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Editorial

E-Bulletin (International Sociological Association)

It gives me great pleasure to pen a few lines for the second issue of the ISA E-Bulletin. This issue is an exciting one. It begins with a feature essay, ‘Women as “Missing Persons” in Social and Political Theory’ by Lynn McDonald, dealing with a subject that is of pressing concern to all sociologists. It is a privilege and an honour to carry the text of an engaging conversation between Prof. André Béteille and Prof. Surendra Munshi – both eminent Indian sociologists – who address such issues as the comparative method, role of intellectuals and indigenization in the social sciences, etc. Also included in this issue are voices of four graduates students in sociology and their reflections on the state of the discipline and embedded within, their vision of a sociology for the future. The issue ends with a collection of three papers from the 2005 Meetings of the ISA Council of National Associations – ‘Local, Regional and Global Sociologies: Contexts, Perspectives and Practices’ held in Florida in 2005. Michael Burawoy’s ‘Forging Public Sociologies on National, Regional and Global Terrains’, Carlos Fortuna’s ‘Glocalities’ as a metaphor for Regional Associations’ and Roberto Cipriani’s ‘State, nation and Sociology’ collectively address themes that engaged sociologists everywhere.

The contributions in these two issues deal with a variety of subjects, about which sociologists clearly hold different opinions. In the spirit of generating healthy debate and discussion, I welcome comments and reflections from readers on pieces published thus far in the E-bulletin to kick start the 'Forum' section of this publication. I also look forward to receiving feedback, suggestions and most of all, contributions from you. Thank you.

Editor, E-Bulletin, ISA

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Women are still largely absent from accounts of the development of Western social and political theory, whether as taught in sociology, political science or philosophy departments. Some recent text books give token coverage. Women appear at the end, often for their writing as “feminist theorists,” but not for their many and substantial contributions to mainstream theory: the nature of society, the social bond or social contract, the development of norms and laws, social obligation, social reform, internationalism, war, militarism and peace, nor on epistemology or the methodology of the social sciences. For some of the women who made important contributions there may be brief remarks: Mary Wollstonecraft, Harriet Martineau, Beatrice Webb and Jane Addams often get a modest nod of recognition. But even great contributors--when their books are examined for their theoretical content--are still missing from the canon, notably the late-seventeenth-century Mary Astell, the eighteenth-century Catharine Macaulay and Germaine de Staël, and the nineteenth-century Florence Nightingale.

This is but to note the most important women theorists and those with at least substantial works available. Also worthy of attention, if not at the same level, are Emilie du Châtelet, Marie Philpón Roland, Sophie Grouchy de Condorcet, Mary Hays, Flora Tristan, Harriet Taylor Mill, Helen Taylor and other scholars would add yet other names.

My Early Origins of the Social Sciences, 1993, was the first theory book to give coverage to women theorists on the same basis as men, i.e., reporting and commenting on their theoretical work. My Women Founders of the Social Sciences, 1994, gives them more coverage (and correctly identifies the book as reporting theorists of one gender only--would that authors titled their books honestly, such as “Classical Theory by Men”). My Women Theorists on Society and Politics, 1998, included a few more women theorists, emphasizing political and social theory more than epistemology and methodology, and gave excerpts from their work, including much that was long out-of-print and some that was never translated into English. Many other scholars have put out useful editions of these women’s books, biographies and analyses. There are even now collected works for Mary Wollstonecraft and Harriet Martineau. New material on Jane Addams has appeared. There have been sessions on women theorists at professional conferences such as the American Sociological Association and the World Congress on Sociology. The Harriet Martineau Sociological Society was founded in 1997 and produces scholarly work on her.
In short, good sources on women theorists are now easily to be had. The scholars who work on women theorists are still small in number, but they are active and productive. There is then no excuse for professors of theory courses and writers of theory texts to exclude women theorists.

The frequently-used justification for their ongoing exclusion has been that women did not do “grand theory,” that their work was not of the same calibre as that of men, hence undeserving of the same serious treatment. This paper is directed at refuting that contention. An earlier paper took the first step by showing the distinctive contribution of many women theorists (note 1). Here I will argue that they need to be included to make sense of the development of key theoretical ideas. Their exclusion, in other words, entails not only injustice to their memory and the loss of information, detail and nuance in theory, but misses major initiatives and developments in central aspects of theory.

The eighteenth-century Enlightenment was a fertile period for the development of so much political and social theory: on the social bond, social contract, sovereignty of the people, law, liberty and equality, opposition to slavery--ideas that we can see nourished the development of democratic institutions, individual and collective rights.

The values and thinking of the Enlightenment were then key not only to the development of the social sciences (scientific methodology, liberty of inquiry and expression and belief in the possibility of progress, especially through the application of knowledge) but the basic human rights and democratic institutions we now take for granted in Western industrial countries. The right of every person to a vote is unthinkable without the Enlightenment regard for the ordinary individual and a broad understanding of the principle of “sympathy” or “compassion,” extended now to all humankind--for purposes of voting to all adults. This Enlightenment “universalism” fostered both individual rights (for all count, not merely the nobility and aristocracy) and supported another fundamental principle, sovereignty of the people (as opposed to the divine right of kings). The United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights is a clear product of Enlightenment thought, as indeed are all codes of human rights and charters of rights.

Utility theory, or the notion that society ought to be organized so as to produce the “greatest good” or “greatest happiness” of the greatest number is another important theoretical formulation of the Enlightenment. While it can be and has been criticized for its crass, mechanistic elements, it is scarcely possible to imagine the emergence of democratic institutions without it. “The greatest number” requirement marks an enormous shift away from the priorities of the educated and cultured elite of society to include the vast mass of ordinary people, who would have been uneducated and uncultured at the time.

The principles of the French Enlightenment emerged when France was a monarchy, indeed with a “sun king” who held absolute power. The monarchy in Britain at the same time (thanks to an earlier bloody revolution and the “glorious,” nonviolent, revolution) was less powerful. Or people had more rights in the constitutional monarchy that had replaced the Stuart “divine- right” kings. Both British and French Enlightenment writers developed justifications for the principles of universalism and sovereignty of the people.

Typically men theorists only are cited in the history of these ideas. But there were important women contributors both in the early stages, notably with Mary Astell and Emilie du Châtelet, and in the later stages with Catharine Macaulay and Germaine de Staël.

Mary Astell (1666-1731), whose early writing on methodology contributed to the late seventeenth-century development of scientific method, was an early exponent of feminism
(not so-called, but no less powerful for that). Given that it was based on her Christian faith she can be seen as the first Christian feminist. She has also been described as "arguably the first systematic feminist theoretician in the West" (note 2) for her strong arguments for the right of women to a life of the mind. Here we examine her work for its early formulation of Enlightenment ideas.

Although Astell was a conservative royalist in her politics, she accorded considerable duties to the monarch, and was enormously democratic and non-elitist in according duties to people. Along with the subject’s duty to obey the sovereign there is a counterpoising ideal of the greatest good of the greatest number, which modifies it considerably. It was more important that everybody’s basic needs be met than that the privileged gain more luxuries or advantages. In her words:

> A less evil suffered by me is not so bad in itself as a greater suffered by my neighbour. Therefore it is not reasonable, and consequently not best, that my neighbour should endure an evil to procure me a good not equal in degree to that evil, or that I should refuse pain or loss to procure for another a good that outweighs it. (note 3)

From her faith Astell understood that God was no respecter of persons, and further did not "will a good to any one of his creatures that tends to the greater evil of another, but...always wills the greatest good" (203). God, in short, was an advocate of utility theory. This use of the “greatest good” language is from 1705, long before the work of the great men cited as utility theorists or precursors.

Astell’s arguments on obligation are in clear contradiction to what would be called the “possessive individualism” of other, male, seventeenth-century political theorists, notably Thomas Hobbes and John Locke. Catherine Stimpson credits her further with being "the first feminist critique of possessive individualism" (xii), but C.B. Macpherson's classic analysis, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, does not even mention her.

Nor does John Rawls mention Astell or any other woman theorist in his much-discussed Theory of Justice, 1971. This work attempts to derive obligation using a form of social contract theory. Although he devoted a whole section to showing “the connection between moral and natural attitudes,” he paid no attention to the work of any of the women who had earlier done just that. Drawing from Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments he raised some of the same sorts of naturalistic points the next women we shall examine did. He even went so far as to the call the moral sentiments “a normal part of human life,” which could not be done away with “without dismantling the natural attitudes as well.” His description is very similar when he argues that “love of mankind and the desire to uphold the common good include the principles of right and justice” (489).

Rawls's theory of justice attempted to avoid anyone being advantaged or disadvantaged by the “natural contingencies” of intelligence, strength, status, etc. (12). This is very similar to Astell’s argument for government’s function as an equalizer, to smooth over the disparities between people. For Rawls inequalities in basic rights and duties could only be justified if they resulted in “compensatory benefits” for all, and in particular for the least advantaged members of society (14). This is very similar to Astell’s treatment.

Emilie du Châtelet (1706-1749) in her translation and commentary on Mandeville's Fable of the Bees, written roughly 1735-37, held that "love seems to have been the beginning of society" (142). Love naturally resulted in procreation and meeting the needs of young families in turn gave birth to society. Châtelet was the French translator of Isaac Newton’s
Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy) and an early contributor to methodology as well (see the section on her in Women Founders of the Social Sciences). Her use of Mandeville to argue for the origin of morals and laws without a social contract long predates that of the much better known French and British Enlightenment theorists: La Mettrie's Man Machine, 1747, Montesquieu's Spirit of Laws, 1748, David Hume's Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, 1751, Helvétius' On the Mind, 1758, and Adam Smith's mature and more systematic formulation in the Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759.

Du Châtelet was, as Voltaire had earlier done with his English Letters, introducing English work to France. Her choice was Mandeville, not Hobbes, a social compact not based on force or fear but which stressed the role of positive social bonds, initially through the family. She described Mandeville as an English Montaigne, a high compliment, said he had “even more method,” and was the author of the "best book on morality ever written" (137).

The emphasis on sympathy/feeing as the basis of morality is highlighted also by Sophie Grouchy de Condorcet (1764-1822), wife of the probability theorist and feminist, Jean-Antoine Caritat, the marquis de Condorcet (1743-94). After his death she published a translation of Adam Smith’s Theory of Moral Sentiments and to it added her own book-length commentary, Letters on Sympathy, 1798. Grouchy de Condorcet was herself a supporter of the French Revolution.

Thomas Hobbes is the major source for the illiberal, or even totalitarian, version of social contract theory, from his harsh view of the state of human nature without organized society. Where life was so terribly “solitary, poor, nasty, brutish and short” (note 4) people had more to fear from their neighbours than their government. Hence the justification for an unequal contract, with inordinate rights to the sovereign over the unruly people. John Locke is the great source for the liberal version of social contract theory, which flowed logically from his more benign view of human nature. His Two Treatises of Government, 1690, give a profoundly different account of the social contract and the reasons for people entering into it.

There are numerous other versions of social contract theory from various men theorists, and a vast literature on them in the academic literature. Notably missing from this discussion is the work of Catharine Macaulay (1731-91). Macaulay first denounced Hobbes's portrayal of the state of nature and the social contract in a lengthy essay, Loose Remarks on Hobbes's Philosophical Rudiments, 1767 and then again in a substantial book, Letters on Education, 1790. Macaulay disagreed with Hobbes’s contention in his Philosophical Elements of a True Citizen, which set out to refute the more social opinion that humans were creatures “born fit for society.” He enumerated the “vicious affections inherent in human nature, which affections are confined to the innate quality of selfishness.” He drew from these premises the inference that people could not “desire society from love, but through hope of gain.” Therefore, he argued, “the origin of all great and lasting societies” consisted not in the mutual good-will people had for each other, “but in the mutual fear they had of each other” (note 5).

Macaulay’s Loose Remarks then systematically demolished Hobbes's analysis. She argued instead that a contract was binding on the sovereign as well as the people, a fundamental point of difference. The people, she held, continued to hold considerable rights, while the sovereign was accorded precise responsibilities. Instead of the state of Hobbesian primitive equality in the original, brutish state of nature, Macaulay argued that political equality and the laws of good government were mutually compatible and indeed complementary.
She went much further in her later *Letters on Education*, drawing clearly on the moral philosophy school. Far from justifying the ongoing rights of oppressive sovereigns Macaulay insisted that there had to be measures to remove sovereigns when they governed badly. She further specified the need for provisions to select the most capable people for government, a key point for she would later accord a much larger role for government than other theorists of the time did.

Instead of a social contract being arranged among terrified people, there was the positive communication, by parents, of right and wrong to their children. People gradually acquired ideas of good and evil, “by experience,” and then “communicated their observations to their offspring.” “Domestic education,” she argued reasonably, must, therefore, “have begun with the beginning of the life of man.” Using moral philosophy theory she described how the “the stock” of ideas increased as people made comparisons, consequently enlarging their knowledge of the relation of things. “Education then, in a state of the rudest society, must necessarily be more complex and more methodical than education in the natural or more solitary state of man” (note 6). Macaulay then described a gradual process of socialization in even the most rude state of society, ending in complex motives and enlarged duties and obligations, and critical observation of and punishment for offences.

Macaulay was an effective and astute user of the notion of “sympathy” in moral philosophy theory. Sympathy, according to her, lay dormant in every mind and had to be prompted to become active. Governments had considerable power to affect its development through enacting or promoting laws, precepts and customs. She was influenced here by Beccaria’s *Treatise of Crimes and Punishments*, 1764, which she cited with approval and which gave detailed arguments for the formulation of laws that would deter bad behaviour and elicit good behaviour by the penalties and rewards attached to them. The entire account is a thorough repudiation of the illiberal social contract and its replacement with a naturalistic, sympathy-based theory. Yet Macaulay is scarcely even mentioned in the development of utility theory or moral philosophy.

Jeremy Bentham is typically recognized as the best source of the mature formulation of utility theory, and accordingly he is blamed for its mechanistic excesses. His *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*, 1780, is rightly treated as a classic text, deservedly with a large literature on it, including critiques and condemnations as well as appreciative applications. Yet one of the best adaptations of utility theory, Catharine Macaulay’s *Letters on Education*, is still unrecognized as a major contribution to utility theory.

Macaulay did not believe that the calculation of pleasures and pains of utility theory should be confined to the human species. Like a growing body of ecologically-minded persons she believed that it should be a general principle, that the feelings of all creatures of sense should be considered, the “whole sentient creation,” in Bentham’s apt description (note 7). The fact that humans abused their powers over animals was to Macaulay a melancholy sign of barbarous state of human sentiments. Her prescription included giving children care over animals to teach them a higher regard.

Ecologists continue to credit Bentham for his inclusion of “the whole sentient creation” in the calculation of utility theory. But his discussion of species other than the human was brief. Macaulay was much more comprehensive in her treatment, used stronger language and was less anthropocentric. Yet she is not listed in the development of these ideas, or of animal welfare. The Scottish moral philosopher David Hume is typically given some
recognition for his much weaker advocacy of "gentle usage" for non-human creatures, short of justice (note 8).

**Germaine de Staël (1766-1817)** continues to be known chiefly as a “femme de lettres,” which she was, and she continues to attract attention for her personal life—a major biography (by Christopher Herold) calls her “mistress to an age.” Her interesting work on political science and methodology is still largely ignored, although selections at least are available in translation. Even her “collected works,” in French, exclude a major book, in my view her best: *Des circonstances actuelles*, published posthumously in 1906.

This book sets out the requisite means to end the civil war unleashed by the French Revolution, as is clear in its full title: *Des circonstances actuelles qui peuvent terminer la révolution et des principes qui doivent fonder la république en France* [The current conditions that can end the revolution and the principles which must found the republic]. De Staël advocated the establishment of a republic to replace the old, unjust and wasteful hierarchical regime. No feminist, de Staël’s proposal would have given representation to the whole, male, nation, as in fact happened—women did not get the vote in France until after World War II. Positions would be determined on a merit system. Her analysis includes an interesting analysis of the trade-offs between liberty and equality, principles normally treated as being at least partially in opposition. She proposed extensive de-centralization of the French administrative system, even some measure of federalism. France under the old regime was highly centralized, and remained so after the revolution, and indeed after subsequent constitutional changes as France switched between monarchy and republic. Rebel movements in Occitanie, the Basque country and Brittany periodically protested the rigid centralization she sought to temper.

De Staël’s practical recommendations for change in *Circonstances actuelles* were eminently moderate, so much so that they would have offended virtually everybody in some respect. By accepting the fundamental principles of the revolution she angered revolutionaries, by condemning its excesses and assisting aristocratic refugees to escape she angered the revolutionaries. She herself had to flee the country during the revolution, and again during the Napoleonic period after it.

De Staël’s position on the French Revolution shows a consistent concern for justice. In a pamphlet she argued that Marie Antoinette should not be held responsible with the king for his decisions (note 9). She is worth reading on her opposition to slavery, and practical proposal to take advantage of the peace conference after the defeat of Napoleon to end the slave trade, and on militarism. By omitting de Staël from the political science canon we accordingly miss out on an astute, republican, liberal and moderate advocate of social change. We lose a fine writer at the same time, and, since she was the daughter of the last king’s minister of finance, Jacques Necker, and an acquaintance of many of the leading political figures at the time, one who could write with personal experience.

Why is Jean-Jacques Rousseau still so beloved of political theorists and Germaine de Staël so ignored? True, he was a brilliant writer and with interesting sidelines, such as music. He gave some encouragement to women of the time for at least according them a role complementary to that of their husbands’. But his great original contribution, the concept of the “general will,” is a justification of totalitarianism. His male supremacy theory was always, like Aristotle’s, groundless—he simply asserted that men were superior to women and that women therefore owed them subservience! And this still passes for brilliance in the world of political theory!!
Germaine de Staël was no advocate of women’s rights, but was surely a positive example of womanly competence. She wrote sensitively about women’s lives both in her sociological work (notably On Germany) and in her novels. Her political theory is moderate and constructive, always liberal and democratic--quite unlike Rousseau’s mindless misogyny. It does not flash like the “general will,” but it attracts by its reasonableness. De Staël envisaged increasing rights for ordinary people (through education), liberty for slaves, respect for the people’s day-to-day concerns and opportunity for occupational advancement regardless of class of origin. For the nobility she argued for their survival and reinstatement from exile, so long as they accepted the new constitution, and thus gave up their significant previous privileges.

Rousseau was a theorist with no method but the mind. De Staël was a theorist with the method of political science, a belief (overly confident, in my view) of the possibilities of using data to solve problems of political conflict peacefully. Social scientists today do not share her optimism as to political science, although we still use the same techniques (with lesser objectives). Her excessive optimism reflects Enlightenment values, but it is hardly the dangerous excess that Rousseau’s general will was. Germaine de Staël’s contribution overall deserves attention in my view; she should have a prominent place in the Enlightenment-early nineteenth-century canon.

**Nineteenth-Century Social and Political Theory**

The reigning theoretical school for most of the nineteenth century was political economy, based on the work of economists Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo; sociologist Herbert Spencer is a good later example. This “laissez-faire” school opposed intervention in the economy or society, holding interference in the “laws of nature,” as they were seen, to be futile or even dangerous, capable of making matters worse. Malthus’s “law of population” and Ricardo’s “iron law of wages” became for many theorists reasons for accepting massive poverty and even starvation for the poor in their societies. Interference such as by feeding them would cause them to reproduce more, adding to the number of mouths to feed, hence only postponing starvation or other disastrous measures of population control.

Harriet Martineau was an early popularizer of the laissez-faire doctrine, notably in her *Illustrations of Political Economy*, but she did not do serious theoretical work on the subject. In fact her views mellowed over time, probably under the influence of Florence Nightingale (on whom more shortly). There were then no serious women theorists of the early political economy school. Margaret Thatcher, in the late twentieth century, is a superb example of its later (and not significantly altered) manifestation. However the topic here is theorists of the time.

Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, with other Marxists, rejected the political economy school, but held that change was possible only with the overthrow of capitalism and its replacement by a completely different socialist/communist system. Without the demise of capitalism they, too, were pessimistic about any reform providing real help to the great mass of poor workers. Rosa Luxemburg and Clara Zetkin are examples of later Marxist theorists, in fact examples of women theorists who have been given some coverage in the literature.

Between these two pessimistic extremes of laissez-faire political economy and radical Marxism there was a great mainstream middle: liberal, reformist and optimistic that reforms could be made, varying as to the best means. The nineteenth century saw numerous proposals for reform advanced in writing and worked on by dedicated bands of people: co-operatives, trade unions, savings banks, credit unions, self-help organizations, minimum
standards legislation, schools and workers’ education. Labour and democratic socialist parties were formed and advanced their programs for legislative change.

**Florence Nightingale (1820-1910)** is possibly the best example of this reformist mainstream position (she was a supporter of many of these schemes), yet she is not treated as a political theorist or advocate but still confined to her place as a heroine of the Crimean War, founder of modern nursing and, perhaps, advocate of hospital reform.

The two books on women theorists mentioned above, two volumes in the *Collected Works of Florence Nightingale* show how broad her interests were and how coherently they were set out. In *Society and Politics* (volume 5) her views on income security for the working class, lower middle class and rural workers are presented, with a host of other measures for improving their housing and other living conditions. *Public Health Care* (volume 6) reports her work to introduce professional nursing into the dreaded workhouse infirmaries of the day, within a more comprehensive view of social change that is an early version of the social democratic welfare state.

The workhouses of Victorian Britain were massive institutions holding the destitute for any number of reasons: the aged, sick, disabled, mentally ill or handicapped, single pregnant women and the children of destitute parents. They were given minimal assistance quite deliberately to discourage people from seeking help and becoming a burden on taxpayers. For an ardent Christian like Nightingale this harsh treatment was an offence. As a systems thinker with a strong orientation to data and social science research she could think of a better alternative.

Nightingale set out an “ABC” of workhouse reform that would have revamped the entire system, indeed dismantled the workhouses except for the small number of able-bodied unemployed, for whom deterrent measure she considered to be justifiable. The unemployed themselves would be a much smaller group if her proposals for employment stimulation in economic downturns were adopted, for she had an early, long pre-Keynesian understanding of using public works to provide employment. She did not believe that there were many people who were wilfully employed. Nightingale’s proposed reform of the workhouse system was:

A. To insist on the great principle of separating the sick, insane, incurable and children from the usual pauper population of the metropolis;...

B. To advocate a general metropolitan rate for this purpose and a central administration.

C. To leave the pauper and casual population and the rating for under the boards of guardians, as at present--these are the ABC of the reform required.

Her alternative scheme would provide a scheme of suburban hospitals and asylums for sick, for infirm, aged and invalids, for insane and imbeciles, and industrial schools for children.

She explained the rationale in terms perfectly explicable to social scientists:

Sickness, madness, imbecility and permanent infirmity are general afflictions affecting the entire community and are not (like pauperism) to be kept down by local knowledge or by hard usage. The sick or infirm or mad pauper ceases to be a pauper when so afflicted and should be chargeable to the community at large, as a fellow-creature in suffering.

Consequently, Nightingale advocated that there be “a general rate” or tax “to be levied over the whole metropolitan area, to be administered by the central authority” (note 10). J.S.
Mill, then an MP, argued precisely this last point in committee, supporting her argument. In fact a Metropolitan Poor Bill was adopted in 1867 that brought in some of Nightingale’s advocated changes (it is a long story why more was not done, told in Public Health Care). It in fact served as the framework from which many reforms in the welfare system were made. Social administration expert Brian Abel-Smith called it “an important step in English social history....the first explicit acknowledgment that it was the duty of the state to provide hospitals for the poor,” even “an important step towards the National Health Service Act which followed some eighty years later” (note 11).

The legislation was permissive only, however, so that reformers had to struggle for improved workhouses in each institution separately. The broader “ABC” of reform Nightingale envisaged was not implemented in her lifetime although many specific improvements were made. Not until 1909 do we see any vision of the same scope, in the recommendations of the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission, advocated by Beatrice and Sidney Webb. Even then many were only partially enacted, to reappear as recommendations in the Beveridge Report at the end of World War II and the post-war establishment of the welfare state in Britain.

Interesting comparisons between Nightingale and Marx become possible when she is seen as a major liberal reformer. Both were critics of capitalism, but with thoroughly opposing approaches to how to accomplish change and what changes should be made. Nightingale’s vision was of a profoundly reformed system, the private sector largely running the economy, but with measures for income security, savings and pensions, employment stimulation in bad economic times, better housing, provision for the disabled, aged and chronically ill, foster care for children, and a whole system of public health care. This we can now see as an early conceptualization of the welfare state or social democracy. Marx gave only the sketchiest idea of his reformed society, in rather romantic terms, with details only for the initial transition. A comparison of Nightingale’s early vision with that proposed in the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission would also be of great interest.

Nightingale would be a valuable addition to nineteenth-century textbooks on theory also for her espousal of a sound methodology. Her methodology drew particularly on the pioneering work of Belgian statistician L.A.J. Quetelet, notably from his Physique sociale, 1869. Nightingale was a pioneer data collector, although from institutions only, not individuals. There is no “Nightingale methodology” so-called, but one can be identified from her actual work:

- Get the best information available in print, especially government reports and statistics;
- Read and interview experts;
- Send out a questionnaire if the available information is not adequate for the purpose;
- Test all questions first at one institution; consult practitioners who use the material;
- In report writing send out a draft or proofs to experts for vetting before publication.

This remains good advice for social science students of every kind. So also are her cautions for the application of research results. Nightingale was a strong believer in science, believing that God made the world and runs it by laws. By conducting good research we can ascertain what these laws are and formulate measures to intervene and correct problems. But
Nightingale also had a strong belief in the potential for harm from unintended consequences. From Quetelet she had learned that even the best-intentioned reforms could have negative, even contrary results (he gave examples of mortality rates increasing from the founding of a supposedly benevolent institution). Nightingale as a consequence advocated that reforms decided upon, even after the most assiduous research, be introduced gradually and then systematically monitored.

Statistics were an invaluable tool in Nightingale’s scheme, required on an ongoing basis. When she was asked, for example, by medical authorities in Staffordshire about the desirability of building a new children’s hospital (such hospitals were then becoming the fashion), as compared with establishing a children’s ward in a general hospital or continuing to place children in adult wards, she gave what advice she could. Using reports from experienced nurses in the different situations she explained:

It would be exceedingly interesting to find out the relative rates of mortality and duration of sickness in children’s cases, otherwise similar, placed in “general” or children’s wards or hospitals, but unfortunately hospital statistics are not sufficiently well kept to ascertain this” (note 12).

She had in 1860 forcefully argued for uniform categories for collecting hospital data, so that institutions could be compared on their outcomes (in Society and Politics 5:83-85). That resulted in improvements, but clearly the data were woefully insufficient for addressing the issue of children’s hospitals.

The great leaders of public health reform of the period, called “sanitarians” (from the Latin word for health) were certainly greatly influence by Nightingale. They trusted her results because they knew that her method was sound. Nightingale could then work with Drs John Sutherland and William Farr, the latter Britain’s most distinguished statistician. She undoubtedly moved Edwin Chadwick’s initially more conservative views to the liberal middle (he had been an advocate of the deterrence principle in workhouses).

J.S. Mill, although a radical MP in many respects, was still a proponent of deterrence in workhouses, probably overestimating the problem of the able-bodied unemployed. It seems he was oblivious to the much greater problem of the harsh treatment of those unable to work on account of age, illness or disability. The position Mill took on the Poor Law in his major publication, Principles of Political Economy, 1848, argues against state measures unless there is a compelling reason for them, and certainly he gave none for the sort of workhouse reform Nightingale advocated. Nor do later versions of that work, or his speeches or journalism, show him to be an advocate of workhouse reform, at least not until he supported Nightingale work on the Metropolitan Poor Law Bill in 1867. Yet Mill’s being influenced by Nightingale seems to appear nowhere in the political theory literature. A recent article even has him taking on the issue of workhouse reform before her! (note 13).

The collaboration between Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels has received much commented on but the enormously productive collaboration between Nightingale and Harriet Martineau (1802-76) not. My coverage in Women Founders of the Social Sciences and Women Theorists on Society and Politics is obviously an exception. Martineau is justly credited with important work of her own—she is perhaps the best known and best published of the women theorists, certainly of the nineteenth century. S.M. Lipset hardly overstates her How to Observe Morals and Manners as “perhaps the first book on the methodology of social research,” in the introduction to his fine edition of her Society in America (7). She is no longer
relegated to being the translator of Comte, although her translation was superb, and so succinct that the founder of sociology had it retranslated for French readers!

Martineau had done much good sociological (and other) work before the collaboration with Nightingale began, but grew and developed with it. She was a pioneer methodologist, but her *How to Observe Morals and Manners* is geared to informal observation (in fact prepared for her trip to America). She could analyze quantitative data, e.g., from the census, but she never prepared or sent out a questionnaire herself. Nightingale was the leader there, albeit somewhat later. Martineau did an excellent book, using Nightingale’s material, on mortality in the Crimean War, *England and Her Soldiers*, but the pioneering use of pie charts and graphs was Nightingale’s, from her collaboration with William Farr.

Martineau’s journalism, which remains largely unpublished, also shows the Nightingale influence--Martineau taking up issues at her colleague’s request. The issues she took on also show her moving to the left, from her extreme laissez-faire “liberalism” (now more often called conservatism or neoconservatism) to the mainstream, reformist centre-left. From opposing government intervention in the economy in her early writing she came to support a number of measures for state intervention, doubtless thanks to Nightingale’s influence. This development would be well worth pursuing.

**Beatrice Webb (1858-1943),** as well as being an important contributor to nineteenth-century social scientific method, was, with her husband, Sidney Webb, a major formulator of the principles of the welfare state. She is recognized much more than most of the other women theorists, probably because of her joint work with her well-known husband. For example she is included--the only woman--among the “founding fathers” of Timothy Raison’s *Founding Fathers of Social Science*. Yet she does not, in my view, get the consideration she deserves as a reformist writer. When Nightingale’s much earlier work on the welfare state is considered, Webb can be seen as her best successor--although Webb was a socialist and Nightingale a liberal.

Both thoroughly and expressly rejected the laissez-faire doctrine that dominated political thought of the day, and both rejected the Marxist alternative. Webb was a socialist, however, one who could see a major role for public ownership of the economy. Yet still there are significant differences as the Webb model would have had much municipal ownership rather than national, and more flexibility than centrally owned. Most significantly, the Webbs, unlike Marx and Engels, did not hang all their reforms on overturning capitalism. Capitalism was an unjust and fundamentally unsuccessful way of ensuring a decent life for the great mass of the people, and so should be replaced, they believed. The means, however, could and should be gradual, not revolutionary. Most importantly they saw many reforms as being possible *within* capitalism, for example measures to assist workers to train for and find new jobs in bad economic times (a point raised sketchily by Nightingale earlier). They proposed a whole system of collective provisions (consistent with Nightingale’s ABC of workhouse reform) that could be introduced even within capitalism. Beatrice Webb then is an important contributor to this reformist middle way.

In an early Fabian pamphlet, “The Case for the Factory Acts,” Beatrice Webb argued for protective factory legislation for women, opposing the liberal laissez-faire rejection of it. This was a divisive issue in the women’s movement of the time, and shows how powerful a hold the laissez-faire philosophy had on opinion leaders. Liberal women, Webb said, were making the same mistake liberal men had made a century earlier in opposing the first factory legislation, to restrict child labour. Unfettered competition as advocated by these liberals
ignored the fundamental and permanent inequality in bargaining power between individual workers and their employers. Workers were at disadvantaged in bargaining with powerful owners, and on many issues of health and safety had no bargaining power at all (7).

Beatrice Webb held that cheap "sweated" labour was not good for the nation as a whole, quite apart from the damage it did to the worker. A nation depended on its citizens being healthy. There was a public interest in bringing up all children in "health, strength and character" (20). Webb here is reflecting the principles of Enlightenment universalism. As well she can be seen as advocating human capital theory before it became popular. "The human beings of a community form as truly a portion of its working capital as its land, its machinery or its cattle" she stated (20-21). Textiles and coal mining provided good industrial examples. They had been two of the worst industries for sweated labour. Collective agreements and legislation to regulate them had resulted in great improvements. Both industries, she observed, had expanded and thrived after the interventions of government and unions, contrary to laissez-faire theory.

A pertinent example of the Webbs’ moderate left, welfare state alternative to providing adequate employment is their proposal for a National Labour Exchange, in the minority report of the Poor Law Commission. They argued the need for such a scheme whether under current conditions or if basic reforms were made, in their words if “a deliberately ordered co-operative commonwealth” or some form of socialism, replaced the current “industrial anarchy,” or capitalism. They pointed out the losses suffered, “draining away the vitality and seriously impairing the vigour of the community as a whole” from underemployment on the one hand, and “sweating” labour on the other. The cost for “poor relief, hospitals, police and prisons” also laid an unnecessary burden on the better off. Far from being “utopian” the Webbs argued that their alternative proposal would take little time to accustom people to it and bring practical measures into operation.

Like social reformers of all ages they pointed out how natural earlier abuses had seemed, until they were abolished:

The first step is to make the whole community realize that the evil exists. At present, it is not too much to say that the average citizen of the middle or upper class takes for granted the constantly recurring destitution among wage-earning families due to unemployment as part of the natural order of things, and as no more to be combatted than the east wind. In the same way the eighteenth-century citizen acquiesced in the horrors of the contemporary prison administration and the slave trade, just as, for the first decades of the nineteenth century, our grandfathers accepted as inevitable the slavery of the little children of the wage earners in mines and factories and the incessant devastation of the slums by “fever.”

They predicted that fifty years hence people would look back:

with amazement at the helpless and ignorant acquiescence of the governing classes of the United Kingdom, at the opening of the twentieth century, in the constant debasement of character and physique, not to mention the perpetual draining away of the nation's wealth, that idleness combined with starvation plainly causes....

In our judgement it is now administratively possible, if it is sincerely wished to do so, to remedy most of the evils of unemployment, to the same extent, at least, as we have in the
past century diminished the death rate from fever and lessened the industrial slavery of young children. (note 14)

In fact the proposals of the minority report were eventually adopted and enormous changes made. As well as these within-the-system changes considerable public ownership came into being, for some decades at least, on the election of a Labour government in 1945, but these were later reversed by Conservative governments, beginning with Margaret Thatcher’s.

Beatrice Webb’s 1918 Fabian pamphlet, “The Abolition of the Poor Law,” argued that people should be treated like citizens, not paupers. Instead of the inadequate and demeaning provision for the poor in the existing Poor Law there should be collective provision for all. The various stages of life are all considered, from maternity hospitals, child care, schools, books and even food for needy children through to provision for workers out of work, notably assistance in finding work (Nightingale, too, noted how people may be good workers but hopeless at finding a job when out of work). Old age was a predictable condition for which a system of pensions was required. All of these measures should be provided with no stigma of pauperism, rather as collective ways of providing for known, predictable needs. The Webbs were so bold as to argue for the “abolition of destitution.” Institutions should be established with that as their goal.

Continuities with Enlightenment values, notably universalism and the belief in progress are clear here. The eighteenth-century focus on political rights has now shifted to economic rights. Their achievement would be the work largely of the twentieth century.

When sociology books and courses concentrate on--some even limit themselves to--the “big three” of Marx, Durkheim and Weber, all this is lost. Those three theorists offer strikingly different “grand theories” to be sure, but they are not alternatives. By omitting women theorists, especially now Nightingale and Webb, a great debate is missed. This should be particularly obvious now with the demise of the Soviet bloc.

The proper role for government and the nature of social change are hardly debates of the past but are ongoing issues. So are the Enlightenment values that have shaped so much political action and vision today. Should we not seek to understand their origin and early application? The inclusion of key women theorists would help in both these useful endeavours of making sense of theory. Indeed these women theorists contributed mightily to the formulation of the best elements of contemporary liberal democracies. Is this not reason alone to study them?

Notes
1. This is set out in a paper I gave at the American Sociological Association’s Mini-conference on Theory, Washington, DC, 1995, and published as "Classical Social Theory with the Women Founders Included."
11. Brian Abel-Smith, The Hospitals 82.
13. Monica Baly and Colin Matthew, “Florence Nightingale, Oxford Dictionary of National Biography 2004 and online; this source is inaccurate in many other respects as well.

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Webb, Beatrice "The Abolition of the Poor Law," Fabian Tract No. 185 (March 1918).

In Conversation with Prof. Andre Beteille

It is a privilege and an honour to carry in this issue of the E-Bulletin, the text of an engaging conversation between Prof. Andre Beteille and Prof. Surendra Munshi on a variety of themes and problematics of great interest to sociologists everywhere. The conversation occurred in Kolkata, India on 27 August 2005.

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Surendra Munshi: Andre, may we begin with method? You have written much on the comparative method. How do you view it?

Andre Beteille: Well, I do advocate the comparative method, but this does not mean that I am unaware of the problems involved in it. I prefer to speak of a comparative approach rather than the comparative method in order to avoid giving the impression that there is one single method on whose rules of procedure all sociologists are agreed. As far back as 1896 Franz Boas drew attention to the limitations of the comparative method. He objected to the use of the comparative method for making sweeping and sometimes vacuous generalizations. Above all, he advised students of society and culture to pay attention to the facts on the ground, and to study them in detail and in their context. It is useful to keep this in mind. We cannot go back to the old view which tied the comparative method to the theory of evolution. We have to avoid making reckless comparisons in the service of one or another grand theory. But there is also the danger of moving to the opposite extreme and making the study of each particular society an end in itself.

There is another problem to be avoided. The comparative method has often been used to highlight the otherness of non-Western societies, and by implication the uniqueness of Western civilization. This attitude of mind has been well brought out by Jack Goody who has exposed the sterility of the bipolar contrast between ‘the West and the Rest’.

SM: I believe it was Jack Goody who said in his Cooking, Cuisine, and Class that both sociology and social anthropology fall under the heading of comparative sociology. Would you go as far as him on the comparative method?

AB: Yes, indeed, I would. It was actually Radcliffe-Brown’s formulation that social anthropology was only another name for comparative sociology. As you know, M N Srinivas, with whom I worked closely for many years, had been Radcliffe-Brown’s pupil. I
also know Jack Goody well and admire his work greatly on this point. The unity of sociology
and social anthropology was an article of faith with Srinivas, and my attachment to the
comparative method has much to do with the belief in this unity.

We have to be careful in making comparisons and we have to make them as
systematically as possible, but we cannot evade comparisons if we are to be sociologists or
social anthropologists. So long as students of society in France studied only French society,
or in Germany only German society, and in India only Indian society, they were not yet
sociologists. They became sociologists only when they began to study systematically their
own society as well as other societies by bringing them on the same plane of enquiry and
investigation.

In the early phase of the development of our discipline scholars from one part of the
world, namely Europe and America, were studying societies in all parts of the world. When
Western scholars studied their own societies they were regarded as sociologists but when
they studied other cultures they were regarded as anthropologists. Thus, the distinction
between ‘ourselves’ and ‘others’ was built into the earlier comparative approach, although its
adherents were not all aware of it, or sufficiently aware of it. The situation is now rapidly
changing. Today, Indians, Indonesians and Japanese as well as the British and the Americans
are studying societies through the comparative approach. We must be attentive to both
similarities and differences in making comparisons between societies. There are many
differences within a society as well as similarities between societies. In drawing attention to
similarities between societies we must avoid the pitfalls of the earlier evolutionary approach
which regarded ‘other’ societies as only copies, and imperfect or unformed copies at that, of
Western society. The mistakes of the 19th century evolutionists were repeated to some extent
by the development theorists of the 20th century.

**SM:** What will you contrast the comparative method with?

**AB:** Well, as you know, the traditional contrast has been between the comparative
method and the historical method. This was the contrast made by Boas. Radcliffe-Brown
made the same kind of contrast, but with a different emphasis. For him it was important to
distinguish between the reconstruction of the past and the discovery of the laws governing
social life. He was not in favour of ‘conjectural history’ and he distanced himself from
evolutionary speculations. I believe that Srinivas’s antipathy towards the Indological
approach had something to do with what he learnt from Radcliffe-Brown of the pitfalls of
conjectural history, and of course Srinivas had a great influence on my own work.

Radcliffe-Brown borrowed much from Durkheim. They both believed that societies
were governed by laws and that these laws could be discovered by the application of the
right method. For both of them classification was of fundamental importance. Radcliffe-
Brown believed that societies constituted ‘natural kinds’, and Durkheim had argued before
him that there were ‘social species’ just as there were natural species. Their idea was to
classify societies into types, groups or classes and through that route arrive at generalizations
regarding human societies. There was a mistake in believing that whole societies could be
treated in this way. Human societies are not like plants or animals in either their similarities
or their differences. No two societies resemble each other in the way in which two animals
or two plants of the same species do.

**SM:** If you don’t believe in what Radcliffe-Brown called ‘natural kinds’, how do we
avoid the problem of comparing apples with mangoes? Aren’t there problems of the unit of
comparison as well as the broader problem of the purpose of comparison?
AB: There are all kinds of problems in the comparative study of society. The problem of choosing the right units for comparison is a crucial one. There are other problems as well. But we cannot afford to avoid making systematic comparisons if we wish to be true to our vocation as sociologists. Evans-Pritchard, who incidentally was also Srinivas’s teacher at Oxford, raised the question in his Hobhouse Lecture in 1963 when he asked what had been achieved by the use of the comparative method. But in the end he drove himself into a corner where only the detailed study of the individual society could be defended.

The route to sociological comparisons through the classification of whole societies has turned out to have too many pitfalls to be really viable. There are not enough instances of whole societies of any one kind for that route to be very useful. But one need not limit oneself to the comparison of whole societies. One might wish to compare households, or schools, or other institutions across societies or across different sectors of the same society and arrive at valuable insights. One could find enough instances of households, or schools or other small-scale units to make their classification very useful for the larger purpose of systematic comparisons between and within societies.

SM: You have written a valuable critique of Louis Dumont. Does your critique of Dumont draw from comparative sociology? And if yes, how?

AB: As the exchanges in *Current Anthropology* in 1987 brought out, my disagreement with Dumont is basic and fundamental. But this should not obscure the fact that I have great admiration for Dumont and his work. As I once wrote, I have learnt more from my disagreement with Dumont than from my agreement with many lesser sociologists. In my judgement, Srinivas and Dumont stand out as the two outstanding influences in the study of Indian society in the second half of the last century, although their approaches were very different.

In his rejoinder to me in *Current Anthropology*, Dumont accused me of ‘eschewing comparison’. This is absurd. The fact is that I do not make comparisons in the way in which he does. The point of departure in his work is the contrast between societies on the plane of values. His contrast is between societies governed by the values of individualism and equality on the one hand and by those of holism and hierarchy on the other. My objection to this is that it makes short work of the conflict of norms and values inherent in each society, particularly in the contemporary world. Of course, hierarchical values are still important in Indian society, but one cannot ignore the commitment to equality in our Constitution and laws and in our many public institutions. Nor can one ignore the high value placed on inequality in many spheres of contemporary Western society with its great emphasis on competition and individual achievement.

Dumont’s contrast between *homo hierarchicus* and *homo equalis* may look like Tocqueville’s contrast between aristocratic and democratic societies, but there are important differences. Tocqueville’s objective was to show how one type of society grew out of the other whereas Dumont wanted to highlight the radical opposition between the two. One can say, as I said in a paper twenty years ago, that Tocqueville took pains to establish historical continuity whereas Dumont took pains to demonstrate a contrast. In my judgement the contrast is overstated by Dumont. This is because he is more interested in contrast than in comparison, and in difference than in similarity.

SM: This brings me to two other European sociologists. How do you view Durkheim and Weber?
AB: Durkheim and Weber established through their work the scope and method of sociology as a distinct intellectual discipline. In that sense we are all heirs to the tradition of sociological enquiry and analysis that they established. They were sociologists in the sense that they did not confine their work to one single society or type of society. They sought to formulate concepts and methods through which all societies – their own as well as other societies – could be brought on the same plane of enquiry and investigation. Comparison and contrast of different types of society was indispensable to their understanding of any one society. They gave to sociology its distinctive orientation as a discipline that is empirical, systematic and comparative.

Though they both advocated and undertook the comparison of societies, they differed in their orientation to the comparative approach. If I were to simplify, I would say that Durkheim followed the route of classification whereas Weber took the route of typification.

Durkheim’s approach to comparison through observation, description and classification is most clearly evident in his early work, particularly *The Rules of Sociological Method*. Durkheim, like many 19th-century sociologists, had been greatly impressed by the success of the biological sciences, and the uses to which taxonomy had been put in those sciences. He based his approach, particularly in his early work, on the analogy between societies and organisms. In this he influenced Radcliffe-Brown greatly. But the organic analogy has severe limitations and the taxonomic or classificatory approach, as we saw, does not work when we take whole societies as our units of comparison, although classification itself is still very useful in the systematic study of societies.

Weber rejected the organic analogy from the very start. He developed the use of ideal types in his study and comparison of societies. This is why his approach may be called the typifying approach. Nobody can deny the usefulness of ideal types in the systematic study of societies. At the same time, the ideal type is a delicate instrument that has to be used with great care. Weber himself was on the whole careful and disciplined in his use of ideal types, but he also slipped up from time to time. As he himself pointed out, the construction of an ideal type entailed a ‘one-sided accentuation’ of certain properties in the interest of sharper contrasts between social values and the institutions through which they are expressed. Where whole societies are contrasted, the ideal type can easily become a stereotype. We are and ought to be worried about stereotypical contrasts between ‘the West and the Rest’ and we have to acknowledge that some of the stereotypes have their roots in Weber’s own work. Here I am very greatly attracted by the strategy of three-way comparisons adopted by the Cambridge anthropologist Alan Macfarlane who, as it happens, is a very close friend.

SM: In what ways has Srinivas influenced you?

AB: Srinivas was a major influence on my entire generation of scholars working on India whether from India or abroad, and I worked very closely with him at the Delhi School of Economics for more than ten years. But although Srinivas’s influence is clear and there for everyone to see, there were other influences too. In Calcutta I had known N K Bose and Surajit Sinha. Both Bose and Sinha were outstanding fieldworkers, and they wanted to go out and talk with people and base their understanding of Indian society on what they saw and heard. Bose was also a Gandhian and somewhat austere in his manner. He got me to write reviews for *Man in India* which he edited even while I was an M Sc student in Calcutta. That was an educative experience of great value. Surajit Sinha was a very different kind of person, not at all austere but full of a sense of joy. He had returned from the United States while I
was still a student in Calcutta with a large stock of new books which he encouraged me to read, and which I devoured.

Like Bose and Sinha, Srinivas too was a great fieldworker. He had developed a particular orientation to the study of Indian society, the ‘field view’ as against the ‘book view’. He advocated the merits of the field view tirelessly, and was acting, quite consciously, against the Brahminical tradition of his ancestors. He also emphasized the importance of the idea of social structure, which in one form or another, was being used by the Oxford anthropologists with whom he had studied and worked: Radcliffe-Brown, Evans-Pritchard, Fortes and Gluckman. So I did intensive field work in a South Indian village and used the framework of social structure in presenting the material from the field work in my first book, *Caste, Class and Power*.

SM: What is Srinivas’s most important contribution to the study of Indian society?

AB: Srinivas’s first major work, *Religion and Society among the Coorgs* was a turning point in the sociological study of Hinduism. He used his field work and the concept of social structure to great effect in that book by showing how religious beliefs and practices were refracted by the social structure. The book was not an account of Hinduism as a set of ideal values but an analysis of the beliefs and practices of ordinary Hindus. Other social anthropologists, particularly at Oxford, were doing work of a similar nature, but whereas they were writing about small tribal communities, Srinivas’s work dealt with a major world religion.

Subsequently Srinivas wrote a great deal about caste and village in India. The decade following independence saw the beginning of a great surge in village studies, and Srinivas was in the front rank of this development. His work on caste also broke new ground, by turning attention away from *varna* to *jati*. He was one of the first to show how, instead of destroying caste, democratic politics was giving it a new lease of life. Srinivas showed great insight not only into the structure of Indian society but also into the forces that were altering that structure.

I do not wish to leave the impression that Srinivas’s work did not suffer from any limitations. Its most serious limitation was its confinement of attention almost exclusively to the study of social structure and social change in India. This is a limitation that mars the work of almost every Indian sociologist of Srinivas’s generation. It left an unhealthy legacy for the next generation of sociologists in India for most of whom the study of Indian society became a branch of Indian studies rather than of sociology. They rarely write on topics of general interest or on societies outside India. As a result, the conceptual and theoretical side of sociology has not developed to the same extent as its empirical side. Srinivas himself did not write on subjects of general interest, but he was keenly aware of the importance of doing this, and strongly encouraged me to write on such subjects, for instance, on inequality and not just caste. He felt that more Indian sociologists should do this, but that his own intellectual and institutional commitments kept him away from it.

SM: Your own work has been mainly in the area of social stratification. How do you see the issue of inequality in contemporary India?

AB: I must stress at the outset that although I am greatly interested in India, as a sociologist, I am also interested in inequality wherever it exists, in India and outside India too. I have taught courses on social stratification, and have written books on inequality that are general and comparative in their scope. I did a Reader on *Social Inequality* which was published by Penguin Books in 1969, and that book was more widely used in Britain than in
India. I also wrote a book called *Inequality among Men* which was published by Blackwell in 1977 and that also was general and comparative in its scope, although, naturally, I also used material relating to India in it.

My first book was a monograph on a single village in South India which I studied by living in it for about ten months. Although it was a village study in the tradition of anthropological monographs, its emphasis was not on kinship, religion and caste, but on social stratification. I identified three related dimensions of inequality, caste, class and power, and showed how the relations among them were changing. My close encounter with a very distinctive social setting gave me a first-hand understanding of the problems that arise in the systematic study of society. Shortly after my first book was published, I put together a collection of papers dealing mainly with caste, but covering larger territorial units than the village. Then I devoted a number of years to the study of the agrarian class structure and published a book called *Studies in Agrarian Social Structure* in 1975.

My earlier work focussed mainly on aspects of social structure or social morphology. Subsequently I moved onto the examination of the structure of norms and values. I have been fascinated by what I call the antinomies of society, i.e. the conflicts inherent in the structure of norms and values. In other words there are not only disjunctions between the morphological structure of society and its normative structure, but there are contradictions within such values as equality.

**SM:** What implications does this have for policy issues?

**AB:** At first I distanced myself from considerations of policy. I felt then that the interpretation and analysis of societies in their infinite variety, the discovery of similarity where difference was expected and of difference where similarity was expected, could be an end in itself. This attitude was not at all uncommon among social anthropologists who went out to study distant societies, and I must confess that I still find a certain appeal in it.

When I began my academic career in the late fifties, it was the economists who were most actively involved in questions of policy: at least in India, economics was the ‘policy science’ par excellence. I was somewhat uneasy with the preoccupation with policy of the economists with whom I worked. At the Delhi School of Economics we had some truly outstanding economists, and other economists, from the Indian Statistical Institute, the Planning Commission, the Ministry of Finance and elsewhere were in and out of the place. I admired their intellectual brilliance but thought that they were truly naïve in their belief that a large, complex and disorderly society could be changed by intelligent advice given to planners and policy makers by a small number of outstanding economists. But partly as a result of my close association with the economists in the Delhi School, I did become interested in the unanticipated consequences of economic and social policy.

**SM:** You have not hesitated to take a stand on policy issues. Is it important for academics like you to participate in public discussions? Can they make a difference?

**AB:** As I said, I was at first hesitant to get involved in discussions of policy, and my initial interest was in the unanticipated consequences of policy.

My writings on policy matters have a long and complicated trajectory into whose discussion we cannot enter here. But I do insist on the distinction between policy analysis and policy prescription, and I have confined myself as far as possible to the former and avoided the latter. I do not believe that all issues in the study of society are issues of policy and I continue to be sceptical about the definition of sociology as a policy science.
I believe that the social responsibility of the intellectual extends beyond matters of policy. If you define sociology as a policy science your orientation tends to be towards the government. Government does have an important role in changing things, but it is a limited role. No social change can be effective unless a change comes about in the ways in which people think. I believe that sociologists have an important role to play in the formation of public opinion. It is because I believe this that I have written edit page articles for leading newspapers for nearly forty years now. However, I must emphasize that the social scientist must not engage in social advocacy at the cost of his scholarly work. But the fruits of his scholarly work must be brought to the attention of the wider public from time to time. Can intellectuals make a difference to the way in which society moves forward? I am sure they can, although the contribution of any single individual should not be emphasized too much.

SM: Some scholars have argued that we need to free ourselves from borrowed concepts and go for indigenization. What do you have to say about this?

AB: I am thoroughly opposed to it. I believe that the idea of indigenization is a reactionary one in every sense of the term. It has been a good rhetorical device for inaugural and valedictory addresses at national conferences of sociologists, but it has not led to any fruitful outcome anywhere.

There can be only one general sociology, with a common reservoir of concepts, methods and theories, although it has to accommodate variant forms arising from different traditions of sociological practice existing within the same broad framework of aims and objectives. It is neither possible nor desirable to have different sociologies attuned to different nationalities, civilizations, religions or ideologies although, naturally, national, religious and other differences are bound to be reflected in sociological practice in different places at different times. As an intellectual discipline, sociology seeks to minimize rather than maximize such differences. Whether in the West or in India, sociology as I understand it is not an ideology. Its basic aim is to treat all societies, irrespective of national, religious or ideological variations, on the same plane of enquiry and analysis within a broadly comparative framework.

SM: Your views on the subject then bring us back to the comparative method.

AB: Yes, they do. It is only when we follow the comparative approach that we can go beyond limited concerns. Frankly I am worried about the excessive concern among my colleagues with Indian society to the exclusion of all other concerns. In our teaching, we talk about theory and draw upon contributions from different parts of the world, but in our writings we remain confined to India, and that too, generally, our own particular corner of it. This reluctance to go beyond one’s own society has to be dispelled if we are to contribute something of value to sociology as an intellectual discipline.
Academic Colonialism, Corporate Intellectuals, and ‘Lost’ Ideals: Reflections on the State of Sociology in the New Millennium

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It is often recognised, though rarely admitted overtly, that the state of knowledge production or what is framed as ‘relevant’ knowledge within academic cultures of learning, research and teaching is intimately tied to the global concept of what is ‘marketable’. Closely associated with this are opportunities for research funding, graduate scholarship awards, the employment of research and university staff, and so forth. These are largely contingent on the effectiveness of their terms of reference, which more often than not, either need to accommodate to the largely corporate objectives of ruling governments or to the models that are especially regarded pertinent in North American or ‘Western” institutions.

In spite of the fact that colonialism sporadically lingers over the fate of many undeveloped and developed countries in the non-West, its effects continue to be felt in many institutions, including academic and knowledge structures in these countries. While many scholars argue that high theory is almost entirely ‘Western’ and largely European in provenance (Alatas, 1998; Clammer, 2000), there have also been intellectuals who are actively involved in disengaging and decentering the issue of hegemonic social theories, epistemologies and methodologies for almost half a century (H. Alatas, 1974, 1977; F. Alatas, 2000; Chaudhuri, 1990; Chakrabarty, 1992; Said, 1979; Sinha, 2000, 2003; Wallerstein et al., 1996). Alatas further contends that ‘some non-western scholars in the 19th century and more during the postcolonial period recognised that the social sciences cannot be transplanted to a different historical and socioeconomic setting without doing injustice and violence to their respective realities’ (2000:ff). Many of those who make these observations do not consider the entire corpus of ‘Western’ social science as irrelevant or incompetent and do not reject such knowledge on the sole grounds of origin. However, many other
scholars continue to uncritically subscribe to such ideas of Western origin or what Alatas (1974) terms as the ‘captive mind’ – which largely refers to the theoretical and institutional dependence of scholars to Western thought and the uncritical and imitative manner in which such knowledge is assimilated and disseminated. He further notes that intellectual imperialism has, among other things, resulted in a lack of attention from issues that should be of critical concern to non-Western societies. Of course, we agree with Alatas (2001) that the concepts of imitation, relevance and emulation need to be called into question and linked to the global power structures in academia. These procedures of normalisation become ingrained and internalised as everyday practices, and are concomitantly disseminated through learning, teaching and research structures in non-Western universities. We contend, however, that while we do recognise that there are corpuses of diverse alternative social knowledge produced, these are not given due recognition or equitable standing in academic cultures in many of these non-Western countries.

Connected with these are not only theoretical, conceptual and empirical manifestations, but more crucially, how these are disseminated and reproduced in everyday academic practices and actions, which include the areas of learning, teaching and research that govern individual intellectuals and researchers. This has, according to Rye (2003), influenced and impeded the pursuit and development of academic freedom in ‘Third World’ societies. While we do acknowledge that there are many instances where such issues are discussed theoretically, these are seldom translated into practice through individual acts and choices, apart from the work of Sinha (2003). These, we argue, are tied intimately to the rise of corporatisation in the universities not peculiar to the non-West, but to the global academic environment as a whole. This is further accentuated by pressures applied onto academic and research staff, and graduate students in such universities. In post-capitalist Asia, for instance, the corporatisation of universities and its departments have become more intensified in the late 1990s and early millennium. This neo-colonial state of affairs stems from a complex of historical realities, internal compulsions and external pressures, which usually include the colonial legacy of cultural, intellectual and economic dependence. The most acute problem is the overwhelming and habitual academic and intellectual dependence on North American models and their knowledge structures, which even translate to the selection of graduate schools by graduate students deemed reputable and acceptable in such countries. Very often, these are intertwined with the global politics of academia and the embedded complexities to perpetuate and reproduce such a traditional division of intellectual labour. As Alatas (1992:35) puts it, ‘the Western social sciences are well entrenched in much of the developing world and it is Western standards of scholarship, cogency, precision and the like which are the criteria by which these indigenous social sciences in their embryonic form are judged’. We would also add that this trend, though initially reported in the 1960s and 1970s by Alatas and Said, continues to recur today and not only takes place in developing countries, but also in many developed, non-Western contexts as well. It is very common for graduate students from many universities from Southeast Asia, East Asia and other non-North American institutions to hear that the model for internationalism is to emulate standards from North America. The shift from the United Kingdom and Europe to North America becomes even more intensified in the new millennium, and even universities in Europe have begun to follow suit. One plausible reason why universities and academic cultures subscribe to such global measurements is that they require benchmarks to determine their ‘cutting edge’ above others to allow them to market their capabilities and performances – both nationally and globally.
On the most pragmatic level, some scholars such as Karim (2003) argue that academics cannot disconnect themselves from corporatisation and marketing. The corporate intellectual is controlled by the principles and idealism of corporations in post-industrial and capitalist societies. Many develop an aptitude for marketing their ideas by presenting papers in seminars and lectures locally and abroad. As Karim (2003) further maintains, academics need to develop mindsets to frame themselves as current intellectual capital, which fundamentally refers to their role as producers of ideas that may be manufactured, packaged and sold for commercial profit.

Pertinent questions such as what types of research and studies are regarded important and thus worthy of study and funding surface. This question becomes particularly pertinent today for graduate students (particularly those who intend to pursue an academic career) in terms of opportunities for scholarships, stipends and funding. Closely associated with this is the pressure to publish, not only for academic staff, but also for graduate students as well. Ostensibly, the proof of their self-worth lies in producing such works that include conference papers, articles in journals, book chapters, monographs and even books. What becomes more pertinent is where such works are published. This is a problem since many of the issues raised in the non-West such as Southeast Asia are only pertinent to a select audience in North America, and often, reviewers and editors reject such articles by stating explicitly that they are not interested in such regional issues. Regional journals, on the other hand, attract an interested, appreciative and critical audience, which generate a more intense and beneficial academic discussion. However, many staff and graduate students are penalised for publishing in such journals and works in regional journals such as *Akademika, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies, Sojourn* or *Asian Journal of Social Sciences*, which are not regarded as prestigious as ‘top-tier’ journals such as *American Journal of Sociology, American Ethnologist* or *British Journal of Sociology*. Similarly the selection of a graduate school from North America such as *Harvard, Berkeley* or *Columbia* is automatically deemed better and more reputable than other regional or non-North American universities. Thus, the concern for where the work is published, or where the degree comes from, becomes more important than what is actually produced and the intellectual discussion it generates, though this is hardly explicitly admitted. It even becomes a necessity to justify the selection of a particular journal, graduate school or research topic, especially when it does not follow a North American standard. For instance, when both of us started to apply to graduate schools in non-North American locales, many academics and graduate peers alike were perplexed as to why we did not select universities such as *Harvard, Chicago* or even small American state universities. When one of us started to write articles in regional journals, some asked why these articles were not submitted to American journals. When one of us chose to research on the sociocultural dimensions of olfaction, it was met with disapproval by some faculty members who regarded the topic as ‘non-conventional’, ‘non-mainstream’ and ‘unworthy of funding’. While many of such concerns are well-meaning, it is more difficult to justify and legitimate these individual choices when the ‘natural’ and ‘normal’ procedure is to aim for top-tier graduate schools, journals and the selection of ‘marketable’ research topics. This is not peculiar to us alone, but to many graduate students and academic staff both past and present. Thus, what becomes important is not really the actual processes of learning and discussion, but the eventual end product viz. where one’s works are published, where one’s doctoral and postdoctoral degrees are earned, and so forth. This is not to say that works produced by the journals ranked top-tier are not good, or that there is no worth in producing and writing in such journals, or that pursuing graduate studies in North American universities is ineffectual, but it also does not
necessarily mean that work published in regional journals, or that earning a Masters or Ph.D. from non-North American universities are not good as well, merely because there are high rejection rates for the former.

Associated with the rise of corporate intellectuals is, more crucially, a displacement and ‘loss’ of the original ideals of academia and more specifically in this case, the discipline of sociology as a whole. While sociology teaches and instructs us to question the taken-for-granted, and re-evaluate concepts such as class, stratification, gender, race, and the like, it is paradoxically the discipline and institutional structures of universities that perpetuate and reproduce these taken-for-granted assumptions. To be fair, this is not applicable to all institutions and individuals alike. However, the unseen presence of racism, sexism, neo-colonialism and stratification in terms of graduate school selection, module selection, journals to publish with, and even intellectuals to look up to, have become increasingly pervasive for graduate students and academic staff, who become increasingly disillusioned to what they have been taught to argue and fight against. Of course, such exclusions and bias take place in many structural settings, but it is increasingly difficult to reconcile the paradoxical establishment and existence of such a discipline such as sociology when the very discipline itself seeks only to reproduce and mystify concepts and theories which it has initially set forth to re-think and de-mystify. Why should we question race, racism and colonialism when such issues happen in sociology departments and larger academic cultures? Why should we de-mystify gender and sexism when it happens in everyday institutional structures? Why should we bother about class stratification and differences when the corporatisation of universities merely seeks to re-produce such inequalities?

Of course, the institutional structures of the universities cannot be disassociated with the nation-state and its ideals. In other words, the university, the respective disciplines including sociology, and the nation state cannot be discussed in a vacuum. However, the image of academics and academia as an institution that carries with it academic freedom, especially in fields such as sociology, has become very bleak. What is indeed more disheartening is that the trends for corporatisation and uncritically following North American standards are justifiable. As such, there exist very little outlets available to connect with the original ideals of academia. While many scholars no longer deny the existence of such Eurocentric conceptions in social theories and methodologies, these however have merely been normalised, taken-for-granted, and regarded as ‘dated’ and ‘unoriginal’, and thus ‘trivial’. This is highly problematic because the problem still remains, and as we suggested, is seldom translated into everyday practices and choices. There are, in our opinion, very few initiatives of bold, courageous institutions or individuals who are able to think and practise alternative social sciences in the midst of the corporate intellectual and academic culture, apart from the teaching of certain modules in universities and ‘resistance’ from some academics to publish in non-Western journals (see for example, Sinha, 2003). We suggest the following non-exhaustive initiatives in such settings:

1.) Encourage and develop an environment of alternative/interdisciplinary discourses among graduate students, research staff and academics through the organisation of symposiums, graduate seminars/forums, and any other form of collective action to develop a sense of individual and/or collective agency. For instance, we recently organised an international postgraduate conference to bring together and provide a platform for the discussion and dissemination of differences and alternatives, in spite of many financial obstacles and funding. Graduate students during this conference had the
benefit of being exposed to different scholarly disciplines and university education from America, China, England, Ghana, Hong Kong, India, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Thailand. Difference should be seen as an enriching tool for learning, rather than one which is conceptualised as divisive or counterproductive to academic learning and research. At the end of the conference, all of us concurred that there was a future need for such arrangements and a re-evaluation of the ideals of academic cultures in an age of corporatisation.

2.) Support research in both ‘conventional’ and ‘non-conventional’, ‘non-mainstream’ research topics and areas to further develop the actual learning process of scholarship and academic discussion across a diverse range of topics. We contend that no topic is too ‘dated’, ‘unsociological’ or ‘unworthy’ to be researched – regardless of whether the topic is newly emergent such as the sociology of emotions and sociology of food, or as well-established as sociology of religion, race or class/stratification, since the processes of social change take place constantly.

3.) Related to the second point are the roles of committees who decide on research funding for both faculty members and graduate students, and those in charge of employment and tenure/promotion. Such boards should regard works on the basis on merit as priority, rather than on where the degree is earned, where the work is published or what research s/he conducts. While it is understandable that the universities and departments must work on the availability of resources and institutional/departmental requirements, it must also be recognised that such selection processes should be made transparent and involve multiple voices within the department/universities, including those of graduate students. This is not to say that the opinions of graduate students are not taken into consideration in some universities, but there are many settings in which such voices are merely taken as token voices and are thus not justifiably represented.

The ‘rules’ to regulate professionalism among academics and graduate students alike often backfire, resulting among others, a disillusionment with academia, cynicism towards administrators and clique alliances. It is often a regime that does not create cohesive, creative or congenial learning among each other, but develops into a competition between each other. Who has published in what journal? Who presented in which seminar? Which graduate student made it to Harvard, Yale or Cornell?

Thus, more often than not, the ideals and starting point of sociology and its call to rethink the taken-for-granted have all been muted towards a call for branding, ranking and increasing corporatisation. There is a need to question why we entered sociology in the first place and to re-visit its ideals once again. Very rarely do sociologists and graduate students employ critical self-reflexivity in their corporate races. They need to develop their own brand of intellectualism from the voices within their own setting itself, which are oftentimes silenced and marginalised for models from North America. This again is not to say that ideas from the ‘West’ are not necessarily valuable, but it is to give recognition to the voices within non-Western local institutions themselves, and voices from other interested groups, such as graduate students. It is a simultaneous call to internationalisation insofar as the latter is not a one-sided process but rather emanating from various societies while incorporating selectively
the Western social sciences (Alatas, 1995; Oommen, 1995). In other words, there is a need to recognize and acknowledge the equitability of multiple and alternative centres, spaces and discourses, both in the West and non-West, as repositories of social science thinking and theorising (Sinha, 2003). It is a recognition that good social science thinking can emanate from both non-Western sources and locales and that such work should not be validated, legitimated and justified by standards that originate from Western locales. The restructuring of the ideals in sociology should return back to the individual and their respective societies and requires them to re-think and explore their intellectual and cultural histories.

The corporatisation of universities, coupled with the calls to produce articles in top-tier journals, to network with North American scholars, study in North American graduate schools and so forth, become an everyday normalisation among graduate students and academic staff. Yet, for sociology and the social sciences to be pertinent and important, no single voice should dominate public discourse. It is time to re-imagine a sociology that Mills once envisaged, which inspired students such as ourselves to believe in the ideals of the discipline and to translate these into everyday action and to re-evaluate the taken-for-granted. As Vaclav Havel once said: One should not be afraid to dream of the seemingly impossible if one wants the seemingly impossible to become reality.

Notes
1. The term ‘West’, in this case, is merely a shorthand, descriptive label, and is not used in any occidentalist mode.

References


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The idea of civil society has become both very influential and highly controversial over the course of the past twenty years in the context of social change prompted by the collapse of socialist regimes in Eastern Europe as well as in connection to various political struggles in South America, Africa or Asia, and more recently in debates regarding the prospects of the interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. The concept has been challenged in various ways and yet, it has proven to be unrelenting lying at the heart of various arguments may these be theoretical or policy-oriented.

My concern here is not to reflect on the coherence of conceptualizations of civil society in general. I rather point at a particular tension in dominant conceptualizations that are constructed with respect to non-western situations. This tension derives from the similarity, and yet difference, between community and civil society. It employs the conceptual difference drawn between the *gemeinschaftlich* and *gesellschaftlich* principles of social organization. These concepts have been conventionally used in sociological theory to denote broadly two distinct forms of social organization that pertain respectively to less advanced as opposed to more advanced stages of division of labor. They have also been employed to mold a notion of civil society as distinct from, and desirable vis-à-vis that of community. In this frame, civil society corresponds to the *gesellschaftlich* principle of social organization. As such it is part of a constitutive complex of other concepts i.e. the modern state, the market (Chandhoke, 2001) and modern bourgeois life (Chatterjee, 2004). The notion of community, similarly to that of civil society, signifies a sphere that brings people together in the ‘meshes of solidarity,’ but differently from that of civil society, stands out as an appendage to the conceptual constitutive complex that denotes modernity, and is thus likened to the conceptual construction of *gemeinschaften*. The two categories bleed into each other and are yet juxtaposed in a qualitative as well as a temporal differentiation that calls for a passage from one to the other. This bifurcation relies on given, fixed abstract categories that not only assert an insufficiency to analyze everyday localized practices in non-Western situations but also enhance a notion of civil society as a metanarrative of social change towards an apparently known end (Böröcz, 1997), i.e. a presumably singular Western type of modernization. But what are the fundamental traits underlying civil society conceptualizations that have become dominant most recently? How do local practices get
combined in a unifying notion of community that is rendered comprehensible through the notion of a *gemeinschaftlich* principle of social organization in such arguments? Why is this conceptual move indispensable to civil society arguments? More importantly, what is wrong with it?

Recent civil society arguments (i.e. Taylor, 1991; Cohen and Arato; 1992, Seligman, 1992; Honneth, 1993; Putnam, 1993; Clayton, 1996, Waltzer, 1998, Kaviraj and Khilnani, 2001, among several others), developed in the light of struggles against untrammelled state power, typically use three main planks of definition: (1) a notion of boundaries that demarcates a distinct sphere of collective life autonomous from the logic of the state and the market; (2) a view of social interaction and engagement that is defined horizontally through the language of solidarity rather than the language of market instrumentality or that of state power, and signifies the exercise of popular will; (3) a realization of the basic principles of individuality, equality and freedom that are associated with democracy, as well as economic development. In these arguments, civil society signifies “promises of a sphere that just brings together people in the meshes of solidarity, as opposed to the meshes of power” (Chandhoke, 2001: 4). This realm provides integrity while accommodating difference and comprises the potential of resistance against the state since it is theorized as off the limits of the state.

This imagery as a site of collective life and a bounded entity renders the concepts of civil society and community susceptible to each other. Yet, they are juxtaposed as unmistakably opposites. Consider for example the following statement:

More important for our argument, in these anti-state arguments 'civil society' can mean two different things. It can mean all social organizations apart from the state - which would include not merely those based on *gesellschaftlich* principles, but also those of *Gemeinschaft*. Alternatively, there can be a more cautious and restrictive use of the term which implies that the powers of the state should be restrained - not by any possible form of social organization, but only by those of the right sort, i.e., the Gesellschaft ones.

[...] The use of *Gemeinschaft* against the state would not be appropriate precisely because it might lead to the replacement of one kind of compulsory membership by another.

(Kaviraj, 2001: 319-320)

Kaviraj himself problematizes the concept of the *gemeinschaft* in that it can't speak of the distinct variants of communities in different non-western settings. But he accepts it as a dangerous feature of Third World societies that threatens the principle of individuality and the rational and deliberate choices that can be realized only through membership in voluntary associations. In another instance, an ethnographic study of community in the context of a weakening state in post-socialist Albania, standing outside of the state and functioning as principles of social organization are “primordial loyalties that provide stability and cohesion [yet] at the expense of civil values” (Saltmarshe, 2001: p. 103-104). Also, parts of a speech delivered at a think tank organization that works on international development and humanitarian issues resonate well with the ideas above:

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And the most important forms of social organization that may be seen as lying ‘outside the state’ in post-colonial societies in South Asia and I suspect in Africa too, are rather of a ‘community’ type, based on caste or other forms of ethnicity – and not therefore on those principles of the equality and autonomy (of citizens), and of freedom of entry and exit that are a fundamental aspect of civil society.

[...] where, as it is often the case according to my argument today, organizations outside the state are based on notions of community rather than being fully voluntary associations of a truly civil society, donors tread on dangerous ground.

(Speech by J. Harriss delivered at the Overseas Development Institute in the UK on 22 June 2002)

In all of these arguments community is conceptualized as opposite to the abstract principles of individuality, freedom, equality and autonomy. Whereas civil society comes to denote the historical expression of collective life organized on the basis of this set of abstract principles, community is rendered a representation of precisely the opposite. This move de-historicizes both notions and locks them in opposition. A normative appreciation of civil society as a desirable state of affairs derives from this juxtaposition. The notion of community in this sense plays a role in realizing the normative beauty of its conceptual other, the civil society. Critical approaches to the notion of civil society have pointed at the idealizing thrust implicit in this concept. Studies have nonetheless neglected looking at the ways in which the civil society/community dichotomy reproduces such a problematic view by means of constructing a particular notion of community. As Chatterjee has put it, in the period of the modern nation-state, we lack a theoretical language to talk about the community or the domain of popular political discourse (1993: 11, 226).

The problem with community in approaches that depict it as organized on the basis of gemeinschaftlich principles, lies in considering the former a realm with discernible contours where de-differentiated identities are shaped and social locations are rigidified. Civil society is depicted likewise as an autonomous realm where principles of gesellschaftlich solidarity harmonize differentiated, even conflicting, identities. Both notions of autonomy and solidarity in civil society conceptualizations have been challenged (see for example Alexander, 1998; Chandhoke, 2001; Navaro-Yashin, 2002). As it has been pointed out, neither can the boundaries be drawn in reality nor do they ensure a safe space for a kind of logic wholly disengaged from other aspects of reality. Moreover, power differentials that structure struggles for equality and freedom cannot be abstracted from this presumed domain.

Yet, this kind of reflection has not necessarily extended to representations of community as molded by the civil society/community distinction. Both the notion of boundaries and that of a static principle of social organization should be opened up to reconsideration. In this light, rather than being an impenetrable entity, driven by principles of its own, community becomes one of the myriad sites where modern power is subtly reaffirmed as well as resisted, only to get reconfigured in novel ways. Boundary thinking disguises the ways through which social practices in seemingly distinct domains are co-produced (Mitchell, 1991). In this sense, community’s boundaries and its logistics of solidarity are reproduced and reshaped in the interstices of modern governmentality. As such, it is articulated not only by means of internal dynamics but also external ones that feed into the workings of modern power. It can't be defined in terms of gemeinschaftlich principles, which denote relationships frozen in time and are centered on a notion of restrictions posed upon the individual. When historicized, communities are not intrinsically de-differentiated civic realms exclusively prone to give rise to authoritarianisms. If we were to think in
essentialist terms, the history of western capitalism has attested to us that the allegedly opposite *gesellschaftlich* principles can be as dangerous in giving way to totalitarian regimes and repressive public practices. Social formations that crystallize as communities in specific historical instances are not devoid of power differentials but they do pose alternatives to the universal metaphors of the modern order. Their patterns might not resemble idealized examples of well-articulated civic spaces in developed countries, and yet they constitute sites, which in their fluid and fuzzy but also well-patterned shapes produce 'narratives of love' that enhance and empower while confining. Everyday life civic practices formed in such contexts should not be rendered un-intelligible under the rubrique of ahistorical concepts such as *gemeinschaft*, or, unworthy through the label of underdevelopment. In an effort to analyze them, we should nevertheless not abandon the task critiquing power relations within such formations, and loose sight of the values of freedom, equality and development.

Lastly, the distinction between civil society (*gesellschaftlich* social ties) and community (*gemeinschaftlich* social ties) is largely implied in connection to discussions on economic development. Since Robert Putnam’s ideas on ‘social capital’ in *Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy*, the view that a robust civic life, and the gesellschaftlich types of social ties, gives rise to sound policies, democracy and development has become influential, informing for instance development agendas of leading organizations such as the World Bank. However, as dependency theory and world-system perspective has thoroughly explained, development can neither be explained nor accounted for by means of internal factors only, may these be economic, cultural or political. So, the way in which the question of civil society is raised is not necessarily illuminating; it rather conceals. Therefore, establishing a question of ‘society-centered’ view of development can be not only limiting in describing social reality but also instrumental in reproducing a notion of civil society as a “meta-narrative of emergence and progress” (Sarkar, 2004) vis-à-vis it.

Historicizing the notion of community as well as that of civic practices would allow us to take into account the specific mechanisms through which social practices and classificatory categories are produced. We would have to engage in the laborious endeavor of developing a language that can grasp social difference and creativity in adequate ways rather than merely forcing them into dichotomous categories.

**References**


Sociological thinking or thinking sociologically?

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I defended my Master’s thesis several months ago at the UFPR (Federal University of Paraná, Curitiba, Brazil). Though this may be too short a time to assess the achievements and flaws inherent to the thesis, it is probably enough to review the theoretical positions that prevail within the UFPR’s Graduate Program in Sociology. It can be said that, within the context of Brazilian sociology, and specifically in relation to its major academic institutions – UnB (University of Brasília) and USP (University of São Paulo), for instance – the UFPR’s Graduate Program occupies a peripheral position. In spite of its expressive size, having 20 lecturers and about 30 new students every year distributed among its five different areas of concentration, the Program ranks somewhere around the middle level of Brazilian graduate programs in Sociology. This brief description serves only as my point of departure, from which I will proceed to an analysis of the set of authors read over the course of the graduate program, in order to portray some aspects of the intellectual and institutional network that establish the boundaries of this sociological universe.

As most rather conventional Sociology programs, our courses begin with the all too familiar classics: Marx, Weber and Durkheim. Here, Marxism’s fall from its prior position as the most prestigious theoretical perspective can be clearly perceived. In the aftermath of the critical review of some of Marxism’s central tenets which occurred during the 1970s and the 1980s, very little of Marx’s own work has remained in the curriculum. ‘The German Ideology’ and ‘Commodity Production’, accompanied by the commentaries that authors such as Raymond Aron and Henri Lefebvre made regarding them. The exceptions, however, are those who devote themselves to the also classic field of ‘Sociology of Work’ which, even when it makes some effort to include the more subjective dimensions of labor and work, refuses to abandon its cherished Marxist foundations.

It is also significant to note that Weber’s work is given a different treatment. From ‘The Protestant Ethic’ to ‘Class, Status and Party’, Weber is the classical author who is most revered. Durkheim, in turn, occupies a position that has become increasingly instrumental and methodological, rather than theoretical. After a rather careful reading of ‘The Rules of the Sociological Method’, we are encouraged to read ‘Suicide’, but never to go as far as to
study ‘The Elementary Forms of Religious Life’. Its alleged ‘anthropological’ profile dislocates the latter work from the sociological pantheon.

The author who occupies the most ambiguous position on the list of classics is George Simmel. Although he is considered an author of great sociological import, especially for the subtlety and accuracy with which he analyzes the psycho-sociological density of ‘le modernité’, his work has been pedagogically separated from the ‘founding fathers’ of the discipline. Confined to the substantive area of ‘Urban Sociology’, Simmel remains a classic, albeit a minor one.

Recently, Norbert Elias has become the next author to enter the canon of the sociological legacy. Introduced to Brazilian social science during the 1980s, his acceptance as a classical figure is based not only on his original heuristic resources, but mainly because of the way those resources permit him to avoid dichotomous forms of reasoning. Nowadays, Elias’ unfailing presence in the bibliographies of theses produced by the program can be taken as testimony of his talent for bridging the boundaries between the disciplinary areas of the Human Sciences, and of the usefulness of his theory for the study of a wide range of areas that are so allegedly distinct, from Political Sociology to Gender Studies.

At this point, it might be helpful to consider some elements suggested by Jeffrey Alexander in his article ‘On the Centrality of the Classics’, in his considerations on critical presences and absences in the sociological field of reflection. The pedagogical issue of the role of classics can be summarized through two key points that Alexander makes: “classical works” condense a range of different theoretical commitments, and often divergent ones; yet once ‘classicized’ they become the interpretative basis of discussion in the field. Over the course of the Master’s program, the issue of the classics was consistently evoked, particularly in our professors’ repeated insistence that we develop the ability to ‘think sociologically’. We students strove to understand not so much sociological thought itself, limited as it was to a sort of history of sociological ideas, but the distinct interpretative keys of a discursive field that should supply analytical tools to appraise historical and empirically-located topics. In short, we sought to embody the sociological habitus.

The next step was to face up to the challenge of research: learning to articulate the complex theories of modernity and our particular objects of study. This made it necessary to resort to contemporary authors – especially since the objects we had chosen to study so often led us to question to the very category of “the modern”. It was primarily through the dialogue that these current authors established with the founding works that many students were able to locate the theoretical discourses that would prove useful for them. Whether moving closer to or further from the classics – for example, in Giddens’ critique of nineteenth century materialism or in the way Foucault, Elias and Weber can be put together – sociology proves to be an increasingly reflexive form of discourse, simultaneously plural and homogenous, and able to provide an understanding of singular realities.

This path is not followed without certain difficulties. On the one hand, the multiplicity of perspectives and critiques within the field obliges the newcomer to “think sociologically” without resorting to the mechanical application of consecrated labels: the theory of practice, the theory of reflexivity, interactionism, etc., which are all theories that are quite frequently employed as mere formula. Furthermore, there is the almost “medical” problem that the category of “the individual” has become for sociological research: from the “transformation of intimacy” to “the death of the subject”, the researcher must confront a wide range of analytical options for thinking about the complexity of the social game and its players. On
the other hand, the chronological and thematic ambiguity that characterizes the approach of contemporary authors has made them difficult to understand. In the current kind of “anything goes” theoretical environment, scholars as different as Huizinga, Moscovici, Habermas, Foucault, and Maffesoli are often thrown together in very concise and fragmented ways.

Over the course of our studies, there are three contemporary authors –Giddens, Touraine and Bourdieu – that receive a somewhat differential – or shall we say preferential – treatment. The first two authors have become a steady point of reference, particularly for those working in Rural Studies or certain other fields, due to the emphasis that their respective theories place on the forms of cultural and political re-signification carried out by new and old collective actors within the scenario of “hyper-modernity”. Bourdieu is also offered a special position, and his key categories are repeatedly used, particularly in the field of the Sociology of Culture and intellectual life.

Our graduate studies come to a peak – this is when our ability to “think sociologically” is really put to the test – when we are confronted by the task of finally completing the methodical elaboration of a theoretically-grounded research problem. It is not infrequent that one’s path of epistemological and methodological reflection has not led to a successful theoretical construction of a research problem. Thus, after reviewing all of the varied and divergent sociological perspectives that are available and after pondering the status of sociological discourse and its objects, a good portion of the program’s graduate students are still not ready to put sociological analysis into practice.

One common way of dealing with this moment of impasse is to rush off on a veritable frenzy of data hunting and collecting, using whichever research techniques – interviews, surveys, questionnaires, discourse analysis, etc, – seems most pertinent. The end result of such a frenzy is usually a break between what is established on the one hand as abstract theory and on the other, the empirical universe that is to be researched. The weight of theoretical and conceptual elaboration is forgotten, in lieu of which often appears an alliance between methodological rigidity and the desire for “scientificity”, doing away with all possibilities for the ‘sociological imagination’ to be born. Under these circumstances, then, it is no surprise that ethnographic methods are left out. In short, it seems that even today we have not successfully put to rest the desire for sociologically “pure” methodologies and the bureaucratic ethos that supports it.

Finally, our Master’s Program has to a large extent left out sociological literature of North American origin. Goffman is perhaps the one major exception. It seems that – unlike Brazilian Political Science and Anthropology – Brazilian Sociology has very little interest in dialogue with what is produced in that part of the academic world. This carries over into its treatment of post-modern and post-colonial theories, which are given scant attention or practically ignored, perhaps given their (only partially correct) association with the U.S. academic environment.

There is not enough space here to go into the a more detailed explanation of what has caused this particular state of pedagogic transmission of the classics, of different schools of sociological thought or of research problems and confusions. It is most likely that the “intermediary” position of our particular institution within the already difficult circumstances of sociology in Brazil foments particular forms of reproduction of consensual structures of intellect formation and formulation. Nonetheless, this would not “explain everything away”. Looking back over our experiences, one is also reminded that to “think
sociologically” – disregarding the common anxieties of being labeled as “sociologism” – means responding to a series of theoretical and political inquiries and interests, themselves intellectually and institutionally produced, while never ceasing to remember that sociological discourse continues to be a critical voice in chorus of those who aspire and struggle to understand our “radicalized modernity”. The task at hand is as enormous as it is urgent.
In “Knowledge, Power, Politics: The Role of the Intellectual in the Age of Transition,” that appeared in Summer 2005, ISA e-bulletin, Immanuel Wallerstein writes that the role of the intellectual today is crucial. We are in a period of transition when:

Clarity of analysis is often blurred by the chaotic realities and their immediate emotional tugs. But if the intellectuals don’t hold the flag of analysis high, it is not likely that others will. And if analytical understanding of the real historical choices are not at the forefront of our reasoning, our moral choices will be defective, and above all our political strength will be undermined.

The uncertainties of transition require intellectuals to map out alternatives paths into the future that will guide moral visions and their political realization.

Wallerstein argues that since 1968 the world system has been in deep economic crisis and, therefore, we are today in a period of transition. Hence there is an urgency to the analysis of its possible directions. Furthermore, economic crisis has disrupted global knowledge systems, dissolving the antiquated division between the humanities and the sciences, making possible the unification of all knowledge around the social sciences, which are themselves abandoning their own anachronistic disciplinary boundaries. Thus, Wallerstein presents us with the now familiar vision, formulated in the Report of the Gulbenkian Commission (1996), Open the Social Sciences -- a vision of universal knowledge that intellectuals will deploy for an analytical understanding of real historical alternatives, informing our moral choices, which they will then attempt to realize politically. In this process, Wallerstein warns, intellectuals will not be popular with “those in power”, with “those in opposition” or even with “the vast numbers of working strata”, but they have to bear their responsibility, carry out all three functions – analytical, moral and political – that define their vocation.

There is nothing wrong with this as an ideal, a moral ideal if you wish, perhaps attainable in the next world system, the only problem is its abstract character. We learn so little about the possibilities and obstacles to its achievement in the here and now, the dilemmas, for example, of being simultaneously analytical, moral and political! Or the interests that lie behind disciplinary knowledges that won’t just evaporate because to some they appear arbitrary. Wallerstein also omits – paradoxically for the leading world system
analyst and, moreover, one who did so much to promote regional sociologies -- any consideration of the context within which different intellectuals operate in different parts of the world, in different historical periods. Absent also is any sense of the broader political terrain of this “age of transition.” We are missing precisely the empirical-analytical moment necessary to turn moral vision into political struggle – the analytical moment that Wallerstein argues is so central and so important.

Leaving aside such questions as whether there is a world system obeying laws of its own, whether it has been in prolonged economic crisis for 40 years due to rising costs of accumulation, whether economic crises give rise to transitions or are the vehicles through which capitalism restructures itself, and whether economic crises automatically generate political openings or the political has an autonomy of its own -- putting aside such important questions I want instead to dwell on the micro-politics of knowledge production and dissemination. I shall focus, therefore, on the sociologist, not as a Wallersteinian “total” intellectual but as a humble specialist intellectual, who cannot pursue the analytical, the moral and the political all at once.

My approach advances from below in three steps: (1) locating sociologists in the concrete context of their practice, paying attention to the actual disciplinary character of their knowledge, (2) which is itself shaped by different national political regimes, (3) before finally moving to the realm of the global. In this ethnographic composition, sociologists do not orbit in some empty space beyond the economy, but carry out their missions on ideological and political terrains – terrains that are local and national before they are global. Reconnoitering these terrains is the first task of any critical engagement or political project, just as they are the building blocks of any international sociology.

The Disciplinary Division of Labor

By couching his “universal” knowledge in disciplinary terms, Wallerstein obliterates the genuine and fundamental differences in intellectual approach borne of vastly discrepant positions from which sociologists (and intellectuals more generally) undertake their work in different socio-political spaces around the globe. We need a conceptual apparatus that will bring the existence and vitality of these divergent practices into relief. I propose to do so by asking two critical questions Wallerstein obfuscates: Knowledge for whom? Knowledge for what? These are questions of universal validity but, with historically, geographically as well as biographically specific answers. These questions compel sociology to confront the logic and context of its practice.

First, sociology for whom? For the purposes of this essay I distinguish between two broad audiences: on the one side we are producing knowledge for one another, a community of scholars, of scientists seeking to better comprehend the world, to develop our research programs, while on the other side we are producing knowledge for others beyond the academy so that they can be more effective in the world. Sociological knowledge helps others to understand their place in the world as well as strategies for what they can and should do about it. This division between academic audiences and extra-academic audiences implies that sociology cannot be reduced to its activist or pragmatic moment, but has an indispensable scholarly moment, requiring its own relative autonomy. Equally, the necessity for such an autonomy does not gainsay our responsibility for taking our research, or the implications of our research, to constituencies beyond the academy, constituencies that would benefit from sociological knowledge. Their responses in turn become a living laboratory for our research programs.
This leads to the second question of how different constituencies might benefit from sociology: knowledge for what? Here I distinguish between, on the one hand, an instrumental knowledge in which ends are taken as given and where the purpose is to decipher means that will best realize those ends and, on the other hand, reflexive knowledge that concerns precisely an open discussion, an open collective examination of those ends or values. Max Weber called this “value discussion,” Jürgen Habermas called it “communicative action.” This distinction between instrumental and reflexive knowledge is an old one with a venerable tradition in sociology, most clearly formulated by Weber whose conceptualization of social action distinguished between technical and value rationality. It was developed by the Frankfurt School in a more critical vein – that contemporary capitalist society, driven by markets and profits, is riveted to questions of efficiency and thus of means, thereby losing sight of ultimate goals, what they referred to as “reason.” Whether there has been such an eclipse of reason or not, it is important for sociology to place at the forefront of its analysis not only instrumental knowledge of means but also reflexive knowledge about ends.

This distinction between instrumental and reflexive knowledge applies to the academic community as well as to interventions beyond the academy. Thus, we distinguish between the puzzle solving -- addressing anomalies and contradictions of our research programs -- in which we take for granted all sorts of assumptions of an ontological kind (such as the nature and potential of human beings), an epistemological kind (the ways we may apprehend the world, methodologies), but particularly the normative assumptions that necessarily underlie our research programs. Serious research within a paradigm, what I call professional sociology, pushing forward the frontiers of knowledge, cannot at the same time question the foundations upon which it rests. Puzzle solving is a game (in the serious sense of Bourdieu) in which focused playing presumes agreement on the rules and the suppression of critique. “Critique,” therefore, requires a special knowledge of its own kind, what I call critical sociology, that interrogates the foundations of our research programs. In the first instance it is separate from the development of research programs. Celebrated exponents of critical sociology in the United States have included Robert Lynd, Pitirim Sorokin, C Wright Mills, Alvin Gouldner, and more recently, Patricia Hill Collins, and Dorothy Smith. Each country has its own tradition of critical sociology, counter-balancing its professional sociology.

We can apply the same distinction to our extra-academic constituencies. On the one hand we have policy sociology that seeks to provide solutions to problems defined by a client or a patron. Here the sociologist is an expert who sells his or her specialized knowledge to a client for a specific task, e.g. to discover how popular is a politician or to develop strategies of a union organizing campaign, or to be an expert witness in a legal case. Alternatively policy sociologists may serve a patron, such as a foundation, which gives money for research in a particular area of concern, whether it be HIV AIDS or criminal justice or human rights. On the other hand, the reflexive form of extra-academic knowledge is public sociology which distinguishes itself from policy sociology by the mutuality of the relation of the sociologist with specific publics. The function of the public sociologist is to problematize the goals taken for granted by policy science, and to do so by heightening the self-consciousness of publics through broad conversations about values. Here we can distinguish between traditional public sociology in which the sociologist, as writer, say, of a best-selling book, is a catalyst for public discussion and organic public sociology in which the sociologist has a direct relation with a public, such as a social movement or a local organization. The traditional public sociologist speaks from a pedestal and has a relation to publics mediated by print,
television, virtual communication whereas the organic public sociologist works directly, often face-to-face, with publics in the trenches of civil society.

We may distinguish, therefore, among different public sociologies by the nature of the publics they engage. Considered as discursive communities with shared commitments, publics vary by the density of their internal interaction (thin versus thick), by their level of mobilization (active versus passive), by their geographical extension (local, regional, national or global), by their politics (hegemonic versus counter-hegemonic). Traditional public sociology addresses thin, passive, national and hegemonic publics whereas organic public sociology focuses on thick, active, local and often counter-publics. In our ideal typical formulation, however, what is important is that public sociology be a dialogue of sociologist and lay-persons about the values and goals of their communities.

The result is the table above that cross-classifies knowledge-for-whom and knowledge-for-what in order to generate four disparate sociologies that diverge in their production, in their criterion of truth, in their mode of legitimation, in their accountability, in their politics and in their pathologies. While there is no space to develop each type of knowledge along all 6 dimensions, the table summarizes the differences which define the four subcultures of our discipline, expressed through different values, modes of evaluation, forms of communication, etc.

These are not simply four disconnected types of knowledge, but are dependent upon one another even as they are in contradiction. Thus, for example, professional knowledge involves the interchange of theory and empirical data, its criterion of truth is correspondence to reality, its legitimacy is based on scientific norms, its accountability is to peers, and its politics is professional self-interest. Its pathology is self-referentiality. Public sociology, on the other hand, is developed through communication of sociologists (carrying analytical sociological knowledge) with publics (carrying folk or common sense knowledge). Here truth is measured by the consensus that emerges between two partners. Its legitimacy is based on relevance to publics which is easily at odds with professional knowledge that is often incomprehensible to publics. Public sociology is accountable to designated publics, which puts it in tension with professional knowledge accountable to peers. Its politics involves public dialogue which can indeed be threatening to professional self-defense. Here the pathology is not self-referentiality but pandering to publics, faddishness. At the same time that they are antagonistic, the two knowledges are also interdependent: professional knowledge is inspired by impulses from public sociology just as public sociology couldn’t exist without the input of professional sociology. I could develop parallel arguments about the antagonistic-interdependences among any other two types of sociological knowledge.

Therefore, these 4 knowledges form distinct subcultures, connected to one another through a division of sociological labor. When these subcultures lose their vigorous interchange with one another -- whether because they are drawn inwards or outwards -- they assume pathological forms that endanger the discipline as a whole. Wallerstein is right to emphasize the functions of analysis (professional sociology), moral vision (critical sociology), and politics (policy and public sociologies), but he doesn’t analyze how their distinct projects form an antagonistic interdependence, how they each call for their own specialization and relative autonomy -- a relative autonomy that does not preclude but mediates external influences. Nor does Wallerstein recognize the traps and dangers, intrinsic to each of the knowledge-types as they pursue their distinctive practices.
Table 1: The Division of Sociological Labor

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Instrumental Knowledge</th>
<th>Professional Sociology</th>
<th>Extra-Academic Audience</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Theoretical/empirical</td>
<td>Concrete</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth</td>
<td>Correspondence</td>
<td>Pragmatic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Scientific Norms</td>
<td>Effectiveness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Peers</td>
<td>Clients/Patrons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathology</td>
<td>Self-Referentiality</td>
<td>Servility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Professional Self-interest</td>
<td>Policy Intervention</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reflexive Knowledge</td>
<td>Critical Sociology</td>
<td>Public Sociology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowledge</td>
<td>Foundational</td>
<td>Communicative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Truth</td>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>Consensus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Moral Vision</td>
<td>Relevance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accountability</td>
<td>Critical intellectuals</td>
<td>Designated Publics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pathology</td>
<td>Dogmatism</td>
<td>Faddishness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>Internal Debate</td>
<td>Public Dialogue</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Of course, it’s more complicated than I have so far enunciated. Each of these specialist knowledges is itself internally divided along the same dimensions – knowledge-for-whom and knowledge-for-what. There is, for example, a policy, public and critical moment of professional sociology. In addition to this internal complexity of each quadrant of knowledge, we also have to recognize a distinction between the type of knowledge and the people who produce that knowledge. Specialization might be necessary but it does not mean that any given sociologist has his or her foot in only one type. Far from it! Many sociologists straddle different types of knowledge and, moreover, their careers following different routes through the 4 quadrants. In this (di)vision of labor, interdependence does not mean one has to be a public sociologist, for example, to contribute to public sociology, one can do so indirectly through one’s professional, policy or critical sociology. There is no space to develop these aspects of the division of sociological labor since here I’m only concerned with national and historical variations in the division of sociological labor.

From National to Regional Regimes

Behind the division of sociological labor is the idea of an organic interdependence in which the flourishing of each type of sociology is a condition for the flourishing of all. Insofar as each retains continuous interchange with the others, and avoids being wrapped up in itself or held hostage to external forces, so sociology will prosper. In reality, reciprocal interdependence among the four sociologies is rarely achieved without some sort of hierarchy, a field of power if you will, which varies by time and place.

Thus, if one looks historically at the development of the field of sociology in the United States, one sees a public sociology emerging in the pre-civil war and the immediate post-civil war eras out of reform and religious associations. Interestingly, the first sociology in the US was a Southern appropriation of Comte’s ideas of “order and progress” to develop an ideology justifying slavery, an ideology that played up the social degeneration of the industrial North. Sociology’s entry into the university in the post-bellum period, especially in the Gilded Age, was colored by reform and social gospel, inspired by utopian ideas, and led
to struggles over the limits of academic freedom. Once joined together in a single social science, during the mounting class struggles of the 1890s the economists professionalized, leaving the sociologists to pursue their more radical visions. By the turn of the century, however, and through the Progressive Period, private sponsors of universities and their administrators successfully sought to contain sociology’s public commitments. So sociology followed economics into the world of professionalization with its academic journals, textbooks, PhD programs, organized careers, esoteric language, hierarchies, etc.

If the first period was marked by a dialogue between professional and public sociology, the second period, which begins with the formation of the American Sociological Society in 1905 and stretches through two World Wars and into the 1960s, involves a dialogue between the professional and policy sociology. Under the surveillance of captains of industry and their foundations, sociology framed its research in terms of social control -- the dominant theme after World War I at the then emerging hegemon in the field, the department of sociology at the University of Chicago, but also in the other leading department, Columbia University. Sociology would develop and deploy its science in pursuit of the regulation of subordinate populations, whether immigrant populations from Europe or Blacks migrating from the South to the northern cities, or the militant working classes of the 1930s. If initially foundations were the main sponsors of sociological research, over this period the federal state also became more deeply involved, especially during World War II after which federal funding grew by leaps and bounds. As it did so sociology’s signature tune passed from social control to value consensus, the basis of modernization theory, extolling America as the promised land.

The messianic celebration of the United States and the intensified application of sociology to policy issues finally led to a backlash in the 1960s, responsive to the social movements of the streets – civil rights, anti-war, feminist and so forth. In this third period there developed a sociology critical of professional sociology as well as its entrenchment in the policy world. Both grand theory, which provided the scientific foundation of value consensus, and abstract empiricism, which was tied to market research, came under assault. Such notable figures as C Wright Mills and Alvin Gouldner, captured the growing sentiments among a new generation that sociology had sold its soul to the establishment. During the 1970s sociology responded to multiple challenges from marxism, feminism, and critical race theory by absorbing critique and indeed moving the whole discipline leftward. But as the political climate moved rightwards, in the eras of Reagan and then Bush so sociology came to shed its radical fangs, although it still remained far to the left of the American public. The question now is whether US sociology is ready to launch into a fourth period of renewed dialogue between professional and public sociology, and what role it will play in the international arena.

The history of US sociology that I have just sketched is marked by the broad ascendancy of a powerful professional sociology that, in alliance with policy sociology, dominates and at times suppresses critical and public sociologies. In other words, it is a history of the ascendancy -- contested and always incomplete -- of instrumental knowledge. I have traced this history not only to demonstrate the usefulness of my categories, but to counter the temptation to repress the past and eternalize the present, to suggest that just as the present is quite different from the past, so the future too will be different from the present. I want also to counter the notion of US sociology as a static, invariant, homogeneous model to be emulated (or dismissed) by other sociologies, a norm against which they are assessed or assess themselves as more or less deviant.
We make our own sociology but not under conditions of our own choosing. This applies to other nations as well as the United States. Thus, while many countries of the Global South may not have an independent professional sociology, those that do, such as Brazil, South Africa, Mexico, Philippines, etc., often exhibit an equally strong public sociology. Nordic countries, with their welfare states, have traditionally had a strong policy sociology and sociology’s public profile may be as strong as economics. It is harder to find countries where sociology is dominated by its critical moment, although this has been strong in Germany, the heartland of critical theory, and France. One might argue that the dissident movement in Soviet societies, often latently sociological in its disposition, showed a similar inclination toward critique.

The dynamism of national divisions of sociological labor can best be seen through the lens of political transitions. Thus, we can talk of post-colonial regimes as ones grappling with the legacies of colonialism. This is strongly apparent in India, for example, where sociology has been inextricably bound up with anthropology, and especially British social anthropology, notwithstanding the importation of American sociology of development. Reflective of colonial legacies Indian sociology exhibits an ambivalent relation to Western social science. India, after all, has not only been the home of social anthropology but also of subaltern studies that wrestled with the deep influence of Western discourses of modernity by seeking out alternative visions harbored by lower classes. Still, with its vast network of universities and colleges and some prominent institutes of social research, Indian sociology is strongly rooted in the academy and its public and policy presence is still relatively muted.

Very different is the legacy of Soviet communism which alternatively banished and resurrected sociology as an ideological tool. It is not surprising then that the sociology in post-communist regimes has generally been hostile to Marxism, and often combined with an uncritical embrace of Western, particularly American sociology. While a public sociology briefly flourished in the Soviet Union under perestroika in the twilight of communism, it certainly does not do so now. The true critical sociology – reflexive and normative – of the samizdat awaits a new generation of sociologically inclined intellectuals who will follow in the footsteps of a Havel in Czechoslovakia, a Kolakowski in Poland or a Konrad and Szelenyi in Hungary.

Although today there is a central tenor toward crude policy science, there are also divergences among post-communist regimes that reflect sociology’s variable status under communism. Thus, sociology was freer to develop in Poland and Hungary, suppressed in Romania and Czechoslovakia, while in Bulgaria it developed expansively under the careful tutelage of the state. Reflecting variations in the measure of political freedom allowed under state socialism, these divergences have since given rise to somewhat different emphases around the centrality of policy sociology.

Dialogue between professional and critical sociologies in post-colonial regimes and dialogue between policy and professional sociologies in post-communist regimes both contrast with the dialogue between professional and public sociologies in post-authoritarian regimes. In many countries of Latin America the lifting of military rule led to an effervescent anti-authoritarian, public sociology, that had been nurtured in pockets of freedom, often sustained through inter-continental networks of support. Authoritarian regimes neither
controlled sociology to the same extent as communist regimes nor forged close links with metropolitan countries as colonial regimes. Latin American sociologists were able to build alliances and draw on critical thinking in Europe in order to develop an indigenous and engaged sociology that flourished after dictatorships. Spreading into civil society, it became a prototype of public sociology. Here too we may perhaps include the two countries of Southern Europe that lived under authoritarian regimes for such a long time – Spain and Portugal.

As with post-communism and post-colonialism there is much variation around the central tendency, depending on the specific authoritarian legacies. There has also been a great deal of cross-fertilization across Latin America. For example, it was in exile in Allende’s Chile, during the Brazilian dictatorship that Cardoso joined Faletto to write their *Dependency and Development in Latin America* – a classic of critical and public sociology, which was also taken up in the professional sociology of development. Today, Brazilian sociology has a public presence, unimaginable say from the standpoint of the US. Variations in the configuration of the division of sociological labor within Latin America have to be seen in relation to past as well as present political regimes. Very often the effervescence of public sociologies requires the bolstering of a professional sociology, the very opposite situation as in the United States. Moving to another continent, South Africa is an interesting case that has marks of post-colonial sociology but in many ways is more akin to the Latin American post-authoritarian model. Public sociology thrived in the opposition to apartheid and continues that civic engagement in the post-apartheid period, although ever more threatened by state cooptation and the demobilization of civil society.

For want of a better term I call the fourth complex of disciplinary configurations, *post-industrial societies* of Western and Northern Europe. The economy of these countries has increasingly abandoned heavy industry and turned toward the service sector – a shift that is reflected in both the structure of the sociological discipline and its substantive concerns. There is a turn away from such traditional subjects as industrial sociology, labor movements toward new social movements, gender, leisure, mass communications, etc. Sociology is neither so developed professionally nor so delineated from other disciplines as it is in the United States, and accordingly policy and public dimensions are, therefore, relatively well developed. We might divide the region into two sub-regions – Northern Europe with its more developed welfare states has a stronger policy sociology while Southern Europe with its more vibrant politics and civil society has a stronger public sociology. In both regions, however, public and policy sociologies tend to be mutually reinforcing.

England is an interesting case, straddling the two regions. With a long tradition of social administration closely connected first to Fabian evolutionary socialism and then to the birth of the welfare state, sociology proper was a late development in the 1960s, coming as it did with the expansion of the university system. As a late developer its boundaries were porous, drawing sustenance from the neighboring disciplines of economics, anthropology, geography and history as well as from European social theory. It was much more suspicious if not down right hostile to American sociology. Being taught in high schools sociology put down deep roots, which Thatcher’s anti-social policies could not destroy. Today sociology exists as a force in public debate but also in expanding consultancies with state agencies, especially in the area of policy evaluation.

Max Weber was the first to analyze systematically the political context of academic social science, puncturing the notion of value free science. His analysis of German universities showed that sociologists don’t operate in ideological or political vacua. He
opposed political interference whether it be the denial of academic positions to talented scholars because they were social democrats or the appointment of government spokespersons as professors. In these circumstances it was important to assert professional autonomy. I have tried to advance his arguments into very different historical contexts by sketching the parameters of a disciplinary division of labor (the ideological terrain) and the way it, in turn, is framed by political regimes and their transformation.

Although the prefix “post” is conceptually flabby, it is useful to signal legacies that constrain but do not determine national trajectories. “Post” allows us to identify constellations of regional sociologies that share a common history -- the basis for regional dialogues about differences as well as commonalities, a locus for developing a sense of national specificities. Such regional associations can strengthen the critical and public backbone of national sociologies, especially when they are under statist pressure to instrumentalize themselves, just as such associations can also stiffen contestation over global hegemonies, thereby contributing to an emergent international sociology.

**Recomposing the Terrain of International Sociology**

National divisions of sociological labor are not autonomous, they are affected by a broader global division of sociological labor -- an emergent global configuration of professional, policy, critical and public sociologies. Thus, it is not surprising that global professional sociology is dominated by the United States that stands like a Leviathan, with its concentration of resources, sporting over 200 journals, some 14,000 members of the American Sociological Association, more than twice that number of active PhDs, and lavish funding for research from private and public sources (at least compared to any other country if not to other disciplines). Every year universities pump out over 600 doctoral degrees and 25,000 undergraduate degrees in sociology. The US educational system has its own internal hierarchy, of course, with a carefully calibrated prestige system, so that the division of sociological labor looks very different at a state college as compared to a private research university. Still, the stamp of a US PhD, from wherever it comes, has high status in most parts of the world, whether in universities or government agencies. Whatever the hostility to the US few turn down the opportunity of graduate or postgraduate education or a research fellowship in the US. Time spent in the United States pays off in careers back home. In this way US professional sociology leaves its mark on national professional sociologies as a hegemonic point of reference.

This influence is especially marked in clientalist states such as Israel and Taiwan, where the majority of the leading sociologists are trained in the US and where a publication in a leading American journal commands a place at the top of the prestige hierarchy. But even here the situation is not so simple as it appears. In Taiwan, there is a selective appropriation of American sociology, manifested in a clash of generations, with a more reflexive sociology pursued by those influenced by the student movement of the late 1980s and early 1990s, opposing the instrumental sociology of the establishment. In Israel, while the leading universities are indeed oriented to the United States, sociologists in the lower status and recently created college system are oriented to the issues of local communities, exponents of a critical and public sociology. Palestinian sociology, beleaguered by occupation, struggling for survival, is almost unavoidably critical and public.

Counter-tendencies notwithstanding, benchmarking scientific research, including sociology, to publications in “international” journals is becoming increasingly common across the globe, and not just among those tied to the US for geopolitical reasons. The
National Research Foundation of South Africa, for example, grades individuals on their international profile, thereby drawing the best research away from national and local issues to ones that concern the gate-keepers of American journals. Even in such a wealthy country as Norway, the trend is in the same direction drawing science into international competitive networks. The surfacing of sociology in China – an intriguing and complex case of late development – has also drawn on the more conservative strands of US sociology, with a limited but not absent space for critical and public sociologies. Such models of international referencing might work for the natural sciences, but it is a disaster in the social sciences whose flourishing depends on connection to local issues. These alien adoptions are generally not the result of a US imperial project to control national sociologies but are more usually propelled by the interests within nation states and their elite academies.

The hegemony of US professional sociology does not go uncontested. From Europe, especially France but also Germany, traditional heartlands of sociology, have come powerful critical sociologies. Alain Touraine and, much more directly, Pierre Bourdieu, have assaulted American professional sociology for its claimed universalism, its obfuscation of class, and most generally its lack of reflexivity. Similarly, Jürgen Habermas, continuing the tradition of the Frankfurt School, has challenged the limitations of positivism, or more generally what I have called instrumental knowledge, from the standpoint of critical theory and communicative action, what I have called reflexive knowledge. From the standpoint of the Global South, however, European sociology might represent the symbolic capital that buttresses – all the more insidiously because of its claimed critique -- the more silent domination of US academic and institutional capital. After all, there has been an active exchange between these two poles of domination, with the flow of research methodologies in one direction and social theory in the other direction. Another layer of critical theory, often under rubric of postcolonial studies and born in countries of Asia, Africa and Latin America, has taken a hostile stand toward all “Western” social science.

If US professional sociology silently colludes in a symbiosis with European critical sociology, what of policy sociology at the global level? Here one might think of sociology’s place in various multilateral agencies – United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund and a wide range of transnational NGOs – that hire social scientists to address their specific policy agendas. It turns out, of course, that sociologists are rarely found in such corridors of power, although feminists have made in-roads in the United Nations and NGOs. Generally, this is the terrain of the economists, accountants, and lawyers whose knowledge systems are better attuned to the politics of world organizations. More likely we will find sociologists among those who criticize the operation of these multilateral agencies, questioning the IMF’s one-model fits all, what Peter Evans calls mono-cropping, or attacking the World Bank, whether in its old swash-buckling destruction of the environment or, as Michael Goldman has shown, in its dissemination of new and more subtle disciplinary knowledges and technologies of power.

Such critiques of world straddling organizations emerge from and in turn feed transnational civil society – the soil of public sociologies on a global scale. The crucible of such public sociologies can be found in the World Social Forum and the regional forums it has spawned, living off networks that join all manner of reformist, anarchist and radical anti-globalization struggles. Here we can find novel labor movements that stretch across national boundaries, environmental movements, human rights organizations, anti-war protest and feminist networks all of which breed public sociology’s engagement within an emergent global public sphere. Inspired by critical sociologies, often born on national terrains,
opposed to global structures of power, and aiming at conscientizing and provincializing professional sociologies, especially US professional sociology, global public sociologies seek to realize values that have impelled sociology from its outset.

Finally, to return to Wallerstein, global public sociologies are the antithesis of his project to unify the social sciences. Any unity of the social sciences would be a unity of the powerful: in disciplinary terms it would be a unity around economics and its neoliberal project and in geopolitical terms it would be a unity around the interests of well-resourced Western social sciences. I have, therefore, sketched an alternative project whose energy comes from below, that seeks to protect the integrity of national divisions of sociological labor through the binding of public, critical, professional and policy sociologies. It involves stitching together national sociologies into regional associations, challenging the hegemonies of US and European sociologies, while all along retaining connection to civil society – national and transnational. Such a project would not by-pass US and European academic sociologies but force the latter into a consciousness of their own power, compelling their adjustment to the needs of, revelations from and dialogue with the powerful public sociologies, emanating from but not confined to the Global South.

In direct contrast to world systems theory which descends from heaven to earth, here we ascend from earth to heaven. That is to say, we do not set out from an imaginary unity of knowledge, nor from an abstract economic system with natural laws, in order to arrive at sociology in the flesh. Rather we set out from real existing sociologies, struggling to survive in hostile milieus, and, on the basis of their divisions of labor and their living connections to civil society, we weave the tapestry of international sociology.

Notes

1. This was originally the text of an address to the Conference of the Council of National Associations of the International Sociological Association held in Miami, August 9-10, 2005. It has since been revised on the basis of the papers presented and the discussions that unfolded. I’d like to thank all the participants for this stimulating meeting and particularly the organizers, Sujata Patel and Doug Kincaid. Finally, back in Berkeley, I’ve relied on the perspicacity of Peter Evans.

2. My data are limited, and so the mapping that follows is but an initial sketch. I have had to rely on my research experiences in the former Soviet Union and Central Europe, my long lasting attachment to Southern Africa, readings about India, an on-going familiarity with Western Europe, living in the US, and a romance about Latin American sociology as well as many years working with graduate students studying different regions of the world.

3. Thanks to Hwa-Jen Liu for help in disentangling the different strands of Taiwanese sociology.

4. Of the Presidents of the 53 research committees of the ISA, 26 (49%) are from Western Europe, 11 (21%) are from the United States, 8 (17%) are from Israel, Canada, Japan and Australia, while only 7 (13%) are from all the rest of Asia, Latin America and Africa! Individual membership of ISA (2003 figures) is, not surprisingly, somewhat less skewed: Western Europe – 32%, North America – 23%, Former Soviet Union and East and Central Europe – 12%, Asia, Middle East and Latin America – 33%.
I shall start this brief talk by saying that it is meant to be supportive of the role played by regional associations in the development of today’s sociology. In my view we should encourage the formation of regional associations and their effective membership into associations like ISA. For the sake of clarification I am assuming regional associations to be supra-national sociological organizations with shared concerns related to a number of social processes within a given geographical area of the world. We all know about the stimulating participation of such entities in the regular activities of ISA. The set of seven volumes prepared for the Montreal World Congress of ISA is surely one of the most significant examples of such dynamics in providing an overall picture of regional sociologies worldwide.

At this point in time, the number of regional associations registered at ISA may not be large but many of them, of a diverse geographical and cultural nature – Latin American, South-East Asian etc. – are, in one way or another, clear expressions of a dynamic institutional/organizational form of debating and producing sociology. In my opinion, such an organizational form of making sociology is likely to amplify and multiply over time. It may sound paradoxical but the fact remains that under globalization and side by side with “global” sociological knowledge we witness the emergence of different forms of sociological views encompassing varying units of analysis other than the global, and applying to diverse geopolitical and cultural scales (“local knowledges”). The point that I would like to make here is that rather than insisting on the possible differences existing between these forms of knowledge (the so-called global and local knowledges) we should rather look at the encounter of these knowledges and try understand what comes out of such complex intersection.

Let me underline, following Immanuel Wallerstein, the fact that by and large the numerous talks/debates on how to organize sociology worldwide reflect an old concern among scholars, especially from the post-WWII period, when many changes took place in the political, geo-cultural and scientific arenas. The result was a wave of optimism in which all sciences - including social sciences - were seen as carrying hope and virtue all over the world.

Gradually, many ideas regarding scientific knowledge and its apparent contribution to humankind began to crystallize. Many conceptualizations, methods and perceptions of the world lost their initial capacity to generate optimism. Serious concerns regarding the role of science followed in consequence.
In the last two or three decades, with the onset of globalization, many of these problems have grown, particularly inasmuch as globalization has remained a descriptive rhetorical view, with very little explanatory capacity if any at all.

However, it seems to me that there are still many reasons for optimism regarding the contribution of social sciences, and of sociology in particular, to the better understanding of the world and to the possibility of better solutions for social existence. This is part and parcel of the ongoing reevaluation of the nature of social knowledge and its explanatory capacity. The latter is increasingly made up of new epistemologies, and new processes of knowledge construction, which I will not develop at this juncture.

Let us turn instead to how we envisage the new ways of organizing sociological work on the world scale at a time when we face unpredictable sociological (and political) futures. As I have already said, my point is to argue for the relevance of regional sociologies i.e. regional forms of organization of sociological work. I am not ignoring the existence of national sociologies which have formed the foundations of sociology since its very inception as a discipline. However, national sociologies undergo a systematic erosion of their explanatory power. This is largely due to the erosion of the nation-state itself and the correlate privilege given to the study of “national” societies.

Arising from this erosion, the debate between “local” vs. “global knowledges” has intensified. This is in itself a significant sign of this erosion of the nationally-based social knowledge. To be validated, such “national” knowledge has to confront global premises and be submitted to a sort of comparative analysis.

Another outcome of current sociological debate refers to the confrontation of Western vs. non-Western (nowadays North vs. South) premises of knowledge and the denunciation of the primacy of the (hegemonic) conceptualization (and dogma) coming from the “North” and the “West”, which implicitly recognizes some inherent virtue to the views coming from the “South” and the” non-West” sociologies.

We have for long been working with this kind of binary descriptions and categories. We have worked on the presumption that virtue is somewhere in between the opposite binary categories. Although I am not sure of the extent to which this is true, the matter of the fact remains that we have had many contributions from respectable and outstanding scholars arguing for the mixture of local/global, north/south dichotomies.

We have been working with binary descriptions and categories like these for some time. Many of us have been working on the presumption that virtue is somewhere in between opposite binary categories. Doubtful as it may be, however, such a presumption is somehow included within the various contributions put forward by outstanding scholars in favour of the mixture of local/global or north/south antinomies.

“Glocal” knowledge is just one of those proposed solutions. It is a straightforward category meant to highlight the combination of both local and global processes (Roland Robertson). “Global” knowledge, like any other type of knowledge has to be “situated” knowledge. As a result, let me use the word “glocality” to refer to the spatiality in which “global” and “local” knowledges meet. With this specific application to knowledge construction I am diverging a little from the meaning assigned to “glocality” by authors like Michail Epstein or Stuart Carr, among others.

I think of “glocalities” as territories of encounter and the interplay of various forms of knowledge (of national origin as well as global “origin”). We should focus upon this territory
of encounter and look at the way in which “global” and “local” expressions of knowledge merge with or repel each other.

The argument is not for us to be for or against the “global” or the “local”. It is rather a question of attempting to understand what happens at these “glocalities”, regarding them as “zones of contact” (Marie-Louise Pratt) and intersection.

“Glocalities” foster contact between diverse or opposite sociological views whereby they promote the emergence of conditions for comparative analysis between fragmentary knowledges.

Metaphorically “glocalities” equal regional associations devoted to sociological work. They bring national (“local” for the sake of argument) and “global” perceptions into contact and by so doing they presumably help renew the dominant forms of understanding the world.

So, regional associations could very well be understood as concrete expressions of “glocalities” where national problems are confronted and compared with each other beyond the limits of national boundaries. By the same token they may be disputing global premises and anticipating supra-national processes.

Just as a footnote, I would like to add my opinion that with this line of reasoning one could argue for other forms of “glocalities” such as international research centers, exchange of international mobility and exchange programs and networks, in a nutshell diverse fora where new contributions and comparative analysis are regularly experimented.

Coming back to regional associations they work very much as Simmel’s “Door and Bridge” metaphor, that is to say, as zones of passage they tend to promote unity from within and diversity from without.

A final point on communication within “glocalities”: as an “intellectual technology” language is an infrastructure for a solid interplay of scientists, researchers and practitioners who share sociopolitical concerns at the “glocality”. This community of sociological encounters expresses itself in various tongues. It is actually very likely that they communicate in mutual respect for each other out of the so-called “imperium of monolingualism” (Emily Apter). Under an increasingly market-driven situation, minor languages are threatened by, and risk succumbing to the more widely spoken ones. On a “glocality” concert these various languages are supposed to try to find a common adequate base for overall human communication. In other words, along with the attempt to foster communication within and between different sorts of paradigms and languages (“local” and “global”), “glocalities” ought to speak the language of sociological concern and preoccupation with major multi-range issues and challenges, so as to bring them to the forefront of the sociological agenda and to render them open to reflection.

What has been said about “glocalities” can easily be adapted to expressions of regional associations. There are some practicalities, however, that give rise to some technical problems for an association like ISA such as those related to double registration or membership.

But let us not be overwhelmed by practicalities and turn to the more creative and challenging possible ways of counteracting any sort of pessimism that may erode our confidence regarding today’s contribution of sociology and its dynamic forms of organization. For the development of scientific knowledge, the betterment of democratic governance and for the improvement of social living conditions, it is important that more regional associations are created to work together with peer associations. There is a great
deal of activities to be undertaken in order to fulfill such an endeavour. But I will have to leave them for another round of conversation.
All political structures are not a state. The concept of state is very different in Chinese cultures and in Western cultures, for instance. In the history of sociology, the concept of state has received a lot of attention, but has also aroused a lot of questions too.

After the welfare state crisis and the difficulties of welfare mix we are now dealing with the necessity to contextualize the state in its territorial and historical frame. Max Weber too does not help us very much with this matter. In historical terms, perhaps the feudal era was the starting point of state. But this presupposition still remains Western oriented. Actually, there are many states, many ideas of state, and many realities of state. In any case, the state is not just an invention, it is based on a society, in particular on civil society according to Scottish school of Adam Ferguson (1767).

The beginning of state consists of the end of feudal power, together with the evidence of social stratification as a social problem.

Today's state represents a form of accomplishment of the old Roman republic or empire. But this is just a stream. Other patterns of state come from Asia or Africa, even though they are the result of colonization and imposition from abroad, from outside (the phenomenon of apartheid comes to mind: Bert Klandermans has more to say on the topic).

In any case the state is not a natural evolution. It is a social construction. It is not a universal model. However we are conscious that the state in itself is not a solution of different contrasts. We have to take into account the presence of populism as a common way of political campaigns. This same populism can change the general frame if people discover that the governing political party is charged with corruption (as is the case with the PT in Brazil, where the workers’ party is in considerable trouble because of allegations of corruption, even though President Lula is innocent). Tom Dwyer presents some analyses on these developments, after Cardozo’s presidency and Lula’s present behavior.

At the same time post-Soviet countries are searching for new legitimation, for a place in the European and/or world context. They are asking for a new political order, in terms of territory and borders, stressing their peculiarity in ethnic, religious and language perspective. Janusz Mucha adds some reflections about the contribution of sociology in this post-communist phase.

The general situation is that, according to Neil Smelser, “the adoption of the Western state model created a kind of international society of elites (both North and South), with shared interest in governing and a kind of derived solidarity among themselves”. This was not the purpose of Polish Solidarnosc movement, for instance.
Therefore the ideal and the idea of state have been discredited. And, in some cases, the authoritarian proposal has received more and more interest. Corporatism, crises in governance, diminishing national and international power, instability (in Africa for instance), international disorder, multinational character, and revolution: these are some key-points to discuss. Even the state of a nation is an abstraction from the experiences of its members, however solid a reality the people may be. But a nation is a group of people who, normally living in a particular territory, wish to form their own state.

Our discipline was born many years after the idea of nation was diffused. But the idea of a national sociology didn’t come so late. Weber and Simmel founded the German Sociological Association. One hundred years ago saw the beginning of the American Sociological Society, in Philadelphia. And René Worms with other sociologists anticipated future developments creating the International Institute of Sociology in Paris, in 1893. Other national societies of sociology followed this initial path. Last but not least, the Italian Sociological Association had its first statutes in 1984. Now new national associations are emerging, for instance in post-communist countries, or in Africa, or in Asia. Together with national and international approaches, the new evidence concerns the necessity of more local convergences, based on regional areas. This is for instance the case of relevant networks in the United States, well formalized and historically organized, or of informal relationship, for instance in Europe, just this year between Portuguese, Spanish, French, Greek and Italian Sociological Association, in order to discuss common topics on Southern Europe. Perhaps there are more projects in progress that we have to take into account.

Are national sociologies better off being self-organized? If so, does this imply that national associations of sociology are best guaranteed also by an international body like the I.S.A.? And what about the relationship with national identity and language? According to Diderot, a nation is “une quantité considérable de peuple qui habite une certain étendue de pays, renfermée dans de certaines limites, et qui obéit au même gouvernement » (Diderot 1751-65, page 36), that is, a nation is a number of people living in a limited territory and under the same government. A nation is continuity with the past. We can say the same about national sociological associations. In spite of differences between specific areas of knowledge, current national sociologies have been shaped by certain characteristics of the beginning of and following history. In Italy’s case, with Vilfredo Pareto’s contribution, we experienced the Fascist era, when no sociology was present in universities. But after the World War Two we had a new beginning, notwithstanding the intellectual opposition of a philosopher like Benedetto Croce who, because of his liberalism, was a strong enemy of our “ill” science. This peculiar heritage still remains in the social context of Italian sociology. It is difficult to contrast a permanent stream. For instance, last month I had to send an official letter of protest against a state Italian TV anchorman, who criticized sociologists, as professionals without any role or relevance in society. Millions of Italian TV watchers have received this kind of message: sociologists for what? The natural answer was evident: for nothing. But in the same TV program the anchorman was using the support of a sociologist to comment his speech with sociological data… It is evident that a national sociological association is useful, also for this purpose: to protect the public image of our science, sometimes considered “soft”, sometimes “politically oriented”, sometimes “good for all topics and for all seasons”. In Europe, in general, the birth of an international association, like the European Sociological Association, is too late, many years after the construction of European Community. European sociologists were unable to foresee (in time) the relevance of a new continental economic and political structure. Even today, the European network
hasn’t take off in as supposed (let me elaborate a detail: in order to partake in a conference or convention you have to pay 400 euros, a fact that doesn’t help the participation, in particular of young sociologists). In any case the road has been opened; perhaps the future will be better. Emerging in a social setting of rapid urbanization, industrialization and now of globalization, we are all dealing with a field concerned with social problems. Starting from unspecialized or overspecialized interests, our associations are rich of diverse intellectual backgrounds. But the most important thing is that we have begun to get to know each other personally. And afterwards, we are also carrying out our research no longer as individuals, but frequently as members of teams, of national associations and of international networks.

In some cases, we see an unsuccessful attempt to establish our scientific discipline. But we have to begin. Therefore I was very happy last year when I participated in Beijing, as a speaker, at the First Chinese Meeting of Sociologists of Religion. Of course there is the weight of Chinese and Marxist ideology, but a new perspective seems to appear, thanks to a national relationship and to an effort to reach the international scientific standard. In other countries too, the study of society is largely undertaken from the perspective of local culture or political frame or religious confession. Therefore, improving social and international links remains a basic, if not the fundamental, concern of the I.S.A. Of course, a full awareness of the state of local situations is necessary. We are not preachers. We are not missionaries. We have to offer proposals and to suggest ideas. Other people will decide if they want to accept. In this field, communication – I mean good and qualified communication – is a fundamental tool. Internet can help, but it is mandatory to make proper use of it, to avoid misunderstandings, lack of information, inundation of messages and news, impersonalization and generalized ways of interacting together. The person, the individual, must remain the key point of reference.

The common task is to stress the usefulness of sociological knowledge to justify sociological teaching and research.

However we are not specialized organizations for the occupational interests of sociologists as academics or professional social operators. The increasing conclusion of courses of sociology in universities is a goal to reach, but not in spite of scientific standards and quality of teaching. The sociological science must be employed in the amelioration of society.

The intellectual climate of a nation is a determinant feature for the success of sociology. Actually, there are areas in which the frame seems more favorable: Midwest of United States, Northern Italy and so on in other nations. But also specific places can give a strong impulse: Chicago or Paris, Sâo Paulo or Montreal, Milan or Heidelberg. The role of these areas and university cities greatly help the emergence of our discipline in terms of added significance and distinctive part in the diffusion and improvement of sociology. And the professional organization or national association of sociologists is a direct descendant of a general intellectual movement that pushes other areas and people to follow the same trajectory. The starting point could be a scientific Center or an Institute, but the final outcome is a Society or an Association. It is difficult to distinguish between society and association. In general an association contemplates the presence of members not only at an individual level. Therefore collective members are a characteristic of national or international association (in the former, collective members are Departments, Institutes, Centers and so on; in the latter, collective members are specifically national associations).
A society is a more generic liaison, without local structures, at least in principle. The risk concerns the fact that a national association can remain isolated, without exchanges, without comparisons, without debates outside its own field. When a national association doesn’t favor an international debate or doesn’t stress the usefulness of international dialogue between regional approaches, and the opportunity of knowing best practices, new issues and new results of a multifaceted contribution in the scientific arena. A national or international association cannot seem to become an exclusively self-referential preoccupation. Of course, a national association reflects the sensitivity of sociologists of that nation. Its spirit transpires in the scientific production of its members.

I think that the intellectual framework within which sociological and organizational problems have been approached has been too largely shaped by European and North-American influences. It is time to move towards new lines, new designs, new projects, accepting and emphasizing the output coming from other horizons. I’m thinking of African nations, of Asian societies, of Latin-American experiences. Perhaps it is time to organize more and more regional conferences, to have a personal, direct contact between scientists, scholars sharing similar topics, using the same or different methodologies, working in broad and common areas. The sociological divide is not based only on digital software and hardware. There are costs of travel, of publications, and of information. A world conference every four years is not enough. And, first of all, it is not enough to meet, without previous agreements, without an interpersonal knowledge between Mediterranean sociological associations, between Eastern-European associations, between the Australian and far Eastern associations and so on. We need a global program, to manage international activities, meetings, seminars. I don’t think that it is only an issue of costs. We know that if we want to we are able to solve many problems, to find inexpensive solutions. The sole problem is the political choice of doing so, that we must privilege the strength of reciprocal knowledge, of mutual relationship, of increasing these opportunities to meet and exchange information.

In a few days, the American Sociological Association will celebrate its centennial year in Philadelphia. In reality, early American sociologists were not hesitant to recognize their indebtedness to British, French, German and other European predecessors and contemporaries, with whom they often came in contact, through travel or work abroad.

Nevertheless the intellectual characteristics of North American sociology are still manifestly North American. The same can be said about our national associations. Problems, methods, assumptions and preoccupations reveal the distinctive impact of each association and its members, through the books, the sociology courses in the universities, the volumes of national journals of sociology (British Journal of Sociology, American Sociological Review, Acta Sociologica, Revue Française de Sociologie, and so on).

Today, we don’t agree with Albion Small’s four major sociological assumptions presented in 1906 during the first meeting of the American Sociological Society: the search for scientific laws of human behavior; the social change interpreted as a progress towards a better society; the direct human melioristic intervention; the roots of society in individual behavior. However, at least a point of Small’s proposal we can corroborate, with a widespread acceptance: the individual in association can do a lot, can give its best. Therefore, as individuals, we don’t have a great future but as sociologists in association we can survive, we can promote the continuation of our ideas.
We are still in a formative period, particularly in a globalizing perspective. If we stress the force of associative initiatives, of cooperative associationism, we will not have many problems of time and space. After us, other sociologists will continue, around the world.

New generations of scholars are emerging. Worldwide competition for junior sociologists must be improved. It has to become a distinctive *point de repère*, a basic parameter of our activity.

In Providence, Rhode Island, 100 years ago the American Sociological Society counted only 115 members. Now the number is around 20,000.

The I.S.A. is about a quarter of the American Sociological Association.

It isn’t a problem of quantity because quality must go together with quantity.

Like in A.S.A. we need more comprehensive regional associations, for instance by continent or by other specific territories. The trend to make sociology more scientific in all countries will also stimulate field differentiation and specialization, for being scientific is generally understood to mean engaging in concrete research.

On the other hand, the participation of sociologists, in a variety of interdisciplinary ventures, functions to heighten the autonomy and independence of sociology as a separate social science, with its own viewpoint and its own body of knowledge. In any case, this doesn’t mean avoiding a wider cooperation with other scientific societies or associations.

We have so much to gain from a broader scientific environment, in particular from economics, political science, statistics, history, anthropology, geography, law, psychology, etc. Perhaps we need a new *Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, after that published in 1934. George Ritzer is preparing an eight-volume *Encyclopedia of Sociology* to be published by Blackwell. I’m delighted to be involved in it as Advisory Editor. Finally we are aware of a more mature social science and of the need for sociology to deal with empirical, real phenomena, the relevance of multi-factorial explanations, the merits of qualitative methods (I’m working a lot on life-histories and computer assisted soft analyses), and the subjective-objective distinction, to say between personal values or viewpoints and scientific results.

The establishment of new electronic journals, regional and national associations and sociological societies reflects the expanding range of interests and professional specialization. Smaller local publications have also been founded by regional sociological societies. The main problem, as María Durán has stressed, concerns linguistic barriers. For instance *International Sociology*, our official I.S.A. journal, is giving room for reviews of books in languages other than English. Having a combined membership exceeding that of national societies, regional associations permit greater personal contact, fellowship and intellectual discussion among groups of scholars than is possible at the national or international meetings, as well as increased opportunities – particularly for younger sociologists – to present research reports.

Any kind of congress, be it local, regional, national, international, is useful to interrelate the mass of different studies. Another purpose is to translate into English theoretical and empirical work, written in other languages.

And let me add a final proposal: we have to increase the exchange of scholars between continents, to reinforce the trends already in progress in many countries. International Sociology has diversified its tools of investigation, specialized its methods and refined its generalizations and theories. In investigating the problems of the world in which they are, sociologists utilize prevailing European and North-American intellectual traditions and
resources. Today there are other possibilities, accepting new sociological issues from Africa, Asia, Australia, South America, Central America.