Dear Colleagues, Members of RC48,

I am pleased to present our first Grassroots newsletter for 2021. RC48 Members’ discussion on pandemic social issues, which started in the July 2020 issue of Grassroots, continues in this issue, too. The current issue is focused on the ‘Vaccine Question.’ Reflections concerning the different countries’ management of public health disparities in the face of vaccine shortages, and the role of social movements and citizen protests are presented in this issue, edited by our new editorial team, Camilo Tamayo Gomez and Kaan Agartan.

Contributions concern a wide and multidisciplinary range of topics focusing on aspects related to vaccine nationalism, analyzed through economic and psychological lens, an historical overview about ‘acting selfishly’ in different countries, the role of power in vaccination and, of course, the role of social movements in the vaccine question.

As the previous Covid-19 special issue, this issue addresses an important sociological debate that focuses on the consequences of pandemics on political choices and active citizenship protests, and on people’s life/health around the world. RC48 members can do a lot in this direction, contributing to the debate with very challenging reflections about protests and beyond, “boosting” through sociological analysis the phase of re-starting, renovation and challenges.

Furthermore, this Grassroots issue reports the several sessions of the Forum with short summaries, impressions and pictures provided by some session organizers and chairs. I am thankful to these members for having provided reports and impressions in order to compose a quick glance of the RC48 programme. All the
Note from the RC48 President

sessions were amazing and it will be great to have the possibility to read some participants’ descriptions. These reports allow members who cannot attend the Forum to enjoy an easy but accurate summary, and then choose to watch session video recordings at this link: https://isaconf.confex.com/isaconf/forum2020/meetingapp.cgi/Symposium/614.

Even if online, the Forum was successful. The sessions had a good level of involvement and highlighted central issues and aspects of social movements around the world. Sessions stressed on recent debates and concerns on social movements research today from theoretical and empirical angles. The several joint sessions highlighted the efforts of our members in building relationships in order to widen RC48’s intellectual horizon. Difference in time zones was the main problem that affected participation in the sessions and business meetings at the Forum. Despite the time difference, members had a great exchange at the RC48 business meeting, and several proposals were discussed, including the development of a RC48 website — it will be present it at the end of this year—, a new format of Grassroots newsletter —starting from this number—, the will of attracting new members and planning outreach activities and events.

We also started to plan the RC48 mid term conference: it could be a blended event in Catania, co-organized by the University of Catania and University of Warsaw. Several conditions due to the pandemic crisis and the debate about postponing the World Congress to 2023 delayed this latter plan, but I am hopeful we will decide on a date soon. All the RC48 members are welcome to continue to send us information about 2021 publications and events, we would be glad to add them in each Grassroots newsletters and on the RC48 website, when ready.

Yours sincerely,

Liana M. Daher
President RC48
The Research Committee on Social Movements, Collective Action and Social Change (RC48) is part of the International Sociological Association (ISA). It was founded as a Working Group in 1992, under the presidency of Prof. Bert Klandermans. In 1994, it was recognized as an ISA Research Committee.

The objective of RC48 is to foster intellectual, academic and scholarly exchanges between researchers of broadly defined social movements, collective action and social change. The RC48 is currently based at the Collective Identity Research Centre (Department of Sociology 2, University of the Basque Country, Spain).

The ISA was founded in 1949 under the auspices of UNESCO. With more than 5,000 members coming from 167 countries, the ISA is currently the most important international professional association in the field of sociology. Its goal is to advance sociological knowledge throughout the world, and to represent sociologists everywhere, regardless of their school of thought, scientific approaches or ideological opinion.

The on-going scientific activities of the ISA are decentralised in 55 Research Committees (RC), 3 Working Groups (WG) and 5 Thematic Groups (TG), each dealing with a well-recognized specialty in sociology. These groups bring together scholars who wish to pursue comparative research on a transnational basis and they constitute basic networks of scientific research, intellectual debate and professional exchange. Although they must fulfil certain minimum requirements, RCs have complete autonomy to operate. Each RC’s governing body is the Board, formed by a President, a Secretary, and a variable number of board members. RC48 participates in the organization of both the ISA World Congresses, celebrated every 4 years since 1950 (Zurich), and the ISA Forums of Sociology, also celebrated every 4 years since 2008 (Barcelona).

In contrast to the ISA World Congress, which has a more professional and academic character, the forum’s original purpose was to establish an open dialogue with colleagues
About RC 48

doing sociology in public institutions, social movements, and civil society organizations. This means that every two years, we are involved in the organization of a worldwide event. In between ISA World Congresses and forums, our committee organizes smaller scientific meetings called RC48 international conferences. These meetings tend to be more narrowly focused than other ISA events and, on average, they gather between 30 and 60 scholars. Consequently, colleagues can make longer presentations, and we can go hold deeper and more enriching debates.
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Without a doubt, the last ISA online IV Forum of Sociology was a remarkable event. In this section, different members of RC48 provide a short report regarding some of the sessions hosted by our Research Committee members.

**Session ‘Protest Politics in Times of Crisis: Comparative Perspectives from the Global South’**
Report by Isamu Okada

Two papers were presented in our session “Protest Politics in Times of Crisis: Comparative Perspectives from the Global South”. Isamu Okada and Jewellord Nen Singh’s work on “State Capacity and Popular Incorporation in the 21st Century Latin America” addressed how state responses to societial incorporation demands varied systematically across Latina American countries and what explain the regional divergence. Federico L. Schuster’s presentation under the title of “The Political Content of Protest in Recent Argentina” coincides the attention on Latin America and provokes a debate around a possible ‘break’ in protests due to the pandemic of covid-19. The expositors coincided how historical periods, before and during neoliberalism and in post-neoliberal era, shaped political processes of protest-making in the region. Then, discussion revolved around leading forces in the interaction between the state and societal agencies. Panelists bridged new questions with conventional understandings and lively exchanged insights with audience and to each other. Camilo Tamayo
Gomez, who kindly chaired the session called attention on the values of protests in sometimes unfavorable situations.

**Session ‘Organized Collective Action: Building Bridges from Social Movements and Formal Organizations (Part I and Part II)’**

Report by Thiago Duarte Pimentel

Professor Marcos Ancelovi (UQAM) could not attend the forum in this new virtual format, but I guided the session by myself. However, I have had the help of Professor Michael Grothe-Hammer (Secretary of RC17), who joined us in the 2 sessions. I think everything was good and we have had a high level of the paper presented, with presenters from Brazil, England, USA, Thailand, South Korea, and participants from all over the world. All the presenters attended the session and presented their papers. And also we have had participants (10 on average, in each session) watching the sessions and interacting, making questions at the end. Finally, I have proposed a special issue for the journal Theory and Culture (UFJF - Brazil), https://periodicos.ufjf.br/index.php/TeoriaeCultura/index, where I am the current associated editor. Please find this call for papers, organized by prof. Michael Grothe-Hammer and myself, in the section ‘Call for Papers’ in this edition of Grassroots.
Session ‘Democratic Experiments in Social Movements and Society’
Report by Micha Fieldschuster

This online session, which attracted 13 participants from around the world, was hosted by Micha Fieldschuster. The session provided three case-based empirical perspectives on contemporary issues about citizen engagement and democracy. The original and thought-provoking papers sparked a lively discussion with the audience. Gil PRADEAU (University of Westminster, United Kingdom) discussed the democratic potentials and pitfalls of participatory budgeting in France. Participatory budgeting was famously introduced in Brazil to democratize democracy by increasing citizen participation in the budgetary process and giving citizens a greater say in how public funds are spend. Many countries around the world adopted the model or introduced similar mechanisms. In his talk “Sandpit democracy. About the third wave of participatory budgeting in France” PRADEAU presented his findings from France where he mapped participatory practices and conducted a rule analysis and surveyed website functionalities. He showed that there is no advancement of participatory budgeting in France over time and it is even often used to mask austerity measures. He
argued that the French cases cannot be seen as robust democratic innovations, they cannot help to foster accountability and they appear unlikely to increase the trust of citizens in politics.

Camila PENNA (Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil) presented a paper co-authored with Priscila CARVALHO and Priscila ZANANDREZ (both Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais, Brazil) with the title “Political participation and democratic attitudes in Brazil: Political talk and perceptions on Democracy”. The authors addressed the important question how participatory practices influence the democratic values of Brazilians? They conducted focus group interviews and with 47 participants from different types of organizations and analyzed their data with a thematic categorial analysis. Depending on the organizational format (councils, social movements or associations), participants had different views on democracy ranging from procedural to substantive conceptions.

Remarkably, the Black activists voiced the strongest view on democracy by claiming that there is no democracy because of the racial violence and inequalities. David DUENAS-CID turned our attention to the topic of e-democracy and trust. In his talk “Internet voting and trust, an open debate” he pointed out the importance of trust for any social order. He asked us to consider the changing conceptions of trust and what is necessary to adopt a new technology. The question of whether or not adopting e-voting is a pressing issue during the pandemic when many elections were postponed or held during a public health emergency. He went beyond the conventional understanding that trust and distrust are consequences of technology and that they are mutually exclusive by arguing that trust and distrust can co-exist and that they each have their own impact as causes on the adoption of technology.
Session ‘Public Problem/ Public Social Science’
Report by Paola Diaz Lizé

The session ‘Public Problem/ Public Social Science’ went very well, with two meetings on different days. The coordinators organized the meeting previously with the speakers and that helped us to structure the discussion. In the sessions, there was a real substantive discussion on the sociology of public problems as a heuristic tool for the investigation of concrete problems in different cases, i.e. in Argentina (human rights), Chile (environment and climate change), Mexico (obstetric violence), etc. We also discussed the importance of creating synergies between professional researchers, experts and civil society knowledge production. We did not have much public and that is quite unfortunate, but there are many sessions in parallel. Because of the change of date (Pandemic crisis), several speakers did not participate, others could not pay for the congress (social crisis) and others could not participate because of the schedule.

Session ‘Young People, Collective Action and Participation: Diffusion and Innovation’
Report by Ilaria Pitti

During the IV World Forum, the joint session ‘Young People, Collective Action and Participation: Diffusion and Innovation’ engaged scholars in youth studies and social movement studies in discussing processes of “political contagion” driven by young people. The papers presented during the session
have addressed this topic exploring how young people manage to foster their collective agency by building internal trust, sharing power and sharing knowledge discussing the strategies developed by young people to empower other (disadvantaged) young people to take control of their lives through collective action, and analysing contextual factors shaping processes of political diffusion of youth movements across the world. The session, which has seen the engaged participation of a very active public, has also served as a moment of collective reflection on the ISA’s social and political role prompted by the reading of a letter from Cihan Erdal, a Turkish Phd Student at Carleton University (Canada) and a member of LGBTQ+ community who, at the time of the conference, was imprisoned in Turkey due to his political engagement.

Session ‘The Challenges of Democratic Political Agency in Social Movements Today’
Report by Anna Maria Leonora

The session ‘The Challenges of Democratic Political Agency in Social Movements Today’ took place in the late afternoon (for me CET) on 28 February 2021. The panel shed a light on the link between the growing social inequality challenged by social movements aiming at creating and renewing the space of democracy. More in depth, the session wanted to explore the multi-dimensional issues of political agency - and its contradictions - in progressive social movements. These cognitive targets were placed at three levels of scientific observation: the institutional debate in the global context, the institutional confrontation in the regional context, and a peripheral confrontation challenging institutional subjects.

Micha Fiedlschuster, from York University of Canada, focused his attention on the multidimensional issues of political agency in the World Social Forum (WSF). The author critically assessed the reform attempts that have been made to make the WSF more inclusive, less prone to commercialization and
commodification, and more attuned to newer mobilizations pointing that WSF can be considered as an important tool of the alter-globalization movements, even though its organizers missed to adapt it to the democratic expectations of many participants, new modes of mobilization, and persistent challenges of inequality and power differences among the (old and new) participants.

Paulo César Ramos from Universidade de São Paulo and Danilo Morais from Fundação Herminio Ometto in Brazil presented a part of the early research findings that explored discursive resources created by peripheral movements – a group of collective actors widely referenced in hip-hop culture in the southeast of Brazil – that use to link their local agendas with so-called “structural” problems, such as multiple and persistent inequalities, filling content or thickening the meaning of the notion of periphery.

Rachid Jarmouni from University Moulay Ismail Meknes in Morocco presented a paper that adopted a new concept of the political work labeled “the new paradigm of political work” that does not mean a revolution or a rebellion against the situation, rather, it is a peaceful, civilized, and patriotic work that adopts democratic methods in political work, in the sense of practicing the political work but according to new rules that go beyond what is institutional and close to the concept of social movements. The panel overall discussion, held in the final part of the session, involved both presenters and the audience through a very intense and fruitful discussion highlighting how the heterogeneity and variety of approaches and research cases shed a light on the relevance of confrontation between scholars as an added value in framing social movement research.

**Session ‘Solidarity Economy Projects in Diverse Social Contexts’**

Report by Melanie Bush
In this Invited Session presenters explored questions related to projects comprising the “solidarity economy”. For example, the impact of involvement in these initiatives on youth development; which types of structures of solidarity most align with deeply transformative practices; the relationship of these projects to political resistance; commonalities and distinctions with indigenous forms of associativism and the shaping of individual and collective narratives about the kind(s) of society(ies) that members strive to create.

We brought intergenerational (ages 25-65) feminist, scholar-activist, critical race and decolonial perspectives about contemporary initiatives and the possibilities they represent. We affirmed the centrality of interdisciplinarity in our analyses. Most presenters are involved in scholarly and community projects characterized by solidarity economy oriented practices such as cooperatives, mutual aid, etc. We collectively considered how communities “be the change” structurally and through transformative social relations. We explored what principles and practices most firmly embed solidarity and the common good in contemporary efforts aimed at radical social change. This session engaged participants and attendees in thinking about the Challenges of the 21st Century: Democracy, Environment, Inequalities, Intersectionality through a conversation of ideas and energies in action.
Panelists shared excerpts from ethnographic research, and centered respondents’ voices in an analysis of the meaning and significance of the projects examined. Their comments provided a space to visualize knowledge created on the other side of the abyssal line (Santos, 2014). Presenters demonstrated how communities navigate the challenges of meeting basic needs in different ways, utilizing resources at hand.

Drawing from Youth Studies, Erika Licon discussed the impact that solidarity economy organizations have on youth human development. She demonstrated how these projects provide safe physical spaces in which subaltern representations of youth selfhood are developed and expanded. Participants expressed that when you grow as a person, you also grow with the project in the sense of belonging. Being, belonging and becoming is transformative for the individual, the community and the collective. This influences their ideas about who they will be in the future. Participation satisfies their social, economic and emotional needs and develops them as environmentally conscious citizens. Participation expands youth subaltern representations of selfhood.

Whitney Sabino (Mozambique) spoke of her experience with communities constantly challenged by displacement, environmental catastrophe and armed conflict. Sabino explored how movements reinvent themselves to sustain their struggles outside traditional structures and bring a feminist organizing perspective. She describes how doing so involves challenging generational power relations within the feminist movement, because of tensions with and dependence on already established larger organizations. Associação Sócio Cultural Horizonte Azul (ASCHA) began their work by using social media tools, and in 2020 created a new funding movement called aljada, (allies) to support their initiatives. By doing so they shifted from dependence on formal funds and power structures to support activities such as COVID support, education, obtaining and distributing basic food, health and
school supplies.

Through a feminist inquiry approach with the ‘Capuchinhas’ women’s cooperative in Portugal, Teresa Cunha discussed how companionship, autonomy, freedom, and decision-making power are experienced in co-op members’ lives. She counters the dichotomy between productive and reproductive work. Cunha establishes that all women's work is productive as it is the material and immaterial foundation of life. Cunha states that the sociological imagining of another world centers life and therefore women in an economy of desire that affirms generative practices.

In “Associativism in Traditional Communities”, Marilia Veronese speaks of the living metaphor of suffering caused by coloniality and asserts that a major problem is of cognitive injustice. Veronese spoke of the long tradition of solidarity in Brazil, particularly among indigenous communities, Quilombos, artisans and fishermen who work cooperatively as a way of life. These communities' strength comes from traditional practices related to water, irrigation systems and seed banks that rid them of dependence on the state and the market. They also participate in social movements for example around housing, the autonomous management of schools and in challenging binary gender relations. Through this work they engage a deeper participatory citizenship through social activism.

Examining the solidarity economy in the United States, Melanie Bush shared respondents’ perspectives about two models: a time bank and a comprehensive project with a vision and program for reshaping social relations and ways to meet the needs of their community (Brattleboro Time Trade/Vermont; Cooperation Jackson/Mississippi). Bush stated that the characterization of these as “new” disregards historical examples of community-based efforts to meet needs, where formal structures either do not exist or are insufficient. What is new is the contemporary crisis of the modern world system.
While short and long term goals can sometimes represent a tension, community education building can be part of movement building making political education important. Race, class, gender and age dynamics play a significant role in the form and focus of these initiatives. Finally, Bush states “change” comes because people create it, not because those in power grant it.

Jean-Louis Laville asked why it is difficult for the solidarity economy to become a legitimate topic, noting the strong separation between social movement and alternative economies studies. He suggests that the liberal tradition presents history as a succession of steps and assimilating market economy to progress and a lack of consideration for the resources which according to Jean-Baptiste Say are not part of economic analysis. He asserts that neoliberalism emphasizes reference to competition and by definition, capitalist forms of organizing society. Laville proposes that to highlight the political dimension of solidarity economy we need international dialogue mostly south-north, rooted in the historical context.

This theme was noted throughout the session - that it is critical for the separation of solidarity economies, social movements and the academy to be bridged. Furthermore, the role of youth, intergenerationality, women and the most oppressed is central to the organization of these economic structures. A challenge is sustainability outside the market economy and the state, and meeting both immediate and long term needs. In this moment of capitalist crisis, solidarity economy projects have a critical role to play. Research and analyses are essential.

**Session ‘Revisiting the Role of Digital Media in Social Movements: Part II’**
Report by Tin-yuet Ting

While digital media has been observed to offer new opportunities for social movements to thrive across the world, adopting new media and information technology requires
citizen activists to operate under different premises and to confront new challenges. The question remains about whether and how digital media empower or constrain the capacity of protest movements. This session was thus organized to revisit the uses of digital media in recent protest movements.

Our first presentation by Stefania Milan and Davide Beraldo addressed the timely issue of datafication and its impact on political engagement. It was argued that linked databases, platforms, and apps have come to reconstitute the definitions of public sphere and citizenship in today’s datafied society. In this theoretical discussion, they offered three notions, namely ‘data citizenship,’ ‘data activism,’ and ‘data epistemology,’ to capture how emerging data practices may offer new pathways to democratic participation and movement mobilization. Our second presentation by Davide Beraldo proposed the concept of ‘contentious branding’ to examine the appropriations of ‘semiotic repertoires’ in contentious politics. In his view, many protest movements, such as Occupy and Anonymous, can be understood as contentious brands which offer affective devices to catalyze and refract diverse
mobilizations.

On the other hand, we had empirical cases on the adoption of new media technology in social movements in different parts of the world. Sheba Saeed examined the use of social media in the mobilization of a trans-movement in Pakistan. She stressed the role of the digital platform in bringing the otherwise marginalized minority group into the public sphere through the process of ‘scaling.’ Meanwhile, Hayat Douhan’s presentation discussed the representations of Mohsen Fikri’s death in Moroccan online mainstream and alternative media. Based on a comparative framing analysis, she found that citizen journalists made the best use of thematic framing to contextualize the incident for mobilization and making the state accountable, whereas mainstream media used episodic framing to de-dramatize the incident and mitigate the public outrage. Using the case of La Manada, Elisa Garcia-Mingo investigated how feminist associations created new activist strategies that combine on- and offline actions to challenge rape culture and gender stereotypes in the Spanish legal system. In her view, new digital culture has reconfigured the ways activists fight against sexual violence. Bringing together presentations on a variety of digital activism and media practices, our session produced fruitful conversations among presenters and audiences. It expanded and updated our knowledge of the role of digital media and information technology in the recent wave of contentious politics and citizen action.

Session ‘Social Movements, Civil Society and Grassroots Activism’
Report by Natalia Miranda

We had three wonderful presentations in the session. We started with Laura Bullon-Cassis (NYU, IHEI) exploring issues on climate change and digital media use of youth activists in the US. The second presentation was from Dr. Temitope Oriola (U. Alberta) who analized girl’s kidnapping in Nigeria and
the mobilisation of state and non-state actors. Lastly, we had a presentation from Porto Alegre (the official place of our Forum before the world pandemic). Dr. Rafael Flores (UFRGS) presented activism deployed by the Combat Comite against a carbon mine project in Brazil. Overall, we had a great discussion, with interesting questions and comments from the audience. This session was a good example of the spirit of the whole ISA Forum: a place where sociologists from all around the world are committed to participate and exchange ideas, no matter where in the world we are.

Session ‘Social Movements, Contentious Politics, and the Imagination of Alternative Futures’ Joint Session ISA Research Committees on Futures Research (RC07), Social Classes and Social Movements (RC47), and Social Movements, Collective Action and Social Change (RC48)
Report by Markus S. Schulz

This Joint Session questions the recent rise of retrotopian politics and authoritarian leadership in different countries around the world, the disenchantment this expresses with narrowly conceived liberal democracy, and the imaginative efforts of social movements to overcome the confines of the social and institutional status quo. It is jointly organized by Breno BRINGEL (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil), the President of RC47, Liana DAHER (Catania, Italy), the RC48 President, and Markus S. SCHULZ (Erfurt, Germany), member of the three participating RCs. Five papers offer a thought-provoking array of theoretical insights, new empirical case-studies, and historical comparisons of different settings and regions.

Lauren LANGMAN (Loyola University) jump-starts the session with a paper entitled “From Social Movements to Social Change: A Better World Better be Likely.” Building on Hegelian-Marxian notions of history, he rejects the view of progress as linear and pointed to an oscillation of advancements and countertrends, ranging from the 1960s opening of cultural spaces and the Reagan era’s casting of
government as the problem to the turn-of the millennium mobilization of the Zapatistas, Seattle protests, the Arab Spring, Occupy Wall Street and the rise of the Tea Party and Trumpism. While Langman agrees with the basic tenets of New Social Movements Theory, he also calls for a remediation of its two major blind spots regarding political economy and emotions, both of which intersect at legitimation crisis. Langman locates hopes for a better world in the creativity of progressive activists and their ability to coalesce diverse needs and social sectors.

Jan NEDERVEEN PIETERSE’s (University of California at Santa Barbara) talk “After Populism” focuses on the broad global context and the need for empirical comparison. Nederveen Pieterse presents a multi-temporal analytical framework with which he distinguishes between forms that change and sturdier long-term trends that last. This frames the crucial question about the contested re-organization of globalization. Nederveen Pieterse considers the neoliberal weakening of institutions and the accompanying concentration of wealth and power as major underlying factors for enabling the rise of right-wing populist authoritarianism. However, he sees
rightwing populism already over its peak and the resurgence of nationalism at its limits, with the internationalist international stronger than the nationalist international because of its synchronicity with the longer trend. Nederveen Pieterse rejects the narrow angle of a globally converging neoliberal globalization that ignores differing experiences, including but not limited to those from Asia.

Christopher CHASE-DUNN and Javier EZCURDIA (both University of California at Riverside) present “The Vessel: Forging a Diagonal Instrument for the Global Left.” Chase-Dunn and Ezcurdia propose the “vessel” as a new organizational strategy for the global left to overcome its fragmentation and lack of influence at a time of rising neo-fascist and populist reactionary nationalism. By merging struggles as diverse as environmentalism, human rights, feminism, anti-racism, and queer rights, it seeks to gain political efficacy to confront and contend with the intricate power structures of world capitalism. As a “diagonal” strategy, the vessel is meant to combine horizontalism with a semi-centralized formal organizational structure that is democratic and flexible. Such a network aims to merge the resilience of leaderless activist groups with a stability that is otherwise more characteristic of institutional parties.

Ines DURAN MATUTE (Universidad Benemérita of Puebla, Mexico) continues the discussion of organizational forms and visions in her presentation on “Re-Thinking Democracy from Below and to the Left”. Duran Matute contrasts a rhetorical democracy curtailed by a neoliberal mode of governance with a substantial democracy that affords actual participation. She shares her scholar-activist experience in Mexico with the Indigenous Council of Government (CIG), which was formed by the National Indigenous Congress (CNI) and the Zapatistas. Their appointment of Marichuy as the first ever indigenous woman as a presidential candidate for the 2018 elections marked a new round of activism from below. Duran Matute points to the reimagining of the ‘pluriverse’ as a ‘world where
many worlds fit’, that allows multiple temporalities to thrive instead of suppressing them in favor of the linear time of capital. Taking up ideas from Benita Cruz, an indigenous woman from Tehuantepec, she suggests the need for mutual reciprocity over autonomy within a territory, so as to break fences, to build synergies, and imagine alternative futures.

Cécile VAN DE VELDE presents comparative research “From the Indignados to the Hong-Kong Pro-Democratic Movement: What Slogans of One Decade of Youth Protests Tell Us about Generational Aspirations.” Van de Velde asks whether mobilizations during the 2010s mark the rise of a common generational future vision. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, she analyzed nearly 2,000 slogans from movements as diverse as the Indignados in Madrid (2011-2012), the student movement in Santiago de Chile (2011-2012), the Maple Spring in Montreal (2012), the Umbrella (2014) and pro-democracy mobilizations (2019) in Hong-Kong, the Nuit Debout (2016) and the Gilets Jaunes (2018) in Paris, and the climate demonstration (2019) in Montreal. She frequently found generational voices asking about ‘what have you done to our world?’ and protesting against unfair burdens from past decisions. Overall, Van de Velde finds in her data set more expressions “pro” than “anti”, indicating constructive vibrancy at the very grassroots.
Grassroots On Focus: Reflections on COVID-19, Vaccine Nationalism, and Social Movements

Preface
Kaan Agartan and Camilo Tamayo Gomez

While the Covid-19 vaccine rollout has successfully immunized millions of people in the US and Europe, some countries have not even started vaccinating their citizens. Despite the spread of a more aggressive variant of the coronavirus, the “luckier” portions of the global population have already returned to their pre-pandemic lifestyles, while people in countries such as Brazil, India or Senegal have struggled to provide for the most basic health needs – oxygen! – of their citizens. Meanwhile, the global pharmaceutical industry has not given up its pressure for strict imposition of vaccine patents, despite the fact that the vaccine research received generous public funds. What we are witnessing is a shocking and immoral “global vaccine apartheid”.

As Geoffrey Pleyers argues in his most recent paper, the pandemic and the lockdown occurred in a specific historical context that deeply affected social movements. The rise of populist leaders and a tense geopolitical context have shaken alliances and the relations between governments and their citizens. We agree with Geoffrey that we are experiencing a double
tension: while progressive intellectuals and social movements consider the pandemic opened opportunities to build a fairer world, they compete with reactionary, capitalist and state actors to shape the meaning of the crisis and the world that may come out of it. In this context, the politics of vaccines becomes one of the main battlegrounds where these tensions unfold.

The “vaccine question” dossier we prepared for this issue is somewhat unconventional. The articles compiled here are not written by our members, nor are they directly related to social movements, such as the ways through which communities are organizing to develop public health responses in the face of vaccine shortages and disparities in access; or how social movements can build pressure on rich countries and global pharmaceutical monopolies to ensure global vaccine equity; or how communities at local, national and global levels can be mobilized to fight for a “people’s vaccine” against the threat of vaccine nationalism. Instead, we compiled a group of short pieces that were written for different purposes and published (all but one) in various open source venues, with the hope that they inspire and encourage our members to take up this challenge and develop new sociological research agendas within the social movements literature to offer novel analyses. In this introduction, we highlight the potential of these six opinion pieces for their possibly opening up new ways of expanding the social movements literature to address global inequality in access and availability of vaccines.

The first article in the dossier, “Quantifying the economic cost of vaccine nationalism,” by Erez Yerushalmi is adapted specifically for this issue from a longer research report by Yerushalmi and his collaborators. The piece focuses on the question of negative economic implications of vaccine nationalism for the whole world. The report offers a convincing analysis of available data and concludes that the selfish attitudes of hoarding vaccines or key components of producing them by governments acting in national interest come with a considerable cost for the world economy. This is
true, the argument follows, even if certain countries manage to immunize their populations, without the issue of global inequality in accessing vaccines being addressed. If anything, then, going against vaccine nationalism and engaging in efforts to ensure that the whole world has access to vaccines makes economic/business sense. The importance of the piece and the longer report for the social movements literature comes from highlighting the relationship between socioeconomic differentiation and how social movements should respond to address structural inequalities through mobilisation and direct collective action. Even though this is coming from an organisation whose messages do not always align with the main interests of grassroots social movements, the emphasis on not playing by the rules of liberal economy is important. It demonstrates how neoliberalism itself is taking this issue of “vaccinating the whole world no matter what” very seriously. The fact that this message collides with social movements’ emphasis on “vaccine as a common global good” would be relevant for the literature to comprehend the consequences of such “unholy alliances”.

"Vaccine nationalism will block our path out of the pandemic," by Hanna Zagefka, is based upon an interesting observation that human beings are psychologically driven to help people from their own tribe, (or in-group) and this is reflected in the way countries are acting “selfishly” in the face of the pandemic. And yet, the argument goes, the pandemic is a global phenomenon and can not be eradicated through simply prioritizing one’s own nation. Zagefka suggests that cultivating an awareness through ‘sharing the blame’ for the pandemic and ‘emphasizing our common fate’ in the face of this catastrophe is essential to effectively address the issue. Scholars of social movements who are focusing on the rise of populism and authoritarianism may benefit from the insights in this article by interpreting vaccine nationalism as yet another symptom of a larger problem of nationalism, xenophobia and even racism. The dynamics of social stratification and inequality find new expressions in collective attitudes towards survival in the face of a deadly virus. Moreover, the cosmopolitan
approach offered in the article can also inspire studies that articulate the concepts of ‘community’ and ‘social justice’ from a global perspective, and allow researchers to observe how these concepts are currently pursued (or not) by the existing social movements.

The next article, "The online anti-vaccine movement in the age of COVID-19," by Talha Burki, brings into focus a report recently released by Centre for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH). Burki highlights the role of social media in boosting anti-vaxxers and the failure of social media companies in preventing the spread of misinformation about vaccines. After presenting information from the said report, the article introduces two opposing views on whether anti-vaccine communities on social media should be de-platformed or not. The importance of this short article for social movements scholars is that it offers a lens to look into how reactionary social movements – especially in times of social crisis and great uncertainty – develop and online platforms to broaden their sphere of influence. As governments all around the world are moving towards vaccine and mask mandates, it would be interesting to observe and study the ways through which these reactionary movements broaden their support base and gain strength.

"To end COVID-19 we need vaccine justice for developing countries, not an outdated charity," by Sophie Harman, Eugene Richardson, and Parsa Erfani, reminds the readers that – at the time of that writing (June 2021) – only 0.8% of all COVID vaccines distributed in the world have gone to poor countries. They develop a convincing argument for vaccine justice that needs to go beyond charitable models of sharing leftover vaccines. Arguing also against charity-like initiatives such as COVAX, the authors support poor nations’ ability to manufacture their own vaccine through initiatives such as technology transfers, immunization campaigns and expansion in productive capacity. The issues raised by the authors in this article, we believe, resonate with the global justice demands by many international organizations. It would be interesting to
observe how social movements, too, which take vaccine equality as their focus may (or may not) make the suggestions in this article a part of their struggle.

In a similar vein, "The Pandemic is us (but now mostly them)," by Rajan Menon, draws attention to the Global North-South divide in vaccination rates and how the Global North failed to keep its promises. The fact that there is no real progress in waiving the patent rights or pharmaceutical companies sharing technological know-how with the nations of the global south are testimony to this failure, especially as new variants of the coronavirus spread fast. We believe that the article's importance for scholars of social movements come from its emphasis on the futility of vaccine nationalism in the face of deepening global inequality. In other words, vaccine nationalism is yet another symptom of a growing global trend of nations closing themselves, and social movements are facing a challenge in either supporting a globally coordinated effort to fight against inequality (and especially against vaccine inequality), or prioritize their national issues. Social movements studies can benefit from efforts to understand the dilemma social movements are facing when it comes to the possibility (or necessity) of pursuing a globally coordinated strategy for mobilizing for vaccine equality.

Finally, "Vaccine nationalism is killing us," by Rogelio Mayta, KK Shailaja and Anyang’ Nyong’o amplifies the voice of the Global South and informs the readers about some of the initiatives the Global South is undertaking in the face of the pandemic. It is an important reminder that the Global South is not simply a ‘victim’ in this pandemic but actively seeking ways to engage the virus. The article singles out “Summit for Vaccine Internationalism,” an initiative by Progressive International, which aims to “develop a common plan to produce and distribute vaccines for all – with concrete commitments to pool technology, invoke patent waivers and invest in rapid production.” The Summit strives to come up with solutions that undermine – rather than reinforce – the dependency of these governments on big pharma and rich countries’ benevolence. The article’s
importance from a social movements point of view comes from its emphasis on “civil disobedience” to override intellectual property protections is worth emphasizing. It would not be surprising to see social movements responding to this call but the question of how it will be possible to overcome the hurdles of organizing and coordinating efforts on a global scale as well as at local levels remains to be answered by the movements themselves.

It is our hope that the dossier can inspire social movements researchers, activists, and practitioners to start developing a new agenda and innovative methods of collective action that can address the highly contested topics described above. The challenge is immense. The pandemic has confronted the way of life of communities around the planet, who have responded to the crisis through numerous methods, including expressions of solidarity, care, love, and resilience both online and offline. Nevertheless, while social movements have been shaping the contours of politics for over two centuries, there is a need to make more common efforts now to fight the intensification of social inequalities and struggles against deepening economic and political exclusion arising from this combination of vaccine nationalism and embedded socioeconomic neoliberalism. We hope that the present dossier can help the intensity of social justice movements’ initiatives to overcome the challenges posed by this new phenomena of vaccine nationalism.

Quantifying the economic cost of vaccine nationalism using computable general equilibrium model

Erez Yerushalmi, with Marco Hafner, Clement Fays, Eliane Dufresne, and Christian Van Stolk. Birmingham City University (UK).

Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic in January 2020, the cumulative confirmed COVID-19 deaths have reached 4.07 million[1] and hundreds of millions have been infected worldwide. In an unparalleled scientific effort, eight vaccines
Grassroots On Focus: Reflections on COVID-19, Vaccine Nationalism, and Social Movements

have been developed with various satisfactory levels of efficacy, and at least 184 vaccines are in pre-clinical trial phase.[2] However, the roll out of these vaccines have proved challenging from a global perspective.

Ongoing international efforts are being made through COVAX - a cooperation between the WHO and other international institutions to provide equal access to vaccines globally by pooling resources. However, so far, there have only been weak commitments from wealthier countries. In addition, pharmaceuticals have recently increased pressure to impose vaccine patent protection even though a lion’s share of the research was funded by the taxpayers. Governments differ in their view on the issue, e.g., the Biden administration recently expressed support for a patent waiver, while Britain, Germany, Japan and Switzerland so far have opposed it.[3]

In a bid protect themselves, countries have pushed to get first access to a supply of vaccines or hoarded key components of vaccine production rather than globally coordinating its roll-out. This is called “vaccine nationalism” and as our results show, lowers welfare for all. Vulnerable people or frontline health workers in certain countries receive the vaccine after lower-risk individuals in other countries, leading to unnecessary excess number of deaths. Vaccinating only the wealthier nations will not stop the spread of the virus because it will continue to circulate, mutate, and potentially adapt in regions without immunisation. This poses a real risk on the efficacy of current vaccines, which will reduce protection, also in populations that have been vaccinated.

The aim of our research on vaccine nationalism (see full publication here)[4] is to quantify the economic cost of vaccine nationalism when a limited number of countries have access to the vaccine. We develop a multi-country Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) model and calibrate it to the real-world economies.

We test for a range of scenarios, e.g., from no vaccine
developed, only certain “vaccine developing nations” immunising their own populations, to nearly all countries excluding the poorest nations accessing vaccines. Our benchmark for comparison is when NO COVID-19 is present. We quantify the reduced activity level from physical distancing and changes in consumer behaviour in the following high-contact intensive service sectors: hospitality; recreation; retail and wholesale; transportation; and health and social care.

Table 1 below presents our main results for mid-range scenarios. (for high and low scenarios, please read full report.) The model captures frictions in trade, supply chains disruptions and negative spill-overs from one country to the other. Our results are clear: even if all high and middle plus vaccine developing nations have access to the vaccine (scenario 4), countries continue to lose GDP because the poorest countries haven’t been vaccinated. E.g., the USA loses 16 $bn a year, and China loses 15 $bn.

**Table 1: Change in real annual GDP in $bn relative from**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Scenario</th>
<th>World</th>
<th>USA</th>
<th>EU-27</th>
<th>UK</th>
<th>China</th>
<th>India</th>
<th>Russia</th>
<th>High</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Low</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 2 - Vaccine nations have access</td>
<td>-1,232</td>
<td>-127</td>
<td>-311</td>
<td>-41</td>
<td>-110</td>
<td>-26</td>
<td>-18</td>
<td>-453</td>
<td>-65</td>
<td>-82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 3 - All high-income and vaccine nations have access</td>
<td>-292</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-76</td>
<td>-10</td>
<td>-27</td>
<td>-7</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-73</td>
<td>-30</td>
<td>-35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scenario 4 - All high and middle income plus vaccine nations have access</td>
<td>-153</td>
<td>-16</td>
<td>-40</td>
<td>-5</td>
<td>-14</td>
<td>-3</td>
<td>-2</td>
<td>-39</td>
<td>-6</td>
<td>-28</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Based on our estimates, the US, the UK, the EU and other high-income countries combined could lose about $119 billion a year if the poorest countries are denied vaccine supply. If these high-income countries paid for the supply of vaccines, which Oxfam International estimated in 2020 to be around $25 billion, there could be a benefit-to-cost ratio of around 4.8 to 1. In other words, for every $1 spent on vaccines, high-income countries would get back about $4.80 of economic outcome. Furthermore, these figures do not include the true socio-economic costs which are substantially higher. Providing an equitable access to vaccines and healthcare in general thus makes economic/business sense. The economic losses associated with COVID-19 are far greater than the current spending on vaccine development and allocation. Healthcare is known for generating externalities, and global coordination is therefore necessary to mitigate the negative externalities and promote the positive ones. Without global coordination, we will continue being caught in a Prisoner’s Dilemma whereby countries’ individual actions lead themselves and the group overall towards lower welfare outcomes.

The international effort to support vaccination distribution needs to have a long-term view that extends far beyond the short-run political cycles. We need to develop systems of sharing and mutual support not only for the current COVID-19 crisis, but for other future crisis on the horizon, such as Anti-Microbial Resistance (AMR).[5] We would need to re-evaluate the patents system on vaccine development to support low-income countries to jump-start their own local production.

Vaccine nationalism will block our path out of the pandemic – so how do we resist our tribal instinct?

Hanna Zagefka. Professor of Social Psychology, Royal Holloway University of London.

Most nations are currently focusing their efforts to defeat the pandemic within their own borders, under pressure to help their citizens first. But this is a global problem and governments need to work together to eradicate COVID. To avoid hardening attitudes against helping other countries, governments need to change how they talk about the pandemic. They must resist the urge to blame other countries. The emphasis must now be on the need for a global response.

We are psychologically driven to help people from our own tribe, or in-group, over members of out-groups. This is what we are now witnessing in the allocation of resources to fight COVID. Around the world, governments are trying to vaccinate their own populations first. There is, so far, little talk of helping other countries.

My research involving over 2,000 Britons suggests that the UK population supports their government’s prioritisation of

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domestic vaccination. Most people surveyed supported investment in measures that would benefit British (in-group) people over offering financial aid to other countries in the EU or sub-Saharan Africa.

When asked whether they would donate money to help others who are struggling due to the pandemic, over 60% of British participants indicated that they would donate to help other British people, whereas less than 40% indicated that they would donate to help people in other countries.

If governments are to start cooperating more internationally, it is essential to shift public opinion away from such in-group favouring biases. But the survival of democratic governments depends on their popularity with the electorate. So it is vital for decision makers to draw on approaches that can counteract our human impulse for tribalism, and build public support for sharing resources across borders.

Hoarding vaccines is, ultimately, self-defeating. Vaccinating the entire population of one country is not going to guarantee lasting protection if the virus is allowed to run rampant in other parts of the world, mutating into potentially vaccine-resistant variants.

But the desire to protect the in-group is deep seated. When things go wrong, we find it much easier to blame others than look inwards. More than half of our research participants blamed other countries – not Britain – for the ongoing pandemic.

**Shouldering a fair share of blame**

My research points to actions that can stop feeding self-defeating in-group tribalism. For a start, governments need to stop pinning the blame for the pandemic on other countries, as for example both the US and China have done. In my studies, participants who blamed other nations for starting or spreading COVID were less willing to offer help
across national boundaries. Blaming other nations not only reduced willingness to support those scapegoated nations, it decreased willingness to assist all other out-group countries, even those perceived as blameless.

Being honest about each nation’s own role in perpetuating the pandemic is also vital. British participants who were more aware of their own country’s role in spreading the virus were more likely to support global coordination and resource-sharing to defeat COVID. Honesty about failings, such as the delay in locking down in spring 2020, could help encourage an honest perspective about the British contribution to the problem. That, in turn, could boost public support for the need to act beyond British borders.

**Emphasising our common fate**

Being open to joint action to overcome this global crisis was also more common among participants who were aware of our interdependency with other nations. Clear messaging on this front will also be essential.

Current broad public optimism about the success of the British national vaccination programme is understandable but we must be clear that can only get us so far. To lend weight to the importance of an international perspective, politicians must go beyond platitudes and lip service. Words must be backed up, in practical terms. That means vaccine resource sharing.

Faced with a rampant virus, the temptation for all governments is to focus on protecting their own populations – to stick within in-group borders. For many nations, this approach is being justified by the argument that we need to make ourselves safe before helping others. But this can only be a short-term strategy. Unless we change the narrative, the longer-term strategy is at serious risk.

If we keep stoking in-group tribalism, governments risk resistance from a vaccinated electorate with little to no desire
to help any out-group members in other countries. Faced with a COVID-ravaged economy, exhausted public health system and record levels of public debt there will be emotive arguments that we cannot afford to share our resources. We might prefer our own tribe but, to the virus, the world’s population is one big tribe. There is no out-group.

*This article was originally published by The Conversation. Read the original article by [clicking here.](#)

**To end COVID-19 we need vaccine justice for developing countries, not an outdated charity – viewpoint**

Sophie Harman, Professor of International Politics, Queen Mary University of London; Eugene Richardson, Assistant Professor of Global Health and Social Medicine, Harvard Medical School, and Parsa Erfani, Fogarty Fellow, University of Global Health Equity, Harvard Medical School.

We will never end the death and destruction of COVID-19 until we get real about vaccine equity. In a month of high-level meetings from the G7 to the World Health Assembly, we have seen a lot of rhetoric from the global north, and a lot of frustration and urgency from the global south, but still no substantial changes on how to get the world vaccinated. Vaccines offer an incredible opportunity for science to outpace the virus, but now we are seeing the virus outpace our outdated politics.

Around 0.8% of all COVID vaccines distributed in the world have gone to poor countries. Most of the 1.65 billion doses of vaccines administered have been in rich countries. We know that this is a problem. Global coverage of the vaccine is imperative to prevent death and disease from COVID-19 and to help stop new variants. Unless we sort out this imbalance the threat of COVID-19 will never go away.

As we argue in BMJ Global Health, we can address this imbalance through a call for vaccine justice. We need to move past outdated charitable models of poor countries depending
on rich countries for their leftovers. Instead, we need to develop manufacturing and distribution capacity throughout the world to get vaccines to where they are needed and fast. To start, the international community needs to stop pushing charitable models of sharing leftover vaccines and Covax. Sharing leftovers is unsustainable and dependent on the whim of individual countries, often coming too little, too late. Pledges at the G7 are all very well, but these are already too late and mask the substantial problem of vaccine nationalism and hoarding.

Covax, the initiative set up to avoid vaccine nationalism and hoarding, was doomed to failure from the outset. It was created to ensure every country in the world has access to doses for 20% of its population in 2021, regardless of ability to pay.

Covax has been lauded as an effective model that delivers. However, it is already running into three major problems. The first is perhaps the most obvious: doses for 20% of a population this year will never be enough to build up immunity to COVID-19 quickly enough. The second is supply. India is the main supplier of vaccines to Covax. India’s introduction of vaccine export restrictions to help deal with its devastating outbreak is limiting supply to Covax. The third is perhaps more predictable – a significant funding shortfall.

Charitable models like Covax are always under-funded. If they are under-funded in the short term, there is little hope for their medium and long-term funding. We have seen this time and again with financing initiatives from Make Poverty History to the health-related Millennium Development Goals. Institutions will always be going cap in hand to states who will never fully pay up.

Covax has become a political dead cat in global health. For every accusation on vaccine hoarding or lack of support for sharing intellectual property, states use Covax as evidence that they are committed to vaccinating the world. Covax is used as
an example of good intentions, while simultaneously as an excuse for blocking the transfer of technology and passing of intellectual property waivers in the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Low and middle-income countries are on to this. This is why they are pushing for the waiver and suspicious of efforts towards a new international pandemic preparedness treaty. Such states accept the charity from Covax as the only offer on the table but know the way out of their situation would be to make vaccines themselves.

**It doesn't have to be this way**

States must be empowered to produce their own vaccines and draw from previous knowledge of effective community vaccination campaigns and mobilisation to stimulate uptake. The role of the international community must be to facilitate technology transfer, vaccine production capacity in-country, and the development of in-country immunisation campaigns. Anything else is just a distraction.

A waiver on intellectual property for vaccines is within WTO rules under the trade-related intellectual property rights (Trips) amendment that was introduced at the height of the HIV/AIDS crisis. Countries could be issuing compulsory licenses and making their own COVID-19 vaccines. It is in the rules. Countries understandably don't do this as they fear punishment in the global trading system.

Defenders of intellectual property suggest low and middle-income countries lack the capacity to develop vaccines. This smacks of discrimination as to what is seen to be possible in poor countries.

If such defenders truly believe this to be the case: put your money where your mouth is and help build capacity. Low and middle-income countries can produce vaccines through technology transfer and investment from high-income
countries, and through working with vaccine supply experts, such as Covax, to negotiate complex supply chains. Complex, yes. Impossible, no. Pharmaceutical companies can be compensated by additional public funds. Their investment does not have to be out of pocket. Given that state funding was fundamental in stimulating research and development of COVID-19 vaccines, state funding can likewise be used to incentivise technology transfer. As the head of IMF, Kristalina Georgieva, said: “Vaccine policy is economic policy,” and thus investment in vaccines are good investments for states given the threat of COVID-19 to the global economy.
A year ago, no one thought it would be possible to have safe and delivered vaccines for COVID-19. Public finance, private innovation, and scientific endeavour combined to show what could be possible. Let’s stop talking charity and start getting real about what will end this pandemic.

*This article was originally published by The Conversation. Read the original article by clicking here.

The online anti-vaccine movement in the age of COVID-19

Talha Burki, The Lancet Digital Health

A new report by the Centre for Countering Digital Hate (CCDH) has lambasted social media companies for allowing the anti-vaccine movement to remain on their platforms. The report’s authors noted that social media accounts held by so-called anti-vaxxers have increased their following by at least 7.8 million people since 2019. “The decision to continue hosting known misinformation content and actors left online anti-vaxxers ready to pounce on the opportunity presented by coronavirus”, stated the report. The CCDH warned that the growing anti-vaccine movement could undermine the roll-out of any future vaccine against COVID-19.

The report noted that 31 million people follow anti-vaccine groups on Facebook, with 17 million people subscribing to
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similar accounts on YouTube. The CCDH calculated that the anti-vaccine movement could realise US$1 billion in annual revenues for social media firms. As much as $989 million could accrue to Facebook and Instagram alone, largely from advertising targeting the 38.7 million followers of anti-vaccine accounts. Huge sums indeed, but it is worth noting that, in 2019, Facebook generated revenue of $70.7 billion.

A survey commissioned by the CCDH and released alongside their report found that around one in six British people were unlikely to agree to being vaccinated against severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), and a similar proportion had yet to make up their mind. The survey, which polled 1663 people, found that individuals who relied on social media for information on the pandemic were more hesitant about the potential vaccine. WHO has warned of an infodemic of false information about COVID-19 spreading online. Around a third of respondents to a six-country survey by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism reported that they had seen “a lot or a great deal of false or misleading” information about COVID-19 on social media during the previous week.

“Attention grabbing headlines with sensationalist content can attract even the savviest internet users and studies have shown they tend to generate more user engagement”, warned the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, in July, 2020. “As a result, content personalisation algorithms can repeatedly expose people to the same or similar content and ads even on the basis of disinformation.”

The CCDH report divided the online anti-vaccine movement into four (sometimes overlapping) groups. First, campaigners work full-time to foment distrust in vaccines, but they only reach 12% of the total audience that follows the anti-vaccine movement. Second, entrepreneurs reach around half of the anti-vaccine following, exposing them to advertisements for products purporting to have health benefits. The CCDH report accuses Facebook of being a “shopfront for anti-vaxx
products”, directing customers to online marketplaces where these products can be purchased. Imran Ahmed, founder and chief executive officer of CCDH, advocates prosecuting vendors who make false claims about their products. “Going after a few high-profile hucksters who are exploiting and encouraging anti-vaccine sentiment to make money would be a powerful disincentive to anyone else considering choosing the same path”, he said. Conspiracy theorists constitute the third category. Finally, there are the communities, which have a relatively small following and are mainly to be found on Facebook.

In 2019, several social media firms pledged to act against the anti-vaccine movement. Facebook announced that it would not recommend content that contained misinformation on vaccines. YouTube removed advertisements from anti-vaccine videos, meaning the account holders would not make money, and Twitter ensured that the National Health Service or Department of Health and Human Services would appear as the first result for anyone searching for vaccine-related topics in the UK and USA, respectively.

In August, 2020, Facebook deleted a video posted by the US President, Donald J Trump, in which he suggested that children were “almost immune” to SARS-CoV-2, on the grounds that it contained “harmful COVID misinformation”. Twitter suspended Trump’s campaign account, which posted the same video. “The platforms genuinely want to tackle this problem”, explained Heidi Larson, director of the Vaccine Confidence Project at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. “Facebook has hired a lot of people to work on this and they are genuinely motivated to find answers. You often find that the staff in the social media firms are putting pressure on management to get things right—people want to feel good about where they work.” Facebook uses fact-checkers to identify and label false information about COVID-19. Twitter has similar policies. Alongside Facebook, it has also offered free advertising space to WHO and national health authorities.
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The CCDH is unconvincing. Their latest report, entitled Failure to Act, describes how out of 912 posts containing misinformation about COVID-19, fewer than one in 20 were dealt with by social media companies. Ahmed argues for a far sterner response: removing the anti-vaccine movement from the platforms. “The first step is to de-platform”, he said. “Shutting down spaces and de-platforming individuals is the single most effective tool for dealing with these sorts of malign actors.” Ahmed cites studies from counterterrorism, in which de-platforming was found to cause networks to fragment. “It is the one thing that absolutely works. It cripples the networks and it is the best way to stop the anti-vaxx infection from spreading”, he stated.

Vish Viswanath, Professor of Health Communication in the Department of Social and Behavioral Sciences at the Harvard T H Chan School of Public Health, disagrees. “De-platforming makes me nervous”, he said. “This is an issue of freedom of speech. Unless you have a situation where there is blatant misinformation that is directly causing harm, you have to ask ‘where do you draw the line?’ You might have actors whose anti-vaxx activities are not taking place on their social media channels, are they also to be removed?” Shutting down conspiracy theorists and campaigners risks making them into martyrs and could even lend credence to their arguments that they are speaking truth to power. “You cannot just take away the stage, and assume these people are going to go away”, adds Larson. “We are talking about very deep-rooted beliefs; they will simply find another stage.”

The CCDH-commissioned survey found strong public support for sanctions such as financial penalties and advertising boycotts against social media companies that declined to remove “material designed to spread fake news or misinformation on vaccines”. Ahmed points out that 98% of Facebook’s revenues come from advertising. “If advertisers are scared off by the content on a site, then there is a strong incentive for the platforms to remove it; we have seen plenty of examples of advertisers refusing to be associated with
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particular material”, he explained.

Instead of de-platforming, Viswanath advises that vaccine advocates should be putting their energy into rebutting anti-vaccine arguments. “Groups such as the CCDH deserve a great deal of credit for calling attention to this issue, and adopting such a combative attitude”, he said. “For much too long, the pro-vaccine groups have been reactive and reticent; they have assumed that science can speak for itself. That has not worked. We need to throw light on these malign actors, refute their arguments very aggressively and proactively.”

Viswanath believes that the platforms are still not acting quickly enough. “They are making some tentative steps, but it is insufficient. It is not adequate to simply flag inappropriate posts; people will still read them and we know that even if a falsehood is labelled as such, people will still remember it, and some people will believe it”, he said. “Our response has to draw on the science of how people develop these beliefs and then we can take up strategies to call the anti-vaxxers on their misinformation, rather than completely eliminate their voices.” Ahmed counters that there is limited evidence on the efficacy of rebuttal. “The best way to stop someone from becoming an anti-vaxxer is to stop them from becoming infected in the first place”, he stated. “I want to reduce the R0, rather than treat the disease.”

Public attitudes towards vaccination can be split into three categories. First, there are people who have been persuaded of the merits of vaccination. In the UK and USA, this group constitutes somewhere between 70% and 90% of the population. Second, there are dogmatic anti-vaxxers. “These are people on the fringes”, explains Viswanath. “They are not going to change their views.” Between the two groups lies a third comprising people who are undecided. “These people have legitimate questions”, said Viswanath. “They want to do the right thing, but they have doubts. This is where we need to be focusing our attention.”
The anti-vaccine movement looks as if they have already figured this out. A paper published in Nature earlier this year mapped online views on vaccination. The authors concluded that “although smaller in overall size, anti-vaccination clusters manage to become highly entangled with undecided clusters in the main online network, whereas pro-vaccination clusters are more peripheral”. They warned that in a decade the anti-vaccination movement could overwhelm pro-vaccination voices online. If that came to pass, the consequences would stretch far beyond COVID-19.

*This article was originally published by The Lancet. Read the original article by clicking here.

**The Pandemic is Us (but now mostly them). Power, Wealth, and Justice in the Time of Covid-19**

Rajan Menon, Senior Research Fellow at Columbia University’s Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies.

Fifteen months ago, the SARS-CoV-2 virus unleashed Covid-19. Since then, it’s killed more than 3.8 million people worldwide
(and possibly many more). Finally, a return to normalcy seems likely for a distinct minority of the world’s people, those living mainly in the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, the European Union, and China. That’s not surprising. The concentration of wealth and power globally has enabled rich countries to all but monopolize available vaccine doses. For the citizens of low-income and poor countries to have long-term pandemic security, especially the 46% of the world’s population who survive on less than $5.50 a day, this inequity must end, rapidly — but don’t hold your breath.

The Global North: Normalcy Returns

In the United States new daily infections, which peaked in early January, had plummeted 96% by June 16th. The daily death toll also dropped — by 92% — and the consequences were apparent. Big-city streets were bustling again, as shops and restaurants became ever busier. Americans were shedding their reluctance to travel by plane or train, as schools and universities prepared to resume “live instruction” in the fall. Zoom catch-ups were yielding to socializing the old-fashioned way.

By that June day, new infections and deaths had fallen substantially below their peaks in other wealthy parts of the world as well. In Canada, cases had dropped by 89% and deaths by 94%; in Europe by 87% and 87%; and in the United Kingdom by 84% and 99%.

Yes, European governments were warier than the U.S. about giving people the green light to resume their pre-pandemic lifestyles and have yet to fully abolish curbs on congregating and traveling. Perhaps recalling Britain’s previous winter surge, thanks to the B.1.1.7 mutation (initially discovered there) and the recent appearance of two other virulent strains of Covid-19, B.1.167 and B.1.617.2 (both first detected in India), Downing Street has retained restrictions on social gatherings. It’s even put off a full reopening on June 21st, as previously planned. And that couldn’t have been more understandable. After all, on
On Focus: Reflections on COVID-19, Vaccine Nationalism, and Social Movements

June 17th, the new case count had reached 10,809, the highest since late March. Still, new daily infections there are less than a tenth what they were in early January. So, like the U.S., Britain and the rest of Europe are returning to some semblance of normalcy.

The Global South: A Long Road Ahead

Lately, the place that’s been hit the hardest by Covid-19 is the global south where countries are particularly ill-prepared.

Consider social distancing. People with jobs that can be done by “working from home” constitute a far smaller proportion of the labor force than in wealthy nations with far higher levels of education, mechanization, and automation, along with far greater access to computers and the Internet. An estimated 40% of workers in rich countries can work remotely. In lower- and middle-income lands perhaps 10% can do so and the numbers are even worse in the poorest of them.

During the pandemic, millions of Canadians, Europeans, and Americans lost their jobs and struggled to pay food and housing bills. Still, the economic impact has been far worse in other parts of the world, particularly the poorest African and Asian nations. There, some 100 million people have fallen back into extreme poverty.

Such places lack the basics to prevent infections and care for Covid-19 patients. Running water, soap, and hand sanitizer are often not readily available. In the developing world, 785 million or more people lack “basic water services,” as do a quarter of health clinics and hospitals there, which have also faced crippling shortages of standard protective gear, never mind oxygen and ventilators.

Last year, for instance, South Sudan, with 12 million people, had only four ventilators and 24 ICU beds. Burkina Faso had 11 ventilators for its 20 million people; Sierra Leone 13 for its eight million; and the Central African Republic, a mere three for eight
million. The problem wasn’t confined to Africa either. Virtually all of Venezuela’s hospitals have run low on critical supplies and the country had 84 ICU beds for nearly 30 million people. Yes, wealthy countries like the U.S. faced significant shortages, but they had the cash to buy what they needed (or could ramp up production at home). The global south’s poorest countries were and remain at the back of the queue.

India’s Disaster

India has provided the most chilling illustration of how spiraling infections can overwhelm healthcare systems in the global south. Things looked surprisingly good there until recently. Infection and death rates were far below what experts had anticipated based on the economy, population density, and the highly uneven quality of its healthcare system. The government’s decision to order a phased lifting of a national lockdown seemed vindication indeed. As late as April, India reported fewer new cases per million than Britain, France, Germany, the U.K., or the U.S.

Never one for modesty, its Hindu nationalist prime minister, Narendra Modi, boasted that India had “saved humanity from a great disaster by containing Corona effectively.” He touted its progress in vaccination; bragged that it was now exporting masks, test kits, and safety equipment; and mocked forecasts that Covid-19 would infect 800 million Indians and kill a million of them. Confident that his country had turned the corner, he and his Bharatiya Janata Party held huge, unmasked political rallies, while millions of Indians gathered in vast crowds for the annual Kumbh Mela religious festival.

Then, in early April, the second wave struck with horrific consequences. By May 6th, the daily case count had reached 414,188. On May 19th, it would break the world record for daily Covid-19 deaths, previously a dubious American honor, recording almost 4,500 of them.

Hospitals quickly ran out of beds. The sick were turned away in
droves and left to die at home or even in the streets, gasping for breath. Supplies of medical oxygen and ventilators ran out, as did personal protective equipment. Soon, Modi had to appeal for help, which many countries provided.

Indian press reports estimate that fully half of India’s 300,000-plus Covid-19 deaths have occurred in this second wave, the vast majority after March. During the worst of it, the air in India’s big cities was thick with smoke from crematoria, while, because of the shortage of designated cremation and burial sites, corpses regularly washed up on riverbanks.

We may never know how many Indians have actually died since April. Hospital records, even assuming they were kept fastidiously amid the pandemonium, won’t provide the full picture because an unknown number of people died elsewhere.

The Vaccination Divide

Other parts of the global south have also been hit by surging infections, including countries in Asia which had previously contained Covid-19’s spread, among them Malaysia, Nepal, the Philippines, Sri Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam. Latin America has seen devastating surges of the pandemic, above all in Brazil because of President Jair Bolsonaro’s stunning combination of fecklessness and callousness, but also in Bolivia, Columbia, Chile, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay. In Africa, Angola, Namibia, South Africa, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are among 14 countries in which infections have spiked.

Meanwhile, the data reveal a gargantuan north-south vaccination gap. By early June, the U.S. had administered doses to nearly half the country’s population, in Britain slightly more than half, in Canada just over a third, and in the European Union approximately a third. (Bear in mind that the proportions would be far higher were only adults counted and that vaccination rates are still increasing far faster in these places than in the global south.)
Now consider examples of vaccination coverage in low-income countries.

- In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Sudan, Vietnam, and Zambia it ranged from 0.1% to 0.9% of the population.

- In Angola, Ghana, Kenya, Pakistan, Senegal, and South Africa, between 1% and 2.4%.

- In Botswana and Zimbabwe, which have the highest coverage in sub-Saharan Africa, 3% and 3.6% respectively.

- In Asia (China and Singapore aside), Cambodia at 9.6% was the leader, followed by India at 8.5%. Coverage in all other Asian countries was below 5.4%.

This north-south contrast matters because mutations first detected in the U.K., Brazil, India, and South Africa, which may prove up to 50% more transmissible, are already circulating worldwide. Meanwhile, new ones, perhaps even more virulent, are likely to emerge in largely unvaccinated nations. This, in turn, will endanger anyone who’s unvaccinated and so could prove particularly calamitous for the global south.

Why the vaccination gap? Wealthy countries, none more than the United States, could afford to spend billions of dollars to buy vaccines. They’re home as well to cutting-edge biotechnology companies like AstraZeneca, BioNTech, Johnson and Johnson, Moderna, and Pfizer. Those two advantages enabled them to preorder enormous quantities of vaccine, indeed almost all of what BioNTech and Moderna anticipated making in 2021, and even before their vaccines had completed clinical trials. As a result, by late March, 86% of all vaccinations had been administered in that part of the world, a mere 0.1% in poor regions.

This wasn’t the result of some evil conspiracy. Governments in rich countries weren’t sure which vaccine-makers would
succeed, so they spread their bets. Nevertheless, their stockpiling gambit locked up most of the global supply.

**Equity vs. Power**

Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus, who leads the World Health Organization (WHO), was among those decrying the inequity of “vaccine nationalism.” To counter it, he and others proposed that the deep-pocketed countries that had vacuumed up the supplies, vaccinate only their elderly, individuals with pre-existing medical conditions, and healthcare workers, and then donate their remaining doses so that other countries could do the same. As supplies increased, the rest of the world’s population could be vaccinated based on an assessment of the degree to which different categories of people were at risk.

COVAX, the U.N. program involving 190 countries led by the WHO and funded by governments and private philanthropies, would then ensure that getting vaccinated didn’t depend on whether or not a person lived in a wealthy country. It would also leverage its large membership to secure low prices from vaccine manufacturers.

That was the idea anyway. The reality, of course, has been altogether different. Though most wealthy countries, including the U.S. following Biden’s election, did join COVAX, they also decided to use their own massive buying power to cut deals directly with the pharmaceutical giants and vaccinate as many of their own as they could. And in February, the U.S. government took the additional step of invoking the Defense Production Act to restrict exports of 37 raw materials critical for making vaccines.

COVAX has received support, including $4 billion pledged by President Joe Biden for 2021 and 2022, but nowhere near what’s needed to reach its goal of distributing two billion doses by the end of this year. By May, in fact, it had distributed just 3.4% of that amount.
Grassroots On Focus: Reflections on COVID-19, Vaccine Nationalism, and Social Movements

Biden recently announced that the U.S. would donate 500 million doses of vaccines this year and next, chiefly to COVAX; and at their summit this month, the G-7 governments announced plans to provide one billion altogether. That’s a large number and a welcome move, but still modest considering that 11 billion doses are needed to vaccinate 70% of the world.

COVAX’s problems have been aggravated by the decision of India, counted on to provide half of the two billion doses it had ordered for this year, to ban vaccine exports. Aside from vaccine, COVAX’s program is focused on helping low-income countries train vaccinators, create distribution networks, and launch public awareness campaigns, all of which will be many times more expensive for them than vaccine purchases and no less critical.

Another proposal, initiated in late 2020 by India and South Africa and backed by 100 countries, mostly from the global south, calls for the World Trade Organization (WTO) to suspend patents on vaccines so that pharmaceutical companies in the global south can manufacture them without violating intellectual property laws and so launch production near the places that need them the most.

That idea hasn’t taken wing either.

The pharmaceutical companies, always zealous about the sanctity of patents, have trotted out familiar arguments (recall the HIV-AIDS crisis): their counterparts in the global south lack the expertise and technology to make complex vaccines quickly enough; efficacy and safety could prove substandard; lifting patent restrictions on this occasion could set a precedent and stifle innovation; and they had made huge investments with no guarantees of success.

Critics challenged these claims, but the biotech and pharmaceutical giants have more clout, and they simply don’t want to share their knowledge. None of them, for instance, has...
participated in the WHO’s Covid-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP), created expressly to promote the voluntary international sharing of intellectual property, technology, and knowhow, through non-restricted licensing.

On the (only faintly) brighter side, Moderna announced last October that it wouldn’t enforce its Covid-19 vaccine patents during the pandemic — but didn’t offer any technical assistance to pharmaceutical firms in the global south. AstraZeneca gave the Serum Institute of India a license to make its vaccine and also declared that it would forgo profits from vaccine sales until the pandemic ends. The catch: it reserved the right to determine that end date, which it may declare as early as this July.

In May, President Biden surprised many people by supporting the waiving of patents on Covid-19 vaccines. That was a big change given the degree to which the U.S. government has been a dogged defender of intellectual property rights. But his gesture, however commendable, may remain just that. Germany dissented immediately. Others in the European Union seem open to discussion, but that, at best, means protracted WTO negotiations about a welter of legal and technical details in the midst of a global emergency.

And the pharmaceutical companies will hang tough. Never mind that many received billions of dollars from governments in various forms, including equity purchases, subsidies, large preordered vaccine contracts ($18 billion from the Trump administration’s Operation Warp Speed program alone), and research-and-development partnerships with government agencies. Contrary to its narrative, Big Pharma never placed huge, risky bets to create Covid-19 vaccines.

**How Does This End?**

Various mutations of the virus, several highly infectious, are now traveling the world and new ones are expected to arise. This poses an obvious threat to the inhabitants of low-income
countries where vaccination rates are already abysmally poor. Given the skewed distribution of vaccines, people there may not be vaccinated, even partially, until 2022, or later. Covid-19 could therefore claim more millions of lives.

But the suffering won’t be confined to the global south. The more the virus replicates itself, the greater the probability of new, even more dangerous, mutations — ones that could attack the tens of millions of unvaccinated in the wealthy parts of the world, too. Between a fifth and a quarter of adults in the U.S. and the European Union say that they’re unlikely to, or simply won’t, get vaccinated. For various reasons, including worry about the safety of vaccines, anti-vax sentiments rooted in religious and political beliefs, and the growing influence of ever wilder conspiracy theories, U.S. vaccination rates slowed starting in mid-April.

As a result, President Biden’s goal of having 70% of adults receive at least one shot by July 4th won’t be realized. With less than two weeks to go, at least half of the adults in 25 states still remain completely unvaccinated. And what if existing vaccines don’t ensure protection against new mutations, something virologists consider a possibility? Booster shots may provide a fix, but not an easy one given this country’s size, the logistical complexities of mounting another vaccination campaign, and the inevitable political squabbling it will produce.

Amid the unknowns, this much is clear: for all the talk about global governance and collective action against threats that don’t respect borders, the response to this pandemic has been driven by vaccine nationalism. That’s indefensible, both ethically and on the grounds of self-interest.

*This article was originally published by The TomDispatch. Read the original article by clicking here.
On Focus: Reflections on COVID-19, Vaccine Nationalism, and Social Movements

Vaccine nationalism is Killing Us. We need an internationalist approach.

Rogelio Mayta, Member of Kerala’s Legislative Assembly and former Health Minister of India; KK Shailaja, Governor of Kisumu County, Kenya; and Anyang’ Nyong’o, Foreign Minister of Bolivia.

We must develop a common plan to produce and distribute vaccines for all. That’s the only way to end this pandemic.

We have the power to end this pandemic. We have the technology, materials and productive capacity to vaccinate the world against Covid-19 this year. We can save millions of lives, protect billions of livelihoods and reclaim trillions of dollars worth of economic activity along the way.

But instead, our countries are now moving into the pandemic’s deadliest phase. Mutant strains are spreading into regions where the vaccines are not only scarce; they have barely arrived. At present rates of vaccination, the pandemic will continue to rage until at least 2024.

This is not a coincidence. The system of pharmaceutical patents at the World Trade Organization was designed to prioritize corporate profit over human life. Even in the midst of a deadly pandemic, a coalition of pharmaceutical companies and global north governments refuses to re-order these priorities – blocking patent waivers, refusing to share vaccine technologies and underfunding multilateral responses.

That is why government ministers and health officials from around the world are convening the Summit for Vaccine Internationalism. Hosted by the Progressive International, the Summit’s aim is simple: to develop a common plan to produce and distribute vaccines for all – with concrete commitments to pool technology, invoke patent waivers and invest in rapid production. The G7 has proven unwilling and incapable of delivering on this promise. The central banks of the world’s
major economies mobilized roughly $9tn to respond to the economic shock of the Covid-19 pandemic, acting swiftly and decisively to protect the interests of their investors.

The cost of global vaccination, by contrast, is estimated at just $23bn, or 0.25% of this monetary response. That number would dramatically decrease if the governments in the US, EU and UK compelled their pharmaceutical companies to share technology with manufacturers around the world – an idea that commands large majority support in the United States, where taxpayers have footed the entire bill for the development of the Moderna Covid-19 vaccine.

But the will to do so has yet to manifest. Even the 1bn doses that the G7 pledged to the world at its meeting in Cornwall has now fallen to 870m, of which only 613m are truly new.

The G7 plan is not only stingy. It is also stupid: the ICC has estimated a cost of $9.2tn to the global economy for the failure to deliver vaccines to every country. And – in the final count – it may also prove suicidal: the longer the virus travels, the more often it mutates, and the more viciously it may boomerang back to the rich countries that are already rolling out vaccination programs.

But the problem runs much deeper than the number of doses in the G7 pledge. The Covid-19 virus will continue to circulate across the world for the foreseeable future. Without a transformation in the global health system, governments everywhere will have to shell out billions for annual purchases of boosters from big pharma corporations like Pfizer – or beg the US government to come to the rescue.

We cannot wait for the G7 to find its common sense – or its conscience. That is why the Summit for Vaccine Internationalism will strive for solutions that undermine – rather than reinforce – the dependency of these governments on big pharma and the countries where they are headquartered.
To do so, our governments are considering three key proposals.

The first is focused on intellectual property. Pleas for big pharma to share technology have fallen on deaf ears. One year after the launch of the WHO’s Covid-19 Technology Access Pool (C-TAP), not a single company has donated its technical know-how, choosing instead to retain complete control of supply. As countries with vaccine candidates and manufacturers, we will consider a platform for sharing ongoing progress with candidates, trial protocols and data – setting the stage for real transparency and allowing local vaccine manufacturers world over to produce the critical doses of Covid-19 vaccines.

The second is focused on manufacturing capacity. A dangerous myth continues to circulate that developing countries cannot produce vaccines for themselves. This is simply untrue. Attempts by local manufacturers of vaccines, biologics, and drugs to produce Covid-19 vaccines have been rejected by pharmaceutical companies that are keen to control the world’s supply within their closed ranks.

Every vaccine has two elements: the legal rights to make the vaccine, and the knowledge about how to make it. If vaccine recipes are shared – and the opportunity to produce them is provided – then we can adapt our factories to produce the vaccines required. We will consider investing in public industry in each of our nations and equipping our factories to produce the vaccines required, not only for our own countries but for each other.

We will do what we can to end this pandemic together by sharing the capacities we have. For example, where one of us has greater capacity to regulate Covid-19 vaccines and treatments we will lend these capacities to countries that don’t.

The third proposal is focused on collective disobedience. Certain provisions to override intellectual property protections
already exist, for example, through the 2001 Doha declaration of the WTO. Yet countries have been hesitant to do so due to fear of sanctions from certain governments and reprisals from big pharma. We will consider how we could introduce national legislation to override intellectual property protections collectively, introducing a credible threat to the monopoly pharmaceutical model currently at play.

Together, these proposals can begin to shift the entire logic of the global health system – from nationalism to internationalism, from charity to solidarity, and from competition to cooperation. The Summit is a first step on this journey of transformation.

*This article was originally published by The Guardian. Read the original article by clicking here.*
Started to recognize RC48 Facebook Page as a place to share relevant information for the community of researchers interested in the topic, receiving external information about CFPs, Conferences, Publications or PhD Seminars. We aim to continue this dynamic by inviting scholars to share with us the information that they want to disseminate and contribute to make the RC48 Facebook Page a trustworthy information source in Social Movements research.

Between March 2020 & September 2020

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David Dueñas Cid and Natalia Miranda
1st International and Interdisciplinary Conference on Spatial Methods

The Global Center of Spatial Methods for Urban Sustainability (GCSMUS) together with the Research Committee on Logic and Methodology in Sociology (RC33) of the International Sociology Association (ISA) and the Research Network Quantitative Methods” (RN21) of the European Sociology Association (ESA) are organising the 1st International and Interdisciplinary Conference on Spatial Methods (“SMUS Conference”) which will at the same time be the 1st RC33 Regional Conference – Africa: Botswana from Thursday 23.09 to Saturday 25.09 2021, hosted by the University of Botswana in Gaborone, Botswana.

Given the current challenge of the COVID-19 pandemic, the conference will convene entirely online. The conference aims at promoting a global dialogue on methods and should attract methodologists from all over the world and all social and spatial sciences (e.g. area studies, architecture, communication studies, educational sciences, geography, historical sciences, humanities, landscape planning, philosophy, psychology, sociology, urban design, urban planning, traffic planning and environmental planning). Thus, the conference will enable scholars to get in contact with methodologists from various disciplines all over the world and to deepen discussions with researchers from various methodological angles. Keynote speakers will be Wolfgang Aschauer, Bagele Chilisa, Sabelo Ndlovu-Gatsheni, and Gabriele Rosenthal.

Please find the conference programme by clicking here: https://gcsmus.org/conferences/botswana/
Participation is free. However, people interested in participation are kindly asked to register by 15.09.2021 via:

https://docs.google.com/forms/d/1_ZKCZq7w9Wlc_LNsCXv5DeRPCYY_g0aT0DpVpk3d-7w/viewform?edit_requested=true

Regards,
Gabriel Faimau (University of Botswana, Botswana) and Nina Baur (TU Berlin, Germany).
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HOW SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (SOMETIMES) MATTER

David S. Meyer

People protest to try to change the world, because they think they can help change the world, and sometimes they do. But not by themselves, and generally not just how and when they want.

This inclusive book explains how groups of ordinary individuals can affect the world, what makes it possible when it works, and why it sometimes doesn’t go as planned. Digging into previous scholarship on social movements, David S. Meyer looks at the origins of social movements, identifies key factors that explain why they succeed or fail, and assesses the persistent influence of activists on politics, policy, and culture, and the way people live their lives. He concludes by dressing the narratives about political change that activists construct and the power that lies in these stories.

With sharp insight and a wealth of intriguing cases, this book offers a fuller understanding of the politics and potential payouts of protest politics.

"With characteristic eloquence and humor, realism and optimism, David Meyer has given us a new book about the success (sometimes) of social movements, both in America and abroad. Readers will appreciate Meyer’s talent for synthesis, presenting complex arguments with clarity, and unearthing the deeper meanings behind familiar tropes. In a world that has become ever more protest-prone, Meyer’s book will take its place alongside classics like Tilly’s From Mobilization to Revolution and Gamson’s Strategy of Social Protest.”

Sidney Tarrow, author of Power in Movement

"David Meyer draws on expertise accumulated through a career studying and analyzing social movements to take the reader through the lifecycle of a social movement to understand how social movements sometimes lead to protest in the streets, revolution, political change, and all sorts of social and cultural outcomes."

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SPECIAL ISSUE

“Collective action, social movements, and organization: Collected papers from the ISA Forum 2021”

Boris Tarita et al. (ISSN 2198-101X)
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Purpose of the thematic section

This issue seeks to explore the convergence between organizational theories, social movements, and the collective action sociology in order to entail a dialogue and make some improvements toward a more nuanced and robust theoretical framework. Usually, one can identify two main lines of reasoning: one that considers social movements as organized groups, and the other that focuses on unfolding flexible organizational as action taken on collective action — usually often neglecting organized fields of collective action and social movements that do not seem to the concept of formal organizations (Alarcón, O’Donnell & Vendsve 2010). On the other hand, social scientists who study social movements and collective action frequently put on more fluid and strategic to their research objects, which often appear exogenous or external from the organized worldviews actors. As proposed by Edna Friedberg (1991) and others, in what has been called Organized Collective Action (Lazer & Bentele 2010), these theories and empirical objects involve such as different points on the same continuum with differing degrees of collective action's organization or organizationalism. Following the prevalent, Popular (2010) has made the assumption that, in a critical sense, we may define as empirical study of Organized Collective Action.
Recent Publications, Book Recommendations, Call for Papers, and News from Members of RC48

Similarly, but grounded in a constructivist approach, Dobusch and Schonborn (2015) as well as Coelho and Hamer (2019) have engaged in theorizing different degrees of “organisationality” of collective thereby acknowledging and systematizing that organized collective action does not necessarily imply stable collective actors.

Against this backdrop, the Special Issue aims to collect contributions from those who are working in some kind of fiction, dialogic or configurative models dealing with social movements and organizational theory as two different sides of the same object: the collective action. We hope to feature and produce a debate getting closer these different schools and their specific interests, in order to guarantee a broader picture, aiming to construct deep theoretical models and their applications.

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Possible themes and formats

While not limited to the following topics, we encourage authors to focus on:
- Organized Collective Action: state of art, contributions and current challenges;
- Social movements theory formed by collective action;
- Organizational theories formed by or framing collective action;
- Theories of collective action and their empirical models of application;
- Ontology and Epistemology of collective action, and their implications to social movements and organizational theory;
- Contributions can be conceptual, empirical, or methodological in nature. We encourage a variety of methodological approaches. Different manuscript formats are welcome:
- Full articles – Essays, conceptual papers, theoretical review articles, case studies, results of original research – with a length between 5,000 to 10,000 words;
- Short commentaries - research notes, reflections, technical reports, reviews – with a maximum length of 3,000 words.

Articles can be written in Portuguese, English, French or Spanish. Following the style guide of the APA, 6th ed., and followed by an abstract and five keywords.

**Timeline**

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**Submission**

Please, send the manuscript to Thiago Parenti (thiago.parenti@ufrgs.br) and Michael Coelho (coelho@ufms.br). The articles sent shall not be published before or being under consideration for publication by another journal. Do not hesitate to contact us at the email addresses mentioned above!

**Guide for authors and Publishing**

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Metodologías Poscoloniales. Acerca de las teorías y praxis dialógicas alter-hegemonicas

Presentación ensayos, experiencias y narraciones, como así sus desarrollos conceptuales, en derredor de estas relevantes temáticas, para ser publicados en una destacada coedición de REALIS Revista de Estudios AntiUtilitaristas e PosColonialas y CACyC Cuadernos Abiertos de Crítica y Coproducción.

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Los envíos deben orientarse con las normas de recepción de REALIS: https://bit.ly/2R41Zgl

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Fechas de envío: 15 de junio al 15 de agosto de 2021.
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When Students Protest / Secondary and High Schools / Universities in Global South / Universities in Global North (Rowman & Littlefield), 2021

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Volume 1: When Students Protest: Secondary and High Schools

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“Student political action has been a major and recurring feature of politics across the globe throughout the past century. Students have been involved in a full range of public issues, from anti-colonial movements, anti-war campaigns, civil rights and pro-democracy movements to campaigns against neoliberal policies, austerity, racism, misogyny and calls for climate change action. Yet their actions are frequently dismissed by political elites and others as ‘adolescent mischief’ or manipulation of young people by duplicitous adults. This occurs even as many working in governments, traditional media and educational organisations attempt to suppress student movements. Moreover, much of mainstream scholarly work has deemed student politics as unworthy of intellectual attention. These three edited volumes of books help set the record straight.”

“Written by scholars and activists from around the world, When Students Protest: Secondary and High Schools is the first of a three-volume study. The authors document and analyse how generations of secondary and high school students in many countries have been thoughtful, committed and effective political actors and especially so over the past decade. This book also reveals moves by power holders to stigmatise, repress and even criminalise student political campaigns. While these efforts were sometimes successful, this volume shows that whether responding to problems within schools, or engaging the major public issues of the day,
school activists have renewed and revived the political culture of their society, while also challenging long-held age-based prejudices.”

"Written by scholars and activists from around the world, When Students Protest: Universities in the Global South is the second in a three-volume study that explores university student politics in the global south. The authors document and analyse how generations of university and college students in the Global South responded to issues such as problems in their own universities as well as standing up against violent military dictatorships, human rights abuses, oppressive poverty, foreign interference and the effects of neoliberal austerity regimes. Contributors to this this volume also reveal repeated moves by states and institutions to stigmatise and suppress student political action while highlighting how those students developed new kinds of political action further demonstrating why this rich and complex global phenomena is worthy of more attention.”
"Written by scholars and activists from around the world, When Students Protest: Universities in the Global North is the third in this three-volume study that explores university student politics in the global north. Authors explore university and college student political action, especially over the past decade. It is just over fifty years since May 1968 when student protests erupted at Université Paris Nanterre in France and then spread across the globe. Contributors to this book demonstrate that despite repeated attempts by states, power elites and institutions to suppress and even criminalise student political action, student movements have always been part of the political landscape and remain a significant and potent source of political change and renewal."

Three volumes edited by three women on three continents and three years in the making! We are very grateful to all the contributors and hope the volumes will take understanding of young people’s political participation forward, notably the outcomes of their actions.
The book also reveals moves by power holders to stigmatise, repress and suppress effective political actors and especially so over the past decade. This work has deemed student politics as unworthy of intellectual attention. Moreover, much of mainstream scholarly study that explores university student politics in the global south. The authors document and analyse how generations of university and college students in the Global South responded to issues such as campaigns against neoliberal policies, austerity, racism, misogyny and calls for climate change action. Yet their actions are frequently dismissed by political elites and others as 'adolescent mischief' or manipulation of the stigmatise and suppress student political action while highlighting how interference and the effects of neoliberal austerity regimes. Contributors demonstrate that despite repeated attempts by states, power elites and institutions to suppress and even criminalise student political action, student movements have always been part of the political landscape and institutions to suppress and even criminalise student political action, stigmatise and suppress student political action while highlighting how interference and the effects of neoliberal austerity regimes. Contributors demonstrate that despite repeated attempts by states, power elites and institutions to suppress and even criminalise student political action, demonstrating why this rich and complex global phenomena is worthy of the stigmatise and suppress student political action while highlighting how interference and the effects of neoliberal austerity regimes. Contributors demonstrate that despite repeated attempts by states, power elites and institutions to suppress and even criminalise student political action, demonstrating why this rich and complex global phenomena is worthy of the public attention.

Thematic mini-conferences are a key element of SASE's annual conferences. We are currently accepting submissions for mini-conferences for the 2022 annual SASE conference, to take place at the University of Amsterdam, 9-11 July 2022. Preference will be given to proposals linked to the overarching conference theme, "Fractious Connections: Anarchy, Activism, Coordination, and Control". Special consideration will also be given to proposals that cover areas currently underrepresented in SASE, notably race and ethnicity, migration, economic history, and heterodox economics – as well as submissions that provide a global perspective.

Before submitting a proposal, please consult the list of extent SASE networks. Proposals that would otherwise fit within a network will be expected to include an explanation as to why the topic should be discussed in a mini-conference format. You may also consult programs from past conferences (https://sase.org/events/past-meetings-archive/) to view mini-conference themes from previous years. SASE is committed to diverse membership and lively intellectual debates, and encourages proposals that are offered by a diverse group of organizers and/or are likely to bring a diverse group of participants.

Proposals for mini-conferences must be submitted electronically to the SASE Executive Director (saseexecutive@sase.org) by 20 October 2021. To apply, please fill out the form available here. Please be sure to indicate if the mini-conference was organized in the past, with details on attendance and how the current application may or may not differ from the past. Do note, however, that past mini-conference organization does not guarantee future organization - the mini-conferences are not intended to be permanent structures, they rather vary in content and focus from year to year, depending notably on the conference theme of that year. If you have questions about transforming a mini-conference into a permanent SASE research network, please contact Executive Director Annelies Fryberger directly (saseexecutive@sase.org).

Contrary to previous years, each mini-conference will consist of a minimum of 3 panels and a maximum of 5 panels. These will be featured as a separate stream in the program. If accepted, your mini-conference will be included in the general SASE call for papers (deadline in January), and you will receive applications through our conference submission system. Applicants to mini-conferences must submit an extended abstract for review.

You will review applications and create the panel sessions for your mini conference, which may also include participants and panels you have invited in advance. If a paper proposal cannot be accommodated within your mini-conference, we will assist you in forwarding it to the most appropriate research network for consideration. As a mini-conference organizer, you will be expected to assign a discussant for each session that you organize.
Dates to bear in mind:

20 October 2021: Deadline for mini-conference proposals

Early November 2021: Notification of acceptance of mini-conference themes

Mid-November 2021: Circulation of general Call for Papers, which includes mini-conferences.

January 2022: Deadline for paper submissions to the SASE conference

February 2022: Accept/reject submissions for your mini-conference

March 2022: Create sessions and assign discussants

15 June 2022: deadline for full papers, to be given to discussants for review (if you set a full paper requirement)

9-11 July 2022: SASE annual conference

Proposals should be submitted to SASE’s Executive Director, Annelies Fryberger; saseexecutive@sase.org. You will receive confirmation of receipt. Please note that you may only organize one mini-conference per year - if a given individual applies as organizer of multiple mini-conferences and more than one is accepted, that person will have to choose which mini-conference they will actually organize. Please also feel free to reach out with questions about the application procedure.

SASE is committed to providing a safe and welcoming environment for all members and event participants, irrespective of, for example, race, color, ethnicity, ancestry, national origin, language, gender, sexual orientation, gender identity, gender expression, age, marital status, religion, disability, veteran status, or socio-economic status. Our association exists for the purposes of scholarly, educational, and professional exchange; much of the richness and vitality of this exchange is owed to SASE’s diverse membership and spirit of inclusiveness. We provide inclusionary events such as the Women and Gender (WAG) Forum, conference fees are based on socio-economic status, we are dedicated to a Code of Conduct, and we consider diversity in committees and convener teams. Discrimination and harassment of colleagues, students, or other participants in SASE events undermines shared principles of equity, free inquiry, and free expression – and is considered by SASE to be a serious form of professional misconduct.
**When Disobedience is «social»:**
*Democratic Protests and New Forms of Collective Action*
Department of Education, University of Catania, October 21-22, 2021

**Conference Programme**

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<th>DAY 1</th>
<th>OCTOBER 21, 2021</th>
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<td>WELCOME GREETINGS</td>
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<td>Francesco Priolo, Rector – <em>University of Catania</em></td>
<td>9.30</td>
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<td>Rosa Loredana Cardullo, Director, Department of Education – <em>University of Catania</em></td>
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<td>Massimo Pendenza, Coordinator <em>Ais - Teorie Sociologiche</em></td>
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<td>Liana M. Daher, President <em>ISA RC48 – Social Movements, Collective Action and Social Change</em></td>
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**INTRODUCTION:**
Liana M. Daher - *University of Catania* | 10.00 |

**OPENING SESSION**
Civil and Social Disobedience: challenging issues
Chair: Benjamín Tejerina
10.30-13.00

| 1 | Helena Flam  
*Universität Leipzig* | The Puzzle Civil Disobedience |
| 2 | Teresa Serra  
*Sapienza University* | From the civic to the social. Disobedience as need of transition to the democracy of future |
| 3 | Jennet Kirkpatrick  
*Arizona State University* | Tocqueville and Anti-Social Disobedience |
| 4 | Tova Benski  
*The College of Management-Academic Studies* | Between civil-military-social disobedience |
**When Disobedience is «social»: Democratic Protests and New Forms of Collective Action**
Department of Education, University of Catania, October 21-22, 2021

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**Discussion**

**BREAK**

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**SESSIONS**

**Disobedience in Pandemic Times**
Chair: Augusto Gamuzza  
14.30-16.00

1. Chiara Sagone  
   University of Catania  
   The handling of the Covid-19 pandemic and the regional disobedience

2. Miri (Miriam) Gal Ezer  
   Kinneret College on the Sea of Galilee  
   Israel Covid-19 Authoritarian 'Disaster-Capitalism' and Media: Obedient Populist Collectives' Organised Violent Actions Against Disobedient Democratic Social-Civic Collectives' Protests

3. Francesco Antonelli Santina Musolino  
   University “Roma Tre”  
   Riots and social disobedience at the time of Covid19 Crisis: the case of the Italian University

**Discussant:** Emanuele Toscano (Università degli Studi Guglielmo Marconi-Roma)

**BREAK**

**Disobedience and the Law**
Chair: Caterina Drigo  
16.30-18.00

1. Fausto Vecchio  
   Kore University of Enna  
   Disobedient judges as a reaction to political populism

2. Edoardo C. Raffiotta  
   University of Milano Bicocca  
   The role of “private sovereigns” in the political choises of States

3. Augusto Sperb Machado  
   University of Lausanne  
   The ‘standard’ definition of civil disobedience between the fidelity-to-law requirement and the rule-of-law ideal

**Discussant:** Manuel Anselmi (UnitelmaSapienza, University of Rome)
When Disobedience is «social»: Democratic Protests and New Forms of Collective Action
Department of Education, University of Catania, October 21-22, 2021

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<td>Social Dissent and Disobedience in Education</td>
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<td>Chair: Liana M. Daher</td>
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<td>9.00 – 10.30</td>
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</table>
| **1** | Maurizio Merico  
Nadia Crescenzo  
University of Salerno | Education and dissent: rethinking Kenneth Keniston’s contribution to youth studies |
| **2** | Augusto Gamuzza  
Anna Maria Leonora  
University of Catania | Cosmopolitan Educational Disobedience. A theoretical proposal for changing times |
| **3** | Giorgia Mavica  
Alessandra Scierni  
University of Catania | Disobedience in pandemic times: protests for and against distance teaching in Italy |

**Discussant:** Mariagrazia Santagati (Catholic University of the Sacred Heart - Milan) |

**BREAK**

**Disobedience as a form of resistance: the interdisciplinary outlook**
Chair: Anna Maria Leonora |
| 11.00-13.00 |
| **1** | Caterina Drigo  
University of Bologna | From civil disobedience to social disobedience: new paths on a globalised world. Theoretical framework and case studies |
| **2** | Vito Giannini  
Nicola De Luigi  
Ilaria Pitti  
University of Bologna | Why disobeying the law? Emotions and reasons in the protest against the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline |
| **3** | Francesco Paterniti  
University of Catania | Children in the context of homosexual couples, between legislative limits and the disobedience of would-be parents. Reflections on a problem awaiting solution |
| **4** | Emanuele Coco  
University of Catania | Philosophy of Disobedience. The detachment from the rule as a theoretical act |

**Discussant:** Andrea Borghini (University of Pisa) |

**BREAK**
When Disobedience is «social»: Democratic Protests and New Forms of Collective Action
Department of Education, University of Catania, October 21-22, 2021

Disobedience and Solidarity Processes
Chair: Ilaria Pitti
14.00-16.00

1. Camilo Gomez, Birmingham City University
Understanding the 2021 Colombian protests as an act of social disobedience: places, spaces, and bodies of resistance and solidarity

2. Lina Vosliute, CEPS (Centre for European Policy Studies)
Stephanie Brenda Smialowski, SciencesPo
Guilty without crime: policing of solidarity with refugees and other migrants

3. Davide Nicolosi, University of Catania
Prosocial activism: first evidences from the protests for migrants’ rights in Sicily

4. Martín Julian Acevedo Miño, Pontificia Universidad Católica
Civil disobedience as a current form of resistance: the tax rebellion of the agricultural sector in Argentina

Discussant: Kaan Agartan (Framingham State University)

BREAK

CLOSING SESSION
Looking for a Definition of Social Disobedience: Evidences from the Sessions
16.30-17.30

Benjamín Tejerina
Augusto Gamuzza
Caterina Drigo
Anna Maria Leonora
Ilaria Pitti

Concluding Remarks: Liana M. Daher
Call for Research Summaries from student and early career members

Grassroots is seeking submissions for Research Summaries, a future new section in our newsletter to address and showcase topics and research developments of relevance to all RC48 members. The main purpose of this new section is to present the work of students and early career researchers regarding social movements topics, and provide information about the latest research activities in our field.

Website analytics show that Research Summaries are widely viewed on the Internet. While potential authors can submit contributions for summaries at any time of the year to the editorial team of Grassroots, we would appreciate it if you can send us your piece in line with the two main editorial review cycles for the year: 15 June and 15 November.

Contributions should:

1. Be approximately between 1,000 to 1,500 words (not including references);

2. Be double-spaced with 1-inch margins in 12-point Times New Roman font;

3. Provide operational definitions of essential concepts and terminology;

4. State the question of the research and explain why it is important, describing also the methods in a few paragraphs, and explaining the results focusing on why they are significant for our field;

5. If appropriate, include a list of recommended resources that are practitioner/activist oriented.

Please send your contributions to our editors Kaan Agartan (kagartan@framingham.edu) or Camilo Tamayo Gomez (c.a.tamayogomez@hud.ac.uk)
Grassroots