INTRODUCTION

Caglar Keyder
SUNY-Binghamton (US) and Bogazici University (Istanbul, Turkey)

1. The history of southern European societies reflects a troubled dialectic with the version of modernity that emerged in the North. The essence of northern modernity was circumscribed by the emergence of the autonomous individual, which gave rise to the liberal ideal. In the classic version, this ideal is premised upon modernization processes in a matrix of interrelated domains covering all walks of life. The critique of modernization articulated since the 1960s has attempted to proffer a broader conception of modernity in which neither the autonomous individual nor political liberalism remain as necessary components of the transformation. In this critique, modernity is taken to denote something narrower: having to do with rationality in organizations, modernization of state functions, economic efficiency, and the adoption of technology changes associated with economic and administrative fields. Hence, it does not necessarily entail the replication of what is considered the essential characteristic of western modernity, the emergence and primacy of the autonomous individual; but may admit the maintenance, at some level, of alternative particularisms. Such a reformulation makes it difficult to discuss empirical cases with any certainty. Is the absence of the autonomous individual in the liberal vein a result of invariant culture; or is it an indication of insufficient, blocked, or stalled modernization?

The title of the workshop where these papers were originally delivered was "Tradition in Modernity": The interplay between the individual-based conception of modernization and its critique has defined the agenda of social sciences most explicitly in the third world, but also in other regions outside the heartland of western Europe, notably southern Europe. In fact, it is possible to claim that the critique was initially formulated in the Southern European context. This confrontation with the North constitutes the principal key to understanding southern European societies: here, all accommodations to the liberal ideal create their own oppositions. These are not necessarily frontal, as, for instance, in defending statist nationalism or, a fortiori, fascism. They may be more subtle: as in the case of subverting democracy toward clientelism of party politics, or in expanding the space of maneuver left to interstitial practice in order to uphold moral economies, e.g. through the informal sector.
Southern Europe has been the privileged locus of all such opposition and accommodation: not in the real-historical sense of being the premier stage of the confrontation (which it nonetheless was) but also because, due to its proximity to the origin of self-conscious modernity, it attracted the attention of observers and students of matters social. Their speculations and projections of difference had the effect of inscribing elaborate and necessarily exaggerated versions of this difference in the conceptualization of southern Europe. The reality effect of this northern production of knowledge was reflected in political and social thought in the south, the essential driving force of which was resentment of and, variously, the desire to avoid or to rapidly emulate the kind of modernity identified with the North.

II. Southern European modernization was mostly reactive, directed by state structures and induced by the pressure of the North. This pressure imposed a sense of urgency, which was employed by nationalist and reformist cadres, at times in a project of catching up, at other times in resistance. The pressure from the North could be subtle, working through the imaginary of the intelligentsia; but, it could also be direct and negotiable, as in the demands relayed through the institutions of post-War American hegemony, or of the European Union.

There were middle-class "liberal" parties which took up the cause of modernization in southern countries, but those who declared themselves to be on the side of the "Anglo-Saxons", making individual liberties and economic enterprise the bases of their political platforms and the retreat of the state their goal, were more rare (cf Kurth 1993). These generally remained in the minority, and were countered by far more popular political and social movements which looked skeptically at the promises of liberalization. The mantle here was carried by those who claimed to represent a substantive cultural interest, in the name of the nation, of the state that expressed the community of the nation, or of a party which spoke for the preservation of community which was the object of threat. The presumption was that there was a common good and an organic community, and these could be maintained (or pursued) through the agency of the state. There is a venerable tradition behind this organic-statist conception (Stepan 1978, Wiarda 1973), and as has become clear in the discussion on East Asia, its heritage does not lie uniquely in Catholic social thought. The presumption of unitary interest, the vesting of the state to pursue the goals of community, the primacy of obligation to the collectivity, and a corporatist pattern of interest mediation, all contradicted the tenets of individual autonomy, self-regulating markets, and political liberalism, and are presumed to be integral elements of this alternative conception.

The period roughly between Italy's Risorgimento and the Great War witnessed a series of debates between political liberalism and statist control from above. This was, of course, the period of state modernization as well.

In all countries of the South, the pressure to rationalize and centralize the state structures, to abandon oligarchic or despotic authority in order to establish effective national administration, had risen to a peak. The immediate source of the pressure varied. In Spain and Italy it could be argued to derive from the civil society, i.e. the bourgeoisie which were regionally defined but sought to establish political and ideological hegemony over the whole country. The pressure of the inter-state arena was paramount in the case of the Ottoman Empire and in Greece. The debate between liberalism and statism thus took place during the transition from weak states to strong ones, when oligarchic rule with various local variations of clientelism was to be dismantled in favor of a more regulated relationship between a stronger state and the civil society.

The projects of state modernization intended to strengthen infrastructural mechanisms of administration, but were unclear as to how to employ the new capacities of the state. State modernization may serve different goals: the new capacities of the state may be deployed toward constructing the legislative and institutional infrastructures for the functioning of a self-regulating civil society, autonomous markets, and liberal politics; or, the state may become more efficient in carrying out its substantive goals concerning the society. There were debates on precisely these issues in Spain, Turkey and Greece, taking place during the same period. (Italian liberal tradition identified with Cavour had already been subverted by the accommodation of the church and the socialists under the pressures of unification, and through the practice of transformismo, leading to institutionalized patronage.) In Spain, the intellectual platforms constructed in the wake of the 1898 defeat pitted Europeanizers against Hispanicizers. Europeanizers defended an Anglo-Saxon direction of state modernization, with political and economic liberalism and Fabianist social reform. They felt that the constitution of a citizenry, and especially of a middle class not identified with the oligarchy, would guarantee the modernization of the economy and of the state. On the other side were proponents of Hispanicization:

"what is commonly meant, then, by Hispanicization as opposed to Europeanization is the reluctance among Spanish conservatives to exchange their traditional values and norms for the ideas of the European 'enlightenment'" (Holman, 1996, 47)

Hispanicizers argued that democratic-liberal institutions would undermine social stability and threaten the political order; unbridled economic transformation would also eventually result in social demands challenging oligarchic rule. Their choice was clear: conservatism with a stronger state which could keep the more destructive urges of oligarchy and caciquismo in check. The synthesis emerging from the debate was dubbed 'regenerationism', which found its later expression in Franquismo: modernization from above which would adopt European methods to further a centrally determined national interest. In other words, the state would be in a position to define national goals and to avoid the pitfalls of individualism and
liberty, but at the same time achieve a controlled transformation. For the privileged groups it was a way of assuring continued domination while accepting controlled change.

A similar debate took place in the Ottoman context, before and immediately following the Young Turk revolution against the ancient regime in 1908. The Young Turk opposition organized in Europe against the sultan had been divided into two rival factions—a division which became concrete in two political parties when a constitution was promulgated. The party that took power was called Union and Progress and the opposition was known as the Entente Libérale. (1) While the Entente took its inspiration from a tract by a little known French thinker, Edmond Demolins, on Anglo-Saxon superiority (A quoi tient la supériorité des Anglo-Saxons? 1897) via the political and economic liberalism of its intellectual leader, Prince Sabahaddin, the spokesman for the Unionists was Ziya Gokalp, a follower of Durkheim, and theoretician of nationalism and corporate solidarism. According to the liberals, "the real problem of Turkey was to transform society from a collectivist formation to an individualistic order" (Berkes, p.311), while Unionists embodied all the ideological orientations that came to characterize southern formations in the subsequent period: nationalism, solidarism, and corporatism. Not only did the Unionist position prevail in the short run, but its platform became the official ideology of the Turkish Republic after World War I. Thus, the debate about the path to be taken toward modernity was resolved in favor of state primacy and against a modernization based on individual autonomy and political liberalism. As in the Spanish case, the short period before and during the War served to rehearse for the much longer subsequent consolidation of state-led modernization, with economic nationalism, corporatist institutions and a disenfranchised citizenry.

The political debate in Greece roughly corresponds to the same period, and was again explicit in terms of the ramifications of liberalism versus statism. Here liberals were considered to represent the more entrepreneurial, albeit mercantile bourgeois interests, and supported republicanism and alliance with Britain. By contrast, the king and the royalists in 1915 supported the German side. While Venizelos's Liberal Party prevailed in the short run, "towards the end of the interwar period, economic developments, and above all the Depressio, resulted in a drastic restructuring and realignment of bourgeois factions—at the expense of Venizelism. Its aspiration to represent a broad interclass coalition headed by the entrepreneurial bourgeoisie as a whole was critically undermined by the increasing conservatism of the bourgeoisie." (Mavrogordatos, 1983, p.135).

In other words, in Greece too the bourgeoisie eventually opted for a non-liberal modernization project.

In fact, what is remarkable is the similarity of the political outcomes in Southern European states during especially the inter-war era (Arrighi, Keyder, Wallerstein, 1980). Mostly due to the lack of any resolution to the problem of world hegemony, these states all continued on the course set during the earlier period. British liberalism, along with informal empire and free trade, had waned as an influence. Uncertainty, and the feeling that economic management had to be taken into the guiding hands of the state led to a consolidation of the choice already expressed—for keeping liberalism at a distance. When terms of trade turned against these countries and merchants began to call for protection, no obstacles remained against inviting the state to step in to supplant the market. The orientation of economic activity shifted to the domestic economy and bourgeoisies became convinced that only the state could lead economic modernization. It was thus that developmental dictatorships were instituted, bolstered by the twin ideologies of nationalism and industrialization.

The legitimating discourse of these regimes did not have to be "fascist". Fascism was one version within a spectrum of state-centric discourses whose objective seemed to be to discredit liberalism and to extol models which would make possible solidarity rather than strife in the society. Fascism in Italy relied on a precedent social mobilization which all the other regimes sought to preempt through authoritarian dictatorship and conservative modernization. Perhaps for this reason Italy provided a laboratory whose particular innovations were borrowed by the other regimes: versions of the casa, the corporazione, and especially the labor-repressive legislation which outlawed independent unions and strikes were enacted in all the southern countries during the 1930s.[2] The states now had full control over their economies, and there was no possibility left for local bourgeoisies to aspire to an independent stance or to revive the liberalism debate. The period starting toward the end of the nineteenth century had been remarkable for the widening debate and the open expression of anxiety toward northern models of modernity—in some ways similar to the discussion taking place a century later in East Asia. Although the debate was generally concluded before and during World War I with the irreversible weakening of the liberal option, an even more unambiguous resolution had to wait until the inter-war episode when authoritarian statism and developmental dictatorship became universal models within the parameters of British decline and German ascendancy.

The argument so far has been presented in the vocabulary of elite competition and strategies; but the choice for strong states and corporatism and for the rhetoric of solidarity and social protection was in some sense inevitable, since the social forces seeking to achieve liberalism were weak and marginal. Whether regionally defined bourgeoisies (the Catalan and the northern Italian cases), pure mercantile interests with scant impact on the local economy (as in Greek shipping bourgeoisie), or religious minorities whose appurtenance in the political community was never clear (non-Muslim bourgeoisies in Turkey), they could be marginalized within the rhetoric of state-building on the basis of national unity. Although it is tautological to argue the
point, the very marginality of these social forces indicated that there was no support within the civil society for the establishment of a self-regulated market or individual autonomy. Instead of middle strata, the social structures of southern European countries were dominated by groups whose interests were satisfactorily mediated through clientelism; and, as the state attained greater infrastructural strength, through some form of corporatism. The sociostructural demand for liberalism, especially in the absence of accommodating world conditions, could not establish ideological hegemony in the civil society.

III. Although developmental dictatorships, in their will to realize ‘national integration’ were successful to some degree in establishing conditions for modern economic growth and thus contributed to the creation of bourgeoisie that could no longer be considered marginal, transformation of the societies toward an autonomous preference for economic and political liberalism was not yet on the agenda (cf. Arrighi, 1985). Italy’s post-war transformation was under conditions of occupation; in Greece and Turkey American presence was not much short of colonial and the considerable impact of Marshall funds created a further incentive. Spain and Portugal were the exceptions in continuing with the pre-war regimes while gradually accommodating the new forces and institutions of American hegemony. (3) American pressure was generally in the direction of ‘democratizing’ the political system ushering in party competition, without, however, overdriving emphasis on individual civil rights, or on a self-regulating, autonomous market. Southern European states never gave up their prerogatives of managing the economy, albeit through modernized instruments such as planning bodies and nationalized banks. During the 1960s, both in Greece and Turkey, the military became the self-appointed guardians of social harmony and solidarity against forerunners of strife and class warfare. Although somewhat distorted in Cold War optics, the opposition was clear: new middle classes and modern bourgeoisie (especially those oriented to the European North) versus the peasantry, the statist bourgeoisie, and ideological conservatives. The irony was that the military would declare the old-style left, which certainly was anti-liberal and statist, its principal opponent.

That the rejection of liberalism goes far deeper than political regime became evident after the defeat of authoritarianism and the military in Spain, Portugal, and Greece. Once again, the intricate balances struck in Italy by the political parties, the Catholic church, and various clientelistic accommodations at the local level became a model. The state in Italy was shaped by rival patronage interests to perpetuate particularistic arrangements and to eschew rule-bound universalism. No attempts were made by any of the political interests to challenge the compromises thus struck—especially after the de facto acceptance of the status quo by the Communist Party in its compromise. Italy’s example was significant in one other respect: it showed that the relationship with Brussels need not upset any arrangements at the national level, and in fact could be used to consolidate the links between the political elites and its clients, as in the example of EC’s regional funds and the Mezzogiorno. It was this model which became the blueprint for Spain and Greece. Eurosociusm emerged as yet another movement to modernize states in order to conform to the administrative requirements of Eureocrats on the one hand, and foreign capital on the other. There were no more oligarchies, but political parties had their barons who did their best to protect and conserve their constituencies. They took it upon themselves to uphold the “principle of social protection”, as Polanyi described the alternative to the principle of economic liberalism (Polanyi 1957, ch. 11). Neither universalism aimed at creating an undifferentiated citizenship in front of law and administration, nor economic liberalism with its goal of a self-regulating market, held any allure.

It may be the case that state modernization introduces borrowed legislation which nevertheless changes the legal environment, and although it may remain in conflict with socially accepted legitimate behavior, has an impact in permitting and legalizing practices which would otherwise not be tolerated. This has often been a dilemma faced by third-world modernizers anxious to import the right forms but reluctant to give up the prerogatives of the state or offend the moral basis of the society. It is surprising, however, despite more than a century of legislation borrowed from the North and the clear victory of American-style liberalism after 1945, how much the text of the basic laws may reflect the malaise with liberalism, and specifically grant to the state the status of guardianship. In Greece, for example, the conservative choices of the military and the church were inscribed into the post-dictatorship constitution (1975), requiring the state to remain paternalist and anti-liberal. Thus, according to the constitution human rights are not inalienable but are granted and guaranteed by the state (Legg and Roberts 1997, p. 113); and what emerges from the Constitution is “the notion of the state as extended family” (ibid., 114). The Constitution reads: “The state shall have the right to claim of all citizens to fulfill the duty of social and national solidarity”, emphasizing vague duties and obligations rather than rights. There are several other articles sanctifying the state as paternalist protector of the citizens, eliminating the possibility of an autonomous, self-regulating civil society on liberal lines. The 1981 Constitution of Turkey, prepared during the military regime, contains exactly the same provisions for the state to call on the duties and obligations of the subjects, and to “regulate” the civil society, and thus grants the political authorities an infinitely flexible ground in which to intervene both in the market and in the political process, in the name of higher societal good. This higher good becomes the framework within which individual rights may be granted or denied as befits the reasons of the state.
Introduction

as recipients of transfers of income, but also because they are often production units, sometimes in the formal but mostly in the informal economy—especially in informal construction of housing.

IV. The informal economy is one of the defining characteristics of the South in general and southern Europe in particular. Official unemployment rates or estimates of level and distribution of income based on the formal economy misrepresent the actual situation. Thus, unemployment in Spain (or in any other of the countries) is not, in fact, in excess of one-fifth of the labor force. Turkey does not, in fact, have a trade deficit; and, in the entire region, income levels are higher and distribution probably more equal than officially recorded. These stipulations are generally not disputed; what remains underlining is that it is the attitude of the state which determines the existence and the extent of the informal economy and the nature of its structuring effects. This is not to say, in the libertarian mode, that it is the excessive regulation and paperwork required by the bureaucracy which leads to the flourishing of an unregulated sector. Although this is certainly true, at a more substantive level there is a reluctance by the state to relinquish its control privileges and to permit the market to take its course. In other words, it is not because the state is after fees and stamp duties, or even after creating employment for its functionaries, that there exists forbidding paperwork. It is because the state is committed to a certain protective stance, determined to thwart off the abuse and destruction of the unbridled market. This noble sentiment, of course, derives from the more general anti-liberal attitude and is directed at perpetuating paternalist dependency.

One revealing instance of the reluctance and inability of the state to ratify the working of the market is in urban land. As Liia Leonidou (1990; also this volume) has argued Mediterranean cities have followed a pattern of urban ecology similar to other southern cities rather than northern European urban systems, as reflected in the emergence of popular peripheries around an urban core which remains the high-status area. One basic reason for this divergence is the informality reigning in the land market. It is because states have been "weak" from the point of view of being able to enforce property rights on land, that migrants (and city-dwellers themselves) have succeeded in devising informal ways of appropriating land in the periphery, and building on it. This weakness conceals a substantive choice based on the distrust of the market and on a preference for upholding moral rights—especially when it comes to a "licitious" commodity such as land. The northern propensity to allow the market maximum autonomy and then patch up the outcomes in order to preserve social peace, here translates to an ex ante suspicion which prevents the market from penetrating every field of economic behavior, and particularly from fully commodifying land and labor. From this complex of prohibitions and negotiated benign neglect, the state emerges stronger, not in the sense of
infrastructural strength that depends on the autonomization of the civil society, but because of its capability to arbitrarily intervene and declare an ongoing informal activity as, in fact, illegal; or, conversely, by signaling the permissibility of a practice which is on paper illegal. Thus, most bargains are struck and outcomes emerge on a temporary basis—because the ‘balance of forces’ may change at any time.

It may be a truism, but it should be added that this configuration characterized by the absence of legal predictability leads to a particular type of organization in the economy, in turn structuring a particular type of class formation. A positive assessment of this model may highlight the flexibility of the Italian state’s judicious neglect which permitted low wages and unpaid taxes (Capelletti, 1989, p.193), and thus made possible the success of the model of flexible accumulation. It may even be argued that this model, in some advanced form indicates the way of the post-Fordist future (cf. Piore and Sabel, 1984, Sabel 1994). On the other hand, it may precisely be the uncertain nature of the state’s enforcement rules and legislation and the apprehension over the nature of its intervention that leads to a different time horizon for investors. In this reading, flexibility is not a desirable but a necessary strategy. One recent example is the emergent of Istanbul as a center for informal international trade. According to IMF estimates the volume of this trade reaches ten billion dollars per annum and it is conducted entirely as unrecorded, untaxed, unoffical commerce. Soviet bloc shoppers arrive in the city as tourists, buy large amounts of consumer goods (mostly textiles, but also other light manufactures), and take them back “in their suitcases”, i.e. informally. They sell the wares wholesale in Russia or other parts of Eastern Europe. In other words, all sides collude in not regulating a trade, which is in fact conducted illegally. While, on the one hand, this reflects admirable flexibility on the side of merchants, shopkeepers, and employment decisions accordingly—on a flexible and inefficient, rather than rational and calculable basis—hence the particular shaping of accumulation and class formation.

V. The attempt to provide a hypothesis about the unifying orientation of southern European social science leads to the positing of difference with northern modernity. This difference results from a complex genesis not excluding cultural essence. However much it emanated from an irreducible cultural divide, it was continuously re-shaped and constructed through economic, political and cultural interactions with the northern core and its state structure, law, institutions, and values. Uneven development led to reactions of statism and nationalism, which in turn were legitimated on the basis of older notions of solidarity and paternalism. Societal practices of clientelism were transformed into party politics which, coupled with statism, “with the presence of a state that was as interventionist as it was administratively weak” (Sapelli 1995, p.20) led to a peculiar version of populist democracy, still upholding an anti-liberal legitimation. These balances may satisfy the state elites by permitting the preservation of privilege and corruption, but they also perpetuate a certain ambiguity in practice, making it difficult for the civil society to flourish on the basis of predictable rules. Thus, a certain kind of non-liberal state breeds a certain kind of non-autonomous civil society, both short of the northern ideal of modernity.

How does the current global phase promoting liberalism through the agency of an ‘international corporate bourgeoisie’ threaten these balances? It would seem that the crisis of national capitalism, and therefore of states which legitimated themselves on the basis of their ability to govern national capitalism, has led to conflict and stagnation in southern Europe. It is primarily the conception of the state and its legitimacy that is being questioned. The emergence of a bourgeoisie who were bound less to the state, and more to the international circuits of global capital, ready to emancipate themselves from state tutelage, spoke both to the success of the statist efforts at creating modern economies, and to the changing conditions of the world economy which would no longer accommodate national capitalism. Growing internationalization meant that maturing capitalists would seek opportunities at the global scale rather than within national confines, and would prefer liberal economies and predictability rather than the substantive goals of the state dictating national priorities. Although stalled, the process that began in Italy to combat corruption in the bureaucracy, party machines, and the entire mechanism of patronage, is an important attempt in this direction: to introduce accountability and thus to transform the premises of the state-society relationship. At the same time, however, the crisis leads to disillusionment with the promises of modernist transition to liberalism in the northern mode. Without the gravitation provided by that promise, regional and ethnic movements become more attractive, intensifying pressures on the state. At the same time, practices that avoid the formal market or the formal realm of legislation increase in importance because of an expanding sector of unemployed who no longer live in contexts where populist mechanisms designed to incorporate them can function. The pressure on welfare systems contributes to the disinheritting of this group. Along with the populations introduced into the picture via illegal immigration, it may even be possible to talk about a growing irrelevance of the state for an increasing portion of the society. The transition therefore hangs in balance: liberalization and convergence with the North (only if reinforced by successful corporate
globalization of the economy), and hollowing out and growing irrelevance of the state accompanied by autonomization and fragmentation of the civil society are two of the possibilities. Given the argument of this paper, is there perhaps a third scenario in the form of a reversion to a reconstituted organic statism? We are still at a stage when both the state and the civil society are muddling through, and the contours of the social forces and coalitions behind these alternatives are yet to be defined. More importantly, the global context within which one of these alternatives will be elected, is also in the process of acquiring shape.

VI. The papers in this volume exhibit a broad range. Nicos Mouzelis explicitly addresses the issue of different modernities and concludes that convergence is not on the agenda. Without directly dealing with southern Europe, he argues for the conjunctural specificity of the genesis of western (northern) modernity and elaborates the ways in which variants of state-dominated modernities may prevail. Nükhet Sirriyan’s paper analyzes the academic heritage of social science research on Southern Europe, and critiques the concepts which have served in the construction of the area as an object of study. She finds that not only the critique, but also the recent developments point to a new problematic beyond the essentialization of Mediterranean cultures. Eliezer Ben-Rafael in a succinct account of the ethnic complexity of Israeli society, reminds us that all ‘national’ cultures are constructs of culturally dominant groups, and societal balances are in constant flux in response to cultural and political struggles of other socio-cultural groups. This ‘multiculturalism’ is in fact a strong force leading to social change. Fortunata Piscali reviews the diverse paradigms of migration studies in southern European context and finds that the growing complexity of migration flows in the post-modern world requires a similarly variegated conceptual approach. Lila Leonidou discusses the historical differences between southern and northern cities in terms of culture and ecology, and argues that the urban orientation of the Mediterranean world has allowed the city in the South to adapt to re-urbanization of the last two decades, and to emerging urban entrepreneurship of postmodern global economy with great ease.

Luciano Li Cauci describes the historical role played by the Communist Party in the Tuscan countryside, and how its appeal derived not from narrow political ideology but from its successful campaign in making citizens out of, until then disenfranchised, sharecroppers. Ayse Oncu describes the shift from the ruling paradigm of three-worldist nationalism in Turkish sociology, both under the influence of changing academic concerns, and due to the growing awareness of the multiplicity of competing orientations in the society—especially with the surfacing of the Islamic and the Kurdish movements challenging secularism and the assumptions of ethnic homogeneity.

Introduction

In all of these papers, an implicit concern is the nature of the change brought about by globalization and postmodernity, and the ways in which it can be seized in conceptual study of the subject. Thus, we are reminded that multiculturalism is becoming accepted reality and replacing facile assertions of national homogeneity; that population movements are no longer predictable or controllable and cross-national networks have gained a new presence. National perspectives are no longer sufficient to understand politics, urban cultures, or academic preoccupations; in fact, we should be ready to relativize the western trajectory to modernity. All this seems to suggest that the questions of the current era may require a new sociology which starts with the recognition of difference in cultural and historical heritage, avoids assumptions of convergence and linearity, resists the temptation of assuming static balances within homogenized national spaces; and investigates the compatibilities and conflicts between processes, practices, and relations found in southern Europe and those emerging in the global arena.

Notes

(1) The intellectual platform of the Entente consisted of political and economic liberalism and administrative de-centralization. Economic liberalism would be achieved by minimizing state intervention and through reliance on 'private initiative'. Compared to the statist centralism of Union and Progress, the federalism of the Entente had already, before 1908, attracted various minority groups who were increasingly wary of Union and Progress designs for a unitary state, which they feared would become Turkish-nationalist, and uncompromising in imposing a single blueprint for a newly constructed community where the interests of the Muslim-Turkish element would be paramount. The Union and Progress, on the other hand, found its constituency among the aspiring Turkish intelligentsia and provincial merchants, whose main concern was to safeguard their privileged access to the state.

(2) As Germany emerged dominant in continental economy toward the end of the 1930s, all these measures could be accommodated within an international market politically regulated from Berlin.

(3) Paradoxically, it was in Turkey where a self-proclaimed liberal party had to openly confront the ruling party of the authoritarian era in order to come to power in 1950. (Keyder 1987, ch. 6). The paradox is revealing, however. The authoritarian regime in Turkey had been far less successful than its counterparts in other southern European countries in instituting effective channels of interest mediation. Its modernization of the state apparatus was insufficient to contain social change, and was more repressive than regulatory; hence, it had to resort more frequently to arbitrary and despotic power.
Bibliography


