national economy over eight million skilled workers. In the Soviet Union there is a broad system of *apprenticeship and training on the job.* In the past ten years upwards of nine million workers and collective farmers have annually undergone training on the job at various courses at schools by means of individual training and study in teams. Thus the ministries of various industries annually train some 1,200 thousand apprentices and two million workers get training on the job. The three-year agronomy and zootechnical courses in 1954, enrolled nearly 2·5 million farmers.

In 1955, 1,900,000 persons were enrolled at *secondary vocational training institutions,* while in pre-revolutionary Russia no more than 35,800 received training.

In the U.S.S.R. a broad network of *the most diverse higher schools has been organised.* In 1955 there were 818 institutions with an aggregate student body of 1,865,000, whereas in tsarist Russia there were no more than 91 colleges and universities with 112,000 students. In 1955, the higher and secondary special training schools graduated over 640,000 young experts. A comparison of the data on the number of students of higher schools per 10,000 head of population in certain republics of the U.S.S.R. and other countries is of considerable interest: in the Tajik S.S.R. there were 58 students, in the Uzbek S.S.R., 71; and in Azerbaijan, 93; at the same time in Turkey there were 12 students per 10,000 head of population, in Sweden, 21; in Italy, 32, and in France, 36.[1]

Correspondence and evening technical secondary and higher schools occupy a place of importance among the higher and specialized secondary schools. The system of correspondence and evening training

enables people engaged in industry and desiring to get a degree to enhance their knowledge and raise their industrial proficiency. Hundreds and thousands of workers attend the branches of correspondence and evening colleges and secondary technical training schools functioning at mills and plants. In the country there are 22 correspondence institutes and hundreds of branches that in 1955 had an enrolment of 3 million persons. Many of the correspondence institutes are huge educational institutions.

Young scientific workers are trained mainly at scientific research institutes and at higher schools. Post-graduate training is a three-year course after which the post-graduate must present his master's thesis. The U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, the branch academies, some universities and scientific research institutes have doctoral courses. Researchers with master's degrees who are preparing their doctor's theses are sent to these institutions ; in 1953 alone there were 58 nationalities represented among the 3,000 post-graduates and 500 masters preparing for a doctorate who took courses and presented their theses at the Academy of Sciences.

Children who have become orphaned are placed in children's homes where they are fully maintained by the state. These children attend the school nearest the home; besides, at each children's home there are shops where vocational training is given. Many children from homes have graduated from higher schools. All the trainees of the labour reserves schools, too, are fully maintained by the state, students of secondary technical training schools receive stipends, and students of higher schools who make good progress receive stipends of 3,000 to 8,400 roubles a year. Those enrolled in part-time and evening higher schools are given an additional annual 20-day leave with pay. When they are in the last course they are given a 30-day additional leave with pay. Particular attention is devoted to the peoples of the Far North. On reaching school age their children are enrolled at state-maintained boarding schools. There are 200 boarding schools in the seven areas of the Far North where over 7,000 children are completely maintained by the state and receive tuition. There are many of these state-maintained boarding schools in the national republics.

In the national republics there are women's teachers' colleges where the students are boarded and lodged. Here all the students are completely maintained by the state.

Post-graduates are given stipends sufficient to allow them to do research work without having to undertake chance jobs. Those working for doctors' degrees are given the pay they received as teachers at higher schools.

This is how the entire people of the U.S.S.R., and the young generation in particular, is given the full and real possibility to receive an education and become familiar with world culture. Altogether, studying in the educational institutions of the U.S.S.R. are some 60 million children and adults, or over one quarter of the population. This

progress in the sphere of education which has radically changed the cultural aspect of the country, the Soviet people has rightly called a *cultural revolution.*

The course of development of Soviet education is a reflection of the socialist course of development of our country which coincides with the fundamental interests of the working people, and ensures the further progress of its creative talent and ability.

Soviet culture does not stand aloof from world culture. It has mastered all that is valuable in the development of human thought and culture. Socialist culture is a culture of profound humanism, permeated with the ideology that all races and nations are equal, with the feeling of respect for the freedom and independence of other peoples. The Soviet people have the deepest respect for the culture of other peoples regardless of their social and economic system, since genuine culture is the bulwark of peace, friendship and progress of all peoples of the world.

NOTES

[1] E. L. Manevich, " The Growth of the Wellbeing of the Soviet People," Goskultprosvetizdat, 1953, p. 39.

Education Towards Rural Life in Israel

H. V. MUHSAM

(Lecturer in Statistics, The Hebrew University, Jerusalem)

INTRODUCTION

In the society of the State of Israel, the interplay of education and social and occupational mobility presents some very particular aspects. Although we are, at present, only in the stage of fact finding, in investigating this constellation of social forces and changes, we thought it worth while to describe the situation and to point to certain features which are met with in this work and which we think to be unique. It is hoped that in view of the unusual juncture of trends and events in Israel, it will become possible to test the validity of certain general theories under these particular circumstances and perhaps even to open some new views on the problems of the mutual effects of education and social change.

One of the foremost ideological principles of political Zionism has been for at least fifty years the " productivization " of the Jewish people, i.e., a systematic transfer of the population from the " traditional " Jewish occupations in trade, commerce and the services to agricultural occupations. This transfer was obviously often accompanied by immigration to Palestine (or Israel), and it has frequently caused a considerable social stress, particularly to persons who had already some seniority in one of the traditional occupations in their country of origin in the diaspora—a problem with which we shall not be concerned here. Another aspect of this change of occupation which is outside the scope of the present communication, is the " Hakhsharah " movement, i.e., the systematic preparation, before immigration to Israel, of youngsters of the diaspora countries, who according to their social and economic background would normally not engage in agricultural occupations, for exactly this type of occupation in Palestine (or Israel).

We shall confine ourselves, here, to the description of certain educational efforts, which are being made in this country, for the purpose of inducing youngsters to part with the " traditional " Jewish occupations and to turn to rural life. But before means and measures used for this purpose can be analysed, two particular circumstances must be mentioned:

(i) The effort to guide youngsters towards agriculture is almost always coupled with education for life in a collective settlement (" kibbutz "). It would again be beyond the scope of this communication to expose the historical, political and sociological

reasons of this link between agricultural occupations and collective living; it will be assumed as an external datum for the present purpose.

(ii) In spite of Zionist ideologies and resulting political and educational efforts, most of the population of Israel engages in other than agricultural occupations and in the minds of most parents, and society at large, occupations other than agricultural ones enjoy higher prestige than the very occupations which, within the frame of the ideology of the prevalent political theory, are given highest social value.

The present communication is thus concerned with a description of the ways and means of educating youngsters in Israel towards interest in, and ultimate actual choice of, agricultural occupations and collective life, in spite of different traditional ideals still held in esteem by large sections of the population. We are dealing with a conscientious effort to bring about social and economic change—through occupational movement—by means of purposive education.

In the following some such channels of education are described and certain research work already published or actually being carried out in order to test the success of these efforts, is summarized.

Labour Education Trend

Until the recent unification of the public education system in Israel, practically all schools in Israel were affiliated with one of four recognized ideological " trends ", each " trend " enjoying, within a frame of united administration and finances, a considerable degree of independence in matters of curriculum and supervisory control, as well as in the establishment of ultimate objectives of education. One of these " trends ", the Labour Trend, in which we are interested here, was politically and administratively controlled by the General Federation of Labour (" Histadruth "). The schools affiliated with this trend, the " Homes of Education " as they were called, were considered by the General Federation of Labour as one of the foremost means of attaining its main political aim, namely the establishment in Israel of a model labour commonwealth based on socialist ideals, and, at the same time, these schools represented one of the most splendid achievements in this endeavour.

In view of this ideological background of education and concurrent Zionist ideologies, one of the main objectives of education in these Homes of Education was the creation of a particular order of vocational preferences in the minds of their pupils. Agricultural labour, preferably within the frame of a collective settlement, was given highest priority, and second to it ranked certain types of manual work. The occupations of most of the parents, who belonged, at least as far as the urban section of the population is concerned, in general to the middle class, were very lowly ranked.

The success of this purposive education was twice investigated, in 1937 and in 1949, by Ormian[1] who came to the conclusion that no other attempt to entice youngsters into agricultural vocations and rural life has ever met with similar success. In fact, 56 per cent. of the pupils interviewed in 1937 (and 37 per cent. of those interviewed in 1949) indicated agricultural labour as their first vocational preference. But most unfortunately, preferences of pupils were ascertained by an open, non-anonymous questionnaire, administered to them by the teacher who is known to be an advocate of agricultural occupations. Many pupils may be suspected to have given expression, in their replies, to their loyalty to the educational trend and its ideals, to flattery towards their teacher, etc., rather than to their actual preferences. It might further be questioned how far replies to such a questionnaire may be considered relevant for predicting the ultimate vocational choice of the youngsters concerned.

"Youth Aliyah"

The foremost among the institutions engaged in the task of education towards rural life is the "Youth Aliyah",[2] an organization originally established for the care of young people of school age immigrating without their parents. At present, Youth Aliyah has engaged, in addition to its original tasks, in various activities aimed at helping young immigrants—even if they came with their families—to become integrated into Israel society.

It is the declared aim of Youth Aliyah to prepare its pupils, in general, for life in agricultural collective settlements, pupils not suited for this type of life, or exceptionally gifted for other professions, being however provided with fair chances to choose another career. The main means of education used by Youth Aliyah are the following:[3] (*a*) change of milieu—which is obvious in the case of youngsters who joined Youth Aliyah when immigrating; but an attempt in this direction is always made, even with respect to children who do not leave their family while under the care of Youth Aliyah; (*b*) the assignation of each pupil to a group of youngsters with common educational needs and requests; (*c*) rural surroundings; (*d*) specially adapted curriculum; (*e*) a fair amount of manual labour as part of the regular curriculum; (*f*) organized group life and (*g*) premeditated integration of learning, working and group life.

During over 20 years of its existence, about 50,000 youngsters have passed through Youth Aliyah, and extensive research is at present being carried out[4] to check the result of the educational work performed. The main purpose of this research project—not only from the point of view of the present communication—is to find out how many former pupils of Youth Aliyah actually live in agricultural collective settlements or similar other forms of agricultural labour settlements, that is to say have chosen, and remained attached to, the very type of life for which they had been trained by Youth Aliyah. It is expected that

this proportion will come up to about 15 or 20 per cent. of the former pupils. At the same time, an attempt is obviously made to ascertain the reasons, psychological, sociological or other, for the choice of the particular career of each former pupil in the sample investigated. The questionnaire used therefore, includes questions as to whether the attachment to the group of pupils to which the interviewee belonged, love for the particular village in which he lived as a pupil of Youth Aliyah, the influence of youth movements, etc., is mainly responsible for the choice of living in an agricultural settlement; and a similar analysis will be made regarding the reasons for having parted with the main objective of Youth Aliyah education, with respect to those former pupils who do not live in agricultural settlements.

YOUTH MOVEMENTS OF SECONDARY SCHOOL PUPILS AND "NAKHAL"

In almost all youth movements in Israel, membership in an agricultural collective settlement is accepted as the ideal form of life by all members of the movement. It is irrelevant for the present purpose, whether this ideal is freely chosen by the youngsters themselves as the natural solution of their various conflicts of adolescence, as assumed by Ben-David[5], or whether these youth movements are artificially established and perpetuated by various organizations of these agricultural collective settlements in order to serve as recruiting cadres, as presumed by others.[6] The fact remains that practically all those youth movements which comprise a considerable number of secondary school pupils among their members and which, at the same time, are the only ones to which high school pupils adhere in considerable numbers, share the basic ideology of pioneering Zionism which finds its concrete expression in life in agricultural collective settlements. All these youth movements which comprise together probably about half of the high school pupils (perhaps at certain ages considerably more, but in the highest grades of secondary schools certainly less) make most serious attempts to prepare their members mentally and socially as well as physically for life in such settlements and to induce them, in due time, actually to join such a settlement. Both the indoctrination and the actual preparation are obviously performed by means of systematic purposive education within the ranks of the youth movement. Intensive group work is here again one of the main means of this education.

This endeavour of youth organizations is sanctioned by the State by the establishment of a special unit of the Armed Forces called "Nakhal". In order to understand the function of "Nakhal" in this context, it must be remembered that one of the means of preparing youngsters for communal life, used by all educational agencies adhering to this ideal, is organized group work and, as far as possible, group life. Groups formed during the period of training, are ultimately transferred as a whole into the settlement or form the nucleus of a new settlement. It is evident that the preservation of the group as a unit

is a necessary condition for the success of the educational effort. As soon as the group is broken up, its members disperse and become attached to new circles and institutions, and very few of them will finally find their way to the collective settlements.

The long months of compulsory military service, which is intercalated between secondary school and the choice of a career, would be the factor which breaks up these groups and would leave very little new blood for the agricultural collective settlements, if no special arrangements were available for such groups who have decided to stay together for a life-time within the frame of a collective settlement. The " Nakhal " affords to such groups, including its male and female members, the possibility of retaining their unity during compulsory military service, within the frame of the Armed Forces.

It is still early to pass a judgement of any kind on this new experience. From the angle of the present communication, the " Nakhal " is the most original and boldest attempt to attract youngsters to rural life and agricultural occupations, or at least not to divert them from their intentions, if they have shown some inclination towards this type of life and this group of occupations.

Some information on the effect of " Nakhal " on the choice of career is expected to become available from a research project[7] which includes a follow-up of graduates from secondary schools during four years. This project will not enable us to study the extent and direct effect of military service in the " Nakhal " units. But it may already be estimated that not more than five or ten per cent. of the graduates of secondary schools untimately join agricultural collective settlements, while, as has already been mentioned, youth movements which are so to say preliminary to service with " Nakhal " units, may comprise at certain ages well over 50 per cent. of secondary school pupils.

Conclusion

Unusual and bold institutions have been shown to have been used in Israel in order to attract youngsters to agricultural occupations and to educate them to the values of rural life. Recourse to such new means might have been made possible or necessary because of the particular " traditional " Jewish occupational preferences, because of the link between agricultural occupations and collective life, or because of the particular position of agriculture within the frame of Zionist ideology. But it must be admitted that up to now, neither has the appropriateness of these means been proved, nor has their actual success been satisfactorily ascertained. In fact, one of these institutions, the Labour Trend of education, has recently been abolished in order to open the way to a unified national education system. At the same time, basic information regarding such preliminary data as the correlation between the actual occupational structure of the population of Israel and the particular circumstances of orders of preference in various institutional settings is still lacking.

NOTES

[1] H. Ormian, *Vocational Interests of Pupils in the Schools of the "Labour Trend" in Israel*, Urim Press, Tel Aviv, 1952, (in Hebrew).

[2] See, e.g., C. Frankenstein, ed., *Child Care in Israel, A Guide to the Social Services for Children and Youth*, Henrietta Szold Foundation, Jerusalem, 1950.

[3] J. Rapaport, *Youth Aliyah and its Place in Israeli Education*, Megamot (Hebrew Child Welfare Research Quarterly), vol. v, pp. 50–77, 1953.

[4] Under the direction of A. Nadad, assisted by a steering committee of which the present author is a member.

[5] Y. Ben-David, *Membership in Youth Movements and Social Status*, Megamot (Hebrew Child Welfare Research Quarterly), vol. v, pp. 227–247, 1954.

H. Barzell, "Youth Movements", in C. Frankenstein, ed., *op. cit.*

[7] "The Supply and Demand of Professional Manpower in Israel" (project Supervisor: H. V. Muhsam), in Falk Project for Economic Research in Israel, 1st Annual Report, 1954, Jerusalem, 1955.

The New Post-Primary Education in New Zealand and its Social Implications

E. G. JACOBY
(Research Officer, Department of Education,
Government of New Zealand)

Last year New Zealand could celebrate the tenth anniversary of a sociologically most significant event in its educational history. The occasion might have received more notice than it did, had not education authorities been so hard pressed in their work of accommodating in new classrooms and providing with more teachers a rapidly growing child population. As it was, the anniversary of the "Education (Post-Primary Instruction) Regulations, 1945" was not made the occasion for a review of, or reflection on, a momentous educational development. No word was said on it in the matter-of-fact introduction with which the Chief Inspector of Post-Primary Schools prefaced a re-issue of the revised Regulations, Syllabuses and Examination Prescriptions after ten years of their operation.

This unusual degree of unostentatiousness need not prevent a contribution from New Zealand to a discussion before an international sociological forum of problems of social change in the twentieth century taking this anniversary as a suitable starting point.

I

Ten years ago, the system of what was called "secondary education for all" was ready to be set to work. The school leaving age had—after a delay of some twenty years—at last been raised to fifteen years in 1943. Some time before that, the greatest barrier to the realisation of a new secondary education policy had been removed when the proficiency examination at the end of the primary school course had been abolished. With the normal age of leaving primary school at just over 13 years, the road was free for giving the benefit of two years of post-primary education to every boy and girl in the country. The machinery to give effect to the new policy was based on the recommendations of a consultative committee set up by the Minister of Education in 1942 (Thomas Report). The introduction of the Regulations coincided with the coming-into-force of new conditions for entrance to the University. The aim of the post-primary education system was to satisfy the educational needs of every adolescent, instead of only catering for the future university student.

The dominant features of the system that are relevant for assessing the social change it partly recognised and partly helped usher in, must

be briefly examined. The emphases of such a retrospective review will naturally somewhat differ from those at the time when the new system was moulded into shape by a small group of men who were assured of the full support of their Minister of Education, the late Mr. Peter Fraser.

It should be recalled first of all, that the New Zealand child attends primary school for eight years at least, two being spent in the infant room, four in the "standards" (mastery of the basic skills in the tool subjects), and another two at a senior level. No examinations exist dividing one stage from the next. There has been, on the contrary, a strong move in favour of age-promotion, and, more recently, a trend to escape from the levelling effects of an age-promotion system by means of "streaming" particularly in larger schools. The last two years spent in the primary school are "intermediate", and approximately one-fifth of all children in public primary schools, chiefly in the larger towns and main urban centres, do enrol at this stage in a separate intermediate school, or department attached to a high school.

This last stage is not merely a continuation of the elementary education in the standards but places a new emphasis on the preparation for the future citizenship and vocation of its children. Its idea had never been simply to provide some more advanced and broadened education (in a kind of junior high school) for children who would be going to work—whether in industry, in offices, or on farms—on reaching the leaving age. Its purpose had been from the beginning, to provide, as the very term indicated, an intermediate "period of expansive, realistic and socially integrated education that will give all future citizens a common basis of experience and knowledge" (1944)—even those children who would then be taking a full post-primary course with its attendant academic, technical, agricultural or domestic specialisation.

It would nevertheless be true to say that the function of the intermediate school underwent some subtle change once more than 90 per cent. of all children passed on to some post-primary education, and the principle of a common core at that level was firmly developed. Intermediate schools became, with one or two exceptions, restricted to the forms I and II level.

Secondly, it may be observed how in the last ten years the slogan of "secondary education for all" has become a reality. In 1934 only 55 per cent. of the pupils leaving primary school went on to a post-primary school. By 1944 the proportion had risen to 80 per cent., to approximate 100 per cent. to-day.

In the 1930's only two-thirds of the 14–15 age group, one-third of the 15–16 age group, and one-fifth or less of the 16–17 age group attended school as full-time pupils. At present, the figures are two-thirds in the 15–16 age group, and well over one-third in the 16–17 age group.

Of those children who entered a post-primary school in the early thirties, over 20 per cent. left school again in or at the end of the first

year, and well over one-half left within two years or less. In the early fifties, the early leavers were only 10 or 11 per cent. in the first year, with another third leaving in or at the end of the second year. Well over one-half of the 1952 cohort of post-primary school entrants continued their post-primary education into their third or later years.

These figures show that, (*a*) nearly all children now get some post-primary education; (*b*) the total period of school attendance has increased by at least one year (or more, if the trend to enter school at 5 rather than at 6 or 7 years is taken into consideration); (*c*) the portion of early leavers has markedly declined, though the problem is still a serious one.

However, these figures do not (as figures never do) tell the whole story of the development that has taken place. A further point to be noted is the change in the school leaving examination. The Report of 1943–44 had proposed that the course leading to the School Certificate should normally be one of four years, and only for the brighter pupils one of three. To appreciate the significance of this proposal, two further circumstances must be taken into consideration.

One is that the first three years of the post-primary course were predominantly devoted to a common core of studies consisting of English language and literature, social studies, general science and elementary mathematics, music, a craft or one of the fine arts, and physical education. The core studies in the first year left something like two-fifths, and in the third year nearly three-fifths of the total time available for optional pursuits. Thus, taking the course during the first three years as a whole, it may be said to represent a blend of an appreciable bedrock-minimum of core studies with a wide range of options according to the interests of the pupils and to the differing practices and circumstances in the different types of post-primary school, with a high degree of flexibility in the grouping of subjects.

The second point is that when the Consultative Committee was reporting, the old School Certificate examination was being taken at the end of form V, i.e., normally after three years, and could be taken at the same time with some modification as "matriculation", or university entrance examination. This tradition proved so strong that the practice reverted to under the new regulations soon became again one of an increasing number of pupils entering for the School Certificate examination after three, and not after four years at a post-primary school. To-day nine-tenths of all boys and four-fifths of all girls sitting the examination for the first time do so after three years. The "four-year course for most pupils" remained an intention, partly because the examination continued to be taken at the end of Form V—that is, the third year of post-primary work—partly because the headmaster's certificate on the satisfactory completion of the course became largely a formality testifying to the work in core studies, and partly because the standard set by the examination papers in some subjects (which allowed the candidates a great degree of choice among the questions) was such

that the optional work in the first three years appeared to be a normally sufficient preparation. At present, with between 80 and 90 per cent. of all candidates sitting the examination after three years, approximately one-half fail to pass, and one-third or more of those who fail in the examination sit again in the following year, this time with a pass of 60 to 65 per cent. Consequently, approximately three out of five pupils who stay through the course, eventually pass the School Certificate examination.

To round off the picture, it should be mentioned that the University Entrance-qualifying examination was completely separated from the School Certificate. It is now taken at the end of Form VI, that is, at the earliest after a four-year course, and all larger post-primary schools are entitled to pass their pupils after an internal examination by accrediting.

It is of interest to compare once again the change at this level by means of the following figures. The passes in the School Certificate Examination represent to-day a little less than one-quarter of a whole age group—with a probable trend of further increase—whilst in 1934 less than 8 per cent. of an age group passed what was the old "matriculation" examination.

In this comparison, however, the considerable differences in the nature of the examination must not be overlooked. The present examination consists, besides English as the only compulsory subject, of over thirty options, which allow a considerable variety of abilities to be tested at this level, ranging from the more academic subjects to technical subjects and vocational and domestic pursuits. The system was geared to a new organisation of vocational guidance and advice on careers, in order to make the best possible placement in work of pupils when leaving post-primary school.

II

The second portion of this paper will give some consideration to the social implications of the emerging new system of post-primary education. The social implications were, from the beginning, seen in a very practical way as "the background of guidance". In the development of the whole idea of vocational guidance as an essential part of a modern education system, one can discern three phases which reflect the process of thinking on the social implications of an educational policy. But this process is not at its end. It has, on the contrary, gone only some way to meet the sociological problems of social change insofar as this is influenced by the operation of a particular school system. These phases may be briefly sketched.

The first phase, comprising approximately the ten years before the new post-primary education system was introduced, was dominated by the idea—or perhaps it was an ideal—that it was possible to match one by one the range of abilities and aptitudes of school leavers with the range of occupational openings for youths. In a country that makes

its living from the exportable surplus of its farming produce and therefore has proved highly sensitive to the cycles of the world markets, but whose working population is divided into three groups of roughly equal size among primary, secondary, and tertiary industries, the range of occupational openings, in terms of a census enumeration, was always considerable. Available information on what was called the absorptive capacity of any one industry or occupational group was too sketchy to permit of an estimate of the relationship between advice given by a careers adviser and the condition of the labour market.

The lack of occupational surveys and of adequate information on jobs proved, indeed, a blessing in disguise. It blocked the attempt to pursue the idea of matching one by one the abilities and aptitudes of school leavers with jobs. The idea was abandoned, if ever it had been seriously entertained, that one could at the post-primary schools educate the right number of boys vocationally as future motor-mechanics or orchardists, or accountants. The conditions of war and national service requirements at a crucial moment, made a placement service based on this idea a matter of "man-powering" into essential work; and after the war the placement service lost in importance through the conditions of over-full employment. The vocational guidance service was separated from the employment administration, and taken over solely by the Education Department.

In the second phase, which coincided with the first five years or so of establishing the new post-primary education, the emphasis was laid, quite naturally, on the hope and expectation that the work of the schools, with their wide range of subject options, would produce a youth better prepared for occupational choices to be made when entering working life. But the educational philosophy, not only of the post-primary course, was placing a greater and greater emphasis on personal development and creative activities. Insofar it became further removed from the realities of a working life that contained a growing proportion of mere routine work, routine work in factories and offices, in the servicing activities of the so-called tertiary industries as well as in primary industries with their rapid mechanisation. Critical observers did not fail to remark on the "widening gulf between education and work" and warned against the danger of "encouraging, even unintentionally, impossible vocational dreams". This phase, then, inevitably resulted in proving, for the other end of the relationship between post-primary education and work-life, the impossibility of preparing at school for a specific job, or work in a specific vocation. The solution of the problem the school-work relationship involved must, then, be sought not at the level of the sum-total as it were of individual relationships between specific school careers and courses and specific industrial occupations or specific kinds of work, but at a more general level; this was far more difficult to determine adequately.

Before this development is pursued a little further it should be added that the second phase had one very important positive outcome in the

field of technical education. The technical schools, and the facilities they offered for part-time students, were given a function in the training of apprentices. Daylight training, as part of the apprenticeship whether on certain days or half-days of the week, or in block courses, became part of many apprenticeship orders which had been put on a new basis by a statute arising from a report of a Commission of Inquiry into Apprenticeship and Related Matters (1944). The vigorous development of Technical High Schools in this and in other respects has probably not reached its peak. It may, for example, lead to the bigger city schools functioning as technological institutes, providing for the training of the intermediate level of vocations between, e.g., the skilled mechanic and the academically trained professional engineer.

What I suggest may be taken as the third phase that was reached in the thinking on the social implications of educational policy was dominated by some retreat from the optimism displayed in the earlier phases of vocational education. The situation has been fully described in the New Zealand contribution to the 1950 Yearbook of Education, which took as its general theme "occupational selection and differentiation through education". Some aspects of the process, "not always the least important" (it was admitted) had never been seriously studied at all, and on others it was difficult to obtain up-to-date information. The author of the paper, one of the most distinguished educationists of his generation, had to rely probably more than he wished, upon personal impressions; but it is fair to add that there appeared to be wide agreement with other equally well-informed observers. Post-primary courses had, through the way the flexible combination of core studies with more specialised options worked itself out in practice, become less vocational in their emphasis. To a neat division of schools into those of a more general and those of a more vocational kind of education the whole system had never lent itself. The problem had rather, in this view, become one of the "rôle of education in the sorting process" by which "certain people secure the desirable jobs while others must remain content with more or less undesirable ones". Status and security as social aims had always played a considerable part in the outlook of both parents and students, and it was suggested that in the first instance the education system functioned as a social elevator to a marked degree. "Examples of boys from poorish homes who have distinguished themselves in the professions or gone far in the public service (which in New Zealand is a perhaps disproportionately large sector) are so numerous as scarcely to occasion comment; and the numbers of those who have risen just a grade or two in the socio-economic scale must be very large indeed." To the extent to which the education system favoured such changes, it was no doubt strongly supported by public opinion. For "there is in New Zealand a strong feeling that it should be possible for the able lad who begins at the bottom to make his way to the top".

No useful purpose would be served if one were to press the inquiry beyond this point. It sufficiently reflects a certain lack of urgency to find solutions to problems of social mobility—simply because a small community such as New Zealand possesses a relatively narrow "social spectrum" in which one grade imperceptibly shades into the next, and where there is much movement from grade to grade anyhow. The social scientist is, of course, at liberty to question the validity of generalisations of this nature when even the grades of social stratification have been left largely undefined. What counts for more with the practical-minded New Zealander is that even more recent experiences of recruiting difficulties in a wide range of skilled occupations (from teaching to engineering)—accentuated by low age groups coming on a labour market of rising demand—have proved that the problem of influencing, even guiding social change by educational policy and of adapting itself to it, is a very real one. As this insight is slowly becoming more firmly established, the need for social research into relevant aspects of the situation such as recruitment problems, demand predictions, labour turnover, and so forth, finds more and more recognition.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

1. Department of Education: *The Education (Post-Primary Instruction) Regulations*, Syllabuses of Instruction, and Prescriptions for the School Certificate Examination (Government Printer, Wellington, 1955).

2. *The Post-Primary School Curriculum*, Report of the Committee appointed by the Minister of Education in November, 1942. (Wellington, Government Printer, 1944).

3. *Education To-day and To-morrow*, by Hon. H. G. R. Mason, Minister of Education, New Zealand (Wellington, 1944).

4. *Next Year?* Some information for Boys and Girls Leaving School etc. Published annually by the Department of Education, Wellington, latest issue for 1956.

5. *The Background of Guidance*, by H. C. McQueen, *et al.* (New Zealand Council for Educational Research, 1941).

6. *The Yearbook of Education*, 1950, Sec. III, ch. 4, "New Zealand," by A. E. Campbell (pp. 360–74) (University of London Institute of Education and Evans Bros., London).

The Changing Ideology of Success: A Study of the Aspirations of High School Men in Los Angeles

RALPH H. TURNER

(Associate Professor of Sociology, University of California, Los Angeles)

Recent decades have witnessed a striking increase in the average level of formal schooling in the United States and very likely in the prevalence of education as a means of upward mobility. Such changes are not isolated phenomena but relate to more pervasive shifts in the system of social stratification. Our present interest is in the kinds of modification in the traditional ideology of mobility and success which have accompanied these changes. Without time series data, we shall attempt to make some inferences in this direction through an examination of the actual aspirations of high school senior men students in the Los Angeles metropolitan area. We shall first sketch briefly the elements of traditional ideology upon which we shall concentrate attention; then we shall note the actual aspirations of our subjects, study the interrelations among different kinds of aspirations which are indicative of the old and new ideologies, and finally examine the relation of these various aspirations to the background levels of our subjects.

The data consist of questionnaire responses secured between April and June, 1955, from 1,262 twelfth grade boys in ten high schools in the Los Angeles metropolitan area.[1] The schools were chosen as a representative sample of the metropolitan area on the basis of the 1950 Shevky *social rank indices* of the census tracts from which their students are drawn.[2] Questionnaires were administered in classes by the investigator and his trained assistants, and nearly all second semester students filled out the questionnaires in each school.[3]

IDEOLOGIES OF SUCCESS

Certain elements from the traditional ideology of success and upward mobility have been selected for measurement either as aspirations or as indications of value preference. (*a*) In some respects the key idea in the traditional complex is *ownership* of one's own business, which can then be developed into a gigantic empire by the shrewd entrepreneur. Accordingly the students were asked whether they expected to own their own business or be employed by somebody when they were ultimately established in their life-work. (*b*) An unremitting drive for *eminence*, such that no success is great enough to justify relaxation

of effort, is supposed to account for high attainment. Subjects were asked when they would consider themselves successful enough to relax and stop trying so hard to get ahead. They chose from among seven answers ranging from, " when I am doing well enough to stay in my occupation ", to " never ". (*c*) Success is achieved through willingness to take *risks* and eschew security. (*d*) The successful person is something of an *individualist*. These latter have been posed as value-choice questions, individualism being presented as two questions, one on pride in doing things without the help of others and one on unwillingness to take orders from someone else.[4] (*f*) Finally, the traditional ideology emphasizes " experience with life ", or common sense, rather than formal education.

Spearheading the changing circumstances which should affect this traditional ideology is the emphasis placed upon formal education. Subjects were therefore asked how much more schooling they expected to get, the check list ranging from none to post-graduate college work. When a well-established ideology encounters changing circumstances, various developments are possible. First, the traditional ideology may disappear. Such a trend could be confirmed by absence of correlation between elements of the traditional pattern and more stable aspects of ambition such as occupational and material (or monetary) aspiration. Second, a polarization may take place, old and new patterns coexisting as mutually exclusive but alternative avenues to success. Such a trend would be revealed in negative correlations between old and new elements, both showing positive correlations with more stable success indicators. Third, an emerging ideology may absorb some elements from the old, rejecting others, with the result that some features of the old will be correlated with stable indicators and with emphasis on formal education and others will not.[5]

A special question was devised to identify level of *material* aspiration. Since the purchasing power of any given sum of money is differently understood by people from different backgrounds, we measured material aspiration in terms of house and car, which we believed to be the most universally understood standards of material value available. Subjects checked " yes " or " no " to a graded series of completions to the following question, " Will you feel a little disappointed if—in your whole life—the best you can ever afford to have is— . . . ? " Completions ranged from " a one-room house and a fifteen-year-old car ", to " several large houses and several new top-priced cars ".

Aspiration and Background

Table 1 compares occupational background with aspiration.[6] The prevalence of upward mobility aspiration is indicated by the fact that while forty-eight per cent. of the families represented are in some form of manual labor, only twenty-six per cent. of the sons expected to be in manual labor. While only twelve per cent. of families are from

professional and semi-professional backgrounds, fifty-three per cent. of the sons aspire to these occupations.

Selectivity of preference among occupations can be examined in terms of increment or decrement, measured as the ratio formed by dividing the number of aspirants to any given occupation by the number of persons from that occupational background. The popularity of the

Table 1. *Occupational background and aspirations.*

Occupational category	Per cent.		Ratio: Aspiration/ background
	Background	Aspiration	
Unskilled labor	5·9	0·5	·08
Semi-skilled labor	10·3	1·2	·12
Skilled labor	32·2	24·1	·75
Clerical-salesmen	6·6	3·2	·48
Small business owners-managers	19·6	11·6	·60
Semi-professionals	3·6	17·8	4·89
Business agents-officials	8·2	3·6	·44
Professionals	8·4	35·2	4·19
Large business owners-managers	5·2	2·9	·55
Total	100·0	100·1	
Total number	(1,262)	(1,262)	

professions probably reflects the contemporary trend. The relative unpopularity of higher level business positions may run counter to aspects of both the traditional pattern and purported conditions in the modern metropolis favoring upward movement through large business bureaucracies. The relatively small decrements in small business ownership-management and in skilled labor appear to perpetuate highly traditional goals.

Intercorrelation of Aspirations

In Table 2 are reported the indices for each type of aspiration and for the three values, by categories of occupational aspiration. When the occupations are ranked according to each of the four types of aspiration, the rank order correlations of each with every other one are positive, ranging from the highest intercorrelation between education and material aspiration (rho=·88) to the lowest correlation between ownership and eminence aspiration (rho=·26). The grouping of occupations thus suggests that elements of the traditional ideology are still related to success striving, and that any tendencies toward polarization occur within the traditional ideology, retaining education in the common core to which both poles relate.

A more cautious measure of relationships is provided by the fourfold intercorrelations among the aspirations and values, which have been arranged in the order which insures the most consistent slope of

Table 2. *Characteristics by occupational aspiration.**

Occupational aspiration category	Material aspiration	Educational aspiration	Eminence aspiration	Ownership aspiration	Risk value	Anti-submission value	Self-achievement value
Unskilled and semi-skilled labor	·58	·08	·69	·24	·42	·24	·62
Skilled labor	·34	·15	·73	·32	·47	·29	·58
Clerical-salesmen	·59	·33	1·25	·28	·60	·42	·63
Small business owners-managers	·61	·55	·61	·90	·56	·50	·50
Semi-professionals	·66	·28	2·05	·33	·55	·41	·67
Business agents-officials	·89	3·40	1·25	·36	·64	·40	·64
Professionals	1·13	125·67	1·47	·44	·60	·46	·65
Large business owners-managers	4·60	12·50	2·57	·81	·89	·50	·83

* The indices of material, educational, and eminence aspiration are simple ratios of the number of persons in the categories above the median to the number of persons in categories below the median, omitting the median category. The remaining indices are simple percentages, i.e., per cent. aspiring to ownership, per cent. more strongly endorsing the " risk " value, etc.

co-efficients away from the diagonals (Table 3).[7] The ordering of co-efficients even more strongly underlines a polarization within the traditional ideology itself, so that preference for risk-taking over security becomes part of the core with material and educational aspiration, while the ownership and eminence emphases from the traditional ideology become polarized as unrelated kinds of aspirations only tenuously linked to what is probably the dominant emerging success ideology. Individualism appears to take two unrelated forms, each related to the core and respectively related to the two poles of eminence and ownership. Ownership aspiration is related to an unwillingness to submit to direction from others, even when such submission would be to one's interest. Pride in accomplishing things without help from others is related to eminence striving. The dismembering of traditional ideology is clearly represented in the contrast between the small business and large business owner-managers categories. Small business aspirants combine the maximum anti-submission individualism with the minimum pride in individual achievement and eminence aspiration. The large business group, however, retain the traditional ideology intact except for high educational expectation, combining these with maximum material aspiration.

The professions, which showed the highest aspiration increment, are high in all elements of the traditional ideology, but significantly lower than large business owner-managers in all of them.[8] They are, however, significantly higher in educational expectation. Thus while the current success ideology tends to combine the new and the old rather than rejecting the old for the new, the most popular road to success represents a partial choice between education and the total traditional ideology.

Background and Aspiration

If there are an old and a new ideology of success, it can be hypothesized that subjects from higher backgrounds will reflect more fully the newer tendencies because of their closer acquaintance with the actual conditions making for success. So simple a relationship might be complicated, however, if the actual conditions for success vary according to the individual's starting point. For purposes of this analysis we have divided the subjects into three groups which we shall designate *low background* (unskilled, semi-skilled, skilled labor, and clerical-sales workers), *small business*, and *high background* (agents-officials, large business owners-managers, semi-professionals, professionals).[9]

The expected number of aspirants to each occupation has been computed according to the assumption that background is not a factor in level of aspiration. The difference between *high background* and *low background* ratios of observed to expected frequencies provides a basis for ranking the occupations (Table 4). When this ranking is correlated with the ranking according to the various aspirations and values, it corresponds most closely with material expectation (rho = ·95),

Table 3. *Fourfold intercorrelations among aspirations and values.**

Aspirations and values	Ownership aspiration	Anti-submission value	Risk value	Material aspiration	Educational aspiration	Self-achievement value
Anti-submission value ..	·160					
Risk value	·101	·136				
Material aspiration	NS	·073	·150			
Educational aspiration ..	NS	·111	·115	·176		
Self-achievement value ..	NS	NS	·099	·090	NS	
Eminence aspiration	NS	NS	NS	NS	·109	·081

* Fourfold tables were secured by arbitrarily dividing each continuum as near to the median as possible. All correlations are significant by the Chi-square test with one degree of freedom at the one per cent. level or better. When correlations were not significantly greater than zero the abbreviation NS has been entered.

and quite closely with the newer emphasis on formal education (rho = ·89) and the traditional eminence aspiration (rho = ·89). The correlation with ownership emphasis, while positive, is lower (rho = ·60). Among those subjects who aspire to move from a low background to a high level occupation there appear to be two contrasting groups, those who differ from the high background group in their preference for the education-related professions and those who differ in their preference for the semi-professions which promise the traditional attainment of eminence without the newer achievement of formal schooling.

We cannot interpret the above observations, however, until we know whether the choice of a given occupation means the same things to persons of high and low backgrounds. Within the three background

Table 4. *Occupational aspiration by parental background*

Occupational aspiration category	Ratio of observed to expected frequency			
	Low background	Small business background	High background	Mother's education higher
Unskilled and semi-skilled labor	1·57	·49	·19	·50
Skilled labor	1·42	·69	·33	·81
Clerical-salesmen	1·10	·92	·83	1·20
Small business owners-managers	·93	1·83	·51	·87
Semi-professionals	1·06	·79	1·02	1·00
Business agents-officials	·89	·90	1·30	1·20
Professionals	·72	1·09	1·52	1·22
Large business owners-managers	·41	·99	2·28	1·33

groups we have used actual distributions of occupational aspiration as a basis for computing expected frequencies of each degree of material aspiration, eminence, educational, and ownership aspiration. The Chi-square test indicates no significant deviation of observed from expected frequencies in eminence aspiration and a deviation of only borderline significance ($P < ·05$) in case of material aspiration. A highly significant difference with respect to ownership ($P < ·001$) is principally accounted for in the excessive ownership expectation of students from small business backgrounds rather than in any marked difference between those from high and low backgrounds. Educational emphasis, however, is significantly related to level of background ($P < ·001$), any given occupation being associated with higher educational expectation on the part of subjects from higher backgrounds.

According to the orienting hypothesis regarding background, then, the higher educational aspiration associated with given occupations among persons of high backgrounds and the tendency to select occupations with higher education may reflect the emerging emphasis on formal

schooling. Continued linkage of much of the traditional ideology with the newer trend is also indicated, with ownership being the least perpetuated. Perhaps those from high level background may be described as integrating better the old and the new emphases while those from low level backgrounds are more likely to make choices.

In considering background it must not be overlooked that the mother's level, when discrepant from the principal wage-earner's, may be a factor. Using the only information we have regarding mother's level we have simply divided the cases into those in which the mother's education exceeds that of the principal wage-earner and those in which it does not. Expected frequencies were then computed for each type of aspiration on the basis of the actual distribution of the principal wage-earner's education.

From application of the Chi-square test we conclude that the higher educational background of the mother is unrelated to material, eminence, or ownership aspiration of the sons. The mother's superior education is also unrelated to occupational aspiration, unless the occupations are condensed into the three categories of low, small business, and high, in which case a relationship of borderline significance emerges ($P < \cdot 05$). The actual order of deviation from expectation in occupational choice corresponds closely with the difference in preference between persons of high and low backgrounds (rho $= \cdot 96$, see Table 4). A striking difference emerges, however, in the case of educational aspirations ($P < \cdot 001$). Thus while the mother's superior education may bear some slight relation to a generalized pattern of higher level ambitions, it bears strong and clear-cut relationship to higher level educational aspiration. The mother with superior education appears to be an important element in promoting the newer ideology of success through formal education completely apart from the traditional ideology.

SUMMARY

Recognizing the growing importance of formal schooling in the American success ideology, we have attempted to determine what effect this trend may have had on the traditional success ideology revolving about private ownership and unremitting drive toward ever higher success. Our analysis has concerned the actual interrelations among the aspirations and values which high school students hold for themselves, rather than statements of belief about success in general. The most general trend seems to be an assimilation of the new to the old, so that the emphasis on education does not displace the traditional ideology as a whole. A more complex trend is reflected, however, in the unique patterns exhibited by different groups of students.

The assimilation of the newer emphasis on formal education to the total traditional ideology is most complete in the case of those who aspire to the highest occupational and material levels and who come from high backgrounds. But among these highest aspirants there

appears to be a choice of emphasis with those who seek top material or monetary success and those who come from the highest backgrounds favoring slightly the traditional ideology of ownership and eminence. In this respect large business ownership and management represents the somewhat more traditional emphasis and the professions the newer emphasis. In the whole population studied, however, the newer emphasis is favored in the marked generational gain in popularity of the professions, as compared with a loss for large business. Though high aspirants from lower backgrounds disproportionally favor the professions with their high educational requirements, they actually expect to attain any given occupational level with less education than those from high backgrounds. High aspirants from low backgrounds expect more benefit from less education, in contrast to persons from high backgrounds who realistically acknowledge the importance of education without letting it take the place of the older features of success.

Below these top aspiration groups the typical residue of a changing ideology is found in the preservation of segments of the traditional pattern divorced from the whole. Most striking in this respect are the small business aspirants who are disproportionately recruited from small business backgrounds. This group perpetuates an emphasis on private ownership which is associated with a negative kind of individualism, while rejecting entirely the traditional accompaniment of an emphasis on unending striving for ever-higher levels of success. They show an acceptance of new trends, however, in an educational aspiration which is appropriate to their intermediate material aspirations. By contrast the semi-professions, the high level occupation most disproportionately preferred by students from lower backgrounds, exhibits an exaggerated eminence striving divorced from both traditional ownership emphasis and current educational emphasis.

NOTES

[1] These data were secured as part of a larger study through the co-operation of the Los Angeles and Beverly Hills City Schools Systems, with funds granted by the Social Science Research Council and the University of California Faculty Research Committee. Ninety additional questionnaires were omitted from analysis because the question on either occupational aspiration or background was unanswered or the response unclassifiable.

[2] The social rank index is explained in Eshref Shevky and Marilyn Williams, *The Social Areas of Los Angeles* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1949), pp. 37–40. Indices already computed from 1950 Census data were made available by the Occidental College Laboratory in Urban Culture.

[3] Great care was taken to cultivate rapport with the students. Co-operation was judged to be excellent and there were no refusals.

[4] In each instance the questionnaire presented two value alternatives and the subject indicated (*a*) which kind of person he would rather be and (*b*) whether or not he was sure of his choice. The two responses were combined into a four-point continuum, and the continuum was dichotomized so as to place as nearly equal numbers of respondents in each phase of the dichotomy as possible. The actual items are as follows: " Someone who takes advantage of any good opportunity to get ahead, even when he has to take the chance of losing what he has; *or* Someone who would rather have a small but secure position than take a chance on losing what he has to get ahead "; " Someone who prides himself on doing things on his own,

without asking anyone else for advice or help; *or* Someone who likes to have help and advice from other people on anything he does and seldom does anything entirely on his own"; "Someone who doesn't mind taking orders from somebody else if he can get ahead that way; *or* Someone who would rather be his own boss than get ahead by taking orders from anyone else".

[5] This method does not supply the same information as do questions on the respondents' beliefs regarding success in the society at large. However, it does reveal the ideology implicit in the actual ambitions of the subjects.

[6] Students were asked, "What occupation do you think you will make your *life work*?—What do you expect to be doing *ten* and *twenty* years from now?" As further basis for classification they were asked to, "tell us the kind of work you expect to be doing in your chosen occupation". In order to identify occupational background the respondent was first asked, "In your family, who has earned most of the money to pay most of the bills during your lifetime?" He was then asked, "What has been the occupation of the person you checked in question.... during most of your life?" and a further question about the kind of work done. The scheme of classification is a modification of the Alba Edwards grouping in light of the Lloyd Warner scale and the North-Hatt study.

[7] This ordering procedure has been repeated, using the rank order correlations by occupations, and giving basically similar results.

[8] Significance was tested by Chi-square applied to fourfold tables.

[9] The characteristics of the small business owners-managers are such that their treatment as a distinct middle group was necessary if contrast between clearly high and low backgrounds were not be be clouded.

Contribution à l'étude de la mobilité sociale en France: Les instituteurs

IDA BERGER

(Attachée au Centre Nationale de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris)

C'est la Révolution de 1789 qui a donné le beau nom d'"instituteur" ("celui qui institue la Nation") à l'ancien "petit Maître d'Ecole". Mais pendant presque cent ans encore, le "Maître"—surtout dans les petites agglomérations rurales—devait assumer simultanément avec son enseignement, les fonctions d'aide-curé: Bedeau et sonneur de cloches.

En effet, l'Ecole gratuite, obligatoire et laïque ne fut instaurée qu'en 1881 et 1882. C'est seulement à cette époque-là que la bourgeoisie française, entreprenante et conquérante, avait réellement besoin d'ouvriers, sachant correctement lire et écrire, d'une main d'oeuvre intelligente et instruite, apte à servir des machines de plus en plus compliquées. L'instituteur devint alors un des principaux piliers de la troisième République. L'essor de cette nouvelle Ecole gratuite, obligatoire et laïque est étroitement lié à celui d'une bourgeoisie radicale et positiviste, se fiant non seulement au progrès scientifique et technique illimité, mais encore à une expansion sans entraves sérieuses de ses propres activités économiques.

En ces temps-là, l'instituteur, également radical et positiviste, était profondément pénétré de sa mission pédagogique et sociale. Bien qu'encore mal retribué,[1] il jouissait alors d'un prestige social incontesté. Le "Certificat d'Etudes Primaires" qu'il conférait à ses élèves les plus doués au terme de leur scolarité, fréquemment "mis sous verre", occupa une place d'honneur dans les foyers de parents très modestes. Ces parents étaient fiers de leurs enfants qui allaient assurer à la famille une promotion sociale certaine.

A la même époque une autre promotion sociale, mais à un échelon supérieure, se réalisa pour une grande partie des fils d'instituteurs. Ceux-ci, petits fils de fermiers, métayers et petits propriétaires, d'ouvriers, de petits boutiquiers et d'artisans, devinrent dans bien des cas ingénieurs, professeurs de l'Enseignement Secondaire et Supérieur et membres des professions libérales. "Le fils d'instituteur qui va loin" s'insère en France à la fin du dix-neuvième et au début du vingtième siècles dans une mobilité sociale ascendante très spectaculaire d'une manière analogue à celle des "fils de pasteurs protestants" dans l'Allemagne du dix-huitième et du dix-neuvième siècles.

Le grand rôle culturel et politique que jouait l'instituteur dans la troisième République et la place intermédiaire qu'il occupa dans une mobilité sociale ascendante de trois générations, semblait tout particulièrement désigner ce groupe socio-professionnel pour une étude

sociologique approfondie. Nous voudrions savoir, en effet, si l'instituteur de nos jours conserve ces traits, caractéristiques de ses ainés.

C'est pourquoi le Centre d'Etudes Sociologiques a entrepris une grande enquête sur questionnaire, axée essentiellement sur le problème de la mobilité sociale des Enseignants du Premier Degré. Le questionnaire demande aux intéressés des renseignements socio-professionnels sur quatre générations. (Les deux grand-pères, le père, la mère, les frères, soeurs et les enfants de l'enquêté.) Etant donné que les instituteurs et les institutrices les plus proches de la retraite, sont aujourd'hui âgés de 50 à 55 ans, l'activité professionnelle de leurs grand-parents s'est donc approximativement exercée vers 1875. Ainsi notre enquête donnera un aspect de la mobilité sociale de la famille des instituteurs au cours des dernières quatre-vingt années.

Nous avons encore demandé la profession des conjoints et des beaux-parents; car il nous paraît que les mariages contractés dans un milieu semblable ou hétérogène pourront nous fournir des indices très précieux de la mobilité sociale, provoquée par le choix conjugal. Enfin la recherche d'une éventuelle interférence entre les réponses, concernant l'origine sociale et géographique d'une part et celle d'ordre plus socio-psychologique d'autre part,[2] seront d'un très grand intérêt.

L'enquête en cours ne concerne actuellement que le Département de la Seine, mais elle sera élargie ensuite à toute la France. Nous disposons de la moitié environ des réponses pour les 15,000 Enseignants du Premier Degré, exerçant dans la Région Parisienne. Nos recherches préliminaires et plusieurs sondages effectués dans les milliers de réponses de la grande enquête nous permettent dès à présent quelques constatations et certaines hypothèses de travail.

Un premier dépouillement des archives de deux Grandes Ecoles Parisiennes (Ecole Normale Supérieure des jeunes gens de la rue d'Ulm et celle des jeunes filles du Bd. Jourdan), nous a prouvé que "les fils et les filles d'instituteurs et d'institutrices" constituent un pourcentage assez élevé de ces étudiants particulièrement brillants, future élite de la Nation.[3]

Un deuxième travail préliminaire plus important—l'exploitation des archives des trois Ecoles Normales Parisiennes, pour rechercher l'origine de trois générations d'Elèves-Maîtres et d'Elèves-Maîtresses—nous a démontré que la mobilité socio-professionnelle des instituteurs était beaucoup plus complexe qu'il ne paraîssait au premier abord.[4]

Bien que l'origine sociale de la grande majorité de ces futurs instituteurs et institutrices soit aujourd'hui encore très modeste, nous avons trouvé pour les deux sexes une particularité dans le ménage des parents; particularité qui a peut-être puissament contribué à l'ascension sociale de leurs enfants: c'est le grand nombre des mères de futurs Enseignants Primaires, exerçant une profession.

La progression est régulière à Auteuil, de 27,1% à 40,9%. Aux Batignolles, elle n'est pas constante; mais le pourcentage des mères, exerçant une profession pour la dernière période considérée, se situe

Mères ayant une profession

	Auteuil E.N. (jeunes gens)	Batignolles (jeune filles)	Le Bourget (jeunes filles)
1906–13 ...	27,1%	—	—
1926–33	34,5%	40,6%	—
1946–49	36,9%	47,1%	—
1950–53	40,9%	40,3%	41,0%

partout autour de 40%. Dans quelques prélèvements de la grande enquête nous avons trouvé des pourcentages analogues.

Ces pourcentages sont beaucoup plus élevés que ceux qu'Alain Girard[5] a trouvés en 1948–49 pour les mères de lycéens travaillant en dehors de leurs foyer et qui ne s'élèvent qu'à 27%. Ce chiffre constitue notre point de départ pour la période de 1906–13 à Auteuil. Les "mères de lycéens" d'Alain Girard appartiennent probablement dans leur grande majorité à un milieu beaucoup plus aisé que celui qui nous préoccupe.

L'étude de l'origine sociale des trois générations de futurs instituteurs et institutrices nous a donc déjà fourni un élément essentiel: 40% des parents disposent de deux salaires.

Ce sont les ouvriers, petits employés et très petits fonctionnaires qui occupent encore aujourd'hui la première place dans les professions paternelles chez les instituteurs comme chez les institutrices. Mais la recherche de l'origine sociale des anciens Normaliens et Normaliennes de la Seine, étayée par les résultats de quelques échantillons de la grande enquête, démontrent néanmoins une différence notable entre les deux sexes. Le nombre de pères, faisant partie d'un groupement socio-professionnel supérieur (ingénieurs, officiers de carrière, cadres supérieurs du secteur public ou privé, membres des professions libérales, etc.), ne constitue que 1,8% des Elèves-Maîtres en 1946–53 contre 10,3% pour les Elèves-Maîtresses.

L'écart entre ces deux pourcentages est moins élevé dans les échantillons de la grande enquête, mais il reste touojurs considérable: 6,6% des pères d'instituteurs et 14% des pères d'institutrices exercent des professions à prestige social supérieur à celui de leurs enfants. Mais il faut tenir compte du fait qu'il s'agit dans ce cas non seulement d'anciens Normaliens, mais aussi d'un nombre à peu près équivalent d'Auxiliaires, entrés sans préparation professionnelle préalable dans l'Enseignement du Premier Degré[6]

Il est facile d'expliquer cette différence notable dans l'origine d'une partie des instituteurs et des institutrices. La fille, dans une société restée, malgré l'émancipation professionnelle de la femme, encore assez patriarcale, ne marque pas la promotion sociale d'une famille d'une manière aussi frappante que celle du fils; ce qui ne convient plus dans une famille bourgeoise au fils, apparaît encore très acceptable pour la fille.

Mais nous avons trouvé une autre différence sociale entre les Enseignants et les Enseignantes du Premier Degré qui concerne la

presque totalité des instituteurs et des institutrices de la Région Parisienne. Il s'agit de la composition socio-professionnelle très distincte des ménages d'instituteurs et des institutrices.[7]

Profession des conjoints

	Instituteurs	Institutrices
Ouvriers (ères)	1,0%	—
Employés (ées) Bureau et Commerce ...	9,5%	8,0%
Commerçant (tes), pet. Entrepreneurs ...	5,0%	12,5%
Enseignement Premier Degré	41,0%	26,5%
Autres cadres moyens (sect. publ. et privé)	11,0%	24,5%
Cad. Sup. Prof. Libérales	3,0%	28,5%
Sans profession	31,0%	—

Pour 31% des ménages d'instituteurs d'après quelques échantillons de la grande enquête, un seul salaire doit suffire aux besoins familiaux. Par contre, la famille de l'institutrice mariée, dispose toujours de deux salaires, exception faite de quelques veuves et divorcées.

Seulement 3% des instituteurs ont épousé des femmes exerçant une profession à prestige social supérieure à la leur, contre 28,5% d'institutrices, dont les maris sont des professeurs de l'Enseignement Secondaire, des architectes, des ingénieurs, des administrateurs civils, etc.

Il est vrai que 41% des instituteurs se sont mariés à une collègue. C'est un "beau mariage", vu du côté instituteur. La famille de l'institutrice par contre, a tendance à considérer un pareil mariage comme une "mésalliance".

Le trait le plus caractéristique du tableau ci-dessus est le statut socio-économique très différent d'un tiers des instituteurs et institutrices mariés de la Région Parisienne. A l'une des extrémités, se trouve l'instituteur, père de plusieurs enfants, dont la femme s'occupe uniquement de son ménage, et à l'autre, l'institutrice mariée à un homme de prestige social et de revenus considérablement plus élevés que les siens. Etant donné que la féminisation de la profession fait des progrès de plus en plus rapides,[8] ce problème retient fortement notre attention; car si dans l'avenir le pourcentage de ces deux extrèmes augmentait, il y aurait de fortes chances pour que la socio-physionomie de cette profession subisse de sérieuses transformations.[9]

Dans notre recherche sur trois générations d'anciens Normaliens, nous n'avons pas seulement constaté une différence d'origine sociale entre les hommes et les femmes, mais encore entre les Normaliens et les Auxiliaires. Ces derniers venaient dans les Ecoles Normales pour y faire un stage de perfectionnement.[10] Nous avons trouvé, en effet, une différence notable d'origine sociale, s'exprimant d'une manière convaincante dans la comparaison des taux de décès paternels des deux catégories considérées.

En outre, 37,5% des auxiliaires-hommes et 38,2% des auxiliaires-femmes ont des pères dont la situation professionnelle est égale ou supérieure à celle de leurs fils ou de leurs filles. Ce même pourcentage

Décès des pères (1946–1953)

	E.N. Auteuil (jeunes gens)	E.N. Batignolles (jeunes filles)
Normaliens (nes)	8,8%	8,7%
Auxiliaires	28,2%	21,6%

s'élève à 17,4% chez les Normaliens d'Auteuil et à 27,2% chez les Normaliennes des Batignolles.[11]

Il nous semble donc qu'un grand nombre de ces auxiliaires, issus de la petite et de la moyenne bourgeoisie, avaient déjà commencé leurs études supérieures. Ce sont des revers familiaux (et quelquefois des échecs aux examens universitaires) qui les ont obligés à bifurquer vers une profession où l'on gagne plus rapidement sa vie.

Nous avons pu faire une constatation analogue: en dépouillant un échantillon de 800 cas, prélevé dans la grande enquête sur questionnaire, échantillon dont la moitié se compose d'hommes et l'autre de femmes: 46% des institutrices et 61% des instituteurs ont été obligés à un moment donné de leur vie, d'interrompre leurs études et avaient envisagé d'autres professions.

46% des institutrices voulaient devenir professeurs de lycée, pharmaciennes, chirurgien-dentistes, etc. et 61% de leurs collègues masculins auraient préféré la profession de médecin, d'ingénieur ou celle du professeur du Secondaire.[12] Leur choix final de l'Ensignement du Premier Degré est donc pour eux un pis-aller et ceci pour des raisons presque uniquement matérielles.

En effet 50% des instituteurs et 51% des institutrices handicapés rendent responsables de cet état de choses les difficultés matérielles de leur jeunesse.

"Ressources insuffisantes de mes parents", "revenus trop modestes de la famille", "je devais aider mes parents et frères plus jeunes", "père devenu aveugle quand j'avais 16 ans", "quatrième enfant d'une famille dont le père était invalide à 42 ans", "deux décès coup sur coup dans ma famille", "je suis enfant naturel", "mon père a abandonné le foyer conjugal", etc., voici quelques exemples des raisons invoquées.

Ces mêmes causes ont été indiquées par Sylvain de Coster[13] à propos des obstacles sociaux qui s'opposent à l'ascension sociale des enfants de milieux peu fortunés.

Ces obstacles, rencontrés à une période plus tardive de leur existence, ce sont les femmes qui en souffrent le plus. 37,8% des institutrices contre 19,5% des hommes, se trouvent contrariées dans leurs desseins professionnels par le mariage, la naissance des enfants, la fatigue, la maladie, la difficulté de mener de front leur travail professionnel et la préparation d'autres examens et de concours. La vie des instituteurs par contre se trouve plus souvent bouleversée par les deux guerres et leur participation à la Résistance: 22,7% des hommes indiquent ces raisons contre seulement 2,2% de leurs collègues féminins.

Pour conclure, nous tenons à souligner que jusqu'à présent toutes nos observations sur la mobilité sociale concernent uniquement Paris

et le Département de la Seine. "Paris n'est pas la France; au moins en ce qui concerne les instituteurs" affirment à l'unaminité des personnalités compétentes, interrogées à ce sujet.

D'autre part, il se peut que le dépouillement complet de la grande enquête nous montrera que dans tel ou tel cas, nous avons fait fausse route dans nos hypothèses de travail, nous amenant à rectifier le résultat de tel ou tel échantillon. Mais un fait nous semble dès à présent acquis: La profession d'Enseignant Primaire n'est pas seulement le palier intermédiaire d'une mobilité ascendante, mais une sorte de "plaque tournante". Ici se rencontrent deux courants contradictoires de mobilité sociale: Dans la plupart des cas, aujourd'hui encore, la profession d'instituteur représente une étape intermédiaire dans l'ascension sociale de trois générations successives, mais pour certains cette profession est une halte au cours d'une évolution regressive.

NOTES

[1] Une enquête faite sur les conditions de vie des instituteurs et publiée dans le Manuel Général de l'Instruction Primaire du 26 avril 1902 conclut ainsi: "Au total nous trouvons qu'ici les circonstances peuvent faire que de tels ou de tels cas manifestent une aisance convenable. Mais dans l'ensemble et dans le cas normal le budget de l'instituteur, malgré les recettes supplémentaires qu'il arrive à ajouter à son traitement, est un budget de prolétaire."

[2] Telles que: "Pourquoi êtes-vous devenu instituteur?" "Vos parents ont-ils approuvé votre choix professionnel?" "Etes vous satisfait vous-même de votre profession?" "Quels sont vos projets professionnels pour l'avenir?"

[3]

	Ecole Norm. Sup. (jeunes gens)	Ecole Norm. Sup. (jeunes filles)
1934–39 ...	13,0%	26,1%
1950–53 ...	14,8%	20,1%

[4] Nous y avons en effet recherché la profession des parents des futurs instituteurs et institutrices à trois époques différentes: de 1906 à 1913, de 1926 à 1933 et de 1946 à 1953: c'est à dire à vingt années d'intervalle, les huit années précédant la première guerre mondiale, les huit années se plaçant approximativement à mi-chemin entre les deux guerres et enfin les huit années après la deuxième guerre mondiale. Notre investigation a porté au total sur 2·986 cas d'anciens Normaliens et Normaliennes du Département de la Seine.

[5] Alain Girard: "Mobilité sociale et dimension de famille"—*Population*, janvier–mars 1951.

[6] Nous allons revenir un peu plus tard sur ce problème très important, concernant les deux possibilités d'entrée dans la profession.

[7] Environ 70—80% du total de l'effectif du personnel.

[8] Actuellement 75% de femmes et 25% d'hommes dans le Département de la Seine.

[9] On pourrait nous objecter que ces remarques ne concernent pas seulement les Enseignants Primaires, mais beaucuop de fonctionnaires-hommes et de fonctionnaires-femmes mariés. Pourtant notre cas nous semble bien particulier. Nous nous trouvons en face d'une "profession idéologique", ayant de fortes traditions laïques et républicaines. Les milieux de gauche et de syndicalistes français ont toujours compté les instituteurs parmi leurs militants les plus zélés; ces instituteurs issus du peuple et enseignant le peuple, en restant fidèles à leurs origines sociales.

[10] Leur présence à laissé des traces dans les archives des Ecoles Normales.

[11] Cet écart de presque 10% est une nouvelle preuve de la différence d'origine sociale entre instituteurs et institutrices.

[12] Le professorat de l'Enseignement Secondaire se trouve le plus fréquemment cité parmi les professions préférées.

[13] Sylvain de Coster et Georges van der Elst: "Mobilité sociale et Enseignement", *les Cahiers de l'Institut Solvay*, Bruxelles, 1954, p. 56.

The Social Status of University Students in Relation to Type of Economy: An International Comparison

C. ARNOLD ANDERSON
(Professor of Sociology, University of Kentucky)

In recent decades the managerial, technical, and intellectual élites have come to be composed of individuals with higher education. Education, accordingly, has become increasingly necessary, though not sufficient, for high status positions even though other channels of upward mobility, or other means of status inheritance, remain. Higher education is not a sole qualification and one should not over-simplify the rôle of schooling in mobility.

Sociologists in recent years have begun to investigate the social composition of student bodies in higher schools as part of their renewed interest in social stratification. The import of the social system for the distribution of opportunities is indicated, in part, by the proportions of youth from various strata who attain university education.[1]

Within this setting, the present report has three aims. (1) The social composition of university student bodies is compared for two dozen countries.[2] (2) The degree of selectivity of university attendance is related to the type of economy and income level of the different societies. (3) The level of university attendance (in relation to population) is also used as a classification factor on the assumption that distinctive educational traditions may operate independently of economic factors, and in order to determine whether a higher attendance level itself alters selectivity.

Though the writer compares more countries than did the *Yearbook* editors, the same frustrations in procuring comparable data were experienced. Different sources use different numbers of occupational categories, often formed on quite dissimilar principles. The occupational categories for the base population often have little resemblance to those used for university statistics, even when prepared by the same agency.[3] The *Yearbook* comparisons reduced parental occupations to two groups : manual and non-manual. Here more rubrics are retained.

The level of student enrollment was measured by the ratio of students to one hundred individuals aged 20–24. The index of type of economy was the percentage of employed male population engaged in primary production (agriculture, fishing, forestry, mining) or, alternatively, tertiary production (government, professions, transport, trade, etc.). (Secondary production is manufacturing and construction.) The

income figures, expressed in "International Units", were taken from Clark[4] for the available year nearest that of the student data.

There are three basic methods for describing the social composition of students.[5] (1) One can compute the percentage of students coming from each social category; e.g., 10 per cent. of students may be children of farmers, 20 per cent. children of urban entrepreneurs, etc. This actual social profile of the student body is adequate for some purposes, such as comparative study of élites. (2) One can compute the number of students enrolled per thousand fathers in each social category ; e.g., from a thousand professional homes come 30 students as contrasted with 5 from each thousand farm homes. (3) One can compare the percentage distribution of students by parental status with the distribution of families by status; e.g., professional families are 5 per cent. of the total but furnish 20 per cent. of students—the ratio of these percentages (here called the selectivity index) being 4·0. Either of the last two procedures (which are numerically interchangeable) measures selectivity, but the first does not. Principal reliance here is on the third procedure.[6]

Level of University Enrolment in Relation to Economic Factors

In Table 1 the populations here analyzed[7] are grouped by proportion of primary employment as a basis for examining variations in levels of enrolment. It is clear that using this index a nation's type of economy has only a limited relation to the rate of university attendance. On the average countries with less than 30 per cent. in primary production have half again more students in relation to population aged 20–24 (even excluding the United States) than do the others; but intra-group variation is wide. Thus at both 2 per cent. or less and at 4 per cent. or more of attendance primary production ranges from under 20 per cent. to about 70 per cent.

The correlation for male students alone is somewhat closer, but for level of female attendance there is virtually no association with type of economy. And the proportion of students who are women is quite unrelated to extent of primary or tertiary activity. Variations within each group are great. Thus at about 60 per cent. primary and 20 per cent. tertiary production the share of students who are women ranges from one in fifty to one in three ; even among the post-war instances these percentages range from 14 to 38. Excluding the United States, in the most tertiary countries the average percentage of students who are women is in fact lower than in countries of intermediate tertiary level.

National income level (Table 1, column 7) shows a moderate positive association with level of enrollment. Of the countries for which income data were available, all with over 3 per cent. attendance have incomes above 500 I.U.'s ; but some countries with lower attendance (as Sweden) also have high income levels. For women students alone there is no association ; the Netherlands and Sweden have female

Table 1. *Rates of Attendance in Higher Schools, Arrayed by proportion of the Working Male Population in Primary Employments*

Country and Date	Percentage of Working Male Population in		Students per Hundred Persons aged 20–24			Percentage of Students Female	Income; International Units per Man-year in Employment
	Primary Employment	Tertiary Employment	All	Male	Female		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)
Group I—Over 50% Primary Employment							
Yugoslavia, 1931	71	15	1·1	1·7	0·5	21·8	376
Yugoslavia, 1953	69	18	3·2	—	—	—	—
Latvia, 1939	69	16	4·0	5·7	2·4	29·8	530
Mexico, 1949	67	22	1·6	—	—	—	100
Greece, 1936	61	21	1·9	3·5	0·4	9·6	332
Finland, 1935	58	27	4·4	5·5	3·7	38·1	652
Hungary, 1913	54	24	0·9	1·9	—	2·3	427
Spain, 1945	53	24	2·5	4·6	0·7	14·0	825
Hungary, 1930	52	26	2·0	3·5	0·6	13·9	382
Group II—30%–50% Primary Employment							
Italy, 1931	48	25	1·9	3·1	0·6	16·4	331
U.S. Negroes, 1940	47	34	3·6	3·4	3·6	55·2	(800)
U.S. Negroes, 1950[1]			5·8	6·7	5·1	47·0	
Denmark, 1880	42	31	0·1	—	—	—	—
Czechoslovakia, 1947	40	25	2·1	—	—	—	445
France, 1948	38	34	3·6	4·7	2·6	37·9	715
Sweden, 1930	36	34	1·8	3·1	0·5	12·9	818
Austria, 1953	33	26	4·2	6·5	1·8	20·7	825
Group III—Less than 30% Primary Employment							
Denmark, 1921	29	35	—	—	—	—	964
Denmark, 1947	28	41	4·6	7·4	1·8	19·0	823
Sweden, 1945	26	38	2·8	4·3	1·3	22·2	980
Switzerland, 1945	21	36	3·7	6·4	0·9	11·8	696
Netherlands, 1948	21	47	3·4	5·7	1·1	15·8	1,070
U.S. Whites, 1940[1]			14·4	17·5	11·5	40·2	
U.S. Whites, 1950	21	50	20·9	28·5	13·4	33·0	2,566
Germany, 1928	19	37	1·7	2·9	0·5	14·5	795
West Germany, 1953	18	34	3·2	5·3	1·1	17·7	—
Indiana University, 1946	12	48	—	—	—	—	—
Group Means							
Group I	62	22	2·4	3·8	1·2	18·5	428
Group II[2]	40	29	2·3	4·4	1·4	22·0	627
Group III (1)[3]	22	40	5·6	8·6	2·9	19·1	1,128
Group III (2)[4]	23	38	3·2	5·3	1·1	16·8	888

[1] The extra year is included to facilitate Negro-White comparisons in the face of the marked post-war changes in male attendance. The declines between 1940 and 1950 in proportions of females reflect the backlog of male students from the army and in part the impact of educational aid to veterans.

[2] Excluding U.S. Negroes.

[3] Including U.S. Whites for 1950 but not for 1940; including Indiana.

[4] Excluding U.S. Whites and Indiana.

attendance rates similar to Greece or Italy. For males this association is considerably closer ; yet pre-war Hungary had a higher rate than pre-war Germany, and pre-war Finland as high a rate as post-war Netherlands. As to the proportion of students who are women, the low income countries show great diversity—from 2 per cent. in 1913 Hungary to 22 per cent. in 1931 Yugoslavia and 38 per cent. in Latvia. At intermediate income levels France and Finland have 38 per cent. of students female while Switzerland has only 12 per cent. Among the more prosperous countries (excluding the United States) the range is less, from 13 per cent. in pre-war to 22 per cent. in post-war Sweden.

While there is some relation between date and attendance rates within the countries for which more than one sample was available, the variations among countries in the post-war period are marked. Excluding the United States, post-war rates of attendance ranged from 1·6 in Mexico to 4·6 in Denmark. Figures by sex are obtainable for fewer countries. For males alone the post-war range is 4·3 to 7·4 and for females 0·7 to 2·6. The post-war proportions of students who are women vary from 12 to 38 per cent. The phenomenal performance of the United States, and especially of the Negroes, deserves underlining. In deference to European opinion, which we believe to be only partially justified, one can eliminate a third or even a half of the white American students and still obtain a rate well above any other nation.

The data presented in Table 1 provide clear indications that rates of university attendance depend very little upon either the income level of a country or the extent to which its economy is of primary or tertiary type. Although an international upward trend over time seems probable, the underlying factors explaining national contrasts must be sought in values, customs, and public educational policies—each of which may be different in its effects on males and females.

Percentage Distribution of Students by Social Background

The relative size of the various strata-cadres among students gives no evidence about selectivity but does describe the composition of the student corps (Table 2). In all countries the majority of students come from non-manual (non-farm, non-labor) families, who of course are a distinct minority of the population. Among American Negroes only 44 per cent. were from such homes. The other proportions range from nine-tenths down to three-fifths. The percentages coming from farm families vary from 5 to 34, and from farm operator families from 4 to 23. Over a third of the Negro students and almost a third of the white students in the United states were children of non-farm manual workers. Excluding the Unites States, for all laborer families the range is from 1 to 23 per cent. and for non-farm labor alone from 2 to 14 per cent. As would be expected, the contribution from agriculture is larger in the primary production countries, but not uniformly so; it was only 6 per cent. in Mexico as against 23 per cent. in 1953 Yugoslavia

Table 2. *Percentage Distribution of Students by Paternal Occupations*

Country and Date	Agri-culture and Labor (1)	Non-Agri-culture Non-Labor[1] (2)	Agriculture		Labor	
			All (3)	Operators (4)	All (5)	Non-Farm (6)
Group I—Over 50% Primary Employment						
Yugoslavia, 1931 ..	21·7	78·3	—	19·1	2·6	—
Yugoslavia, 1953 ..	30·6	69·4	22·7	21·4	9·3	7·9
Latvia, 1939 ..	—	—	33·6	—	—	—
Mexico, 1949 ..	18·1	81·9	6·4	—	—	11·7
Greece, 1936 ..	16·8	73·2	—	22·8	4·2	—
Finland, 1935 ..	39·6	60·4	—	16·6	23·0	—
Hungary, 1913 ..	21·8	78·2	18·4	15·7	6·2	5·2
Spain, 1945 ..	9·4	90·6	7·0	—	—	2·4
Hungary, 1930 ..	21·0	79·0	14·5	11·3	9·6	8·1
Group II—30%–50% Primary Employment						
Italy, 1931 ..	8·8	91·2	6·6	5·9	2·9	2·6
U.S. Negroes, 1940	55·7	44·3	19·4	—	—	36·3
Denmark, 1880 ..	—	—	—	8·2	—	—
Czechoslovakia, 1947	17·0	83·0	10·0	—	—	7·0
France, 1948 ..	8·7	91·3	6·5	5·4	3·3	2·2
Sweden, 1930 ..	23·1	76·9	9·5	—	—	13·6
Austria, 1953 ..	14·3	85·7	—	5·6	8·7	—
Group III—Less than 30% Primary Employment						
Denmark, 1921 ..	12·8	87·2	—	9·7	3·1	—
Denmark, 1947 ..	17·6	82·4	—	9·9	7·7	—
Sweden, 1945 ..	20·6	79·4	9·6	—	—	11·0
Switzerland, 1945 ..	9·0	91·0	—	4·0	5·0	—
Netherlands, 1948 ..	5·0	95·0	—	4·0	1·0	—
U.S. Whites, 1947 ..	37·3	62·7	9·8	—	—	27·5
Germany, 1928 ..	7·5	92·5	5·8	5·7	1·8	1·7
West Germany, 1953	9·6	90·4	4·9	4·8	4·8	4·7
Indiana University, 1946	42·2	57·8	—	9·9	32·2	—
Means by Primary Employment Groups						
Group I	22·4	76·3	17·1	17·8	9·2	7·1
Group II[2]	14·4	85·6	8·2	6·3	5·0	6·4
Group III (1)[3] ..	18·0	82·0	7·5	6·9	7·9	11·2
Group III (2)[4] ..	11·7	88·3	6·8	6·4	3·9	5·8
Means by Rate of Attendance Groups (as grouped in Table 3)						
Group A ..	18·2	78·9	9·3	12·9	3·5	7·0
Group B[2] ..	16·2	83·8	11·5	10·4	6·2	6·9
Group C (1)[3] ..	21·0	78·9	16·6	—	—	(14·9)
Group C (2)[4] ..	17·8	82·2	(20·1)	8·3	9·5	(2·2)

[1] Including agricultural white collar, who are also included in " All Agriculture ".
[2] Excluding U.S. Negroes.
[3] Including U.S. Whites, and for Group III (1) Indiana.
[4] Excluding U.S.

and 33 per cent. in Latvia. A similar situation prevails for farm operators alone. The proportions of students from laboring homes has little relation to the extent of primary production. (Grouping the countries by level of attendance shows no systematic pattern for any occupation.) These percentages must be interpreted in the light of the relative size of the occupational sectors ; hence the discussion turns now to consideration of the selectivity indexes.

Social Selectivity of University Attendance

The selectivity indexes[8] in Table 3 are grouped by level of attendance rather than by type of economy since the former factor is more closely associated with selectivity. Averages for each set of countries (grouped alternatively by attendance and by economy type) appear at the foot of the table.

Though attendance is three times as high in Group C as in Group A, few of the selectivity ratios show a corresponding change. The trends for some ratios challenge accepted preconceptions, though plausible explanations can be offered. Thus the ratio of actual to expected share of students from manual families (labor plus farmers) remains unchanged if the United States is excluded. The drop in the favorable position of non-manual families is more definite, and does not depend on inclusion of the United States figures.[9] The ratio for all agriculture rises consistently from low to high attendance rates. The ratio for children of farm operators increases from Group A to B but not further, as is true also for non-farm labor (but Group C has only two cases). The representation from all labor homes doubles and becomes a fifth of expectancy in the countries with the highest general attendance rates. The excess in the contribution from professional homes is cut by three-fifths with expanded attendance, and urban entrepreneur families also show a decline in representation.

When the countries are grouped by type of economy the changes are more erratic. Here also it is between the two lowest levels that effects are largest, especially the sharp decline in the non-farm, non-labor ratio (column 2). In three countries (Mexico, Finland, Spain), all predominantly agricultural but with widely differing attendance rates, students from this category exceed five times their quota. Five quite diverse countries (Greece, Czechoslovakia, France, Austria, and 1947 Denmark) have about two and one half times their quota. And among whites in the United States the ratio is less than 2·0. This ratio for American Negroes is very high.

The decline in the labor group ratios from the most primary to the intermediate economies is presumably a transition phenomenon due to two causes. On the one hand, in the more primary production countries urban labor is relatively skilled while at the next stage it becomes diluted with less skilled industrial labor. Only at a later stage do industrial workers attain a level of living and of ideology leading to higher levels of university attendance, and few countries have yet reached

Table 3. *Ratios of Percentages of Students to Percentages of Male Labor Force from Designated Occupational Categories, Arrayed by Rates of Attendance*

Country and Date	Students per Hundred Persons Aged 20–24	Agriculture and Labor (1)	Non-Agriculture Non-Labor (2)	Agriculture		Labor		Professional (7)	Private Entrepreneurs (8)
				All (3)	Operators (4)	All (5)	Non-Agricultural (6)		
Group A—Less than 2 students per hundred persons aged 20–24									
Denmark, 1880 ..	0·1	—	—	—	0·26	—	—	5·5	1·4
Hungary, 1913 ..	0·9	0·27[1]	4·4[2]	0·27	0·37	0·14	0·29[1]	14·0[3]	2·4
Yugoslavia, 1931 ..	1·1	0·25	3·8	—	0·34	0·09	—	8·3	2·3
Mexico, 1949 ..	1·6	0·20	7·7	0·10	—	—	0·46	9·8	12·5
Germany, 1928 ..	1·7	0·11	2·8	0·32	0·60	0·03	0·04	17·2[4]	2·3
Sweden, 1930 ..	1·8	0·29	2·8	0·29	—	—	0·30	25·6	2·1
Italy, 1931	1·9	0·09	3·2	0·11	0·13	0·05	0·07	24·8	—
Greece, 1936 ..	1·9	0·39	2·4	—	0·52	0·16	—	8·6	—
Group B—2–3·5 students per hundred persons aged 20–24.									
Hungary, 1930 ..	2·0	0·24	3·4	0·25	0·37	0·15	0·24	9·3	1·6
Czechoslovakia, 1947	2·1	0·24	2·4	0·55	—	—	0·14	1·2[5]	3·8
U.S. Negroes, 1940	3·6	0·64	5·9	0·48	—	—	0·79	9·3	—
Spain, 1945 ..	2·5	0·11	5·2	0·13	—	—	0·08	13·2	—
Sweden, 1945 ..	2·8	0·27	3·2	0·32	—	—	0·24	10·9	2·7
Yugoslavia, 1953 ..	3·2	0·33	4·0	0·29	0·29	0·46	0·53	27·0[5]	2·8
West Germany, 1953	3·2	0·15	2·7	0·38	0·64	0·08	0·09	16·3	1·7
Netherlands, 1948 ..	3·4	0·07	2·8	—	0·50	0·02	—	—	1·8
Group C—Over 3·5 students per hundred persons aged 20–24									
France, 1948 ..	3·6	0·12	2·5	0·24	0·25	0·07	0·05	4·6[6]	2·8
Switzerland, 1945 ..	3·7	0·12	3·3	—	0·50	0·08	—	—	—
Latvia, 1939 ..	4·0	—	—	0·54	—	—	—	5·0	—
Austria, 1953 ..	4·2	0·22	2·4	—	0·43	0·17	—	3·4	2·0
Finland, 1935 ..	4·4	0·44	5·6	—	0·34	0·57	—	—	—
Denmark, 1947 ..	4·6	0·26	2·5	—	0·66	0·15	—	10·1	1·6
U.S. Whites, 1947 ..	20·9	0·57	1·8	0·62	—	—	0·56	3·4[6]	3·0
Rates of attendance unknown or inapplicable									
Denmark, 1921 ..	—	0·18	3·0	—	0·44	0·06	—	10·1	2·5
Indiana University, 1946	—	0·54	2·2	—	0·67	0·51	—	3·3	—
Means by Rate of Attendance Groups									
Group A	1·4	0·23	3·9	0·22	0·37	0·09	0·23	14·3	3·8
Group B[7]	2·7	0·26	3·7	0·34	0·45	0·18	0·30	12·5	2·4
Group C (1)[8] ..	5·3	0·29	3·0	0·47	—	—	(0·30)	5·3	2·4
Group C (2)[9] ..	4·1	0·23	3·3	(0·39)	0·44	0·21	(0·05)	5·8	2·1
Means by Primary Employment Groups									
Group I	2·4	0·28	4·6	0·26	0·37	0·26	0·32	11·9	4·3
Group II[7]	2·3	0·19	2·7	0·30	0·27	0·10	0·14	10·9	2·4
Group III (1)[8] ..	4·6	0·30	2·7	0·41	—	—	0·23	11·6	2·2
Group III (2)[9] ..	3·2	0·25	2·9	0·34	0·58	0·07	0·12	13·6	2·0

[1] Excludes some public labor.
[2] Excludes some public labor.
[3] Excludes minor professions in public service.
[4] Includes upper white collar in public service.
[5] Private only.
[6] Computed from other sources.
[7] Excluding U.S. Negroes.
[8] Including U.S. Whites, and for Group III (1) Indiana.
[9] Excluding U.S.

this point. Related to this last feature is the second factor. The diffusion of ideologies favorable to less selective attendance takes time, quite apart from limited family incomes. In few countries has sufficient time elapsed for this assimilation. The fact that level of attendance has greater weight than type of economy suggests that distinctive educational policies and traditions play a major part in this process.

Among countries with unusually low indexes for manual labor are Italy, Spain, France, the Netherlands, and Germany. These range in income from 331 I.U.'s to 1070 and from 18 to 53 per cent. in primary and 34 to 25 per cent. in tertiary employment. Rates of attendance are moderate : from 1·7 in pre-war Germany to 3·6 in France. The proportion of women among students is exceptionally high in France but somewhat below average in the other countries. The common factor underlying the low representation of manual worker's children appears to be the presence of aristocratic traditions of education and the absence of aggressive public policies breaking with those traditions.

At the other extreme are the United States—most strikingly the Negroes—together with post-war England, Yugoslavia (1953), Mexico, and Finland.[10] Incomes range from 100 I.U.'s (Mexico) to 2,500 (United States); primary production ranges from 67 to 21 per cent. and rates of attendance from 1·6 to 20·9. These countries have in common an exceptional emphasis on " democratization " of education, expressed in both propaganda and public policies. The American tradition is " grass roots ": free schooling through secondary level and public financial support for numerous higher schools—bolstered by generous educational stipends to war veterans. Finnish policies and traditions have stabilised worker representation at high levels. Emphasis on wider educational opportunity is more recent in Mexico, Yugoslavia, and England, and is associated with drastic changes in governmental policy.[11]

There is little relationship between the indexes of selectivity for labor and for agriculture. Italy, Spain and France have exceptionally low ratios for all agricultural and manual categories whereas the United States ratios are high. Though high in representation of urban labor, Mexico is lowest for farm people. In Germany representation of farm operators is very high but neither children of farm laborers nor of other workers often enter college doors. Only Denmark (1947) matches the German and American farm operator ratios. With the probable exception of Sweden (1945), the farm operator indexes are 0·50 or higher in all countries with less than 30 per cent. primary production, whereas among the other countries only Greece, Latvia, and Czechoslovakia attained this level. The indexes for farm operators are of course consistently below those for non-farm entrepreneurs, reflecting tradition and place of residence as well as income. However, the frequent excess of farm operator over urban labor ratios suggests that the entrepreneur factor may be more important than the income factor, since non-farm workers live in cities (often with a

university), have as much cash income and nearly as large families as the typical farmer.[12]

The index for business families is distinctively high in Czechoslvakia and phenomenally so in Mexico, but in most instances these ratios cluster around 2·0. Denmark, West Germany, and Netherlands show relatively low ratios today. Businessmen furnish comparatively more students in the primary economies and fewer in the tertiary ones ; in fact these business ratios dropped more with the shift to tertiary economies than they did with expansion of enrollments.

The professional ratios are typically highest of all.[13] Except for Czechoslovakia (where the data concern " private " professionals only), the lowest ratios are in Austria, the United States, France, and Latvia. Very high ratios are found for pre-war Sweden and Italy and (paradoxically) present-day Yugoslavia. Attention should be called to the fact that there is no close parallel between the professional and the total non-manual ratios. Thus Sweden in 1930 had a high professional index but a moderate non-manual one whereas Mexico illustrates the opposite situation. The professional indexes show little relation to type of economy but do decline sharply as attendance levels rise. The relatively low ratio for professional families in the United States is the complement of the relatively high ratio for business men and may well reflect the strong " private enterprize " ideology. The professional ratios show more dispersion from country to country than those for business families.

For a few countries figures are available for separate professions. The ratios for all professions and for teachers were, respectively : Italy 24·8 16·6; Yugoslavia (1931) 8·3, 15·3 ; West Germany 16·3, 14·2 ; Denmark (1880) 5·5, 4·5 ; and Denmark (1921) 10·1, 9·7. Clergy ratios were: Yugoslavia (1931) 6·7, West Germany 10·2, Denmark (1921) 21·0. The ratio for physicians in Yugoslavia (1931) was 12·0 and in West Germany 14·7; for lawyers in these two countries 5·2 and 10·9. These (and other) ratios shift from country to country or from time to time within the same country.

A few ratios for public employees are obtainable. For military and non-military public employees of all ranks the ratios are quite diverse; they were, respectively: Yugoslavia (1931) 1·8, 10·0; Hungary (1913) 3·4, 5·8; Hungary (1930) 1·1, 6·8; Spain 6·8, 2·0, Denmark (1921) 3.3, 2·3. Thus the public employee index was less than a fourth that of all professionals in Denmark (1921), nearly three-fourths of the professional index in 1930 Hungary, and a fourth larger than the professional index in Yugoslavia (1931). Non-farm entrepreneurs and public employees had about the same index in Denmark (1921) ; the public employee ratio was twice that of businessmen in Hungary (1913), and four times the business ratio in Hungary (1930) and Yugoslavia (1931).[14]

There are strong tendencies for professional indexes to be highest, for urban to exceed rural enterprisers, or for non-manual categories

to exceed manual labor. But there are distinct factors determining the level of various vocations within one country or the ratio for the same group in different countries. In the absence of careful comparisons of relative incomes for all these categories one cannot do more than to suggest that non-economic factors appear to be of major importance in bringing about these variations.

CONCLUSIONS

The present study has compared several occupational groups in some two dozen populations with respect to the degree of inequality in opportunities for higher education enjoyed by their offspring. Despite many defects of indefiniteness and inaccuracy as judged by the standards of acceptable demographic research, the results complement other comparative studies of social structure.

A sufficient number and variety of societies were analyzed to establish a set of tentative " ranges " of inequality indexes for key occupational strata. A scale for judging general " educational inequality " definitely has not been established since the indexes for different strata are too loosely intercorrelated to permit combining them into an unambiguous single measure. No effort has been made to compare the degree of educational inequality for these populations with inequality in other features of the societies or with educational inequality in more remote decades.[15]

A major contribution of this study (and of the earlier report by the 1950 *Yearbook* Editors whose results were partially incorporated) is the establishment of definite norms by which to judge the comparative inequality of higher educational systems. In the light of the standing of the United States in the present data (which results were known approximately some years ago), it is evident that strictures on American education as " class bound " suffer from lack of perspective.

To be sure, none of the farm or manual labor groups attain much above half of parity attendance even in the United States. But in relation to the other populations studied here, those same American groups enjoy unusually favorable opportunities. The privileged sectors of American society, on the other hand, have retained less of their educational lead—on these criteria—than similar groups elsewhere. One recognizes that the higher schools attended by most Negroes are of too low quality. But even discounting heavily for these defects, the American Negroes show a degree of educational attainment and representation of manual workers that is distinctive in the set of peoples studied here. This is the other side of the American " Negro problem ".

Even including the United States, however, the general picture emerging from these data is one of definite inequality in opportunites for higher education. The non-farm, non-labor sectors of society supply from three-fifths up to over nine-tenths of the students though this group is a small fraction of any society. Nowhere does the farm

population furnish over a third of the students and in some cases less than one in ten ; farm operator shares range from 4 to 23 per cent. Outside the United States, all laborers combined nowhere supply as many as a fourth and in some nations virtually none of the students ; urban labor's share varies from 2 to 14 per cent. (excluding the United States).

Rising levels of university attendance or the development of a tertiary type of economy bring little systematic expansion in the shares of farm or labor groups outside a few exceptional countries.

Judged by the more pertinent "inequality index" (a group's share of students in relation to its proportion of male population) some interesting patterns emerge, even excluding the United States.

1. The selectivity indexes for all farm plus labor categories combined range from 0·07 to 0·44 among countries. These indexes show little relation to either the proportions of primary and tertiary employment or attendance levels, though there is some indication that they may go through a declining and then a rising phase as primary employment decreases.

2. By contrast, the total non-agricultural, non-labor indexes (ranging from 7·7 to 2·4) drop with a shift to intermediate levels of primary production and decline more definitely and steadily as attendance expands. This index is more sensitive than the one for manual groups because of the smaller underlying populations that form its base.

3. The indexes for farm operators range from 0·13 to 0·66, rising between intermediate and tertiary economies. They rise between low and intermediate attendance levels.

4. The index for all agriculture ranges from 0·10 to 0·55 among countries ; it rises continuously by a half with the growth of tertiary production and doubles with expanded attendance.

5. The index for non-farm labor ranges from 0·04 to 0·53 ; it declines sharply between low and intermediate tertiary production but increases as attendance rises from low to intermediate levels.

6. The index for all labor ranges from 0·02 to 0·57; it drops with advancing tertiary production but doubles with rising attendance.

7. Professional indexes range from 27·0 to 3·4 ; they are unrelated to shift of economy but drop by three-fifths with the rise in attendance.

8. Entrepreneurial indexes range from 12·5 to 1·6 ; they drop with a shift from high to intermediate primary production and drop by a third with a rise in attendance from low to intermediate levels.

The complexity and looseness of the relations just summarized is evident. Part of the variation among inequality indexes or attendance levels is a correlation with time. To a limited extent and for certain types of change in selectivity patterns, a shift from primary toward

tertiary types of economy may supply an explanation. Association of selectivity with attendance rates is a little closer. Advancing proportions of tertiary employment have a moderate though irregularly stimulating effect on attendance, especially of males. Rising levels of per capita income facilitate male attendance, but not female. The proportion of students who are women is unrelated to either of the foregoing economic factors. Expansion of university attendance appears not to depend basically on either economic factor but rather on " cultural " factors of educational ideology and policy.

The striking fact that emerges from these data is that as the economy becomes more tertiary (and even as university attendance expands) there is at most a sluggish tendency for the more disadvantaged sectors of the population to contribute an increasing relative proportion of students. Specific ideologies, traditions, and educational policies peculiar to each nation—and impinging uniquely on each sex and social stratum—appear to contain the principal explanations for the results found.

These findings raise a basic economic question. It is assumed usually that a productive economy requires high levels of education and a large, highly educated élite. Yet some of the countries studied here contradict this assumption. Is their less extensive schooling qualitatively superior? Do they provide equivalent training in schools not regarded as " higher education "? Do they combine the various types and qualities of human resources in different but equivalent ways?

The present results certainly demonstrate that inequality of oppotunity for higher education is a widespread, and stubborn, characteristic of societies.[16] Many would therefore endorse the statement by the Editors of the 1950 *Yearbook* (p. 639) that " the best classification of student's parents would be by their incomes and their ability to defray the costs of higher education ". The writer interprets the data as demonstrating equally clearly the penchant for parents in certain groups in most nations to overlook existing opportunities well within their children's grasp, because of their own traditional preconceptions.[17]

NOTES

[1] In most countries, however, the principal selection in fact occurs at the secondary level or earlier.

[2] In this respect the present study extends and elaborates the comparison presented by the editors of the 1950 *Yearbook of Education* (London: Evans), pp. 639–44.

[3] For example, farm operators are mixed with farm laborers; physicians in public health work are included with officials though teachers are given separately; private white collar workers may or may not be distinguished from publicly employed ones, etc. In the initial computations several dozen occupational rubrics were used to keep the fullest information; by successive regroupings the distributions given below were derived. Textual comments utilize fuller data for several countries.

[4] C. Clark, *The Conditions of Economic Progress*, 2nd ed. 1951, London: MacMillan.

[5] Compared in detail in an analysis of the 1897 Russian educational census (forthcoming in *Genus*).

[6] Ideally one requires the occupations of fathers of potential students; but occupations for all men above, say, age 45 serve adequately. Unfortunately, one must use the distribution for all males since most countries furnish no other. This compromise unduly raises the selectivity indexes for higher status groups (and lowers those for manual workers) since men in higher occupations are older. Differential fertility has an opposite effect.

[7] The data for the United States are from Havighurst's table in the 1950 *Yearbook* (p. 635) as are those for Czechoslovakia, France, Netherlands, Switzerland (pp. 639–44). For Sweden: S. Moberg and C-E. Quensel, *Studenternas Sociala Ursprung*, Statens Offentliga Utredningar, 1948: 48, p. 86. For Indiana University: R. A. Mulligan, " Socio-Economic Background and College Enrollment ", *American Sociological Review* 16, 188–96, 1951. For Spain: M. F. Iribarne and J. T. Artigas, " Una Encuesta a los Estudiantes Universitarios de Madrid," *Revista Internacional de Sociologia* 7, 5-46, 1949. For Mexico: Universidad Nacional Autonoma, *Primer Censo Nacional Universitario*, 1949, 1950, p. 45. For Denmark: N. Bang, " Til Studentersporgsmaalet," *National-økonomisk Tidskrift*, 1901, 1-11; F. T. B. Friis, " De Studerende ved Kjobenhavns Universitet," *Ibid.*, 1919, 571–87. Other data were taken from documents. All higher schools, not merely " universities " are included.

[8] Ratio of percentage of students from a group to the percentage of males employed in the same group.

[9] Non-manual indexes can decrease markedly without manual indexes rising appreciably due to the large numbers of males employed in the latter groups.

[10] To eliminate the first two college years from the United States data would reduce its ratio, but data not shown here suggest the effect would not be large. The *Yearbook* data give a non-farm labor ratio of 0·57; England was omitted due to non-comparability of the data on all other points.

[11] The high levels of worker attendance in contemporary Yugoslavia may be partly factitious, reflecting guided recruitment and quotas. Judging from the course of Soviet policy and experience with " the reserve of talent " in the working class, regression from these high levels may be anticipated though the level may remain above most other countries shown here.

[12] For three instances ratios are available for different groups of farmers. In 1913 Hungary the ratio for all farm operators was 0·37, for small farmers 0·25, but total for big plus middle farmers 12·4, and for farm labor 0·04. In 1930 Hungary the farm operator ratio was again 0·37, farm laborers 0·05, small farmers 0·27, middle farmers 8·3, and big farmers 16·0—the latter two ratios equalling professional families. In Denmark in 1921 the total farm ratio was 0·44, small and middle farmers ·35, big farmers 10·0—again matching professionals. A similar sub-classification can be made between large and small businessmen for three countries, though the sources do not give the basis for grouping. The respective ratios in the United States were 4·3 and 1·6; in France 4·6 and 1·0; in the Netherlands 2·8 and 1·4. Since small entrepreneurs have very low incomes, attitudes appear as important as income in explaining their good showing.

[13] These ratios are rather unreliable as a basis for comparisons, primarily because in some countries not all publicly employed professionals were identified.

[14] This and other evidence suggests the urgent need for a study of the tendencies toward hereditary officialdom.

[15] The former topic is dealt with in a paper at the 1954 Rome Population Congress by M. J. Bowman and the writer, " Educational Distributions and Attainment Norms in the United States," and material for comparison over longer time-spans can be found in the writer and M. Schnaper's " School and Society in England ", *Annals of American Research*, 1952.

[16] It is desirable perhaps to state that the author assumes that class inequalities in inherent intelligence are far less unequal than the differences here demonstrated.

[17] D. Wolfle, *America's Resources of Specialized Talent*, New York: Harper, 1954. See also the evidence for the equipotency of non-economic factors in R. F. Berdie, *After High School—What ?*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1954.

Education and Social Change in Canada

S. D. CLARK
(Professor of Political Economy, University of Toronto)

In a paper concerned with the problem of education and social change in the twentieth century it is tempting to turn, as most other Canadian sociologists have done, to the case of French Canada where developments of the past half-century have presented a striking example of how a tradition-bound educational system has failed to meet the needs of a rapidly changing society.[1] Here the problem remains largely one of seeking to persuade educators who do not want to change that change is vitally necessary. In English-speaking Canada, in contrast, those who command the important posts of education, with only a few exceptions, have been persons who have clearly identified themselves with the cause of social progress and advancement. Almost every official release, of the various provincial departments of education, urges the importance of new and advanced methods of classroom teaching and school organisation, and the boast is constantly made that in the nature of the school curriculum and the style of school architecture education is keeping abreast of the times.[2] Under such circumstances, it might appear that there was little to be said about the problem of education and social change in English-speaking Canada.

Yet in certain respects, perhaps, the educational system of English-speaking Canada has been no more responsive to social change than the educational system of French-speaking Canada. An educational system may become a powerful force directed towards maintaining the *status quo* not only because of its command of the resources of the state or of the church and its elaborate and propagandistically-minded bureuacratic organisation but because every person in the community whose social position depends upon the education he received is in someway its apologist. The doctor of medicine, the lawyer, the engineer, the druggist, the minister of the gospel, and indeed even the minor civil servant, are possessors of certain special educational qualifications which entitle them to perform certain special services, and the education of which they were recipients can scarcely be repudiated without repudiating the claims which are made on the basis of that education. It is just here that education can operate so powerfully as a force of conservatism in society. Changing social conditions lead to a demand for new kinds of services and thus for new types of training but such changes tend to be strongly resisted by those with vested interests in old established forms of training. The greater freedom of the educator in English-speaking Canada from what might be called parochial influences has made it more possible for him than for his

counterpart in French-speaking Canada to overcome the resistance of that powerful class within the community and within educational circles which has a stake in established forms of education, and to introduce change. Yet there is a point beyond which even the most socially conscious educators have not been prepared to go in the effort to adapt an educational system to changing social needs, and in this respect there has been no essential difference between English- and French-speaking Canada.

To the educator who likes to think of himself as socially conscious, whatever is directed towards the object of adapting education more fully to the needs of present day society is considered desirable, but this may mean little more than making education serve better the interests of dominant cultural groups in society. Educational reform thus becomes a force in support of the established order of things. In a business culture such as ours, extension of the hold of rational forms of thought tends to become the end to which education strives. For the vast majority of the population an education such as this may well serve its best interests, but this may clearly not be true of certain sections of the population whose needs are not being taken care of within the dominant culture, and it is these sections of the population which are the most caught up in social change. Under such circumstances, the traditionalist, intent on cherishing values of the past and acutely aware of the danger of any slavish conforming to the present, may well prove the real radical in education.

In a new country like Canada, the development of which has been characterised by the sudden opening up and settlement of large hitherto unoccupied land areas and by the equally sudden conversion of peaceful countrysides and small rural towns into great sprawling industrial cities, the problem of building up a social system which would meet all the various needs of the population has been very great, and the rise at different times and in different places of new movements of economic, political, social and religious organisation indicates that the effort to establish such a system has not always and everywhere been wholly successful.[3] In what might be called the outer fringes of the society, in the new farming, mining, lumbering and fishing communities and in the new growing areas of the industrial cities, large sections of the population have found themselves in sharp conflict with the dominant interests and social groupings of the established society.

Primarily, the problem of social organisation here, as in all situations of social change, is one of the development of kinds of social needs which can be satisfied only by persons possessing a different kind of educational training from that which hitherto has been provided within society, but here the changes required in the form of educational training offered are of a sort which can not readily be made within the established educational system. What occurs, where new movements of social organisation take their rise, is in effect a revolt against the

leadership of the established society and consequently, indirectly but in a very real fashion, against the kind of education upon which such a leadership bases its claims.

To persons economically and socially insecure, seeking within a new kind of social order a more satisfactory form of life, there are two things basically wrong with the leadership of the established society: it imposes upon the population for its support too heavy financial demands and it fails to provide the kind of leadership which is wanted. Both failings to some extent can be attributed to the kind of educational training of which it is a product. A long, expensive educational training makes necessary substantial rewards in the way of fees, salaries or financial returns of other sorts while a training designed to fit persons to serve in the more favoured circles of society may have the effect of making them unfit to serve in less favoured circles. So it seems to those more socially harassed sections of the population which is offered, by the leaders of the old established political parties, by ministers of the gospel in the traditional churches, and by the representatives of such socially protected professions as medicine and law, cures for its political, spiritual, physical and litigious ills which while costly produce no certain results. To get the kind of government, spiritual solace, medical attention or legal aid wanted, and which is not too costly, may involve breaking outside the social system established for providing such services and turning to persons who lack the kind of educational qualifications demanded within the society at large.

Thus, for instance, the farmers of Alberta in 1920, in seeking a change of government, entered into a political association which stipulated that no one could run for political office who was not a bona fide farmer. Fifteen years of Liberal rule in Alberta had demonstrated the extreme difficulty faced by anyone who had not come up through the usual channels of party preferment, beginning ordinarily with a career in law or small town business, getting anywhere in politics. At one stroke, in the election of 1921, all those persons who had what hitherto had been an accepted background of training and experience for politics were swept from office and an entirely new kind of leadership created.

Similarly, in Alberta again, in 1935, when now the leaders of the Farmers' party could boast of fifteen years of education through political and administrative experience, there occurred, out of the desperation created by the Great Depression, a new sudden break from an accepted type of leadership. Newspaper interviews held with the members of the Social Credit administration were revealing of the kind of claims made by the new political leaders of Alberta. Almost without exception these new ministers of the crown boasted that they were men completely lacking in political experience, in many cases previously so uninterested in politics that they had not voted or subscribed to any newspaper or magazine, that until the truths of Major Douglas and Mr. Aberhart were made known to them they had been wholly ignorant

of economic matters, that, indeed, they had none of the preparation usually expected of people entering into public life.

The significant thing about these two political movements[4] in Alberta was that they based their appeal on their freedom from dependence on a leadership made up of men of education and experience. There was no apology that, because they were a new party, they had not yet got their full share of leaders with acceptable qualifications. Their virtue lay in the fact that the men they put forward for public office, being of simple tastes, would not expect the kind of material rewards accorded to persons of more accomplished attainments and, being comparatively uneducated and wholly inexperienced, would neither have been misled by the false teachings of, for instance, economics and political science as offered within the universities nor have been taught the arts of political corruption by service in a party organisation. They were thus men who could be expected to serve the people of Alberta honestly and well.

Something of this sort of thing occurs with the rise of any new political movement, such as the C.C.F., the Union Nationale and, where it seeks to make a popular appeal, Communism. The attack upon the entrenched positions of established political parties and institutions involves, to some degree at least, an attack upon that whole system of training upon which the leadership of these parties and institutions bases its claims. Thus Jacksonian democracy, as represented in Canada by various movements seeking a more direct control by the people of its political affairs, contained within it something of an anti-educational philosophy.

Even clearer was the attitude of hostility to an educational training which found expression in those new movements of religious reform the growth of which has been such a characteristic feature of the religious development of Canada.[5] The new religious sects very deliberately turned to the leadership of men who had little or no academic or theological training. The less education a preacher had the closer to God he was believed to be. Thus, in denying the value of an educational training, the sects demolished virtually all those special claims of the established clergy as ministers of the gospel. The way was opened for the intrusion of the part-time local preacher and the itinerant evangelist who because he "lived off the country" expected no great material reward, and because he had no great education could be expected to have a firmer hold upon the simple truths of Christianity.

With respect to medicine and law there is no way of knowing to what extent certain elements of the population have turned to the services of persons lacking prescribed educational qualifications. Judging from newspaper reports, and from knowledge of conditions in such a city as Calgary, Alberta, in the nineteen thirties, the number of what might be called "quacks" practising medicine in various parts of Canada at different times has not been inconsiderable, but the strength of the reaction against the medical or legal profession cannot be determined by

the incidence of those sorts of acts which involve a breach of public regulations. Thousands of people, it may be suspected, in those areas of the community least economically and socially well off, stay away from doctors and lawyers except in cases of urgent necessity and turn for medical or legal advice to persons who, because they publicly make no claims to possession of the skills of the doctor or lawyer, cannot be apprehended by the authorities of the law. A reluctance to pay the kind of fees exacted by the medical or legal profession (the size of which are often exaggerated in the minds of such people) has much to do with this tendency to "shop around" and find someone who can provide the same sort of services at much less cost. In addition, however, there is among such sections of the population, a deeply rooted distrust and suspicion of the kind of learning possessed by medically or legally trained persons. Getting "into the clutches" of the doctor or lawyer is something which strikes terror into the hearts of such people.

It should not be concluded from this that movements directed against the established leadership of society grow out of feelings of unconditional hostility to education. There is, among people caught up in such movements, an ambivalence in their attitude to education as, indeed, there is in their attitude to many institutions of society. Such people may have an overwhelming desire to secure for their sons and daughters that education which will provide them with the kind of opportunities enjoyed by young persons in more favoured social circles and thus may be insistent that nothing is too good—and thereby too modern—in the way of educational institutions. More than that, such people may develop an enormous faith in "education", meaning by education that which offers easy and immediate solutions to the kind of problems they face. Such attitudes to education as these may be combined in a way not entirely contradictory with one of distrust and suspicion. The very same person who wants his son to become a lawyer, or who joins a study group to learn more about the legal problems of, for instance, trade unionism, may be highly distrustful of lawyers or lawyer-politicians, and that on the grounds of the kind of training they had received.

It is easy for the apologist of an established educational system to take comfort in the view that this failure of certain persons to recognise the value of an educational training is a result of ignorance and that all that is necessary is to reveal to them some of the "truths" of which the educated person is a recipient. It was this sort of thinking which led, in the Alberta election of 1935, one of the old parties to bring into the province a professor of economics to expose the falsehoods of social credit and another of these parties to arrange for a series of radio broadcasts to be given by its intellectually most able leader on the unconstitutionality of the social credit programme. Nothing could have been better calculated than either of these two acts to convince the Alberta electorate that the old party leadership of the province,

with all its learning, had nothing to offer it. The truth was, given the kind of economic and political ills this electorate was suffering at the time, the old party leadership, wedded to certain economic, political and constitutional doctrines currently being taught in the universities, had nothing to offer it. Likewise, it would appear evident that in those areas where the old established churches or such professions as those of medicine and law have come under attack, the reason has been that they were not able to offer cures (given the uncertain definition of what cure really is) of the kind of spiritual, physical or legal ills being suffered by certain people.

One might well question thus some of the sociological assumptions underlying discussion of such a movement of educational reform as that in French Canada. Wedded as many of them have become to a functionalist theory of society, sociologists, like psychologists, have been too much inclined to stress the importance of processes of adjustment and integration at the expense of processes of conflict and disorder as forces of change in personality or social organisation. To build bigger and better equipped engineering schools, to crowd out of the school curricula the classics and philosophies to make room for the social and natural sciences and to introduce programmes of teacher training are thought of as steps in advance in making over the educational system of French Canada. Like all persons in economically and socially insecure positions, the French Canadian is faced with the problem of providing for the future of his son or daughter, and if the young French-speaking Canadian is to compete successfully with the young English-speaking Canadian he must have an educational equipment which is his equal. Thus the drive to "modernise" the educational system of French Canada, to make it conform to the demands of the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture. But the French Canadian, caught up in the changes taking place in his society, and seeking relief, turns to values of the past and to a re-assertion of the simple truths of nationality and religion. It would be foolhardy to suggest that he is mistaken in doing so, considering what the dominant Anglo-Saxon culture has immediately to offer him. Rather the real radical in French Canada may well be that person determined to resist at all costs the values of this dominant culture.

What this means is that an educational system which seeks "to keep astride of the times" may fail to meet the needs of those people most fully exposed to forces of social change. That is not to say that the simple reaction of distrust of education offers any real solution in itself to the kinds of problems such people face. Nor is it to say that those expedients which may be resorted to as alternatives to an educational training represent any real advance in preparing people for positions of leadership in society. The establishment, within new movements of political, social or religious reform, of various kinds of training schools, such as labour or bible colleges, may lead, in certain particulars, to new and improved methods of training within the established

educational system, but developments such as these, for the most part, are in the way of compromises forced upon movements if they are to survive in the social world in which they find themselves. The significance of the growth of an attitude of distrust of education lies not in the direct effect of leading to improvements in forms of educational training but in the indirect effect of giving support to movements directed against the established leadership structure of society. Change is forced upon the social system from without, by the repudiation of that form of educational training of which its leadership is a product. It is thus that reactionism may operate, within education as within other areas of social life, as a revolutionary force within society.

NOTES

[1] Jean-C. Falardeau, ed., *Essais sur le Québec contemporain* (Québec, 1953).
[2] Hilda Neatby, *So Little for the Mind* (Toronto, 1953).
[3] S. D. Clark, *Social Development of Canada* (Toronto, 1942).
[4] For an account of these two movements, see W. L. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada* (Toronto, 1950) and C. B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta* (Toronto, 1953).
[5] S. D. Clark, *Church and Sect in Canada* (Toronto, 1948); W. E. Mann, *Church, Sect and Cult in Alberta* (Toronto, 1955).

Education and Social Mobility in Australia

W. F. CONNELL
(Professor of Education, University of Sydney)

When education is discussed as a factor in social mobility it is usually assumed that its function is one of elevation. The school is regarded as a social elevator enabling the younger members of a lower class to rise steadily and make themselves acceptable within the ranks of a higher social group.

How, in fact, does an educational organisation do this? It works in several ways. It may set up schools of special prestige, often lying outside a public system, attendance at which is an indispensable preliminary to acceptance as a member of a higher class. Children of the less privileged groups may be attracted into such schools by the provision of scholarships, or may be enabled to attend them at great financial sacrifice on the part of their parents. To them also may come the children of the *nouveaux riches*. Similarly within a public or state school system special secondary schools of high prestige may cater for an élite, generally of high intelligence drawn from all classes, and may thereby open to them a path to the professions and other highly valued occupations, denied in large part to the vast majority who attend the ordinary school. Again, by encouraging adolescents to remain longer at school and thus qualify for various commercial or semi-professional entrance examinations, the schools may help the lower class children to climb a little further up the ladder. By constant insistence, too, during this period on the acquisition of the particular kinds of knowledge valued by the teachers and those who construct and regulate the secondary school curricula, and the absorption of the ethical principles and manners approved by such people, the school in part may help to elevate the under-privileged.

These facts are commonplace and have been well explored in the literature on the subject. Interest in the matter, in fact, among educators, centres nowadays not so much on an examination of the process of social elevation as on the question of its desirability. It is assumed that some such process does occur in part through the instrumentality of the schools; it is not quite such a settled question whether the schools should consciously engage in promoting social mobility. To do so was held by Havighurst, Warner, and Loeb, to be both realistic and democratic; a similar view is taken by an English educator, Eric James. We are, they feel, committed indefinitely to some form of class system and we should therefore seek to make the best of it. This we can do by using our schools to sort an élite drawn from all groups and train them to qualify for membership of the highest classes. Programmes should be redesigned so as to equip the others to serve the community worthily according to the several talents they may possess. In this manner a

certain degree of fluidity of class structure, and opportunity for the exercise of individual aptitude may be preserved in accordance with the democratic traditions of our society.

It may be questioned, however, whether this view is either realistic or democratic.

It appears to rest upon a view of leadership which is open to serious question. The assumption is made that the community does or should follow the lead of the individuals who are members of the highest classes and that care should be taken therefore that the best and most suitably educated should be constantly supplied through our schools as recruits to those classes. This seems to take a rather narrow view of the meaning of leadership and of the manner of its functioning in modern western society. The twentieth century democrat is no longer inclined to look for or to accept guidance from an individual or a group set apart from him. Social leadership means the re-directing of his activities in the direction of greater social usefulness and enjoyment. The determination of these ultimate ends is not a matter for decision by an expert or a specially privileged person but for agreement in common among all the men and women of the society. The rôle of the expert, of course, in helping to formulate and to implement the decision is an important one. He is not, however, a leader in the sense of being the decision maker, nor is he necessarily a permanent consultant. His very expertness narrows his field. His need to be a specialist means that his competence is restricted. On matters outside his field others are the experts; even within his own field on many aspects of it and at various levels he must defer to others with more suitable skills.

From this it is possible to say two things: first, special training is so various and so widely demanded in modern society that it has the effect of spreading skills and various kinds of competence so extensively that opportunities for leadership of this kind are widely diffused throughout the community; secondly, leadership, in the sense of deciding relatively general policies for a society is no longer a job for either an expert or a special class but for the common man.

Some might be prepared to question the desirability of this trend, and it is not intended here to argue the case for or against it. It is suggested, however, that this kind of trend is to be found in many western countries, and that it is an aspect of the relationship between education and social leadership that needs re-assessment.

It furnishes, in some measure, evidence for regarding education not as a social elevator but as a social lowerer.

The kinds of effects that point in this direction may be observed in less tradition-bound western countries such as Australia. There is as yet too little evidence collected to justify any sweeping generalisation, but at least the data in respect to Australia's largest urban centre is such as to indicate that the 'lowerer' hypothesis might well merit a closer scrutiny than has hitherto been its lot.

Sydney is a metropolis of some 1,800,000 inhabitants, a population somewhat comparable with that of Rome or Madrid. If you add together the two English cities of Birmingham and Liverpool, or the two American cities of Washington and Baltimore you have approximately the size of this rapidly expanding Pacific seaport. No social class analysis has as yet been made of it or of any particular part of it, but an approximate distribution of the kinds of living areas to be found in it has been made by its planning authority. It has differentiated broadly three living areas, one, the "upper" area of very comfortable and attractive living conditions, a second, the "middle" area of decent, reasonably pleasant homes, and a third, the "lower" sub-standard area. Sydney's population is distributed between the three areas in the proportion of 1: 7: 2. The overwhelming preponderance of the "middle" area gives some indication of the basic homogeneity of the population. This situation is largely a twentieth-century phenomenon.

The change in Sydney's outlook and orientation began about the 1880's. Founded in 1788 she was, at first, merely a place of reception for British convicts becoming, with the growth of the wool trade, an important export centre by the mid-nineteenth century. Gold and grain, produced in her hinterland in the next three decades, increased her significance as a distributing centre for the state's primary produce. It was with the last quarter of the century that she felt the impact of the growing industrial revolution of the western world, which accelerated her growth, changed her face, and altered the outlook of her inhabitants. Expanding suburbs sprawled along new main roads, suburban railways, and steam tramway tracks; tasteless public buildings and cramped terraces grew apace, and all the usual disfigurements that accompanied the first flush of industrialism in European and American cities could be seen repeated in the development of Sydney from 1880 to 1920. Indent, exchange, and the carrying business had to compete with trade and manufactures as the city steadily built up a variety of light and heavy industries. In the twenty years 1891–1911 the population doubled itself to reach a figure of 630,000; in the following forty years it was to triple that figure. The initial increase came mainly to the working class districts on the flat central and western areas and has tended subsequently to overflow on a broad front south by Botany Bay, and westward across the coastal plain.

The measure of Sydney's industrial conversion may be judged from the fact that in 1890 she had 1,450 factories employing 28,000 persons; in 1953–54 it was estimated that the number had increased to 12,859 employing about 300,000 persons. This represented 36 per cent. of all her workers, and their production slightly more than one third of the total value of the whole of Australia's industrial production.

In the earliest days the tone of Sydney society had been set by the Governor and his military entourage. As the 19th century wore on, Government House remained "the centre round which society revolves"[1] preserving nostalgically the forms and beliefs of an English

society from which it was continually replenished. Wealth, however, subject to certain restrictions of occupation, came to play the largest part in determining the composition of those admitted to social leadership in the community and in a measure broke through the earlier rigidity of class organisation. The wealthy recruits and the ranks which stretched below them sought to emulate the practices and to assume the outlook of those whom they imagined to be their equals in England, customarily referred to as "Home." The growth of industrialisation and the development of compulsory State-provided education, introduced in 1880, nurtured the seeds of equalitarianism which even casual observers had long seen embedded in the hitherto unpromising soil of Sydney. By the end of the century the equalitarian movement had gathered impetus, abetted by the growing labour force in politics and industry. It achieved remarkable and forceful expression in the verses of the popular radical Sydney poet, Henry Lawson:

> "But the curse o' class distinctions from our shoulders shall be hurled,
> An' the influence of women revolutionize the world;
> There'll be higher education for the toilin', starvin' clown,
> An' the rich an' educated shall be educated down."[2]

Thenceforth, the standards of taste and judgment in the Sydney community tended to come less and less from the upper strata of society.

This movement has been paralleled by the development of a strong Labour Party which since 1910 has tended to be the dominant force in both state and municipal politics. Throughout its history it has drawn much of its strength from its anti-privilege programme which has appealed strongly to the citizens of Sydney's expanding industrial suburbs.

The significant educational developments affecting the welfare of Sydney's children have, without exception, been initiated by Labour governments and have been in keeping with their policies. Of particular importance to our purpose here was the establishment and expansion of secondary High Schools in the first two decades of the 20th century, and the subsequent institution during the last fifteen years of a highly selective system of secondary education. The High Schools were set up initially with the avowed object of providing for less privileged adolescents educational opportunities that their more fortunate brothers and sisters could obtain through private and denominational schools. Their programmes therefore were modelled on those of the private schools with whom they proudly and successfully competed in examinations conducted by the university. A further stage was reached when the state secondary schools in the metropolitan area were divided into two types, selective High Schools to which entry is controlled by a selection based on the pupils' primary school record and

their score on an intelligence test, and non-selective three-year schools which receive all the adolescents who fail to gain entry into the High School group. At present, one-third of the children are to be found in the selective, two-thirds in the non-selective group. In this way there has been developed a public secondary system whose pride is to cater for an intellectual élite drawn from every segment of Sydney's society, a system, at first sight, designed to act specifically as a social elevator.

There is, at the moment, insufficient evidence to judge whether, in fact, it does act in this way. The suggestion, however, is put forward that it may be found to act in the opposite direction, and that similar public systems in other industrial societies may also be found to function as "lowerers" rather than as "elevators".

An "elevator" system requires for its success at least two things, that the society in which it operates should recognise and believe in the desirability of leadership by higher classes, and that there should be an accepted method of behaviour characteristic of a higher class in which aspirants can be trained at least in part in schools. It is doubtful whether either of these conditions holds good in present-day Sydney.

The almost century-old tradition of equalitarianism which has accompanied Sydney's industrial development militates against class leadership of any kind. Lawson's verse, quoted above, is virtually a part of Sydney's oversoul. Sydney's industrial age has no recognised heroic figures, and Australian boys and girls, indeed, no national heroes. If an adolescent seeks a hero to emulate he looks to the Wolfes, Hampdens, and Elizabeth Frys of English history. He has not been taught to speak familiarly of any of the Australian great men as the young American has of Washington, Jackson, Lincoln, or Henry Ford. He cannot turn even in imagination to a fictitious Paul Bunyan or a Febold Feboldson. The great men to him are the men of Anzac or the Kokoda Trail, nameless heroes, whose exploits of courage and endurance took place in an environment and under circumstances so markedly different from home conditions as to make it rather difficult for the young Sydney citizen to think of them with a familiar affection or to look to them for guidance and inspiration in his life. Nowhere, thus, in his education does he receive inspiration and encouragement to strive for a position of leadership in the community. He may want to get on and be helped to get on, but he is not encouraged to become distinguished.

Starting from the inception of the High School movement the supreme test of a good education in Sydney's schools has been success in the public examinations at first conducted by the university and subsequently by the State. There is scope for considerable research into the sociology of public examinations which is too little understood and appreciated. Sydney, with its belief in their over-riding importance, might prove to be an ideal place for interested field-workers. The general effect in secondary education here appears to have been a blurring of distinctions between different secondary schools. Since the

public schools produced such a good crop of examinees and successfully advertised the fact, the private schools have been forced to make similar public display of their examination successes. Thus the main efforts of teachers and pupils in both high and private schools is channelled towards the measurable achievement that can be recorded by the results of public examinations. This tends to mean that the kinds of outcomes that the public expects of the schools do not differ significantly from school to school. A recent survey by the Australian Council for Educational Research has shown that there are wide and surprising variations between the achievements of supposedly comparable schools in the metropolitan area, but these variations among schools are surprising precisely for the reason that the public has a common expectation concerning them. The tendency of the system appears to be towards the elimination of distinctions between schools and thus the elimination of characteristics, in so far as schools can provide them, distinctive of an upper class which has no special knowledge, attitude, or skills built into it by the schools. The upper class seems therefore to have sunk or to be sinking imperceptibly into the middle class below it which, in Sydney, is not effectively elevating any new group to take its place.

A study of the habits and interests of 10,000 of Sydney's adolescents, between the ages of 13 and 18 years, undertaken during the last five years appears to lend a little support to this thesis. In examining, for example, the reading habits of these adolescents, divided into three living areas in the proportions mentioned above, there is no significant distinction to be found between the upper and middle areas in respect to the incidence and type of reading of comics, newspapers, and books. The pattern of development in both areas is the same. There appears, however, to be a number of significant differences between the reading habits of these two groups and those of the adolescents from the lower living areas. Similarly, in the pattern of activities found in a study of some 632 peer groups no distinction can be made between the adolescents of the upper and middle areas nor even any distinction between those who attend selective high schools and those in the non-selective schools. Of interest also is the fact that the vast majority of these groups claimed that they had no individual leaders and that they had never had one. They appear to have a genuine "peer" quality, and their members feel themselves to be members of a group of equals who, for the most part, do not constantly follow the interests of any particular individual. It is probable that for the various activities that they undertake leaders arise as the occasion demands, and are superseded by others as a new situation develops; in this way the function of leadership passes constantly around and is shared among a large number of the group's members.

This situation seems to be a reasonable forecast of the way in which Sydney society is structuring itself. If the present school set-up is contributing to this kind of development and if it is regarded as a

movement in a desirable direction for an industrial democratic society, it suggests that rather more thought should be given to revising our concept of leadership and incorporating more consciously the skills and attitudes required by the newer concept into our educational programmes. If it is true that the idea of an élite leadership is no longer suitable, it still remains true that educators have as yet scarcely begun to think or to work knowingly towards any adequate alternative substitute.

NOTES

[1] R. E. N. Twopenny, *Town Life in Australia* (London: Stock, 1883), p. 108.
[2] *Worker*, 13 Oct., 1894.

PART TWO

Education and Social Mobility in Economically Underdeveloped Countries

K. A. Busia
(Professor of Sociology, University College of the Gold Coast, Achimota)

Durkheim defined education as " the action exercised by the generations of adults on those which are not yet ready for social life ". Every society must have an educational system by means of which the culture necessary for its survival, unity and continuity is transmitted by the older to the younger generation. In this sense, education is universal. The cultural heritage that is transmitted consists of a whole complex of institutions, skills, occupations, manners, customs, laws, beliefs, values, language and forms of æsthetic expression.

A more restricted use of the word " education " limits it to the processes of teaching and learning carried out in schools by professional teachers. Non-literate peoples have not normally educated their young in this way. There has therefore been a tendency to regard education as something which is the exclusive possession of literate societies. Hence European countries which have introduced education through schooling to non-literate societies have usually based it on their own culture. This problem is discussed in the papers by Professor Frazier, Mr. Mercier, and Mr. Richmond. It recurs in all discussions on education in non-literate societies. The three papers deal with the problem against an African background. Mr. Mercier points out in his paper that the whole trend of the French system of education in French West Africa has been towards the production of a civilization essentially non-African in character. In content and orientation the education has been foreign to the tradition and culture of the societies concerned. The French philosophy of education did not consider that a curriculum for African schools could be built on African social life. The education provided by the French in their West African colonies was therefore as Mr. Mercier points out, " conceived and organized in the ideological and political context of assimilation ". The school was a " French school " from which native language and culture were excluded.

Yet for centuries those African communities had educated their children in their own patterns of living, in their manners, morals and values, in creative expressions through the graphic arts, dance and song and oral narrative and, above all, in forms of behaviour and inter-personal relations to which their cultures gave especial emphasis.

The wholesale transplanting of European culture through schooling has a bearing on the problems of social mobility which is the special theme of these papers. Mr. Goldthorpe in his paper comments on the fact that in East Africa " though educated Africans form from one point of view the obvious source of African leadership, their very training in Western ways may lead to their rejection by their fellow tribesmen ". On the other hand, " to be denied the privileges enjoyed by Europeans after having painfully assimilated one's self to Western values is an obviously embittering experience ".

A close correlation exists between social mobility and education. This is reflected in the various educational policies and philosophies of the European powers that have introduced formal education to Africa. The Belgians, in line with their utilitarian outlook, have emphasized manual training, the vernacular languages, post-primary vocational training and religious teaching in which the Catholic Church has played the prominent part. The aim seems to be to produce not equals, but useful citizens providing unskilled and semi-skilled labour in the economic co-operation between Belgian capital and expert knowledge and skill, and African resources and labour. The aim of Belgian educational policy has been directed towards preventing Africans from aspiring to the high levels of the social hierarchy. It is only recently that avenues are being provided for Africans to acquire higher education.

Mr. Richmond discusses social mobility and racial relations in the Union of South Africa against the background of the Education Act of 1953. The Act seeks to provide a kind of education which will " prepare natives more effectively for their future occupations "; that is, their subordinate position, for Mr. Richmond points out that " the dilemma facing the Union Government is how to bring about an industrial revolution which will raise the standard of living of the non-European population without affecting the relative advantage of the European ".

In the British territories, educational policy, though modelled largely on that of Britain, gave opportunities for higher education to Africans, and this has made it possible for some Africans to rise to the highest posts. It is Africans who are playing the leading rôle in the emergent nations of Nigeria and the Gold Coast.

In addition to social mobility, the close relationship between educational opportunity and the nature of the political organization of a country stands out in all the papers, and is specifically commented upon in Professor Frazier's paper.

Mr. Richmond discusses a fundamental problem of education in Africa. It is now becoming a generally accepted view that " the aim of education must be to prepare Africans to live well in their own country " and this implies that " the things that are of value in the old African way of life must be preserved ". Mr. Richmond points out that " difficulties arise when an attempt is made to define the

things that are of value in the old African way of life and which are compatible with a society undergoing rapid social change in the direction of greater urbanization and industrialization ".

Education has a dual task. One is to hand on the accumulated experience of the society to the young, in order to ensure that its way of life is preserved; the other is to prepare the young for social change. Ottaway has called these the " conservative " and " creative " functions of education.[1] Most societies have got by with an educational system that largely fulfilled the " conservative " function, for the pace of change has generally been relatively slow, and moreover change has usually been generated from within the society itself. In such a situation it has been possible for the " creative " functions of education to be fulfilled without particular emphasis. But the situation in Africa is different. As a result of the contact with Europe through conquest, trade, education, Christianity and government by European powers, many African societies are undergoing a rapid change in all aspects of social life, and traditional systems and values have either been disrupted or are facing a severe change. In this situation the " creative " task of education becomes paramount. Indeed, in Africa education is an instrument of change,[2] for the African child who goes to school is " introduced to a world of thoughts, of achievement, and of conduct outside the experience of his parents; this access to new ideas is bound to make a break in his life, however much the educationist may wish to respect native tradition ".[3]

The problem of linking African culture with educating for change is a formidable one. In territories like Nigeria and the Gold Coast where a fair number of Africans have received university education, and where there is the prospect that the aspiration for self-government will shortly be realized, there is also the desire for an education that will be rooted in the traditions and culture of the people; and there is confidence that, with educated Africans themselves playing a leading rôle, such an educational system can be devised. Nationalism brings along with it the determination to have and to contribute a society's own unique way of life and achievement to the common heritage of mankind; and this is reflected in the demand for a system of education which will not only equip Africans for dealing with the rapid changes in their social environment, but will also preserve and enhance their own indigenous way of life.

Mr. Richmond's paper discusses the possible implications of the policy underlying the South African Education Act of 1953 with special reference to the social status of the Bantu, relative to the European. He considers that the policy shifts the " ideological foundations of African education from providing a bridge between the European and African ways of life to an emphasis on fitting Africans for a distinct and separate rôle in society ". This, he opines, is unrealistic in the face of the industrial revolution taking place in the Union, and he advances the hypothesis that " where an educational system makes

separate provision for different racial groups and where opportunities for secondary and higher education are much greater for one group which monopolises the positions of highest status and reward then racial conflicts will be intensified".

Dr. de Kiewiet who has discussed the same problem[4] has pointed out that "one of the major misconceptions of apartheid is that native and European are totally separated from each other by irreconcilable differences of culture". Culture, however, can be learned, and the evidence of sociological investigations suggests that it is along the road of equality of opportunity of education, particularly for higher education, that better harmony could be hopefully sought. Dr. de Kiewiet's conclusion about the policy of apartheid is the same as Mr. Richmond's—that it is unrealistic. Two of the reasons given by Dr. de Kiewiet who displays a clear and sympathetic insight into the problems of the Union are that the growing labour shortage of the Union of South Africa "has within it a compulsion that the laws of apartheid are already finding it difficult to resist", and secondly that "physical or geographical apartheid is also a practical impossibility. There are more millions living outside the native reserves than inside them. Geographic apartheid might be more feasible if, taken together, the resources could maintain the native population. This they are notoriously unable to do. . . . If possible, the native population is even more dependent upon the industrial activities of the great towns than the whites themselves."[5] Mr. Richmond points out that the policy of apartheid is rooted in the firm belief that it is only by restricting the area in which Indians, Europeans and non-Europeans come into competition that severe conflict will be avoided. Dr. de Kiewiet has something penetrating and arresting to say about this: "In the decision to impose severe measures of segregation upon natives, coloured folk and Indians alike there is a quality which arrests attention. It is more than consistency. It is the quality almost of integrity, of total belief in the right of white civilization to maintain itself, of complete faith that apartheid is a goal to be courageously sought whatever the danger and sacrifice. It has the power of moral compulsion over the minds of its followers, bred of racial pride, national zeal, religious fervour and historic anger. Apartheid may commit South Africa to great international embarrassment, frustration, even disaster, yet its zealots are refreshingly and naïvely un-Machiavellian."[6]

Apart from South Africa, the evidence is that the introduction of Western education into a non-literate community creates a new élite. This is the main subject of Professor Frazier's paper. Africans who become literate are able to share the "higher" civilization of the European, and to play new rôles in their own societies. But attention must be drawn to Professor Frazier's reminder: "that the spread of education has not been an isolated phenomenon but has been closely tied up with industrial development and urbanization". In the new

situation, education opens the way to new occupations and professions which bring both money and prestige.

Mr. Goldthorpe discusses the position of the educated African élite in East Africa, stating in connection with salaries in the public service that " a near-parity (between Europeans and Africans) at the higher levels of Government Service does widen the inequality between Africans, and there seems no escape from the dilemma that either inequality is enhanced or a colour bar is resorted to ".

The East African situation which he discusses also provides evidence that the formation of an élite is the result of the correlation between education and economic development. Education is an avenue to higher paid jobs. In the context of Africa generally, the jobs are usually white-collar jobs during the early years of the introduction of formal education. Professor Frazier refers to Mitchell's study of *The African Middle Classes in British Central Africa* when 653 Africans at the secondary level who were asked to rate occupations on a prestige scale gave the 11 topmost positions to white collar occupations, with the positions of African Education Officer and African Secondary School teacher receiving the highest scores. This pattern of aspirations takes a long time to change. In a recent study based on the students of the University College of the Gold Coast, the students were asked to name the kind of job they hoped to enter immediately after leaving college, and also what they would like to be doing in 20 years' time. The results are summarized in the Table below.[7]

General Outline of Arts and Science Students' Short- and Long-term aims

	Arts				Science			
	After Degree		20 years later		After Degree		20 years later	
	N	%	N	%	N	%	N	%
Teaching or Educational Administration ..	72	(51·8)	26	(18·7)	23	(22·1)	7	(6·7)
University Teaching	6	(4·3)	12	(8·6)	2	(1·9)	8	(7·7)
Civil and Diplomatic Service ..	42	(30·2)	22	(15·8)	4	(3·9)	4	(3·9)
Politics	—	—	10	(7·2)	—	—	1	(1·0)
Law	7	(5·0)	15	(10·8)	—	—	—	—
Medicine	—	—	—	—	35	(33·6)	36	(34·6)
Scientific Work ..	—	—	—	—	9	(8·6)	14	(13·5)
Engineering ..	—	—	—	—	15	(14·5)	10	(9·6)
Agriculture and Farming ..	—	—	12	(8·6)	13	(12·5)	12	(11·5)
Business	—	—	11	(7·9)	—	—	4	(3·9)
Clergy and Ministry	2	(1·4)	3	(2·2)	—	—	2	(1·9)
Authorship ..	—	—	7	(5·0)	—	—	—	—
Miscellaneous ..	4	(2·9)	12	(8·7)	2	(1·9)	2	(1·9)
Don't Know ..	6	(4·3)	9	(6·5)	1	(1·0)	4	(3·9)
Total ..	139	(99·9)	139	(100·0)	104	(100·0)	104	(100·1)

It will be observed that scientific work and engineering is a long-term aim for about one-quarter of the choices. This reflects the growing realization of the need for scientific and technical skills in a country that is aiming at rapid economic development and industrialisation. Even so, Dr. Jahoda comments: " Altogether, it seems doubtful whether the pattern of aspirations just outlined is the most appropriate for the Gold Coast ". The prestige of white collar jobs still remains in spite of the felt need for technicians. Dr. Jahoda points out that the students' remarks show that most of them expect to get to the top, or near the top of their chosen profession, and that many regard teaching or the civil service (which the scholarships they hold for their university education oblige them to enter) as springboards for the realization of other ambitions. In the British territories of West Africa the educated élite can rise to the highest posts including political positions. Unlike the position in East Africa as portrayed by Mr. Goldthorpe, in the Gold Coast nationalist aspirations for self-government have identified more closely the interests of the educated and the illiterate, with the former giving leadership. Moreover, the cocoa industry and other cash crops give many unlettered farmers the chance of earning as much, and in some instances more than the highest paid posts in the civil or professional services. The prestige of literacy is nevertheless still high. It does not monopolize wealth; but it does monopolize political power. For example, there is universal adult suffrage to the legislatures of both the Gold Coast and Nigeria, but only the educated people are eligible to stand for election. In neither country do these number more than 10 per cent. of the total population. There is thus an aristocracy on the basis of literacy which opens the door to all political posts including ministerial offices in a Cabinet. In both countries the traditional office of the chief still ranks high in prestige, though the élite who become Cabinet Ministers could curtail and even abolish the power of the chief. The conflict surrounding the position of the chief illustrates the conflicts in statuses and rôles that result from the introduction of education into a non-literate society.

Education as an instrument of social change is best seen when schooling is newly introduced into a non-literate society. The paper by Armstrong and Hirabayashi giving the results of a study of the patterns of educational participation in five agricultural villages of Lebanon with special reference to the indications of change resulting from a developing economy affords an illustration of the way education affects socio-economic status. Each of the five villages has a government elementary school which offers five years of schooling. The investigators found that " the lowest scoring group on economic status also had the greatest lack of schooling while the high status group had the fewest members without any schooling and the largest percentage at the level of advanced or secondary education ", and " throughout, the relationship between education and socio-economic status was positive ". They also found that three times as many boys as girls had

been to school; that sons and daughters were receiving more education than their fathers and mothers respectively, and that education was spreading among all levels of the population. This last point is noteworthy, for in a developing economy statuses which are open for competition and achievement tend to increase, and as education improves one's chances of success, the spread of education to all levels of the population implies that there will be more movements up and down the social scale. The fact that sons and daughters were receiving more education than fathers and mothers respectively is also an index of the transformation taking place in society.

The situation in the Lebanese villages may be compared with the Gold Coast study by Dr. Jahoda. Details of the educational level of all four grandparents, as well as that of parents and siblings of the students of the University College of the Gold Coast were obtained, and the results are given in the Tables below.[8]

Details of Education (Grandparents and Parents)

Grandfathers

		No Education	Elementary School	Secondary School	University	
GRANDMOTHERS	Secondary School ..	—	1	1	1	3
	Elementary School ..	2	33	12	1	48
	No education ..	329	79	14	3	425
		331	113	27	5	476*

* No adequate data for five students.

Fathers

MOTHERS	Secondary School ..	—	4	9	3	16
	Elementary School ..	3	28	34	1	66
	No education ..	59	73	22	2	156
		62	105	65	6	238*

* No adequate data for five students.

Educational Status of Siblings Between the Ages 6-16 inclusive

	Boys		Girls	
	N	%	N	%
Primary and Middle	134	(78)	118	(81)
Secondary and Technical	31	(18)	8	(5)
"Home"	7	(4)	20	(14)
Total	172	(100)	146	(100)

Out of 476 pairs of grandparents for whom information was available, 329 or nearly 70 per cent. were totally illiterate, whereas by the same standard, among parents (both parents) 25 per cent. were illiterate; among siblings, 96 per cent. of the brothers and 86 per cent. of the sisters of the University students were receiving education in Primary and Middle or Secondary and Technical Schools. This proportion is not representative of the whole of the Gold Coast. The literacy rate for the whole population is about 10 per cent.; and in 1951 there were nearly three times as many boys attending primary schools as there were girls. This ratio is the same as given by Armstrong and Hirabayashi for the Lebanese villages.

Some idea of the effect of the spread of education is given by the comparative distribution of occupations of the parents and siblings of the students.[9]

Comparative Distribution of Occupations
(Parents versus Siblings)

A. Fathers versus Brothers

Occupational Type	Fathers		Brothers	
	N	%	N	%
Farming	66	(30·0)	30	(11·1)
Artisans	21	(9·5)	61	(22·6)
Clerical	30	(13·6)	69	(25·6)
Commercial	46	(21·0)	28	(10·3)
Professional	57	(26·0)	82	(30·4)
All Types	220	(100·1)	270	(100·0)

B. Mothers versus Sisters

Occupational Type	Mothers		Sisters	
	N	%	N	%
Farming	57	(25·8)	10	(3·0)
Petty Trading	81	(36·7)	23	(6·9)
Craft	34	(15·4)	28	(8·4)
Teaching and Allied..	10	(4·5)	76	(22·8)
Housewife	39	(17·6)	197	(59·0)
All Types	221	(100·0)	334	(100·1)

The emphasis on white collar jobs is seen in the increased number of clerks and professionals among the sons. The economic change in the society is also reflected in the fact that there are fewer farmers and more artisans among sons than fathers. As between mothers and sisters, there is a drastic reduction in the proportions in farming, petty trading and crafts, the daughters having taken more to teaching and similar

work, whilst a much larger proportion of them have confined themselves to household duties. As Dr. Jahoda comments, " in the younger generation a much greater approximation to Western patterns is found ".

This last is a pointer to the line along which a solution of the problem of co-existence in multiracial groups should be sought. Economic and industrial development as well as formal education bring enlightenment and revolutionary transformation, in individuals as well as societies, and where different races in the same society have equal opportunities of education, the prospects for harmony are much brighter, since education could be designed to equip all to share in the life of the common social environment.

NOTES

[1] Ottaway, *Society and Education*, Kegan Paul, 1953, p. 9.
[2] Hailey, *An African Survey*, O.U.P., 1938, ch. XVIII.
[3] Hailey, *op. cit.*, p. 1,207.
[4] C. de Kiewiet, in " Fears and Pressures in the Union of South Africa " in *Africa Today*, Hopkins Press, 1955.
[5] De Kiewiet, *op. cit.*, *Africa Today*, p. 210.
[6] De Kiewiet, *op. cit.*, *Africa Today*, p. 208.
[7] Gustav Jahoda, " The Social Background of a West African Student Population," *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. VI, no. 1 (March, 1955).
[8] Gustav Jahoda, *op. cit.*, pp. 71–73.
[9] Gustav Jahoda, *op. cit.*, *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. V, no. IV, p. 365.

Education and the African Élite

E. Franklin Frazier
(Professor of Sociology, Howard University)

Less than a decade ago a book, published in the Belgian Congo, was addressed to the black élite which was coming into existence as the result of the impact of western civilization.[1] Although the tone of this book is largely exhortatory and contains much common sense and homely advice to the black élite concerning their behaviour and responsibilities to the African masses, it nevertheless emphasizes at the start the necessity for intellectual development. This appears to be a recognition of the important fact pointed out in an article by Miss Read that " There is general agreement, based upon abundant evidence of a political and economic character, that the spread of modern education has been one of the most powerful forces in African social change ".[2] The special concern of this paper is with the rôle of education in the development and orientation of the élite in the new African societies which are coming into existence. Within the limits of a short paper it will be possible only to indicate what may be regarded as the most important sociological aspects of the problem with which this paper is concerned.

The modern education of the African began, in the broader sense of the term, almost from the beginning of European contacts. This was inevitable since traders in their dealings with Africans from the slave trade onward were forced to educate some Africans in European ways. Then soon thereafter missionaries assumed the task of educating the Africans. While the trading companies were concerned primarily with educating clerks, the missionaries were interested in training teachers, artisans, and evangelists in addition to teaching their charges Christian doctrine. In fact, the extent to which missionaries educated Africans in agriculture and skills necessary for a new way of life has often been overlooked. In their rôle of educators, the missionaries became the chief agents of the " mission of civilization ", the chief justification of European control. While the mission schools have continued to play the most important rôle in African education, they depend no longer upon their home churches, gifts, and student fees for support. Their support today comes from grant-in-aids from the governments which have assumed responsibility for education as a part of their administrative functions. As the result of governmental responsibility for education, the expansion of educational facilities and school attendance have shown phenomenal growth in recent decades. In Nigeria, for example, in 1951 there were more than a million pupils in primary schools and over 30,000 in secondary schools,

while in the Northern Region alone in the same year there were 53,232 persons enrolled in 2,161 mass literacy classes.[3] In recent years, institutions providing for the higher education of Africans have been opened in British and French West Africa, while during 1954 university courses for Africans were inaugurated in the Belgian Congo.

There has been much controversy over the type of education which Africans should receive. In order to deal with this question in 1951 the Nuffield Foundation and the Colonial Office jointly sponsored a study of educational policy in practice in British Tropical Africa.[4] At a conference which followed the next year at Cambridge, practically every phase of African education—the number of schools needed, the training of teachers, language teaching, etc.—was discussed and recommendations for the future were drawn up. Both the study and the conference were focused upon educational problems in a developing society. Although British Tropical Africa provided the basis of discussion, the problems discussed exist in all parts of Africa south of the Sahara.

The western education of the African created from the beginning an élite which was separated from the masses. They were an élite in the sense that they were able to share in a " higher " civilization and were differentiated from so-called " savages " and " heathen ". They spoke the language of the metropolitan country, wore European clothes, and were supposed to be converts to Christianity. In the French territories they became the *évolués*. Some of those who had acquired an English or French education had acquired it in the metropolitan country and had thus become even more identified with European culture. The class of élites was in the beginning relatively small and grew slowly in numbers, but during the last few decades the élites have grown in numbers and importance. While the growth in the size and importance of the élite has been due partly to education, it should be emphasized that the spread of European education has not been an isolated phenomenon but has been closely tied up with industrial development and urbanization. It is necessary to keep this in mind since in analysing the relation of education to the formation of the élite, our interest is chiefly in the rôle of the élite in the new societies which are coming into existence as the result of the disintegration of the traditional social organization.

The undermining of the traditional African social organization and culture has been due to mining and agricultural concessions and systems of taxation. Under systems of forced labour or where so-called systems of " voluntary recruitment " have concealed the element of compulsion, millions of Africans have been drawn from their native villages into the European economy. Moreover, where natives have been forced to pay taxes in money, they have been forced to sell their labour. As the Africans have been drawn into the European economy, the extent and character of their education has reflected more or less their rôle in the new economy. In a paper on the emergence of the

black middle classes in British Central Africa, Mitchell has shown how through the interaction of missionary activity, the introduction of western economy, and the need for money to pay taxes has created the African middle class.[5] The missions taught the Africans to read in order that they could learn the Gospel, and such skills as bricklaying and carpentry in order that they could maintain certain standards of living. Then when the western economy was introduced and the British administration required the taxes to be paid in money, the Africans were forced to make their living in European enterprises. As the western economy developed, Africans who had had the advantages of missionary education were able to fill posts as clerks, skilled workers, supervisors in industry and government and to become traders. In this connection it is to be noted that when 653 Africans at the secondary level were asked to rate occupations on a prestige scale, the white collar occupations were in the eleven topmost positions with the positions of African Education Officer and African Secondary School Teachers receiving the highest scores.

The rôle of education in the formation of the élite is related to new occupational classes which are emerging as the result of industrialization and urbanization. In British West Africa, the intellectual leaders of the élite had generally been men educated in England and had returned to Africa as barristers, civil servants, and politicians. This older élite has been submerged to a large extent by an educated class that has a wider outlook and has been subjected to a broader education. This broader education has been due partly to education abroad as well as at home and partly to travel and the informal education that comes through contact with a larger world of experience. The new rôle of the educated élite in British West Africa is due primarily to the political changes which have occurred in that area. In both the Gold Coast and Nigeria, the leaders in the revolutionary political changes are men who received an important part of their education in the United States, and that in Negro schools. They are men whose education has not been along lines of the traditional English education. Moreover, a large measure of their informal education was acquired from their observation and study of American political methods as well as the relations between whites and Negroes in the United States. In addition to their peculiar rôle in the political developments which have occurred in West Africa, they have a special rôle in the Africanization of the administrative services.[6] It is, therefore, upon their shoulders that the responsibility for the education of the African will fall. It is already evident that the new leaders place much dependence upon education in the development of their country and that they want this education to be based upon the traditional culture.

Many of the educational problems are essentially the same as those faced by the colonial authorities. There is a need for agricultural and technical education and the planning of community life. But there is also the problem of instituting a system of education which

will not create a class which is unfitted by training or inclination for anything besides white collar jobs. During a period of political agitation against colonial rule such persons are important for the political tasks, but this class must find employment in the new administration or they will become the source of constant political unrest. The solution of this problem may depend upon the rejection of some of the basic political doctrines of the West.

The rôle which the educated élites play in the developing African societies is determined in a large measure by the nature of the political organization. Under the French policy of assimilation the educated élite becomes a part of a central administration. But it is still a question whether the aspirations of the educated African élite can be satisfied within the framework of the French Union unless greater freedom is provided for self-determination. On the other hand, the educated élite within the British territories have been prepared for the rôles which they are playing in the Gold Coast and in Nigeria. But in the Belgian Congo, there has been a fear of educating an African élite that would be alienated from the masses. Although recognition was given to the traditional culture in African education, it was not encouraged to the extent that it would become the basis of an African nationalism. Nevertheless, the government of the Belgian Congo has recognized in recent years the necessity of educating an intellectual élite and have inaugurated university courses. This is supposed to be in accord with the " policy association " in which African and Belgian will build up the Congo.

So far, we have considered the education of the élite mainly from the standpoint of their rôle in the more formal aspects of the new social structures which are coming into existence. There is a phase of the education of the élite which has a great significance for the developing African societies. This concerns the general orientation of the élite towards their African background and in a sense towards the modern world. As one student of education has pointed out, one of the most important changes which have occurred in the education of the African has been " the recognition that African cultures have a distinctive contribution to give modern education ".[7] This has been due largely to the work of anthropologists whose studies of African religion, social organization, systems of land tenure, and legal codes influenced the work of missionaries and administrators.

The most extreme expression of the opposite conception of education in Africa is to be found in the French conception of education as a means of creating an African élite as a part of their policy of assimilation. And since education has been a leading function of the state, it became a phase of a policy of " cultural imperialism ".[8] Even the schools which were established for the education of the sons of chiefs in the latter half of the 19th century were based upon the principle of assimilation.[9] The education of the African was designed to make him think like Frenchmen and to acquire a loyalty to the

French State. Beginning in 1910 with the publication of *Domination et Colonisation* by Jules Harmond, French scholars began to criticize the policy of assimilation. As a result the French have given greater recognition to native institutions. This has not, however, solved what Labouret calls the problem of the élites.

Accepting the classification of Richard Molard, Labouret divides the élites into three categories.[10] There are, first, the completely Europeanized Africans, educated in France or in Africa, who are in the liberal professions, work as technicians, and in commercial and similar occupations. The second includes conservative elements who have remained identified with the traditional culture. The third comprises the detribalized Africans who speak and write a little French and idle about the towns. With the spread of education, it is said, this class will disappear. According to Labouret, the chief failing of the élite is that they are becoming increasingly separated and alienated from the African masses.

Many of the African leaders are aware of the cleavage between the educated élite and the uneducated masses and those who remain within the traditional culture. It appears that some of the African élite, who were educated in French culture, attribute the separation of the élite from the masses to colonialism.[11] According to this view, the élite in Africa have been a " prefabricated élite " who are " depersonalized and dehumanized " and whose rôle has been to cushion the effects of European domination. It is pointed out that the " prefabricated élite " are marginal people who are separated from both the French and the African. They suffer from malaise and exhibit a certain instability because of their failure to have their roots in any cultural tradition. This represents not so much a revolt against the economic and political domination of the French as a revolt against the " cultural imperialism " of the Europeans. From this standpoint it concerns the entire conception of education of the élite as well as of the masses. The proper rôle of the élite, according to the African writer just quoted, is to take the lead in the renewal of the African milieu and in synthesizing the various currents of thought in the African humanism which is gestating.

The same developments are apparent in the British territories where according to Miss Read,

> It is interesting to see how West Africans, whose fathers and grandfathers originally accepted wholesale the western form of education from the metropolitan country, have been the leaders in accepting and promoting African cultural elements in the school curriculum. At the same time they are aware of the need to develop this local culture, and not to keep it as a kind of museum piece. In East Africa the schools, the missionaries and the education authorities seem to have given less attention to the possibilities of the African cultural contribution. Central Africa, partly due to missionary policy, has been on the whole more ready to use and adapt African

elements in the schools. The reasons for this difference of attitude vary in each territory, and in recent times are related to the degree of participation by Africans in the forming of policy.[12]

This change in the educational outlook of the élites is a part of course of nationalistic movements throughout Africa. The new emphasis on native elements in education represents a return to their cultural heritage and an attempt to resolve the conflicts which have resulted from the impact of western civilization. Where the political developments have provided a free scope for this new spirit among the educated élite, nationalism has been a normal and desirable development by overcoming tribal provincialisms and by creating new loyalties. But where the education of the élite has been retarded and political development has been restricted, the spirit of nationalism has assumed dangerous and archaic forms in religious movements with a messianic outlook which at the same time cannot conceal their racial antagonism and anti-European orientation.[13]

On the whole, however, the African élite who have received a European education are not rejecting entirely European civilization. Whatever part the native culture may play in the education of the Africans, they will continue to learn the European languages. Moreover, the élite is ever eager to acquire a knowledge of the technological aspects of western culture including techniques of administration and a knowledge of the social sciences. But there appears to be an insistence that Africans shall not become black Englishmen, Frenchmen or Belgians. The élite seems to be increasingly conscious of their rôles as leaders in the building of new societies with a culture rooted in the African background. This spirit may be seen in the creative work of Africans in the field of art and literature and the growing interest of African scholars in the traditional cultures of Africa.[14]

In concluding this discussion it might be pointed out, first, by way of summary that modern education in Africa is one of the most important factors in shaping the new societies which are coming into existence. From the beginning of European contacts, education played a rôle in undermining the traditional culture and in creating an élite. As economic, political and social changes have been accelerated in recent decades it has been through the agency of education, both formal and informal, that the thought and values of African peoples have undergone changes. The rôle of the educated élite in the changing social structure has been determined by the character of the economic, political and social changes resulting from European contacts. In order to play their new rôles the élites are acquiring the technical knowledge and administrative technique which are necessary in modern society. With the growth of nationalism and race consciousness, there has been a demand for an education which would include elements of the traditional culture. Despite much confusion as to the nature of the synthesis of African and European culture, the new orientation is finding expression in the development of nationalism in

which the élites are playing a leading rôle. The new élites in Africa are conscious of the important function of education and in their literary and artistic creation are providing the content of an education which will provide the moral and spiritual basis of the new societies.

NOTES

[1] Jean-Marie Domont, *Elite Noire*, Leopoldville: Imprimerie du Courrier d'Afrique, 1948. The author defines the élites broadly as the detribalized Africans who because of their social, moral and intellectual development exercise an influence over Africans and the literate chiefs and other persons of good moral character having authority among Africans remaining within the traditional society. For the purpose of this paper the élite includes those who, because of their education in European ways, are playing an important rôle in the evolution of the new African societies.

[2] Margaret H. Read, "Education in Africa," *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, vol. 298 (March 1955), p. 177.

[3] *The Nigerian Handbook*, Lagos, The Government Printer, 1954, p. 120.

[4] See *African Education: a Study of Educational Policy and Practice in British Tropical Africa*, Oxford University Press 1953.

[5] J. Clyde Mitchell, "The African Middle Classes in British Central Africa," *Working Paper for the 29th Study Session of the International Institute of Differing Civilizations*, London, September 13–16, 1955.

[6] David E. Apter, *The Gold Coast in Transition*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1955, pp. 295–96.

[7] Margaret Read, *Africans and Their Schools*. London: Longmans Green & Co., 1953, p. 11.

[8] See Raymond L. Buell, *The Native Problem in Africa*. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1928, vo. II, pp. 77 ff.

[9] *Ibid.*, vol. I, pp. 992–94.

[10] Henri Labouret, *Colonisation, Colonialisme, Décolonisation*. Paris: La Rose, 1952, pp. 194–97.

[11] See Kotch Barma, "Problème de l'Elite en Afrique Noire," in *Les Etudiants Noirs Parlent, Présence Africaine*, Paris 1952, pp. 33–39.

[12] *Africans and Their Schools*, p. 12.

[13] See Georges Balandier, "Messianismes et Nationalisme en Afrique Noire," *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, XIV (1953), pp. 41–65.

[14] See, for example, *Le Monde Noire*. Numéro Special 8-9 de *Présence Africaine*. Dirigé par Theodore Monod, Paris, 1950; Cheikh Anta Diop, *Nations Négres et Culture*. Paris: Editions Africaines, 1954, and J. C. de Graft-Johnson, *African Glory*, New York, Praeger, 1954.

Enseignement et mobilité sociale en Afrique Occidentale Française

P. MERCIER

(Maître de Recherches, Office de la Recherche Scientifique et Technique Outre-Mer, Paris)

On a assisté, en ces dernières années, à une intensification et à un approfondissement de l'étude des changements sociaux, de leurs mécanismes et de leur signification au niveau de l'Afrique noire française. Les cadres spécifiques d'une nouvelle " sociologie coloniale ", ou d'une sociologie des peuples dépendants, ont été plus précisément définis. Une série d'analyses, au premier rang desquelles il convient de placer celles de G. Balandier concernant l'Afrique centrale,[1] ont permis une première évaluation, dans leurs traits essentiels, des processus globaux de transformation repérables dans ces régions. Des recherches intensives sur l'action de chacun des facteurs principaux de changement qui ont été dégagés apparaissent comme l'indispensable complément de telles études ; elles ne se sont encore développées que très inégalement. Ainsi, en ce qui concerne les incidences sociales du développement de la scolarisation, et de la diffusion de l'enseignement de type occidental, on ne dispose encore que de données de caractère trop général. La nécessité s'est fait rapidement sentir d'enquêtes plus systématiques et détaillées ; plusieurs ont d'ailleurs été entreprises récemment, dont les résultats ne sont pas, ou ne sont que partiellement, publiés. D'autres projets de recherche sont à l'étude. En particulier, une série de recherches sociologiques et psychologiques doit être entreprise dans le cadre de l'Afrique Equatoriale Française, où le taux de scolarisation est particulièrement élevé. Elle doit porter simultanément sur une région rurale et sur un centre urbain de ce territoire, sur les éléments qui ont pu tirer bénéfice de l'enseignement reçu, au moins sur le plan professionnel, et sur ceux qui, n'en ayant tiré aucun avantage, forment une catégorie de la population spécialement inadaptée et défavorisée. Elle permettra de compléter les données encore fragmentaires dont nous disposons actuellement. Celles-ci, cependant, rendent possible une première évaluation des problèmes relatifs à la diffusion de l'enseignement, et en particulier du rôle et de l'importance de ce facteur quant aux faits de mobilité sociale. Ces problèmes ont été abordés à l'occasion d'études sur la formation des élites africaines de type " moderniste ", sur les changements qui interviennent dans la stratification sociale des groupements africains, etc. Il est possible de citer, outre celles de G. Balandier, celles de P. Mercier au Sénégal[2], de C. Tardits au Dahomey,[3] menées soit exclusivement soit principalement en milieu urbain. Il sera ici tenu compte essentiellement des faits concernant l'Ouest africain français.

EVOLUTION DE L'ENSEIGNEMENT

C'est un caractère commun des changements sociaux qui se sont accomplis, à un rythme accéléré, en pays colonisé, d'avoir été imposés ou déclenchés de l'extérieur—de façon directe ou indirecte d'ailleurs. C'est évidemment dans cette perspective que doit être envisagée toute évaluation de l'action de l'enseignement: celui-ci est, dans son contenu comme dans son orientation, un élément essentiellement étranger à la tradition et à la culture des sociétés considérées. Nous reviendrons plus loin, pour y insister, sur le fait qu'il n'est point facteur d'intégration de l'individu à son groupe, mais au contraire—au moins dans une première phase historique qui, dans nombre de régions, est encore en cours—facteur de rupture. Ce trait est particulièrement accentué en territoire français d'Afrique de l'Ouest. L'effort de scolarisation y a été, à l'origine, conçu et organisé dans le contexte d'une idéologie et d'une politique assimilationnistes. L'adaptation du contenu de l'enseignement, ni même de ses méthodes, au milieu social africain, ne fut guère envisagée. Le fait que l'utilisation des langues locales ait été et demeure totalement exclue, même dans les premières années d'enseignement, est assez significatif de cette tendance, quelques raisons d'ordre pratique qui puissent en être données. Autre fait à noter, les Africains, aujourd'hui encore, parlent rarement de l'école tout court, mais de l'" école française ", même là où cette formule n'est pas rendue nécessaire par la distinction à faire entre école profane et école coranique. Certes des assouplissements ont été apportées aux conceptions primitives, le principe d'adaptations locales de l'enseignement métropolitain a été retenu (elles tiennent d'ailleurs beaucoup plus compte du cadre physique que du cadre social). Mais la tendance profonde est demeurée, et il importait de la souligner.

Organe essentiel de l'effort d'assimilation, l'école ne touchait cependant, et ne touche encore, qu'une faible minorité de la population. Malgré les progrès considérables réalisés en Afrique Occidentale Française depuis une dizaine d'années, le taux de scolarisation demeure très faible, aux environs de 7%. Encore faut-il remarquer qu'une proportion non négligeable d'enfants scolarisés ne terminent même pas le cycle de leurs études primaires, et perdent assez rapidement les connaissances acquises. Selon les chiffres de 1954, les élèves et étudiants se répartissaient de la façon suivante entre les différents ordres d'enseignement: environ 90% dans l'enseignement primaire, environ 7% dans l'enseignement du second degré et l'enseignement technique, environ 2% dans l'enseignement supérieur et les grandes écoles. Bien que le taux de scolarisation soit très bas, nous verrons cependant que déjà un seuil est atteint, au-delà duquel les problèmes que pose la diffusion de l'enseignement revêtent des formes en partie nouvelles.

Il faut insister aussi sur la répartition très inégale des établissements d'enseignement. Elle est due à des causes diverses, d'ordre historique, d'ordre économique, d'ordre religieux, etc. Certains territoires comme le Sénégal et le Dahomey atteignent ou approchent un taux de

scolarisation de 25% ; par contre, dans certaines régions de l'intérieur, il demeure au-dessous de 2%. Les zones côtières sont remarquablement favorisées. Mais l'opposition fondamentale demeure celle entre villes et zones rurales ; dans les premières, le taux de scolarisation monte rapidement, jusqu'à atteindre fréquemment 50%, et la multiplication des écoles satisfait difficilement l'augmentation de la demande. Mais il s'agit d'un phénomène assez récent pour que toutes ses conséquences n'aient pu encore se développer. Il ne doit pas dissimuler le fait que, dans la population adulte actuelle, ceux qui ont reçu une instruction de type occidental ne forment qu'une faible minorité. Une enquête récente menée dans la ville de Thiès (Sénégal) a montré qu'environ 25% des hommes (la proportion est considérablement plus faible pour les femmes) ont fait des études, et que 19% seulement ont au moins achevé leurs études primaires, qu'elles aient été ou non sanctionnées par l'obtention d'un diplôme. Et il s'agit d'une des régions les plus scolarisées d'Afrique Occidentale Française.

L'enseignement ne pouvant atteindre qu'une minorité de la population, au concept général d'assimilation s'était rapidement ajouté celui de " formation d'une élite ". En fait, les quelques éléments qui, au début de la période coloniale, recevaient une instruction à l'occidentale, devaient répondre à des besoins immédiats et limités ; ils fournissaient les indispensables auxiliaires de l'implantation administrative et commerciale qui dessinait les nouvelles structures du pays : commis, petits fonctionnaires, interprètes, etc. Le niveau de culture occidentale qu'ils pouvaient atteindre, quelque modeste qu'il fût, les faisait participer aux prestiges de la société européenne et du nouvel ordre de choses qu'elle instaurait, en même temps qu'à une relative richesse. Du point de vue de la puissance colonisatrice, il s'agissait donc, par certains aspects, d'une élite, qui devait servir de pont entre la masse inculte et la Civilisation qu'elle était destinée dans l'avenir à acquérir. Les notions relatives aux rapports de la masse et de l'élite ont fait l'objet alors de toute une série de rationalisations qui s'écartaient plus ou moins de la réalité. En fait, dans la mesure où l'élite acceptait les perspectives assimilationnistes, elle tendait à se couper plus radicalement de la masse de la population et de ses représentants traditionnels, et à se placer par rapport à ceux-ci en position de conflit—de formes très variables comme nous le signalerons plus loin.

Il faut noter enfin que, en contradiction partielle avec le souci affirmé d'une assimilation, même limitée dans son étendue, l'enseignement en Afrique Occidentale Française se présentait, dans son ensemble, comme un *système fermé*, fournissant des titres et diplômes qui n'étaient pas équivalents à ceux de la métropole, et qui ne rendaient aptes, dans tous les domaines professionnels, qu'à exercer des fonctions subalternes. Ce n'est que très lentement que s'est opéré, à tous les niveaux, le développement d'un enseignement de type métropolitain. Ce n'est pratiquement qu'après la seconde guerre mondiale que des efforts méthodiques ont été entrepris à la fois pour compléter le système scolaire de l'A.O.F.,

et pour l'ouvrir sur l'extérieur. Ainsi se sont accrues les possibilités de formation d'une élite moderniste qui ne se sente plus vouée exclusivement aux rôles subalternes. Les lycées et collèges se sont multipliés, un Institut des Hautes Etudes a été créé à Dakar, qui doit devenir progressivement une Université complète, et enfin le nombre des bourses accordées pour l'enseignement supérieur métropolitain a été considérablement augmenté. Une phase transitoire s'est ouverte, dans laquelle les problèmes qui se posent à l'élite nouvelle sont particulièrement complexes. Tels sont, très schématiquement rappelés, les traits essentiels qui caractérisent la situation de l'enseignement en Afrique Occidentale Française.

Enseignement et Mobilité Sociale

Les problèmes relatifs à la stratification sociale, et à la mobilité sociale, revêtent, en territoire colonial où les sociétés traditionnelles ont été brutalement transposées dans un cadre fondamentalement nouveau, une coloration particulière. Ce fait a été mis en relief par toutes les études récentes, et nous n'y insisterons pas. Des facteurs nouveaux de différenciation ont été mis en jeu, sans que, dans aucun cas jusqu'à présent, les facteurs anciens aient totalement perdu leur efficacité. Tout statut, toute situation individuelle, revêt un caractère d'ambiguïté, qu'on l'envisage du point de vue de la société traditionnelle ou du point de vue de la société coloniale. Dans un travail récent, à propos de recherches menées dans les villes du Sénégal, nous soulignions le fait " qu'il n'y a pas un, mais plusieurs cadres de référence à considérer. Individus et groupes sont placés à la fois dans plusieurs systèmes sociaux, inégalement vigoureux, dont les structures sont hétérogènes et les valeurs radicalement différentes . . . les statuts individuels résultent de déterminations multiples, et dont l'importance relative est très variable selon les circonstances."[4] D'où deux ordres de phénomènes, qui sont d'ailleurs étroitement liés. D'une part, dans les zones rurales où les structures globales traditionnelles conservent une certaine solidité, les situations de conflit entre les élites traditionnelles et les élites modernes, qui n'ont pas encore fait l'objet, en territoire français, d'études intensives. D'autre part, dans les centres urbains, où recherches précises ont été conduites récemment, la cristallisation de catégories sociales définies par les nouveaux statuts socio-économiques, et qui, dans certain cas, préfigurent plus ou moins nettement des classes sociales proprement dites. Situations sensiblement différentes, mais qui doivent être interprétées dans la même perspective.

Au cours d'enquêtes menées au Sénégal sur des échantillons systématiques de populations urbaines, il est apparu que l'on pouvait distinguer des catégories définissables par un certain nombre de comportements sociaux constants ou au moins dominants, mais qu'il ne s'agissait pas, dans la situation actuelle, de groupements structurés ou au moins structurables qui manifestent des tendances accusées

à la fermeture. On constate essentiellement que l'ensemble des comportements retenus comme base de l'enquête se sont répartis en deux séries. Les uns sont en forte corrélation avec l'appartenance à un groupe de parenté, à un groupe ethnique, à une confession religieuse, etc.; leur fréquence varie peu d'une catégorie socio-professionnelle à l'autre. Les autres dépendant peu des facteurs précédemment énumérés, et peuvent être retenus comme caractéristiques des catégories socio-professionnelles qui se dégagent dans le cadre moderne; les différences significatives apparaissent en particulier dans les domaines du mode et du genre de vie, de la configuration des réseaux d'appartenances sociales (rôle des groupements de type moderne), etc. Dans la plupart des travaux consacrés jusqu'ici à ce problème, les strates ou les catégories sociales qui sont distinguées, sont définies par un critère essentiel, le degré d'occidentalisation, évidemment lié de façon directe au niveau d'instruction reçue. En réalité, on constate, vis-à-vis d'une masse dans laquelle les facteurs de différenciation à base traditionnelle jouent encore un rôle primordial sinon unique, l'existence d'un certain nombre de catégories sociales définies par les statuts socio-économiques modernes. Il en est deux au moins qui se dégagent partout avec netteté. D'une part, celle des " évolués lettrés ", ou des " évolués " sans autre spécification; ils sont caractérisés par une formation intellectuelle de type occidental—même limitée à un niveau très modeste—par un style de vie ayant subi des influences européennes plus ou moins profondes, et aussi, dans une certaine mesure, par une situation économique favorable. La distinction est donc surtout d'ordre culturel; comme le remarquait G. Balandier à propos de l'Afrique centrale, " les individus sont classés dans l'une ou l'autre des catégories (' évolués' et ' traditionalistes ') selon la distance qu'ils ont prise à l'égard du milieu socio-culturel dont ils sont issus ".[5] D'autre part, celle des " évolués économiques " qui, sans avoir en général bénéficié d'une formation intellectuelle de type occidental, ont pris place dans l'organisation économique nouvelle, basée sur la notion de profit, et se sont imposés par un certain degré de réussite matérielle. Il s'agit essentiellement des commerçants, traitants, petits entrepreneurs, et des planteurs ; leur mode de vie a été beaucoup moins systématiquement influencé par celui des Européens. Les rapports entre l'élite intellectuelle et l'élite économique sont très variables d'une région à l'autre dans l'Ouest africain français. Elles peuvent s'imbriquer profondément comme en Côte d'Ivoire. Elles peuvent demeurer dans une large mesure distinctes comme au Sénégal, où la première a une importance et une influence beaucoup plus grandes. L'instruction est ici le facteur primordial de différenciation sociale ; le problème qui nous occupe s'y présente avec un relief particulier.

L'étude des aspirations qui se manifestent au niveau des adultes aussi bien qu'au niveau des enfants donne des résultats très significatifs. L'instruction est considérée par l'énorme majorité d'entre eux comme le facteur essentiel d'élévation sociale. C'est autour des fonctions et

des situations qui sous-entendent un minimum de formation intellectuelle de type occidental que se cristallisent les prestiges éminents, reconnus, avec plus ou moins de netteté, par tous les éléments de la population. A la participation aux savoirs modernes apparaissent liées les notions de puissance—en particulier la possibilité d'accéder aux pouvoirs politiques et administratifs, fussent-ils mineurs—et de richesse ou tout au moins de sécurité matérielle. A Dakar et à Thiès, les parents ont été interrogés sur les professions qu'ils souhaiteraient voir embrasser par leurs enfants ; les mêmes réponses dominantes ont été fournies dans toutes les catégories socio-professionnelles entre lesquelles se répartissait l'échantillon. Près des trois quarts des réponses concernaient les professions considérées comme " intellectuelles ". On rencontrait le plus fréquemment: la profession enseignante (instituteur, professeur), les professions libérales (avocat, médecin); les professions techniques (ingénieur) étaient beaucoup plus rarement évoquées. Enfin, une réponse très fréquente, et significative malgré son imprécision: " fonctionnaire ", montrait combien demeurait fort le lien entre la notion d'instruction et celle d'emploi administratif, que nous avons signalé plus haut. Une enquête menée auprès des enfants des écoles révélait les mêmes tendances. Environ un quart des enfants interrogés n'affirmaient pas de préférences. Parmi ceux qui fourniss aient une réponse positive, près des neuf dixièmes choisissaient une profession dite intellectuelle; on voit la rareté des choix en faveur des professions manuelles, du commerce, etc. Une répartition des réponses d'après la profession du père de l'élève interrogé ne faisait d'ailleurs pas ressortir de différences significatives. Ainsi s'affirme de façon générale cette conviction stéréotypée: le fait de fréquenter l'école—et il s'agit ici de l'école primaire—doit conduire aux professions intellectuelles, c'est-à-dire à l'appartenance à l'élite " évoluée ", définie de la façon très large que nous avons vue. Cette image correspond à une situation qui est déjà en partie dépassée.

Certes aucune des catégories socio-professionnelles que l'on peut distinguer en milieu urbain, y compris celles qui forment cette élite intellectuelle, n'est fermée. Pourtant l'enquête réalisée dans la ville de Dakar faisait apparaître certaines différences significatives qui, sans doute, ne feront que s'accentuer. Ainsi, 45% des personnes interrogées étaient fils de cultivateurs. Mais cette proportion était de 80% pour les manœuvres; elle n'était par contre que de 42% pour les ouvriers et artisans, de 33% pour les employés et fonctionnaires subalternes, de 28% pour les employés et fonctionnaires supérieurs, de 21% pour les membres des professions libérales entendues au sens large. On constatait une certaine stabilisation d'une part au niveau de la catégorie formée par les ouvriers, d'autre part au niveau de l'" élite intellectuelle ". En effet, parmi les personnes interrogées dont le père était ouvrier, 60% étaient demeurés ouvriers—la majorité des autres passant à des professions dites intellectuelles. Parmi celles dont le père exerçait déjà une de ces professions, les trois quarts avaient continué dans la

même voie. Si les chances d'accéder à la catégorie sociale la plus prestigieuse ne sont pas égales entre les villes et les zones rurales, comme nous l'avons déjà souligné, elles tendent aussi à l'être de moins en moins pour les divers éléments de la population urbaine, malgré l'expansion très rapide de l'enseignement primaire que l'on peut constater en ville.

Plusieurs transformations importantes sont d'ailleurs intervenues, qu'il convient de souligner. Le rôle de l'instruction en tant que facteur d'élévation sociale se trouve progressivement modifié. Dans une première phase qui s'est prolongée jusqu'à l'immédiat après-guerre, la rareté des éléments instruits, même au niveau primaire, leur assurait de façon automatique des débouchés dans l'administration ou dans le secteur privé. Le " certifié "—celui qui était pourvu du certificat d'études primaires—représentait le type moyen de l'" élite intellectuelle ". Il n'était guère que les instituteurs et les " médecins africains " pour dépasser ce niveau. Ce sont les jeunes gens pourvus d'un enseignement primaire qui alimentaient ce qu'on a dans certains cas appelé une " bourgeoisie d'administration " qui ne pouvait occuper, presque par définition, que des postes subordonnés. Or la situation actuelle est sensiblement différente. D'une part, l'expansion de l'enseignement primaire, si elle reste limitée, a atteint et dépassé un point critique; il forme maintenant beaucoup plus de jeunes gens que les professions bureaucratiques ne peuvent en absorber; le surplus n'est que très partiellement récupéré par les professions manuelles ou la vie rurale. A cause des prestiges mêmes qui demeurent attachés à instruction, on a pu parler, en dépit du très faible taux de scolarisation, d'un " suréquipement scolaire " de l'Afrique Occidentale Française. Paradoxe qui ne fait qu'exprimer les modifications qui se produisent dans la composition et la définition de l'élite intellectuelle. Une phase nouvelle, en effet, s'est ouverte avec l'apparition et le développement, à côté de cette " bourgeoisie d'administration " évoquée précédemment, d'une élite des professions libérales, pourvue d'un niveau d'instruction beaucoup plus élevé, et de qualifications professionnelles plus nettes. C'est elle seule qui peut prétendre aux statuts les plus élevés. Mais, quelle que soit sa faiblesse numérique dans les conditions actuelles, elle ne les atteint pas sans difficultés. Paradoxalement encore, dans un pays où les besoins sont si grands en personnel de direction et de responsabilité, la demande dépasse l'offre. Il y a en Afrique Occidentale Française un problème officiellement reconnu du " placement des diplômés ". L'explication est à chercher dans le domaine des faits politiques et des relations raciales. Le rôle de l'enseignement en tant que facteur de montée sociale est freiné par l'apparition de situations de compétition entre Européens et Africains; symptôme très net, le fait que certains étudiants venus en Europe y demeurent, faute de trouver dans leur pays d'origine les débouchés auxquels ils pouvaient prétendre. La gamme des situations de compétition s'est d'ailleurs étendue au cours de ces dernières années: le mouvement

d'immigration européenne s'est accentué, et le nombre des Européens occupant des positions relativement subalternes s'est considérablement accru. Ainsi, tandis que les possibilités théoriques d'accès aux statuts les plus élevés et d'intégration au groupement européen dominant augmentaient avec le développement de l'enseignement, les obstacles à une mobilité sociale généralisée, jusque là demeurés latents, se manifestaient avec de plus en plus de netteté.

Enfin, dans la mesure ou les cadres traditionnels sont restés vivaces, les prestiges modernes liés à l'instruction n'ont encore qu'une valeur relative. Ils peuvent en effet s'être ajoutés à des prestiges traditionnels —de groupe ethnique, de caste, de groupe familial, etc.; au contraire, ils peuvent s'en être éloignés: les cas ne manquent pas où, dans une région donnée, les premiers éléments scolarisés ont été fournis par les castes inférieures, les serviteurs, les captifs, etc., tandis que les castes supérieures refusaient de se soumettre aux influences occidentales. Il n'est pas encore fréquent que l'obtention d'un statut élevé dans le contexte moderne efface totalement une infériorité traditionnelle. Elle n'empêche pas l'accession à un tel statut, mais ne permet pas de bénéficier de façon complète des prestiges qu'il confère. On retrouve ici ce caractère d'ambiguïté des situations individuelles que nous signalions plus haut, et qui donne aux faits de mobilité sociale en territoire colonial leur aspect spécifique.

NOTES

[1] *Sociologie actuelle de l'Afrique noire, Dynamique des changements sociaux en Afrique centrale*, Paris, 1955.

[2] Cf. "Aspects des problèmes de stratification sociale dans l'Ouest africain", *Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie*, vol. XVII, 1954.

[3] Les élements recueillis lors de cette enquête sont encore en cours d'élaboration.

[4] P. Mercier, *op. cit.*

[5] G. Balandier, *Sociologie des Brazzavilles Noires*, Paris, 1955.

Education, Social Mobility and Racial Relations in the Union of South Africa

ANTHONY H. RICHMOND

(Lecturer in Social Theory, Department of Social Study, University of Edinburgh)

The object of this paper is to consider some of the possible implications of recent changes in the organisation and control of African (Bantu) education in the Union of South Africa, with particular reference to the consequences of these changes in terms of the social status mobility of individuals within the Bantu group and the corporate status relationships of the Bantu relative to the European ethnic group.

AFRICAN EDUCATION BEFORE AND AFTER 1953

The passing of the *Bantu Education Act, 1953* marked a profound change in the ideological foundations of African education in the Union of South Africa. As in other parts of the world, Churches were responsible for pioneering education, as a necessary part of the process of converting the 'heathen' to Christianity. Often the education provided was unduly 'bookish' and unrelated to the needs and experiences of Africans. Nevertheless, education was one of the main factors responsible for bridging the gulf between the African and European way of life. As one authority put it, "In general education has been a stabilising and integrating factor, multiplying similarities between dissimilar peoples, creating channels of communication and understanding between hostile groups, forging a basis of common interests, and preparing for a way of life in a common social scheme."[1] This conception of education as a factor promoting the assimilation of Africans and their partial incorporation into western civilisation, consciously or unconsciously motivated those responsible for African education before 1953. In this respect it was not compatible with the philosophy of *apartheid* as understood and practised by the Nationalist Government which, in 1949, set up the *Commission on Native Education* under the chairmanship of Dr. W. M. Eiselen.[2] The recommendations of this Commission were largely incorporated into the *Bantu Education Act, 1953.*[3]

A conception of 'Bantu' education as distinct from the kind of education that would be provided for Europeans is implicit in the terms of reference of the Commission, which was instructed to formulate "the principles and aims of education for Natives as an independent race, in which their past and present, their inherent racial qualities, their distinctive characteristics and aptitudes, and their needs under the ever-changing social conditions are taken into consideration." The Commission was further instructed to recommend changes in the

educational system and in the content and form of syllabuses in order "to prepare Natives more effectively for their future occupations."[4]

Although geneticists are not in a position to state categorically that there are no 'inherent racial qualities' as suggested in these terms of reference, the bulk of the evidence points to that conclusion. This is admitted by the Commission in its report. It accepts the view that such differences as are found between different races are predominantly cultural in origin. "The Bantu child comes to school with a basic physical and psychological endowment which differs, so far as the Commissioners have been able to determine from the evidence set before them, so slightly, if at all, from that of the European child that no special provision has to be made in educational theory or basic aims."[5]

The report goes on to point out that, "The now universally accepted principle of leading the child in his education from the known and familiar to the unknown and unfamiliar, has to be applied equally in the case of the Bantu child as with children of any other group. But educational practice must recognise that it has to deal with a Bantu child, i.e. a child trained and conditioned in Bantu culture, endowed with a knowledge of a Bantu language and imbued with the values, interests and behaviour patterns learned at the knee of the Bantu mother. These facts must dictate to a large extent the content and methods of his early education."[6] Few would take exception to this formulation of the position. The use of the vernacular and "working through known patterns and existing social groupings" has been urged by the World Federation of Mental Health as a first principle in fundamental education.[7] A similar view is taken by those responsible for planning educational development in British colonial territories in Africa. The Binns report on education in East and Central Africa states, "The aim of education must be to prepare Africans to live well in their own country and the system of education must not be a pale reflection of that given in England."[8] The Jeffery report on West Africa makes the same point,". . . the things that are of value in the old African way of life must be preserved . . ."[9]

Difficulties arise when an attempt is made to define 'the things that are of value in the old African way of life' and which are compatible with a society undergoing rapid social change in the direction of greater urbanisation and industrialisation. Hoernlé and Hellman have expressed the view that, apart from Bantu languages, there is very little of the traditional African way of life that is viable under these changing conditions.[10] While the Eiselen Commission hoped to see emerge "a progressive modern and self-respecting Bantu order of life",[11] Hoernlé and Hellman cannot see how this would differ in any fundamental respect from 'western' civilisation whose social institutions, they point out, are rapidly being adopted by Africans throughout the Union. There is a real dilemma here. In a relatively unchanging static type of society education is primarily concerned with passing on to the next generation the beliefs and practices of that society. In dissenting from

the views of his fellow Commissioners on certain points Professor A. H. Murray points out that in a changing society, "it has often happened that education has turned against the 'culture' of the group, by way of self criticism passed by the reasonable thinking members of the community upon its way of life . . . if education centres round the individual, the community will become adjusted to his needs and in this way the community will develop from the individual."[12] In other words it is possible for education to become an instrument of social change as well as a means of preserving traditions.

One of the consequences of this dynamic view of education is that it is bound to create some people, if not many, who are dissatisfied with the existing state of society and are ambitious for themselves or for their fellows. In so far as there are opportunities for self-expression and for improved social status available for such people they need not be unduly frustrated. In the absence of such opportunities the accumulated frustration may express itself in anti-social activities even to the point of mass movements and violence. This fact is fully appreciated by the Europeans responsible for introducing the *Bantu Education Act, 1953*. The Minister of Native Affairs in introducing the Bill stated that racial relations "cannot improve if the result of Native education is the creation of a frustrated people." "Education," he said, "must train and teach people in accordance with their opportunities in life, according to the sphere in which they live . . .Native education should be controlled in such a way that it should be in accord with the policy of the state . . . Good racial relations cannot exist when the education is given under the control of people who create wrong expectations on the part of the Native himself."[13]

The plea for realism in the provision of education for those in a subordinate status in society is not a new one. It is reminiscent of the remarks made by Robert Lowe in 1862 when speaking to the House Commons on the subject of state grants for school purposes. He said, "We do not profess to give these children an education that will raise them above their station and business in life; that is not our object, but to give them an education that may fit them for that business. We are bound to take a clear and definite view of the position of the class that is to receive instruction; and, having obtained that view, we are bound to make up our minds as to how much instruction that class requires and is capable of receiving."[14] Throughout the nineteenth century in Britain an argument used in favour of elementary education was that literates were less likely to be socially or politically irresponsible than illiterates. Five years after making the remarks quoted above Lowe made his now famous statement, "I believe that it will be absolutely necessary that you should prevail upon our future masters to learn their letters." In fact the franchise came before universal compulsory education.

The Union Government has no intention of extending the franchise to the Bantu. Yet they realise that some education for Africans is

essential if they are to take their place in a rapidly expanding industrial economy.[15] Unfortunately, from the point of view of the dominant European minority, elementary education will promote a thirst for further education in at least some of those who receive it. It is even doubtful whether deliberate indoctrination would make the more intelligent and ambitious Africans content to remain for ever in an economically, politically and socially subordinate status relative to Europeans. It is not a question of education being "under the control of people who create wrong expectations." It is simply that education of any kind under whatever auspices will create a critical minority who will smart under the injustices of a social system which does not provide them with an outlet for their talents. It would require a policy of repression more severe than has been experienced in any known dictatorship to silence such potential rebels altogether.

Nevertheless, the Union Government believes that an educational system over which it has direct control is less likely to create dangerous discontent than one which is left in the hands of the missions. Therefore, in order that educational policy could be co-ordinated with other aspects of Native policy, particularly from the economic point of view, the Act of 1953 transfered responsibility for Bantu education from the provincial authorities and placeed it in the hands of the Department of Native Affairs of the Union Government. At the same time Churches and mission societies, responsible for managing the majority of schools in the Union, were informed that they must indicate by the end of 1954 whether they wished (a) to retain control, for the time being, of existing state-aided schools and hostels as private unaided institutions, or (b) as aided institutions with a gradually diminishing subsidy, or (c) whether they wished to hand over responsibility for the management of their schools immediately to Bantu community organisations.[16] Subsidisation naturally implies control in accordance with government policy. Even if a voluntary organisation endeavours to maintain its schools without state subsidy, which few can afford to do, the government retains the power to refuse or withdraw permission to such bodies to occupy premises in Native areas.[17]

The struggle between church and state for the control of education is a familiar part of social history and in the long run it would seem to be inevitable that the state should make itself responsible for providing the bulk of educational services in any country. Whether or not this proves, in the case of South Africa, to be a retrograde step will depend entirely upon the way in which the education system develops, the kind of education provided and the opportunities available to individual Africans to use their intelligence and abilities to the maximum at school and when they leave school and seek employment.

Education and Economic Development

When mission schools were first started Churches were entirely dependent upon their own resources and what Africans could

contribute directly. When the Union came into being in 1910 the provinces were assisting the voluntary organisations but they soon found the cost beyond their resources. In 1922 the state made a block grant of £340,000 for education. The cost of African education continued to rise, largely as a consequence of increasing demand and, in 1925 a sum equivalent to a fifth of the income from general tax paid by Bantu was added. This proportion was increased from time to time until in 1943 the whole of the general tax and the state subsidy, were paid into the Native Trust Fund, four-fifths of which was earmarked for education and one-fifth for general development. After 1945 the principle that any increase in expenditure on African education should depend upon what Africans could pay was abandoned and the state subsidy was increased to £2,500,000. After the passing of the *Bantu Education Act, 1953* the amount available from general revenue (mainly, though not entirely, derived from European taxation) was again increased this time to £6,500,000 but the principle that any further increase must come from African taxation was re-asserted. The following table sets out the position in quinquennial periods and relates expenditure to enrolment.[18] The figures for 1959–60 are based upon the estimates put forward in the report of the Eiselen Commission.[19]

UNION OF SOUTH AFRICA :

Expenditure on African Education in Relation to Enrolment

Year	African Taxes £	State Subsidy £	Total Annual Expenditure £	Enrolment Nos.	Expenditure per head
1934–5	412,232	272,000	684,232	356,830	£1 18s.
1939–40	771,376	272,000	1,043,376	464,024	£2 3s.
1944–5	234,357	2,076,651	2,311,008	587,856	£3 18s.
1949–50	1,337,060	3,804,850	5,141,910	742,553	£6 18s.
1954–5*	2,000,000	6,500,000	8,500,000	900,000	£9 8s.
1959–60**	3,461,400	6,500,000	9,961,400	1,391,000	£7 3s.

* Estimated. ** Estimates based upon Eiselen Commission report.

It will be observed that there has been a steady rise in total expenditure on education and in expenditure per head. The latter has increased by approximately five times, between 1935 and 1955. It should be borne in mind that in the same period the national income of the Union of South Africa has multiplied four times.[20] If the predictions of the Eiselen Commission are fulfilled there will be an increase in the number of pupils by 1960, but a fall in the expenditure per head. The Eiselen Commission recommended an annual rate of increase in total expenditure of 7 per cent. between 1949 and 1959. Under the present system the whole of this increase will have to be found from African taxation, which until productivity and earning capacity are increased is unlikely to yield very much more.

At the present time education for African children is not compulsory and approximately 40 per cent. receive some schooling. Wastage is considerable. For example, in 1951, 45 per cent. African children at school were in sub-standards A and B compared with 23 per cent. European; 48 per cent. African children at school were in remaining primary classes (50 per cent. Europeans); only 7 per cent. were in secondary classes (25 per cent. European). 2 per cent. Europeans were receiving University education while the proportion of Africans was too small to calculate as a percentage (approximately 500 Bantu were in receipt of full time University education and approximately a similar number were receiving higher education by correspondence course).[21]

The objectives set by the Eiselen Commission were (i) to provide by 1959–60 sufficient places in the first four classes of primary schools to accommodate the estimated number (over a million) of children in the Bantu population in the age groups 8–11 years inclusive, (ii) to provide the necessary places in the higher primary classes and in secondary schools for those who were expected to continue their education beyond standard II. They suggested that provision should be made for approximately 37 per cent. of those attending the first four standards (A, B, I and II) in 1955 to remain at school in 1959 and 17 per cent. of those in the four higher primary classes in 1955 to be receiving secondary education in 1959. (This would mean that twice as many children would be receiving secondary school education in 1959 as in 1949.)[22] More recent government pronouncements suggest that it is unlikely that these targets will be reached. It is now suggested that the aim should be to ensure that within the next fifteen to twenty years all Bantu children will receive some schooling. The first step towards this will be to increase the number of children attending sub-standards A and B. In order to achieve this as rapidly and cheaply as possible in the face of a shortage of teachers, classes in sub-standards A and B are to be 'duplicated'. That is to say there are to be two sessions per day of $2\frac{3}{4}$ hours each, attended by a different group of children. In so far as any expansion in the number of teachers is required at this level, to meet the increasing population of children at lower age groups, the posts are to be filled by women teachers with lower qualifications at lower rates of pay.[23] It is evident, therefore that, although there will be an increase in the number of children attending school there will be a deterioration both in the quantity and quality of teaching received by each individual child. Retardation of the brighter child who might otherwise proceed to upper-primary, secondary and possibly University education will almost certainly occur under these conditions. It will be increasingly difficult for them to compete with European children in the school certificate and University entrance examinations which both sit. This is an inescapable conclusion despite the re-assurance of the Minister of Native Affairs that "there will be no limit to the education to be given to Natives to allow them to serve their own people."

In order to understand what is implied by the phrase "to serve their own people", it is necessary to examine proposed economic developments in the Union. It has been officially stated that there are growing opportunities for doctors, teachers, agricultural demonstrators, constables to the rank of senior sergeant, hospital ward sisters, other medical auxiliaries and building trades artisans, all to work in African group areas and Native reserves.[24] However, with the possible exception of building artisans, the number of openings in these fields is still very limited and opportunities for the necessary training restricted. Moreover, rates of pay are much lower than those for Europeans doing the same work. More significant are the Government's plans for the use of the large supplies of labour, male and female, at present in the Reserves. Publication of the report of the Tomlinson Committee which was set up to examine the question of economic development of Native Reserves has been delayed. This is believed to be because its recommendations are not acceptable to the Government. Instead semi-official blessing has been given to a plan put forward by the industrial adviser to the Natural Resources Development Council. The plan, which it is estimated would cost £200 million, proposes to set up secondary industries *near* but not *in* the Native Reserves.[25] One of the advantages of this scheme, from the point of view of the Government, is that it would enable them to enforce residential *apartheid*, while drawing on labour in the Reserves and enabling Europeans to be employed in the more responsible posts. Another advantage is that labour costs would be much lower. At the present time there is concern in Government circles regarding the number of non-Europeans (which includes Coloured and Asian peoples as well as Bantu) who are occupying semi-skilled, skilled and supervisory posts in industry. The Minister of Labour is reported to have said that he was "alarmed" at this increase although, as far as Africans are concerned, they only fill approximately 13 per cent. of the semi-skilled posts in industry and 5 per cent. of the skilled.[26]

The dilemma facing the Union Government is how to bring about an industrial revolution which will raise the standard of living of the non-European population without affecting the relative advantage of the European. Discrimination against non-Europeans in industry, together with increasing demands for the enforcement of segregation, arose very largely out of an attempt to deal with the growing problem of 'poor whites' in the Union in the early 1920's.[27] Hence the *Mines and Works Amendment Act, 1926* which effectively imposed a 'colour-bar' on the employment of Africans in skilled trades in the mines. In other trades discrimination is maintained unofficially by trade union action. The effect of the 'colour-bar' is to introduce a rigidity into the economic system which might otherwise undergo the same kind of revolution that took place in Britain, where opportunities to rise in socio-economic status were matched by the possibility of those in positions of higher status falling to a lower status. This tendency to

fall in status is precisely what most Europeans in South Africa are determined to prevent.

Social Mobility and Racial Relations

Recent investigations into social mobility in Britain have shown that the effect, in the last sixty years, of increased educational opportunity has been, "to modify but not to destroy the characteristic association between the social status of fathers and sons."[28] That is to say, although there was nothing like maximum vertical status mobility in Britain in the first half of the twentieth century, the social structure was a relatively open one. Taking men born between 1900–1909, 46 per cent. of those whose fathers had been in upper occupational categories fell in social status and 53 per cent. of those whose fathers were unskilled or semi-skilled workers rose.[29] This probably accounts, in part at any rate, for the fact that Marxist predictions regarding the intensification of corporate class consciousness and conflict have not been fulfilled. Possibly a factor of even greater significance is the egalitarian philosophy which gradually replaced the emphasis upon aristocratic privilege of the eighteenth century. While economic, social and educational policies have not been altogether successful in removing the privileges accorded to birth and the possession of wealth, in Britain as in America, the belief prevailed that those who had ability and were ambitious could improve their socio-economic status by their own efforts. The consequence was an emphasis upon individual competition for improved social status rather than upon a consciousness of corporate class membership.[30]

It is doubtful if this experience will be repeated in a country where the *distribution of socio-economic status corresponds closely to the division of the population in clearly differentiated ethnic or racial groups.* The outward and visible signs of a person's social status in western type societies are such that they can be acquired if not in one generation at any rate in two. The possession of wealth may not by itself enable a person to take his place in a higher status group but at least it will enable him to purchase for his children the education and other qualifications that will make them acceptable. When social status is closely associated with visible racial characteristics such as skin colour this is no longer possible. Inter-marriage may partly obscure racial origin and enable some people to 'pass' into the superior status group. But as far as the Union of South Africa is concerned law and custom are rigidly opposed to miscegenation which is a severely punishable offence.[31]

Those who put forward the policy of *apartheid* as a solution to South Africa's racial problem do so in the firm belief that it will only be by restricting the area in which individual Europeans and non-Europeans come into competition with one another that severe conflict will be avoided. The considerations set out in this paper suggest the opposite view. So long as the African tribal system remained intact Europeans had little to fear even though they were outnumbered. To-day the

tribal system is disintegrating with ever increasing momentum and economic pressures are such that it is impossible to put the clock back. Conflict is an inevitable concomittant of social change but whether this conflict takes the form of open hostility between one social group and another depends largely upon the extent to which those whose super-ordinate status is threatened cling to their power. The fact that the social and industrial revolution in Britain took place in a relatively peaceful fashion must be attributed, as much as anything, to the fact that through the exercise of the franchise, through educational opportunity and economic advancement, members of the "proletariat", individually and collectively, were able to improve their socio-economic status, largely at the expense of the old privileged class. The absence of such opportunities in the Union of South Africa may have disastrous consequences.

The following are the main conclusions which emerge from this analysis of recent changes in educational policy and practice in the Union of South Africa. Firstly, the ideological foundations of African education have shifted from providing a bridge between the European ways of life to an emphasis upon fitting Africans for a distinct and separate rôle in society. It is suggested that this is an unrealistic policy in the face of an imminent industrial revolution. Secondly, an examination of the actual provisions made for African education in the near future suggest that, while there is to be a limited expansion of secondary and higher education the large majority of children will receive a minimum basic education which, at most, will make them literate. Thirdly, consideration of proposed economic developments suggests that, with minor exceptions, the more responsible and better paid positions will be reserved for Europeans. Fourthly, comparative evidence from Britain suggests that even when social policy deliberately attempts to promote social mobility through the education system, there is still a tendency for those whose fathers are of higher status to retain a competitive advantage over those from less privileged families. This tendency is likely to be even greater in a society where socio-economic status and skin colour are closely associated and where social policy is oriented in the direction of maintaining the super-ordinate status of a minority group. The proposed changes in African education are not likely, therefore, to contribute to the social status mobility of Africans individually or collectively. Finally, it is suggested that an increasingly literate Bantu population faced with restricted opportunities for occupational advancement will experience frustration and discontent, which may find expression in heightened racial tensions. The hypothesis here put forward is that *where an educational system makes separate provision for different racial groups and where opportunities for secondary and higher education are much greater for one group, which monopolises the positions of highest status and reward, then racial conflict will be intensified.*[32] This conclusion directly contradicts the assumptions underlying current social policy in the Union of South Africa.

NOTES

[1] P. A. W. Cook, "Non-European Education" p. 348, in E. Hellman *et. al. Handbook of Race Relations in South Africa*, Oxford University Press, 1949.

[2] Union of South Africa, *Report of Commission on Native Education*, 1949–1951. U.B. No. 53/1951, Government Printer, Pretoria.

[3] Union of South Africa, *Act* No. 47, 1953 as amended by *Act* No. 44, 1954.

[4] *Op. cit.*, para 1.

[5] *Ibid.*, para 773.

[6] *Loc. cit.*

[7] Margaret Mead (ed.) *Cultural Patterns and Technical Change*, p. 278, U.N.E.S.C.O., Paris, 1953.

[8] *African Education: A Study of Educational Policy and Practice in British Tropical Africa*, p. 67.

[9] *Ibid.*, p. 57.

[10] A. W. Hoernlé and E. Hellman, *The Analysis of Social Change and its Bearing on Education* (Mimeographed). South African Institute of Race Relations, 1952.

[11] *Op. cit.*, para. 770.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 169, para 14.

[13] Union of South Africa, *Hansard No. 10 of the 11th Parliament*, cols. 3575–3590.

[14] Quoted by Roger Wilson in "The Teacher: Instructor or Educator", p. 5, *Lyndale House Papers*, University of Bristol, 1954.

[15] The same point was made by W. E. Forster in introducing the *Education Bill, 1870* in England. "Upon the speedy provision of elementary education depends our industrial prosperity." *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[16] *South African Survey*, No. 89, p. 10., Director of Information, South Africa House, London, 1954.

[17] Union of South Africa: Circular from Department of Native Affairs, dated 3.9.1954.

[18] Statistics 1935–1955 based on material supplied by the South African Bureau of Racial Affairs (S.A.B.R.A.)

[19] Table CXL, p. 161. Enrolment figures include teachers in training.

[20] The Eiselen Commission estimated that in 1948 expenditure on Bantu education represented 0·46 per cent. of the national income and 2·8 per cent. of total government expenditure, including provinces.

[21] Calculations of South African Institute of Race Relations (S.A.I.R.R.). If *apartheid* were enforced in the universities the number of places for non-Europeans would decrease.

[22] *Loc. cit.*, p. 161.

[23] *South African Survey* No. 84, June 15, No. 86, July 15, and No. 96, December 30, 1954.

[24] *Ibid.*, No. 85, June 30, 1954.

[25] *Ibid.*, No. 99, February 28, 1955 and No. 102, April 30, 1955.

[26] J. de Klerk, Minister of Labour, reported in *Pretoria News*, April 4, 1955.

[27] W. W. MacMillan, *Complex South Africa*, Faber and Faber, London, 1930.

[28] D. V. Glass (ed.) *Social Mobility in Britain*, p. 307. Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1954.

[29] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[30] J. Floud, "Educational Opportunity and Social Mobility" in *The Year Book of Education*, 1950 pp. 117–135. Evans, London, 1950, and S. M. Lipset and R. Bendix, "Ideological Equalitarianism and Social Mobility in the United States" in *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, London, 1954.

[31] For a fuller discussion of racial relations in South Africa and elsewhere see A. H. Richmond, *The Colour Problem*, Penguin Books Ltd., Harmondsworth, 1955.

[32] This view is shared by E. C. Malherbe, Principal of Natal University College, who wrote, "To spread mere literacy thinly amongst the masses is dangerous, unless it is accompanied by the training of truly educated leaders who can guide the masses and who will see to it that their little education is not exploited in cultivating more bitterness." "Race attitudes and Education", *Hoernlé Memorial Lecture*, 1946. South African Institute of Race Relations.

Social Class and Education in East Africa

J. E. GOLDTHORPE

(Lecturer in Sociology, Makerere College, the University College of East Africa)

East Africa, comprising the British-administered territories of the Uganda Protectorate, Kenya Colony and Protectorate, and the Trust Territory of Tanganyika, affords interesting examples of the process of social stratification in an economically underdeveloped area in which government, as well as most economic enterprise, are associated with immigrant populations marked off from the indigenous inhabitants by differences of race and culture.

Table 1. *East African Population by Race and Territory, 1948.*

(Thousands)

Territory	European	Asian	Other	Total non-native	African	TOTAL
Kenya	29·7	121·8	3·3	154·8	5,251	5,406
Tanganyika	10·6	57·3	2·2	70·2	7,408	7,478
Uganda ..	3·4	36·7	0·8	41·0	4,918	4,959
TOTAL ..	43·7	215·8	6·3	266·0	17,577	17,843

Notes: " Asian " includes Indian, Goan, and Arab.
" Other " includes Coloured and otherwise unclassified.

Social class relations in a multi-racial community such as this are inevitably complex. It might be theoretically possible for each of the three racial categories to form a social class in a three-tiered system, with Europeans as a ruling class, Asians as a middle class—they are often described locally in these terms—and Africans as a working class. At the other extreme, the three races might form separate and parallel communities each with its own system of upper, middle, and lower classes. Neither of these simple models, however, would represent reality; and, as was ably shown by Mary Parker,[1] the situation may be thought of in terms of three overlapping triangles, though even this, as will appear, is still a little too simple. In analysing this pattern, it may be convenient first briefly to review the internal social class and status of each racial group separately, and then consider how, and to what extent, they combine in a single system of social class embracing individuals of all races.

SOCIAL CLASS AND STATUS SYSTEMS AMONG AFRICANS

It is impossible in a short paper to do justice to the very great diversity of traditional systems of status and power among the African tribes,

numbering well over a hundred, of East Africa. Generalising very broadly, they seem to ring the changes on four main themes. A segmentary kinship and lineage system allots high status to family, clan, and lineage heads; an age-system puts a premium on age and on conformity to customary ideals; a hierarchical chieftainship makes for extremely rapid mobility upwards and downwards at the whim of the king and chiefs; while in all systems there was a greater or less opportunity for qualities of natural leadership to gain recognition. There is thus a wide range of contrast, between, for instance, the extreme rigidity and egalitarianism of the traditional Kikuyu system to the equally extreme deference and mobility of the Ganda and other Uganda kingdoms. Accordingly, there are marked local differences in the way in which emerging élites of wealthy and educated Africans are accepted, or rejected, by the traditional status systems of their tribes. Among the Ganda—whose formidable élite has shown itself capable of holding its own in Uganda and even Commonwealth politics—there already existed a chiefly rôle into which a wealthy business man or Government official could fit, together with a set of expectations—of lavish hospitality and preferential treatment for kinsfolk—which have often proved embarrassing to him. By contrast, among the chiefless Kikuyu no one traditionally possessed more wealth or power than his age-mate, so that the élite has had to make a cleaner break with tribal tradition. Moreover, owing to the later start of Western education in Kenya, it is a much smaller and younger élite—a contrast not, perhaps, without its political and social significance.

Modern African social stratification is marked by extreme inequalities of wealth. The great mass of peasants live at little above bare subsistence level, the average income per head of African population being put at well below £20 annually;[2] there are, however, a few business men, landowners, and professional men who are not poor even by European standards. Thus where, for instance, in modern Britain the biggest net incomes may be perhaps twenty times the earnings of unskilled workers, in East Africa the factor is more like four hundred. This in turn is linked with the fact that among some tribes, though by no means all, inequalities of wealth and power are accepted and even regarded as desirable, the Ganda being an important instance.

This situation leads to a dilemma in one realm of Government policy, namely the proper remuneration of those Africans who become qualified to take over higher posts in the public service, in which most educated Africans work. If these poor countries are to be developed, and delivered from the vicious circle of poverty, malnutrition, and ignorance, the great bulk of the administrative and managerial skills have to be recruited from abroad; and to do this the immigrants have to be offered a standard of living—in terms of health and housing as well as money—at least comparable with what they enjoy in the wealthy countries from which they come. For a number of years, however, it was felt improper to saddle the territories with an indigenous upper

class paid disproportionately more than the indigenous peasants; and a somewhat arbitrary rule was adopted whereby a locally-recruited official was paid three fifths of the salary paid to an immigrant in the same post. Though in form this was not a racial distinction, it was generally interpreted as such, and being seen as a colour bar it caused much bitterness. The three-fifths rule has now been abandoned and though small inducement allowances for those recruited overseas remain the symbolic humiliation of " three-fifths for Africans " is a thing of the past.[3] Near-parity at the higher levels of Government service, however, does widen the inequality between Africans, and there seems no escape from the dilemma that either inequality is enhanced or a colour bar is resorted to.

Social Class among Europeans

Since these territories are British-administered, the highest positions of political power are necessarily held by appointed British officials. At the apex of the local social class system, a Governor is in a quasi-Royal position, and the Court-like rituals of a Government House enable the seal of official recognition to be set on the social prestige of individuals; while at the local level, too, District and Provincial Commissioners might be described as " the chiefs of the Europeans ". This, together with the importance of the institution known as " the Club " (whose critical significance has been well described by the Sofers[4]), makes the internal class structure of the European community a somewhat rigid one, at any rate in Uganda and Tanganyika.

Moreover, the European population is for the most part a floating one. Most Europeans are recruited in Britain for specific jobs, usually not below those of the most highly-skilled workers; and they retire there after a period of from two to twenty years. They come to East Africa, then, with an occupational status already fixed, and fit into positions in the local social scale accordingly. A rather rigid framework, then, linked with that of the United Kingdom, seems to afford the Europeans a stable and familiar pattern into which they can fit during their stay in East Africa, and from which they can, if they wish, ultimately escape into the anonymity of British life.

The main exception to these generalisations is, of course, the settled European population of Kenya. In that Colony in 1948, 23 per cent. of the Europeans were Kenya-born—a minority, but one substantial enough to impart to Kenya society a somewhat different flavour, and one, moreover, able by the very fact of its permanence to impress on the majority distinctive patterns of life and attitudes. In contrast to the other territories, there is in Kenya something approaching a poor-White class—the City Council of Nairobi, for example, recently found it necessary to prohibit European beggars in the city. At the other end of the scale, avenues of upward mobility are less confined to promotion in Government or commercial employment, and the upper levels contain a possibly higher proportion of local business men and

large farmers, while opportunities for political advancement as European elected members of local and Legislative councils afford both a political organisation and an informal social life less completely dominated by the official hierarchy than those of Uganda and Tanganyika.

Social Class among Asians

Though the term " Asian community " is much used locally a number of distinct groups are in fact included in the population classed as Asian. Arabs have been settled at the coast since the time of Herodotus, and penetrated inland at least a century ago, while periods of Arab rule have left a number of old noble families and wealthy landowners. The Goan community, found in small numbers in most towns, largely in responsible clerical employment, is sharply marked off from other Asiatic groups, being Catholic in faith and Portuguese in national status. Among other groups originally derived from the Indian sub-continent, specially notable is the Khoja Ismaili community, followers of the Aga Khan—a liberal Moslem sect with well-marked internal leadership, marked by the bestowal of titles such as " Count " and a programme of Western economic advancement, enabling its leaders to penetrate effectively to the highest economic and social levels. A large Hindu population include the Patels, while mention must be made also of the Sikhs and a small but rich and influential Parsee community.

Wide differences in income and social class exist among Indians generally, who include probably the richest men in East Africa and at the other extreme poor self-employed craftsmen and semi-skilled workers. East Africa is the Asians' land of opportunity; and though that opportunity exists in a field restricted by certain disabilities the prizes are nevertheless enormous. The disabilities relate mainly to the ownership of land; except at the coast, practically no Asians practise agriculture, while trading sites are restricted to gazetted " trading centres " and parts of municipal areas—and since these amount, for traders, virtually to restrictions on residence, Indians are in effect confined to small areas in which ghetto-like conditions of dishygiene and social problems readily arise. In the public service, too, Indians fill many clerical and supervisory posts, but the higher appointments are virtually restricted to Europeans with a few exceptional Africans, while at the lower levels African educational advancement is continually edging Asians out. The main energies of the Asian population, therefore, are concentrated on trade, the professions, and skilled work. Among those who succeed it is possible to identify a small élite of millionaires or near-millionaires, whose prestige is beyond question—from this group come the Asian ministers, Legislative Council members, and the like, with an increasing amount of social mingling with Europeans. At the middle levels, a substantial part of the medical, legal, and other professions, and the great bulk of the retail trade, are filled by Asians. Skilled workers form the lowest substantial group of Indians,

unskilled work being rare—significantly, the word for skilled person in East Africa is " fundi ". Among these masons, carpenters, mechanics, skilled railway staff, and the like—many of them Sikhs—hours of work are long and wages not high, while conditions of life are often poor. It is among this group that the greatest amount of social mixing with Africans seems to occur, with a good deal of inter-marriage especially between Indian and Arab Moslem men and African Moslem women—Islam being, it seems, impatient of colour bars and strongly patrilineal, the children of such unions belong unambiguously to their fathers' community.

Race and Social Class

If we apply to the East African situation the test of Professor Ginsberg's classic definition, we seem to find that though the " gaps which can only be bridged with difficulty " follow the lines of racial division at least as closely as those of social class, there are certain limited ways in which, at least at the topmost social levels, people of all races " stand to each other in the relation of equality " and are " marked off from others by accepted standards of superiority ".[5]

At the top of the social scale it is possible to discern a small upper class which is to a significant extent inter-racial—senior Government officials and Ministers, the wealthiest business and professional men, native rulers, bishops, members of Legislative Councils. A few score names would exhaust the list, and the group indeed sometimes appears as a kind of stage army, familiar names recurring among members of Government bodies, business directorships, and charitable and religious associations. Members of this " stage army " have frequent official dealings with one another, and a certain amount of formal contact at social events like opening ceremonies and " sundowners " (evening cocktail parties). They share increasingly a common material style of life, much like that of the rich anywhere. Intermarriage is, however, quite out of the question, and within East Africa the education of their children is divided on racial lines, though to a significant extent they overcome this by sending them to England.

At the level of the middle class, barriers of race and community seem to become more important; the present writer found, for instance, that few old students of Makerere College had frequent social contacts with Europeans.[6] Though some inter-racial associations exist, especially in Uganda (such as, for instance, the Uganda Council of Women), and sporting and religious activities—from cricket matches to Bible classes—do tend to bring people of different races together, these activities remain somewhat on the periphery of East African social life. Since this group is not rich enough seriously to contemplate education in England, the *lebenschances* of the children are affected by the division of the schools on racial lines; while among this class, too, inequalities of economic opportunity result from complex racial laws and administrative practices regarding residence, immigration, the

ownership of land, and the marketing of crops; sometimes favouring one group, sometimes another.

At the lower economic levels, racial and tribal barriers become so strong that it seems meaningless at present to speak of a unified East African working class. The migratory nature of African labour, with " one foot in the Reserves ", together with obstacles of language and inexperience, inhibit the growth of a trade union movement and with it class-consciousness of the Western sort, while tribal differences loom larger even in the limited field of wage employment—most Africans are peasants most of the time—than class solidarity. At this level too, political appeals tend to be at most to colour—" we Africans "—and more usually to tribal sentiment—" we Baganda " or " we Kikuyu ".

The Politics of Inter-Racial Education

As has been indicated, education in East Africa is broadly divided between European, Asian, and African schools, with significant differences in the cost per schoolchild. The main exceptions are a few private inter-racial schools, notably under Roman Catholic auspices; the Royal Technical College in Nairobi; and Makerere College, the University College of East Africa. Since educational opinion strongly —and understandably—favours the vernacular in primary education,[7] it seems probable that a division along linguistic lines is inevitable in primary schools. Most African secondary schools were established " for Africans " as part of the activities of missionary bodies, and their strongly Christian character might make it difficult for them to assimilate Asians if not Europeans. Government schools have followed the mission pattern, though Kenya has recently given a lead towards inter-racial secondary education and Uganda is probably sympathetic. Makerere College is open to all, but the number of Asian and European parents who regard a predominantly African College as suitable for their children's higher education has hitherto not been large.

Inter-racial education would hardly be in the interest of any of the immigrant communities, however. For the transients among the Europeans, the main preoccupation must be with as exact a parallel as possible with the British system, so that children who go home at any stage may fit easily into the corresponding stage there. For the settled Europeans, a superior education—at least, one superior in esteem—is an important means of maintaining European leadership in a society of inter-racial partnership, and, to quote a policy statement by the European Elected Members' Organisation in Kenya:[8]

> " If any racial group requires a standard of education higher than can be afforded by the central government, such group must find the extra finances necessary. Separate schools for each race must continue to be provided."

Somewhat similarly, Asian education is a live political issue in which communal aspirations tend to find communal outlets. For a

population largely middle-class in character, the ideal of secondary education for all and higher education for most is an intelligible one (though it has been officially ridiculed), and it represents, indeed, perhaps the only way in which Asians, lacking both the privileges of the ruling group and the entrenched position of the indigenous population, can maintain their foothold in East Africa.

The Educated African Elite

Finally, the position of the educated African élite is clearly crucial. Education is ardently desired as the main avenue to wealth and power through the mastery of Western techniques, and hence to a share in the prestige of the dominant group; and to be denied the privileges enjoyed by Europeans after having painfully assimilated one's self to Western values is an obviously embittering experience. At the same time, though educated Africans form from one point of view the obvious source of African leadership, their very training in Western ways may lead to their rejection by their fellow-tribesmen; thus it was largely this group against whom mass disapproval was directed in the 1949 riots in Buganda. Unless, of course, they repudiate the West; and some educated Africans denied access to European society have appeared as the leaders of chauvinistic revolts, the life history of Jomo Kenyatta affording a case study on this point. It is in this context that small symbolic slights assume disproportionate importance. Until recently, for example, Africans were forbidden by statute to buy spirits, and were excluded by informal practice from the more expensive hotels, though in the last two years the repeal of antiquated ordinances and strong Governmental pressure on the hotel and catering trade has somewhat abated these discriminations. Such things affect less than vitally the lives of few individuals, and yet arouse great emotion.

In connection with salaries in the public service, it was seen that a choice has to be made between a colour bar and enhanced inequality; and it may now be seen that this dilemma has wider implications. For the sociologist trained in the British tradition, from Hobhouse to Titmuss, the notion of enhancing class distinctions is a distasteful one; yet, in East Africa, and doubtless in other underdeveloped territories, wide inequalities between the poor local people and the privileged but necessary immigrants seem inevitable, at least for a time. Meanwhile, if the alternatives are class distinctions or colour bars, there seem good reasons for preferring class distinctions. The vital question is whether the door is open or closed; and, for example, the admittance to the Uganda Club of twenty-odd African Representative Members of the Uganda Legislative Council may have a symbolic importance far transcending the convenience of a few individuals. The door is not open quite so widely in some parts of East Africa as in others, but perhaps the most hopeful feature of the East African scene is that nowhere is it altogether closed.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT. I am most grateful to my colleagues and pupils at Makerere College for their contributions to the Seminar on Social Class in East Africa, March–June, 1955. Many of the points here presented arose from discussion at that Seminar.

NOTES

[1] Mary Parker, " Race Relations and Political Development in Kenya ", *African Affairs*, vol. L, pp. 41–52 and 133.
[2] East Africa Royal Commission 1953–55 Report, Cmd. 9475.
[3] Report of the Commission on the Civil Services of the East African Territories and the East African High Commission, 1953–4.
[4] C. Sofer and R. Ross, " Some Characteristics of an East African European Population ", *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. II, 315–327.
[5] M. Ginsberg, *Sociology*, p. 159.
[6] J. E. Goldthorpe, " An African Elite ", *British Journal of Sociology*, vol. VI, pp. 31–47.
[7] See for instance the Nuffield Foundation *Report on African Education, 1953*, pp. 79–84.
[8] Nairobi, 13th November, 1953.

Educational Participation in Selected Lebanese Villages*

LINCOLN ARMSTRONG
(Assistant Professor of Sociology, Department of Sociology, American University of Beirut)

and

GORDON K. HIRABAYASHI
(Assistant Director, Social Research Center, American University at Cairo)

If it is true, as many reports and programs in the field of development in underdeveloped areas assume, that education constitutes the most important vehicle for social change, then an investigation of variation in educational participation and its variations among social categories may be of importance. The following report is based upon data gathered in 169 questionnaire interviews in as many households in five agricultural villages of the Southern Beqa'a valley in Lebanon.[1]

Before proceeding with the description and analysis of educational data, certain related information that bears directly on the subject at hand is here presented. The general level of living in all of these villages may be characterized as sub-marginal. Most households are dependent on substandard production on insufficient land holdings or on irregular and insufficient market for labour. Meagerly furnished, over-crowded mud houses are general in the villages.

The village consists of a cluster of houses, frequently sharing walls in common, sometimes surrounding an old manor house or other evidence of decayed feudal organization. Nearby, and sometimes almost encircled by the dwellings, is the village *bidar* (common grain-thrashing area) and from the outskirts of the clusters a path leads to the river from which water is collected by the womenfolk. The unirrigated outlying *kharaj* (outlying lands within the village boundaries) is fragmented into small strips of land belonging to slightly over 50% of the villagers. The irrigated sections of the land are less fragmented and generally belong to the three or four moderately well-to-do resident villagers or to wealthy absentee operators.

The area is characteristically Sunni Moslem with the exception of a few villages in which concentration of Greek Orthodox Christians

* The writers acknowledge with appreciation the assistance of the Department of Sociology, American University of Beirut (A.U.B.), and the U.S. Point IV Mission to Lebanon for the field work phase, and the Educational Research Program of A.U.B. and the Social Research Center of the American University at Cairo for facilitating the analysis and reporting phases of this study.

account for 10% to 35% of the inhabitants. One of the five villages in the present sample had such a Christian minority.

THE SCHOOL SITUATION

Each of the villages in the sample has a government elementary school. Theoretically, these schools offer five years of schooling leading to a *certificat*, a diploma which is recognised in French educational systems, and which is the equivalent of completion of the 5th grade in the U.S. system. Coeducation as sponsored by the government school system exists in only two of the five villages. In only the two larger villages do the public schools actually extend instruction to the level of *certificat*. Lack of space and adequate facilities appear to be two of the major reasons for the low matriculation at the *certificat* level. Crowded conditions force teachers to limit the number of students who can be admitted, even though priority is given to the early grades.

Well over half of the elementary students in the five villages receive their education in private secular and sectarian schools. At the most elementary level there are the Islamic Charity Schools in which education has been limited traditionally to instruction in reading and writing based on the *Koran*. One of the villages has a locally designated "Sheikh School" offering two years of kindergarten and two elementary grades. The total picture for the five villages appears in Table 1.

Table 1. *Schools, Grades, Students and Teachers in five villages of the Southern Beqa'a, 1954*

	No. of Schools	*Total Grades* KG	Elem.	Higher Elem.	*No. of Students* Male	Female	Total	Teachers	Student-Teacher Ratio
Govt. Schools ..	5	4	21	—	367	29	396	8	50
Private Sectarian	4	6	16	—	244	133	377	7	54
Private non-Sectarian ..	1	1	5	4	142	57	199	11	18
Total	10	11	42	4	753	219	972	26	38

For the area as a whole several features stand out. There are very few educational facilities beyond the level of *certificat*. Boys are recipients of education more than three times as frequently as girls. The government is carrying a minor share of the responsibility for educating Southern Beqa'a children. Student-teacher ratios are generally high. With few exceptions the schools themselves are desperately in need of housing improvement and expansion.

The sample, as previously stated, included 169 households, 15% of the universe. These households were composed of 489 males and 443 females, giving an overall sex ratio of 110. On the whole it is an

exceedingly young population concentrated in the early age grouping as indicated in Table 2.

Table 2 indicates that more than 50% of the population is under 20 years of age. Also of interest are the unbalanced age specific sex ratios, particularly the sudden absence of men in the more productive age levels. Migration is obviously an important factor.[2] The fact that education is largely a male prerogative may be due partially to the actual excess of males in the school-age years.

Table 2. *Age composition and sex ratio of 169 sample households in five villages*

Age Groups	Number of Persons	Percentage of Populations	Cumulative Distribution of Percentage	Sex Ratio
0–4	137	13·6	Below 5 yrs. –13·6%	114
5–9	145	15·5	„ 10 „ –29·1%	128
10–14	124	13·5	„ 15 „ –42·4%	
15–19	102	10·9	„ 20 „ –53·3%	134
20–24	62	6·6	„ 25 „ –59·9%	
25–29	55	6·0	„ 30 „ –65·9%	97
30–34	36	3·8	„ 35 „ –69·7%	
35–39	45	4·8	„ 40 „ –74·5%	64
40–44	52	5·5	„ 45 „ –80·0%	
45–49	37	3·8	„ 50 „ –83·8%	118
50–54	33	3·5	„ 55 „ –87·3%	
55–59	21	2·2	„ 60 „ –89·5%	113
60–64	28	3·0	„ 65 „ –92·5%	
65–69	20	2·1	„ 70 „ –94·6%	77
70–74	21	2·2	„ 75 „ –96·8%	
75–over	14	1·5	„ 100 „ –100·0%	
Total	932	100·0		110

In order to check the representativeness of the 15% sample of this survey the following procedure was taken. According to Table 1 the Ministry of Education reported 972 children in attendance ; this survey found 138 children enrolled in school for the corresponding period. 138 is equivalent to 14·2% of 972, which is within 1% of perfect agreement. This minor difference is probably due more to faulty reporting by both the Ministry and the survey interviewers than to any serious sampling error.

The Problem

In investigating the relationship between education and social differentiation this paper describes educational participation from three reference points : the occupational and socio-economic differentiation, age differentiation, and sex differentiation.

In a static society, educational participation would most likely be confined to the élite class and the dominant sex (male in the Arab Middle East). In a developing society, however, certain changes in the old pattern would be expected. No longer would the élite be

expected to monopolize educational facilities. An increasing variation should emerge in the pattern of educational participation, particularly among the peasant mass. Similarly, increasing participation should indicate increasing variation. If these assumptions may be accepted for the moment, to what extent do the five villages under study reveal a developing society with an emerging heterogeneity as evidenced by increasing variation in educational participation? This is the core problem under investigation here.

The Survey

Educational Participation by Occupation and Socio-economic Status.[8] Observation of educational experience of the several occupational groups revealed rather wide differences in level of attainment percentages. A test of the null hypothesis that the distribution of educational attainment is identical for all occupational groups revealed a *chi square* of 39·22. Since the critical score with twelve degrees of freedom was 26·21, the rejection of the hypothesis is possible at the ·01 level of significance. Table 3 presents the occupational categories along with their respective mean status score ratings and their degree of educational participation.

Table 3. *Occupation, status score and amount of schooling in five villages of the Beqa'a*

Occupational Category	Mean Status Score	Without any Schooling	*Per cent. of group who have had* 1–2 yrs.	3–5 yrs.	6 yrs. plus	Total number of persons involved**
A Simple Agricultural Laborers ..	138·4	59%	19·3%	15·3%	6·3%	254
B Skilled and unskilled small land operators ..	220·1	46·4%	22·9%	21·0%	9·5%	166
C Skilled and unskilled non-agr. laborers	336*	52·0%	21·7%	16·0%	10·2%	58
D Stable, moderate sized land operators	391	46·5%	17·2%	27·8%	8·6%	225
E The élite, landed and professional	602	40·2%	23·3%	19·5%	17·0%	77
Total..	288·84%	53·0%	21·0%	18·0%	9·3%	N=780

* The non-skilled group had a mean status score of 286·6; the skilled group had one of 363·5.

** Five years of age and over.

In support of the relationship shown in Table 3 between socio-economic status and educational level in a different method of analysis presented elsewhere a correlation of plus 0·35 was found to exist

between composite average household educational attainment scores and composite household socio-economic status scores.[4]

That the occupational categories are significantly differentiated in terms of economic well-being is clearly demonstrated by the range of status scores. The degree of correlation between economic status and educational achievement is not so pronounced. However, the lowest scoring group on economic status also had the greatest lack of schooling while the high status group had the fewest members without any schooling and the largest percentage at the level of advanced or secondary education.

There is very little difference between groups in so far as primary education (one or two years) is concerned. There is more variation at the level of 3-5 years of schooling, a difference which continues to be present at the level of secondary education. Throughout, the relationship between education and socio-economic status is positive.

Educational Participation by Age Groupings. Several interesting probabilities are suggested in Table 4. The first of these is the probability that educational opportunity is increasing in these villages or that the villages are more concerned with their children's education than has been the case previously. This is indicated by the considerably higher percentages in the younger generations who have had some education. A possible explanation might be that the educated

Table 4. *Amount of Schooling by broad age groupings*

Age Groups	Without any Schooling	*Years of Schooling* One Year	Two Years	Three Years	Four Years	Five Years	Six thru Nine	Ten Plus
5–19	39%	14%	16%	11%	9%	3%	6%	1%
20–50	63%	4%	7%	4·5%	2%	4%	10%	4%
51 plus	74%	3·5%	10·5%	9·9%	—	2%	1%	—
Total ..	53%	9%	12%	8%	5%	3%	8%	2%

members of the earlier generation migrated away from the area, but the survey indicated no difference in amount of education between kinsmen of the household heads and those currently residing in the villages. Thus, a decrease from 74% without schooling in the old age group to 39% without schooling in the present child population may indicate a highly significant change. It is interesting to note that Glick[5] found a similar trend in the United States—an economically developed country.

Educational Participation by Sex and Age. In Table 5, males are compared with females in various age groups on two variables.

The extent to which education has been a male prerogative is clearly observable. Less than one and a half years of schooling is the most that is achieved by any age group of females, while the overall average

Table 5. *Educational Attainment by Age and Sex*

Age Groups	*Percent with no schooling*			*Average No. of school grades completed**		
	Males	Females	Total	Males	Females	Total
5–7	55%	60%	57·3%	0·66	0·45	0·57
8–11	9·6%	41·3%	24·4%	2·01	1·41	1·74
12–15	18·0%	56·0%	33·3%	3·32	1·48	2·61
16–19	24·1%	74·1%	50·0%	3·55	0·97	2·31
20–24	15·3%	90·9%	52·0%	4·11	0·27	2·35
25–29	30·0%	89·6%	65·3%	2·95	0·14	1·32
30–40	34·1%	95·0%	69·2%	2·43	0·25	1·17
41–50	29·6%	94·7%	63·1%	4·07	0·15	1·98
51–60	25·0%	100·0%	64·7%	2·16	—	1·01
61 and up	68·0%	100·0%	85·1%	0·76	—	0·35
Total average	31·8%	79·3%	53·0%	2·70 weighted	0·58	1·63*

* The total averages are weighted. The unweighted averages are 2·60, 0·51 and 1·54 for males, females and total respectively.

for females is slightly under three years. Even the most elderly males have enjoyed some education while fewer than 10% of the females over 20 years of age have had any education. That the younger groups of both sexes are apparently being given some education today is only slightly suggestive of change for the better. But prejudice against the females is obviously still very strong.

Educational Participation by Occupation and Sex. Was discrimination with regard to extension of educational opportunities to females differentiated by occupational categories? Table 6 indicates that such discrimination is general in all groups but is most pronounced in the lowest occupational categories, and least in category C. There is also observed a positive relationship between educational opportunity for males and occupational status, and at a considerably higher percentage of participation at all levels than for females. A prevailing pattern in the Beqa'a village whereby females are excluded from the formal educational process is clearly indicated.

Table 6. *Education by Sex and Occupation*

Occupation Categories (ranked in order of increasing status)	*Having had at least one year of education*			
	Males		Females	
	No.	Percentage	No.	Percentage
A	89	68%	15	14%
B	69	78%	20	16%
C	23	75%	8	30%
D	76	74%	32	27%
E	34	85%	12	33%
Total	291		87	

Educational Participation by Occupation and Family Relationship. A more detailed picture of the prevailing pattern is presented in Table 7 where the educational experience of male household heads, wives and old females, sons and daughters are shown separately, and also compared for occupational differentiation.

It is noted that only 8 of the elderly females, or less than six per cent out of a total of 144, have had any schooling. Category A, the lowest status occupational group shows the highest percentage (54%) for household heads without any schooling.

Table 7. *Education by Familial Relationship and Occupation*

Occupational Category	No. of Persons	Without any Schooling	1 and 2 years Schooling	3–5 years Schooling	6 years Schooling
Male Household Heads					
A	50	54%	20%	8%	18%
B	32	34%	15·5%	40%	9·3%
C	16	25%	18·7%	43%	12%
D	45	35%	29%	9%	27%
E	16	25%	12%	31%	31%
Sons					
A	173	28%	28%	34%	10%
B	112	16%	35·6%	30·3%	18%
C	28	28%	21·0%	46·0%	14%
D	102	18%	36%	32·0%	14%
E	44	9%	41%	22·7%	27·2%
Daughters					
A	92	67%	21%	11%	—
B	61	61%	22%	13%	4%
C	27	46%	31%	23%	7%
D	106	43%	28%	26%	2%
E	20	60%	20%	10%	10%
Wives					
A	40	97·5%	—	—	2·5%
B	14	85%	7%	—	7%
C	46	100%	—	—	—
D	28	93%	3·5%	3·5%	—
E	16	81%	6%	12%	—

The sons in every occupational group, with the exception of Group C, are receiving more education than their fathers. This is especially noticeable in the category " without schooling ", where the sons have approximately a 100% advantage in educational participation.

In comparing daughters with their mothers there is a clear indication of the greater educational participation by the younger generation. Some peculiarity is noted, however, regarding the trend of decreasing percentages of those without any schooling in the highest status group, E. The data provides no ready explanation for this reversal of trend.

Educational Participation by Sex and Birth Order. Is the first son or daughter more or less likely to be given schooling than his or her siblings ? As in previous observation the most clear-cut answer

comes from the data on lack of schooling. Also, since all of the subjects were above 5 years of age and thus had an opportunity of at least a year of schooling, the "no schooling" category facilitates a safe comparison.

In Table 8 it is noted that all sons and daughters are receiving more education than their fathers and mothers respectively. The difference is very pronounced in the comparison of daughters with mothers.

Table 8. *Education of Household Members by Relationship to Family Head and by Birth Order.*

	Family Head	1st Son	2nd Son	3rd and other Sons	Other Males
MALES					
No. in sample	159	103	67	58	22
Without any schooling ..	38%	14·5%	20·9%	31·0%	38·0%
1 and 2 years schooling ..	21%	25·4%	27%	48·0%	33·0%
3–5 years schooling ..	21%	30·0%	42·0%	17·0%	19·0%
6 years and more schooling	20%	30·0%	10·5%	4·0%	9·0%
	Wives	1st Daughter	2nd Daughter	3rd and other Daughters	Other Females
FEMALES					
No. in sample	144	81	48	24	75
Without any schooling ..	94%	65%	46%	43%	82%
1 and 2 years schooling ..	2·5%	18%	25%	43%	12%
3–5 years schooling ..	2·5%	11%	29%	14%	4%
6 years and more schooling	1·0%	5%	—	—	2%

In the case of rank order there appears to be a tendency in the female group for second and later daughters to receive more schooling than the first daughters. This might be due to the prevailing custom in this area of leaving the care of younger children to the eldest daughter thereby relieving the mother for economic activities such as working as a field hand along with her husband. A similar tendency of sharing in the family responsibilities among the boys is reflected in the higher percentage of second and later sons who receive the primary school education, but this is counteracted by the smaller percentage of first sons in the "no schooling" category and their larger percentage at the secondary level.

Summary and Conclusions

This paper was concerned with the patterns of educational participation in five agricultural villages of Lebanon with special reference to the indications of change resulting from a developing economy.[6]

The sample under analysis was briefly described and the recognition of its bizarre sex ratios was noted. The major problem of this paper dealt with the amount of schooling as compared among the sexes, the various age groups, and the occupational categories.

A negative relationship between the age of the group and the amount of schooling suggests that the amount of educational participation is increasing. In the comparison between fathers and sons as well as between mothers and daughters the evidence clearly indicates increasing educational participation. Among the occupational categories it was noted that participation at all levels of education was greater for those with higher socio-economic status scores. And the comparison of educational participation between generations shows an increasing amount of schooling for the younger generation among all occupational levels, as well as for the female sex.

But for economically underdeveloped countries such as the area under study here, the observation that educational participation is no longer limited only to the highest status group is of crucial interest. While advantages skew toward the upper class, educational participation is now distributed among all levels of the population.

On the basis of this conclusion and the notion that " the school is the most important spearhead of the process of inculcating the disciplines which are the most central to adult functioning in our society " both in terms of orientation to the general social patterns as well as in the " values of performance or achievement as distinct from those of ascriptive status-quality "[7] the implication for vast social changes for the near future in rural underdeveloped areas is clearly suggested. Also, with the educational participation becoming increasingly universal, a certain note of optimism might be warranted regarding the ability of the population to better cope with the problems associated with these changes. But this, of course, assumes a corresponding increase in the fundamental education (functional, community development) type of emphasis in the schools as compared to the traditional emphasis, which was not apparent in this survey.

NOTES

[1] A related paper, Hirabayashi and Armstrong, " Social Structure and Differentiation in Rural Lebanon ", *Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology*, vol. III, Pt. 3, 1956, describes the socio-economic status structure of a segment of the Arab society. See it for the basic methodology of the survey.

[2] Afif Tannous, " Emigration, A Force of Change in an Arab Village ", *Rural Sociology*, vol. VII, 1942, pp. 62–74.

[3] Hirabayashi and Armstrong, *op. cit.* Refer to it for the definition and the development of the occupational categories and the socio-economic status scores.

[4] *Ibid.* While the status score itself included a small value reflecting the degree of education of the head of each household, it was felt necessary to create a more refined measuring stick. This can be represented by the following basic formula:

Composite-Average Household

$$\text{Educational Attainment Score} = \frac{1}{n} \sum_{j=1}^{n} \left(\frac{A}{P} \times T\right)_j$$

where A=actual years of schooling completed by persons 5 years old or more;
P=possible number of years of schooling each person could have had.
Thus: age 0–5=does not apply;
age 6=1 possible year of schooling;
age 7=2 possible years of schooling.
T=type of school.

Thus: private schools = 1.
public schools = 0·8.
Mosque schools = 0·6.

n = number of members in household 5 years old or more.

The resultant distribution of composite-average household educational attainment scores had a mean of 1·57 years and a standard deviation of 0·73. The standard error of the mean was 0·10 and the coefficient of variation 0·063.

[5] Paul C. Glick, "Educational Attainment and Occupational Advancement," *Transactions of the Second World Congress of Sociology*, vol. II, International Sociological Association, London, 1954, pp. 184–185.

[6] The Southern Beqa'a valley was intentionally selected for study because it is the site of the proposed Litani development project, a small TVA type program and subject to considerable changes in the immediate future.

[7] Talcott Parsons, "The Social Structure of the School," paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociological Society, Washington, D.C., August 31st to September 2nd, 1955.